Journalistic Narrations for Deliberative Ends

A Country Comparison of Narrative News and Its Contribution to the Deliberative Quality of Mediated Debates on Climate Change

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July 2016

Inaugural dissertation submitted

to the School of Humanities, University of Mannheim, Germany

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Abstract

The dissertation investigates journalistic news narrations. It aims at assessing their deliberative qualities by applying a quantitative instrument for a content analysis of newspapers that focuses comparatively on climate change coverage in Brazil, Germany, and the United States.

For this study, narrative news in the journalistic context is understood as a form of writing that differs from the conventional inverted pyramid style of traditional newspaper coverage by telling news stories in a sequential order, focusing on agents, their actions, and emotions as well as including additional details and hypothetical information. Narratives in a non-fictional media environment are a phenomenon about which the scholarly debate is ambiguous when it comes to an assessment of benefits and harms. Narratives in the context of so-called hard news have been evaluated differently, ranging from the negative assessments of intensified personalization and simplification to stressing the positive effects of increased accessibility to an issue and providing space for alternative and challenging interpretations.

Nevertheless, extensive theoretical considerations regarding journalistic narratives and their specific impact on public deliberation, especially within the mass media context and mediated deliberation, are rare. This study deals with this gap from a theoretical and empirical perspective. It aims at assessing narrative news coverage against the discussion of news quality in times of increasing economic constraints, by reviewing their deliberative performance. The investigations systematically look at the fulfillment of deliberative ideals such as the inclusion of actors and ideas on the input dimension of the public sphere, the occurrence of opposing arguments on the throughput dimension, and the openness or closure of the debate on the output dimension. Context knowledge about the journalistic cultures, historical developments of journalism, and the political and media systems of the three countries Brazil, Germany and the US is used to describe under which conditions narrative news is more likely to fulfill positive functions of public deliberation.

To investigate the deliberative quality of journalistic narratives in the coverage on climate change, a quantitative content analysis was conducted of German, Brazilian and US newspaper coverage on the UN climate change conferences of Cancun, Mexico (2010); Durban, South Africa (2011); Doha, Qatar (2012); and Warsaw, Poland (2013). The sample contains two widely read daily quality newspapers for each country. Narrative and deliberative elements were deduced theoretically for quantitative operationalization.

Results reveal that there is no general relationship between narrativity and the deliberative quality. There is no indication that narrative news writing is either good or bad in deliberative terms; it is rather context dependent. The results show that the newspaper coverage of all three countries differs in the use of narrative elements, the application of different story types, and in their general deliberative quality. While the Brazilian coverage generally has a high degree of narrativity and mainly uses story types that emphasize the urgency of climate change, it has a rather low deliberative quality. The opposite is the case for the US, which has a lower degree of narrativity, mainly using unexcited story types, and provides a higher deliberative quality. In both cases, narrative writing compared to non-narrative writing accounts for higher or lower deliberative quality only on some dimensions, but no consistent pattern was found. The picture is more diverse in Germany, with a less unambiguous use of narratives and story types, and a mixed deliberative quality. However, the relationship between higher narrativity and deliberative quality is most salient in this case.

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LIST OF ABBRIVIATIONS

COP   Conference of the Parties

et al.   et alii, et aliae, et alia (meaning "and others")

FAZ   Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

ibid.   ibidem (meaning "in the same place")

i.e.   id est (meaning „that is to say")

NYT   New York Times

p./ pp.   Page(s)

SZ   Süddeutsche Zeitung

WP   Washington Post

UNFCCC   United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

1 Introduction

Extensive global economic liberalization and political deregulation have had significant structural consequences for news media companies during the last decades (Umbricht & Esser, 2014). Technical innovations and the rapid rise of online phenomena, such as search engines like Google or the free online encyclopedia Wikipedia, as well as social networks like Facebook challenge the information sovereignty and interpretative authority of traditional media. To remain competitive, a growing pressure to increase efficiencies and to lower costs has led to substantial cost cutting on staff in newsrooms, as well as to a reduction of journalists who are specialized in specific news sections, and, in addition, to shorter formats and a higher service orientation (Neveu, 2014; Umbricht & Esser, 2014). Traditional newspapers fight against a declining newspaper circulation, an aging readership, and a significant decrease in the amount of time that people spend reading newspapers per day in order to hold market share positions and advertising revenues (Kramer, 2000). The rise of online news media, today permanently accessible through mobile devices, and 24-hour TV news channels with ongoing breaking news (Conboy & Steel, 2008) increase the pressure, and make the traditional morning newspaper seem almost obsolete as soon as it arrives at the breakfast table.

Against this background of rising economic pressure, scholars have expressed their concerns about the decline in the quality of news and vitally criticized a shift from hard news to soft news, to personalization, sensationalism, infotainment, and the reduction of policy-relevant information (Plasser, 2005). These trends, commonly labeled with terms such as audience orientation or commercialization (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), are connected to a negligence of central news values which are assumed to be important for the maintenance of a democratic public sphere that builds on well-informed participants and audiences (Dunn, 2003). Instead, the dedication to profit maximization, as critics fear according to Webster (2011, p.22), "leads to content that is escapist, shallow and hucksterist because the media producers must achieve highest possible audience figures while creating least possible controversy." What is widely called the *crisis of journalism* may be explained with an ongoing process of rationalization, which Neveu (2014, p. 534) calls a "double process of impoverishment, of disconnection of journalism with a significant part of the readership's expectations and abilities." Western journalism, however, has always been marked by a double character: on the one hand, serving the common interest as a social institution and even a fourth estate with a significant

relevance for democracies; on the other hand, serving individual (economic) interests as an industry that has always been bound to pragmatic conditions such as deadlines and outreach (Weischenberg, 1998). Increasing commercialization is a threat to media systems as social institutions when they shift "away from the world of politics towards the world of commerce" (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 277).

Entman (2010, p. 105) appeals to "interrupt the vicious circle binding lower quality news production to less-informed and less-interested citizens" and calls for creative solutions. For him, this includes a "need for narrative" (p. 113). Nerone (2008) already identifies a comeback of narrative forms, especially in print media: "As newspapers recede further from mass circulation and breaking news, they have developed a new openness to narrative and literary styles." However, narratives in a non-fictional media environment are a phenomenon about which the scholarly debate is rather ambiguous, when it comes to an assessment of benefits and harms. Although often primarily associated with human interest and soft-news journalism rather than with hard news, the role of narratives is far from being sufficiently investigated. Narratives emerge in the context of so-called hard news, where they have been evaluated variously, ranging from the negative assessments of intensified personalization and simplification (Lester & Hutchins, 2012), to the positive effects of increased accessibility to an issue, as well as providing space for alternative and challenging interpretations (Cottle, 2000). Entman (2010, p. 113), referring to Iyengar (1991), emphasizes that narratives can "connect dots" and counteract fragmentation by connecting single events to their long-term thematic contexts. Kramer (2000) argues that narratives help to engage readers more deeply when they offer information on events through good storytelling. Beyond that, narratives can help people to discover unknown or hidden social worlds, for example, by "humanizing" experiences to which readers would otherwise not have access (Neveu, 2014; Benson, 2014).

In this study, I argue that there can hardly be one definite conclusion about whether narrative news is either good or bad altogether. It is more likely that there are certain circumstances that either facilitate or impede a positive contribution of narrative features to the quality of media coverage. The overarching research question of this study therefore asks for the contribution of narrative news writing to the deliberative quality of the mediated public debates in different (national) contexts.

To evaluate the actual contribution of narrative news to the quality of news coverage, it is necessary to (1) develop a concept to determine the narrativity of news texts, and (2) apply a suitable measurement to rate the quality of narrative news. To offer explanations for the contribution of narrativity within the news, the study will (3) perform a comparative research design, conducting a content analysis of newspaper coverage in Brazil, Germany and the United States, while taking the different contexts of media systems and journalistic cultures and traditions into account.

This approach aims at contributing to the discussion about the value of narrative forms within journalism and in this case especially within newspaper coverage about climate change and climate politics at the UN climate change conferences. Eide and Kunelius emphasize the high relevance of the issue of climate change by stating:

> Climate change knows no borders, and is thus a historically unforeseen challenge to global governance and regulation. As a global problem calling for coordinate action, it is *the* paradigmatic case to look for to encourage the emergence of transnational or global public spheres, i.e. spaces or moments in which networks of communication flows enable and force global and national civil society actors to interact with representatives of states and international political bodies. (Eide and Kunelius 2010, p. 12)

The climate change conferences, which have generated a lot of media attention over the years (Schäfer, Ivanova, & Schmidt, 2013), provide a suitable object of investigation, because by enabling the emergence of a global public sphere they allow us to identify cultural particularities within the media coverage of one globally accessible event in vastly divergent contexts (e.g. Krøvel, 2011; Kunelius & Eide, 2012). This is a necessary condition for being able to identify those contexts in which narrative news contributes positively or negatively to the mediated debate.

Obviously, such assessments need some kind of yardstick. For this reason, this study engages with thoughts about deliberation theory, which values the wide exchange of ideas and opinions of different actors as an important foundation for collective decision making. Deliberative democrats argue that the legitimacy of political decisions needs to be reached through public discourse on issues that are relevant for society. Such a public discourse should meet certain standards, which are expressed in definitions of deliberation as "a form of discussion in which an individual or group carefully examines a problem and considers proposals for solutions that reflect a variety of perspectives with the aim of arriving at a well-reasoned solution." (Rinke, 2016, p.1). In modern

societies, such a communicative process cannot function without the mass media that presents the broadest range of ideas and solutions enabling media users to engage in the deliberative process (Gastil, 2008). How the news media perform on providing public deliberation is a matter of empirical concern.

For the investigation of the deliberative quality, it also seems quite reasonable to regard the mediated debate on climate change. Climate change is a highly political and normative issue, especially concerning questions of justice and equity. Besides normative considerations, there is a need for concrete political solutions and actions that follow from these—though there cannot be only one solution that fits the problem, since the causes and effects of climate change are diverse. Therefore, the public debate has to be able to disclose a wide range of ideas, enabling a vital competition for the best solutions. To what extent narrative news forms about climate change and climate politics are able to fulfill these deliberative demands will be the central focus of this study.

Several scholars have already engaged in considerations about the surplus of narrative forms of deliberation. Young (2002, p. 7), for example, argues that "*[n]arrative […]* has many important functions in political deliberation; narratives can supply steps in arguments, but they can also serve to explain meanings and experiences when groups do not share premises sufficiently to proceed with an argument." Boswell (2013, p. 621) adds that "[n]arratives can be important rhetorical devices in deliberation on complex and contested issues." However, deeper theoretical considerations of the understanding of narratives and their specific impact on public deliberation, especially within the mass-media context and mediated deliberation, are rare. This dissertation wants to deal with this gap both theoretically and empirically. It therefore brings both lines of thoughts together, aiming at assessing narratives within news coverage against the discussion of news quality in times of increasing economic constraints, by reviewing their deliberative performance as a measure of quality. Empirical analyses will focus on newspaper coverage on climate change as an all-embracing topic with scientific, political, social and normative implications, concentrating especially on newspaper coverage on the annual UN climate change conferences, which are important periodical drivers of global media coverage on climate change (Schäfer, Ivanova, & Schmidt, 2013). I will apply a quantitative content analysis with a comparative approach for investigating the implementation and performance of journalistic narratives in newspaper coverage on climate change in three highly involved countries: the USA,

Brazil, and Germany. The countries were chosen because they represent different media systems and traditions according to Hallin and Mancini's (2004) classification, which I will explain in detail in Chapter 5. The US represent the North American liberal model, Germany the democratic corporatist model, while Brazil is not part of the original classification, since the authors originally concentrated on European and North American countries. However, the media system in Brazil was highly influenced by its European colonial history and especially by Portuguese and French styles of writing (Albuquerque, 2012) to an extend that it shows enough resemblance to Hallin and Mancini's (2004) polarized pluralist model and represents a good contrast to the other countries in the sample. Beyond considerations on their media system, all three countries play a distinct role in the political process surrounding climate change: the US and Germany are both developed countries, contributing to climate change for decades but with different dedication to solving the problem within the guidelines set up by the United Nations. Brazil as an emerging country has had less responsibility for climate change in the past but is highly affected by it in the present. It also has a great interest in connecting climate change measures with its own development aims. These differences will be considered when trying to explain similarities and differences in the coverage.

By and large, I will argue that news narratives are not generally either "good" or "bad" but that we need to define standards to evaluate and explain their performance with relevant context factors to assess the value of news narratives in a specific media environment.

1.1   Research Questions

The overall research is aimed towards the role of narrative news within newspaper coverage in the current media environment. The work will especially focus on the deliberative quality of news narratives within newspaper coverage on climate change in Germany, the US, and Brazil. Specific research questions cover different levels of the analytic process. On a more descriptive level I ask:

RQ1a: How and in which topical contexts are narrative elements used in newspaper coverage on climate change?

RQ1b: Which country specific differences can be detected between Germany, the US, and Brazil?

A second set of research questions aims at a normative assessment by asking:

RQ2a: What are the contributions of news narratives to the deliberative quality of newspaper coverage?

RQ2b: Are there country specific differences that can be detected between Germany, the US and Brazil?

On the explanatory level, I aim at finding causes (regarding the journalistic cultural, professional, political, or media system context) for the dispersion of narrative news and its degree of deliberative quality by asking:

RQ3: Which factors drive (a) the dispersal and (b) the deliberative quality of news narratives in Germany, the US, and Brazil?

Finally, to reflect on the utility of the empirical approach used to assess deliberative quality, the last research question will focus on the meta level and ask:

RQ4: How useful is it to employ an analytical instrument to measure the deliberative qualities of narrative newspaper coverage?

1.2 Book Outline

After having introduced the general research interest as well as the research questions that this dissertation aims to answer, I will go into detail on the relevant theoretical considerations. Chapter 2 covers the theory of journalistic narrations as the central concept of this work. This communicative mode will be generally discussed to come to a definition that is applicable to the empirical investigations (Ch. 2.1). To further this understanding, I will also discuss social functions of news narratives (Ch. 2.2), as well as different narrative genres (Ch. 2.3). The scholarly debate on the uses and harms of narratives in the news context will be retraced, regarding the critique that is commonly brought forward (Ch. 2.4) and the current state of research (Ch.2.5). The chapter will close with an excursus on framing as one of the central concepts in communication science to clarify the differences between both concepts.

To assess narrative news writing, this study proposes the application of deliberative theory and mediated deliberation, which will be introduced in Chapter 3. I will reflect on basic assumptions of the public sphere and public discourse, as well as the role of deliberation (Ch. 3.1) and go into detail on deliberative ideals (3.2). Deliberative concepts have widely been criticized in academic discussions, which will be sketched out in Ch. 3.3. Since public (political) communication in modern democracies is heavily dependent on media and since newspaper content is the object of investigation in this

study, I will close the chapter by highlighting further considerations on mediated deliberation (Ch. 3.4).

Taking the general theoretical considerations on (mediated) deliberation into account, Chapter 4 will define explicit deliberative standards that can be applied to media coverage for assessing its quality. In this chapter, it will be especially important to reflect on the role of journalists and their contribution to facilitating or inhibiting deliberative coverage. For structuring, I will separately look at journalistic performances at the input (Ch. 4.1), throughput (Ch. 4.2), and output (Ch. 4.3.) dimensions of the public sphere, and come to an interim conclusion (Ch. 4.4) at the end of the fourth chapter.

Chapter 5 will outline the foundations for the comparative analysis of the three countries Brazil, Germany, and the US by elaborating on various context factors that may influence the use of narrativity in a country's media coverage as well as the deliberative quality of that country's coverage. With the help of considerations on journalism culture (Ch. 5.1), journalism history and especially the history of narrative journalism (Ch. 5.2), the media system (Ch. 5.3) and the national political context (Ch. 5.4), I will hypothesize on when to expect certain types of narrativity and stories but will also reflect on when to expect higher or lower deliberative quality of news narratives (Ch. 5.5).

Chapter 6 presents the research design, introduces (the media coverage on) climate change and climate politics at the annual United Nations climate change conferences as the object of investigation, and justifies its applicability for the comparative analysis (Ch. 6.1). It then explains the operationalization of the central theoretical concepts (Ch. 6.2 – 6.3) as well as the formal characteristics (Ch. 6.4) of my quantitative content analysis. Detailed pretest results are offered in Ch. 6.5.

The results of my research will be presented in three sections in Chapter 7. First, it will present the narrative features in all three countries (Ch. 7.1.), distinguishing between the degree of narrativity (7.1.1), story types (7.1.2), and narrative roles (7.1.3). The deliberative qualities of the coverage in general will be investigated in Ch. 7.2, before assessing the deliberative qualities in narrative news in Ch. 7.3. A summary will be given in Ch. 7.4.

The discussion and conclusion section in Chapter 8 will reflect on the results against the background of the theoretical considerations and the context knowledge gained in

previous chapters to evaluate the hypotheses and further explore circumstances in which narrative news may contain more or less deliberative quality. The chapter will draw it conclusions by answering the original research questions and pointing out implications for further research.

2   Journalistic Narratives

Approaches to analyzing narratives differ mostly in how broadly they understand the term. On a very general level, Avraamidou and Osborne (2009, p. 1686) emphasize their importance by stressing that lives are told and represented through narratives, even arguing that "history is of itself a narrative." They highlight an important function that narratives fulfill: They are used in everyday life as a way of making sense of, as well as communicating experiences and events in the world to others (ibid.). McComas and Shanahan (1999, p. 36) explain that "humans use narratives to weave together fragmented observations to construct meanings and realities." They also point out that social meaning is created through a shared set of symbol systems between a storyteller and an audience. Fisher (1984) even introduces the master metaphor "homo narrans" (p. 6) to express that storytelling is a fundamental form of communication for humans, even stating that "humans are essentially storytellers" (p.8). As Barthes (1975) explains in his theoretical considerations, narratives are a fundamental mode of human communication. According to him, there is an "infinite variety of forms, it is present at all times, in all places, in all societies" (p. 237). He lists a few of these possible forms: "narrative is present in myth, legend, fables, tales, short stories, epics, history, tragedy, drama [suspense drama], comedy, pantomime, paintings […], stained-glass windows, movies, local news, conversation" (ibid.). For the sake of this work's intention, this all-embracing concept needs to be narrowed down to the explicit context of interest. The challenge herein is to carve out the specifications of narratives in (non-fictional) news coverage to come to a useful comprehension which is worthwhile to be applied as a basis for the empirical investigations, in order to assess the relevancy of news narratives within a mediated deliberation process.

Hence, the following paragraphs aim at presenting a definitional approach which grasps the concept of narrative news and is suitable as a foundation for the empirical investigation of this study. Narrative news will therefore be regarded according to its form (degree of narrativity), to its content (genre) as well as to the narrative roles (victim, villain, hero) presented in coverage, which will allow a comprehensive characterization of climate change coverage.

I will also reflect on the relevance of news narratives for the construction and perception of reality and point out normative implications by presenting a critique that is brought forward against narrative journalism.

2.1 Degree of Narrativity

This work needs to grasp narratives in the news context in order to assess their value for the deliberative debate. Therefore, we have to come to an understanding of what narratives in the news contexts are in particular and how to identify them. First and foremost, news narratives refer to non-fictional storytelling, which is "also distinguished from fictional narrative by an ethical recognition that the consequences are not invented but real; or at the very least, that they can be tested in some way against what we understand to be real" (Greenberg, 2014, p. 518). Following Roeh (1989), storytelling is actually the essence of journalism, even if journalists would probably spontaneously reject that telling stories is what they do, perhaps because of an underlying assumption that storytelling contradicts the common notion of "objectivity" (p. 608).

Scholarly reflections on narratives and storytelling in non-fictional frameworks, such as news coverage of events, is nothing uncommon, as it is one possible stylistic form in the journalistic repertoire. It is therefore present in the everyday news media context (e.g., Berning, 2011; Bird & Dardenne, 1997; Carr, 2009; Duncan, 2012; Dunn, 2003; Ettema & Glasser, 1988; Joseph, 2010; Krøvel, 2011; McComas & Shanahan, 1999; Shen, Ahern, & Baker, 2014; Viehöver, 2010; Wasserman, 2011; Zelizer, 1990; Zerba, 2008). However, these works miss one universal definition of what should be understood as narratives within the mediated framework. Nevertheless, there are several basic characteristics and elements which are constitutive for narratives to be identified as, which therefore can be used as a foundation for empirical research (Franzosi, 2010).

The first set of characteristics concerns formal aspects. Several authors highlight the sequential order as constitutive for narratives (e.g., Hinyard & Kreuter, 2007; Fransozi, 2010; Ellis, 2012; McComas & Shanahan, 1999, Neveu, 2014; Zerba, 2008). A definition provided by Hinyard and Kreuter (2007, p. 779) highlights that the form is constitutive of narratives, referring to the classical Aristotelian sequential arrangement of a story as well as to other important elements: "A narrative is any cohesive and coherent story with an identifiable beginning, middle, and end that provides information about scene, characters, and conflict; raises unanswered questions or unresolved conflict; and provides resolution." McComas and Shanahan (1999) point out that it is the plot that is significant for narratives. It consists of a series of events or actions that are meaningfully tied together and involves an exposition period in which a conflict is

developed and in which action rises before a moment of crisis. The conflict is a central moment of a story; it generates interest for the story and its outcome. McDonald (2014) points to the connection between at least one actor and one event through a causal spatio–temporal framework as being decisive for narratives (p. 117). Ellis (2012) explains that narratives are stories containing events which take place in time. They therefore consist of a plan as well as a consistent and coherent main story line that gives answers to the W-questions 'who, what, when, where, and why'. It is important to note here that a narrative is "not [a] neutral description or purely about individuals" (p. 99) but that it also makes a point on a general situation or question. The sequential ordering of events and actions is also a basic element of narratives within the concept of Franzosi (2010). However, he emphasizes that "the temporal order […] is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence of a story. The events in the sequence must also be meaningful overall (coherence)" (p.15). Zerba (2008) highlights the sequence of events as structured within a plot and contrasts this to the traditional inverted pyramid style of the classical news story that presents the most important facts first, adding less important details and background information afterwards. For Ytreberg (2001, p. 359), the term "news story" is rather confusing in this context of the common journalistic writing style, since it is "applied to news that is not obviously narrative in character." However, the typical journalistic writing represents the inverted pyramid style following the convention that a news story should present the most important fact first (Dunn, 2003). The inverted pyramid style in journalistic writing is mostly adhered to for efficiency's sake, because it helps reader to get a quick overview on the events of the day (Knobloch, Patzig, Mende, & Hastall, 2004). News values such as "proximity, consequence, prominence, timeliness, conflict and so on" (Dunn, 2003, p. 113) as well as a focus on a "who, what, where, when, how and why approach to informative news" (Johnston & Graham, 2012, p. 522) determine what the journalist perceives as important and anticipates what the reader would find most interesting. The equalization of efficiency and the inverted pyramid style implicitly suggests that other journalistic pieces, that do not fit this pattern but rather follow, for example, the narrative approach, are automatically longer. This is not necessarily the case, as Kramer (2000, p. 7) notes: "Narrative touches in shorter assignments needn't take more reporting time, just more attention - a finer-grained, heads-up apprehension of the events at hand."

This sequential order of narratives is what Glaser, Garsoffky and Schwan (2009) identify as "dramatization" within their research on narrative-based learning, and it is a

first important element to distinguish narrative writing from other forms. Following these authors, I will use the term "dramatization" to refer to the sequential order of a narrative text.

Events are usually tied to actors that are in some way involved in, responsible for, or affected by those events (McDonald, 2014). Or, as Barthes (1975, p. 257) notes, that "it may safely be assumed that there is not a single narrative in the world without "characters," or at least without "agents."" Neveu (2014, p. 537) pursuits a similar approach, stating that "journalism is a narrative art" and that "[t]elling news as (true) stories also means organising a cast of characters" Franzosi emphasizes: "It is the action that defines the event, although without characters there can be no action." (p.21).

Glaser, Garsoffky and Schwan (2009) use the term "personalization" to refer to the characteristic that a narrative plot is always about agents (mostly humans) causing events. To avoid confusion with other concepts of personalization within communication studies (for an overview, see, van Aelst, Sheafer, & Stanyer, 2012), I will rather use the term "narrative personalization" in the following to refer to agents and actors within news stories that are either responsible for or affected by an event. Very strong forms of narrative personalization would include telling the story thorough the eyes of a character (who might be the author or one of the narrative's main characters), or even from a first-person perspective (Harber and Broersma, 2014; Zerba, 2008).

To gain a more complete understanding of events, narratives also disclose actors' motives, reasons for their actions, their emotions, and specific details that do not necessarily contribute to the ongoing of the events but help to provide background. Harber and Broersma (2014, p. 643) emphasize "the life-like and psychologically realistic portrayal of people" as being specifically characteristic for narratives, which is not exclusively bound to so-called soft news with a human-interest focus but can also be applied to "hard issues like politics or international affairs." Revealing the emotions of the actors of a story is also an important criterion for Glaser, Garsoffky and Schwan (2009), who refer to this as "emotionalization", which is also a widely used term in communication studies, but will here be used to refer to the portrayal of actors' emotions and motives.

Narratives provide further insights about the background of a situation, for example through the "portrayal of atmosphere and symbolic details" (Harber and Broersma 2014, p. 643). By including information that a classical news story would rather spare,

narratives are more likely to "connect dots" (Entman, 2010, p. 113), especially in time. They can allow the reader to look backwards or even forward. This element of "time" for the construction of news narratives also plays a central role in the considerations of Neiger and Tenenboim-Weinblatt (2016), who argue that through references to the temporal dimension news narratives contribute to the construction of meaning in the news context. Since looking backwards and forward in time often entails speculative moments about what could have been or what could possibly come, I call this narrative feature (also following thoughts of Glaser, Garsoffky and Schwan, 2009) "fictionalization".

The aspects dramatization, narrative personalization, emotionalization and fictionalization are basic features of narrations. I will use these features to identify and characterize narrative news texts by using these aspects to determine the **degree of narrativity**. To do so, I understand the narrative concept as rather gradual (Wolf, 2002), especially against the background of the diversity of possible formats within newspapers (editorial, op-ed, feature, interview, etc.). A single news story does not necessarily have to be either a complete narrative or a classical factual news story only. Narrative elements can be more or less distinctive within an article and therefore have a smaller or greater degree of narrativity, depending on how many of these features are present in a text. Articles can have sequential paragraphs presenting the action and motives of an actor while overall following the inverted pyramid style, for example.

In addition, we have to note that the narrative elements presented here are basic characteristics to identify narrative texts. As Franzosi (2010) elaborates referring to Roland Barthes, narratives have a common structure, or more specifically: "distinguishable *regularities"* behind narrative, behind the "millions of narratives" (p. 3). He identifies "the sequential ordering of narrative clauses, the story-versus-plot distinction of this sequential ordering, and the basic structure of narrative clauses as actors and their actions in time and space". These aspects as necessary elements for a full narrative translate into the elements introduced above: the sequential order and story form as dramatization, the concentration on actors, their actions and motives as narrative personalization and emotion, and the connection of these actions to time and space as fictionalization. There are further aspects that can be regarded when investigating narratives, such as the role of the narrator (e.g., Avraamidou & Osborne, 2009; Berning, 2011) or the stylistic ornamentation (Lucaites& Condit, 1985). However, aspects like these can be subject to great variation, e.g. the absent versus the

omnipresent narrator, or a very plain style of expression versus a more metaphorical use of language. Therefore, it is more difficult to express a rule that is comparably distinct, for example that a sequential order is a clear hint to identify narratives.

2.2 Narrative Genre

When theorizing narrations within the non-fictional media environment, it is it is helpful to use genre theory to grasp the specificity of different story types. Roeh (1989) also suggests applying theories of modes and genres to news stories to better understand processes of meaning production. He argues not to primarily study the facts that constitute stories but to rather ask the other way around and engage with the question about the "stories [that] constitute what we perceive as facts" (p. 168). He uses a genre approach to determine the narrative patterns that guide audiences' perception and understanding significantly.

