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***Mechanism design by an informed principal:
the quasi-linear private-values case***

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MECHANISM DESIGN BY AN INFORMED PRINCIPAL: THE QUASI-LINEAR PRIVATE-VALUES CASE

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ABSTRACT. We show that, in environments with independent private values and transferable utility, a privately informed principal can solve her mechanism selection problem by implementing an allocation that is ex-ante optimal for her. No type of the principal can gain from proposing an alternative mechanism that is incentive-feasible with any belief that puts probability 0 on types that would strictly lose from proposing the alternative.

We show that the solution exists in essentially any environment with finite type spaces, and in any linear-utility environment with continuous type spaces, allowing for arbitrary disagreement outcomes.

As an application, we consider a bilateral exchange environment (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983) in which the principal is one of the traders. If the property rights over the good are dispersed among the traders, then the principal will implement an allocation in which she is almost surely better off than if her type is commonly known. The optimal mechanism is a combination of a participation fee, a buyout option for the principal, and a resale stage with posted prices and, hence, is a generalization of the posted price that would be optimal if the principal's valuation were commonly known.

1. INTRODUCTION

The optimal design of contracts and institutions in the presence of privately informed market participants is central to economics, with applications including auctions, procurement, public good provision, organizational contract design, legislative bargaining, etc.. In many of these models, transferability of utility serves as a convenient assumption that makes problems tractable and allows for a clean welfare analysis. A restriction in much of this theory is that a contract or a mechanism is either designed by a third party, e.g., a benevolent planner, or is proposed by a party who has no private information. As such, the theory is not applicable to a large set

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of environments in which contracts or institutions arise endogenously as a choice of privately informed agents such as in, e.g., collusion, resale, contract renegotiation, bargaining over arbitration procedures, design of international agreements, etc..

Furthermore, the assumption that the designer does not have private information, even when it is a benevolent planner, is a tractability-driven simplification. As such, it is useful to understand under what conditions this assumption is *with* loss of generality, whether uncertainty about the designer's information advances or hinders the design objectives, and how the qualitative structure of optimal institutions can be affected by this uncertainty.

In this paper, we consider mechanism design by a privately informed principal in the most important class of environments in theory and for applications: we assume that parties have independent private values and payoff functions are quasilinear. The agents' uncertainty about the principal's information transfers the mechanism design problem into a signaling game in which the value of any mechanism is determined endogenously given the beliefs and the continuation play assigned in equilibrium. We show that a privately informed principal can solve her mechanism-selection problem by implementing an allocation that is ex-ante optimal for her. That is, the allocation maximizes the principal's ex-ante expected payoff among all interim incentive-feasible allocations.

Thus, the issue of the principal's potential information leakage through the choice of the mechanism imposes no cost on the principal in terms of the total surplus she realizes: Even though the principal's information is realized and the principal's preferences over how to distribute the available surplus among her types has changed, the principal nevertheless implements an allocation that would be optimal for her ex ante before she learns her type and no surplus is lost as long as the agents are still uncertain about the principal's type.

A further implication of the ex-ante optimality result is that in environments in which the principal learns her type over time she is indifferent between writing an ex-ante (long-term) contract and offering a (short-term) contract after her information is realized; this might explain why sometimes we do not observe complete long-term contracts. Finally, a direct consequence of the result is that the principal cannot improve her expected payoff by delaying information acquisition until after selection of a mechanism or by delegating selection of a mechanism to another party.

The ex-ante optimality result is most convenient in environments with continuous type spaces where, due to incentive compatibility, the ex-ante optimal allocation is typically unique. The principal then solves her mechanism-selection problem simply by proposing the ex-ante optimal allocation as a direct mechanism. From a technical perspective, this connects the informed-principal problem to the standard mechanism design approach that can be used to characterize ex-ante optimal allocations.

Most prominent in the literature on mechanism design are linear-utility environments, that is, environments with continuous one-dimensional types in which each player's payoff is a linear (precisely: affine) function of her type. We characterize the ex-ante optimal allocations in linear-utility environments in terms of virtual-surplus

maximization. Importantly, in contrast to Ledyard and Palfrey (2007), we cover environments with arbitrary disagreement outcomes.¹ This extension is crucial for many of the applications mentioned above.

As an example, we consider an application to a bilateral exchange environment in which each trader is privately informed about her valuation (Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)). One of the traders is designated as the principal. We assume that both traders' valuation distributions have the same support and satisfy standard regularity assumptions. We show that if the property rights over the good are dispersed among the traders, then the principal will implement an allocation in which she is almost surely better off than if her type is commonly known.² This contrasts with the well-known result for the environments with transferable utility considered in Maskin and Tirole (1990) showing that the principal cannot benefit from the agent's uncertainty about her preferences. The ex-ante optimal allocation is unique and can be implemented via a mechanism that is a combination of a participation fee for the agent, a buyout option for the principal, and a resale stage with posted prices. It implements the optimal allocation in three stages: In the first stage, the agent pays the participation fee and the good is tentatively allocated to the agent. In the second stage, the principal decides whether to exercise a buyout option, in which case the good becomes tentatively allocated to the principal. In the third stage, given the tentative allocation of property rights, the principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent to sell or buy the good. Observe that the first two stages consolidate the originally dispersed property rights over the good and allocate them either to the principal or the agent, determining whether the principal becomes the seller or the buyer in the third stage.

The optimal mechanism is a generalization of a posted price mechanism that would be optimal in the environments with the extreme property rights allocation in which either the principal or the agent own the good (Riley and Zeckhauser 1983, Williams 1987, Yilankaya 1999).

Our characterization results can be easily applied to other environments such as, e.g., public good provision, multiunit or multigood auctions, collusion, legislative bargaining and voting, speculative trade, assignment problems, matching with transferable utility, etc.

An important lesson from the bilateral-trade application is that the ex-ante optimal mechanism differs from the mechanism the principal would offer if her valuation were commonly known. She would then find it optimal to simply set a bid price (at which

¹Formally, this is equivalent to allowing linear type-dependent disagreement payoffs. Jullien (2000) analyzes mechanism design with linear and non-linear type-dependent disagreement payoffs, but in his model there is only one agent and the principal has no private information.

²This environment is equivalent to a partnership dissolution problem (Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer 1987) in which one of the parties selects a dissolution mechanism subject to the approval of the mechanism by the other party. Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) have focused on conditions for ex-post efficient implementation. The informed principal, however, will maximize the expected revenue and will distort the allocation from the efficient one to minimize the information rents she has to leave to the agent.

she is willing to buy) and an ask price (at which she is willing to sell). The intuition for why the principal strictly gains from the privacy of her information is as follows. A low-valuation principal will set low prices. Hence, when dealing with a low-valuation principal, many agent-types will get the good. Normalizing disagreement payoffs to 0, this implies that the agent's payoff will be increasing over a relatively large range of her type space, implying that the agent's participation constraint will be binding for relatively low agent types. Vice versa, when dealing with a high-valuation principal, the agent's participation constraint will be binding for relatively high types. In summary, the agent's participation constraint will be binding for different types, depending on which principal type the agent is dealing with.

In an ex-ante optimal allocation, the agent's participation (and incentive) constraints are only required to hold in expectation over the principal's types. As a result, in the ex-ante optimal allocation the principal can extract more rents than if her valuation is commonly known. In the multi-stage mechanism implementing the ex-ante optimal allocation, at the moment of accepting the mechanism and paying the participation fee, the agent is kept in the dark about the principal's type and is uncertain whether the principal will exercise her buy-out option. The agent's participation constraint can be violated conditional on a particular type of the principal, but is satisfied in expectation over the principal's types.

We justify our focus on ex-ante optimal allocations in three steps. First, following Mylovanov and Tröger (forthcoming) we argue that the principal can solve her mechanism-selection problem by implementing a strongly neologism-proof allocation *if* such an allocation exists. Second, we characterize the strongly neologism-proof allocations in terms of ex-ante optimality under various beliefs about the principal's type. Third, we use the characterization to show that a strongly neologism-proof allocation exists in essentially any environment with finite type spaces, and we show existence in any linear-utility environment by constructing a sequence of finite-type approximations.

An allocation is strongly neologism-proof if it is incentive-feasible given the prior belief about the principal's type, and if no type of the principal can gain from proposing an alternative allocation that is incentive-feasible given any belief about the principal that puts probability 0 on types that would strictly lose from proposing the alternative (Mylovanov and Tröger (forthcoming)). The following simple argument from Mylovanov and Tröger (forthcoming) shows that such allocations are consistent with equilibrium play in a non-cooperative mechanism-selection game.³ Consider the principal's choice between either obtaining the payoff from a given strongly neologism-proof allocation or proposing any alternative mechanism. Suppose that some types of the principal propose the alternative mechanism. By Bayesian rationality, this mechanism implements an allocation that is incentive-feasible given a

³The mechanism-selection game can be formally defined if type spaces are finite, in which case any finite game form constitutes a feasible mechanism, and this set then includes all direct mechanisms (cf. Myerson (1983), Maskin and Tirole (1990)); with non-finite type spaces, the game interpretation is informal. Cf. footnote 14.

belief that puts probability 0 on the set of types that would strictly lose from proposing the alternative. By definition of strong neologism-proofness, then, no type of the principal has a strict incentive to propose the alternative.⁴ Hence, by proposing the strongly neologism-proof allocation as a direct mechanism the principal can solve her mechanism-selection problem.⁵

The second step in our justification of the focus on ex-ante optimal allocations is a characterization of strongly neologism-proof allocations. All our results are based on this characterization. Not only does it connect strong neologism-proofness to ex-ante optimality, it also simplifies the expression of strong neologism-proofness sufficiently to facilitate the proofs of our existence results. The characterization is as follows. Let T_0 denote the principal's type space and let $U_0^\rho(t_0)$ denote the expected payoff of any principal type t_0 in any allocation ρ . Let p_0 be the prior belief about the principal's type. An incentive-feasible allocation ρ is strongly neologism-proof if and only if

$$(1) \quad \eta(q_0) \leq \int_{T_0} U_0^\rho(t_0) dq_0(t_0) \quad \text{for all } q_0 \text{ absolutely continuous rel. to } p_0,$$

where $\eta(q_0)$ is the principal's ex-ante optimal payoff given the belief q_0 about the principal, i.e., the maximal expected payoff on the set of allocations that are incentive-feasible with respect to q_0 and prior beliefs about the agents' types.

This is a rather restrictive condition that requires the principal's expected payoff in the allocation corresponding to ρ , when weighed according to q_0 , to be not less than the total expected surplus available to the principal if q_0 reflects the agents' belief about the principal, and this condition must hold for all q_0 that are absolutely continuous relative to the prior belief about the principal p_0 .

Condition (1), with $q_0 = p_0$, implies that any strongly neologism-proof allocation is ex-ante optimal for the principal; i.e., the principal's expected payoff is equal to $\eta(p_0)$. In environments with finite type spaces there exists typically a continuum of ex-ante optimal allocations (because the principal's incentive constraints do not fully determine transfers); here, condition (1) pins down exactly which of these allocations is strongly neologism-proof (cf. Example 2 in Mylovanov and Tröger (forthcoming)).

Condition (1) simplifies the expression of strong neologism-proofness considerably: instead of having to compare the principal's payoff in different allocations separately for each of her types, it is sufficient to consider her ex-ante expected payoff in different allocations.

⁴Myerson (1983, Theorem 2) uses a related argument to show that his concept of a strong solution is consistent with equilibrium play.

⁵We conjecture that in single-agent finite-type environments *every* perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the mechanism-selection game implements a strongly neologism-proof allocation. Consider a candidate equilibrium allocation that is not strongly neologism-proof. The crucial step is to construct a mechanism that virtually implements (Abreu and Matsushima 1992) a strongly neologism-proof allocation for every belief about the principal. Then at least one type of the principal has an incentive to deviate to this mechanism (cf. Maskin and Tirole (1990), proof of Proposition 7). This idea extends to multiple-agent environments if one excludes coordinated rejection of off-equilibrium mechanisms. Coordinated rejection would make every disagreement-outcome-dominating allocation an equilibrium allocation.

A useful corollary of the characterization (1) concerns the benchmark standard mechanism-design environment in which the principal's type is commonly known. The principal can solve her mechanism-selection problem by implementing the same allocation as when her type is commonly known, if and only if this allocation is ex-ante optimal for all beliefs about the principal's type that are absolutely continuous relative to the prior belief.⁶

The sufficiency of (1) for strong neologism-proofness is immediate from the definition of strong neologism-proofness. The substantive part of the characterization is the necessity. The proof of necessity is subtle: the main difficulty is to demonstrate that if (1) is violated then there exists a dominating allocation that *satisfies* the incentive constraints of the principal.

The final step is to show the existence of a strongly neologism-proof allocation. We begin by showing existence in environments with finite type spaces. We approximate any such environment by constructing a sequence of outcome spaces with larger and larger bounds on payments. Because these outcome spaces are compact, a strongly neologism-proof allocation exists by Mylovanov and Tröger (forthcoming); using the characterization (1) we extend the existence result to quasi-linear environments with no bounds no payments. Then we show existence in any linear-utility environment by constructing a sequence of finite-type approximations and showing that (1) holds for a suitable weak limit—technically, this is the most involved part of the paper; it appears to be the first existence result for continuous-type environments in the informed-principal literature.

In Section 2, we review the related literature. Section 3 provides an example that illustrates the problem and in particular the role of transferable utility. In Section 4 we introduce the basic concepts of our model. Section 5 presents the central characterization of strong neologism-proofness and a number of useful implications. Section 6 deals with the existence of strongly neologism-proof allocations. In Section 7 we characterize ex-ante optimal in linear-utility environments. This characterization is applied in Section 8 to a class of bilateral-trade environments. Proof details are relegated to the Appendix.

2. LITERATURE

Myerson (1983) introduced the problem of mechanism-selection by an informed principal. He uses an axiomatic approach to define a solution and proves its existence in any environment with finite type spaces and finite outcome spaces. This excludes in particular quasilinear environments in which transfers are an essential dimension of the outcome space. Myerson's solution, neutral optimum, is always consistent with sequential equilibrium play in a mechanism-selection game.

⁶It is well-known that in some environments with transferable utility the principal implements the same allocation regardless of whether her type is private or commonly known (Maskin and Tirole 1990). Fleckinger (2007) was the first to observe that there exist independent private value environments with transferable utility in which the principal can benefit from uncertainty about her preferences.

Maskin and Tirole (1990) consider mechanism-selection by an informed principal in a class of environments with independent private values. They consider single-agent environments with two possible types of the agent under structural assumptions about the outcome space and the players' payoff functions. They define "strongly unconstrained Pareto optimal" (SUPO) allocations and show that these are consistent with perfect Bayesian equilibrium play in a mechanism-selection game.⁷ The focus of Maskin and Tirole (1990) is on risk-averse players. In their model, if players are risk-neutral so that utility is fully transferable, the best-separable allocations are ex-ante optimal so that the principal uses the same mechanism as when her type is commonly known. The main result is that, with a general choice of risk-averse payoffs, in the SUPO allocation all types of the principal are strictly better off than in the best-separable allocation.⁸

In Mylovanov and Tröger (forthcoming) we define strongly-neologism-proof allocations which generalizes the concept of an SUPO allocation to arbitrary single- or multi-agent environments with independent private values and finite type spaces (we allow some interdependence of values). The main result in that paper is that in environments with compact outcome spaces a strongly neologism-proof allocation exists under weak technical assumptions. The existence result, however, does not apply to the quasilinear environments considered here because the space of transfers is unbounded.

The informed-principal problem in environments with independent private values and transferable utility was considered by a number of authors. Environments in which a privately informed principal uses the same mechanism as when her information is public are analyzed in (Tan 1996, Yilankaya 1999, Balestrieri 2008, Skreta 2009). Our results show that the "irrelevance" results obtained in this literature are due to the fact that, in these models, the best-separable allocations are ex-ante optimal. A general class of environments in which this applies are linear-utility environments in which the parties' payoffs, net of disagreement payoffs, are monotonic in their type for each outcome; in Mylovanov and Tröger (2012), we extend the irrelevance result to all linear-utility environments with monotonic payoffs.

The literature on countervailing incentives (see Lewis and Sappington (1989) and Jullien (2000) and the references therein) considers mechanism-design in environments in which the participation constraint can be binding for any type of the agent depending on the parameters. If one allows the principal in these models to be privately informed, then the agent's participation constraint can be binding for different types depending on the type of the principal. This suggests that the irrelevance result may not hold, even when we consider independent private values and transferable utility. Fleckinger (2007) first provided an example along these lines, in which the ex-post efficient allocation is incentive-feasible and leaves the principal strictly better off than

⁷Under additional technical assumptions, using the structure of their environment, Maskin and Tirole (1990) show that any perfect Bayesian equilibrium yields an SUPO allocation.

⁸Quesada (2010) provides conditions for equilibrium allocations in Maskin and Tirole (1990) to be deterministic and shows that their characterization continues to hold in a less restrictive environment.

the best-separable allocation. Our bilateral-trade application is based on a similar logic.⁹

The assumption of independent private values focuses attention on the issue of signaling the principal's strategic position and abstracts from other signaling concerns. Mechanism-selection by an informed principal in environments with common values was first considered by Maskin and Tirole (1992). Their results imply that a strongly neologism-proof allocation often does not exist in environments with common values.

A number of recent papers study the informed principal problem in other environments. In environments with correlated types and a single agent, Cella (2008) shows that the principal benefits from the privacy of her information and Skreta (2009) discusses the optimal disclosure policy for the principal. With correlated types and multiple agents, Severinov (2008) provides a construction that allows the informed principal to extract the entire surplus. Balkenborg and Makris (2010) look at common value environments and provide a novel characterization of a solution to the informed principal problem. Izmalkov and Balestrieri (2012) study the problem of the informed principal in an environment with horizontally differentiated goods, where the principal is privately informed about the characteristic of the good. Halac (2012) considers optimal relational contracts in a repeated setting where the principal has persistent private information about her outside option. Nishimura (2012) analyzes properties of scoring procurement auctions in an independent private value environment with multidimensional quality and a privately informed buyer. An informed principal problem arises in Francetich and Troyan (2012) who study endogenous collusion agreements in auctions with interdependent values.

Finally, there exists a separate literature that studies the informed-principal problem in moral-hazard environments, rather than in adverse-selection environments considered here (see, for example, Beaudry (1994), Jost (1996), Bond and Gresik (1997), Mezzetti and Tsoulouhas (2000), Chade and Silvers (2002), and Kaya (2010)).

Application: bilateral exchange. The informed principal problem is well understood in the environments with extreme allocation of property rights. There, the principal is either a buyer or a seller and the informed principal implements a collection of posted prices, conditional on her valuation (Yilankaya 1999). Posted prices also maximize the ex-ante expected payoff of the principal and are optimal if the principal's value is commonly known (Riley and Zeckhauser 1983, Williams 1987). As we show in Section 8, the optimal mechanism for the informed principal is not a posted price and the principal strictly benefits from keeping her valuation private if the property rights are not extreme.

Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) have characterized conditions under which there exists an ex-post efficient allocation in the bilateral-trade environment.¹⁰

⁹In Mylovanov and Tröger (2008) we provide an example of a different kind which is based non-linearity of payoffs instead of countervailing incentives.

¹⁰For the partnership dissolution problem in the environments with interdependent values, see Fieseler, Kittsteiner, and Moldovanu (2003) and Jehiel and Paudner (2006).

The informed principal, however, will not implement the ex-post efficient allocation because she can extract additional surplus from the agent by distorting the ex-post efficient allocation.

3. EXAMPLE

In this section, we provide an example that illustrates the importance of transferable utility, the conflict of preference between different principal types, and why concealing the principal's type might increase the total surplus available to principal types.

There are a principal (player 0) and an agent (player 1). The parties can choose one of four actions a^H , a^D , a' , $\underline{\alpha}$, where $\underline{\alpha}$ arises if they cannot agree on a mechanism. Each player has one of two possible payoff types, $t_0 \in \{H, D\}$ and $t_1 \in \{h, d\}$; the players' payoffs are depicted in Table 1. The players get positive utility from actions a^H and a^D if the action matches the type and negative utility otherwise. Disagreement payoffs are normalized to 0. In addition, action a' gives principal type $t_0 = H$ a higher utility than any other action. The other principal type gets negative utility from this action, while the agent slightly prefers this action to disagreement.

	H	D
a^H	1	-1
a^D	-1	1
a'	$1 + \epsilon$	-1
$\underline{\alpha}$	0	0

	h	d
a^H	1	- y
a^D	- y	1
a'	ϵ	ϵ
$\underline{\alpha}$	0	0

TABLE 1. Players' payoffs; $y, \epsilon > 0$.

All type profiles (t_0, t_1) are equally likely. After the types are realized and privately observed, the principal proposes a mechanism, a finite game form with perfect recall, and the agent decides whether to accept it. If the agent rejects the proposal, the disagreement outcome is realized. The solution concept is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

If utility is not transferable, the mechanism-selection game has a separating equilibrium in which each principal type offers her most preferred action, and this offer is accepted by the agent unless $t_1 = h$ and $t_0 = D$:

- $t_0 = H \rightarrow a'$, accepted;
- $t_0 = D \rightarrow a^D$, accepted iff $t_1 = d$.

Note that this allocation would also be an equilibrium allocation if the principal's type were common knowledge. Furthermore, this is the *unique* equilibrium allocation. This is implied by the fact that principal type H can always offer action a' and this offer will be accepted by the agent.

Per Inscrutability Principle of Myerson (1983), this allocation can be implemented in a pooling equilibrium in which both types of the principal offer the following direct mechanism:

- $(H, h), (H, d) \rightarrow a'$;

- $(D, d) \rightarrow a^D, (D, h) \rightarrow \underline{\alpha}$.

Clearly, this mechanism satisfies the incentive constraints for all players and will be accepted by the agent. The equilibrium can be supported by multiple off-path beliefs; perhaps, the easiest construction is to assign the agent's belief $t_0 = D$ to each alternative mechanism.

Nevertheless, if $y < 1$ and $\epsilon < 1/2$, the equilibrium allocation does not maximize the ex-ante expected payoff of the principal and would not be implemented by the principal if she were to make her choice of a mechanism before learning her type. The allocation is dominated by the following incentive-feasible allocation:

- $H \rightarrow a^H$;
- $D \rightarrow a^D$.

(The principal's equilibrium expected payoff is $\frac{1}{2}(1 + \epsilon) + \frac{1}{4}$, whereas the principal's payoff given this allocation is 1.) Thus, in the environment without transferable utility, realization of private information of the principal changes the choice of the mechanism and destroys some of the expected surplus available to the principal. In equilibrium, optimal behavior of type H requires implementing action a^H , which, however, imposes a negative externality on the ability of the other type to implement action a^D by limiting the amount of surplus left to the agent.

Let us now consider the environment in which the mechanism can execute utility transfers between the players. As a benchmark, assume that the principal's type is commonly known. In the optimal mechanism in this environment,

- principal type H gets $\frac{3}{2} + \epsilon$ by choosing actions a^H if $t_1 = h$ and a' otherwise and charging the agent, correspondingly, 1 and ϵ ;
- whereas principal type D gets 1 by choosing actions a^D and charging the agent 1 if $t_1 = d$ and implementing $\underline{\alpha}$ otherwise.

In this mechanism, H implements the allocation that maximizes the total surplus conditional on her type, and extracts the entire surplus from the agent. By contrast, type D of the principal leaves some surplus on the table whenever $t_1 = H$ by choosing the disagreement action $\underline{\alpha}$ rather than action a^D that would generate the total surplus of $1 - y > 0$. This is optimal for type D because of the agent's incentive constraints; implementing action a^D would decrease the price that can be charged to the agent to y , giving the principal the payoff of $1 - y < 1$.

This amount of surplus left on the table in this environment can be picked up by the principal if her type is not known to the agent. The following direct mechanism is incentive-feasible, maximizes the total surplus of the parties, and allows the principal to extract the entire surplus from the agent (we assume that $y + \epsilon < \frac{1}{2}$):

- $(H, h) \rightarrow a^H, (H, d) \rightarrow a'$, and the agent is charged his surplus from the action, 1 and ϵ respectively,
- $(D, d), (D, h) \rightarrow a^D$ and the agent is charged his surplus from the action, 1 and $-y$ respectively.

In this allocation, the agent's incentive constraints are strictly satisfied conditional on principal type H ; this allows the other type of the principal to extract additional

	H	D
a^H	$\frac{1}{2}2$	
a^D		$2 - y$
a'	$\frac{1}{2}(1 + 2\epsilon)$	
$\underline{\alpha}$	0	0

	h	d
a^H	0	
a^D	0	0
a'		0
$\underline{\alpha}$	0	0

TABLE 2. Players' payoffs in equilibrium with transferable utility

surplus by violating the agent's incentive constraints conditional on her type. The mechanism is an optimal choice for the principal if she selects a mechanism before learning her type. It is also an equilibrium of the mechanism-selection game.¹¹ As in the case without transfers, the easiest way to support this equilibrium is to assign belief $t_0 = D$ to each deviation.

Let *ex-ante*, *interim*, and *ex-post* denote correspondingly the mechanism selected by the principal before learning her type, after privately learning her type, and after her type becomes common knowledge. In the example in this section, we have shown that without transferable utility

- *ex-post* = *interim* \neq *ex-ante*,

while with transferable utility

- *ex-post* \neq *interim* \subseteq *ex-ante*.

The main result in this paper is that in environments with independent private values and transferable utility there exists an *ex-ante* optimal allocation that allocates the surplus across different types of the principal in such a manner that it prevents all possible deviations of all types of the principal.

4. MODEL

4.1. Environment. Consider players $i = 0, \dots, n$ who have to collectively choose from a space of basic outcomes

$$Z = A \times \mathbb{R}^n,$$

where the measurable space A represents a set of verifiable collective actions, and \mathbb{R}^n is the set of vectors of agents' payments. For example, in an environment where the collective action is the allocation of a single unit of a private good among the players, $A = \{0, \dots, n\}$, indicating who obtains the good.

Every player i has a type $t_i \in T_i$ that captures her private information. A player's type space T_i may be any compact metric space. The product of players' type spaces is denoted $\mathbf{T} = T_0 \times \dots \times T_n$. The types t_0, \dots, t_n are realizations of stochastically independent Borel probability measures p_0, \dots, p_n with $\text{supp}(p_i) = T_i$ for all i . The probability of any Borel set $B \subseteq T_i$ of player- i types is denoted $p_i(B)$.

¹¹ There exists incentive-feasible allocations that generate the same *ex-ante* expected payoff for the principal, but differ with respect to the individual principal-types' payoffs. The principal-types' payoffs are bounded by the principal's incentive constraints.

Player i 's payoff function is denoted

$$u_i : Z \times T_i \rightarrow \mathbb{R}.$$

We consider private-value environments with quasi-linear payoff functions,

$$\begin{aligned} u_0(a, \mathbf{x}, t_0) &= v_0(a, t_0) + x_1 + \cdots + x_n, \\ u_i(a, \mathbf{x}, t_i) &= v_i(a, t_i) - x_i, \end{aligned}$$

where $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$, and v_0, \dots, v_n are called *valuation functions*. We assume that the family of functions $(v_i(a, \cdot))_{a \in A}$ is equi-continuous for all i (observe that this assumption is void if type spaces are finite).

The players' interaction results in an outcome that is a probability measure on the set of basic outcomes; the set of outcomes is denoted

$$\mathcal{Z} = \mathcal{A} \times \mathbb{R}^n,$$

where \mathcal{A} denotes the set of probability measures on A , and \mathbb{R}^n is the vector of the agents' expected payments.

If the players cannot agree on an outcome, some exogenously given disagreement outcome \underline{z} obtains. The disagreement outcome $\underline{z} = (\underline{\alpha}, 0, \dots, 0)$ for some (possibly random) collective action $\underline{\alpha} \in \mathcal{A}$. We normalize the valuation functions such that each player's expected valuation from the disagreement outcome equals 0, that is, $\int_A v_i(a, t_i) d\underline{\alpha}(a) = 0$ for all i and t_i .

A player's (expected) payoff from any outcome $(\alpha, \mathbf{x}) \in \mathcal{Z}$ is denoted

$$u_i(\alpha, \mathbf{x}, t_i) = \int_A v_i(a, t_i) d\alpha(a) - x_i,$$

where $x_0 = -x_1 - \cdots - x_n$.

An *allocation* is a complete type-dependent description of the result of the players' interaction; it is described by a map

$$\rho(\cdot) = (\alpha(\cdot), \mathbf{x}(\cdot)) : \mathbf{T} \rightarrow \mathcal{Z}$$

such that payments are uniformly bounded (that is, $\sup_{\mathbf{t} \in \mathbf{T}} \|\mathbf{x}(\mathbf{t})\| < \infty$, to guarantee integrability) and such that the appropriate measurability restrictions are satisfied (that is, for any measurable set $B \subseteq A$, the map $\mathbf{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, $\mathbf{t} \mapsto \alpha(\mathbf{t})(B)$ is Borel measurable, and $\mathbf{x}(\cdot)$ is Borel measurable).

4.2. Linear-utility environments. A common assumption in the literature is that each player's valuation function depends linearly on her type. We say that the environment has *linear utilities* if (i) the set of basic collective actions is finite ($A = \{1, \dots, |A|\}$), (ii) each player's type space is an interval ($T_i = [\underline{t}_i, \bar{t}_i]$), (iii) each player's valuation function $v_i(a, t_i)$ is an affine function of t_i , for all $a \in A$ (that is, there exist numbers s_i^a and c_i^a such that $v_i(a, t_i) = s_i^a t_i + c_i^a$), (iv) there exists of a strictly positive and continuous density f_i for each player's type distribution p_i (and we use F_i to denote the c.d.f.), (v) the disagreement outcome $(\underline{\alpha}, 0, \dots, 0)$ is such that such that, for all i , $\int_A s_i^a d\alpha(a) = 0$ and $\int_A c_i^a d\alpha(a) = 0$, and (vi)

$$(2) \quad \forall i \geq 1 \exists a_i, b_i \in A : s_i^{a_i} \neq s_i^{b_i}.$$

Observe that (v) is not a substantial restriction, but simply expresses that disagreement payoffs are normalized to 0, and (vi) restricts attention to players $i \geq 1$ whose preferences over outcomes actually depend on their private information.

Linear-utility environments provide useful models for many applications, including bilateral exchange, single and multi-unit auctions, procurement, public good provision, non-linear pricing, franchise, legislative bargaining, and assignment problems with transferable utility.¹²

It is important to note that, in contrast to (Ledyard and Palfrey 2007) and many other models, our definition does not restrict the sign of s_i^a . That is, a player's payoff may be increasing or decreasing in her type, depending on the prevailing action. This allows us to model arbitrary disagreement outcomes, which greatly extends the applicability of the model.

4.3. Strongly neologism-proof allocation. We are interested in the problem of optimally selecting an allocation in the absence of a disinterested outsider. Rather, one of the players is designated as the proposer of the allocation. We will assume from now on that the proposer is player 0. We call her the principal; the other players are called agents.

Given the presence of private information, incentive and participation constraints will play a major role in our analysis. Expected payoffs are computed with respect to the prior beliefs p_1, \dots, p_n about the agents' types. However, during the interaction the agents may update their belief about the principal's type, away from the prior p_0 . Let q_0 denote a Borel probability measure on T_0 that represents the agents' belief about the principal's type. For our purposes it is enough work with a belief q_0 that is either absolutely continuous relative to p_0 or is a point belief.

Given an allocation ρ and a belief q_0 , the expected payoff of type t_i of player i if she announces type \hat{t}_i is denoted

$$U_i^{\rho, q_0}(\hat{t}_i, t_i) = \int_{\mathbf{T}_{-i}} u_i(\rho(\hat{t}_i, \mathbf{t}_{-i}), t_i) d\mathbf{q}_{-i}(\mathbf{t}_{-i}),$$

where \mathbf{q}_{-i} denotes the product measure obtained from deleting dimension i of q_0, p_1, \dots, p_n . The expected payoff of type t_i of player i from allocation ρ is

$$U_i^{\rho, q_0}(t_i) = U_i^{\rho, q_0}(t_i, t_i).$$

We will use the shortcut $U_0^\rho(t_0) = U_0^{\rho, q_0}(t_0)$, which is justified by the fact that the principal's expected payoff is independent of q_0 .

¹²For some recent papers using linear environments see, e.g., Che and Kim (2006), Eliaz and Spiegler (2007), Ledyard and Palfrey (2007), Hafalir and Krishna (2008), Pavlov (2008), Figueroa and Skreta (2009), Garratt, Tröger, and Zheng (2009), Celik (2009), Kirkegaard (2009), Lebrun (2009), Manelli and Vincent (2010), Krähmer (2012), and Gershkov, Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu, and Shi (forthcoming).

An allocation ρ is called q_0 -feasible if, for all players i , the q_0 -incentive constraints (3) and the q_0 -participation constraints (4) are satisfied,

$$(3) \quad \forall t_i, \hat{t}_i \in T_i : \quad U_i^{\rho, q_0}(t_i) \geq U_i^{\rho, q_0}(\hat{t}_i, t_i),$$

$$(4) \quad \forall t_i \in T_i : \quad U_i^{\rho, q_0}(t_i) \geq 0.$$

Given allocations ρ and ρ' and a belief q_0 , we say that ρ is q_0 -dominated by ρ' if ρ' is q_0 -feasible and

$$\begin{aligned} \forall t_0 \in \text{supp}(q_0) : \quad & U_0^{\rho'}(t_0) \geq U_0^{\rho}(t_0), \\ \exists B \subseteq \text{supp}(q_0), \quad & q_0(B) > 0 \quad \forall t_0 \in B : \quad U_0^{\rho'}(t_0) > U_0^{\rho}(t_0). \end{aligned}$$

The domination is *strict* if “ $>$ ” holds for all $t_0 \in \text{supp}(q_0)$.