However, the term "genre" in the English language is not as distinct or explicit as in other languages (e.g., German or French) which makes considerations more complex. Lünenborg (2005) notes that various terms, such as genre, mode, form, (display) and format, are used in literary, film, media and journalism studies in very different ways. In literary studies, one would distinguish between classifications based on formal or content criteria. In German, one would refer to formal classifications with the term *Gattung,* while *Genre* would classify texts according to their content[1]. Poetry, prose and performance, referred to as the natural forms of literature by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, are the typical examples for the main literary *Gattungen* (Burdorf, Fasbender, Moennighoff, Schweikle, & Schweikle, 2007). In the English language, these forms are main literary *genres*[2]. A classification of similar texts according to content characteristics would, for example, refer to comedy, tragedy, melodrama etc. Applying the terminology to journalistic products is possible and, as Lünenborg (2005) shows in detail, has also been done in various ways. But what these approaches have in common is that they (1) all characterize sorts of texts, (2) describe the function of texts as intentional, (3) are based on a certain ensemble of forms even though there is a historical variability of formats, (4) refer mostly to newspaper journalism, and (5) are often intended to function as an instruction for journalistic practice (p.121–122).

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[1] Both terms are derived from the Latin word "genus" = kind, sort, class, style
[2] However, the German terms *Gattung* and *Genre* are also often used synonymously. According to Burdorf et al. (2007) attempts to systematically replace the term *Gattung* as well as attempts to finally define *Genre* as a concept of *Untergattung* (=subgenre) failed (p. 275).

Lünenborg herself is explicitly interested in the specific journalistic genres of television. She distinguishes between three modes of communication: informative, narrative, and performative. These modes are expressed in different program forms: forms of showing, reporting, narrating, arguing, and playing. These forms can be hybrids from different modes, something that becomes more obvious when looking at the next level of genres. Forms of reporting, for example, can be accounted to the informative mode alone (e.g., classical news, reports, magazines) or can be compositions of the informative as well as the narrative mode (e.g., documentary, feature, portrait, reality TV). Genres listed as sole forms of narrating within the narrative mode are, for example, moderations, serial documentaries or talk shows. As we can see from this, Lünenborg's (2005) classification of genres clearly focuses on forms which certainly could find an equivalent in newspaper coverage, e.g., in editorials, comments, features, Q&A interviews and many others.

However, even though it is important to note that the forms that Lünenborg characterizes as genres can be hybrids from different modes of communication, which supports the assumption that narrativity is a gradual concept (as elaborated above), understanding genres merely as texts with similar formal characteristics is not useful for this dissertation. I consider other authors who use genre concepts to characterize the content of texts to determine the stories that are told. This will be important to identify cultural differences and understand how climate change and the social processes connected to it are viewed and communicated in different countries.

For example, according to Roeh (1989), news stories can have different genres such as romance, tragedy, comedy and satire, though mass media do not usually show genre archetypes, but rather mixed forms. Smith (2005, pp. 23–27) deduces four types of narrative genre for his analysis of war coverage. The *low-mimetic* genre records events rather dryly and bureaucratically following a "business-as-usual" logic. Daily political events or decisions are presented without emphasizing conflict or emotional drama. The *tragic* genre does the opposite, especially concerning the degree of presented emotions. This genre relates to strong emotions of empathy and compassion since it focuses on a tragic hero struggling in a hopeless situation through no fault of his or her own. Within the *romantic* genre, there is no such hopelessness. Strong ideals and positive optimism lead a hero against high but not insuperable obstacles. Finally, Smith calls the *apocalyptic* genre the strongest of the presented ones. Nothing less than the fundamental fight between good and bad is at stake in stories within this genre.

Schwarze (2006) identifies three main genres in the discourse on environmental issues: comedy, tragedy and melodrama. The comic genre is characterized by an underlying attitude that a situation is not as bad as it seems and that there are no serious dangers. If there are conflicts, they are settled between individuals, but polarization is usually moderate and can be overcome. Impeding problems are accepted, and stories rather deal with a way to cope with these. The comic genre therefore fosters "Compromise, charity, social unification within a reformed social order" (p. 242). The tragic genre is not described precisely but mostly centers on "the bad guy […] within" (p. 243) and the individual conflict, whereas, following Schwarze, the melodrama is the recurrent rhetorical form of environmental controversies. It is characterized by social and political conflicts and a confrontation with external adversaries. Conflicts can occur between individuals, or between groups and institutions, organizations or governments while there are typical victim, villain and hero actor constellations that can be detected. Strong and positive emotional identification is evoked by the presentations of victims and heroes. Furthermore, there is an intense polarization and a bipolar positioning of characters and forces with fundamentally differing positions or beliefs. Upcoming problems are not accepted by the actors, who act against a scapegoat.

Carr (2009), by focusing on audiences' perception, proposes the expression of "narrative templates" to define certain "organized clusters of elements, or even standardized story-structures" (p. 55) which shape narratives. As shared conventions for storytelling, narrative templates help audiences understand and guide their expectations (ibid., p. 100). If confronted with a story, audiences soon recognize its type because of the used templates which "allow[s] them to move into an appropriate mood of receptivity and resonance" (Carr, 2009, p. 57).

These concepts of narrative genre, especially within news coverage, will be central to an operationalization of the quantitative content analysis in Chapter 7.1. With the help of these considerations, I want to determine the contents of the stories told about climate change and climate politics in Brazil, Germany, and the US.

2.3 Narrative Roles

To further characterize the stories that are told, I want to stress again the point of personalization as decisive for narratives, something which is also emphasized by Barthes (1975, p. 257), who notes that "it may safely be assumed that there is not a single narrative in the world without "characters," or at least without "agents."" Most

commonly, such agents within narratives are placed in specific roles that oftentimes imply a constellation of actors as either victim, villain or hero (Schwarze, 2006; Smith, 1997; Higgins & Brush, 2006). According to Higgins and Brush (2006), "heroes and victims provide culturally familiar templates and can generate dramatic effect. […] In positioning themselves as heroes who can overcome normally insurmountable obstacles, subordinated narrators affirm pride and create the motivation and faith they need to cope and to organize for change. In positioning themselves as victims caught in a web of unavoidable circumstance, subordinated narrators build sympathy among peers and create a sense of shared grievance and consciousness (the tinder and flint required to ignite social change)." (p. 700)

Conceptionalizing how news frames are embedded in cultural repertoires, van Gorp (2010) focuses on "culturally shared notions with symbolic significance, such as stereotypes, values, archetypes, myths, and narratives" (p. 85). Typical archetypes are the victim, villain and (tragic) hero. Such archetypes are used to root news frames in common cultural themes and help to reproduce cultural values. They are also understood as "motifs and characters that help to structure stories" (p. 85). Identifying the archetypes used in a news story helps to characterize the story that is actually told. Van Gorp (2010) illustrates: "If the archetype of a villain is used, then poverty can be viewed as the result of certain individuals who make use of, or abuse, the social welfare system to which they do not financially contribute. […] Next, poor people can be portrayed as victims of a demanding socioeconomical system. Some succeed in beating the system and become heroes when they combat poverty." (p. 86).

According to Lule (2001, p.15), archetypes "represent shared values, confirm core beliefs, [and] deny other beliefs." He understands archetypes as "fundamental figures and forces, such as heroes, floods, villains, plagues, patriarchs, pariahs, great mothers, and tricksters." The analysis of these figures and forces guides his case studies on the connection of myths and news in the New York Times. He argues that, "archetypal myths can be found every day within national reports, international correspondence, sports columns, human interest features, editorials and obituaries" (p.3) and he illustrates this by exemplifying seven master myths that are constructed around the archetypes named above.

To better grasp the stories that are actually told about climate change, I will include the analysis of the narrative roles of the victim, villain and hero, which are basic archetypes with clear (moral) implications. Franzosi (2010) cites Propp (1968) who wrote: "The

names of the dramatis personae change (as well as the attributes of each), but neither their actions nor functions change." (p.21). The use of narrative roles such as the victim, villain and hero may also reveal underlying structures and relations, e.g. the position of certain actors within a process or their position towards each other. Eide and Kunelius (2010) revealed such structures in the media coverage of the climate change conference in Copenhagen in 2009. Understanding the victim/ villain/ hero categorization as a framing device and as a part of responsibility attributions to certain countries, they argue that those roles are used to reduce complexity in the global climate politics process. I will also concentrate on these three roles since they seem especially relevant for the coverage of climate change and climate politics where countries that are affected by climate change may easily be ascribed with the role if the victim because countries that are responsible for causing climate change may rather be represented as villains.

2.4 Social Functions of News Narratives

From the above mentioned discussion, we know that narration is a fundamental mode of human communication which, by constructing events in a certain way, guides the perception of these events. In the following paragraph, I will more closely consider the implications for the construction and perception of social reality when regarding news that is presented in narrative form.

Narrative elements that are used in news coverage connect current events to social and cultural traditions. As already denoted in the general discussion above, these functions are sense-making and philosophical, representative and (re-)constituting as well as communicative, social and entertaining (Wolf, 2002). Considering this, non-fictional narratives in a news environment might especially apply to Carey's ritual function of communication: "A ritual view of communication is directed not toward the extension of messages in space but toward the maintenance of society in time; not the act of importing information but the representation of shared beliefs." (Carey, 1989, p. 201). When embedding current events into traditional patterns of storytelling, the audiences are offered to connect to a long-term context (Entman, 2010) which also transports and perhaps reinforces certain values and norms (Carr, 2009; Young 1996), for example, concerning the understanding of what is to be perceived as good and bad or as right and wrong. Roeh (1989, p. 165) also emphasizes: "Storytelling is as old as human history, and the impulse to narrate appears to be entirely natural and unproblematic, given that narrative is present in all known cultures." Carr (2009) argues that narratives play a vital

role in the construction of the public sphere as a whole because of their uniting function, which can create a sense of participating in a collective concerned with social, political and environmental issues. Addressing these issues with collective action is dependent upon a sense of collectivity which, according to Carr, is supported by shared storytelling. This view on the social function of reinforcing the collective is also emphasized by Schudson (2012, p. 186–187): "This narrative view of journalism sees news as part of a process of producing collective meanings rather than as a process of transmitting information. It emphasizes the social rather than the mechanical feature of the news process." However, this should not be understood as a conscious process. People who produce news operate within a cultural system and resort to "a reservoir of stored cultural meanings" (p.184) with which they add to "a part of culture that reproduces aspects of a larger culture" (ibid.).

Though narratives mostly work through cultural familiarity, they can also enable audiences to discover the unknown. "With an effortless trip in a narrative flow" (Neveu, 2014, p. 536) audiences may get into contact with social worlds and experiences that they were not aware of. Narrative elements can foster understanding for others or even identification through the disclosure of actors' motives. The narrative elements that are supposed to produce suspense may engage audiences more deeply or persistently by raising interest in the outcome of ongoing events (Entman, 2010).

There are certain epistemological assumptions implied in the idea that audiences may discover social worlds different from their own through narratives. First of all, narrative journalism breaks with the convention of "objectivity" which traditional Western journalism tries to achieve through depersonalization and detached reporting that presents all sides of a story (Harbers & Broersma, 2014). According to Johnston and Graham (2012, p. 518), narrative journalism combines factual accuracy with fictional writing devices "such as character development, complication, detailed description, scene setting and construction, and time reconstruction", which allows the journalist to show the world how she or he perceives it. Neveu (2014, p. 538) highlights the special combination of objectivity and subjectivity in narrative journalism: "A second feature of this journalism is the aim to combine the objectivity, the factuality of the scenes and actions, and the greatest attention to the subjective dimension of the experience and feelings of the actors of the events." He further explains that, in order to establish such subjectivity in their narrative writing and to gain a better understanding of groups that differ in their social order, many journalists borrow tools and techniques of data

gathering from social science, for example, ethnographic or sociological methods of interviews and observation.

What becomes obvious is that the dichotomy between subjectivism and objectivism does not hold in the case of narrative journalism, which challenges the "objectivity regime" (Harbers & Broersma, 2014, p. 642) as practiced by conventional news journalism.

2.5   Critique of Narrative Journalism

As mentioned earlier, the concept of narrative journalism is a topic of heated debate in the field of journalism studies. One of the most fundamental skepticisms directed to narrative journalism is summarized by Harbers and Broersma (2014, p. 640) in the phrase: "What reads like a novel will probably be as truthful as a novel." Critics imply that narrative journalism's first goal would be to tell a "coherent, compelling and engaging story" (ibid.) and therefore treat factual accuracy, truth, and veracity with less care.

Another concern is brought forward by Benson (2014) who questions the deliberative value of narrative techniques in news journalism. For him, there is a severe contradiction between the personalized narrative and any attempts to add an abstract political idea to a story, which would disrupt the storytelling. These thoughts are also supported by an earlier study by Ettema and Glasser (1988), who analyzed Pulitzer Prize winning news stories and show that these stories oversaw systemic causes of the problems that were reported in the stories. They elaborate: "Even in these stories of "system-wide problems," the individual experience is emphasized while the social issue is marginalized. Similarly, assessments of what exactly has gone wrong with the system are not developed in much detail." (Ettema & Glasser, 1988, p. 24). Beyond that, they criticize an insufficiently complex worldview that reaffirm common-sense concepts of innocence and guilt without further scrutinizing individual and institutional responsibilities (ibid).

Other empirical evidence against narrative journalism is presented by Dunn (2003). She investigates Australian radio news concluding that narrative elements can indeed catch the audience's attention but at the same time are not appropriate for the presentation of hard news, due to their tendency of depoliticizing news through personalization. Issues are simplified when individuals are the focus of a news story, which easily results in what is called "tabloidization" according to Dunn. Such a decline in quality could

especially occur in cases where central news values are ignored within narrative news items. At the same time, narratives within hard news tend to express more attitude and evaluations of behavior, which, according to Dunn, can especially be problematic if narrative elements are contrasted with news that follows the information model rather than the narrative model.

Considering these critical remarks and keeping them in mind is necessary if we want to develop standards for narrative journalism in order to have a deliberative surplus. It is important to remember that the point of this study is not to come to an overall conclusion on narratives in news as being either good or bad and therefore to be held up high or dismissed completely, but to define standards that have to be fulfilled in order for a piece to be deliberatively valuable.

2.6 State of Research

Narratives in the non-fictional context have been observed from different angles. Studies have investigated the rise of a) narrative forms in news media contexts looking at the amount of narratives (Johnston & Graham, 2012) as well as their content and composition (Berning, 2011; McComas & Shanahan, 1999), also about the construction of objectivity, subjectivity, and authority (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013; Harbers & Broersma, 2014; Zelizer, 1990). Another set of studies focuses on b) the audience reception and how narratives in news can foster attention and comprehension (Zerba, 2008; Machill, Kohler, & Waldhauser, 2007; Baum, 2002) or influence cognitive or affective responses (Shen, Ahern, & Baker, 2014). The following paragraph will review some of this previous research in preparation for this study's own empirical approach.

Scholarly interest in narratives in the news context is often based on the assumption that the rise of narrative is connected to an increasing commercialization that is due to higher competition and market pressure. Against the backdrop of continuing changes in the economic structures in which media companies are embedded, it is a popular assumption to hold that narrative news writing helps to keep the readers' attention and is therefore used to an ever-increasing extent. Ytreberg (2001) picks up on the scholarly discussion on the rise of narrative forms in television news in the light of economic deregulation and intensified competition. He analyzed the news program *Dagsrevyen* by the Norwegian public service broadcaster NRK between the years 1992 and 1994 and shows developments that indicate a spread of narrative modes in new modes of descriptions. Ytreberg concludes that labeling television news with "narrative" as some

"immutable foundational structure" (p.369) without further distinctions is not useful for a valid critical engagement in the issue of analyzing news content and the discursive landscape with the help of different modes. The latter must be clearly confined to be valuable for analytical purposes that aim at carefully tracking down the developments.

Similar conclusions can be drawn from Johnson and Graham (2012), who contribute to the discussion on the rise of narratives due to economic pressure. They investigate this hypothesis by conducting a content analysis of two Australian newspapers between 2007 and 2009, comparing their results to previous studies. Adding interviews with newspaper editors and journalists to gain a deeper understanding of ongoing processes, they found that narrative writing decreased during their period of investigation and in comparison, to the longer time frame. One of the explanations that the authors offer contradicts the previous assumption that narrative writing increases with growing economic pressure. In fact, during the time of their investigations, the newspapers they examined were forced to cut staff, which made them more dependent on wire stories. The authors argue that narrative writing needs certain resources for investigation and for a thoughtful writing process. Therefore, it is a false conclusion that narrative writing is automatically less costly. However, Johnson and Graham indicate that there may be an increase of hybrid forms that use wire stories and add, for example, anecdotal elements with local references. Nevertheless, their own investigation only distinguishes between articles that can be identified either as written in inverted pyramid style, narrative style, or as a comment, which impedes a more detailed recording of the developments.

The conclusions drawn from the studies of Ytreberg (2001) and Johnson and Graham (2012) support the theoretical considerations presented above that narrativity in a non-fictional context should be understood as a gradual concept. There are certainly articles at the end poles between a conventional inverted pyramid form on the one side and a narrative form on the other, but several nuances in between are lost if the concepts are applied in this pure form rather than allowing to include hybrid types.

It is therefore of significance to carefully define narrative characteristics and elements beforehand to look the actual occurrence in the news media context. As Berning (2011) shows in her dissertation, narrative categories, such as narrative situation, temporal order, narrative space, and characterization, can be applied to non-fictional journalistic texts. With a qualitative approach and an application of "narratological codes", she investigates a selection of twenty-five journalistic reportages proving that journalists

use a range of literary devices without fictionalizing the reportages. She also emphasizes the hybrid character of the genre, reminding the reader in her discussion to carefully consider the relationship between journalism and literature in general.

Another rather gradual approach is applied by Piazza and Haarman (2011), who examine American and British TV news that covered the Iraq War. They investigate how the element of narrativity is interlaced with that of human interest. Both concepts are understood as two poles of a continuum in which there are new items progressing from those that are predominantly narrative in nature to those that focus mainly on human interest. According to the authors, war narratives are characterized by typical narrative elements such as "a stretch of text which contains a beginning, a middle (or complicating event) and an end suggesting a resolution and often concluding with an evaluative conclusion or coda" (p. 1542). Human-interest reports are defined by their focus on the life and experiences of individual soldiers and their families, as well as the victims of war. Within the war context, these poles combine with human-interest narratives to different degrees. These human-interest narratives are particularly characterized by their tendency to display a certain pathos by addressing social values and a sense of community through solidarity avowals. Within the destabilizing nature of war reporting, according to Piazza and Haarman, war narratives that emphasize human-interest aspects are powerful tools of stabilization and re-establishing social order. Although the conceptual distinction between narratives and human-interest reports is not fully clear in this research, the results at least support to carefully examine the constitution and application of narratives to assess their quality, particularly because certain types of narratives have such a high potential to be used for strategic purposes, such as inducing popular support for war.

There are several other studies which explain how objectivity, subjectivity, and authority are created in narrative news. Dunn (2003), for example, argues that a narrative form is not appropriate for the news genre since storytelling is associated with fiction. Her analysis of Australian radio news supports this by criticizing that especially radio news cannot show evidence and is therefore less trustworthy in any case. Narrative radio news is therefore rather counterproductive, even though she admits that narratives are needed in radio to catch the audiences' attention.

The notion that narratives are less trustworthy in the sense of providing "true" information probably comes from the idea that narratives are a subjective report of

events, while news need to be objective. Ytreberg (2001), referring to Schudson and Høyer, points to the parallel rise of the inverted pyramid style in news writing and the "news paradigm" of the twentieth-century, that fostered objectivism and the ideal of neutral news criteria as a professional ideology in institutionalized journalism. Narrative journalism seems to run contrary to this, perhaps because of the fear that it "challenged on the grounds of factual accuracy and stretching the truth" and the notion that "what reads like a novel will probably be as truthful as a novel." (Harbers & Broersma, 2014, p. 640). In their study, Harbers and Broersma (2014) compare the narrative journalistic writing of two journalists from Britain and the Netherlands on the Middle East conflict and show that subjectivity is created differently. This affects the persuasiveness of their reporting. While one journalist represents an engaged-personal writing type, the other represents a personal-ironic type. They are mainly distinguished by their approach of disclosing their access to reality and journalistic reporting. The narrative writing of the former remains in line with an ethnographic realism, not questioning the journalistic routine that aims at reporting "the truth," while the latter must be seen rather in a tradition of cultural phenomenology. This approach works through irony and a reflective writing-style that questions the process of positivistic reporting, which aims at uncovering an underlying truth. The authors connect this kind of narrative journalism to cultural developments that generally challenge the notion of an objective truth in traditional journalistic routines.

Another approach to subjectivity in journalistic narratives is presented by Wahl-Jorgensen (2013), who investigates subjectivity in Pulitzer-Prize-winning journalistic articles. She questions the dichotomy between objectivity/rationality/impartiality on the one hand and subjectivity/emotion/partisanship on the other. Objectivity, Wahl-Jorgensen argues, "has been translated into a set of journalistic practices which, exercised as strategic ritual, play a crucial role in protecting journalists from the risks of their trade by removing their subjectivity from the stories and hence ensuring that they appear impartial, as required by the liberal democratic model of media operation." (p. 306). Subjectivity is embedded in journalistic stories by using the emotions of the people, on whom the story is about, as a "form of "outsourcing" of emotional labor to the subjects of the story." (p. 306). In her content analysis of 101 Pulitzer-Prize-winning news stories she therefore looks for expressions of affect, judgments of individuals and groups, as well as appreciation as an evaluation of objects.

In an earlier study, Zelizer (1990) had already reconstructed how journalists tried to achieve authority in their reporting about the assassination of John F. Kennedy by using stylistic devices such as synecdoche (a rhetorical figure that replaces an expression with closely related but different wording, often used as "pars-pro-toto" where a part of something is used in order to refer to the whole of it), omission (the exclusion of information on events or people) and personalization, when telling their stories about the events. Personalization is mainly achieved by writing from a first-person perspective. This way, journalists foster an impression of an eye-witness report of someone who attended the actual event even if they were not actually an eyewitness of the assassination.

From a study presented by Duncan (2012), we can learn what a certain type of subjectivity can mean for readers. The author investigated personal narratives of grief in five typical news stories in British newspapers that covered interviews with bereaved people. On the one side, these stories give voice to the personal experiences and subjective perceptions of the subjects. At the same time, Duncan argues that these stories should not be misunderstood as "therapy sessions" for the bereaved only, but rather that they should be regarded as a contribution to a societal discourse on death in general as well. Through the induction of empathy, people may also be able to discover how they might feel if something similar would happen to them, which, according to Duncan, corresponds to a basic human need.

Narrative reporting, as we can learn from the studies above, somehow closes the distance between an event and the reader by generating a certain degree of involvement and by presenting events from a subjective perspective. Truth in this way cannot be absolute but is rather constructed and revealed to be as such. To a certain degree, there is honesty to admitting that journalistic writing does not represent the ultimate reality. But at the same time, it entails a risk, especially when a writer is not able to reflect that there might be different points of views beyond his or her own personal perceptions and considerations. This point is emphasized by Ettema and Glasser (1988), who analyzed Pulitzer-Prize-winning news stories and concluded that even the stories that covered wider ranging problems failed to point out a system-wide significance. The focus is on the individual experience while systemic causes are not regarded. Instead of a sophisticated analysis, stories rather reaffirmed common-sense concepts of innocence and guilt.

Like this, Krøvel (2011) deplores a limited journalistic repertoire when analyzing the news narratives in the coverage on the United Nations climate change conference in Bali. He investigates the use of sources, framing, as well as the use of narratives in TV news, newspapers and magazines from various parts of the world. Supposing that journalists would embed their stories within culture-bound narratives so that audiences can easily recognize and understand new information in familiar stories, he specifically looks at narrative roles (who is the protagonist, who is the opponent in the negotiations at Bali?), what is implicitly and explicitly constructed as a goal and which information is made more salient. Krøvel then draws a critical conclusion, stating that similar characters are central in all narratives where the US is seen as the "opponent" and small and poor countries such as Papua New Guinea are standing up against the only remaining superpower. He also criticizes the low variability of sources and the nontransparent choice of information presented, which mostly concentrates on who would win and who would lose in the negotiations, which results in an unsatisfactory, uniform coverage with a low inclusivity of both sources and arguments.

Another set of studies investigates the reception of narratives and their psychological effects. Without going too far into detail,since the reception process is not in the center of this study, a short overview should foster our understanding of the peculiarities of narrative news stories.

One of the main assumptions that one finds as a reason for the use of narratives in the news context is that they more easily engage people and draw attention to a story. The study of Zerba (2008) can account for this assumption by providing evidence that narrative news stories arouse more interest for hard news in young people who do not frequently read newspapers. Narrative news stories also have a positive influence on the understanding, learning, and enjoyment of a story. Zerba emphasizes that the undiversified presentation of conventional new stories can easily cause recipients to lose interest in the coverage. Another article by Machill, Kohler and Waldhauser (2007) argues that people do not understand and remember TV news. The authors conducted an experiment which showed that a higher degree of narrativity increases people's comprehension and retention. Confronting politically inattentive people who are entertainment seeking rather than information seeking with foreign crisis information in soft news, Baum (2002) demonstrates that such audiences, who would otherwise hardly be confronted with the topic at all, develop a certain interest in it. Also, in an experimental research design, Shen, Ahern and Baker (2014) investigate the impact of

different combinations of narratives and frames in news reports on the recipient's issue attitudes, empathy, transportation and cognitive responses. By and large, the results of the study revealed that narrative news had a greater impact on the recipient's responses than informational news, especially regarding the induction of empathetic feelings. This applied especially to the test persons who were assigned to narrative news stories that regarded the environmental consequences of gas drilling instead of the potential economic benefits. The narrative news stories on the environmental consequences also had a significantly more enduring effect on people's attitudes towards the issue, which was revealed by a follow-up survey twenty-four hours later (Shen et al., 2014).

As we have seen, narratives in the news context have been investigated from various angles. While there is no automatism between growing economic pressure and the increased use of narrative writing in newspaper coverage, there are at least several elements of narratives and hybrid forms that can be detected. Those forms seem to add a certain degree of subjectivity to the coverage and therefore reveal specific perceptions and personal conclusions. For media users, news stories with narrative elements appear to be more easily processed. Nevertheless, the question about the quality of narrative news writing remains controversial, which might be due to two factors: First, in order to determine the quality of something, criteria to measure the quality have to be defined. However, the question what is good or bad quality and what kind of coverage is actually preferable is not easy to answer. Second, even if quality measures are defined, there might not be a definite answer on how good or bad narrative news writing is since it is possible that there are differences depending on the context in which the narrative news writing is applied. Therefore, one research perspective on narrative news that is still underrepresented is a comparative one, which can help us to gain knowledge about culturally specific peculiarities and adaptations, as well as about explanations that help us to understand what kind of narratives can be expected within a specific context. This dissertation aims at contributing to filling this research gap by proposing a comparative approach of different countries. The next step, however, will be to engage in the question of defining quality, after presenting broader considerations about the preferable performance of the public sphere to come to conclusions on what impact narrative news writing can make for public communication.

3 Deliberation

After extensive clarification of the concept of narration within the news media environment, the following chapter elaborates on theoretical considerations regarding mediated deliberation within the public sphere. This chapter will go into detail on basic assumptions about public discourse in society, and specifically on deliberation to theoretically assess the role of news narratives in public deliberation and, finally, to further prepare the empirical investigations in subsequent chapters.

3.1 Public Sphere and Public Discourse

Following Peters (2007), public discourse can be understood as a means of cultural self-understanding that is based on a public culture which is produced and renewed by these discourses at the same time. Public culture in this sense must be regarded as a reservoir of symbols, meaning, knowledge, and values that are available to and should be interesting for a public collective (e.g., within a nation state) (Wessler & Wingert, 2007). Furthermore, the foundation of the public sphere and the discourses within are constructed by public culture. As Wessler and Wingert (2007) explain the term, summarizing Peters, a public culture consists of the language of the majority, and of familiar visual images, movies, songs, plays, and monuments, commonly used narratives, ceremonies, villains and heroes (p.16). These elements of the public culture form the basis of communication and understanding. They determine associations and basic principles for justifications. As such, they also influence the acceptance of decisions and attention for certain events and developments.

The classic understanding of the public sphere refers to it as a sphere of unconstrained public opinion formation and decision-making in a democratic society, a sphere that regulates public concerns (Peters, 2007, p. 59). Marcinkowski (2008) defines the term as follows:

> The public sphere is an indispensable element of a democratic society and the institutional core of democratic decision-making. Every democratic political order is essentially based on the idea that citizens participate in collectively binding decisions, articulate their interests and opinions openly, listen and evaluate the opinions and arguments of others, and, on that basis, make up their minds. The public sphere establishes an arena of discussion on public affairs and guarantees that all these processes are open to the public. (Marcinkowski, 2008)

Beyond political issues of collective concern, debates on general orientation, normative principles and values as well as the engagement with a collective past and an assumed future are also part of public debates in the public sphere. However, as Peters (2007) summarizes Tönnis, public debates are not only supposed to form opinions, but also build the basis of motives and contribute to the collective decision-making.