Our notion of domination refers to the principal’s payoff. If some types of the principal have an incentive to deviate to a dominating allocation, and the dominating allocation is feasible given a belief that excludes all the principal-types who would suffer from the deviation, then we may not expect the original allocation to persist. This idea is behind our concept of a strongly neologism-proof allocation (Mylovanov and Tröger (forthcoming)).¹³

Definition 1. *An allocation ρ is strongly neologism-proof if (i) ρ is p_0 -feasible and (ii) ρ is not q_0 -dominated for any belief q_0 that is absolutely continuous relative to p_0 .*

In environments with finite type spaces, any strongly neologism-proof allocation can arise in a perfect-Bayesian equilibrium in a mechanism-selection game in which any finite game form with perfect recall may be proposed as a mechanism (Mylovanov and Tröger (forthcoming)).¹⁴

4.4. Ex-ante optimal and best separable allocations. A core point of our paper will be that strong neologism-proofness is closely related to the ex-ante optimality of an allocation. For any belief q_0 , the problem of maximizing the principal’s q_0 -ex-ante expected payoff across all allocations that are q_0 -feasible is

$$(5) \quad \max_{\rho \text{ } q_0\text{-feasible}} \int_{T_0} U_0^{\rho}(t_0) d q_0(t_0).$$

Let $\eta(q_0)$ denote the supremum value of the problem. In general, a maximum may fail to exist. This may be because arbitrarily high payoffs can be achieved ($\eta(q_0) = \infty$), or because the supremum cannot be achieved exactly.

Definition 2. *An allocation ρ is ex-ante optimal if it solves problem (5) with $q_0 = p_0$.*

An important benchmark is the *best separable*¹⁵ allocation—the allocation that the principal would optimally propose if her type were commonly known, that is, if

¹³The definition in Mylovanov and Tröger (forthcoming) includes provisions about “happy types” who obtain the highest feasible payoff. In quasilinear environments, there are no happy types because payments can be arbitrarily high.

¹⁴In environments with infinite type spaces, there is no “natural” set of feasible mechanisms, nor is there an obvious choice for the definition of equilibrium.

¹⁵Maskin and Tirole (1990) use the term *full-information optimal allocation* instead.

the agents did have a point belief about the principal's type. Equivalently, a best separable allocation will be selected if the principal is restricted to offer a mechanism in which she is not a player herself.¹⁶

Definition 3. *An allocation ρ is best separable if, for all point beliefs q_0 , ρ is q_0 -feasible and ρ is not q_0 -dominated.*

Observe that the concept of a best separable allocation is entirely independent of the agent's prior belief p_0 .

At some point in our analysis it is useful to consider a simpler variant of the principal's ex-ante problem. An allocation ρ is called *q_0 -agent-feasible* if, for all agents $i \geq 1$, the q_0 -incentive constraints (3) and the q_0 -participation constraints (4) are satisfied. That is, in an agent-feasible allocation the principal's incentive and participation constraints may be violated. Let $\eta'(q_0)$ denote the supremum value of the principal's *relaxed q_0 -ex-ante problem*

$$(6) \quad \max_{\rho \text{ } q_0\text{-agent feasible}} \int_{T_0} U_0^\rho(t_0) dq_0(t_0).$$

Technically, the relaxed ex-ante problem is often easier to solve than the standard ex-ante problem. Obviously, $\eta'(q_0) \geq \eta(q_0)$.

5. CHARACTERIZATION OF STRONG NEOLOGISM-PROOFNESS

The main result in this section is a characterization of strong neologism-proofness in quasi-linear environments. We show that strong neologism-proofness requires, for all beliefs q_0 that are absolutely continuous with respect to the prior p_0 , that the principal's highest possible q_0 -ex-ante expected payoff cannot exceed the q_0 -ex-ante expectation of the vector of her strongly neologism-proof payoffs. This characterization greatly simplifies the expression of strong neologism-proofness; it plays a central role in our analysis.

Proposition 1. *A p_0 -feasible allocation ρ is strongly neologism-proof if and only if*

$$(7) \quad \eta(q_0) \leq \int_{T_0} U_0^\rho(t_0) dq_0(t_0) \quad \text{for all } q_0 \text{ absolutely continuous rel. to } p_0.$$

We prove the "if" part by showing the counterfactual, which is simple: an allocation that q_0 -dominates ρ also yields a strictly higher q_0 -ex-ante-expected payoff, and $\eta(q_0)$ is, by definition, not smaller than this payoff.

To prove "only if", we again show the counterfactual. That is, we suppose that, given a strongly neologism-proof allocation ρ , there exists a belief q_0 such that (7) fails. By definition of $\eta(q_0)$, there exists a q_0 -feasible allocation ρ' with a strictly higher q_0 -ex-ante-expected payoff than ρ . Starting with ρ' , by redistributing payments between principal-types we can construct an allocation ρ'' such that each principal-type is strictly better off than in ρ . This may lead, however, to a violation of a principal-type's incentive constraint in ρ'' . The remaining, more difficult, part of the proof consists in resurrecting the principal's incentive constraints.

¹⁶Zheng (2002) calls such mechanisms "transparent".




FIGURE 1. Illustration of condition (7) for $T_0 = \{t'_0, t''_0\}$. Let ρ and ρ' be two strongly-neologism proof allocations and p_0 and p'_0 be the corresponding prior beliefs. The brown and the blue areas are the regions of incentive feasible principal-type payoff vectors for prior beliefs p_0 and p'_0 respectively. By (7),

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{T_0} U_0^{\rho'}(t_0) dp_0(t_0) &\geq \int_{T_0} U_0^{\rho}(t_0) dp_0(t_0) = \eta(p_0), \\ \int_{T_0} U_0^{\rho}(t_0) dp'_0(t_0) &\geq \int_{T_0} U_0^{\rho'}(t_0) dp'_0(t_0) = \eta(p'_0). \end{aligned}$$

We find a belief r_0 and an allocation σ that r_0 -dominates ρ , thereby showing that ρ is not strongly neologism-proof. Starting with the belief q_0 and the allocation ρ'' , this can be imagined as being achieved by altering the allocation and the belief multiple times in a procedure that ends with r_0 and σ after finitely many steps.

In environments with finite type spaces, the procedure can be imagined as follows. Suppose ρ'' violates the incentive constraint of some principal-type. We may restrict attention here to types in the support of q_0 (all other types may be assumed to announce whatever type is optimal among the type announcements in the support of q_0). Alter ρ'' by giving the type with the violated constraint a different allocation: the average over what she had and what she is attracted to. Alter q_0 by adding to her previous probability the probability of the type that she was attracted to, and assign this type probability 0. From the viewpoint of the agents (i.e., in expectation over the principal's types), the new allocation together with the new belief is indistinguishable from the old one together with the old belief. Moreover, the new belief has a smaller support. Repeating this procedure leads to smaller and smaller supports, until incentive compatibility is satisfied.

The procedure is more complicated in environments with non-finite type spaces. First, we partition the principal's type space into a finite number of small cells such that when we replace in each cell the allocation by its average across the cell, then the new allocation ρ''' is q_0 -almost surely better than ρ . The crucial property of

the new allocation is that, in the direct-mechanism interpretation, there exist only *finitely* many essentially different announcements of principal-types. In summary, ρ''' belongs to the set \mathcal{E} of all allocations that (i) have this finiteness property, and (ii) are r_0 -almost surely better for the principal than ρ , where (iii) r_0 is any belief such that the agents' r_0 -incentive and participation constraints are satisfied (while the principal's constraints are not necessarily satisfied). We consider an allocation σ^* in \mathcal{E} that is minimal with respect to the finiteness property (that is, it is not possible to further reduce the number of essentially different principal-type announcements with violating (ii) or (iii)). Using the averaging idea from the finite-type world, we show that σ^* satisfies the principal's incentive constraints r_0 -almost surely. Hence, we can construct an r_0 -feasible allocation σ by altering σ^* on an r_0 -probability-0 set. Using continuity and the fact that property (ii) holds for σ^* , we conclude that ρ is r_0 -dominated by σ .

The complete proof is in the appendix.

Proposition 1 has several direct implications. The following implication is obtained by setting $q_0 = p_0$.

Corollary 1. *Any strongly neologism-proof allocation is ex-ante optimal.*

This result is most convenient in environments where the ex-ante optimal payoffs are unique (such as many environments with continuous type spaces): in such environments there is an essentially unique candidate for a strongly neologism-proof allocation.

Corollary 1 also implies that the issue of the principal's information leakage through the choice of the mechanism imposes no cost on the principal in terms of the total surplus she realizes in equilibrium: Different principal types, despite their conflict of preference about how to allocate the available surplus, coordinate on a mechanism that maximizes their ex-ante expected total surplus.

A further implication of this result is that in the environments in which the principal learns her type over time, the principal is indifferent about whether to write an ex-ante (long-term) contract or offer a (short-term) contract after her information is realized; this might explain why sometimes we do not observe complete long-term contracts. Finally, from a technical perspective the result connects the informed principal problem to the standard mechanism design approach that can be used to characterize ex-ante optimal mechanisms.

From the proof of Proposition 1 it is clear that the characterization continues to hold when all ex-ante optimizations are replaced by relaxed ex-ante optimizations.

Corollary 2. *A p_0 -feasible allocation ρ is strongly neologism-proof if and only if*

$$(8) \quad \eta'(q_0) \leq \int_{T_0} U_0^\rho(t_0) dq_0(t_0) \quad \text{for all } q_0 \text{ absolutely continuous rel. to } p_0.$$

Thus, $\eta(p_0) = \eta'(p_0)$ in any environment in which a strongly neologism-proof allocation exists.

Observe that the relaxed p_0 -ex-ante problem typically has multiple solutions that differ with respect to the payoff distribution across the various types of the principal. Corollary 2 implies that at least one of these solutions satisfies the principal's incentive and participation constraints if a strongly neologism-proof allocation exists.

Proposition 1 also implies that the question of whether or not the principal benefits from the uncertainty about her information or, equivalently, offers an allocation that differs from what she would if her information were commonly known ("best separable allocation") boils down to the question of whether or not a best separable allocation is ex-ante optimal for various beliefs about the principal's type, as stated in the corollary below.

Corollary 3. *A best separable allocation is strongly neologism-proof if and only if it solves problem (5) for all q_0 that are absolutely continuous relative to p_0 .*

Proof. "if" is immediate from Proposition 1. To see "only if", consider a best separable allocation ρ that is strongly neologism-proof. As a best separable allocation, ρ is q_0 -feasible for *all* beliefs q_0 . Hence, it solves problem (5) by Proposition 1. *QED*

In Mylovanov and Tröger (2012), we show that in linear-utility environments with monotonic payoffs (i.e., $s_i^a \geq 0$ for all i, a) any best separable allocation is ex-ante optimal. Thus, by Corollary 3, the privacy of the principal's information does not affect the implemented allocation in linear-utility environments with monotonic payoffs.

Corollary 3 can also be used to understand when restrictions on the class of mechanisms available to the principal, often made in applied models, is with loss of generality. For instance, a best separable allocation will be selected if the principal is restricted to offer a mechanism in which she is not a player herself; if a best separable allocation is dominated given prior or some other beliefs, it is not a strongly neologism-proof. Similarly, if an equilibrium allocation in a semi-separating or a pooling equilibrium of a game in which the principal is restricted in her choice of mechanisms is dominated given some beliefs, e.g., the beliefs that put the entire mass on the set of separating types, it is not strongly neologism-proof.

Another corollary provides a sufficient condition for an allocation to be strongly neologism-proof; it follows from the arguments in the proof of Proposition 1.

Corollary 4. *If a p_0 -feasible allocation is not strongly neologism-proof, then it is strictly q_0 -dominated for some belief q_0 that is absolutely continuous with respect to p_0 .*

This corollary implies that the set of strongly neologism-proof principal-payoff vectors is always closed and is helpful in proving the existence of strongly neologism-proof allocations in environments with finite type spaces (Proposition 2).

Finally, Proposition 1 can be applied to the design of a disagreement outcome (e.g., the default allocation of property rights or legal regimes regulating the outcome in the absence of a contract) that induces the principal to implement a socially efficient

allocation, or to the design of collusion-proof mechanisms in environments where one of the players of the mechanism can offer a collusion contract.¹⁷

6. EXISTENCE OF STRONGLY NEOLOGISM-PROOF ALLOCATIONS

In this section we use the characterization (Proposition 1) to show that a strongly neologism-proof allocation exists in any environment with finite type spaces that satisfies weak technical assumptions, and in any linear-utility environment.

6.1. Existence in environments with finite type spaces. In Mylovanov and Tröger (forthcoming) we prove the existence of a strongly neologism-proof allocation in environments with finite type spaces under otherwise rather weak assumptions. However, the proof relies on the compactness of the outcome space, which is violated in quasi-linear environments because arbitrarily large payments are possible. We now extend the existence result to quasi-linear environments in which the set of collective actions, A , is compact. We make the assumption of separability that was introduced in Mylovanov and Tröger (forthcoming); it requires that there exists an allocation such that the incentive and participation constraints of all types of all agents are satisfied as strict inequalities.

Proposition 2. *Suppose that the type spaces T_0, \dots, T_n are finite, that A is a compact metric space, the valuation functions v_0, \dots, v_n are continuous, and separability holds. Then a strongly neologism-proof allocation exists.*

The proof (in the Appendix) has the following steps. First, we provide an upper bound λ for the absolute value of the interim expected payment of any type of any player in any incentive-feasible allocation. Then we show that there exists a number κ such that any scheme of interim expected payments that can occur at all can also be obtained from a payment scheme that involves payments at most κ times as large (in absolute value) as the largest interim expected payment of any type of any player. We approximate the outcome space of the quasilinear environment with a sequence of outcome spaces with larger and larger finite bounds on payments. These environments have compact outcome spaces, so that strongly neologism-proof allocations exist by Mylovanov and Tröger (forthcoming). Moreover, we can assume that payments in these allocations are bounded by $\kappa\lambda$. Hence, the sequence of strongly neologism-proof allocations has a convergent subsequence. Using Corollary 4, we show that the subsequence limit is strongly neologism-proof in the quasilinear environment.

6.2. Existence in linear-utility environments. The following result extends existence to environments with continuous type spaces. The result implies that the principal can solve her mechanism-selection problem by implementing an ex-ante optimal allocation.

Proposition 3. *A strongly neologism-proof allocation exists in any linear-utility environment.*

¹⁷See, e.g., Laffont and Martimort (1997), Quesada (2005), Che and Kim (2006), Segal and Whinston (2011).

To prove this, we use the version of our characterization result that refers to the relaxed ex-ante problems (Corollary 2). We use the finite-type existence result (Proposition 2) and consider a continuous-type limit.

In a linear-utility environment, the payoff-relevant aspects of the collective-action choice are captured by the set

$$\mathcal{V} = \{(\hat{s}_0, \dots, \hat{s}_n, \hat{c}_0, \dots, \hat{c}_n) \in \mathbb{R}^{2n+2} \mid \exists \alpha \in \mathcal{A} \forall i : \hat{s}_i = \int_A s_i^a d\alpha(a), \hat{c}_i = \int_A c_i^a d\alpha(a)\}.$$

Therefore, we can think of an allocation as directly determining a vector $(s_0(\mathbf{t}), \dots, c_n(\mathbf{t})) \in \mathcal{V}$ for any type profile \mathbf{t} . Also, instead of determining payments we can think of an allocation as directly determining the players' utilities $u_0(\mathbf{t}), \dots, u_n(\mathbf{t})$ (a player's payment is then given by $s_i(\mathbf{t})t_i + c_i(\mathbf{t}) - u_i(\mathbf{t})$).

Using standard envelope arguments (e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), Chapter 23), the principal's relaxed F_0 -ex-ante problem can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{u_0(\mathbf{t}), \dots, u_n(\mathbf{t}), (s_0(\mathbf{t}), \dots, c_n(\mathbf{t})) \in \mathcal{V}} \int_T u_0(\mathbf{t}) dF(\mathbf{t}), \\ (9) \quad & \text{s.t.} \quad \bar{s}_i(\cdot) \text{ weakly increasing for all } i \geq 1, \\ (10) \quad & \bar{u}_i(t_i) = \bar{u}_i(\underline{t}_i) + \int_{\underline{t}_i}^{t_i} \bar{s}_i(y) dy \text{ for all } i \geq 1, t_i \in T_i, \\ (11) \quad & \bar{u}_i(t_i) \geq 0 \text{ for all } i \geq 1, t_i \in T_i, \\ (12) \quad & \int_T \left(\sum_{i=0}^n s_i(\mathbf{t})t_i + c_i(\mathbf{t}) - u_i(\mathbf{t}) \right) dF(\mathbf{t}) = 0, \end{aligned}$$

where we use the shortcuts

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{s}_i(t_i) &= \int_{T_{-i}} s_i(\mathbf{t}) dF_{-i}(\mathbf{t}_{-i}), \\ \bar{c}_i(t_i) &= \int_{T_{-i}} c_i(\mathbf{t}) dF_{-i}(\mathbf{t}_{-i}), \\ \bar{u}_i(t_i) &= \int_{T_{-i}} u_i(\mathbf{t}) dF_{-i}(\mathbf{t}_{-i}). \end{aligned}$$

Notice that we require the budget to be balanced ex-ante (12). By Börgers and Norman (2009), this is equivalent to an ex-post budget balance condition.