According to the arena model of the public sphere by Ferree et al. (2002a), which helps us to image how the public sphere is constituted, public discourse is held in different forums. Every forum has an arena in which individual and collective actors present themselves, a gallery from where the active audience can follow the processes in the arena, and a backstage area where actors prepare themselves for the arena by planning their strategies and collecting ideas. There are different forums in a society, e.g., parliaments, courts, party conventions, scientific congresses, and the mass media. What is understood as the "public sphere" is the entirety of all these forums. The mass media have become a "master forum" (p.10) which is used by all actors of the other forums, whether as actors or as audience in the gallery. The mass media forum today is the main stage for political competition. However, discourses from the other forums (e.g. sports, science, law) are well presented in the mass media forum, although there is a process of selection and simplifying. Ferree et al. (2002b) emphasize that this mass media forum does not simply present current events, but that it influences society in return. The arena of the mass media forum is the stage in which actors formulate their statements and try to transport their messages, e.g., for a political project or for an organization they represent. Actors usually speak for collective actors (e.g., parties) and therefore always represent a part of the audience in the gallery. Journalists have a special role here. On the one hand, they are gatekeepers, deciding who is to be quoted and therefore who is to be recognized and taken to be important. On the other hand, journalists become actors, too, by framing, interpreting and commenting on events. Furthermore, the audience at the gallery does not only consist of individuals, because all members of the audience are somehow tied to collective identities, so-called "imagined communities" (p. 12), e.g., women, workers, environmentalists. Finally, the backstage area of the mass media forum plays a special role because this is where collective actors receive organized preparation. They are provided with strategic analysis, background material, and arguments. Actors without professional support in the backstage area of the mass media forum are disadvantaged in the competition of the arena. (Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002, pp. 9–13)

This heuristic model helps us to gather an understanding about how the public sphere is structured. But we need to go a step further if we want to understand how the actual processes within this setting work— especially about how the actual discourse is led, by whom, and why. As Ferree et al. (2002b) summarize, there are different theoretical assumptions about the actual constitution of the public sphere as well as different normative ideals on how the public sphere should function in a liberal, republican, deliberative and agonistic tradition of theory. The theories differ in various aspects, e.g., regarding the questions of who should be included in the debate, what kinds of communicative forms are acceptable, and what is a legitimate outcome of a debate. The four theories presented by Ferree et al. would all work as a foundation for a normative assessment. Normative assessment in general can help to provide a rationale for empirical research as well as a contextual foundation for the analysis (Althaus, 2012), which is also highly relevant for this study. While different normative assumptions would lead to different conclusions when evaluating the performance of the public debate and the media within it, it is important to be aware of the possibilities and limits that the application of a particular theory carries with it.

One of the theoretical strands with a long tradition builds on Habermas' theory of communicative action and is known as deliberative theory. This theory has far reaching implications for democratic systems and presents a comprehensive understanding of communication in a society from the individual level to the mass media level. By and large, it draws a picture of a society that functions by communication between its members, who have to make collective decisions for which the exchange of information and rational arguments is an important foundation. On principle, everyone who is involved in some kind of (political) matter that requires collective action should have the chance to engage in the discourse on that issue. The ideas of the deliberative theory will be described in more detail in the next section, because they will be important to set the normative standards which are used in this work for evaluating the quality of narrative news writing. It is important to note at this point, however, that the basic ideas of deliberation theory are particularly relevant for a topic like climate change. Since climate change is an all-encompassing issue that affects everyone on the planet, one that requires collective action to be solved, deliberative theory provides a suitable standard for how societies should handle the process. Dealing with climate change requires an agreement about its causes and (expected) consequences as well as agreement about all possible solutions. While the scientific evidence for climate change is unambiguous, it

is nevertheless complex, and this complexity has to be represented adequately in the media discourse in order for people to comprehend (and accept) the implications. This complexity is increased by the profound questions of justice and responsibility related to the great variety of how people's lives are affected by climate change in different parts of the world and within societies. Different perspectives need to be made visible to gather a complete picture. It is therefore necessary to display the wide range of aspects as completely as possible to grasp the phenomenon. Deliberative theory, as we will see in the next sections, provides a rationale in which such an exchange of different viewpoints is possible. As a normative theory that aims at finding the balance between different interests, it is especially suitable to investigate the climate change debate. The ideas of deliberative theory will therefore be used as a measuring stick to evaluate in how far narrative elements within news writing can help to approximate the ideal of deliberation. As Habermas himself noted, deliberation is a normative scale, because its complete implementation cannot be expected. It should be seen as a *methodic fiction* (Gerhards, 1997, p. 8). In my own study on the deliberative quality of narrative news, I will therefore not focus primarily on the question of whether or not narrative news fulfills deliberative criteria, but rather ask under which circumstances narrative news can have a positive impact (in a deliberative sense) on the public debate on climate change.

3.2   Deliberative Ideals

This paragraph sketches out the basic ideas and ideals of deliberation in order to disclose the basic understanding of this theoretical line of argument, which is necessary for the intention of this work to evaluate the role of narratives in news coverage against this background.

The classic understanding of public deliberation builds on Habermas, who introduced the idea of autonomous actors. Ferree et al. (2002b, p. 301) explain the concept of autonomous actors as people who are "free from the burden of making decisions and from the constraints of organizational maintenance. This allows them, in contrast to other actors, to deliberate more freely; they can more easily take the viewpoint of other actors and respect the better arguments." But what does "to deliberate" mean in this context? Gastil (2008, p. xi) introduces a definition of deliberation which holds that "people deliberate when they carefully examine a problem and a range of solutions through an open, inclusive exchange that incorporates and respects diverse points of

view." This basic principle has further implications for the broader concept of deliberative democracy, which Maia (2012, p. 15) summarizes as a form of democracy that "secures a central place for reasoned discussion in political life. It involves a decision binding on participants, based on concepts of justification through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens, which is supposed to generate legitimacy through a procedure that leads to the formation of opinion and political will." Maia connects the idea of deliberation to a form of democracy in which political action is the result of a communicative process that aims at providing audiences with information about possible alternatives and is geared toward the formation of informed opinions.

To come to conclusions, it is the *better argument* that needs to prevail over weaker ones in the end. The strength of an argument should not be dependent on the status of the speaker who brings the argument up: "For the better argument to be decisive, it should not matter who is making the argument. Differences in external status or power among speakers should be bracketed - that is, put aside and ignored." (Ferree et al., 2002a, p. 302). When it comes to the style of communication, mutual respect and civility are central elements of this tradition, though emotion is not completely excluded either. The aim of the process should be the production of a gradual consensus over time. Since reaching such a consensus is certainly not easy, if possible at all, a working consensus should be a minimum outcome to reach an agreement that society can work with, as Ferree and colleagues describe (2002a).

These ideals translate into certain normative notions about public processes of decision-making. According to Peters (2007), public debates should be organized following a discursive structure. He emphasizes that problem definitions and solutions should be found with the help of arguments which have claimed collective acceptance, and which are based on common beliefs that were reached without force. It should be possible at any moment to level critique just like it should be possible to in turn criticize this critique. What should be preserved at any time in the communication process is the mutual respect between communication partners. Communicative forms that are based on overwhelming (for example, through manipulation or threat) rather than convincing the other are not allowed.

Gastil (2008) summarizes the steps in the deliberation process. Accordingly, deliberation should (1) create a solid information base; (2) identify and prioritize the key values at stake; (3) identify a broad range of solutions; (4) consider the pros, cons

and trade-offs of the solution; (5) enable the group to make the best decision possible. These steps of making information transparent, finding solutions, and deciding about them, are key societal interests. But, according to Maia (2012), deliberation goes beyond this level of transparency. First, participants should be able to engage in rational arguments, putting personal preferences aside so as to be open to hearing other arguments. At the same time, participants should be able to present clear arguments to others as well.

Who these participants should be is made clear by deliberative theorists, too. Habermas emphasizes that popular inclusion is especially necessary when important normative questions are at stake. While concrete decisions on political affairs are usually made by elites in the political center, societal discourse needs to address the general questions of how to organize society. This discourse needs to include actors from the so-called *periphery*— "that is, civil society actors including especially grassroots organizations" (Ferree et al., 2002b, p. 216). The role of those actors from the periphery is vital, as Ferree and colleagues argue with respect to Habermas, who points to their ability to connect autonomous publics and to contribute to discovering relevant issues and solutions. And since these actors from the periphery are not primarily responsible for the actual decision-making, they should be considered as free and equal. They should engage in a free and unforced interaction in which they treat each other with mutual respect, speaking truthfully and with justification. Beyond this inclusion of actors, there should also be no restrictions of topics and topical contributions.

Benhabib (1994) emphasizes the value of deliberative processes to the rationality of collective decision-making. She also argues that deliberative processes impart information: "Deliberation is a procedure for being informed." (p.32). By introducing the arguments to the debate, a certain transparency about the range of ideas and opinions is established. This is a necessary foundation for a second step of reaching clarity about choices and preferences, which is needed for the process of finding a solution. Deliberative processes also impose a certain reflexivity on individual preferences and opinions, which means that participants should, first, be able to express their points of view, but they also have to anticipate the standpoints of all people who are in some way involved (Benhabib, 1994).

3.3 Critique of Traditional Deliberative Ideals

One of the main points of critique of discursive theories constructionist and poststructuralist scholars is that they question the possibility of separating the argument from the position of power of the speaker. In the tradition of Foucault, they recognize discourses as "practices of power diffused outside formal political institutions, making use of seemingly neutral categories of knowledge and expertise to control others as well as to construct the self as a political actor." (Ferree et al., 2002a, p. 307). Maia (2012) summarizes the critique against Habermas' theory of communicative action as abstracted from relations of power, especially in the construct of the ideal speech situation. Poststructuralists argue that there cannot be a situation that is free from inequalities of social power, since economic dependencies and political domination will always prevent participants from being equal speakers: "The key objection is that power and ideology domination cannot be resolved through rational dialog." (Maia, 2012, p. 38). Kohn (2000, p. 426) sharpens the argument by stating that "under the guise of equality and impartiality, deliberative democracy privileges the communicative strategies of elites. By strengthening the conceptual tools of the dominant paradigm, it encourages the reproduction of existing hierarchies."

A second important critique can be deduced from the statement above. Kohn refers to the communicative strategies of elites. Poststructuralist theorists criticize that, according to deliberative theory, argument and reason are supposed to be the dominant factors in a discourse. This, they argue, excludes marginal members of society. Inclusion is therefore one of the main points to which the critics refer. Young (2002, pp. 5–6) strengthens this point: "The normative legitimacy of a democratic decision depends on the degree to which those affected by it have been included in the decision-making processes and have had the opportunity to influence the outcomes." Writers in this tradition share the strong normative value of popular inclusion, emphasizing that especially marginalized groups should be included to recognize distinctive standpoints (Ferree et al. 2002a, p. 307). The media ought to play a significant role in fulfilling this by actively seeking out such perspectives at the grassroots level, rather than concentrating only on the centers of power (p.301). To give a voice to those that are usually excluded in public debates, constructionist writers value a range of communication styles and argue that style is a matter of class (p.313). Therefore, a discourse based solely on argument and reason, excluding emotion as well as storytelling, hinders certain groups from participating in the debate and from expressing

their concerns. Creativity in expressing opinions and standpoints is appreciated rather than dismissed in the first place (pp.311–312). Young (2002, p. 6) argues that concentrating on the narrow conception of political communication to argument is a too "biased or narrow understanding of what being reasonable means." Focusing on such a narrow deliberative style has exclusionary implications and ignores that other forms of communication may increase inclusion in the debate (Young, 2002, pp. 6–7). Maia (2012) argues that "emotion and other modes of communication are important to deliberation and compatible with the Habermasian theory of rationality" (p. 17). She examines emotion, rhetoric, greetings, testimony, and storytelling as communicative forms that should not be ignored or excluded in discursive situations. Concerning the latter, Maia (2012, p. 21—original emphasis) refers to the influential work of Iris Young, noting that informal argumentation, narrative, and storytelling "*may* contribute to enlarging the scope of discussion, the number of its participants, and the perspectives available to be taken into account in public debates." Furthermore, storytelling might help participants to comprehend other participants' standpoints and therefore change their own way of seeing and understanding problems and possible solutions. Narrative is therefore a highly valued mode of communication, because it gives those who are silence(d) (because of a lack of expertise or a lack of familiarity with certain discursive styles) a possibility to express their own experience since, "all people are experts on their own experiential knowledge" (Ferree et al., 2002a, p.313). Including narration into the range of communication styles bridges "the lifeworld and the sphere of formal politics, undercutting both the separation between these spheres and the power relations that produce and maintain that separation." (p. 313). As Young (2002, p. 7) argues: *"Narrative,* finally, has many important functions in political deliberation; narratives can supply steps in arguments, but they can also serve to explain meanings and experiences when groups do not share premises sufficiently to proceed with an argument." Though Maia (2012, p. 23) points out the value of storytelling and other forms of communication, she still makes an important objection and warns not to stretch the concept of deliberation to a "point of rendering it useless" (p. 23), because it would then be indistinguishable from other communication forms. The central element of reason-giving should not be dismissed and be a part of narration when used within the deliberation process. Furthermore:

> [W]hen people are giving testimony or telling their story, the communication should
> implicitly or explicitly appeal to some general concern - whether involving common

norms or values (fair distribution of opportunities and resources or equal legal treatment) or the value of something that is not universally shared (a particular ethical conception, cultural tradition, or religious belief). (Maia, 2012, p. 23)

The critique might be best summarized under the term of plurality, which applies to the plurality of the people who should be included into the process as well as to the communicative forms that should be allowed during the debate.

A third aspect that is criticized with the objection of pluralism is the norm of finding a consensus in deliberative theory. Maia (2012) summarizes several authors who state that consensus is actually a threat to democracy, because disallowing dissent would oppress marginalized groups who do not have the power to voice their arguments in a way that can recognized by all other citizens. Beyond that, it is doubted that hegemonic groups are willing enough to consider the standpoints of the marginalized groups. Maia (2012, pp. 47–48) especially emphasizes the danger of consensus in the mass media environment: "There has long been a school of thought asserting that mass communication creates powerful pressures that push for consensus for the wrong reasons - to serve powerful interests and to lead, in practice, to social conformity."

To sum up, the normative ideals imbedded in the idea of the Habermasian ideal speech situation suggest that deliberation needs to take place in a setting where all participants are free from inner and outer constraints and aim to find the best argument, and therefore the best solution, in a consensus, independently from personal interests and preferences. Critics argue that there cannot be such a situation as the ideal speech situation because power and dependencies are always exerting an influence. Those critics show that it is also difficult for less powerful actors and their arguments to join the debate in the first place, because barriers are constructed, through requirements about a certain type of communication style *(restrictions at the input dimension of the public sphere)*. The concentration on the rational argument as ideal, without acknowledging that arguments can also be brought forward in different forms of communication, contradicts other deliberative ideals such as the freedom from inner and outer constraints that is needed for carefully examining arguments, since this is a constraint that is set by the situation itself *(restrictions on the throughput dimension)*. This implies the danger that the result will equal the preferences and interests of powerful actors rather than the public opinion which is based on the best arguments and reasons *(restrictions on the outcome dimension)*.

Consequently, power differences hinder people from joining deliberative processes, which makes power differences in the process itself smaller, since those with less power cannot join it in the first place. This does not seem consistent with the original idea of deliberation. Instead of imagining the ideal speech situation in a way in which power differences are ignored they should explicitly be brought up. Power differences cannot be overcome if they are not made visible and opened for critique. Regarding differences, various interests and preferences need to be part of the deliberative process, but therefore the entrance to the debate must be more accessible, in order to guarantee the inclusion of aspects, ideas and people. Common interests need to be built on the awareness of different individual interests, recognizing the nature of others (Ellis, 2012, p. 99).

3.4 Mediated Deliberation

Now that we have seen that deliberation is a process in which individuals and groups engage in discussions to carefully weigh options and bring forward and consider arguments to find a solution to a problem that requires some kind of (political) action, we have to ask how this can work on a larger scale in complex modern societies. For this, we need to look at the extended concept of mediated deliberation since "[i]n modern democracies, the mass media are the only communicative setting that permanently provides public deliberation on such a wide scale." (Wessler, 2008, p. 1). Mediated political communication is an essential pillar of modern democracies; communicative processes cannot function without the mass media that presents the broadest range of ideas and solutions enabling media users to engage in the deliberative process (Gastil, 2008). It is a decisive element of the public sphere in which opinion formation, as well as decision-making on the regulation of public concerns takes place (Peters, 2007, p. 59). The *public debate* of modern society therefore to a great extent finds takes place in the media, which ensures the connection between "citizens and political institutions by involving them in a process by which common problems are identified, possible solutions are discussed, ideas are exchanged, decisions are justified, and support or opposition is signaled." (Wessler, Peters, Brüggemann, Kleinen-von Königslöw, & Sifft, 2008, p. 2).

In mediated deliberation, the deliberative ideals sketched out above keep their validity. However, the particularities that come along with the mediated process need to be specified. According to Bennett et al. (2004), *access* to the mediated public sphere is of

crucial importance and determines who controls and is included or excluded from the media. Beyond that, it is the question of *recognition* that needs special adherence within the mass media environment to clarify who is formally identified in and by the media (e.g., by name, status) and how much space for expressing themselves and their arguments is given to the respective actors. But since it is the exchange of ideas instead of the mere proclaiming of them, *responsiveness* is another crucial point to consider in mediated deliberation to determine whether actors engage in dialogue, respond to each other, and acknowledge different positions by replying to them.

What needs to be kept in mind is that the media are not just some free space that needs to be filled by whoever comes first. Instead, media institutions operate according to certain rules and routines. Media production is restricted by laws as well as economic constraints. Mediated debates are shaped by all these circumstances and through "media agents" (Maia, 2009, p. 316), who operate with and within certain parameters. For this project, attention is given primarily to the work of journalists as influential media agents who actively shape the mediated debate. Journalists significantly contribute to the construction of meaning by choosing the events and aspects to be covered and the form in which they are covered (Ferree et al., 2002b; Brüggemann, 2014). They also shape the mediated deliberation process—their selection processes influence how inclusive a mediated debate is by selecting the range of speakers, how reflexive opponents are presented, or how much reason is demanded to be given by actors in the debate (Ettema, 2007).

The idea of mediated deliberation that needs to be constructed by journalists will be a central idea for the empirical part of this work in order to investigate whether the journalistic use of narratives the media coverage is of any benefit for the deliberation process or— to put it differently—to assess how journalistic narratives have to be constructed to be beneficial for mediated deliberation. As we have seen in previous chapters, there are certain potentials derived from the cultural and social function of narratives in our communication processes. The next chapter will explain in a more detailed way how narratives need to be constructed to add valuable surplus to the mediated deliberation process.

4 Defining Standards to Assess the Deliberative Value of News Narratives

The following chapter connects the two concepts of narration and deliberation in an attempt to define standards to assess the deliberative value of narrative news. These standards will serve as a rating scale for the empirical parts of this work.

As we have seen above, the arena model by Ferree et al (2002b) describes how the public debate connects to the public sphere and the role of the mass media: The mass media forum is seen as the stage for political competition. It does not simply present current events but influences society in return. Journalists fulfill a special role in the whole mass media process: They are gatekeepers, deciding who is to be quoted and therefore who is to be recognized as important. Beyond that, journalists become actors, too, by framing, interpreting and commenting on events (Brüggemann, 2014). Many deliberative aspects of a debate are therefore highly dependent on the journalistic performance, when it comes to constructing events displayed in the media. To systematically assess journalistic performance in the public sphere, I will draw on the concept of Gerhards and Neidhardt (1990), who define the public sphere as an intermediary system with important political functions on the input, throughput and output level, which will guide further considerations on the role of journalistically produced narratives in the mediated public sphere and their implications for deliberation within such a mediated context. However, although it is of course an individual journalist who is ultimately responsible for writing a story, this journalist does not act in a vacuum but is embedded in cultural, historical, political and organizational contexts that also shape his or her work. Chapter 5 will explore these factors in detail, which might explain journalistic performance when it comes to the deliberative quality of their coverage and especially of narratives within that coverage. In this chapter, it will be first of all important to sketch out which deliberative qualities news narrative should fulfill in different dimensions.

4.1 Input

The input dimension of the public sphere refers to the process of information gathering—asking for the openness of a public sphere vis-à-vis its environments, which also comprises access of both issues and people to the public debate (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1990). From a normative deliberative standpoint, popular inclusion of people as well as of a wide range topics, ideas and arguments is an important function that the

input dimension has to fulfill (Ferree et al., 2002b) in order to achieve legitimacy for democratic decisions (Maia, 2012; Young 2002). The question "Who deliberates?" (Page, 1996), referring to the actors included in the deliberative process, is especially central in the communication context of deliberation processes of the mass public which—as characterized by Chambers (2009)— "will often be asymmetrical, highly mediated, and distorted by the structural inequalities in society." (p. 339). This can easily result in the restricted access of marginalized, less powerful or less trained actors and therefore can turn into a legitimacy problem for deliberative democracy (ibid.).

On the input dimension of the public sphere it is necessary to have equal chances for a wide range of socially relevant topics in order to become visible and therefore a possible issue to the further debate (Wessler, 2008, p. 3). The deliberative ideal of popular inclusion is also applied to mass media communication and a requirement for mediated deliberation which, according to a summary by Rinke (2016) "should include voices from all corners of society ("multiperspectivalness")". However, the media context with its organizational and economic constraints is far away from fulfilling the requirements of an ideal speech situation. Still, making the range of relevant issues transparent to the audience is fundamental to enable audiences to state their preferences.

Critics fear that deliberative processes cannot guarantee such a wide inclusion of actors and issues because they are in general exclusive to many people that are not part of the mainstream society and their ideas (Ferree et al., 2002a). It is argued that it is not possible to separate an argument from the position of power of the speaker introducing the argument into the debate. People enter the debate with diverse and unequal preconditions. The broadest and most commonly applied distinction between actor types is that "between speakers from the political center (including representatives of formal-institutional politics) and the political periphery (including representatives of civil society)" (Rinke, 2016).

From what we have learned about the nature and potential of narratives in previous chapters, I argue that they can be a useful journalistic tool to meet the demand of increasing popular inclusion within media coverage. Narratives seem particularly suitable for including perspectives besides the ones from the political power center. As Maia (2012, p. 22) states: "Storytelling is an important tool allowing underprivileged people to politicize their situation and facilitating consciousness-raising." In the analytical process of deliberation, Gastil (2008) recognizes the discussion of personal

and emotional experiences as a part of the first step in the deliberation process in which a solid information base is created. These experiences are part of the information that is required to take different sides into account, so narratives may be useful to add to this requirement, allowing potential ideas and interest to become part of the range of ideas in the debate. Journalists can use narrative forms in the media to give voice to actors from the periphery and thus increase the inclusion of marginalized groups and their stories and experiences. Narrative characteristics, such as the display of emotions or the narrative personalization, offer tools to integrate aspects that would rather be of secondary interest if guided by hard facts only. Media would obviously need to play an important role in finding these easily overlooked stories that might not have classic news value but are still valuable for the sake of widening the amount of voices heard in the debate, also revealing how groups and people are affected by decisions made in the political center or the political/economical system. The use of narrative roles may also be a valuable possibility to situate actors in a debate—assumed, of course, that they are not used for simplification or stereotyping but rather for illustrating, for example, severity of certain circumstances. However, to serve as a valuable contribution to a debate, journalists need to clearly draw the connection between the overall issue and the use of narratives: Who says what, in which position, and why is it necessary to include the specific perception in order to build a necessary information base for further debate and future decision-making? These are questions that should be answered for narratives to have a clear deliberative surplus when they are used by journalists.

Beyond that, also keeping Gastil (2008, p. 50) in mind, who states that "[i]t should be clear though that in modern societies the political process could not function without the mass media that presents the broadest range of ideas and solutions […] enabling recipients to engage in the deliberative process and learn about how other people would address problems," we can consider narratives in the mediated context especially valuable for achieving the last part mentioned in this quotation and engaging people in the problems of others. Narratives could therefore be used by journalists as a more low-threshold form of communication when introducing a new thought, a different view of life, or even a challenging idea by tying it to a specific story. We know from studies of small-group deliberation that people are more likely to engage with an argument that is conflicting with their own opinion when it is told in a narrative (Polletta & Lee, 2006; Black, 2008; Ryfe, 2006). Narratives, therefore, foster openness to new and conflicting interpretations, something which is needed to achieve transparency. There is no research

on this mechanism in mediated deliberation, though Avraamidou and Osborne (2009) present results from research which found that narratives in science education arouse interest in new topics. This would at least give some evidence to the assumption that narratives can also create openness to new arguments in mediated deliberation and therefore widen the range of ideas and arguments that can be taken into consideration.

On the other hand, one can also think of possible dangers that narratives on the input dimension of the mediated public debate might have for deliberative ideals. First of all, narratives are, of course, not exclusively a communicative form of life world actors but also a powerful instrument for political elites or business actors, such as lobbyists and PR professionals, to use for strategic communication in their purposes rather than for a general public interest. Their claims might get a disproportionate amount of attention and therefore marginalize other perspectives (Boswell, 2013). Beyond that, mostly negatively evaluated developments in media such as sensationalism may also be reinforced using narratives. If journalists pick out the unique case not because of a new idea or an overlooked actor with a standpoint that needs to be considered but rather concentrate the attention on a spectacular individual case, they risk the suppression of less spectacular stories. Also, the phenomenon commonly discussed as personalization can easily be a problem where narrative forms influence the deliberation process negatively. As explained above, narratives in news are characterized by actors and their involvement in certain events as well as their reactions, motivations, and emotions. This, of course, can easily lead to a concentration on individuals alone, neglecting their actual message and possible contribution to the debate, something that journalists should avoid in the production process.

4.2 Throughput

On the throughput dimension of the public sphere, arguments and ideas that were brought into the debate are further processed and synthesized, aiming at public opinion formation (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1990). *How* this is done is a crucial question to the analysis of deliberation (Wessler, 2008, p. 4). Following Gastil (2008), deliberation should ideally identify and prioritize the key values at stake, identify a broad range of solutions, consider the pros, cons and trade-offs of the solutions, and enable the group to make the best decision possible. These steps require full transparency about the range of ideas and opinions as a necessary foundation for a second step of reaching clarity about choices and preferences during the process of finding solutions.

Comprehensibility is especially essential for establishing such transparency. Gastil and Black (2007) even highlight that people have "the right to comprehend what others are saying" (p.3). Comprehensibility of the arguments in a debate therefore is a necessary condition for the opinion-building and solution-finding process. Careful examination of arguments to find the best solution is only possible if all claims are understood. The use of narratives as a journalistic tool could be one instrument to promote the comprehensibility of complex issues to make the actual argument accessible to consideration. Using a sequential order (narrative characteristic of dramatization) rather than the inverted pyramid style can help to understand the course of events. Explaining complex scientific issues in combination with anecdotes, for example (narrative characteristic of fictionalization), may help to increase comprehensibility. However, trying to break down complex subjects might also risk oversimplification, for example, if narratives use one-sided representations of stereotypes or binary descriptions of good and bad (Boswell, 2013. "Reductive simplicity" (p. 632) within the deliberative process, this is especially problematic if narratives fail to still transport an argument that contributes to the debate as a whole.

Argument and reason are central to understanding the deliberative ideal. Peters (2007) explains the discursive structure that public debates should follow, by emphasizing that problem definitions and solutions should be found with the help of arguments which claim collective acceptance, and which are based on common beliefs that were reached without force.

Ellis (2012) highlights that understanding reason-giving as central to a deliberative argument is connected to reciprocity which "is a core principle of democracy and deliberation. Very simply, it holds that participants in a conflict owe one another justifications and explanations for their respective positions and any mutually binding policies they enact." (p. 154). To have a real exchange and to find a commonly accepted solution, it is not only necessary that arguments are heard, but they also need to be replied to and evaluated in a mutual process in which justifications can and should always be demanded again. Actors in the deliberative setting, mediated or not, need to be responsive to each other to avoid mere pronouncements of opinions. According to Ettema (2007), it is a journalistic responsibility to demand reason and justification from media-external actors. Arguments need to be related to each other, especially if they are opposing one another. To really weight alternatives, they should be recognizable as such.

Including narrative into the range of communication styles bridges "the life world and the sphere of formal politics, undercutting both the separation between these spheres and the power relations that produce and maintain that separation." The argument here is that narratives can in fact help to achieve deliberative ideals. But this can only be the case if it does not lead to a deadlock that would not allow critical reflection. Reasons and arguments within journalistic narratives need to be open for critical debate to be valuable for deliberative purposes. This can only be accomplished if reasons that have their origin in personal experiences are reflected against the circumstances and background they have occurred in (Young, 1996). This would also involve a clear positioning of the argument within the debate and an active tie to or confrontation with other arguments, also to clarify the relevance and scope of the argument. Meeting such a demand is not necessarily easy for people who are affected by certain circumstances (Higgins & Brush, 2006). It would therefore be a central task of journalists to make such connections when using narrative forms in news coverage, in order to assure reciprocity and therefore the processing of the debate (Bennett et al., 2004; Ettema, 2007).

Another narrative category that is relevant for the throughput dimension is the narrative genre. Stories can obviously be told in various ways, e.g., either as comedy, melodrama or tragedy. The genre of a story influences its role in a debate. Some genres may be more suitable to keep a debate going by offering more possibilities to connect an answer to. However, a variety of different genres used for news coverage of one topic (e.g., climate change) is probably most valuable from a deliberative perspective, since a certain degree of alternation offers different perspectives and interpretations. For journalists, it may be a challenge, and require creativity, as well as flexibility, to try to tell stories from a variety of angles; but if successful, the use of a variety of genres avoids uniformity in coverage, which probably keeps audiences more engaged in an ongoing debate.

When it comes to the style of communication with which the deliberative discourse is supposed to be introduced when trying to find the best argument, mutual respect and civility are at the center of the discursive tradition, though emotion is not completely excluded (Ferree et al., 2002a). As Ellis (2012, p. 6) emphasizes, civility and respect do not simply mean being nice in contact with other(s) but also include "an acceptance of the contestatory process, including a willingness to engage on an argumentative level, as well as attitudes such as 'agreeing to disagree' and 'tolerance.'" Civility contributes

to creating an atmosphere of mutual respect that is necessary in the process of conflict resolution. The role of narratives for civility can be regarded ambivalently. Certainly, displaying emotions and personal experiences can also in a media context evoke empathy and understanding, but at the same time it can be destructive, for example, if they are offending or assaulting to others (Boswell, 2013). Especially in the mass media context, there are certain long-term developments that might add negatively in connection to narrative and deliberation. Under the keyword of tabloidization, one can summarize several trends in which narratives also play a role such as in personalization or sensationalism, which is rather conceived of as being a threat to deliberation. If entertainment is the main purpose, rather than a contribution to information and debate, narratives would probably rather distract from the issues at hand. However, the entertainment factor of narrative also increases the attention of audiences for a certain topic, which is important especially for long-term issues like climate change (Spoel, Goforth, Cheu, & Pearson, 2008). Nevertheless, for narratives to have a positive impact in the mediated debate it is important that the ideal of civility and openness that goes hand in hand with argument and reason-giving should never be dismissed or forgotten.

4.3   Output

The outcome dimension of the public sphere refers to the consequences following public opinion formation and the implementation of solutions that were found after a careful weighing of the arguments (Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1990). The classical aim of the discursive process is the production of a gradual consensus over time. Reaching such a consensus is certainly not easy, if possible at all; a working consensus should be a minimum outcome to reach an agreement that society can work with (Ferree et al., 2002b). If the working consensus or political decisions resulting from it is related to majority rule, legitimacy of such a rule can only be gained if the process that led to the decision incorporated all argumentative perspectives (Ellis, 2012).

Wessler (2008) also dismisses the narrow conception of consensus being the desired outcome of deliberation. He argues that consensus is highly unlikely in large-scale mediated public forums, especially because of their "triadic (and competitive) nature", (p.4) referring to the idea that actors in the mediated debate are not aiming at a mutual understanding or at convincing their opponents. They rather reach for the attention of the audience, trying to affect them in their opinion formation by engaging in the discussion "between speakers" but "in front of an audience" (ibid.). Wessler therefore

suggests "reasoned dissent" to be a valued outcome of deliberation, referring to Peters (2005, p. 108), who states that: "A lively discursive public sphere would first of all appear to multiply questions and uncertainties and increase dissidence."

Why the idea of reasoned dissent as a normative ideal, especially in a mediated deliberative context, is more useful than the original concept of consensus can also be understood following Ellis (2012). He acknowledges that, of course, deliberation always requires reflection of one's own preferences to change attitudes, even if that is not easy or self-evident because "[p]eople are surely caught up in their cultural and political discourses, but they are not trapped" (p. 23). Demanding consensus can still build up high barriers in a communicative process. Reasoned dissent that increases the perspectives and clarifies aspects in the debate, which would allow a base for common action, is therefore highly desirable as the outcome of public deliberation (Peters, 2005, p. 108). Beyond that, especially narratives can produce acceptance of difference in the sense that narratives enable role-taking and "help to transform ways of seeing problems and their possible solutions" (Maia, 2012, pp. 21–22). Black (2008), for example, shows that narratives in a deliberative setting encourage people to take other perspectives, allowing participants to understand and respect experiences of other participants and therefore help to manage differences in a setting of divergent argumentation. Boswell (2013) states: "Finally, the ambiguous nature of narrative may ultimately lead to compromise on contentious issues, with commitment to a common narrative allowing actors in a deliberative system with widely diverging opinions to come together under a common banner" and refers to the idea of "incompletely theorized agreements" of Cass Sunstein (p. 632).

However, narratives classically consist of a beginning, middle and an end. Journalistic narratives can contain these elements to certain degrees, but especially the end can differ, mostly according to the genre in which a story is told. A comic story would probably end positively with a suggested solution for a given conflict. This can also be a promising proposal for a solution without the actual conflict being fixed right away. A melodrama or social/political conflict narrative could have an open ending with either no conflict solution in sight or with an unresolved conflict. For a deliberative perspective, the latter can probably leave more openness for the ongoing debate. However, proposals for conflicts should also be open to criticism. Nevertheless, the outcome of a narrative, and with the genre of the news story, certainly depends on real-world events— if climate change negotiations reach an agreement with goals that are

difficult to attain, a news story written in an apocalyptic genre type is probably more unlikely. It is still in the journalistic responsibility to reveal possible solution proposals, however, or to display why a certain conflict is not yet resolved to enable people to determine the current state of progress of the debate.

4.4 Interim Conclusion

This chapter regarded the role of narrative in the mediated deliberative process and argued that narrative news coverage can contribute positively to achieving the normative ideals of deliberative theory if it fulfills certain standards. Table 1 summarizes which narrative qualities might fulfill which deliberative functions under conditions that journalists would have to assure in their coverage.

Table 1 Narrative qualities and deliberative functions on the input, throughput and output level of mediated public deliberation

Public Sphere Dimension	Narrative Qualities	Deliberative Function	Journalistic Role
Input	- Narrative characteristics (dramatization, emotionalization etc.) allow a low-threshold form of communication, also including personal experience and emotion	- **Inclusion of actors**, their particular topics, **and ideas** (giving voice to actors from the power periphery)	- **Detecting voices and ideas** that would otherwise not be heard - Tie stories to the issue at stake (display placement, scope and relevance in the debate)
	- Narrative personalization and narrative roles (hero, victim, villain)	- Identification of actors, their status/ social position, values, and motivation	- Identify roles without serving stereotypes to avoid simplification
Throughput	- Increasing comprehensibility by integrating complex issues in more easily understandable story structure (dramatization) or add details and anecdotes for better illustration (fictionalization)	- Transparency on issues - Further inclusion throughout the process	- Break down complex issues to fit story structure - Find suitable details and anecdotes to illustrate and explain - Avoid oversimplification
	- Accessibility of different worldviews and	- **Contrasting alternatives** in the process of finding	- **Include opposing arguments**

	standpoints	solutions	
	- Include (personal) experiences as reason for beliefs and standpoints	- Form of justification - Responsiveness	- Demand reason-giving and justification - Rational questioning of the systematic circumstances in which experience occurred - Transport a general point relevant to the debate
	- Variety of narrative genres	- Offering diverse approaches and interpretations to a topic	- Operate with variety and avoid uniformity
	- Displaying emotion and personal reason to enable mutual understanding and role-taking	- Civility	- Avoid tabloidization and assaulting others
Output	- Enabling understanding through role-taking	- Reasoned dissent	- Manage differences and conflicting stories
	- Outcome display: conflict solutions (proposals)	- **Transparency over decisions and outcomes**	- **Reveal outcomes and proposals** - Avoid early closure

Deliberative ideals face all kinds of boundaries in the mediated public sphere. Non-fictional narratives might help to approximate these ideals, when embedded in news coverage, to a certain extent. The role of the journalistic production process is central to considering deliberative qualities of such narratives. The journalistic aspect of this process needs to be emphasized, since journalists first gather and then tell the stories. Therefore, in narratives in the news coverage that add positively to the mediated deliberation, journalists would need to include such actors and ideas with fewer chances of representation, making their values and claims accessible and comprehensible. The fact that narratives are a communicative form that is deeply embedded in human communication and that is easy to use and understand in the deliberative context enables people to participate and therefore increases the norm of inclusion. Especially by allowing personal experiences to become part of the range of ideas and arguments, a higher transparency of the range of possibly considered aspects may be achieved. This enables reflective communication and reciprocity, by allowing audiences to easily

engage with the respective argument. For the sake of weighing the possibilities at stake, however, it is also necessary to show alternatives and contrast opposing arguments. Narratives also have the potential to build up connections between participants by enabling role-taking. This can set barriers for uncivil behavior which usually is counterproductive to finding solutions. Beyond that, journalists can enable a reasoned dissent through narrations by fostering acceptance of differences, allowing role-taking and understanding of other perspectives. Nevertheless, an indispensable standard to be assessed positively that journalistic narrations transport a general argument, which is open to critical debate and reviews a circumstance in which it evolved, even if it is retrieved from personal experience for narrations.

It is not possible to test and review all of these aspects in the empirical analysis of this study. Instead, I will focus on one element in each dimension that will be central for the analysis to come: the **inclusion of actors and ideas** at the input dimension, the display of **opposing ideas** at the throughput dimension and the **solution and outcome orientation** at the outcome dimension. These are very basic elements for deliberation. If they are fulfilled in narrative news, it might be worthwhile to engage in future in-depth studies of the more sophisticated elements. The next chapter will give more detailed descriptions of the contexts that shape journalistic production settings in order to be able to assess the circumstances under which news narratives can actually fulfill these standards.

5 Cultural and Systemic Contexts for Comparing Brazil, Germany, and the US

After having further conceptualized what requirements journalistic narratives should fulfill to support deliberative values in the mediated debate, this chapter elaborates on context effects and factors that may influence the actual constitution of narratives within media coverage. This dissertation follows an international comparative approach to find answers to questions such as under which circumstances will narratives positively fulfill deliberative criteria. For reasons mentioned by Hallin and Mancini (2012), a comparative approach seems suitable for this undertaking: Comparative analysis helps us to detect aspects that we would not detect otherwise and limits ethnocentrism. It also fosters sensitivity for variation among countries and cultures as well as for similarities which can contribute to the formation and refinement of our theoretical and conceptual apparatus. Beyond that, comparative analysis allows for the testing of hypotheses and therefore allows a certain amount of causal inference, which is also an important aim of the empirical part of this work. However, this study is a small-N design, since it will only regard the three cases Brazil, Germany, and the USA. Therefore, it is hardly possible to engage in a strictly variable-oriented design when it comes to finding explanations for the use of narrative writing in non-fictional news coverage, as well as for their deliberative qualities. Instead, the approach will be case-oriented, in so far as I will try to provide detailed context information on the three investigated countries which will help to better understand the constitution of each country's media coverage with regard to narrative characteristics and deliberative qualities.

From Shoemaker and Reese (1996 and 2014) we know that different forces shape media content and that they have to be considered carefully within an analytical framework which treats content as a dependent variable and sorts out a number of clearly defined independent variables that shape "the messages that constitute the symbolic environment" (p.1). They propose a model that is formally known as the *Hierarchical Influence Model* or shorter *Hierarchy of Influences,* which consists of five levels of analysis that are expected to shape media content: (1) the individual level (individual characteristics of the communicator), (2) the routine level (organizational constraints in which the individual operates), (3) the organizational level (overarching concepts that shape routines, e.g., the organizational structures and policies), (4) the social institutions level (the structure of media organizations as social institutions), and (5) the social

system level (national and cultural context, ideological forces and systemic patterns) (Shoemaker and Reese, 2014, p. 7-9).

These levels will not be adopted one-to-one to the analysis, although I will follow the logic of regarding different levels of influence on the media content. I will rather choose certain aspects that seem especially promising and theoretically interesting to explain the occurrence of news narratives and their deliberative performance. I will mainly focus on the latter three levels by closely studying certain variables and categories on the cultural and historical level of journalism, the media system level, and the national–political context level.

This chapter aims to provide a range of context information that will help to finally come to a set of hypotheses that connect journalistic professional and cultural aspects to the prevalence of journalistic narratives and their deliberative performance. The first part of this chapter (section 5.1) will remark on journalism culture, and especially on the relationship between a professional culture and the broader (national) culture, which need to be considered jointly when regarding the role of narratives within journalistic work. The history of narrative journalism will be examined in section 5.2 of this chapter, to trace its developments and to elaborate on various cultural and historical influences. Furthermore, the chapter will review classical criteria for international comparative analysis, also trying to characterize the countries of interest Brazil, Germany, and the USA according to these criteria in section 5.3. Lastly, I will review each country's position in the climate change process and regard the role climate change plays for each country and its acting at the climate change conferences (section 5.4)

5.1 Journalism Culture Context

"Journalism does not develop in a vacuum" (Mancini, 2008, p. 149). Unlike many other professions, Mancini argues, the development of journalism is closely connected to the social and political reality in which it is rooted. To describe the variety of shapes of journalistic systems, the term "journalism cultures" is frequently used. It includes the journalistic practices, professional standards, and ethical aspects that have taken on distinct characteristics in different countries over time (Hahn, Schröder, & Dietrich, 2008, p. 7; Zelizer, 2010). However, Mancini points out that journalism culture should not only account for journalism as a profession but should also be linked to a country's more general culture and especially its political culture (Mancini, 2008, p. 149).

Schudson (2012) strengthens the argument that the development of journalism culture and professional practices accompany each other:

> News is produced by people who operate, often unwittingly, within a cultural system, a reservoir of stored cultural meanings. It follows conventions of sourcing - who is a legitimate source, speaker, or conveyer of information to a journalist. It lives by unspoken preconceptions about the audience - less a matter of who the audience actually may be than a projection by journalists of their own social worlds. News as a form of culture incorporates assumptions about what matters, what makes sense, what time and place we live in, and what range of considerations we should take seriously. (Schudson, 2012, p. 184)

At the same time, globalization is irreversible, and the media, more than being affected by it, are a driving force in the process. Reese (2008) talks of a global news arena that has developed, in which journalists now need to navigate and to which they must adapt. Technological developments have contributed to a convergence: "In these settings, operating with the same equipment, access, and need for instantaneous transmission, technology has unified news routines even across organizations operating out of widely different national contexts" (Reese, 2008, p. 245). These changes certainly also have an impact on journalism's role in societies and they are the object of scientific debate. Here, the nation-state usually serves as the reference point for (comparative) observations, which builds on the assumption that journalistic cultures comprise all adjustments that journalists and media producers make (and have historically made) to the social and political system they operate in (Prinzing, 2008). However, this practice of using the nation-state as a primary reference is also contested. Hepp (2008) argues that the classical international comparative approach that follows this assumption should be replaced by a transcultural approach to overcome the imagination of cultural and social processes as being contained within national borders. To meet the complexity of globalization and the connectivity of media communication today, deterritorialization that produces cultural densifications across borders needs to be considered. Hanitzsch (2007) points out that there are similarities in the journalistic orientation and practices that become manifest in a universal and cosmopolitan journalism culture that is characterized by diffusion and interdependences on a transnational level. Nevertheless, differences in the journalistic subcultures, according to Hanitzsch, can be detected on three fronts: on the macro level of national journalism cultures, on the meso level of journalistic organizational cultures, and on the micro level of professional milieus. For their large-scale comparative research on journalism cultures under the title "Worlds of

Journalism"[3] Hanitzsch and colleagues (2011) propose a framework that consists of three dimensions: (1) journalistic roles, (2) epistemologies, and (3) ethical ideologies. Each of these dimensions further consists of sub-dimensions with certain characteristics which are defined as poles that allow a location of empirical values in between. For their pilot study, the researchers carried out interviews with 2100 journalists from more than 400 news organizations in 21 countries. All three countries investigated in this study, Brazil, Germany and the US, were included in the extensive analysis of Hanitzsch et al. (2011), which provides an informative basis on the journalism culture in the three countries.

The dimension of journalistic roles is divided into three sub-dimensions: (1) interventionism, (2) power distance, and (3) market orientation. Interventionism refers to the question of whether journalists pursue a mission in a manner that is involved and socially committed or whether they are uninvolved and neutral. Hanitzsch et al. (2011) state that interventionism is generally not a characteristic of Western journalism but rather of journalism in transitional or emerging countries. This is also reflected when we compare the US, Germany, and Brazil. In Brazil, advocating for social change and supporting policies that bring about prosperity is more important for journalists than it is in the US and Germany.

The subdimension of power distance refers to journalists' position towards loci of power. The two poles of this dimension reach from the concepts of the "Fourth Estate" to journalists as loyal partners of the powerful. In Germany and the US, being a detached observer and acting as a watchdog for governments as well as business elites is an important characteristic of journalism culture, while in Brazil it is also important to be a watchdog of the government, but not of business elites.

The sub-dimension of market orientation looks at whether media serve the public interest and address audiences mainly as citizens, or whether they serve the market interests that address audiences as costumers. When we compare the countries, it seems least important for Brazilian journalists to create news that attracts the widest possible audiences, while Germany and the US do not differ much. In Germany, it seems more important to journalists to provide interesting information, but it is almost equally important in all countries to provide political information. In this category of market

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[3]see http://www.worldsofjournalism.org/

orientation, Brazil is much closer to the US and Germany than too many other developing or transitional countries in the study.

The dimension of epistemologies is divided into two sub-dimensions. Objectivism refers to a philosophical or absolute sense of objectivity. The two poles of this dimension lie between the assumption that there is an objective existing truth and that facts can and should be clearly separated from opinion, and the notion that there is no objective reality and that every representation of the world needs interpretation. Journalists around the world agree with the idea that personal beliefs should not influence their reporting. Directly comparing the three countries shows that this element is most important for Brazilian journalists and least important (but obviously still important) for American journalists. At the same time, it is most important for German journalists to remain strictly impartial, while this is slightly less important for Brazilian and American journalists, who also agree much more on the idea that events and issues need analysis. Empiricism, as the other sub-dimension of the epistemologies, is concerned with the question of how truth is justified—whether through empirical justification (observation, evidence, or measurement) or analytical justification (reason, ideas, values, and analysis). For this sub-dimension, one difference is the most striking. While German and American journalists stay away from information that cannot be verified, this notion is less important for Brazilian journalists, although for all three countries it is almost equally important to make claims only if they are verified by evidence and reliable sources.

The third dimension, "ethical ideologies", consists of two sub-dimensions as well. Relativism refers to personal moral philosophies and whether people stick to universal values in all situations or whether values are dependent on the situational context. The second sub-dimension is "idealism" and refers to the consequences of reasoning in ethical dilemmas and the question of whether the end justifies the means in the work of journalists. The two poles of this sub-dimension comprise the highly idealistic mean orientation and the less idealistic goal orientation. At the dimension of ethical ideologies, it is remarkable that journalists in all three countries maintain very similar attitudes. They all disapprove contextual and situational ethics and would accept harmful consequences of reporting for a greater good. Table 2 summarizes the information on journalism cultures according to Hanitzsch and colleagues (2011):

Table 2 Summary: Journalism Cultures according to Hanitzsch et al. (2011)

Dimension	Sub-dimension	USA	Germany	Brazil

Roles	Interventionism	Low interventionism	Low interventionism	Advocating for social change and supporting policies that bring about prosperity is **more** important
	Power Distance	Detached observer and watchdog of political elites and business elites	Detached observer and watchdog of political elites and business elites	Watchdog of political elites but **less** important to monitor business elites
	Market Orientation	Small differences between countries, but attracting widest possible audience least important in Brazil; providing interesting information more important in Germany		
		Equally important to provide political information		
Epistemologies	Objectivism	Remaining impartial and not letting personal beliefs influence reporting of high relevance	**Most** important to remain strictly impartial, less agreement that events and issues need analysis	**Most** important that personal beliefs should not influence their reporting
	Empiricism	Staying away from information that cannot be verified	Staying away from information that cannot be verified	Staying away from information that cannot be verified **less** relevant
Ethical Ideologies	Relativism& Idealism	Small differences between countries: all disapprove contextual and situational ethics and would accept harmful consequences of reporting for a greater good		

Hanitzsch (2011) also uses this data to assign roles for journalism to each country. There are four distinct roles: the *detached watchdog* (as a detached observer who articulates a skeptical and critical attitude towards the government and business elites), the *populist disseminator* (who has a high audience orientation and is most likely to aim

at providing audiences with interesting information), the *critical change agent* (with critical attitude towards the government and business elites but driven by an interventionist impetus of advocating social change), and the *opportunist facilitator* (as constructive partners of the government in the process of economic development and political transformation). It is remarkable that Germany has the highest share of journalists who would count as "detached observer", with 69 percent. This role is only slightly less often present in the US, with a share of 63 percent. Both countries only have four percent of opportunist facilitators. While the populist disseminator is slightly more often present in Germany than in the US (17 compared to 11 percent), it is the other way around with the social change agent (21 percent in the US, 10 percent in Germany). In Brazil, all four roles are more evenly distributed, with the detached watchdog having a share of 28 percent, the populist disseminator of 26 percent, the social change agent of 27 percent, and the opportunist facilitator of 20 percent. Brazilian journalism culture is therefore the least distinct or clearly defined of the three. The following sections, which deal with the history of journalism in all three countries, will delve further into the reasons behind these differences.

5.2 Historical Context of Narrative Journalism

"A large part of the explanation of the present lies in the past. We are what we are because we were what we were. Thus, the sociology of journalism cannot be severed from the history of journalism." (Schudson, 2012, p. 57). For a better understanding of the cases that are investigated in this study it is necessary to add further contextual knowledge about the history of journalism in general and in each country in particular and, as far as possible, especially about journalistic traditions and narrative practices. The section therefore aims at locating the significance of the narrative forms within journalism in order to find explanations for the shapes of narrative elements in today's journalism. I will begin with a short paragraph on the news paradigm of the twentieth century first, and then retracing the specific developments and journalistic traditions in each of the three countries separately, especially focusing on the role of narrative lines of traditions.

5.2.1 *News Paradigm of the Twentieth Century*

Journalism has always been under development—its shape depends on temporal and spatial circumstances, and societal as well as infrastructural context factors (Nerone, 2008a). Technical developments set certain frames for journalistic performance, but

societies also define limits and boundaries, by holding expectations about what role journalism should fulfill and what it should provide. For example, the today still far-reaching notion of the press as a Fourth Estate originated in the late eighteenth century and contributed to the stepwise institutionalization of the press as a mediator within society between the political sphere and the sphere of the people (Hampton, 2012). The idea of the press as a Fourth Estate entails several implications concerning the place and role of the press in society, but less direct implications on the form, at least at first sight. The notion of the Fourth Estate is closely connected to the concepts of modern democracy and its legislative, executive and judiciary institutions that spread in Europe following the ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. In this sense, the Fourth Estate has been understood as a "counterbalance to these powers, a watchdog guarding the public interest, and providing a forum for public debate" (Thussu, 2008). Originally applied to newspapers, the idea has been extended to broadcast media and eventually to the internet (Hampton, 2012). To fulfill the Fourth Estate ideal, the notion of an objective journalism that follows neutral news criteria as a professional ideology for journalism became the dominant "news paradigm" of the twentieth century (Ytreberg, 2001, p. 358). In how far this also applies to the countries studied in this project (and to what degrees) will be addressed in the following subsection.

However, there are other trends that emerged over time, that set boundaries to the Fourth Estate ideal. Hampton (2012) points to commercialization as a significant development against which one has to reflect the ideal critically:

> Yet if the press barons and corporate media have at times demonstrated a credible financial and political independence of government and have, on occasion, gone so far as to undermine corrupt or anti-democratic government policies, radical critics none the less remain skeptical about commercial media's inability to perform a consistent "Fourth Estate" role as […] a government "watchdog" […]. On the one hand, commercialization has its limits as a basis for journalistic independence; on the other hand, and not unrelated, twentieth century democratic governments have shown themselves quite capable of using commercial media for their own political ends. (Hampton 2012, p. 6)

To understand the role of different developments and influences in each specific case and to find hints that help to explain the use of narrative elements within the news coverage today, the next section will go into further detail by sketching out the history and journalistic traditions in the US, Germany, and Brazil.

5.2.2 Country-Specific Developments

5.2.2.1 USA

"Objectivity" is the keyword that is probably most associated with American journalism. Kaplan (2012, p. 25) calls it the "professional code of studied impartiality and rigorous factuality [that] has been celebrated as American journalism's proudest, if most difficult to sustain, achievement" (p. 25). What is indicated with the term "achievement" is that this journalistic ideal has historically not always been a given. Hackett (2008) underlines that "objectivity is neither universal nor timeless. It has emerged in specific historical, political and cultural contexts." In the case of American journalism, the rise of objectivity s typically understood as originating in the nineteenth century. According to Schudson (2012), American newspapers at their very beginning during colonial times were products of printers who would first and foremost identify as businessmen and not as journalists. Early newspapers were short, weekly journals that contained local advertising, gossip, European political and economic news (taken directly from London newspapers), but very little local political news. These printers did not reach out to collect information, they rather "printed what came to them" (p. 65). They were eager not to take sides or get too political in order not to harm their businesses. It was during the conflict with Great Britain after 1765 when "politics entered the press" (p. 66) and papers started taking sides with the political causes of the colonies. For Schudson, this marks the beginning of a long era of American newspapers being "the mouthpiece of political parties and factions" (p.66). With the rise of mass parties in the 1830s, a partisan press also flourished and persisted as "the dominant ethic of US journalism throughout the nineteenth century" (Kaplan, 2012, p. 28).

Several different developments contributed to changing conditions after the American Civil War. The emergence of new technologies such as photography and the telegraph brought along new forms of organizations as did, for example, wire services that promoted the appearance of the inverted pyramid communication style, with which the most important information was transmitted first (Hackett, 2008). Newspapers grew rapidly, becoming large, profitable, industrialized businesses with advertisement as an increasingly important source of income (Schudson, 2012). Partisanship now seemed be standing in the way of newspaper owners to reach wide audiences and attract advertisers to make profit. Organizational changes as well as the incentive to reach out for new audiences entailed changes at the content level: "Crowd-pleasing features such as simpler language, larger headlines, and more lavish illustrations helped to extend

readership to immigrants and others whose knowledge of written English was limited." (Schudson, 2012, p. 72).

According to Schudson (2008), the renunciation of partisanship was also promoted by a wider transformation of American political culture in the late nineteenth century. During the Progressive Era, liberal reformers. began to push for considerable reforms of the voting system, in an attempt to fight corruption. They also criticized party loyalty: "At the same time, newspapers became more willing to take an independent stance. By 1890, a quarter of daily newspapers in northern states, where the reform movement was most advanced, claimed independence of party." (Schudson, 2008, p. 30). With the decline of party dependence, journalists were able to develop an independent culture and a set of professional practices. Schudson (2008) dates the emergence of the interview as a typical journalistic practice back to his period. Before, reporters would talk to official sources but not refer to them in their articles. But from the 1880s on, "the interview [became] a well-accepted and institutionalized "media event", an occasion created by journalists from which they could then craft a story" (p. 32). At the start of the twentieth century, the modern newspaper was born from both professionalization and commercialization. Even though some editors retained their partisanship, reporters focused on making stories, including competing voices, authorities and genres, instead of on promoting parties. Newspapers became businesses in towering downtown buildings and they amassed a vastly growing readership (ibid.).