The proof of Proposition 3 begins with the observation an ex-ante optimizing principal who implements any vector $(\hat{s}_0, \dots, \hat{s}_n)$ will combine this with a vector $(\hat{c}_0, \dots, \hat{c}_n)$ that has a minimal sum $\sum_i \hat{c}_i$, so that she can charge the largest payments. Hence, we can work with a simplified \mathcal{V} in which $(\hat{s}_0, \dots, \hat{s}_n)$ uniquely determines $(\hat{c}_0, \dots, \hat{c}_n)$, and we can ignore the vector $(\hat{c}_0, \dots, \hat{c}_n)$ in the following.

We define a sequence $m = 1, 2, \dots$ of finer and finer finite-type approximations of the linear-utility environment. Each of these environments m can be shown to be separable, so that a strongly neologism-proof allocation ρ^m exists by Proposition 2. We use the notation $s_i^m(\cdot)$ and $u_i^m(\cdot)$ to refer to the components of ρ^m .

We extend each allocation ρ^m to the original continuous type spaces by letting the intermediate types make optimal type announcements in the direct-mechanism interpretation. For each player i , the sequence of interim-averages $(\bar{s}_i^m(\cdot))_{m=1,2,\dots}$ has an almost-everywhere convergent subsequence by Helly's selection theorem (let $\hat{s}_i(\cdot)$ denote the limit), and the interim-averages $(\bar{u}_i^m(\cdot))_{m=1,2,\dots}$ have a uniformly convergent subsequence by Arzela-Ascoli's theorem (let $\hat{u}_i(\cdot)$ denote the limit). The sequence $(s_i^m(\cdot))_{m=1,2,\dots}$ has a weakly convergent subsequence by Alaoglu's theorem. For the weak limits $s_i^*(\cdot)$ ($i = 0, \dots, n$) one can compute the interim averages $\bar{s}_i^*(\cdot)$. The crucial step is to show that $\bar{s}_i^*(\cdot) = \hat{s}_i(\cdot)$. Once we have that, we know that $\bar{s}_i^*(\cdot)$ is weakly increasing and we can use the envelope theorem to define the interim averages $\bar{u}_i^*(\cdot)$ and a corresponding limit allocation ρ^* . Then one shows that $\bar{u}_i^*(\cdot) = \hat{u}_i(\cdot)$. This implies that the monotonicity conditions (9), the participation constraints (11), and the budget balance condition (12) hold in the limit ρ^* .

To verify the condition of Corollary 2, we suppose that (8) fails. Thus, there exists a belief G_0 absolutely continuous relative to F_0 , and a G_0 -feasible allocation ρ' with a higher G_0 -ex-ante expected payoff for the principal than ρ^* . We consider the sequence of finite-type-spaces environments $m = 1, 2, \dots$ with beliefs G_0^m that approximate G_0 .

For each m , we partition the space of continuous type profiles into cells that correspond to the discrete type profiles in the environment m . We construct an allocation ρ^m by taking the average of ρ' in each cell, and by adding correction terms to the payments so that ρ^m satisfies the agents' (not necessarily the principal's) incentive and participation constraints, as well as the budget balance condition, with respect to the belief G_0^m . We show that the correction terms vanish as $m \rightarrow \infty$. Thus, if m is large, then the G_0^m -ex-ante expectation of ρ^m is larger than the G_0^m -ex-ante expectation of ρ^* . This contradicts the fact that ρ^* is strongly neologism-proof for all m and the proof is complete.

7. EX-ANTE OPTIMALITY IN LINEAR-UTILITY ENVIRONMENTS

In this section, we provide a characterization of ex-ante optimality in linear-utility environments that is useful towards solving the principal's mechanism-selection problem in concrete applications.

Auxiliary notation is needed. For all $i \geq 1$ and c.d.f.s $z_i^*(\cdot)$ on T_i , define the virtual valuation function

$$\psi_i^{z_i^*}(t_i) = t_i - \frac{z_i^*(t_i) - F(t_i)}{f_i(t_i)} \quad (t_i \in T_i).$$

The *ironed virtual valuation* $\bar{\psi}_i^{z_i^*}$ is defined as follows.¹⁸ Let

$$H_i(q) = \int_0^q \psi_i^{z_i^*}(F_i^{-1}(r)) dr \quad (q \in [0, 1]).$$

Let \bar{H}_i denote the convex hull of H_i . Because \bar{H}_i is convex, its derivative exists Lebesgue-a.e. and is weakly increasing; let \bar{H}_i' be a weakly increasing extension to

¹⁸The construction follows Myerson (1981), who considered the case $z_i^*(t_i) = 1$.

$[0, 1]$ and define

$$\bar{\psi}_i^{z_i^*}(t_i) = \bar{H}_i'(F_i(t_i)).$$

One can think of $\bar{\psi}_i^{z_i^*}(\cdot)$ as constructed by ironing the non-monotonicities of $\psi_i^{z_i^*}(\cdot)$.

We characterize ex-ante optimality in terms of virtual-surplus maximization. For all $v = (\hat{s}_0, \dots, \hat{c}_n) \in \mathcal{V}$ and $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbf{T}$, define the virtual surplus function

$$V^{z_1^*, \dots, z_n^*}(v, \mathbf{t}) = \hat{s}_0 t_0 + \hat{c}_0 + \sum_{i=1}^n \hat{s}_i \bar{\psi}_i^{z_i^*}(t_i) + \hat{c}_i.$$

Here is the existence and characterization result.

Proposition 4. *In any linear-utility environment, an ex-ante optimal allocation exists. An allocation $u_0(\mathbf{t}), \dots, u_n(\mathbf{t}), s_0(\mathbf{t}), \dots, c_n(\mathbf{t})$ is ex-ante optimal if and only if there exist c.d.f.s z_i^* on T_i ($i = 1, \dots, n$) such that the following conditions hold:*

$$(13) \quad \forall i \geq 1, t_i \in \text{supp}(z_i^*) : \bar{u}_i(t_i) = 0,$$

$$(14) \quad (s_0(\mathbf{t}), \dots, c_n(\mathbf{t})) \in \arg \max_{v \in \mathcal{V}} V^{z_1^*, \dots, z_n^*}(v, \mathbf{t}), \quad a.e. \mathbf{t},$$

$$(15) \quad \bar{s}_i(\cdot) \text{ is weakly increasing for all } i \geq 0,$$

$$(16) \quad \bar{u}_i(t_i) = \bar{u}_i(t_i) + \int_{t_i}^{t_i} \bar{s}_i(y) dy \text{ for all } i \geq 0, t_i \in T_i.$$

$$(17) \quad \bar{u}_i(t_i) \geq 0 \text{ for all } i \geq 0, t_i \in T_i.$$

The core part of the conditions is the virtual-surplus maximization (14). If this maximization problem has a unique solution, then $s_i(\mathbf{t})$ is automatically weakly increasing in t_i , for any t_{-i} ; in general, however, (15) is an independent condition. The Lagrange multiplier functions z_i^* indicate which agent types' participation conditions have bite; condition (13) requires that z_i^* puts all its mass on types for which the participation constraint is binding. The envelope condition (16) requires that payments are chosen such that all players' incentive constraints are satisfied. The participation constraints are (17).

The proof of Proposition 4 begins with the observation that the solutions to the principal's F_0 -ex-ante problem are precisely the solutions to the principal's relaxed F_0 -ex-ante problem in which the principal's incentive and participation constraints are satisfied (cf. Proposition 3 and Corollary 2). In order to characterize the solutions to the relaxed problem, we take a Lagrangian approach. The crucial insight is to take a Lagrangian approach only with respect to the agents' participation constraints (11), and *not* with respect to the monotonicity constraints (9). The monotonicity constraints are treated with a generalization of the ironing techniques of Myerson (1981). The details are in the Appendix.

The best-separable allocations can be characterized analogously to the ex-ante optimal allocations. The best-separable allocations are obtained by assuming that each type of the principal maximizes her expected utility across all allocations that are

incentive-feasible given the belief that puts probability 1 on this type. The principal's incentive constraints are then automatically satisfied, and her participation constraints are satisfied because she is always free to offer the disagreement outcome. For any allocation and all $t_0 \in T_0$, let $\bar{u}_i^{t_0}(t_i)$ denote the interim-expected utility of type t_i of agent i if she believes that the principal's type is t_0 ; define $\bar{s}_i^{t_0}(t_i)$ analogously.

Proposition 5. *Consider a linear-utility environment.*

An allocation $u_0(\mathbf{t}), \dots, u_n(\mathbf{t}), s_0(\mathbf{t}), \dots, c_n(\mathbf{t})$ is best separable if and only if, for all $t_0 \in T_0$, there exist c.d.f.s z_i^{,t_0} on T_i ($i = 1, \dots, n$) such that the following conditions hold:*

$$\begin{aligned} i \geq 1, t_i \in \text{supp}(z_i^{*,t_0}) : \bar{u}_i^{t_0}(t_i) &= 0, \\ (s_0(\mathbf{t}), \dots, c_n(\mathbf{t})) \in \arg \max_{v \in \mathcal{V}} V^{z_1^{*,t_0}, \dots, z_n^{*,t_0}}(v, \mathbf{t}), & \quad a.e. \mathbf{t}_{-i}, \\ \bar{s}_i^{t_0}(\cdot) \text{ is weakly increasing for all } i \geq 1, & \\ \bar{u}_i^{t_0}(t_i) = \bar{u}_i^{t_0}(t_i) + \int_{t_i}^{t_i} \bar{s}_i^{t_0}(y) dy & \text{ for all } i \geq 1, t_i \in T_i. \\ \bar{u}_i^{t_0}(t_i) \geq 0 \text{ for all } i \geq 1, t_i \in T_i. & \end{aligned}$$

The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4 and is omitted.

Proposition 5 shows that the crucial difference between the characterizations of best separable allocations and ex-ante optimal allocations is that in the former characterization the Lagrange multiplier functions are allowed to depend on the principal's type t_0 . If the environment is such that the conditions in Proposition 5 can be satisfied with Lagrange multiplier functions z_i^{*,t_0} that are in fact independent of t_0 , then the conditions in Proposition 4 are satisfied as well, implying that the best-separable allocations are ex-ante optimal. The Lagrange multiplier functions can be interpreted in terms of the sensitivity of the principal's expected payoff with respect to the participation payoff bound 0 (e.g., Luenberger (1969), Chapter 8). If the agents' participation constraints bite in the same manner independently of the type of the principal, then the best-separable allocations are ex-ante optimal. A class of environments in which this is the case is studied in Mylovanov and Tröger (2012).

In general, however, the Lagrange multiplier functions z_i^{*,t_0} are not independent of t_0 and the best separable allocations are not ex-ante optimal. In particular, then, in an ex-ante optimum the agents' participation and incentive constraints are satisfied in expectation over the principal's types, but may be violated if an agent believes in a particular type of principal. In the next section, we demonstrate this in a class of bilateral-trade environments.

8. APPLICATION: BILATERAL TRADE

In this section, we provide an example to show how Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 are useful towards solving informed-principal problems in linear-utility environments, and how the strongly neologism-proof allocation can differ from the best-separable

allocation. We consider the standard two-party one-good exchange environment of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) under the assumption that one party is designated as the principal and, as in Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987), the disagreement outcome is such that each party obtains the good with a positive probability (the disagreement outcome may also include a side payment which we normalize to 0).¹⁹ That is, we consider non-extreme property rights.²⁰

We consider a linear-utility environment with one agent ($n = 1$). The type spaces are $T_0 = T_1 = [0, 1]$. We assume that the agent's type distribution F_1 has strictly increasing virtual valuation functions $\psi^b(t_1) = t_1 - (1 - F_1(t_1))/f_1(t_1)$ and $\psi^s(t_1) = t_1 + F_1(t_1)/f_1(t_1)$.

The set of collective actions is $A = \{0, 1\}$, indicating who gets assigned one unit of an indivisible good. Any probability distribution on A can be described by the probability $\alpha \in \mathcal{A}$ that the agents obtains the good. Let $0 < \underline{\alpha} < 1$ denote the probability that the agent obtains the good upon disagreement. Player i 's ($i = 0, 1$) valuation function is given by $v_i(a, t_i) = s_i^a t_i$, where

$$s_0^a = \mathbf{1}_{a=0} - (1 - \underline{\alpha}), \quad s_1^a = \mathbf{1}_{a=1} - \underline{\alpha}.$$

That is, a player's type represents her valuation of the good, and payoffs are written such that each player's payoff from the disagreement outcome is normalized to 0.

The following result describes the unique ex-ante optimal allocation. By Corollary 2, this is also the unique strongly neologism-proof allocation.

Proposition 6. *Consider the bilateral-trade environment with non-extreme property rights. There exists an a.e. unique ex-ante optimal allocation $\rho(\cdot) = (\alpha(\cdot), \mathbf{x}(\cdot))$,*

$$\alpha(t_0, t_1) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } t_0 < t_0^*, \psi^s(t_1) < t_0, \\ 1 & \text{if } t_0 < t_0^*, \psi^s(t_1) > t_0, \\ 0 & \text{if } t_0 > t_0^*, \psi^b(t_1) < t_0, \\ 1 & \text{if } t_0 > t_0^*, \psi^b(t_1) > t_0, \end{cases}$$

where $t_0^* = F_0^{-1}(\underline{\alpha})$ and $\mathbf{x}(\cdot)$ is chosen such that ρ is F_0 -feasible, and such that the participation constraints of the agent-types in the interval $[(\psi^s)^{-1}(t_0^*), (\psi^b)^{-1}(t_0^*)]$ are satisfied with equality.

The proof of this result consists of a computation that uses the conditions provided in Proposition 4; the details are in the Appendix.

Observe that in the ex-ante optimal allocation there is trade with probability 1 and the allocation is deterministic. The outcome is sometimes less efficient than the

¹⁹Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) shows that dispersed property rights might allow implementing an ex-post efficient allocation. The informed principal, however, will find it optimal to distort the allocation away from the efficient one in order to extract higher rents from the agent.

²⁰In this environment, the dispersed property rights create countervailing incentives (Lewis and Sappington 1989, Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti 1999, Jullien 2000). Fleckinger (2007) was the first to observe that the principal can exploit uncertainty about her preferences in environments with countervailing incentives.

disagreement outcome and the entire good is sometimes allocated to the party with a lower valuation.²¹




FIGURE 2. The strongly neologism-proof allocation in a bilateral-trade environment.

We compare the strongly neologism-proof allocation to the best-separable allocation. Using methods very similar to those used in the proof of Proposition 6, we obtain the following result.

Proposition 7. *Consider the bilateral-trade environment with non-extreme property rights. There exists an a.e. unique best-separable allocation $\rho(\cdot) = (\alpha(\cdot), \mathbf{x}(\cdot))$,*

$$\alpha(t_0, t_1) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \psi^s(t_1) < t_0, \\ 1 & \text{if } \psi^b(t_1) > t_0, \\ \underline{\alpha} & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

and $\mathbf{x}(\cdot)$ is chosen such that, for all $t_0 \in T_0$, if the agent believes in type t_0 , then ρ is incentive-feasible and the participation constraints of the agent-types in the interval $[(\psi^s)^{-1}(t_0), (\psi^b)^{-1}(t_0)]$ are satisfied with equality.

Hence, in the best-separable allocation, in contrast to the ex-ante optimal allocation, each type of the principal fails to trade with the agent with a positive probability ($= F_1((\psi^b)^{-1}(t_0)) - F_1((\psi^s)^{-1}(t_0))$) and when the trade occurs it increases efficiency relative to the disagreement outcome. Because the ex-ante optimal allocation is strongly neologism-proof, each type of the principal is at least as well off as in the best-separable allocation. In fact, due to the additional volume of trade in the ex-ante optimal allocation relative to the best-separable allocation, the envelope formula (16) implies that the difference $\bar{u}_0(t_0) - \bar{u}_0(t_0^*)$ between the expected utilities of type t_0^* and any other type t_0 is larger for the ex-ante optimal allocation than for the best-separable allocation. Therefore:

²¹Figuroa and Skreta (2009) present an environment with type-dependent outside options in which the optimal mechanism includes overselling. This type of inefficiency is caused by the structure of the outside option designed by the principal; there is no uncertainty about the principal's valuation in their model.




FIGURE 3. The best-separable allocation in a bilateral-trade environment.

Corollary 5. *In the bilateral-trade environment with non-extreme property rights, all types $t_0 \neq t_0^*$ of the principal are strictly better off in the ex-ante optimal allocation than in the best-separable allocation.*

Thus, the principal can use the privacy of her information in order to increase her payoff.