The new circumstances made publishers think of new strategies to gain a greater readership. These strategies had lasting consequences for the development of journalism in general and for a literary journalism specifically. William T. Stead, publisher of the Pall Mall Gazette, called for a "New Journalism" in his article "The Future of Journalism" in 1886. As a publisher, he wanted to promote sensation, campaigning, social engagement and investigation in order to meet "the real needs of the people." (cited from Haas, 2004, p. 43). John Pulitzer, who had bought the New York World in 1882, also developed a popular strategy that included human-interest stories, sensationalism, illustration, stunts, and 'manufactured news', a simple style and partisanship for policies of social reforms (ibid.).

Both Stead and Pulitzer are important trailblazers of a journalistic movement in the middle of the twentieth century, which is referred to as "New Journalism", indicating to a group of young journalists around the leading figure of Tom Wolfe in New York.

Other well-known representatives such as Norman Mailer, Gay Talese, Joan Didion, Hunter Thompson, George Plimpton, Truman Capote, and Michael Herr also shaped the "new journalism" as a style of literary reportage in the 1960s (Pauly, 2008). This group had its roots in the "muckrakers" movement that promoted investigative journalism around the turn of the century, but also in the early literary journalism of Mark Twain and Charles Dickens (Haas, 2004). What the representatives of the New Journalism of the 1960s had in common with the early writers of literary journalism is that they presented journalistic investigated facts and events with literary stylistic devices. However, only the New Journalism movement was recognizable as such since they identified as a group and had an own concept to which they collectively referred (ibid.). Pauly (2008) points out the basic characteristics of this movement by stating:

> The term "new journalism" thus marks a turning point in the history of journalism: an influential moment of self-criticism and an acknowledgement of the cultural contradictions of objective news. What the new journalism bequeathed was not only a different way of telling stories, but also a commercially compelling strategy for making a living as a journalist in a rapidly changing media market. (Pauly, 2008)

Very generally, the New Journalism movement understood itself as counter concept to the dominant information journalism and its strong faith in objectivity. The writing of the New Journalism was therefore mainly characterized by a combination of the classical report with literary and narrative techniques, such as dramatization, complemented with an extensive work of inquiry, an especially pronounced author profile as well as open subjectivity (Pörksen, 2004, p. 19; Haas, 2004, p. 45). Tom Wolfe, who had not invented the New Journalism but had made sure that its representatives were recognized as a group by publicly declaring their objectives (Haas, 2004, p. 49), defined the concept as "journalism that would read like a novel," or, elsewhere, like a "short story" (Hartsock, 2011, p. 24). Referring directly to Wolfe, Haas (2004, p. 48) summarizes the specific use of literary elements that found its way into their writing, besides subjectivity, interpretation and extensive investigations: (1) dramatization and scenic composition, (2) presenting entire dialogues as they were recorded or remembered instead of single citations that are taken out of their context, (3) changing perspectives, (4) detailed descriptions of habitus, status, gestures, facial expressions and behavior to better understand people and their actions as well as American society or subcultures. Their procedures aim at conveying relations between facts rather than presenting isolated details to (re)construct different versions of a perceived reality.

The appearance of the New Journalism movement has to be seen in the light of the time in which it emerged. Important changes in American society in the 1960s, linked to students' protests, a general protest culture, and the Hippie movement, were decisive factors for the New Journalism to develop such a strong opposition to the conventional journalism at that time (Haas, 2004). Based on their experiences with the media coverage on the Vietnam War, the New Journalists accused conventional journalism and its ideal of objectivity of facilitating strategic actors like the state and businesses to easily communicate their interests. It is one of the great achievements of the New Journalists that they provoked a debate on journalistic standards and assumptions on quality, on journalistic practices and credibility. However, the New Journalism was first of all a movement that certainly had its influences but did not develop a new mainstream journalism.

More recent developments see a rise of narrative-driven journalism in the mainstream media due mostly to economic developments and increasing commercialization. Benson (2009) argues that in the US "personalized 'dramatic narrative' has become a dominant journalistic form" (p. 405) with severe consequences for example for pluralism and diversity, as he shows in a study in which he compares American and French coverage on immigration. Especially front-page articles in the US media tend to present rather long stories that lack "multiperspectivalness".

5.2.2.2 Germany

In how far different historic developments and contexts shape the history of journalism and journalistic traditions can be seen when we contrast American and German press history. As we will see below, German journalistic history and tradition is marked by developments and changes that shaped different periods in which especially narrative and artistic elements play specific roles. From the bard who orally presented news to the ordinary people, to the poetic political writer who tried to cover delicate issues behind prosaic forms, to the leftist representatives of the "Neue Sachlichkeit"—narrative elements are deeply rooted in the German journalism history.

Baumert (2013) distinguishes four main stages in the history of German journalism: (1) a pre-journalistic period, (2) a period of a corresponding journalism, (3) a writers' period, and (4) an editorial period. The pre-journalistic period dates to the Middle Ages and is, at first, mostly characterized by a baronial information flow through private agents. During the time of the Protestant Reformation and as a consequence of Martin Luther's bible translations, people's literacy increased, as did the general interest for

political and societal issues. However, according to Baumert (2013), the spoken word remained the major way of distributing information. *Traveling journalists* (p. 75) presented their news in a poetic and easily comprehensible way. Despite the phenomenon that the information content was generally of lower significance than the artistic performance, those traveling poets were highly relevant for the public access to news and information.

During the period of corresponding journalism, the first newspaper-like publications developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, which printed the information in the order in which it was received.

At the end of the seventeenth century, post and printing services further developed independently from each other and printers primarily became publishers for papers. Further professionalization progressed especially in the bigger cities, where so-called "bulletins" collected and printed news from different sources. Baumert (2013) identifies the writers of these bulletins as the first representatives of the journalistic profession.

What follows, according to Baumert (2013), is the period of the writers. Roß (2004) calls it literarization (German: "Literarisierung") of the press. Because both cities as well as the level of education of their inhabitants were constantly growing, the interest in political and literary issues was also increasing. At the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, papers and magazines spread further, due to advanced print and distribution techniques, but also due to basic societal changes after the French Revolution and its consequences for the political and cultural life of Germany. The political, societal and cultural spheres did not operate separately from each other anymore—and journalism and literature further approached one another, with the result that writers became more involved in journalistic work, contributing descriptions and commentaries of current developments and events (Roß, 2004). Further developments follow a similar pattern to that described above in the paragraph concerning the American press history. As a mass product in a capitalist system, newspapers had to reach the broadest possible audiences to be attractive for advertisers. Newspapers became bigger businesses, internal differentiation got stricter, and people producing content became more professionalized in the sense that they specialized in the journalistic profession instead of performing it as a secondary means of income. The telegraph fostered a development through which news became the quick and undistorted distribution of information on events that had just happened, which became a leading maxim for the journalism practice (ibid, p. 86). This understanding of news was

attended by further alienation of literature and journalism at that time (ibid.) and introduced the period of editorial journalism (Baumert, 2014).

The second half of the nineteenth century was further characterized by the rise of party movements that delivered content for news but also developed their own publishing structures (Baumert, 2014). The rise of a conservative, liberal, center and social democratic press was highly relevant until the turn of the century, when party press reached saturation (Stöber, 2014). Afterwards, and especially in the Weimar Republic, ideological orientation kept its relevance despite the simultaneously growing economic pressures to reach broad audiences that developed hand in hand with the new ideals of objectivity and quick and disengaged news. There were especially a few writers from the left who distrusted the—in their eyes—bourgeois journalism in which objectivity was seen as the professional standard for the capitalist media (Hartsock, 2011). By introducing the literary period of "Neue Sachlichkeit" (English "New Objectivity"),writers such as Egon Erwin Kisch reconnected journalism and literature: "Unlike the concept of journalistic "objectivity" as it took shape in the United States at the same time, the German version emphasized first-person witness as the only kind of journalism that could make a claim to epistemological integrity."(Hartsock, 2011, p. 29). Finding their ways mainly into the feuilleton where news and entertainment were the least strictly separated, the authors again pushed for a variety of shapes and forms: "highly polemical broadsides, art criticism, or meditative essays, or they could be physiologies and sketches, narrative and descriptive in model disposition, fictional and nonfictional, and often accompanied by illustrations." (ibid, p. 30)

Traditionally, as the explanations above have demonstrated, the separation between facts and opinion had not been as strict in the German journalistic tradition as it was in the Anglo-American context. During all periods, we see the influence of the literary sphere on journalism. However, after the Second World War, the United States and Great Britain attached a high importance to establishing the ideal of separation of facts and opinion when rebuilding the German press system (Stöber, 2014, p. 187).

5.2.2.3 Brazil

The history of journalism in Brazil is marked by several turning points and raptures with long-lasting effects on its journalistic culture and practices. As Herscovitz (2004) summarizes other authors, explaining that in the nineteenth century, French liberal ideas had great influence on the cultural life in Brazil: "French cultural missions visited the country attending invitations by the Portuguese royal family established in the colony.

French immigrants controlled all kinds of businesses, including major newspapers, while the elite sent its children to French schools." (Herscovitz, 2004, p. 74). A "French" style of writing, which is characterized as being "less objective, passionate, favoring a partisan interpretation of facts, marked by a literary and a political flavor" (ibid. p. 72), also dominated Brazilian newspaper writing until the first decades of the twentieth century. During the First World War, the connection between Brazil and Europe gradually loosened and the country turned towards the United States due to economic and political interests. A flow of cultural products increased, and Brazilians became more aware of American film, music and literature (ibid. p. 74). During the 1940s, a few Brazilian journalists established direct contact with the US media system and journalism culture through a program that was launched by the office director of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Nelson Rockefeller, who sponsored excursions for Brazilian journalists to the US. After their return to Brazil, many of these journalists tried to adapt journalistic norms and practices that they had familiarized themselves with in the US. According to Albuquerque and Roxo da Silva (2009), this is seen as an important point in Brazilian journalism history. The story of a group of journalists who worked at a newspaper called *Diário Carioca* turned into a mythical narrative about Brazilian journalism. It is said that the group, which was led by editor Pompeu de Sousa, reformed Brazilian journalism by publishing a so-called "Stylebook" that was supposed to foster a modernization process according to the American role model. Even though changes in journalistic practice were not as dramatic as some would recall in retrospective (Albuquerque & Roxo da Silva, 2009) one central element of the reform had a certain influence on newsroom routines: the implementation of the so-called "copy desk", which was supposed to ideologically streamline reporters. Albuquerque and Gagliardi (2011, p. 85) describe that the purpose of the copy desk was "to shape news texts to the requirements of an industrial rhythm of news making, and to disseminate the modern, American-based model of journalism among Brazilian journalists. By doing so, the copy desk worked as an instrument for reducing journalists' autonomy in their daily work."

A further adaptation of American journalistic norms occurred in the following years and was fostered by a period during which conservative editors would mainly hire leftist and communist writers at their news media outlets. Albuquerque and Roxa da Silva (2009) explain that, after a long period in which the communist party was forbidden, party members developed strategies to organize themselves and communicate in a

hierarchical way that was based on discipline and loyalty. Beyond that, communists pursued to spread their ideology from within societal institutions—such as media. Conservative editors valued the discipline and hierarchical structures these journalists brought into the newsroom while they could refer to the journalistic norm of objectivity to find a common base of working with each other. These communist journalists were so valuable for the editors that the latter even tried to protect people in their newsrooms occasionally at the beginning of the military dictatorship in the 1960s. However, at some point from the 1970s onwards, publishers were no longer interested in holding up the arrangement. According to Albuquerque and Roxa da Silva (2009), newspapers changed rapidly as a result. Market pressure and business-orientated management as well as political pressure and a law that made a college degree an obligatory requirement for journalists to work as such, let the costs of tolerating communist influence in their newspapers increasingly surpass the benefits for publishers.

During these different periods of Brazilian journalism, a certain professionalization occurred due to the orientation towards the American journalistic norms. However, Albuquerque and Roxa da Siva (2009) conclude that although the American model certainly had a significant influence on the modernization of Brazilian journalism, there was not a mere adoption but rather an adaptation that befitted Brazilian culture and society. The bottom line is that the orientation towards the American model more intensively was concerned with the marked-orientation rather than the content norms of the model (Herscovitz, 2004). Even though there used to be and still is an open commitment to objectivity, for example, (Mellado, Moreira, Lagos, & Hernandez, 2012) it has been "often a formal gesture more than a matter of true belief" (Albuquerque & Roxo da Silva, 2009, p. 379). According to Albuquerque and Roxa da Silva (2009) this is also expressed in modern Brazilian journalism that privileges narrative aspects rather than news-gathering and reporting techniques.

5.3   Media System Context

Media are, according to Beck (2012), open, dynamic, interdependent and differentiated systems. They are closely intertwined with other systems, such as the economic system and the political system. The specific constitution of the media system within society sets certain boundaries in which journalists operate. Therefore, it is worthwhile to engage in a few more considerations to gain a deeper understanding of the cases in this

study and to find explanations for the use and deliberative impact of narratives in the mediated discourse.

The three cases—Brazil, the US, and Germany—were originally chosen for this analysis because they represent important democracies in their respective world regions that all formally allow freedom of the press and of opinions. This is assumed to be a crucial premise for an open media discourse in which the access to topics, ideas and voices is not inhibited by formal obstacles. Therefore, democracy is a basic requirement for deliberation and, normatively, deliberation should enhance democracy (Ellis, 2012). However, it is important to note that the basic democratic rights of freedom of opinion and freedom of the press are not equally enforced in all three countries. According to the report on press freedom 2015 by Freedom House[4], the media systems of Germany and the US— ranking 22nd and 31st in the global rating— are regarded as "free", while Brazil, ranked 90th is only labeled "partly free," In how far press freedom is restricted by legal practice will be shown in the course of this chapter.

Besides the democratic basic order as one crucial similarity for the comparative analysis of this work, all three countries' economic systems also follow a capitalistic order in which media are mostly privately owned. Sectors regulated by public law are more or less strongly developed. There is no media that is directly owned and controlled by the state. Besides having a similar economic order, media markets in the three countries differ in their actual constitution, which will be further explored in what follows.

To more systematically compare the media systems of our three countries and in order to gain a better understanding of the contexts in which this analysis tries to characterize certain media coverage, I will draw on the ideas of Hallin and Mancini (2004), who propose certain categories with which media systems can be compared[5]. In their influential book "Comparing media systems", Hallin and Mancini argue that "common historical roots shape the development of both media and political systems and are

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[4] See https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2015#.VtWhR9CXo9I (Retrieved March 2, 2016)

[5] Hallin and Mancini concentrated on countries from Europe and North America which was often criticized for Western centrism. In "Comparing media systems beyond the western world" from 2012 they react on the critique by stating that the original model could only be a starting point from which further reaching analysis can start of. Several authors follow their invitation by trying to apply their categories, criticize them and propose more suitable approaches (see for example Voltmer (2012), Hadland (2012), Roudakova (2012); Albuquerque (2012)). Those will be kept in mind in the following paragraphs, though this work is not about the detailed comparison of media systems. It rather aims at pointing to such characteristics within the respective media system that seem relevant for the constitution of media coverage with respect to their narrative and deliberative qualities.

crucial to understanding the relation between the two" (p. 46). They propose four categories along which Western and North American media systems can be compared: (1) the development of media markets and especially the mass circulation press, (2) political parallelism, (3) the development of journalistic professionalism, and (4) the degree and nature of state interventions in the media system. Each of these dimensions consists of further categories which I will not describe in detail, because I will concentrate on the dimensions that are particularly relevant for generating further understanding of the three cases.

When it comes to media markets and especially to the development of the press, Hallin and Mancini distinguish Southern Europe from Northern Europe and North America. The latter two developed an early press system in the nineteenth and early twentieth century while the former did not. This had far-reaching consequences until today. Not only in quantity but also in quality, the press markets of these regions differ significantly. Circulation rates are much higher in Northern Europe as well as in North America, where newspapers are directed to a mass audience. In Southern Europe, newspapers address a small political elite of an urban and well-educated part of society and therefore have much lower circulation rates. The daily newspaper circulation rates in the three countries of this study vary to a great extent. According to a statistic by The Economist (2013)[6] on the daily newspaper sales counting the copies sold per 1,000 inhabitants, Brazil shows a rate of 61, the USA of 166, and Germany of 255. With such a low sales rate, Brazil has even less daily newspaper sales than the Southern European countries to which Hallin and Mancini refer[7].Albuquerque (2012) underscores that Brazils press market is poorly developed compared to European countries. The media system is significantly television-centered (97 percent of all households have television according to d'Essen, 2010) and a small number of newspapers address only an elite readership. Also, the Brazilian media market is highly concentrated. A few big companies, often owned by politicians and their families (d'Essen, 2010), own large parts of the media landscape. In spite of legal restrictions for the formation of monopolies, the enforcement of such laws has been weak since the military dictatorship

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[6] The Economist. (2013). Daily newspaper circulation in selected countries worldwide in 2012. In Statista - The Statistics Portal. Retrieved July 21, 2015, from http://www.statista.com/statistics/259731/newspaper-circulation-worldwide/. (Retrieved March 2, 2016)

[7] According to the website http://www.pressreference.com/, the two countries that were given as examples for low circulation rates in Europe by Hallin and Mancini, Portugal and Greece, even have higher circulation rates than Brazil, with Portugal reaching 84 sales per 1000 inhabitants, and Greece having 78 sales per 1000 inhabitants (Retrieved March 2, 2016)

(Amaral & Guimarães, 1994). Today, the Globo network represents the dominant monopoly (Porto, 2007). It is not specialized in one medium but rather overarches several media types: "It is a mass media complex involving sub-monopolies, one of which is moving toward a complete monopoly of all branches of the cultural industry." (Amaral & Guimarães, 1994, p. 29).

The German press market is well-developed, since there are several regional subscription-based newspapers with local editions and several newspapers with national circulation (Wilke, 2008). However, processes of economic and editorial concentration have steadily developed over time (Beck, 2012). According to Röper (2014), ten big publishing groups are responsible for 60 percent of all newspaper sales. Beyond that, digital concentration–the combination of different media types online and offline under the roof of one company–is also increasing (Beck, 2012). Overall sales rates for newspapers and advertising have nevertheless been decreasing in Germany for several years now (Röper, 2014). The US face a similar development. Circulation rates reached a peak in 1985 and have been declining ever since (Stevenson, Scott, & Shaw, 2008). The American press market consists of daily papers that are small and oriented towards local communities, and there are three daily newspapers that are distributed nationally (ibid.). According to Hallin and Mancini (2004), during the early development of the press in the US it was technically impossible to distribute papers on a nationwide scale, which facilitated a local newspaper culture and most often resulted in a local single monopoly newspaper with a catchall audience.

The dimension of "political parallelism" refers in general to "the degree to which the structure of the media system paralleled that of the party system" (Hallin & Mancini, 2012, p. 27) and encompasses certain indicators such as the organizational connection between media and political parties as well as other relevant institutions or organizations in society (e.g., trade unions, churches, etc.), the partisanship of media audiences, the journalistic role orientations and practices and internal vs. external pluralism. For questions of inclusivity of the mediated discourse, it is quite relevant if a media system is generally characterized by low or high political parallelism. If media institutions are tied to a specific societal group or organization one can expect that representatives of such a group will have good chances to be heard in media coverage. Beyond that, where identifiable political camps exist and are reflected in the media landscape, an oppositional camp will probably have good chances to be represented,

too, even if it is mainly for the purpose of demarcation or rebuttal (which would be a special form of responsivity).

Characterizing Brazil according to its degree of political parallelism seems challenging. Political parties in the presidential system of Brazil play a limited role, because the party system is highly fragmented and inefficient when it comes to the representation of common good interests (Vaz de Melo, & Xia, 2015). Therefore, more general political tendencies in media content, organizational connections, partisanship of the audience, and journalistic role orientation have to be considered for an in-depth analysis (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Albuquerque, 2012). For this work, it is important to note that, after the military dictatorship, media organizations tried to distance themselves from political groups and to increase internal pluralism (Albuquerque, 2012). By adapting a market-driven catch-all attitude, Brazilian media organizations also represent their own voices in the debates rather than the voices of particular political groups (ibid.). However, the Brazilian media system is highly concentrated and according to d'Essen "a big part of Brazil's politicians owned media companies" (p. 84).

Germany is assigned to the democratic corporatist model of Hallin and Mancini (2014) which is marked by "segmented pluralism" on the dimension of parallelism. It has a long tradition of media (like parties) being rooted in political and cultural sub-communities. Though the direct party press does not play a relevant role in Germany anymore today (Beck, 2012), especially the nationwide distributed quality papers reflect certain ideological tendencies from left leaning (Frankfurter Rundschau, TAZ, Süddeutsche Zeitung) to conservative (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Welt).

In the US, such an assignment of newspapers to "distinct locations on the political spectrum or distinct partisan sympathies" makes little sense, according to Hallin and Mancini. Political parallelism is low, though, and many newspapers take a stand on their editorial pages but "these carry over only to a limited extent to news reporting" (ibid.). Classically, the American media would rather be attributed with the characteristic of "internal pluralism," meaning that each individual media outlet expresses a diversity of viewpoints (Benson, 2009). However, as Benson (2009) can prove, this often-assumed internal pluralism is largely under pressure in the US and cannot be taken for granted.

I want to highlight the sub-dimension of journalistic role perceptions as an important category within Hallin and Mancini's dimension of political parallelism, since it is the

subcategory that most directly influences journalistic writing and therefore is particularly important to assess narrative writing styles and deliberative qualities in climate change coverage.

> These kinds of differences in journalistic cultures are associated with differences in writing style and other journalistic practices, with colorful or erudite commentary favored in some systems while a telegraphic informational style is favored in others; commentary rigidly segregated from news in some countries, and mixed more freely in others. (Hallin & Mancini, 2012, p. 29)

This sub-dimension links journalism culture and media systems closely together. A detailed operationalization of journalistic role perceptions and their empirical occurrences has already been presented in section 5.1. The section specifically pointed out that Germany and the US are mostly dominated by a detached-observer role perception, whereas the diversity between different journalistic roles is bigger in Brazil. This ambiguity in role perception might have consequences for the production of news coverage, e.g. for the variety of writing styles or the overall deliberative quality.

The dimension of professionalism has three sub-dimensions or indicators that may be useful to consider when trying to determine the relationship between narratives and deliberation. The first sub-dimension is the one of "autonomy" that applies to the "corps of journalism as a whole" (p. 35) rather than to any individual journalist. Autonomy refers to the control over the journalistic working process and to whether journalists are free to make their own decisions or are required to follow instructions, e.g., those dictated by owners or editors. A second indicator of professionalization named by the authors refers to "distinct professional norms," as the existence of shared norms within the profession that defines and confines the profession. For journalism, these norms usually encompass ethical rules (e.g., for the handling of sources or the separation of facts and commentary) as well as practical routines (e.g., the orientation towards news values as guiding decisions). The third sub-dimension of professionalization is "public service orientation" and refers to the notion of an ethic of serving the public interest. Hallin and Mancini (2004) contrast journalistic professionalism with the concept of instrumentalization, which means "control of the media by outside actors—parties, politicians, social groups or movements, or economic actors seeking political influence—who use them to intervene in the world of politics" (p. 37). The authors emphasize that their notion of instrumentalization specifically refers to political rather than to commercial instrumentalization. To take both forms into account when thinking

about the relationship between narration and deliberation can still be fruitful, especially considering the idea that narratives may well be used by powerful actors for strategic purposes (politically and commercially). Where instrumentalization is likely, one should have a close look at narratives in the news media and their deliberative quality, as one could expect that narratives in such an environment rather lack deliberative qualities.

In the case of Brazil, Mancini and Papathanassopoulos (2002) conclude that it is the regional media, especially broadcasting and radio, that is often owned by local oligarchs who use their political control for own purposes. This is the result of a long tradition in which "presidents [have used] the distribution of radio and television licenses as a form of political patronage" (Matos, 2011, pp. 186–187). Though the major national newspapers from Rio de Janeiro and São Paolo are more independent, they also often are influenced by personal feuds or friendships between owners and political leaders (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2002). Nevertheless, the Brazilian media market is marked by a strong trend of commercialization on the one side, while the Brazilian journalism—as explained above—orientates itself on an American model of unbiased reporting and a Fourth Estate understanding of the role of the media (Albuquerque, 2005).

In Germany, as in other representatives of the Democratic Corporatist model, journalistic autonomy is generally given. Hallin and Mancini (2004) report a study that asked journalists in a survey how much pressure they feel from senior managers and editors. Only a very few journalists expressed that they feel a great degree of this kind of pressure on their work. However, it is one of the functions of newspaper to exercise "ideological guidance," which the nationally distributed newspapers attempt by representing certain tendencies in the left–right spectrum. Therefore, the internal pluralism within one newspaper is a slightly more restricted.

Professionalism has strong roots in the North Atlantic/ Liberal Model—of which the United States conform most to the ideal type (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Due to changes in the American political culture of the late nineteenth century, during which partisan politics abated while the "emphasis of neutral expertise" (p. 220) was growing, the journalistic ideal of "objective" reporting of journalists with a large degree of autonomy from outside actors developed. However, as Hallin and Mancini also note, this type of professionalism is eroding due to increasing efforts of actors, for example of business interests or the church, to influence editorial decision-making. Growing

economic pressure and increasing commercialization also restricts journalists perceived autonomy in the US today, as a survey study by Beam, Weaver, and Brownlee (2009) indicates.

Hallin and Mancini (2004) further suggest examining the role of the state as another analytical dimension for classifying media systems. State interventions can differ according to their extent as well as to their form (p. 41). The existence of public service broadcasting is one of the most important forms of state intervention. Media subsidies for privately owned media companies are another example. Beyond that, it is especially the regulatory framework at the legal level that indicates the degree of state interventions. Legal regulations can encompass laws of free speech and laws for journalists' professional secrecy, laws for regulating media concentration and ownership or political communication (e.g., during campaigns) as well as the access to government information (Hallin and Mancini, 2004 p. 43–44). Voltmer (2012) adds that beyond the degree and nature of state interventions the means, objectives and instruments need to be regarded separately (p.228). She argues that it makes a difference whether state interventions aim at ensuring a certain quality of media content or whether states try to directly control the media for their purposes. Brüggemann and colleagues (2014) note that the indicators of state interventions named by Hallin and Mancini differ to such an extent that they can hardly be combined into one index. They suggest making a conceptual distinction between public broadcasting, press subsidies and media ownership regulation. They prove that these indicators cannot be combined into one index by checking the internal consistency and must therefore be seen as having their own dimensions. In addition, I would remark that regulations which ensure the formal freedom of the press should also be considered, especially when analyzing non-Western systems.

In Brazil, the state has never been an owner of media organizations; however, state subsidies, especially for newspapers, played an important role due to the small readership (Albuquerque, 2012). Even though press freedom is guaranteed in the Brazilian constitution, the state interferes with restrictive censorship as well as judicial actions against journalists (Matos, 2011). Attempts to install public service broadcasting are marked by a history of failures (ibid.)

In Germany, there is strong public service broadcasting with a clear mission for information and education (Beck, 2012). Beyond that, state intervention is less

common. There are only indirect subsidies for the press, e.g., a low value-added tax and reduced postal rates.

In countries that fit into the Liberal Model, the role of the state in the media system is by definition limited, according to Hallin and Mancini (2004), keeping up the capitalistic order and ensuring the legal infrastructure for privately owned businesses. Public service broadcasting is much less relevant than commercial broadcasting (ibid.).

Table 3 Summary of media system characteristics (according to Hallin and Mancini's, 2004, media system dimensions)

	USA	Germany	Brazil
Media Market	Mostly locally distributed newspapers (newspaper circulation: 166 sold copies per 1.000 inhabitants)	Well-developed press market (255 sold copies per 1.000 inhabitants but decreasing), critical economic and editorial concentration	Poorly developed press market (61 sold copies per 1.000 inhabitants), television-centered media market, newspapers address elite readership, high market concentration)
Political Parallelism	Low political parallelism and internal pluralism (under pressure today)	Segmented pluralism: long party press tradition, ideological tendencies still represented today	After the military dictatorship: media organizations distanced themselves from political groups and increased internal pluralism; market driven catch-all attitude
Journalistic Professionalism	Objective reporting with high autonomy as important tradition but increasing tendencies of influence from outside and increasing commercialization restrict journalistic autonomy	High autonomy but need to follow ideological base (especially in newspapers)	Owners of regional media use political influence (low autonomy), strong trend of commercialization
State Interventionism	State provides capitalistic order and ensuring the	Strong public service broadcasting,	State subsidies for newspapers, restrictive

legal infrastructure for privately owned businesses	indirect subsidies for the press	censorship and judicial actions against journalists

National Political Context

The political system of a country shapes the legal framework of a media system and these political structures are to some extent reflected in that media system and the contents it produces. Therefore, it is important to consider the national political context, as it influences public political communication (Kriesi, 2003), as well as news communication in particular (Ferree et al. 2002b). For this study, which investigates the inclusiveness of voices and ideas, conflictive arguments and solution orientation in narrative news, in the following I will try to briefly highlight factors in the political context that could facilitate or hinder these deliberative qualities. As a basic distinction for political contexts, Hallin and Mancini (2012) emphasize individual and organized pluralism. In systems that are characterized by organized pluralism, strong institutionalized social groups represent segments of society and their interests in the public debate and in the process of policymaking, where they may also be formally integrated. Where organized social groups are formally integrated into the political process, we speak of "corporatism". The opposite idea is the concept of "liberalism," which is characterized by systems with individualized pluralism in which such organized groups are less relevant and individual citizens represent their special interests in relation to governing institutions. This truly is an important category for assessing the chances of different actors to be presented in the media debate.

Albuquerque suggests adding the category "system of government" to the original categories of Hallin and Mancini (2004). Especially when investigating countries outside Europe and North America, Albuquerque argues, it would be useful to take the distinction between parliamentary and presidential systems into account (in the original study, only the US were a presidential system), since the latter is essentially a Third World phenomenon. Beyond the system of government, I will try to briefly characterize the general political culture as well as the role of civil society, as it seems important for questions of popular inclusion as well as for the acceptance of conflicting arguments.

A good example of how to connect the general political system, political culture, and deliberative qualities is provided by Rinke (2013), who gives some first hints about relevant factors for predicting deliberative qualities. Rinke uses the overall constitution

of a country's political structure to predict the deliberative quality of justification in broadcasting news in Germany, the US, and Russia. Rinke, drawing on considerations about political systems by Lijphart (2012) and Merkel (2004). With his study, Rinke shows the overlapping influences of political context and organizational context factors. His considerations also help to further understand characteristics of the American and German systems as a majoritarian and a consensus democracy. For my own study, as I include Brazil into the comparison, it is important to highlight aspects in which the Brazilian case deviates in various ways.

In the sample of this study, Brazil and the US technically belong to majoritarian systems with presidential rule. However, there is one significant difference between both systems concerning their party systems. Brazil has a highly fragmented multi-party system (Vaz de Melo, Pedro O. S. & Xia, 2015) whose proportional electoral system is likely to produce a two-digit number of parties represented in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies (Mainwaring, 1991). This is a significant difference from the US with its two-party system and majoritarian electoral system. In Brazil, it is very unlikely that the president's party also holds the majority of seats in the parliament (Mainwaring, 1999). To be able to govern the country, Brazilian presidents include several parties in their cabinets, forming government coalitions to gain support for their political agendas (Figueiredo & Limongi, 2000). At the same time, parties only play a marginal role in the legislative realm, and the highly personalized electoral system produces autonomous representatives who do not feel particularly obligated to their parties (Albarracín, 2016). These are also important differences to the German system as a consensus system as well as to the US system as a majoritarian system. While the multiparty system resembles the German system, the German party system nevertheless is overall more institutionalized, more influential in the legislative process, and more stable than the Brazilian one. This already shows that it is difficult to easily apply Lijphart's (2012) classification on the Brazilian case.

The Brazilian democracy is still young. After gaining its independence in 1822, Brazil suffered through several military and authoritarian regimes throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It established a republican democracy in 1988 (Marques de Melo, José, 2008). The transition towards the democratic system processed "gradually and unevenly" with significant failings from which the country still suffers (Friedman & Hochstetler, 2002). According to Albuquerque (2013), Brazil is an example of a competitive and unstable political culture, with its weak and fragmented party system

that is highly polarized at the elite level. The unstable constitution also affects the relationship between media and politics which Albuquerque (2013, p. 752) characterizes as missing a clear line in supporting government or opposition: "Instead, the most important media organizations often claim to be the true representatives of public opinion and use this claim to vindicate their right to play a leading role vis-a-vis the political institutions."

Brazil's society is marked by high levels of inequality (Nederveen Pieterse & Cardoso, 2013). Having experienced a history of slavery during which plantation owners possessed vast amounts of property, it still has an economic structure that concentrates the wealth within the hands of a few (ibid.). Poverty, inequality, and social exclusion (e.g., of the landless, indigenous, and people of color) are therefore important issues for the Brazilian civil society (Scherer-Warren, 2013). In its unstable democratic environment, Brazil's civil society experienced "progress and regression" (Friedman & Hochstetler, 2002, p. 26). During the final years of the military dictatorship, civil society slowly emerged, demanding citizen rights and democracy and trying to overcome the long-lasting tradition of clientelism and patrimonial politics (Wampler & Avritzer, 2004). After the Constitutional Assembly of 1988, organized interests were even more able to progressively influence legislative politics (Boschi, 2016). Market-oriented reforms in the following years also strengthened private lobbying structures, but at the same time allowed to define norms for private-state relationships, which let corporatism develop (ibid.).

One of the central demands from the Workers Party (PT) when it was first elected to parliament was the constitution of popular councils to which civil society organizations were invited to take part in policymaking and budget planning (Friedman and Hochstetler, 2002). The creation of such forums was one of the prioritized actions after the election of Lula da Silva (Boschi, 2016). This form of institutionalized participation persists in several municipalities, and civil society organizations play a vital role in it (Friedman and Hochstetler, 2002). Beyond such institutionalized participation, non-governmental organizations have also become an important mobilizing structure for civil society in Brazil (ibid.). Furthermore, trade unions have gained influence during the last years (Boschi, 2016). Against this background, the current state-society relations in Brazil are reminiscent of the democratic corporatism that is more typical for consensus democracies than for majoritarian democracies (Lijphart, 2012).

It is important to reiterate that the events investigated in this study are not bound to the national level. Especially during climate change conferences, the initial position of journalists from around the world is quite similar. Differences in the countries' political orders may carry less weight than during more typical routines of reporting. During the conferences, all journalists are confronted with strong non-governmental organizations and civil society voices that seek representation, so that it is possibly more a question of habituation to include such voices into the news. The context knowledge about the political systems gained in this section should nevertheless be helpful when trying to assess deliberative characteristics of each country in the next section, which is concerned with bringing together the background information on journalism culture and tradition, media systems, and political systems in order to arrive at hypotheses for the empirical analysis.

5.4 (Political) Climate Change Context

Lastly, it is worthwhile to regard the countries' roles within the global climate change process for gaining comprehensive background knowledge about the three countries in this study to find explanations for the actual constitution of the media coverage on climate change,.

For Brazil, much is at stake today. The country faces the impacts of climate change to a growing degree, which can also be gleaned from the development of its ranking on the scale of the Global Climate Risk Index (Kreft et al., 2016), which calculates the vulnerability of countries to climate change. In the twenty-years period from 1995 to 2014, Brazil on average occupied rank 82 on this. Compared to the two other countries in the sample, this indicates a low risk (with Germany ranked 18th and the US ranked 25th). However, during the last years, the risk seems to increase, as Brazil has moved up the risk ladder to rank 36 in 2013 and rank 21 in 2014.

At the same time, balancing climate change and economic development has long been difficult for Brazil. Especially preserving the Amazonas rain forest for the sake of fighting global climate change conflicts with the country's economic purposes. In 2005, the Brazilian government reported that one-fifth of the Amazon rain forest has been cleared by deforestation (d'Essen, 2010). Since then, an effort has been made to restrict illegal logging. Still, the country has not joined the UN REDD-program (United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries), but in 2007, Brazil had submitted a proposal to

the UNFCCC fora voluntary mechanism to compensate developing countries that demonstrate reductions in deforestation rates, which was later implemented nationally with the launch of the Amazon Fund in 2008, which is financially supported by other countries, such as Norway and Germany (The REDD Countries Database, 2010).

Together with the group of so-called BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), Brazil represents the position that climate change is mostly the responsibility of the developed world, which is why it would be unfair to restrict economic development for the emerging and developing countries before they are able to reach a standard of living like fully industrialized countries. The group therefore demands financial responsibility to be taken by the developed countries and helping developing countries adapt to climate change with their technical assistance. This has produced a lot of controversy during the last years' conferences, leading to harsh confrontations of the different interests (Hochstetler, & Milkoreit, 2015; Xi, 2011; Rong, 2010).

Along with these efforts to promote the interests of the developing/ emerging countries there is a highly professionalized COP communication. Adolphsen (2014) investigated PR strategies of NGOs and several country delegations at COP15 in Cancun and found out that especially Brazil had applied an exceptionally visible PR mix, supported by two PR firms, which aimed at a comprehensive public outreach and the demonstration leadership with messaging reflecting an ambitious agenda.

Climate change is still a contested issue in the US. The coal and gas lobby promotes initiatives that are supposed to spread uncertainty about the reliability of climate science in public discourse (e.g., Boykoff ,2012; Russel, 2010). Even though the US signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998 under the Clinton Administration, the protocoll has never been ratified by the US senate and therefore did not achieve a binding status. President Barack Obama started his terms in office with ambitious climate change goals, the US joined the Paris Agreement in 2015. However, after President Donald Trump began his term in 2017, he soon announced the US withdrawal from the agreement, causing worldwide indignation. Meanwhile, in the ranking of the Global Climate Risk Index, the US steadily climbs upwards. Especially the monetary losses due to climate change related events are exceptionally high in the US. In 2015, the US occupied rank 1 in the category "Sum of losses in US\$ in purchasing power parity (PPP)" (Kreft et al., 2016). This apparent urgency stands in a strong contrast to the dominant role that climate skeptics play in the US society. When it comes to summit communication during the

last years, the US seemed to pursue a rather agitated approach. Even though global interest in the actions of the US has been high (Do they ratify Kyoto? Do they sign a new treaty? Under what conditions?), communication at the conferences was rather low level, or as Adolphsen (2014) classified it for the Cancun conference, they pursue a traditional quiet media work, focusing on formal media briefings and informal media contacts with a low-key outreach work on-site at the country pavilion and no particular strategic objective or message.

Germany has a longer ecological tradition and played a formative role in pushing the idea of the "Energiewende". In the 1970s, social movements formed around issues of environmental protection and anti-nuclear power, resulting in the formation of the Green Party which pushed environmental issues in the political public debates and demanded the immediate end of the use of nuclear energy after their first election into the German national parliament. During their first government involvement with the Social Democratic Party in 1998 under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, the nuclear power phase out was declared along with a range of other measures such as a law for the promotion of renewable energies (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz, EEG). In 2010, during the second term in office by Chancellor Angela Merkel, the *phase out from the phase out* was declared, but after the catastrophe in Fukushima less than a year later, the German parliament agreed on the ultimate termination of nuclear power. The necessary switch to renewable energies is hardly contested under democratic parties in Germany today, although the pace and concrete measures are still up for constant discussion. During the last years, the German role at climate change conferences therefore varied according to the government in charge. There have especially been situations where Ministers of Economics impeded the work of Ministers for Environment (e.g. Philip Röslers rejection of the increase of EU emission reduction goals in Doha 2012[8], or Sigmar Gabriel's refusing to give his approval to a climate protection plan of the Ministry for the Environment in 2016[9]), which shows that balancing economic and ecological interests is not a matter of course in Germany either. By and large, Germany gradually lost its image as pioneer in questions of implementing renewable energies,

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[8] https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/vor-der-klimakonferenz-roeslers-blockade-ist-absurd/7433716-2.html
[9] http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/gabriel-verweigert-klimaschutzplan-die-zustimmung-14519466.html

due to the lack of ambition to set and follow high standards[10]. During the conferences, Germany pursued a rather traditional communication approach, too, that is less actively outreaching (Adolphsen, 2014). Being a member of the EU, the summit communication of Germany cannot be regarded separately, but the EU also discovered that leadership is hard to claim in a situation between strong veto powers such as the US and China. Bäckstrand and Elgström (2013) argue that the EU had to redefined its role after the failure of Copenhagen and it has tried to act more of a mediator in the years afterwards, becoming a "'leadiator', a leader-cum-mediator", as the authors express it.

5.5 Hypotheses

After having provided context information about journalistic traditions, the political system, as well as the media system, and the respective role in the climate change process of the three countries of interest, it is possible to further specify some of the original research questions that guide the analysis, by adding hypotheses to detect directional relations. First, from journalistic traditions as well as different systemic contexts, we can be sure to expect different levels of narrativity as well as different levels of deliberative quality in the three countries. The basic assumption for the empirical analysis certainly is that narrative journalism is not automatically of high deliberative quality but that certain circumstances such as the journalistic tradition, role perception and political and economic factors will make narrative news more or less likely to facilitate deliberative quality.

From what we have learned about journalistic tradition and professionalism I would expect the US to have the lowest degree of narrativity in coverage since the idea of "objective" reporting remains strong in the US, even though commercialization and economic pressure foster developments in which narrative forms find their way into the coverage more and more (e.g., Benson, 2009), followed by Germany which has a more vital narrative tradition (especially on the political left) but is also oriented towards the Western model of journalism which was especially promoted after 1945. That the ideal exerts influence also becomes obvious when looking at journalistic roles in which the "detached observer" is most dominant (and even more common than in the US). I would then expect the highest degree of narrativity in the Brazilian coverage, since the attempts to enforce the American model of journalism resulted in mixed forms (and a

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[10] http://www.handelsblatt.com/my/meinung/kommentare/klimakonferenz-gastgeber-deutschland-vom-vorreiter-zum-schmuddelkind/20589068.html?ticket=ST-2261828-0AzDf7GPn9Bx4fdPCaa1-ap1

greater diversity of journalistic role perceptions) that still hold on to traditional narrative journalism. Beyond that, the Brazilian press market generally is much weaker, and broadcasting dominates the media landscape, which could also have an impact on newspapers if they try to orient themselves towards reporting forms that resemble the more sequential style of television, for example.

H1: The US coverage will display the lowest degree of narrativity, followed by Germany and Brazil.

It is difficult to make precise predictions on the content of the stories that may be told about climate change in the news coverage. I would expect story types to emerge that are more neutral and unexcited in the US and Germany, first of all because this would resemble the 'objectivity' criterion of the Western journalism model but also because both countries, as developed countries, are less dependent on the outcome of the climate change conferences than Brazil, which is an emerging country that is heavily affected by climate change and less able to help itself in light of its development status. Dominant stories in Germany and the US probably highlight the political normality as sort of habituation rather than the urgency of the cause.

H2: Dominant stories told in the coverage resemble the political role of a country within climate change and climate politics processes.

I would also expect that narrative roles that are used and assigned to actors are very closely connected to the cultural or political context of a country, as well as the political situation of a country or even its position in the negotiations at the conferences. It probably reflects a certain country centrism when cultural resonance is constructed through these roles by using actors that are well known to a particular audience, somehow reflecting the own country's role in the global political structures.

H3: The use of narrative roles in news reporting reflect a country's position and relations to other actors in the political processes.

Before trying to predict the relationship between narrative elements and deliberative qualities, I try to come to some conclusions about what to expect at the deliberative level in general in the three countries. Concerning the inclusiveness of debates, the level of corporatism can affect the inclusion of actors in the public debates, as was shown by Ferree et al. (2002b). Since the interest group system of majoritarian democracies is characterized more by a "competitive and uncoordinated pluralism of independent groups in contrast with the coordinated and compromise-oriented system of corporatism

that is typical for the consensus model" (Lijphart 2012, p. 171) the representation of this pluralism in the public debate more likely occurs in the US than in Germany (Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002b). I would expect similar trends in this study in the US and Germany when it comes to inclusion of actors in general and actors from the political periphery in particular.

In addition, the German newspapers follow ideological lines more explicitly than the newspapers in Brazil or the US, which can also result in a more restricted internal pluralism when it comes to the representation of actors. To assess the Brazilian case is nevertheless rather difficult. Since it resembles Germany's multiparty system and its tendencies of democratic corporatism, one could expect both cases to be somehow similar at the level of inclusion. But since the party system is less institutionalized, more fragmented, and less stable in Brazil, the degree of coordination might still be lower, resulting in a stronger tendency of civil society actors to seek direct media representation. At the same time, Brazilian media tend to distance themselves from political interests of any kind and rather present their own voice (or a perceived voice of the people), which could also lead to a more restricted actor inclusiveness. I would also expect that the idea of inclusion functions very similarly. The more different actors are represented, the more different ideas find their way into the coverage. But again, the Brazilian case is more difficult to assess, especially since the practice of censorship by the state is still a problem that can also lead to self-censorship by journalists, which could result in a smaller spectrum of ideas presented in the coverage.

Concerning the number of opposing arguments, different influences may be expected. I would expect the highest amount of opposing arguments in the US, on the one hand because the tendency to report on "two sides of an issue" is deeply rooted in the US journalistic tradition, but also because the polarized political sphere is more vitally represented in the media debate there. I would expect a lower number of opposing arguments in Germany, since the consensus on climate change is generally higher, the tendency to depict different sides of a story less pronounced, and the corporatist system probably tends to less contestation. In Brazil, at first sight, one would probably expect a similar tendency as in Germany. Not much contestation around the issue of climate change due to the urgency that it has for the country, in combination with a corporatist system, will probably result in a medium level of directly opposing arguments. However, since parties are rather weak and the president rather strong in Brazil (while parties are strong in Germany, where I would expect opposing arguments especially

from the parliamentary opposition), one could also presume that there are less opposing arguments in the debate. We have also learned about the Brazilian media that there is a tendency of representing themselves as the true advocates of public opinion, which could also result in less opposing arguments.

Lastly, concerning the outcome orientation, there are few clues that would support an argumentation for or against more or less outcome orientation in a country. To a certain degree, the displayed outcome orientation is surely dependent on the actual outcome of political decisions during the COPs. However, these decisions might be interpreted differently according to a political evaluation, whether or not they will be fitting to solve the problem. In this sense, the displayed outcome orientation in the media coverage, and whether conflicts are perceived as being fixed or not, will probably vary with COP outcomes that are in favor of the disadvantage of a country.

Predicting the relationship between narrative elements and deliberative qualities needs some further consideration, since several context variables have to be taken into account. First of all and very generally, I would not expect that there is a relationship between narrativity and the deliberative qualities across countries, for example in the sense that narrative news texts are in general more inclusive towards actors or ideas or express more or less opposing arguments. Instead, I expect the difference between narrative and non-narrative coverage to be smaller when the deliberative quality is higher in the coverage of one country, so that the deliberative qualities do not differ significantly between narrative and non-narrative news texts. In an environment with a generally higher deliberative quality, it might be less common to include alternative forms of writing to introduce alternative actors and ideas when the inclusion of a wide range of actors and ideas is an ideal.

H4: The higher the general level of deliberative quality of the news coverage in a country, the smaller the difference in deliberativeness between articles with a lower and higher degree of narrativity.

I would expect the US to have a generally high level of inclusion of civil society actors, as was, for example, already investigated by Ferree et al. (2002b), who showed that the American debate on abortion was more inclusive than the German debate, especially because it was more willing to cover civil society and ordinary citizens. Therefore, I would not expect that this high level is much influenced by the difference of higher or lower degrees of narrativity. Beyond that, the American journalism model favors

representations that include different sides of a story; therefore, I would also expect that the number of idea elements is generally higher and that especially the number of opposing arguments within one article is higher than in Germany and Brazil and also less influenced by narrative writing. In these two countries, I would expect that the difference in the deliberative quality between narrative writing and non-narrative writing is higher. While especially inclusivity of actors from the periphery seems to be connected to the political system, and since Germany and Brazil are both multi-party systems, their levels of inclusiveness in general are probably lower than in the US, since the organized pluralism of multi-party systems canalize interests which are brought forward by representatives. However, narrativity might have a bigger influence on the inclusivity if the assumption is right that alternative actors and ideas are more likely to be included in narrative news writing. If this argument, that alternative views are more easily included in narrative forms of news writing, is transferred to the aspect of the outcome orientation, then I would expect a higher diversity of evaluations of the outcome in narrative writing than in non-narrative writing.

As elaborated above, I expect the general level of narrativity to be especially high in Brazil. The question that will need special attention in the following is whether or not this has consequences for the difference of deliberative quality between coverage with high or low degrees of narrativity. If narrative writing is more likely to be the norm than the exception, the likelyhood that alternative ideas, actors, and outcome interpretations find their way into news coverage through narrative writing might also be smaller.

Beyond regarding deliberative qualities in different degrees of narrativity, I will also try to assess the quality of different stories that are told in the news coverage. As stated above, I expect certain dominant story types in each country. The question is whether these dominant story types are of more or less deliberative quality than less dominant or even alternative story types. In the cases of Germany and the US, where I expect rather unexcited stories that emphasize the recurrence of the events as dominant story types, the focus is probably put more on the political center and the progress of the negotiations with a limited number of ideas discussed at a certain point. In these two cases, I would expect higher levels of deliberative quality, especially actor inclusivity, and a wider range of ideas in story types that are less common. Those might also be used to display alternative views to the dominant narrative. In Brazil, again, this is more difficult to predict. Here it may be that the most dominant story type is also the one with

the highest level of deliberative quality, if it reflects the urgent situation for Brazil and the full range of aspects of the issue.

H5: In Germany and the US, dominant story types have a lower deliberative quality compared to less common/ alternative story types, while in Brazil the most dominant story type is expected to be the one with higher deliberative quality.

6   Research Design

The challenge of this project is to analyze narrative elements and structures in non-fictional newspaper coverage from a quantitative and comparative perspective. This undertaking needs detailed elaboration since it is rather uncommon.

The dissertation project was embedded in a wider research project titled "Sustainable media events? Production and discursive effects of staged global political media events in the area of climate change." Aiming at investigating the production of global staged media events such as the UN climate change conferences and their impact on national media debates in different countries, the project consisted of two main parts: on the one hand, production structures were observed right at the scene, and journalists and communication professionals from NGOs and country delegations were interviewed onsite, at the climate change conferences in Cancún (Mexico) in 2010, Doha (Qatar) in 2012, Warsaw (Poland) in 2013 and Paris (France) in 2015; on the other side, the media coverage in different countries was analyzed with a quantitative comparative content analysis to ultimately connect production structures and national media debates.

For the media sample, nationally distributed and widely-read daily newspapers were selected from Brazil (*Folha de São Paulo*, *O Globo*)[11], Germany (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*)[12], and the United States of America (*The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*)[13]. The project focused on daily print newspapers as quality opinion-leading papers that devoted constant attention to the topic of climate

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[11] According to data from 2013 the two Brazilian newspapers of this sample Folha de S. Paulo and O Globo have an average paid circulation of 294,811 copies for the former and 267,542 for the latter. Folha de S. Paulo is therefore the second most sold newspaper, O Globo the third after the tabloid newspaper Super Notícia with an average paid circulation of 302,472 (Associação Nacional de Jornais. (n.d.). Leading newspapers in Brazil in 2013, by average paid circulation. In Statista - The Statistics Portal. (Retrieved July 21, 2015), from http://www.statista.com/statistics/261629/leading-newspapers-in-brazil-by-circulation/.)

[12] According to recent data conducted by the Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung und Verbreitung von Werbeträgern e.V. (IVW), the Süddeutsche Zeitung has a daily print circulation of 382,000 (second highest circulation in Germany). Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung has a daily print circulation of 253,000 copies (third highest circulation in Germany), for more information see: IVW. (2016). Verkaufte Auflage der überregionalen Tageszeitungen in Deutschland im 1. Quartal 2016. In Statista - Das Statistik-Portal. Von http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/73448/umfrage/auflage-der-ueberregionalen-tageszeitungen/ (Retrieved June 27, 2016)

[13] According to its own indications, the New York Times currently has a daily print circulation of 590,000. Digital-only subscriptions add another 1.2 million to the overall circulation rate (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/04/business/media/new-york-times-co-q1-earnings.html). According to data from 2014, the Washington Post has a daily overall circulation (print and online) of about 400.000 copies (http://www.statista.com/statistics/193818/average-paid-circulation-of-the-washington-post/). Both newspapers are within the top 10 of the most widely read newspapers in the USA (http://auditedmedia.com/news/blog/top-25-us-newspapers-for-march-2013.aspx). (Retrieved June 27, 2016)

change during the climate change conferences. These newspapers are widely read by political and business elites as well as by journalists in their respective countries. Since the form and structure of a daily newspaper is quite consistent across countries, cross-national comparability of media content largely undiluted by differences in medium-specific forms of presentation could also be ensured. The project purposely focuses on daily newspapers, although there are other print media which, at first sight, seem more suitable for analyzing narrativity in current-affairs news writing. For example, weekly newspapers such as 'Die Zeit' or news magazines such as 'Der Spiegel' in Germany publish investigative articles which deviate much more from the conventional news writing style and use more diverse styles for their reporting. However, in the end, several factors spoke for the choice of daily newspapers. First, this research tries to contribute to a discussion about news quality in times of economic pressure and declining circulation due to a growing competition in the overall media landscape and especially of web-based content. Narrative news within the traditional news context is viewed ambiguously in this development. In order to contribute to further clarification about the role of narrative news writing in a conventional news environment, it seemed logical to concentrate on daily newspapers. The chosen newspapers are also more easily comparable. They have a similar status and relevance in the public discourse of the countries, which is more difficult to assess for news magazines and weekly newspapers. Nevertheless, at the beginning of this project, weekly newspapers and magazines were also collected, to include their coverage into the analysis (Stern, Der Spiegel, and Die Zeit for Germany, Epoca and Veja for Brazil as well as Newsweek, Time Magazine, and The Week for the US). However, it soon turned out that the daily newspapers of the three countries devote similar amounts of their coverage on the issues of climate change and climate politics during the annual climate change conferences, which are the object of investigation in this study, and therefore provided a comparable and sufficient data base for the investigation. The coverage of the weekly newspapers and magazines was far less extensive and did not provide an adequate amount of coverage that would produce meaningful results within a quantitative content analysis.

The sampling periods comprised November 22 to December 19, 2010 for the climate change conference in Cancún, Mexico (COP 16), November 28 to December 14, 2011 for Durban, South Africa (COP 17), November 19 to December 4, 2012 for Doha, Qatar

(COP 18), and 4 November to 30 November 2013 for Warsaw, Poland (COP 19)[14]. The complete media sample contained 900 articles[15]. The main unit of analysis is the single article, which was coded for formal categories and for narrative characteristics[16].

Three dimensions were the focus of the quantitative content analysis: the textual framing, the visual framing, and the narrative structures[17]. The complete coding scheme with reliability test values for all variables and in-country comparison was described in detail in Wozniak, Lück and Wessler (2014). The original idea to investigate narratives was driven by the hypothesis that through narrative elements newsmakers would construct cultural resonance and bind the transnational events of climate change and the climate change conferences to national audiences. This thought is further elaborated and empirically investigated in Lück, Wessler and Wozniak (2016). Since this dissertation focuses on the specific nature of narrative news coverage in different countries and the deliberative quality of such news, the following section will go into detail on the operationalization of the relevant concepts.

6.1 The Case: Climate Change (Conferences)

The case to which this study of deliberative qualities in narrative news coverage is applied has (at least) two sides: a scientific and a political one. Climate change is, first

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[14] For digitally available newspapers, the following search string was used: (climate change OR global warming OR Durban OR Doha OR greenhouse effect OR Kyoto Protocol OR Climate summit OR Climate conference OR Climate talks OR Climate politics OR Climate science). Non-digital paper editions were scanned manually by looking for articles that featured any of the search words in their headlines or lead paragraphs.

[15] This sample therefore has to be considered as an event-based full sample rather than a random sample. This has certain implications for the analyses of this study, especially with regard to significance testing. There is a debate about the meaningfulness of significance testing when a full sample could be conducted instead of a random sample (e.g., Behnke, 2005; Broscheid & Geschwend, 2005). Strictly speaking, there is no inference on a general population which could be drawn, and it therefore would not be meaningful to report statistical significance that expresses the probability of an event in the sample to also occur beyond that sample. However, Behnke (2005), argues that even full samples can somehow be seen as random samples of all possible realities that were likely to happen in the first place. If one wants to make claims about causal mechanisms in that one reality (which has occurred in a particular time and space), asking whether the observed events occurred more frequently than random, statistical significance tests can offer additional information that go beyond the mere description. This is, however, a different interpretation than the original notion of significance testing that aims at clarifying whether an event is likely to occur in the basic population. Values for the significance of effects in full samples therefore need a careful interpretation about whether the observed effect is likely to be more than a coincidence. In the result section of this study, I will therefore report significance tests as a support for interpreting effects and their relevance, especially when rather causal mechanisms are assumed. However, in many cases, the actual effect sizes and numerical differences (e.g., in the means of values) are more meaningful, which is why I will mainly concentrate on interpreting those.