Yilankaya (1999) shows that, if the default allocation of the property rights is extreme ($\underline{\alpha} = 0$ or $\underline{\alpha} = 1$), then the uncertainty of the principal's valuation plays no role and she will implement a best-separable allocation by making, e.g., a posted price offer. This result can be understood most easily by viewing the bilateral-trade environment with extreme property rights as a special case of a linear-utility environment with monotonic payoffs (cf. Mylovanov and Tröger (2012)).

The best-separable allocation described in Proposition 7 can be implemented by using, for each type t_0 , a bid price of $(\psi^s)^{-1}(t_0)$ and an ask price of $(\psi^b)^{-1}(t_0)$.

In contrast, the ex-ante optimal allocation described in Proposition 6 is implemented by a multi-stage mechanism involving a combination of a participation fee for the agent, a buyout option for the principal, and a resale stage with posted prices: In the first stage, the agent pays the participation fee and the good is tentatively allocated to the agent. In the second stage, the principal decides whether to exercise a buyout option, in which case the good becomes tentatively allocated to the principal; this option will be exercised by the types $t_0 > t_0^*$ of the principal. In the third stage, given the tentative allocation of the good, the principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it fixed-price offer to the agent to sell or buy the good. Hence, the first two stages consolidate the originally dispersed property rights to the good and allocate the good either to the principal or the agent, determining whether the principal becomes the seller or the buyer in the third stage. This mechanism is a generalization of the bid and ask price mechanism that implements the best separable allocation as well as




FIGURE 4. The outcome of the second stage in the three stage mechanism implementing the strongly neologism-proof allocation in a bilateral-trade environment.

a generalization of a posted price mechanism that would be optimal in the environments with the extreme property rights allocation in which either the principal or the agent own the good (Williams 1987, Yilankaya 1999).

9. APPENDIX

The proof of Proposition 2 relies on two lemmas. Given any allocation $\rho(\cdot) = (\alpha(\cdot), \mathbf{x}(\cdot))$ and any belief q_0 about the principal's type, the interim expected payment function of any player i is denoted

$$\underline{x}_i^{\rho, q_0}(t_i) = \int_{\mathbf{T}_{-i}} x_i(t_i, \mathbf{t}_{-i}) d\mathbf{q}_{-i}(\mathbf{t}_{-i}).$$

Lemma 1. *Suppose that A is a compact metric space, and the valuation functions v_0, \dots, v_n are continuous.*

Then, for all beliefs q_0 , in any q_0 -feasible allocation, the absolute value of the interim expected payment of any type of any player is smaller than

$$\lambda = (n + 4) \max_{i, a, t_i} |v_i(a, t_i)|.$$

Proof. Let $\bar{v} = \max_{i, a, t_i} |v_i(a, t_i)|$ denote an upper bound for the absolute value of the valuation of any action for any type of any player.

By (4), each player's q_0 -ex-ante expected payoff is bounded below by 0. On the other hand, the sum of the players' q_0 -ex-ante expected payoffs is bounded above by $(n + 1)\bar{v}$ because payments cancel. Hence,

$$0 \leq \int_{T_i} U_i^{\rho, q_0}(t_i) dq_i(t_i) \leq (n + 1)\bar{v} \quad \text{for all } i,$$

where we define $q_i = p_i$ for all $i = 1, \dots, n$.

Turning to interim expected payoffs,

$$(18) \quad |U_i^{\rho, q_0}(t_i, t'_i) - U_i^{\rho, q_0}(t_i, t_i)| \leq \max_{a \in A} |v_i(a, t'_i) - v_i(a, t_i)| \leq 2\bar{v}.$$

Hence,

$$U_i^{\rho, q_0}(t_i) \leq U_i^{\rho, q_0}(t_i, t'_i) + 2\bar{v} \stackrel{(3)}{\leq} U_i^{\rho, q_0}(t'_i) + 2\bar{v}.$$

Thus,

$$U_i^{\rho, q_0}(t_i) \leq \int_{T_i} U_i^{\rho, q_0}(t'_i) dq_i(t'_i) + 2\bar{v} \leq (n+3)\bar{v}.$$

Because any player's interim payment can differ from her interim payoff by at most \bar{v} , we obtain the desired bound. This completes the proof.

With finite type spaces, both the space of payment schemes $\mathcal{L} = \mathbb{R}^{|\mathbf{T}|n}$ and the space of interim expected payment schemes $\underline{\mathcal{L}} = \mathbb{R}^{|T_0| + \dots + |T_n|}$ are finite-dimensional vector spaces. Endow both spaces with the max-norm. We define the linear map

$$\phi^{q_0} : \mathcal{L} \rightarrow \underline{\mathcal{L}}, \quad \mathbf{x}(\cdot) \mapsto (\underline{x}_0^{\rho, q_0}(\cdot), \dots, \underline{x}_n^{\rho, q_n}(\cdot)).$$

The following lemma says that there exists a number κ such that any scheme of interim expected payments that can occur at all can also be obtained from a payment scheme that involves payments at most κ times as large (in absolute value) as the largest interim expected payment of any type of any player.

Lemma 2. *Suppose that T_0, \dots, T_n are finite. Consider any belief q_0 . There exists a number κ such that, for every $\underline{\mathbf{x}}(\cdot) \in \underline{\mathcal{L}}$, there exists $\mathbf{x}(\cdot) \in \mathcal{L}$ such that $\phi^{q_0}(\mathbf{x}(\cdot)) = \underline{\mathbf{x}}(\cdot)$ and $\|\mathbf{x}(\cdot)\| \leq \kappa \|\underline{\mathbf{x}}(\cdot)\|$.*

Proof. The set $\phi^{q_0}(\mathcal{L})$ is a finite-dimensional vector space, hence a Banach space (with the norm induced by the max-norm in $\underline{\mathcal{L}}$), and ϕ^{q_0} maps onto that space. Hence, the claim is immediate from the open mapping theorem in functional analysis.

Proof of Proposition 2. Consider any sequence of payment bounds (λ_l) such that $\lambda_l \rightarrow \infty$. From Mylovanov and Tröger (forthcoming), for each l , there exists an allocation ρ_l that is strongly neologism-proof in the environment with payment bound λ_l . By Lemma 2 and Lemma 1 (with $q_0 = p_0$), w.l.o.g., all these allocations use payments that are bounded by the same number $\kappa\lambda$. Hence, the sequence of payment schemes in the sequence ρ_l is bounded in the max-norm. Hence, there exists a convergent subsequence with limit ρ^* (in the dimension of the probability measures on collective actions, the convergence is meant as a weak convergence).

As a limit of p_0 -feasible allocations, ρ^* is p_0 -feasible. Suppose that ρ^* is not strongly neologism-proof. By Corollary 4, ρ^* is strictly q_0 -dominated by some allocation ρ' , for some belief q_0 .

If l is sufficiently large, then ρ' is a feasible allocation in the environment with payment bound λ_l (w.l.o.g. by Lemma 2 and Lemma 1).

Moreover, if l is sufficiently large, then ρ_l is strictly q_0 -dominated by ρ' because ρ_l approximates ρ^* . This contradicts the fact that ρ_l is strongly neologism-proof in the environment with payment bound λ_l . QED

Proof of Proposition 1. “if” Suppose that ρ is not strongly neologism-proof. Then there exists a belief q_0 and an allocation ρ' that q_0 -dominates ρ . We obtain a contradiction because

$$\eta(q_0) \geq \int_{T_0} U_0^{\rho'}(t_0) dq_0(t_0) > \int_{T_0} U_0^{\rho}(t_0) dq_0(t_0).$$

“only if”. Consider a strongly neologism-proof allocation $\rho = (\alpha(\cdot), x_1(\cdot), \dots, x_n(\cdot))$.

Suppose there exists a belief q_0 such that (7) fails, that is

$$\eta(q_0) > \int_{T_0} U_0^{\rho}(t_0) dq_0(t_0).$$

By definition of $\eta(q_0)$, there exists a q_0 -feasible allocation $\rho' = (\alpha'(\cdot), x'_1(\cdot), \dots, x'_n(\cdot))$ such that

$$(19) \quad \int_{T_0} U_0^{\rho'}(t_0) dq_0(t_0) - \int_{T_0} U_0^{\rho}(t_0) dq_0(t_0) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \epsilon > 0.$$

Let $\rho'' = (\alpha'(\cdot), x''_1(\cdot), \dots, x''_n(\cdot))$, where

$$(20) \quad \begin{aligned} x''_1(\mathbf{t}) &= x'_1(\mathbf{t}) - (U_0^{\rho}(t_0) - U_0^{\rho'}(t_0) + \epsilon). \\ x''_i(\mathbf{t}) &= x'_i(\mathbf{t}), \quad i = 2, \dots, n. \end{aligned}$$

Then ρ'' satisfies the q_0 -incentive and participation constraints for all $i \notin \{0, 1\}$. Also, ρ'' satisfies the q_0 -incentive and participation constraints for $i = 1$ because

$$\begin{aligned} U_1^{\rho'', q_0}(\hat{t}_1, t_1) &= \int_{T_{-1}} \int_A v_1(a, t_1) d\alpha'(\hat{t}_1, \mathbf{t}_{-1})(a) d\mathbf{q}_{-1}(\mathbf{t}_{-1}) - \int_{T_{-1}} x''_1(\hat{t}_1, \mathbf{t}_{-1}) d\mathbf{q}_{-1}(\mathbf{t}_{-1}) \\ &\stackrel{(20)}{=} U_1^{\rho', q_0}(\hat{t}_1, t_1) + \int_{T_0} (U_0^{\rho}(t_0) - U_0^{\rho'}(t_0)) dq_0(t_0) + \epsilon \\ &\stackrel{(19)}{=} U_1^{\rho', q_0}(\hat{t}_1, t_1). \end{aligned}$$

For all $t_0 \in T_0$,

$$(21) \quad U_0^{\rho''}(t_0) - U_0^{\rho}(t_0) \stackrel{(20)}{=} U_0^{\rho'}(t_0) + (U_0^{\rho}(t_0) - U_0^{\rho'}(t_0) + \epsilon) - U_0^{\rho}(t_0) = \epsilon.$$

In other words, in ρ'' every type of the principal is—by the amount ϵ —better off than in ρ . In particular, ρ'' satisfies the participation constraints for $i = 0$. However, ρ'' may violate an incentive constraint for $i = 0$.

To complete the proof, we show that there exists a belief r_0 and an r_0 -feasible allocation σ such that, for all $t_0 \in \text{supp}(r_0)$,

$$(22) \quad U_0^{\sigma}(t_0) \geq U_0^{\rho}(t_0) + \frac{1}{2}\epsilon.$$

It follows that ρ is r_0 -dominated by σ ; this contradicts the strong neologism-proofness of ρ .

Because v_0 is equi-continuous and T_0 is compact, there exists $\delta > 0$ such that

$$(23) \quad \forall t_0, t'_0 \in T_0, z \in Z : \text{ if } |t_0 - t'_0| < \delta \text{ then } |u_0(z, t_0) - u_0(z, t'_0)| < \frac{\epsilon}{8}.$$

Similarly, because ρ is p_0 -feasible, U_0^ρ is uniformly continuous. Hence, there exists $\delta' > 0$ such that

$$(24) \quad \forall t_0, t'_0 \in T_0 : \text{ if } |t_0 - t'_0| < \delta' \text{ then } |U_0^\rho(t_0) - U_0^\rho(t'_0)| < \frac{\epsilon}{8}.$$

By compactness of T_0 , there exists a finite partition $\hat{D}_1, \dots, \hat{D}_{\hat{k}}$ of T_0 such that $\text{diam}(\hat{D}_k) < \min\{\delta, \delta'\}$ for all $k = 1, \dots, \hat{k}$. By dropping any cell \hat{D}_k with $q_0(\hat{D}_k) = 0$, we obtain a partition $D_1, \dots, D_{\bar{k}}$ of some set $\hat{T}_0 \subseteq T_0$, where $q_0(\hat{T}_0) = 1$ and $q_0(D_k) > 0$ for all $k = 1, \dots, \bar{k}$.

We construct an allocation $\rho''' = (\alpha'''(\cdot), \mathbf{x}'''(\cdot))$ from ρ'' as follows. Given any $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbf{T}$ with $t_0 \in D_k$ for some k , we define $\alpha'''(\mathbf{t})$, and $x_i'''(\cdot)$ ($i = 1, \dots, n$) by taking the average over all types in D_k . That is,

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha'''(\mathbf{t})(B) &= \frac{1}{q_0(D_k)} \int_{D_k} \alpha'(t'_0, t_{-0})(B) dq_0(t'_0) \quad \text{for all measurable sets } B \subseteq A, \\ x_i'''(\mathbf{t}) &= \frac{1}{q_0(D_k)} \int_{D_k} x_i''(t'_0, t_{-0}) dq_0(t'_0). \end{aligned}$$

Given any $t_0 \in T_0 \setminus \hat{T}_0$, let $\hat{t}_0 \in \hat{T}_0$ be an announcement that is optimal for t_0 among all announcements in \hat{T}_0 in the direct-mechanism interpretation of ρ''' ; define $\rho'''(t_0, \mathbf{t}_{-0}) = \rho'''(\hat{t}_0, \mathbf{t}_{-0})$ for all $\mathbf{t}_{-0} \in \mathbf{T}_{-0}$. (By construction of ρ''' , there are at most \bar{k} essentially different announcements, so that an optimal one exists.)

By Fubini's Theorem for transition probabilities, for all k and $t_0 \in D_k$,²²

$$(25) \quad u_0(\rho'''(\mathbf{t}), t_0) = \frac{1}{q_0(D_k)} \int_{D_k} u_0(\rho''(t'_0, \mathbf{t}_{-0}), t_0) dq_0(t'_0).$$

²²See, e.g., Bauer, Probability Theory, Ch. 36.

Hence, letting \mathbf{p} denote the product measure of p_1, \dots, p_n ,

$$\begin{aligned}
U_0^{\rho'''}(t_0) &= \int_{\mathbf{T}_{-0}} u_0(\rho'''(\mathbf{t}), t_0) d\mathbf{p}(t_{-0}) \\
&\stackrel{(25)}{=} \frac{1}{q_0(D_k)} \int_{D_k} \int_{\mathbf{T}_{-0}} u_0(\rho''(t'_0, \mathbf{t}_{-0}), t_0) d\mathbf{p}(t_{-0}) dq_0(t'_0) \\
&\stackrel{(23)}{>} \frac{1}{q_0(D_k)} \int_{D_k} \int_{\mathbf{T}_{-0}} (u_0(\rho''(t'_0, \mathbf{t}_{-0}), t'_0) - \frac{\epsilon}{8}) d\mathbf{p}(t_{-0}) dq_0(t'_0) \\
&= \frac{1}{q_0(D_k)} \int_{D_k} (U_0^{\rho''}(t'_0) - \frac{\epsilon}{8}) dq_0(t'_0) \\
&\stackrel{(21)}{=} \frac{1}{q_0(D_k)} \int_{D_k} (U_0^{\rho}(t'_0) + \frac{7}{8}\epsilon) dq_0(t'_0) \\
&\stackrel{(24)}{>} \frac{1}{q_0(D_k)} \int_{D_k} (U_0^{\rho}(t_0) + \frac{3}{4}\epsilon) dq_0(t'_0) \\
&= U_0^{\rho}(t_0) + \frac{3}{4}\epsilon \quad \text{for all } t_0 \in \hat{T}_0.
\end{aligned}$$

Let $\mathcal{I}(q_0)$ denote the set of allocations that satisfy the agents' (but not necessarily the principal's) q_0 -incentive and participation constraints.

We show that $\rho''' \in \mathcal{I}(q_0)$. To see this, consider any $i = 1, \dots, n$ and $\hat{t}_i, t_i \in T_i$. Then

$$\begin{aligned}
U_i^{\rho''', q_0}(\hat{t}_i, t_i) &= \int_{T_{-0-i}} \int_{T_0} u_i(\rho'''(\hat{t}_i, t_{-i}), t_i) dq_0(t_0) dp_{-0-i}(t_{-0-i}) \\
&= \int_{T_{-0-i}} \sum_k \int_{D_k} u_i(\rho'''(\hat{t}_i, t_{-i}), t_i) dq_0(t_0) dp_{-0-i}(t_{-0-i}) \\
&= \int_{T_{-0-i}} \sum_k q_0(D_k) u_i(\rho'''(\hat{t}_i, t_{-i-0}, t_{0k}), t_i) dp_{-0-i}(t_{-0-i}),
\end{aligned}$$

where we have selected any $t_{0k} \in D_k$ for all k . Applying Fubini's Theorem for transition probabilities, we conclude that

$$\begin{aligned}
U_i^{\rho''', q_0}(\hat{t}_i, t_i) &= \int_{T_{-0-i}} \sum_k \int_{D_k} u_i(\rho''(\hat{t}_i, t_{-i-0}, t'_0), t_i) dq_0(t'_0) dp_{-0-i}(t_{-0-i}) \\
&= \int_{T_{-0-i}} \int_{T_0} u_i(\rho''(\hat{t}_i, t_{-i-0}, t'_0), t_i) dq_0(t'_0) dp_{-0-i}(t_{-0-i}) \\
&= U_i^{\rho'', q_0}(\hat{t}_i, t_i).
\end{aligned}$$

Hence, $\rho''' \in \mathcal{I}(q_0)$ because $\rho'' \in \mathcal{I}(q_0)$.