[16] Narrative elements were not coded for interview articles that were published in a question-and-answer style. Therefore, the narrative sample only includes n=870 articles.

[17] The complete codebook is available at http://climate.uni-mannheim.de/

of all, a highly complex and abstract scientific phenomenon and what Cox (2006, p. 170) calls an "unobtrusive event […] remote from one's personal experience." Even though the world has experienced more extreme weather events over the last years, the actual rise of the average earth temperature that is made responsible for those events cannot be directly perceived by individuals. The connection between the rising CO_2 level, rising temperatures, and growing numbers of extreme weather events has to be evaluated by scientific and political experts. Climate change can be measured, e.g., regarding the amount of rainfall or glacial melting. But how this data is interpreted is not only a scientific issue but also a social process during which knowledge is produced communicatively, which in turn serves as a foundation for perception and (political) action.

Climate change is a problem of global historical scale and it is also a highly political and normative issue, especially when it comes to questions of justice and equity, since those who have a large responsibility for causing climate change (e.g., energy-intensive industries in the Western developed countries) are not as much affected as the Global South, where it is much harder to adapt to climate change. Those who are directly involved in the struggles against the effects of climate change have less power to enforce action against it. Besides normative considerations, there is also a need for concrete political solutions and actions that follow from them—though there cannot be only one solution that fits the problem, since the causes and effects of climate change are diverse. The Climate Change Conference (Conferences of the Parties – COPs) held annually under the auspices of the United Nations Frame Convention of Climate Change (UNFCCC) has become an important institution and the global platform on which the debates on all these aspects take place, visible for the global community. Kunelius and Eide (2012) emphasize the relevance of the conferences and point to the role that they can play for journalism research:

> The summits have become an intensive (and exceptional) example of a global mediatized political event where an enormous amount of knowledge production, economic lobbying, civic activism, and bargaining gravitate around potentially consequential political decision making. The summits force different kinds of actors and forms of knowledge into a compressed time–space, providing an opportunity for researching climate-change politics and claims of social and political theory in general—and climate journalism in particular. (Kunelius& Eide, 2012, p. 267–268)

Hence, the COPs are exceptional examples for international political events in several ways that make a good case for the undertaking of this study which will focus on

narrativity and deliberation in the newspaper coverage about these conferences. Since the conferences exhibit a unique combination of different event features (Lück, Wozniak, & Wessler, 2015), they shape the circumstances under which actors operate onsite in specific ways that need to be taken into account. They are, first of all, a forum for political negotiations that do not exclude civil society actors as much as many other international summits. Therefore, the events are also always an important date in the year for popular mobilization of civil society and non-governmental organizations from the global environmental movement. The conferences also serve as specialized conventions in which stakeholders and experts present themselves and exchange knowledge. Consequently, a broad range of different viewpoint brought into the debate by a great variety of different actors would possibly be also included into the mediated debate. For the purpose of this study, the context of these globally accessible events offers a good case and allows to identify general features of news coverage as well as cultural particularities in divergent contexts (e.g., Krøvel, 2011; Kunelius & Eide, 2012) in order to identify mechanisms and find explanations for a certain combination of the use of narratives and their deliberative qualities.

Climate change, the conferences, and their media coverage have been investigated before in empirical research. Eide and Kunelius (2010), for example, concentrated on the conferences in Bali (2007) and Copenhagen (2009). They point out that the communicative focus during these conferences was mainly on climate politics instead of climate change itself. Gunster (2011) even calls the conferences "a political drama". For the COP 15 in Copenhagen, Kunelius and Eide (2010) analyzed which actors were quoted in the news coverage. Their sample comprised eighteen countries from which they included two newspapers respectively. Across all countries, actors from national political systems where represented the most with 38 percent of the quotes, followed by civil society actors (28 percent), science experts (14 percent) and actors from the transnational political system (10 percent) and business actors (5 percent). These numbers give an overview about the types of actors involved in the process, although countries differ from these mean values a lot, as the authors also show. In the course of their framing analysis, the authors also regarded the attribution of responsibilities to different actors, using victim, villain and hero ascription. Across countries, they identify a "shift of blame" from the Bali to the Copenhagen conference. While the US were assigned the villain role in Bali, many countries blamed China for the weak outcome of the conference. When it comes to the victim perspective, Eide und Kunelius identify a

clear North-South distinction. Coverage in developed countries tended to "blame the victims" by shifting the blame for the failure from the hosts (Denmark) to the G77 countries along with China. Coverage in countries from the Global South, on the other hand, expressed more solidarity with those countries who spoke on behalf of the G77 group. When looking at the role of the assigned hero, the authors identify strong trends of domestication, since there are several cases (China, US, Germany and South Africa are named as examples) that show how countries' political leaders are depicted as leading figures in central roles for the negotiations. While understanding the ascription of the roles as a framing device, these results by Eide and Kunelius nevertheless give some hints on the extent to which the perspective on central actors differs between countries, producing specific narratives about the conference.

Krøvel (2011), however, took a closer look at the narratives in news coverage on the Bali conference and identified a great uniformity in its global media coverage. His qualitative study included print and TV coverage from North and South America, Africa, Asia and Europe and focused on framing, and especially on how the roles of the "protagonists" and "opponents" were constructed in the coverage. He concludes that the journalistic repertoire when it comes to the narratives that appear in the coverage is relatively limited. He points to one major narrative that sees the US as an opponent and that sees "small and relatively poor country standing up to the only remaining superpower" (p. 96). The dominant narrative about the Bali COP according to Krøvel therefore is a classical win vs. lose narrative which is problematic for the author because "by focusing on who is winning, the communication systematically makes important information on the consequences of climate change invisible" (p. 100). These results by Krøvel (2011) as well as Eide and Kunelius (2010) demonstrate that an engagement in the analysis of the narratives told about the conferences can reveal power structures as well as national and inter-/transnational tendencies in the perspectives chosen for the reporting. However, it also demonstrates that narratives can differ depending on the COP and the events taking place at the conference. It is therefore important to note again, that COP 15 in Copenhagen was a particularly significant event in the history of UN climate change conferences: "COP15, held in Copenhagen in 2009, was supposed to see an agreement on a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol to span the period from 2013 to 2020. This agreement failed to materialize, and the extremely high expectations raised in the run-up to COP15 crumbled." (Wessler, Lück & Wozniak, 2017). The following COPs in Cancun (COP16), Durban (COP17), Doha (COP18),

Warsaw (COP19) and Lima (COP20) were therefore perceived as so called "transitional COPs", which were accompanied by lower expectations and a return to questions, for example, on how a new binding treaty can be reached at all or how reliable measurement of the impact of climate change measures could be installed to the general satisfaction of all parties. The COPs 16 to 19 finally let to COP21 in Paris and the achievement of the "Paris Agreement":

> The "Paris Agreement" for the first time specifies binding reduction targets for all countries based on "intended nationally determined contributions" (INDCs). Governments worldwide have agreed to the aim of keeping the global temperature increase to well below 2 degrees Celsius, preferably to 1.5 degrees, as compared to pre-industrial times. (Wessler, Lück & Wozniak, 2017)

The study at hand will concentrate on the analysis of the transitional COPs from Cancun to Warsaw. This brings the advantage of a higher comparability since none of these conferences were out of the ordinary in ways that the Copenhagen and Paris conferences were. Though they are exceptional events overall, the conferences of this study represent a period of routine and should therefore also reveal routine mechanisms in the production of media coverage and messages. Within the overarching project that this dissertation partakes in, we could already gain some insights about the media coverage on these conferences. For example, analyzing the framing of text and images in newspaper articles from Brazil, Germany, India, South Africa, and the United States, we identified four overarching multimodal frames (using a subset of photo-illustrated articles ($n = 432$) as well as the entire conference coverage ($n = 1,311$)): global warming victims, civil society demands, political negotiations, and sustainable energy frames. We could also show that the distribution of these global frames across the five countries is relatively similar. A comparison of frames emerging from the national subsets further reveals a strong element of cross-national frame convergence (Wessler, Wozniak, Hofer, & Lück, 2016). In the actor study that conducted interviews at the conferences, we also gained deep insights into how media message production between the different actors at the conferences proceeds. What we call "co-production" refers to the process of close contact between journalists and communication professionals from NGOs and delegations. However, we could reveal relevant differences in the relationships, for example, according to the professional background of the journalists (the media they work for or the beat) or regarding the focus journalists lay on the contact to actors from their national context (Lück, Wozniak, & Wessler, 2015; Lück, Wessler, Wozniak, and Maia, 2018).

This dissertation aims at adding to the picture and the understanding of the communicative processes of the climate change conferences. By closely looking at the three countries Brazil, Germany and the US in particular, I hope to offer more comprehensive insights into how the events induce media coverage in national contexts and what kind of similarities and differences can be identified and why.

6.2 Narrative Concepts

There are a few studies (Viehöver, 2011), 2012; Schwarze, 2006; Smith, 2012; Krøvel, 2011; Spoel, Goforth, Cheu, & Pearson, 2008) that have investigated narratives of climate change. These are an important foundation for the implementation of quantitative measures of narrativity in the coding scheme. Ultimately, narration was measured on three dimensions: (a) the **degree of narrativity**, which consisted of an index from main narrative characteristics of a news story; (b) the **story type,** based on ideas about the narrative genres in which stories can be written; and (c) the presence of agents assuming specific **narrative roles**. All narrative variables were coded on the article level.

Degree of narrativity

Measuring the degree of narrativity helps to differentiate narrative news stories from conventional news stories. Narrativity in this sense is understood as a rather formal concept based on certain characteristics that are important for narratives. Glaser, Garsoffky, and Schwan (2009) introduce four main narrative characteristics that will also be basic elements for measuring the degree of narrativity in this study: (1) *dramatization*, referring to the traditional story structure with a beginning, middle, and end, in which at the beginning of the story the protagonists attempt to redress an imbalance; these attempts lead to complications, setbacks, crises, and ultimately to success or failure; (2) *emotionalization*, referring to the presentation of information in an emotional way; (3) *personalization*, meaning that narratives are always about agents, mostly humans, causing events; and (4) *fictionalization*, referring to the inclusion of fictional content (to varying degrees).

To develop appropriate categories for a quantitative content analysis, some of these narrative characteristics had to be translated into reliably observable variables in order to measure the degree of narrativity. Emotionalization was therefore redefined as "*emotion*" and its presence was coded when the emotion of an actor is explicitly referred to in the news story. Personalization was renamed into "*narrative*

personalization" to avoid confusion with the established understanding of the concept of personalization in political communication studies (for an overview, see, van Aelst, Sheafer, & Stanyer, 2012). To fulfill the characteristic of narrative personalization the story needs to focus on agents (either individual, collective, or institutional actors) who either cause events or are affected by circumstances caused by other agents, systems, or nature. Acting or reacting agents must play a central role in the story. Their actions are essential for the story to be told in the first place, i.e., the actions are the decisive elements for the plot. The four final variables dramatization, emotion, narrative personalization, and fictionalization can be coded as present or not present in an article. All four variables were added to an index that is supposed to indicate the degree of narrativity. The more of these characteristics are enclosed in an article, the higher the article's degree of narrativity. The index therefore has a range from '0 = no narrative characteristics (i.e. very low degree of narrativity)' to '4 = all four narrative characteristics (i.e. very high degree of narrativity)'.

Story Types

Besides the formal characterization that measures the degree of narrativity I am also going to describe narratives used in non-fictional news coverage according to their content. Which stories are actually told about climate change and climate politics? The operationalization is orientated towards the concept of "genre clues" as described by Smith (2012) and Schwarze (2006). As described in more detail in section 2.3, both introduce specific genre catalogues, with which they characterize environmental stories. My own operationalization uses elements from these genre catalogues but does not aim at measuring the narrative genre holistically, but rather through the use of three distinct variables that correspond to certain genre properties: "overall theme", "tone", and "(expected) outcome." In the operationalization of this study, the main characteristics of the genres named by Smith (2012) and Schwarze (2006) are translated into parameter values of the "overall theme" variable. The *low mimetic* genre corresponds to the variable value "everyday business", the *tragic/tragedy* genre to "failure after struggle", the *romantic/comedy* genre to "triumph over adversity", the *apocalyptic* genre to "struggle over destiny of planet or civilization" and the genre *melodrama* to "(social/political) conflict".

Determining a story's genre through the "tone of a story" is done by measuring the eponymous variable in which coders have to ascribe one of five different tones as being

dominant in a story: (1) fatalistic, (2) optimistic, (3) unexcited/neutral, (4) passionate, and (5) pessimistic. These tones also correspond to the narrative genres. A fatalistic tone would be a genre clue for the apocalyptic genre, the optimistic tone would be either for the comedy or the melodrama, the unexcited/neutral tone for the low mimetic genre, a passionate tone for the comedy or the melodrama, and the pessimistic tone for the tragedy.

Finally, "(expected) outcome" is measured by coding whether a story's conflict is (expected to be) fixed or not (expected to be) fixed. Additionally, coders can ascribe the value "no conceivable outcome" to an article's story. Although this does not correspond to one of the genres, the pretests showed that some stories in articles do not involve a problem or conflict that needs a resolution but rather resemble a note on an event without actual conflict.

Since news coverage is diverse, I would not expect to find the original genres in their pure forms only. Coding the three categories independently from each other allows to find country-specific mixtures and to characterize the stories that are told in more detail.

Narrative Roles

As we have seen, acting and reacting actors are fundamental for stories to be told. As a last narrative category, which is also supposed to shed more light on the stories that are actually told, character specifications are regarded more closely, with the aim of identifying classical narrative roles in the story: "victim", "villain", and "hero". These roles were explicitly mentioned by Schwarze (2006) in combination with the *melodrama* genre. However, other genres can be characterized by such actor constellations too. It is, for example, necessary for the romantic or comedy genre—marked by a triumph over adversity—to have a hero who solves the problem or ends the conflict. Every narrative role can be identified once in every news story and can be coded as present or not present. If a role was identified to be present, coders had to decide whether the particular role is assumed by an individual, collective, or institutional actor. The name or designation of the actor is also recorded in order to find out to whom in particular journalists would ascribe such roles. Finally, the type of action in which the narrative character engages is coded, since action is one of the fundamental characteristics of narrations.

6.3 Deliberative Concepts

To assess the deliberative qualities of the news coverage, four main indicators will be in the center of the analysis: the inclusiveness of actors (and in particular of actors of the political periphery in comparison to actors from the political power center), the inclusiveness of ideas, the direct contrasting of opposing ideas within articles, and the outcome orientation. These are certainly not the only deliberative criteria. Others, such as dialogic form, justification of opinions, rebuttal of arguments from others, and civility and respect in the debate, are also core elements for the deliberative theory. However, since this project is one of the first attempts to assess the deliberative quality of news narratives in particular, I concentrate on the most basic deliberative elements. The concepts of narrativity and deliberation are both complex, and for reasons of clarity and practical manageability I will try to convey some basic ideas about the interrelation of both concepts. If it turns out to be feasible to apply these basic measures of deliberative quality, future research should go more into detail on more sophisticated deliberative qualities.

Inclusiveness of actors

To assess one of the main deliberative criteria, the inclusiveness of actors in the debate – understood as the process of giving voice to a variety of different actors (or actor types) - every direct and indirect statement made by a recognizable actor in the news coverage was coded. All in all, this statement data consisted of n = 4,002 cases. For each of these statements the name, the type (whether individual or collective), the origin, and the affiliation of the actor was coded. The latter distinguished between political actors from the national and international level (also international and transnational organizations and institutions), business actors, scientists, NGOs and NGO activists, journalists (also the author of an article), intellectuals, other celebrities, and ordinary citizens without further affiliation. To rate the level of inclusiveness of actors, it will be especially important to regard the share of statements made by actors from the so-called political periphery (representatives of civil society), compared to actors from the political center (representatives of formal-institutional politics).

Inclusiveness of ideas

The inclusiveness of ideas is supposed to rate the variety and diversity of different ideas about climate change as they appear in the coverage. As it is a basic principle of deliberation that participants in the debate should be able to consider all perspectives

and arguments, it is important that transparency about the range of different ideas is created in the first place.

At the statement level, idea elements that were somehow concerned with the debate on climate change and climate politics were coded for their presence. Based on Entman's (1993) differentiation of framing categories, idea elements were coded on three dimensions: *problem definition* (here: consequences of climate change, such as increases in temperature, melting ice/glaciers, etc.), identification of *causes* (e.g., greenhouse gas emissions, deforestation), and *treatment recommendations* (remedies, such as clean energy, financial assistance to disadvantaged countries etc.).[18] Each of these categories consisted of multiple elements that could have been mentioned in an actor statement or not. Solutions could also be endorsed or rejected, which was coded as well. The idea elements were later aggregated on the article level by using dummy variables (0 = frame element absent in article, 1 = frame element present in article) so that they could be combined with the narrative data in the analysis.

Opposing ideas

In order to investigate the occurrence of truly competing arguments I look at directly opposing idea elements. Of course, ideas within an article can be competing even if they are not directly opposing one another. In the mediated competition for attention, an actor utters a statement that is concerned with a certain aspect, e.g., entails a certain interpretation of events or an idea for a solution, and another actor expresses his or her views without directly referring to the first or even knowing about the utterance of the first actor. In mediated discourse, journalists put these statements together to depict the two sides—and these sides do not necessarily have to be exclusive to one another. It is difficult to reconstruct whether an argument was meant to be an alternative to another argument in the respective case. However, in the list of idea elements that were coded for this study, there are arguments that directly oppose each other. If these appear together in an article, it is clear that the article contained truly opposing sides. At the dimension of consequences, these are the two arguments of whether climate change brings economic benefits or harms. At the dimension of causes, it is the question whether climate change is caused by natural processes or by the (human) use of fossil energy. Lastly, every solution could be coded as either mentioned or even endorsed or

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[18] The original codebook also contained the category "moral evaluation" which was supposed to record whether an actor explicitly denied or acknowledged climate change. Empirically, such statements could hardly be found in the coverage, which is why this category will not play a further role in the analysis.

rejected. The articles in which solutions are mentioned, endorsed, or rejected are also counted to contain opposing idea elements.

Outcome orientation

This category is a mixture of variables that have already played a role above. There are two main variables that need to be taken into account when assessing the outcome orientation. First, the outcome variable distinguishes whether there is any outcome displayed in the article (or no conceivable outcome at all) or whether a conflict actually exists and has been fixed (or anticipated to be fixed) or is not fixed (or anticipated not to be fixed).

The other indicator of the outcome orientation is the inclusion of idea elements on the dimensions of solutions, which is also regarded explicitly in the analysis of the outcome orientation since it hints at attempts from actors to constructively solve the problems.

6.4   Formal Categories

A handful of formal categories were coded at the article level to identify and characterize the articles in the sample. These categories included the country, the medium, the title of the article, the climate change conference during which the article was published, the length of the article (number of words) as well as its date. Each article was given an article ID that allowed connecting actor statements and articles later in the process.

6.5   Pretesting

To test the instrument for the empirical analysis, a comprehensive pretest was conducted with all coders. In the process of pretesting, the codebook was continuously improved by group discussions and clarification decisions of the research team.

The codebook was tested for intercoder reliability on the basis of newspaper articles about the UN climate change conferences in Durban (COP17) and Doha (COP18) that appeared in the complete sample of the project's material of German, Indian, South African, and US newspapers (Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine, The Times of India, The Hindu, Daily Sun, The Star, The New York Times, and The Washington Post).To select the pretest material from these newspapers, 50 randomly sampled issues from the coverage of COP17 were chosen first, which contained 53 news items on the topic. Additionally, 27 articles from the coverage of COP18 were sampled to ensure that 20 news items could be pretested for each of the four countries and to ensure some

variety in the sampling base. Article-level measures were pretested on the resulting 80 items[19]. Finally, 205 actor-statements, which were nested in the 80 original news items, were pretested for the statement variables that mainly contained the different idea elements. Six coders participated in coding the various subsets of the material. Since the coding team only included one Portuguese-speaking coder, the Brazilian media material was not part of the pretest. However, the Brazilian coder participated in coding the English material so that his intercoder reliability could also be ensured.

In the Appendix, a detailed summary reports the average percent agreement, Brennan and Prediger's kappa (1981) as well as Krippendorff's alpha (2004) for the statement and narration variables[20]. The statement variables achieved at least a .70 level with either kappa or alpha, as appropriate. Intercoder reliability is slightly lower for the narrative variables but generally satisfactory when regarded across all countries. However, a detailed country-specific evaluation showed that the values in the US sample material are clearly lower, with the two variables 'emotion' and 'fictionalization' not reaching a level of at least .5 in either Brennan and Prediger's kappa or Krippendorff's alpha. This underscores the challenge that a comparative analysis of something as culturally specific as narratives implies. Narrative elements in news texts of the US turned out to be especially difficult to detect. This may be due to the fact that both US newspapers featured quite fact-based news discourse, replete with technical details and specialized background information, but few overt narrative features. The good values of the German subsample are certainly also influenced by the coder's familiarity with the language and the nature of the news coverage. However, since the undertaking of comparatively and quantitatively analyzing narratives in the news is quite innovative and still exploratory, the values were accepted after another intensive discussion and clarification with the coding team before starting with the main coding process.

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[19] Four items turned out to be stand-alone visuals that contained only minimal text in the caption. Therefore, 76 textual articles were pretested for the narrative variables.

[20] Brennan and Prediger's kappa corrects for chance agreement between coders by subtracting from raw agreement a chance agreement term based on the number of available categories. Krippendorff's alpha employs a covariance-based correction for chance (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007) and is particularly sensitive to coder disagreement in rare categories (Krippendorff, 2011, p. 103), which is not the case for Brennan & Prediger's kappa. Many of the variables concern content elements that occur relatively rarely. Both measures have a range from –1 to 1, with scores above 0 representing a success of the coder training.

7 Results

The forthcoming result section is threefold. The first part (section 8.1) deals with narrative features and their constitution in the three countries Brazil, Germany, and the US. Afterwards, the general deliberative characteristics of the coverage of the three countries will be sketched out (section 8.2). The third part (section 8.3) investigates deliberative qualities of narrative news articles and compares their occurrence between the countries. Within these sections, I will gradually respond to the hypotheses and research questions.

7.1 Narrative Features

This first section will go into detail on the narrative features that are of interest for this study: the degree of narrativity (section 7.1.1), the story types used in the coverage (section 7.1.2) and the narrative roles that are ascribed to actors in the coverage (section 7.1.3). This will serve to give answers to the first set of research questions which asked how and in which topical and formal contexts narrative elements are used in the coverage of climate change and which country differences can be detected.

7.1.1 Degree of Narrativity

A first analysis looks at the degree of narrativity in the coverage. A narrativity index was calculated of the sum of the four narrative elements „dramatization" (referring to a structure that is more sequential rather than similar to the inverted pyramid style), "emotion" (referring to occasions where emotions are explicitly expressed in the text), "narrative personalization" (referring to actors that cause actions or are affected by the actions of others), and "fictionalization" (referring to anecdotal or speculative details added to the text). Therefore, an article with an index value of zero does not contain any of the basic narrative features; an article with an index value of four w indicates that all four narrative elements are present. While the former would therefore represent one pole of the gradual concept of narrativity with the lowest degree, the latter would represent articles with the highest degree of narrativity.

To better illustrate the difference between articles with a higher and lower degree of narrativity, the appendix provides four examples. Two articles from a German newspaper and two articles from a US newspaper contrast articles scoring 0 (i.e. having no narrative elements) with articles scoring 4 (i.e. containing all four narrative elements) at the additive narrativity index. The article *"Der sichtbare Wandel"*

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, November 29, 2012) is an example of coverage with a low degree of narrativity. It covers the report on extreme weather events during the first 10 months of 2012 presented by the World Meteorological Organization during the climate change conference in Durban. The article presents the scientific findings and gives some examples of affected countries. It is fact-oriented and written in a conventional way that starts with the main information ('The first 10 months of the year 2012 were marked by extreme weather, as the World Meteorological Organization detected.'), adding further detailed information afterwards. Another example of low narrativity is presented in the article *"Chinese set terms for climate deal by 2020"* (Washington Post, December 5, 2011). This article represents a typical example of a set of articles that present updates from the ongoing conferences during which parties disclose their positions. In this case, it refers to the Chinese negotiators who made a move towards an agreement by setting their terms which needed to be fulfilled. The article presents the Chinese side, quoting several statements from Chinese negotiators as well as reactions and assessments from other delegations and organizations. The article *"Allein gegen den Rest der Welt"* (Süddeutsche Zeitung, December 13, 2010) is a good example of the fact that narrative news articles do not necessarily have to be long to fulfill the narrative criteria. The article focuses on the Bolivian UN ambassador Pablo Solón who 'fights against the rest of the world' and therefore fulfills the narrative element of *narrative personalization.* His actions and reactions trigger the article. He criticizes the negotiations, engages in a battle of words with Patricia Espinosa, the conference president, faces a lot of resistance and is even abandoned by allies. His frustration and his feeling of being right is explicitly mentioned, fulfilling the criterion of *emotion.* The text is written in a plot-like form rather than in the inverted pyramid style which points to the criterion of *dramatization.* The element of *fictionalization* is found in one of the indirect quotations of the protagonist, who fears that an agreement as discussed at that point in the negotiations would lead to a much higher rise of the earth's temperature than hoped for. A different kind of article, which was also published during a climate change conference, relating rather to the climate change issue itself than to the negotiations, is another example of articles with a high degree of narrativity. The article "*Following in the carbon footprint of Thanksgiving's first diners"* (Washington Post, November 12, 2013) looks into the past to the first Thanksgiving dinner between Native Americans and European settlers. The author writes from a first-person perspective, comparing the carbon footprint of a contemporary Thanksgiving dinner with this very first dinner,

drawing connections to the consequences of contemporary lifestyle for global warming and climate change. *Narrative personalization* is expressed in sentences like "Seventeenth-century farmers grew food, ate food and used those calories to grow more food," in which people's actions are portrayed. Such short anecdotes also fulfill the criterion of *fictionalization.* The form is not typical for a conventional news article but rather plot-like. This feature is already introduced with the first sentence of the article: "It's easy to romanticize the 1621 coming-together of the Wampanoag tribe with the struggling European settlers, which many people now view as the original Thanksgiving," fulfilling the criterion of *dramatization.* Nevertheless, the article is on the whole fact-based and presents detailed information about contemporary food production and its consequences for the environment and climate, but the author also expresses his gratitude (fulfilling the criterion of *emotion*) for the modern lifestyle he can live and calls for a higher awareness of the finite nature of available resources. These four articles mark the two ends of the poles between conventional news stories and narrative news stories. There is a lot of diversity in between. Articles that clearly follow the inverted pyramid style can still have paragraphs that focus on actors and their actions, fulfilling narrative personalization but not dramatization. The display of emotions, e.g., from a political actor during negotiations, can be included in an article that otherwise would not fulfill any other narrative characteristics. Possible combinations have a wide range in the news context, and the additive index of narrativity helps to shed light on the overall narrativity of news coverage in different (country) contexts.

Table 4 illustrates the share of articles with a particular degree of narrativity. Across all articles in the sample, about one fifth can be classified as having a high degree of narrativity with an index value of 3 or 4. The first country differences also become visible. The share of articles with a higher degree of narrativity is highest in Brazil (28.8 percent of the articles), followed by Germany (14.9 percent of the articles) and the US (12.4 percent of the articles). On the other end of the narrativity scale, Germany has the highest share of articles (25.6 percent) that contain none of the narrative characteristics (index value of 0), followed by the US (20.7) and Brazil (18.2).