Given ρ''' and any $t_0 \in T_0$, let

$$D^{\rho'''}(t_0) = \{t'_0 \in T_0 \mid \forall t_{-0} : \rho'''(t'_0, t_{-0}) = \rho'''(t_0, t_{-0})\}.$$

By construction, the set

$$\mathcal{D}^{\rho'''} = \{D^{\rho'''}(t_0) \mid t_0 \in T_0\}$$

is a finite partition of T_0 (with at most \bar{k} cells).

In summary, $\rho''' \in \mathcal{E}$, where we define

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{E} &= \{\sigma \mid |\mathcal{D}^\sigma| < \infty, \\ &\quad \exists r_0 : \sigma \in \mathcal{I}(r_0), \exists \hat{T}_0 : r_0(\hat{T}_0) = 1, \\ &\quad \forall t_0 \in \hat{T}_0 : U_0^\sigma(t_0) - U_0^\rho(t_0) > \frac{\epsilon}{2}, \\ &\quad \forall t_0 \in T_0 \setminus \hat{T}_0, t'_0 \in T_0 : U_0^\sigma(t_0) \geq U_0^\sigma(t'_0, t_0), \\ &\quad \forall t_0 \in \hat{T}_0 : \hat{T}_0 \cap \arg \max_{t'_0 \in T_0} U_0^\sigma(t'_0, t_0) \neq \emptyset\}. \end{aligned}$$

Because $\mathcal{E} \neq \emptyset$, there exists $\sigma^* \in \mathcal{E}$ with minimal $|\mathcal{D}^{\sigma^*}|$. Let r_0 denote a corresponding belief and let \hat{T}_0 a corresponding probability-1 set.

Let B^* denote the set of principal-types for which an incentive constraint is violated in σ^* . Then $B^* \subseteq \hat{T}_0$ because $\sigma^* \in \mathcal{E}$. We will show that $r_0(B^*) = 0$.

Suppose that $r_0(B^*) > 0$. We will show that this contradicts the minimality of $|\mathcal{D}^{\sigma^*}|$.

Because $|\mathcal{D}^{\sigma^*}| < \infty$, there exists $D' \in \mathcal{D}^{\sigma^*}$ such that $r_0(B^* \cap D') > 0$.

By violation of the incentive constraint, there exists $D'' \in \mathcal{D}^{\sigma^*} \setminus \{D'\}$ such that

$$r_0(B'') > 0, \quad \text{where } B'' = \{t_0 \in B^* \cap D' \mid U_0^{\sigma^*}(\hat{t}_0, t_0) > U_0^{\sigma^*}(t_0) \text{ if } \hat{t}_0 \in D''\}.$$

We construct a new belief r'_0 by

$$r'_0(B) = r_0(B \cap B'') \frac{r_0(D' \cup D'')}{r_0(B'')} + r_0(B \setminus \{D' \cup D''\}) \quad \text{for any Borel set } B \subseteq T_0.$$

Clearly, r'_0 is absolutely continuous relative to r_0 (hence, relative to p_0). Also,

$$(26) \quad r'_0(\hat{T}'_0) = 1, \quad \text{where } \hat{T}'_0 = B'' \cup (\hat{T}_0 \setminus (D' \cup D'')).$$

We construct an allocation $\sigma' = (\beta(\cdot), \mathbf{y}(\cdot))$ from $\sigma^* = (\beta^*(\cdot), \mathbf{y}^*(\cdot))$ as follows.

Given any $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbf{T}$ with $t_0 \in B''$, we define $\beta(\mathbf{t})$, and $y_i(\cdot)$ ($i = 1, \dots, n$) by taking the average over all types in $D' \cup D''$. That is, for all measurable sets $B \subseteq A$,

$$\begin{aligned} \beta(\mathbf{t})(B) &= \frac{r_0(D')}{r_0(D' \cup D'')} \beta^*(t'_0, t_{-0})(B) + \frac{r_0(D'')}{r_0(D' \cup D'')} \beta^*(t''_0, t_{-0})(B), \\ y_i(\mathbf{t}) &= \frac{r_0(D')}{r_0(D' \cup D'')} y_i^*(t'_0, t_{-0}) + \frac{r_0(D'')}{r_0(D' \cup D'')} y_i^*(t''_0, t_{-0}), \end{aligned}$$

where we have picked any $t'_0 \in D'$ and $t''_0 \in D''$.

Given any $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbf{T}$ with $t_0 \in \hat{T}'_0 \setminus (D' \cup D'')$, we define $\sigma'(\mathbf{t}) = \sigma^*(\mathbf{t})$. For all $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbf{T}$ with $t_0 \notin \hat{T}'_0$, define $\sigma'(\mathbf{t})$ by letting type t_0 announce, in the direct-mechanism interpretation of σ' , whatever type she finds optimal in \hat{T}'_0 . Then

$$|\mathcal{D}^{\sigma'}| \leq |\mathcal{D}^{\sigma^*} \setminus \{D', D''\}| + 1 < |\mathcal{D}^{\sigma^*}|.$$

We will show now that $\sigma' \in \mathcal{E}$, yielding a contradiction to the minimality of $|\mathcal{D}^{\sigma^*}|$.

First we show that

$$(27) \quad \sigma' \in \mathcal{I}(r'_0).$$

Consider any $i = 1, \dots, n$ and $\hat{t}_i, t_i \in T_i$. Then

$$(28) \quad \begin{aligned} U_i^{\sigma', r'_0}(\hat{t}_i, t_i) &= \int_{T_{-0-i}} \int_{\hat{T}_0} u_i(\sigma'(\hat{t}_i, t_{-i}), t_i) dr'_0(t_0) dp_{-0-i}(t_{-0-i}) \\ &= \int_{T_{-0-i}} \int_{\hat{T}_0 \setminus (D' \cup D'')} u_i(\sigma^*(\hat{t}_i, t_{-i}), t_i) dr_0(t_0) dp_{-0-i}(t_{-0-i}) \\ &\quad + \int_{T_{-0-i}} \int_{B''} u_i(\sigma'(\hat{t}_i, t_{-i}), t_i) dr'_0(t_0) dp_{-0-i}(t_{-0-i}). \end{aligned}$$

Picking any $\check{t}_0 \in B''$, and applying Fubini's theorem for transition probabilities,

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{B''} u_i(\sigma'(\hat{t}_i, t_{-i}), t_i) dr'_0(t_0) &= u_i(\sigma'(\hat{t}_i, \check{t}_0, t_{-0-i}), t_i) r'_0(B'') \\ &= \left(\frac{r_0(D')}{r_0(D' \cup D'')} u_i(\sigma^*(\hat{t}_i, t'_0, t_{-0-i}), t_i) + \frac{r_0(D'')}{r_0(D' \cup D'')} u_i(\sigma^*(\hat{t}_i, t''_0, t_{-0-i}), t_i) \right) r'_0(B'') \\ &= r_0(D') u_i(\sigma^*(\hat{t}_i, t'_0, t_{-0-i}), t_i) + r_0(D'') u_i(\sigma^*(\hat{t}_i, t''_0, t_{-0-i}), t_i) \\ &= \int_{D' \cup D''} u_i(\sigma'(\hat{t}_i, t_{-i}), t_i) dr_0(t_0). \end{aligned}$$

Plugging this into (28) yields

$$U_i^{\sigma', r'_0}(\hat{t}_i, t_i) = U_i^{\sigma^*, r_0}(\hat{t}_i, t_i).$$

This implies (27) because $\sigma^* \in \mathcal{I}(r_0)$.

Next we show that, for all $t_0 \in \hat{T}'_0$,

$$(29) \quad U_0^{\sigma'}(t_0) - U_0^{\rho}(t_0) > \frac{\epsilon}{2}.$$

First consider $t_0 \in \hat{T}'_0 \setminus (D' \cup D'')$. Then $U_0^{\sigma'}(t_0) = U_0^{\sigma^*}(t_0)$, so (29) is immediate from $\sigma^* \in \mathcal{E}$ and from $\hat{T}'_0 \subseteq \hat{T}_0$.

For all $t_0 \in B''$, (29) holds because

$$U_0^{\sigma'}(t_0) = \frac{r_0(D')}{r_0(D' \cup D'')} U_0^{\sigma^*}(t_0) + \frac{r_0(D'')}{r_0(D' \cup D'')} U_0^{\sigma^*}(t''_0, t_0) > U_0^{\sigma^*}(t_0).$$

This completes the proof that $\sigma' \in \mathcal{E}$, thereby contradicting the minimality of $|\mathcal{D}^{\sigma^*}|$.

We conclude that $r_0(B^*) = 0$.

Given any $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbf{T}$ with $t_0 \notin B^*$, we define $\sigma(\mathbf{t}) = \sigma^*(\mathbf{t})$. For all $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbf{T}$ with $t_0 \in B^*$, we define $\sigma(\mathbf{t})$ by letting type t_0 announce, in the direct-mechanism interpretation of σ^* , whatever type she finds optimal in $T_0 \setminus B^*$, or assign the disagreement outcome if t_0 prefers that.

By construction, the principal's incentive constraints are satisfied for σ . Also, the agents' r_0 -incentive and participation constraints are satisfied because $\sigma(\mathbf{t})$ equals

$\sigma^*(\mathbf{t})$ for a r_0 -probability-1 set of principal-types, and because these constraints are satisfied for σ^* .

By construction, (22) holds for all $t_0 \in T_0 \setminus B^*$. By continuity of $U_0^\sigma(\cdot)$, (22) extends to all $t_0 \in \text{supp}(r_0)$. In particular, the principal's participation constraint is satisfied for all types in $\text{supp}(r_0)$. By construction, the same holds for all types not in $\text{supp}(r_0)$. Hence, σ is r_0 -feasible. This completes the proof. QED

Proof of Proposition 3. For a probability-1 set of type profiles \mathbf{t} , a solution to the unconstrained F_0 -ex-ante problem will implement an outcome that puts probability 0 on any action $a \in A$ such that

$$(30) \quad \exists b \in A, (s_0^a, \dots, s_n^a) = (s_0^b, \dots, s_n^b), \sum_{i=0}^n c_i^a < \sum_{i=0}^n c_i^b.$$

(Otherwise, the principal could always implement b instead of a and extract larger payments from the agents.)

Moreover, if instead $\sum_{i=0}^n c_i^a = \sum_{i=0}^n c_i^b$ in (30), then either a or b may be used without changing the interim expected utility $\bar{u}_i(t_i)$ of any type t_i of any player i .

Hence, without loss of generality, we may assume A is such that, for all $a \in A$, the vector $s^a = (s_0^a, \dots, s_n^a)$ uniquely determines the vector $c^a = (c_0^a, \dots, c_n^a) = \Phi(s^a)$. Extending Φ linearly to the convex hull \mathcal{S} of $\{s^a | a \in A\}$, we have

$$\mathcal{V} = \{(\hat{s}, \hat{c}) \in \mathbb{R}^{2n+2} \mid \hat{s} \in \mathcal{S}, \hat{c} = \Phi(\hat{s})\}.$$

For all players $i = 0, \dots, n$, naturals $m = 1, 2, \dots$, and $k = 1, \dots, m$, let $C_i^m(k) = [F_i^{-1}((k-1)/m), F_i^{-1}(k/m))$ and $t_i^{m,k} = E_{F_i}[t_i \mid t_i \in C_i^m(k)]$. Define the finite type space

$$T_i^m = \{t_i^{m,1}, \dots, t_i^{m,m}\}$$

and let F_i^m be the c.d.f. for the uniform distribution on T_i^m .

In the following, we will use the quantile functions $F_i^{-1}(q_i) = \min\{t_i \in T_i \mid F_i(t_i) \geq q_i\}$ ($q_i \in [0, 1]$); define $(F_i^m)^{-1}$ analogously. Let $F^{-1}(q) = (F_0^{-1}(q_0), \dots, F_n^{-1}(q_n))$ for all $q = (q_0, \dots, q_n) \in [0, 1]^{n+1}$; define $(F^m)^{-1}$ analogously. Then

$$(31) \quad |F_i^{-1}(q_i) - (F_i^m)^{-1}(q_i)| \leq \frac{1}{m \cdot \min_{t_i \in T_i} f_i(t_i)} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \delta_i^m.$$

Next we show that each of the discrete environments just defined is separable in the sense of Mylovanov and Tröger (forthcoming). For all $i \geq 1$, $t_i \in T_i^m$, and $a, b \in A$, define

$$p_i^{a,b}(t_i) = \begin{cases} \frac{t_i - t_j}{t_i - t_i} & \text{if } s_i^a \geq s_i^b, \\ \frac{t_i - t_j}{t_i - t_i} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Define a function $\alpha(\mathbf{t})$ for all $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbf{T}^m$ by the following randomization: select any number $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ with equal probability ($= 1/n$), then choose action a_i with probability $(1/n) \sum_{j=1}^n p_j^{a_i, b_i}(t_j)$ and choose b_i with the remaining probability, where we use the notation a_i, b_i from (2).

By construction, $p_j^{a_i, b_i}(t_j)$ is strictly increasing in t_j if agent j weakly prefers a_i to b_i , and is strictly decreasing if agent j weakly prefers b_i to a_i . Hence, for any agent i , type $t_i \in T_i^m$, and t_{-i} , as t_i increases, the randomized action $\alpha(\mathbf{t})$ shifts probability from less preferred actions to more preferred actions. Thus, using (2), the function

$$\hat{s}_i(\mathbf{t}) = \int_A s_i^a d\alpha(\mathbf{t})(a)$$

is strictly increasing in t_i , for all \mathbf{t}_{-i} . Hence, we can define payments such that all agents' incentive constraints are satisfied with strict inequality. By adding constant payments we can guarantee that, in addition, all agents' participation constraints are satisfied with strict inequality, showing separability.

Because A is finite, it is trivially compact and the valuation functions are continuous. Hence, by Proposition 2, for each of the discrete-type-space environments constructed above ($m = 1, 2, \dots$), there exists a strongly neologism-proof allocation

$$\rho^m(\mathbf{t}) = (u_0^m(\mathbf{t}), \dots, u_n^m(\mathbf{t}), s_0^m(\mathbf{t}), \dots, c_n^m(\mathbf{t}))$$

that is defined for all $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbf{T}^m = T_0^m \times \dots \times T_n^m$.

We extend ρ^m to all $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbf{T}$ by assuming that, in the direct-mechanism interpretation of ρ^m , any type $t_i \in (t_i^{m,k}, t_i^{m,k+1})$ makes an optimal type announcement from the set $\{t_i^{m,k}, t_i^{m,k+1}\}$, any type $t_i > t_i^{m,m}$ announces the type $t_i^{m,m}$, and any type $t_i < t_i^{m,1}$ announces the type $t_i^{m,1}$.

Then the functions

$$\bar{s}_i^m(t_i) = \int_{T_{-i}} s_i^m(\mathbf{t}) dF_{-i}^m(\mathbf{t}_{-i}), \quad (i \geq 0, t_i \in T_i)$$

are weakly increasing on T_i . Moreover, defining

$$\bar{u}_i^m(t_i) = \int_{T_{-i}} u_i^m(\mathbf{t}) dF_{-i}^m(\mathbf{t}_{-i}),$$

the envelope formula holds on T_i , that is,

$$(32) \quad \bar{u}_i^m(t_i) = \bar{u}_i^m(\underline{t}_i) + \int_{\underline{t}_i}^{t_i} \bar{s}_i^m(y) dy \quad \text{for all } i \geq 0, t_i \in T_i.$$

Observe that this formula includes the principal $i = 0$.

From (32), for all m, i ,

$$|\bar{u}_i^m(t_i) - \bar{u}_i^m(t'_i)| \leq \max_a |s_i^a| \cdot |t_i - t'_i| \quad (t_i, t'_i \in T_i).$$

Hence, the family of functions $(\bar{u}_i^m)_{m=1,2,\dots}$ is equicontinuous. Moreover, by Lemma 1, it is uniformly bounded. Hence, by Arzela and Ascoli's Theorem, there exists a subsequence m' such that

$$(33) \quad \max_{t_i \in T_i} |\bar{u}_i^{m'}(t_i) - \hat{u}_i^*(t_i)| \rightarrow 0$$

for some continuous function \hat{u}_i^* ; i.e., the subsequence converges uniformly.

For all $i \geq 0$, the composite function $s_i^m \circ (F^m)^{-1}$ belongs to $L_2([0, 1]^{n+1})$. The sequence $(s_i^m \circ (F^m)^{-1})_{m=1,2,\dots}$ is $\|\cdot\|_2$ -bounded (for instance, $\max_{a \in A} |s_i^a|$ is a bound). Hence, by Alaoglu's Theorem, there exists a subsequence m' such that

$$(34) \quad s_i^{m'} \circ (F^{m'})^{-1} \rightarrow_{\text{weakly}} h_i^*$$

for some $h_i^* \in L_2([0, 1]^{n+1})$. Define

$$\bar{h}_i^*(q_i) = \int_{[0,1]^n} h_i^*(q) dq_{-i}.$$

Define

$$s_i^*(\mathbf{t}) = h_i^*(F_0(t_0), \dots, F_n(t_n)), \quad (\mathbf{t} \in T).$$

Define

$$\bar{s}_i^*(t_i) = \int_{T_{-i}} s_i^*(\mathbf{t}) dF_{-i}(\mathbf{t}_{-i}).$$

(At this point, is it not yet clear whether \bar{s}_i^* is a weakly increasing function.)

Note that

$$(35) \quad \bar{s}_i^*(F_i^{-1}(q_i)) = \bar{h}_i^*(q_i).$$

Because the functions \bar{s}_i^m are weakly increasing, Helly's selection theorem implies the existence of a subsequence m' such that

$$(36) \quad \bar{s}_i^{m'}(t_i) \rightarrow \hat{s}_i^*(t_i) \quad \text{Lebesgue-a.e. } t_i \in T_i.$$

for some $\hat{s}_i^* \in L_2(T_i)$. This convergence translates into the quantile space:²³

$$(37) \quad \bar{s}_i^{m'}(F_i^{-1}(q_i)) \rightarrow \hat{s}_i^*(F_i^{-1}(q_i)) \quad \text{Lebesgue-a.e. } q_i \in [0, 1].$$

Because the functions $\bar{s}_i^m \circ F_i^m$ are weakly increasing, Helly's selection theorem implies the existence of a subsequence m' such that

$$(38) \quad \bar{s}_i^{m'}((F_i^{m'})^{-1}(q_i)) \rightarrow \hat{h}_i^*(q_i) \quad \text{Lebesgue-a.e. } q_i \in [0, 1].$$

for some $\hat{h}_i^* \in L_2([0, 1])$.

From now on we will work with a subsequence m' such that (33), (34), (36), and (38) hold.

First we show that

$$(39) \quad \bar{s}_i^{m'} \circ (F_i^{m'})^{-1} \rightarrow_{\text{weakly}} \bar{h}_i^*.$$

²³In order to be able to move between quantile space and type space, it is important that an ‘‘Lebesgue-a.e. property’’ in one space translates into an ‘‘Lebesgue-a.e. property’’ in the other space. This follows from the assumption of positive densities. In particular, consider any set Lebesgue measurable set $X \subseteq T_i$ and $Q = \{q_i | F_i^{-1}(q_i) \in X\}$. Then

$$\Pr[Q] = \int_0^1 \mathbf{1}_{F_i^{-1}(q_i) \in X} dq_i = \int_{T_i} \mathbf{1}_{t_i \in X} dF_i(t_i) = \int_X f_i(t_i) dt_i.$$

Hence, Q has Lebesgue-measure 0 if and only if X has Lebesgue-measure 0.

To see this, notice that, for all $g \in L_2([0, 1])$,

$$\begin{aligned} \int_0^1 \bar{s}_i^{m'}((F_i^{m'})^{-1}(q_i))g(q_i)dq_i &= \int_{[0,1]^{n+1}} s_i^{m'} \circ (F^{m'})^{-1}(q)g(q_i)dq \\ &\stackrel{(34)}{\rightarrow} \int_{[0,1]^{n+1}} h_i^*(q)g(q_i)dq \\ &= \int_0^1 \bar{h}_i^*(q_i)g(q_i)dq_i. \end{aligned}$$

Using (38) and (39),

$$(40) \quad \hat{h}_i^*(q_i) = \bar{h}_i^*(q_i) \quad \text{Lebesgue-a.e. } q_i \in [0, 1].$$

Let $\delta > 0$. For all m' large enough such that $\delta_i^{m'} < \delta$,²⁴

$$\begin{aligned} &\int_0^1 \left| \bar{s}_i^{m'}(F_i^{-1}(q_i)) - \bar{s}_i^{m'}((F_i^{m'})^{-1}(q_i)) \right| dq_i \\ (31) \quad &\leq \int_0^1 \max\{\bar{s}_i^{m'}(F_i^{-1}(q_i)) - \bar{s}_i^{m'}((F_i)^{-1}(q_i) - \delta), s_i^{m'}((F_i)^{-1}(q_i) + \delta) - \bar{s}_i^{m'}(F_i^{-1}(q_i))\} dq_i \\ &\leq \int_0^1 (\bar{s}_i^{m'}(F_i^{-1}(q_i)) - \bar{s}_i^{m'}((F_i)^{-1}(q_i) - \delta)) dq_i + \int_0^1 (s_i^{m'}((F_i)^{-1}(q_i) + \delta) - \bar{s}_i^{m'}(F_i^{-1}(q_i))) dq_i \\ (37) \quad &\stackrel{(37)}{\rightarrow} \int_0^1 |\hat{s}_i^*(F_i^{-1}(q_i)) - \hat{s}_i^*((F_i)^{-1}(q_i) - \delta)| dq_i + |\hat{s}_i^*(F_i^{-1}(q_i) + \delta) - \hat{s}_i^*((F_i)^{-1}(q_i))| dq_i \\ &= \int_{T_i} |\hat{s}_i^*(t_i) - \hat{s}_i^*(t_i - \delta)| f_i(t_i) dt_i + \int_{T_i} |\hat{s}_i^*(t_i + \delta) - \hat{s}_i^*(t_i)| f_i(t_i) dt_i \rightarrow 0 \quad \text{as } \delta \rightarrow 0. \end{aligned}$$

(The limits in the last line have this reason: \hat{s}_i^* is weakly increasing, thus is continuous Lebesgue-a.e., implying that the family of functions $k_\delta(t_i) = \hat{s}_i^*(t_i) - \hat{s}_i^*(t_i - \delta)$ converges to 0 Lebesgue-a.e. t_i as $\delta \rightarrow 0$.)

Taking the limit $m' \rightarrow \infty$ in (41), we conclude that

$$\hat{s}_i^*(F_i^{-1}(q_i)) = \hat{h}_i^*(q_i) \quad \text{Lebesgue-a.e. } q_i \in [0, 1].$$

Combining this with (40), we conclude that

$$\hat{s}_i^*(F_i^{-1}(q_i)) = \bar{h}_i^*(q_i) \quad \text{Lebesgue-a.e. } q_i \in [0, 1].$$

Transforming back into type space and using (35), we have

$$(42) \quad \hat{s}_i^*(t_i) = \bar{s}_i^*(t_i) \quad \text{Lebesgue-a.e. } t_i \in T_i.$$

For any $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbf{T}$, define

$$(c_0^*(\mathbf{t}), \dots, c_n^*(\mathbf{t})) = \Phi(s_0^*(\mathbf{t}), \dots, s_n^*(\mathbf{t})).$$

Define $u_0^*(\mathbf{t}), \dots, u_n^*(\mathbf{t})$ via payments such that

$$(43) \quad u_i^*(\mathbf{t}) = \hat{u}_i^*(\underline{t}_i) + \int_{\underline{t}_i}^{t_i} \bar{s}_i^*(y) dy \quad \text{for all } i \geq 0, \mathbf{t} \in \mathbf{T}.$$

²⁴Extend the functions $\bar{s}_i^{m'}$ and \hat{s}_i^* constantly to the left and to the right of T_i in this computation.

This completes the definition of the allocation

$$\rho^* = (u_0^*(\cdot), \dots, u_n^*(\cdot), s_0^*(\cdot), \dots, c_n^*(\cdot)).$$

It remains to show that ρ^* is strongly neologism-proof.

First we show that ρ^* is F_0 -feasible.

Because all functions $\bar{s}_0^*, \dots, \bar{s}_n^*$ are weakly increasing by (42), the envelope condition (43) guarantees that all players' incentive constraints are satisfied. Moreover,

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{m'} \max_{t_i \in T_i} |\bar{u}_i^{m'}(t_i) - \bar{u}_i^*(t_i)| &= \lim_{m'} \max_{t_i \in T_i} \int_{t_i}^{t_i} |\bar{s}_i^{m'}(y) - \bar{s}_i^*(y)| dy \\ &\leq \lim_{m'} \int_{t_i}^{\bar{t}_i} |\bar{s}_i^{m'}(y) - \bar{s}_i^*(y)| dy \\ &\stackrel{(36),(42)}{=} 0. \end{aligned} \tag{44}$$

Hence, because, for all m and all players i , the allocation ρ^m satisfies the participation constraints for all types in T_i^m , the allocation ρ^* satisfies player i 's participation constraints for all types in T_i .

Because weak convergence is preserved under each component of the affine map $\Phi = (\Phi_0, \dots, \Phi_n)$, (34) implies that

$$\begin{aligned} c_i^{m'} \circ (F^{m'})^{-1} &= \Phi_i \circ (s_0^{m'} \circ (F^{m'})^{-1}, \dots, s_n^{m'} \circ (F^{m'})^{-1}) \\ &\rightarrow_{\text{weakly}} \Phi_i \circ (s_0^* \circ F^{-1}, \dots, s_n^* \circ F^{-1}) = c_i^* \circ F^{-1}. \end{aligned}$$

This allows us to verify the budget-balance condition (12) for ρ^* , as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &= \int_{\mathbf{T}} \left(\sum_{i=0}^n s_i^{m'}(\mathbf{t}) t_i + c_i^{m'}(\mathbf{t}) - u_i^{m'}(\mathbf{t}) \right) dF^{m'}(\mathbf{t}) \\ &= \sum_{i=0}^n \left(\int_{[0,1]} \underbrace{\bar{s}_i^{m'}((F_i^{m'})^{-1}(q_i))}_{\rightarrow \bar{s}_i^*(F_i^{-1}(q_i))} \underbrace{(F_i^{m'})^{-1}(q_i)}_{\rightarrow F_i^{-1}(q_i)} dq_i + \int_{[0,1]^{n+1}} c_i^{m'}((F^{m'})^{-1}(q)) dq \right) \\ &\quad - \sum_{i=0}^n \bar{u}_i^{m'}(t_i) dF_i^{m'}(t_i) \\ &\stackrel{(44)}{\rightarrow} \sum_{i=0}^n \int_{T_i} (\bar{s}_i^*(t_i) t_i - \bar{u}_i^*(t_i) t_i) dF_i(t_i) + \int_{[0,1]^{n+1}} c_i^*(F^{-1}(q)) dq \\ &= \int_T \left(\sum_{i=0}^n s_i^*(\mathbf{t}) t_i + c_i^*(\mathbf{t}) - u_i^*(\mathbf{t}) \right) dF(\mathbf{t}). \end{aligned}$$

It remains to verify the condition stated in Proposition 1. Suppose it fails. Then there exists a belief G_0 absolutely continuous relative to F_0 and a G_0 -feasible allocation $\rho' = (s'_0(\cdot), \dots, u'_n(\cdot))$ with a higher G_0 -ex-ante payoff for the principal than ρ^* .

Define G_0^m such that $\Pr_{G_0^m}[t_i^{m,k}] = G_0(F_0^{-1}(k/m)) - G_0(F_0^{-1}((k-1)/m))$. We will use the shortcuts $G = (G_0, F_{-0})$ and $G^m = (G_0^m, F_{-0}^m)$.

For all m , we define an allocation $\rho^m = (s_0^m(\cdot), \dots, u_n^m(\cdot))$: for all $\mathbf{t}^m = (t_0^{m,k_0}, \dots, t_n^{m,k_n})$ ($k_i \in \{1, \dots, m\}$),

$$\begin{aligned} s_i^m(\mathbf{t}^m) &= E_G[s'_i(\mathbf{t}) \mid \forall i : t_i \in C_i^m(k_i)], \\ c_i^m(\mathbf{t}^m) &= E_G[c'_i(\mathbf{t}) \mid \forall i : t_i \in C_i^m(k_i)], \\ u_i^m(\mathbf{t}^m) &= E_G[u'_i(\mathbf{t}) \mid \forall i : t_i \in C_i^m(k_i)] + \mathbf{1}_{i=0}\epsilon_0^m - \mathbf{1}_{i \geq 1}\epsilon_i^m(t_i^{m,k}), \end{aligned}$$

where ϵ_0^m and $\epsilon_i^m(t_i^{m,k})$ are defined below.

For all $i \geq 1$, m , and k , let

$$\begin{aligned} \gamma_i^m(t_i^{m,k}) &= m \int_0^{(k-1)/m} \left(\int_{F_i^{-1}(q_i)}^{F_i^{-1}(q_i + \frac{1}{m})} \bar{s}'_i(y) dy \right. \\ &\quad \left. - \left(F_i^{-1}\left(q_i + \frac{1}{m}\right) - F_i^{-1}(q_i) \right) m \int_{F_i^{-1}(q_i)}^{F_i^{-1}(q_i + \frac{1}{m})} \bar{s}'_i(y) f_i(y) dy \right) dq_i \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\epsilon_i^m(t_i^{m,k}) = \gamma_i^m(t_i^{m,k}) - \max_{k'} |\gamma_i^m(t_i^{m,k'})| \leq 0.$$

Then

$$\begin{aligned} |\gamma_i^m(t_i^{m,k})| &\leq m \int_0^1 \left| F_i^{-1}\left(q_i + \frac{1}{m}\right) - F_i^{-1}(q_i) \right| \\ &\quad \cdot \left| \frac{\int_{F_i^{-1}(q_i)}^{F_i^{-1}(q_i + \frac{1}{m})} \bar{s}'_i(y) dy}{F_i^{-1}\left(q_i + \frac{1}{m}\right) - F_i^{-1}(q_i)} - \frac{\int_{F_i^{-1}(q_i)}^{F_i^{-1}(q_i + \frac{1}{m})} \bar{s}'_i(y) f_i(y) dy}{1/m} \right| dq_i \\ &= m \int_0^1 \left| F_i^{-1}\left(q_i + \frac{1}{m}\right) - F_i^{-1}(q_i) \right| \cdot |\sigma_1(q_i) - \sigma_2(q_i)| dq_i, \end{aligned}$$

where $\sigma_1(q_i), \sigma_2(q_i) \in [\bar{s}'_i(q_i), \bar{s}'_i(q_i + \frac{1}{m})]$ because \bar{s}'_i is weakly increasing. Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} |\gamma_i^m(t_i^{m,k})| &\leq m \int_0^1 \left| F_i^{-1}\left(q_i + \frac{1}{m}\right) - F_i^{-1}(q_i) \right| \cdot \left(\bar{s}'_i\left(q_i + \frac{1}{m}\right) - \bar{s}'_i(q_i) \right) dq_i \\ &\leq \frac{1}{\min_{t_i \in T_i} f_i(t_i)} \int_0^1 \left(\bar{s}'_i\left(q_i + \frac{1}{m}\right) - \bar{s}'_i(q_i) \right) dq_i \rightarrow 0 \text{ as } m \rightarrow \infty. \end{aligned}$$

For all i and m , define a function $\phi_i^m : T_i \rightarrow T_i^m$ such that $\phi_i^m(t_i) = t_i^{m,k}$ for all $t_i \in C_i^m(k)$. Observe that $\phi_i^m(t_i) \rightarrow t_i$ as $m \rightarrow \infty$ for all t_i and hence

$$\epsilon_0^m \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \int_T \sum_{i=0}^n s'_i(\mathbf{t})(t_i - \phi_i^m(t_i)) dG(\mathbf{t}) + \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{k=1}^m \frac{\epsilon_i^m(t_i^{m,k})}{m} \rightarrow 0.$$

This completes the definition of ρ'^m . By construction, for all $i \geq 1$ and $t_i^{m,k} \in T_i^m$,

$$\begin{aligned}
\overline{s}_i^m(t_i^{m,k}) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \int_{\mathbf{T}_{-i}} s_i^m(t_i^{m,k}, \mathbf{t}_{-i}) dG_{-i}^m(\mathbf{t}_{-i}) \\
&= \frac{1}{\Pr_{F_i}(C_i^{k,m})} \int_{C_i^{m,k}} \int_{\mathbf{T}_{-i}} s_i^m(\mathbf{t}) dG_{-i}(\mathbf{t}_{-i}) dF_i(t_i) \\
&= m \int_{C_i^{m,k}} \overline{s}_i^m(t_i) dF_i(t_i) \\
&= m \int_{F_i^{-1}((k-1)/m)}^{F_i^{-1}(k/m)} \overline{s}_i^m(t_i) f_i(t_i) dt_i \\
&= m \int_{(k-1)/m}^{k/m} \overline{s}_i^m(F_i^{-1}(q_i)) dq_i,
\end{aligned}$$

and similar for \overline{c}_i^m and \overline{u}_i^m . In particular, the agents' participation constraints are satisfied for ρ'^m . To verify the agents' incentive constraints, notice that, using the shortcut

$$\Delta = \epsilon_i^m(t_i^{m,k+1}) - \epsilon_i^m(t_i^{m,k}) = \gamma_i^m(t_i^{m,k+1}) - \gamma_i^m(t_i^{m,k}),$$

we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\overline{u}_i^m(t_i^{m,k+1}) - \overline{u}_i^m(t_i^{m,k}) &= m \int_{C_i^{m,k+1}} \overline{u}_i^m(t_i) dF_i(t_i) - m \int_{C_i^{m,k}} \overline{u}_i^m(t_i) dF_i(t_i) - \Delta \\
&= m \int_{k/m}^{(k+1)/m} \overline{u}_i^m(F_i^{-1}(q_i)) dq_i - m \int_{(k-1)/m}^{k/m} \overline{u}_i^m(F_i^{-1}(q_i)) dq_i - \Delta \\
&= m \int_{(k-1)/m}^{k/m} \left(\overline{u}_i^m(F_i^{-1}(q_i + \frac{1}{m})) - \overline{u}_i^m(F_i^{-1}(q_i)) \right) dq_i - \Delta \\
&= m \int_{(k-1)/m}^{k/m} \int_{F_i^{-1}(q_i)}^{F_i^{-1}(q_i + \frac{1}{m})} \overline{s}_i^m(y) dy dq_i - \Delta \\
&= m^2 \int_{(k-1)/m}^{k/m} (F_i^{-1}(q_i + \frac{1}{m}) - F_i^{-1}(q_i)) \int_{F_i^{-1}(q_i)}^{F_i^{-1}(q_i + \frac{1}{m})} \overline{s}_i^m(y) f_i(y) dy dq_i.
\end{aligned}$$

Then, by the first mean value theorem for integration, there exists $\xi_i \in [(k-1)/m, k/m]$ such that

$$\begin{aligned}
\dots &= m^2 \int_{F_i^{-1}(\xi_i)}^{F_i^{-1}(\xi_i + \frac{1}{m})} \bar{s}_i'(y) f_i(y) dy \int_{(k-1)/m}^{k/m} (F_i^{-1}(q_i + \frac{1}{m}) - F_i^{-1}(q_i)) dq_i \\
&= \frac{1}{1/m} \int_{F_i^{-1}(\xi_i)}^{F_i^{-1}(\xi_i + \frac{1}{m})} \bar{s}_i'(y) f_i(y) dy \cdot (t_i^{m,k+1} - t_i^{m,k}) \\
&= \frac{1}{1/m} \int_{\xi_i}^{\xi_i + \frac{1}{m}} \bar{s}_i'(F_i^{-1}(y)) dy \cdot (t_i^{m,k+1} - t_i^{m,k}) \\
&\quad \begin{cases} \geq \bar{s}_i^m(t_i^{m,k})(t_i^{m,k+1} - t_i^{m,k}) \\ \leq \bar{s}_i^m(t_i^{m,k+1})(t_i^{m,k+1} - t_i^{m,k}), \end{cases}
\end{aligned}$$

showing incentive compatibility.

Moreover, due to the correcting term ϵ_0^m , the ex-ante budget balance condition for ρ' implies that the ex-ante budget balance condition holds for ρ'^m . Finally,

$$\max_{t_0 \in T_0^m} | \bar{u}_0^m(t_0) - \bar{u}_0(t_0) | \leq |\epsilon_0^m| + 2 \sum_{i=1}^m \max_{k \in \{1, \dots, m\}} |\gamma_i^m(t_i^{m,k})| \rightarrow 0 \quad \text{as } m \rightarrow \infty.$$

Hence, the principal's G_0^m -ex-ante payoff according to $(\rho')^m$ converges to the principal's G_0 -ex-ante payoff according to ρ' as $m \rightarrow \infty$. This contradicts the fact that ρ^m is strongly neologism-proof for all m . *QED*

Proof of Proposition 4. From Proposition 3 and Corollary 2, the solutions to the principal's F_0 -ex-ante problem are precisely the solutions to the principal's relaxed F_0 -ex-ante problem in which the principal's incentive and participation constraints are satisfied.

Using (12) to rewrite the objective, the principal's relaxed F_0 -ex-ante problem is to

$$\begin{aligned}
&\max_{u_1(\mathbf{t}), \dots, u_n(\mathbf{t}), (s_0(\mathbf{t}), \dots, c_n(\mathbf{t})) \in \mathcal{V}} \int_T \left(\sum_{i=0}^n s_i(\mathbf{t}) t_i + c_i(\mathbf{t}) - \sum_{i=1}^n u_i(\mathbf{t}) \right) dF(\mathbf{t}), \\
&\text{s.t.} \quad \bar{s}_i(\cdot) \text{ weakly increasing for all } i \geq 1, \\
&\quad \bar{u}_i(t_i) = \bar{u}_i(\underline{t}_i) + \int_{\underline{t}_i}^{t_i} \bar{s}_i(y) dy \text{ for all } i \geq 1, t_i \in T_i, \\
&\quad \bar{u}_i(t_i) \geq 0 \text{ for all } i \geq 1, t_i \in T_i.
\end{aligned}$$

Using the virtual valuation functions $\psi_i(t_i) = t_i - (1 - F_i(t_i))/f_i(t_i)$ and (10), the objective of this problem can be rewritten as

$$\int_T \left(s_0(\mathbf{t}) t_0 + c_0(\mathbf{t}) + \sum_{i=1}^n s_i(\mathbf{t}) \psi_i(t_i) + c_i(\mathbf{t}) \right) dF(\mathbf{t}) - \sum_{i=1}^n \bar{u}_i(\underline{t}_i),$$

Here, only the lowest-types' utilities $\underline{u}_i = \bar{u}_i(\underline{t}_i)$ occur. Thus we can define payments to satisfy (10) in a separate (second) step, and can simplify the maximization problem as follows:

$$(45) \quad \begin{aligned} & \max_{(\underline{u}_1, \dots, \underline{u}_n) \in \mathbf{R}^n, (s_0(\mathbf{t}), \dots, c_n(\mathbf{t})) \in \mathcal{V}} \int_T \left(s_0(\mathbf{t})t_0 + c_0(\mathbf{t}) + \sum_{i=1}^n s_i(\mathbf{t})\psi_i(t_i) + c_i(\mathbf{t}) \right) dF(\mathbf{t}) \\ & \quad - \sum_{i=1}^n \underline{u}_i, \\ & \text{s.t.} \quad \bar{s}_i(\cdot) \text{ weakly increasing for all } i \geq 1, \\ & \quad \underline{u}_i + \int_{\underline{t}_i}^{t_i} \bar{s}_i(y) dy \geq 0 \text{ for all } i \geq 1, t_i \in T_i. \end{aligned}$$

Defining

$$\mathcal{M} = \{(s_0(\cdot), \dots, c_n(\cdot)) \mid (45)\},$$

we have to

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{(\underline{u}_1, \dots, \underline{u}_n) \in \mathbf{R}^n, (s_0(\cdot), \dots, c_n(\cdot)) \in \mathcal{M}} \int_T \left(s_0(\mathbf{t})t_0 + c_0(\mathbf{t}) + \sum_{i=1}^n s_i(\mathbf{t})\psi_i(t_i) + c_i(\mathbf{t}) \right) dF(\mathbf{t}) \\ & \quad - \sum_{i=1}^n \underline{u}_i, \\ & \text{s.t.} \quad \underline{u}_i + \int_{\underline{t}_i}^{t_i} \bar{s}_i(y) dy \geq 0 \text{ for all } i \geq 1, t_i \in T_i. \end{aligned}$$

Using the Lagrange approach (e.g., Luenberger (1969), Chapter 8), we have to

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{(\underline{u}_1, \dots, \underline{u}_n) \in \mathbf{R}^n, (s_0(\cdot), \dots, c_n(\cdot)) \in \mathcal{M}} \int_T \left(s_0(\mathbf{t})t_0 + c_0(\mathbf{t}) + \sum_{i=1}^n s_i(\mathbf{t})\psi_i(t_i) + c_i(\mathbf{t}) \right) dF(\mathbf{t}) \\ & \quad - \sum_{i=1}^n \underline{u}_i \\ & \quad + \sum_{i=1}^n \int_{T_i} \left(\underline{u}_i + \int_{\underline{t}_i}^{t_i} \bar{s}_i(y) dy \right) dz_i^*(t_i), \end{aligned}$$

where z_i^* ($i \geq 1$) is a right-continuous and weakly increasing function on T_i such that

$$(46) \quad \sum_{i=1}^n \int_{T_i} \left(\underline{u}_i^* + \int_{\underline{t}_i^*}^{t_i} \bar{s}_i^*(y) dy \right) dz_i^*(t_i) = 0,$$

where $(\underline{u}_1^*, \dots, \underline{u}_n^*, s_0^*(\cdot), \dots, c_n^*(\cdot))$ denotes a solution to the maximization problem.

Because the solution value is the same as to the F_0 -ex-ante optimization problem (e.g., Luenberger (1969), Chapter 8), we cannot reach arbitrarily high values, implying

that $z_i^*(\bar{t}_i) = 1$ for all i (otherwise \underline{t}_i could be chosen to achieve arbitrarily high values for the objective).

Hence, $\underline{u}_1, \dots, \underline{u}_n$ cancel out and the objective becomes

$$\int_T \left(s_0(\mathbf{t})t_0 + c_0(\mathbf{t}) + \sum_{i=1}^n s_i(\mathbf{t})\psi_i(t_i) + c_i(\mathbf{t}) \right) dF(\mathbf{t}) \\ + \sum_{i=1}^n \int_{T_i} \int_{\underline{t}_i}^{t_i} \bar{s}_i(y) dy dz_i^*(t_i),$$

Using integration by parts, we can rewrite the objective as

$$\int_T \left(s_0(\mathbf{t})t_0 + c_0(\mathbf{t}) + \sum_{i=1}^n s_i(\mathbf{t})\psi_i^{z_i^*}(t_i) + c_i(\mathbf{t}) \right) dF(\mathbf{t}),$$

By the arguments of Myerson (1981), maximization of this objective is equivalent to (14), provided that there exists a solution to (14) that belongs to \mathcal{M} . The existence of a solution that belongs to \mathcal{M} is argued as follows. Observe that

$$(s_0^*(\mathbf{t}), \dots, c_n^*(\mathbf{t})) \in \arg \max_{b \in \mathcal{V}} b \cdot d,$$

where

$$b = (\hat{s}_0, \dots, \hat{c}_n), \\ d = (t_0, \bar{\psi}_1^*(t_1), \dots, \bar{\psi}_n^*(t_n), 1, \dots, 1).$$

If t_i becomes larger, one component of d becomes larger, or d remains constant. Consider the problem to $\max_{b \in \mathcal{V}} b \cdot d^j$ for two vectors $d^1, d^2 \in \mathbb{R}^m$ with $d^2 = d^1 + (\delta, 0, \dots, 0)$ for some $\delta > 0$. Let $b^j \in \arg \max_b b \cdot d^j$ for $j = 1, 2$. Then we claim that $b_1^2 \geq b_1^1$. To see this, consider $\hat{b} \in \mathcal{V}$ such that $\hat{b}_1 < b_1^1$. By optimality of b^1 , we have $\hat{b} \cdot d^1 \leq b^1 \cdot d^1$, implying $\hat{b} \cdot d^2 < b^1 \cdot d^2$. Hence, $\hat{b} \notin \arg \max_b b \cdot d^2$, as was to be shown.

Finally, observe that (46) is equivalent to (13). Hence, a solution to the principal's relaxed F_0 -ex-ante problem is characterized by the conditions (13), (14), (15) for $i \neq 0$, (16) for $i \neq 0$, and (17) for $i \neq 0$. The additional conditions (15), (16), and (17) for $i = 0$ are the principal's incentive and participation constraints. This completes the characterization.

Proof of Proposition 6. We make use of the conditions provided in Proposition 4. Observe that

$$V^{z_1^*, \dots, z_n^*}(v, \mathbf{t}) = \bar{\psi}_1^{z_1^*}(t_1)\hat{s}_1 - t_0\hat{s}_0.$$

Condition (14) yields that $s_1(\mathbf{t}) = 1 - \underline{\alpha}$ if $\bar{\psi}_1^{z_1^*}(t_1) > t_0$ and $s_1(\mathbf{t}) = -\underline{\alpha}$ if $\bar{\psi}_1^{z_1^*}(t_1) < t_0$. Therefore,

$$(47) \quad \bar{s}_1(t_1) = F_0(\bar{\psi}_1^{z_1^*}(t_1)) - \underline{\alpha} \quad \text{a.e. } t_1.$$

Let $[\underline{y}_1, \bar{y}_1]$ denote the interval of types t_1 such that $\bar{u}_1(t_1) = 0$. By the monotonicity condition (15), if $t_1 > \bar{y}_1$, then $\bar{s}(t_1) \geq 0$. In fact, by definition of \bar{y}_1 and the envelope

formula (16),

$$(48) \quad \bar{s}_1(t_1) > 0 \text{ if } t_1 > \bar{y}_1, \text{ and } \bar{s}_1(t_1) < 0 \text{ if } t_1 < \underline{y}_1.$$

First, we show that $\underline{y}_1 < \bar{y}_1$. Suppose that $\underline{y}_1 = \bar{y}_1$. Then $z_1^*(t_1) = \mathbf{1}_{t_1 \geq \underline{y}_1}$ by (13), implying that $\psi_1^{z_1^*}(t_1) = \psi^s(t_1)$ if $t_1 < \underline{y}_1$ and $\psi_1^{z_1^*}(t_1) = \psi^b(t_1)$ if $t_1 \geq \underline{y}_1$.

Suppose, furthermore, that $\underline{y}_1 = \bar{y}_1 = \underline{t}_1$. Then $\psi_1^{z_1^*} = \psi^b$ is strictly increasing. Hence, $\bar{\psi}_1^{z_1^*} = \psi^b$. Hence, for $t_1 \approx 0$, $\bar{\psi}_1^{z_1^*}(t_1) < 0$, implying $\bar{s}_1(t_1) = -\underline{\alpha} < 0$ by (47). That is, \bar{u}_1 is strictly decreasing at $t_1 \approx 0$ by (16), a contradiction to $\bar{u}_1(\underline{t}_1) = \bar{u}_1(\underline{y}_1) = 0$ and (17). For a similar reason, it cannot be that $\underline{y}_1 = \bar{y}_1 = \bar{t}_1$.

Thus, suppose that $\underline{y}_1 = \bar{y}_1 \in (\underline{t}_1, \bar{t}_1)$. Because $\psi_1^{z_1^*}$ jumps downwards at \underline{y}_1 , ironing implies that, for all t_1 in an open neighborhood of \underline{y}_1 , the function $\bar{\psi}_1^{z_1^*}(t_1)$ is constant. Hence, by (47) and (15), $\bar{s}_1(t_1) = \text{const.}$ for all t_1 in the open neighborhood, contradicting (48).

Hence, $\underline{y}_1 < \bar{y}_1$. Then $\bar{s}_1(t_1) = 0$ on $(\underline{y}_1, \bar{y}_1)$ by the envelope formula (16). Hence, using (47) and (48), for a.e. t_1 ,

$$(49) \quad \bar{\psi}_1^{z_1^*}(t_1) \quad \begin{cases} > F_0^{-1}(\underline{\alpha}_1) & \text{if } t_1 > \bar{y}_1, \\ = F_0^{-1}(\underline{\alpha}_1) & \text{if } t_1 \in [\underline{y}_1, \bar{y}_1], \\ < F_0^{-1}(\underline{\alpha}_1) & \text{if } t_1 < \underline{y}_1. \end{cases}$$

This extends to all t_1 because $\bar{\psi}_1^{z_1^*}$ is continuous. Notice that $\underline{y}_1 > \underline{t}_1$ because otherwise $\psi_1^{z_1^*}(\underline{t}_1) \geq \bar{\psi}_1^{z_1^*}(\underline{t}_1)$, but this is impossible because

$$\psi_1^{z_1^*}(\underline{t}_1) \leq \psi^s(\underline{t}_1) = \underline{t}_1 = 0 < F_0^{-1}(\underline{\alpha}_1) = \bar{\psi}_1^{z_1^*}(\underline{t}_1).$$

Similarly, $\bar{y}_1 < \bar{t}_1$.

From (13), $\psi_1^{z_1^*}(t_1) = \psi^s(t_1)$ for all $t_1 < \underline{y}_1$. Hence, because ψ^s is strictly increasing and using (49),

$$\bar{\psi}_1^{z_1^*}(t_1) = \psi^s(t_1) \quad \text{for all } t_1 < \underline{y}_1.$$

Similarly, because ψ^b is strictly increasing,

$$\bar{\psi}_1^{z_1^*}(t_1) = \psi^b(t_1) \quad \text{for all } t_1 > \bar{y}_1.$$

Hence, using (49) and the continuity of $\bar{\psi}_1^{z_1^*}$, $\psi^s(\underline{y}_1) = F_0^{-1}(\underline{\alpha})$, implying

$$\underline{y}_1 = (\psi^s)^{-1}(F_0^{-1}(\underline{\alpha})).$$

Similarly,

$$\bar{y}_1 = (\psi^b)^{-1}(F_0^{-1}(\underline{\alpha})).$$

This completes the proof.

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