Table 4 Share of articles with particular degree of narrativity

Country		Degree of Narrativity					
		0	1	2	3	4	all
Brazil	n	58	83	86	75	17	319
	%	18.2	26.0	27.0	23.5	5.3	100

Germany	n	93	118	98	42	12	363
	%	25.6	32.5	28.0	11.6	3.3	100
US	n	39	79	47	18	5	188
	%	20.7	42.0	25.0	9.6	2.7	100
All countries	**n**	**190**	**280**	**231**	**135**	**34**	**870**
	%	**21.8**	**32.2**	**26.6**	**15.5**	**3.9**	**100**

Expressed in means, this table would translate in an overall average of 1.47 narrative characteristics per article across all countries. Comparing the means for the narrativity index of the three countries, one finds significant differences ($F(2,868) = 12.45$; $p<.001$), with Brazil having the highest degree of narrativity ($M=1.72$, $SD=1.17$), followed by Germany ($M=1.34$; $SD=1.08$) and the US with the lowest degree of narrativity ($M=1.31$, $SD=.99$). This seems plausible with respect to journalistic cultures. Brazilian journalism has long been influenced by the French writing style, which traditionally features essayistic and literary elements (Herscovitz, 2004; Umbricht & Esser, 2014). Even under the increasing influence of US journalism ideals during the twentieth century, Brazilian journalism developed its very own style and culture that connects the different traditions of essayistic storytelling and detached observation with a peculiar relationship to political power and interventionism:

> Although the American model had a significant influence on the modernization of Brazilian journalism, it was not a case of simple, direct adoption. Journalists *adapted* it to the particular characteristics of Brazilian society and culture. Adhesion to the values of American journalism has been often a formal gesture more than a matter of true belief. (Albuquerque & Roxo da Silva, M. A., 2009, p. 379)

Germany and the US do not differ to the same extent to each other as they do to Brazil. Although Germany has a strong tradition of literary writing, it is also very likely that it converges towards the Anglo-American ideal of a rather detached fact-oriented journalism style. The first hypothesis expected the US to have the lowest degree of narrativity, Germany to have a slightly higher one, and Brazil to have the highest degree of narrativity in comparison. This hypothesis seems to be confirmed at first sight. However, a closer look also reveals differences ($F(5,864) = 5.92$; $p<.001$) between the newspapers in the sample, as also shown in Table 5.

Table 5 Degree of narrativity in countries and newspapers

	M	SD	n
Brazil	1.72	1.17	319
Folha de S. Paulo	1.72	1.21	145

O Globo	1.71	1.14	174
Germany	1.34	1.08	363
Süddeutsche Zeitung	1.46	1.07	185
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	1.22	1.08	178
USA	1.31	.99	188
The New York Times	1.34	1.1	95
The Washington Post	1.29	.88	93
All countries	**1.47**	**1.11**	**870**

It is remarkable that there is no consistent pattern between the two German newspapers Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, which differ quite a lot from each other in their degree of narrativity while the Brazilian and US newspapers are rather close to each other. Although the average degree of both German newspapers together is very similar to the average of the newspapers from the US, the single newspapers deviate much more. While the more left-leaning Süddeutsche Zeitung has a higher degree of 1.46 narrative elements per article, the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung has the lowest degree of all newspapers in the sample, even lower than both US newspapers. A Scheffé post-hoc test provides more information on where exactly we can find significant differences. In this case, it is the FAZ that differs significantly from both Brazilian newspapers in the degree of narrativity, but both German newspapers as well as both US newspapers do not differ significantly from each other. However, one should keep in mind that since I do not have a random sample but an event-based full sample, those measures of significance are only to a certain extent instructive and can only give more hints for the interpretation (see footnote 14). The actual values are more informative, especially in case where it is obvious that the two German newspapers differ to a much greater degree than the other newspapers do within one country. Nevertheless, it is therefore difficult to confirm the second part of the hypothesis that the German coverage has a higher degree of narrativity than the US coverage.

Figure 1 gives further implications on the different use of narrative characteristics in the countries and newspapers. At first sight, there is a peculiarly high use of narrative dramatization in the Brazilian coverage (51.2 percent), while the American coverage has the highest share of articles using narrative personalization (46.3 percent). After all, as Albuquerque and da Silva (2009) explain, Brazilian journalists still privilege narrative aspects of "modern" journalism rather than news-gathering and reporting techniques. This finds a remarkable expression in the fact that more than half of the

Brazilian articles in the sample use the element of dramatization, which refers to a sequential plot-like composition rather than to the use of the inverted pyramid style. Also, almost half of all Brazilian articles include a display of emotions, which is also less common in Germany and the US (both around 30 percent), where the notion of a detached journalism is much stronger (Hanitzsch et al., 2011), which could account for such a difference. Besides, Brazilian newspapers are not as significant compared to the TV landscape of the country (Albuquerque, 2012). It is also possible that newspapers try to adapt storytelling forms that are more typical for television formats.

The German coverage does not use one of the narrative characteristics in such an extensive way when looking at the average. Comparing both German newspapers, however, shows that the "dramatization" is strong within the Süddeutsche Zeitung, while "narrative personalization" is strong within the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. The Süddeutsche Zeitung again resembles the Brazilian pattern, whereas the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung is more similar to the US newspapers. Within the German newspaper landscape, one should further investigate if there are actually two narrative cultures that correspond to a left–right classification. Narrative journalism is more of a tradition of the left in Germany. Representatives of the literary period "Neue Sachlichkeit", such as Egon Erwin Kisch, a socialist and a journalist, discarded the American ideal of objectivity as a bourgeois means of information selectivity (Hartsock, 2011). Such tendencies could continue to have an effect which would need further consideration and investigation.

The measures of association presented below the figure support the impression that countries and newspapers significantly differ in their application of narrative characteristics, except for the element of fictionalization.

Figure 1 Narrative characteristics (country and newspaper comparison)

Note: N=870 newspaper articles overall; numbers above bars represent relative frequencies of narrative characteristics within all articles of a country or a newspaper (subsample size displayed behind country or newspaper name)

Country Comparison: Dramatization: $\chi2=55.21^{***}$ *df*(2); $\lambda=.03$ (asymmetric with 'dramatization' as dependent variable); $V=.25^{***}$; Emotion: $\chi2=18.68^{***}$ *df*(2); $\lambda=.00$ (asymmetric with 'emotion' as dependent variable); $V=.15^{***}$; Narrative Personalization: $\chi2=5.42$ *df*(2); $\lambda=.00$ (asymmetric with 'personalization' as dependent variable); $V=.08$; Fictionalization: $\chi2=1.58^{***}$ *df*(2); $\lambda=.00$ (asymmetric with 'fictionalization' as dependent variable); $V=.04$

Newspaper Comparison: Dramatization: $\chi2=77.58^{***}$ *df*(5); $\lambda=.05$ (asymmetric with 'dramatization' as dependent variable); $V=.3^{***}$; Emotion: $\chi2=20.66^{***}$ *df*(5); $\lambda=.00$ (asymmetric with 'emotion' as dependent variable); $V=.15^{***}$; Narrative Personalization: $\chi2=15.98^{**}$ *df*(5); $\lambda=.01$ (asymmetric with 'personalization' as dependent variable); $V=.14^{**}$; Fictionalization: $\chi2=6.05$ *df*(5); $\lambda=.00$ (asymmetric with 'fictionalization' as dependent variable); $V=.08$

Research question 1 also asked for the contexts in which narrative characteristics are used. To get an answer to this, we should regard two general variables coded for all articles: the overall trigger that "caused" the article for the topical context, as well as the classification of an article according to its form for the formal context.

The "trigger" variable was supposed to note the event that caused an article. The four COPs caused most of the articles in the whole sample, followed by the presentation of scientific research, the display of a domestic debate on climate change or an international debate. Keeping in mind that the average degree of narrativity is 1.47,

articles about the climate change conferences score close to that average. Articles on the presentation of new scientific research generally score below that average, while the presentation of new technology as well as of scientific controversy have a degree of narrativity above that average. This pattern is true for all three countries. Comprehensive differences in the combination of the degree of narrativity and specific thematic contexts are difficult to detect due to differing (and often rather small) numbers of articles concerned with a particular topic (such as NGO protest or any weather events for example).

Beyond this thematic context, the formal context in which narrativity is used, can be regarded. Table 6 shows notable differences in the means of the degree of narrativity when looking at the formats of the articles, with press reviews having the lowest degree of narrativity (*M*=0.7; *SD*=0.88), followed by letters to the editor (*M*=1.11; *SD*=0.85), fact-based articles (*M*=1.36; *SD*=1.12), opinion-based articles (*M*=1.7; *SD*=1.06), and other formats (*M*=1.71; *SD*=0.95).

Table 6 Degree of narrativity in fact-based and opinion-based articles, country comparison

N=870 articles	Fact-based articles			Opinion-based articles			Press reviews			Letter to the editor			Other forms of articles		
	M	*SD*	*n*	*M*	*SD*	*n*	*M*	*SD*	*n*	*M*	*SD*	*n*	*M*	*SD*	*n*
Brazil	1.6	1.2	255	2.2	.88	60	-	-	0	-	-	0	1.75	.96	4
Folha de S. Paulo	1.61	1.25	116	2.17	.89	29	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	0
O Globo	1.60	1.17	139	2.23	31	.88	-	-	0	-	-	0	1.75	.96	4
Germany	1.35	1.08	263	1.52	1.09	61	.7	.88	23	1.33	1.05	15	3.00	-	1
Süddeutsche Zeitung	1.42	1.10	138	1.76	1.03	31	1.00	.71	5	1.13	.64	8	3.00	-	1
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	1.28	1.06	125	1.24	1.11	28	.61	.92	18	1.57	1.4	7	-	-	0
USA	1.24	0.98	129	1.56	1.03	41	-	-	0	1.2	.94	15	1.27	0.96	18
The New York Times	1.31	1.11	68	1.45	1.05	20	-	-	0	1.4	1.52	5	1.00	-	2
The Washington Post	1.16	.82	61	1.67	1.02	21	-	-	0	1.10	.98	10	3.00	-	1
All countries	1.43	1.12	647	1.78	1.04	162	.7	.88	23	1.27	.98	30	1.88	.99	8

Comparing countries and newspapers in detail, one detects the general trend that opinion-based articles have a higher degree of narrativity than fact-based articles. Especially the Brazilian opinion-based articles are notable for their particularly high degree of narrativity. The only case where this does not apply is the German Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, which also has the lowest degree of narrativity of all newspapers

in the sample. Again, both German newspapers differ from each other, with the Süddeutsche Zeitung having a remarkably higher degree of narrativity. But one can also detect a particularity in both US newspapers. While the difference in the degree of narrativity between fact-based and opinion-based articles is smallest in The New York Times compared to all other newspapers, the degree of narrativity in opinion-based articles in The Washington Post is almost as high as in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, while the degree of fact-based articles is the lowest of all fact-based articles. This gap indicates a clear association of narrative journalism with opinion, which seems to apply to the other newspapers as well, except for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, even if to less pronounced degree.

7.1.2 Story Types

To get an impression of the kinds of stories that are actually told, I coded a set of genre variables consisting of theme, tone, and outcome. With their values recoded into binary variables I calculated a hierarchical cluster analysis.[21]

Table 7 presents a four-cluster solution that gives more insights into the stories on climate change. Bold numbers are decisive for the interpretation of a cluster. Italic numbers help to further interpret, even if their relative share is slightly lower. The names for each cluster are the results of this interpretation process.

The first cluster is the largest one with 363 articles and is called *Futile Struggle*. These are either stories about climate change as a struggle over destiny and therefore the biggest challenge for mankind or stories about climate politics and the UNFCC process, which seems to bring no solution to the real problems. These stories are mostly written in a pessimistic tone and almost all articles suggest that the conflict is not going to be solved.

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[21] The hierarchical cluster analysis was calculated as proposed by Matthes and Kohring (2008) using the narrative variables 'overall theme', 'tone' and 'outcome'. All three variables were recoded, transforming their original nominal values into dummy variables with a binary code ('0 = not present' and '1 = present'). All articles that missed values on one or more dimensions of the three variables theme, tone or outcome, were excluded from the analysis. Therefore, 829 articles out of the original 870 articles were part of the cluster analysis. All variables were present in more than 5 percent of the articles and could therefore be included in the cluster analysis that was conducted using the Ward method and binary Euclidic distance. Four distinct story-type clusters were identified through the use of the elbow criterion. To apply the 'elbow criterion', I checked the increase in the Sum of Squared Distances (SSD) for different cluster solutions and stopped clustering after an observed 'jump' in the increase. To facilitate better interpretation I calculated the relative 'slope' between SSDs for the last ten clustering steps and then the 'slope quotient' between slopes. The resulting 'quotients' provide a quite clear numerical indication for the 'jump' in the increase of SSDs. The clusters are cross-tabulated with all variables included in the cluster analysis to be able to describe the narrative content of each group (Table 7)

The following example[22] presents the beginning and the end of the New York Times article titled "At Climate Talks, a Familiar Standoff Between U.S. and China" and represents articles from this story type that shed a pessimistic view on climate negotiations:

> DURBAN, South Africa — China, the world's biggest greenhouse gas emitter, has once again emerged as the biggest puzzle at international climate change talks, sending ambiguous signals about the role it intends to play in future negotiations. This week, the nation's top climate envoy said that China would be open to signing a formal treaty limiting emissions after 2020 — but laid down conditions for doing so that are unlikely ever to be met.
>
> […]
>
> This preoccupation with 'binding' has become more an obstacle than a means of progress," he [Elliot Diringer, executive vice president of the Center for Energy and Climate Solutions] said in an e-mail. "The reality is that key players including the United States and China are not prepared at this stage to take on binding commitments to reduce their emissions. "Rather than arguing over that year after year, we should focus on strengthening the international climate framework step by step. (The New York Times, December 8, 2011)

Table 7 Cluster analysis with genre variables (all articles; column percentages of respective characteristic within each variable)

N = 829	total		4 -cluster Solution					
			Futile Struggle	Constant Challenge	Business as Usual	Stories of Success	V	Lambda
n			363	151	203	112		
	n	%	%	%	%	%		
Theme								
Everyday business	197	23.8	19.3	*21.2*	**46.8**	0	0.34	0.04
Failure after struggle	100	12.1	*25.1*	4.6	1	0	0.36	0
Triumph over adversity	152	18.3	0	6.6	14.8	**100**	0.85	0.36
Struggle over destiny	232	28	**31.7**	**48.3**	21.7	0	0.31	0
(Political/ Social) Conflict	148	17.9	24	19.2	15.8	0	0.2	0
Tone								
Fatalistic	30	3.6	6.6	0.7	2.5	0	0.15	0
Optimistic	168	20.3	0	*31.8*	3.9	**100**	0.84	0.35

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[22] The following exemplary quotes for illustrating the narrative story types all emanate from the two US-newspapers only for reasons of language compatibility. However, one would find similar examples in the Brazilian and German material.

Unexcited/ neutral	305	36.8	27.3	**38.4**	**72.9**	0	0.48	0.18
Passionate	91	11	11.8	17.2	10.8	0	0.16	0
Pessimistic	235	28.3	**54.3**	11.9	9.9	0	0.51	0.07
Outcome								
No conceivable outcome	211	25.5	1.1	11.3	**93.6**	0	0.9	0.54
Conflict fixed	238	28.7	0.6	**81.1**	0	**100**	0.92	0.47
Conflict not fixed	380	45.8	**98.3**	6.6	6.4	0	0.93	0.63

Note: **BOLD** elements decisive for cluster interpretation with a frequency of at least 35 percent of the articles in the cluster; *italic* elements subordinate for cluster interpretation with a frequency of at least 20 percent of articles in the cluster.

Stories in the second cluster are named *Constant Challenge* and contain 151 articles that represent the ongoing struggle against climate change, which is also told as the struggle over destiny but in an unexcited/neutral or even optimistic tone. The problem seems manageable after all; conflicts can be fixed probably with small steps in the negotiation processes of the climate change conferences. How hard negotiators have to struggle during the conferences is expressed in the article "At Climate Summit, the Real Action is Behind the Scenes", published in the US- newspaper The Washington Post. The article is optimistic in its tone, expressing that the task to come to an agreement is challenging for all parties but that there are steps taken in the direction of finding a solution and parties with high ambitions that push the negotiations:

> Hundreds of bleary-eyed bureaucrats - from powerhouse countries, tiny island nations and almost everything in between - have begun the serious wheeling and dealing in climate talks here, jostling over individual words in final texts that will steer how hundreds of billions of dollars could be spent trying to save the planet. (Washington Post, December 9, 2010)

A third cluster named *Business as Usual* with 203 articles contains those stories that deal with the year in and year out continuous process of climate change and climate change politics as an everyday business in an unexcited/ neutral way with no outcome to be conceived. These can be short updates in the middle of the conferences, for example when progress is made but when there is no final result yet expected. To give again an example of this story type, the New York Times article "From Copenhagen to Cancun" reminds the reader that the next climate change conference is coming up during which the problems are still the same:

> A year ago, delegates from 193 countries went to Copenhagen with hopes of signing
> a treaty limiting emissions of greenhouse gases and committing each country to hard
> targets.
>
> […]
>
> Delegates are now in Cancun, Mexico, for the latest round of United Nations climate
> talks. Differences between rich and poor countries -- and the biggest emitters, China
> and the United States -- remain unresolved, which means there will be no binding
> agreement. (New York Times, December 3, 2010)

The last cluster, *Stories of Success*, is the smallest one with only 112 articles. It is the most unambiguous one, too, with all stories containing some triumph over an adversity, narrated in an optimistic tone, and a conflict that is solved in the end. These can be stories on successful negotiations with some kind of (partial) agreement or a story of successful individuals or collective actions of civil society members and organizations to fight climate change as some kind of behavioral role model. An example of an article presenting a successful ending of the negotiations is provided by the Washington Post. Headlining "193 Nations Sign Climate-Change Package," the article summarizes the outcome and accompanies the results with optimistic statements of different actors:

> Cancun has done its job," UNFCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres said in a
> statement. "Nations have shown they can work together under a common roof, to
> reach consensus on a common cause.
>
> […]
>
> The reality is we really got what we were looking for," said U.S. special climate
> envoy Todd Stern in an interview Saturday." On issues such as forests, financing
> and scrutiny of major emitters' carbon reductions, he said, "we got good, substantive
> decisions on all of those things. (Washington Post, December 12, 2010)

Figure 2 presents the occurrence of the four story types in the coverage. Across all countries, the *Futile Struggle* is the story type that is found most often, followed by the *Business as Usual* story type. The country comparison reveals more details and relevant differences.

Figure 2 Story types (country and newspaper comparison)

Base: N=829 newspaper articles; numbers above bars refer to the relative frequencies of the articles of the country or newspaper that belong to the particular story cluster;
OVERALL: $\chi2$=134.68*** df(15); λ=.032 (asymmetric with 'story type' as dependent variable);
V=0.23***; BRAZIL: $\chi2$=2.47 df(3); λ=.00 (asymmetric with 'story type' as dependent variable);
V=0.23***; GERMANY: $\chi2$=19,99*** df(3); λ=.00 (asymmetric with 'story type' as dependent variable);
V=0.24***; USA: $\chi2$=1.12 df(3); λ=.00 (asymmetric with 'story type' as dependent variable); V=0.08

In Brazil and Germany, the *Futile Struggle* dominates, while in the US, the *Business as Usual* stories are most often presented (40.6 percent). This type of story is also dominant in Germany (32.2 percent) but very rarely used in Brazilian coverage (only 7 percent). Climate change as a *Constant Challenge* is also much more prevalent in Brazil than in Germany and the US.

To find an answer to research question 1, and in particular to the aspect of the topical contexts in which narrative elements appear, it seems worthwhile to regard which story types are used when covering a particular climate change conference. Table 8 gives detailed information about which story types are used in which country (and across all countries) to cover each COP within the sample.

Across countries, again, the *Futile Struggle* represents the dominant story type for all four COPs investigated. Among the COPs, Doha, however, seems to be the one which

was perceived most unpromising for a positive outcome, since almost half of all articles were told with that *Futile Struggle* story type. Nevertheless, there are interesting country differences that reveal different perceptions of the particular COPs. For example, Cancún was presented in the US coverage only in one fifth of the articles as *Futile Struggle*. While it was mostly *Business as Usual*, there are still 26.1 percent of the US articles that presented *Stories of Success*. It seems like that after the failure of Copenhagen – to which the US had significantly contributed by failing to compromise with China – Cancun was supposed to poor oil on troubled water. Pointedly expressed: Things are going their usual ways (high use of *Business as Usual* story types), it is not as bad at it may seem after Copenhagen (only few stories representing the *Futile Struggle*), and there is even progress to be reported (more than one fourth of articles as *Stories of success*). However, this pattern does not hold in the years afterwards in the US coverage. The *Business as Usual* as well as the *Futile Struggle* are more balanced and there are less *Stories of Success* to be told. Durban also stands out against the other COPs since more than half of the articles use the *Futile Struggle* story type. Those articles mostly lament the non-existing progress that is expected for Durban, the repeating conflicts between the US and China as well as the exit of Canada from the Kyoto Protocol.

The Brazilian COP coverage is clearly dominated by the pessimistic *Futile Struggle* story type which is used in about half of the article on every COP. A little variance can be seen in the use of the *Constant Challenge* story type. Obviously, Durban was perceived as mostly challenging, while in Doha a few more *Stories of Success* could be told. The Germany coverage is also dominated by the *Futile Struggle* story type. Among all COPs, Warsaw seems to be the one that was perceived most negatively, as the *Futile Struggle* story type appears in 55 percent of all articles. Warsaw is also the conference for which the Brazilian coverage applied the *Futile Struggle* story type most often.

Table 8 Coverage of climate change conferences with particular story types

			Futile Struggle	Constant Challenge	Business as Usual	Stories of Success	Overall (story types)
COP16 Cancún	*Brazil*	n	65	36	12	21	134
		%	48.5%	26.9%	9.0%	15.7%	100.0%
	Germany	n	45	12	46	15	118
		%	38.1%	10.2%	39.0%	12.7%	100.0%
	USA	n	14	7	30	18	69
		%	20.3%	10.1%	43.5%	26.1%	100.0%

	Overall	**n**	**124**	**55**	**88**	**54**	**321**
	(countries)	**%**	**38.6**	**17.1%**	**27.4%**	**16.8%**	**100.0%**
COP17 Durban	*Brazil*	n	24	21	4	7	56
		%	42.9%	37.5%	7.1%	12.5%	100.0%
	Germany	n	32	12	18	12	74
		%	43.2%	16.2%	24.3%	16.2%	100.0%
	USA	n	18	5	9	1	33
		%	54.5%	15.2%	27.3%	3.0%	100.0%
	Overall	**n**	**74**	**38**	**31**	**20**	**163**
	(countries)	**%**	**45.4%**	**23.3%**	**19.0%**	**12.3%**	**100.0%**
COP18 Doha	*Brazil*	n	29	18	2	10	59
		%	49.2%	30.5%	3.4%	16.9%	100.0%
	Germany	n	41	8	25	4	78
		%	52.6%	10.3%	32.1%	5.1%	100.0%
	USA	n	12	1	12	4	29
		%	41.4%	3.4%	41.4%	13.8%	100.0%
	Overall	**n**	**82**	**27**	**39**	**18**	**166**
	(countries)	**%**	**49.4%**	**16.3%**	**23.5%**	**10.8%**	**100.0%**
COP19 Warsaw	*Brazil*	n	33	18	4	10	65
		%	50.8%	27.7%	6.2%	15.4%	100.0%
	Germany	n	36	7	19	3	65
		%	55.4%	10.8%	29.2%	4.6%	100.0%
	USA	n	14	6	22	7	49
		%	28.6%	12.2%	44.9%	14.3%	100.0%
	Overall	**n**	**83**	**31**	**45**	**20**	**179**
	(countries)	**%**	**46.4%**	**17.3%**	**25.1%**	**11.2%**	**100.0%**
All countries	*Brazil*	n	151	93	22	48	314
		%	48.1%	29.6%	7.0%	15.3%	100.0%
	Germany	n	154	39	108	34	335
		%	46.0%	11.6%	32.2%	10.1%	100.0%
	USA	n	58	19	73	30	180
		%	32.2%	10.6%	40.6%	16.7%	100.0%
	Overall	**n**	**363**	**151**	**203**	**112**	**829**
	(countries)	**%**	**43.8%**	**18.2%**	**24.5%**	**13.5%**	**100.0%**

The dominant story types used for a particular COP in the coverage of a country can give us more insights into how the conference was perceived in the media debate of that

country. And it is obvious that between the countries, the conferences are perceived slightly differently, which has certain implications for the second hypothesis which suggested that the stories told in the coverage resemble the political role of a country. The results I obtained from the cluster analysis as well as the analysis of the story types of the COPs point to such an interpretation.

In Brazil, the story types *Futile Struggle* and *Constant Challenge* are the ones most present in the coverage. In Germany, it is the *Futile Struggle* but also the *Business as Usual* story type that is most prominent, while it is the *Business as Usual* type in the US (while Durban, for example, presents an interesting exception with a distinctly higher use of the *Futile Struggle* story type). I suggested that Brazil might differ from the US and Germany by applying a more urgent story type more often, while Germany and the US would rather tend towards more neutral and unexcited story types. This mostly applies to Brazil as well as to the US, whereas Germany is a mixed case. Both story types used in Brazil most often emphasize the severity of the situation with regard to both the climate change situation in general as well as to climate politics (all four COPs are predominantly told with the Futile Struggle story type in the coverage). Against this background, it does not seem very surprising that the dominant narratives in Brazil emphasize the urgency of the situation to such a degree, while in countries that are confronted with such severe demands dominant narratives would depict the situation more calmly. Germany, however, in certain ways occupies an "in-between" position, which seems to be expressed in the two dominant story types in the coverage. Together with the EU, Germany, as the country of the "Energiewende," tried to push towards more ambitious targets for the fight against climate change in recent years. Within the political process, they had to face resistance from different sides while the EU tried to claim leadership and uphold negotiations (Wurzel & Connelly, 2011). However, this pattern was ruptured at the 2013 conference in Warsaw, which might account for the strong dominance of the Futile Struggle story type during this conference (more than 55 percent of the articles). Holding the conference in Poland was especially controversial since Poland had just launched new programs to support its coal industries. In addition to that, Poland had blocked climate change goals of the EU in the period leading up to the conference. Another event overshadowed the summit: A severe storm had just struck the Philippines and Philippine delegates announced to go on hunger strike if no serious commitments were made at once. Several major NGOs showed their solidarity with the victims of climate change worldwide by leaving the conference early.

Nevertheless, grand steps in the negotiations were not expected since Warsaw was also planned as a transitional COP to prepare a new climate treaty and to set a timetable to reach an agreement in Paris two years later.

Beyond these directly COP related events, the questions of how ambitious climate change goals should be, has met with controversy in Germany, too, which could also be an explanation for the mixed use of story types. Conflicts between economic and ecological interests have been very present in the past years (e.g., debate about extending the operational life span of nuclear reactors, debates about abandoning coal altogether and in what time span, etc.). The two dominant story types in the German coverage reflect the situation in which Germany is well aware of the need to act on the one hand and handle the recurring negotiations with certain habituality and with respect to domestic matters of dispute on the other hand.

The dominance of the *Business as Usual* narrative in the US and Germany might also be explained with regard to journalistic roles. In Germany and the US, the role that is most prevalent is the one of the detached observer, who reports on events from a more neutral position.

7.1.3 Narrative Roles

As another important element to characterize the stories that are told in the media coverage of the three countries, narrative roles were coded according to their occurrence. Coders could mark the one most prominent victim, villain and hero per article as being decisive for the story to be told. Across all countries, the role of the villain is the one most often assigned, as Figure 3 demonstrates. By naming a villain, responsibility either for climate change itself or for blocking progress in the negotiations is linked to particular actors.

Figure 3 Share of articles in which narrative roles occur

Legend: ■ Victim ■ Villain ■ Hero

Base: N= 870 newspaper articles;
Country Comparison: Victim: $\chi2=.35$ *df*(2); $\lambda=0.00$ (asymmetric with 'victim' as dependent variable);
$V=0.02$; Villain: $\chi2=7.24^{**}$ *df*(2); $\lambda=0.00$ (asymmetric with 'victim' as dependent variable); $V=0.09^{**}$;
Hero: $\chi2=20.06^{***}$ *df*(2); $\lambda=0.00$ (asymmetric with 'hero' as dependent variable); $V=0.15^{***}$
Newspaper Comparison: Victim: $\chi2=8.85$ *df*(5); $\lambda=0.00$ (asymmetric with 'victim' as dependent
variable); $V=0.1$; Villain: $\chi2=16.34^{**}$ *df*(5); $\lambda=0.04$ (asymmetric with 'victim' as dependent variable);
$V=0.14^{**}$; Hero: $\chi2=24.31^{***}$ *df*(5); $\lambda=0.00$ (asymmetric with 'hero' as dependent variable); $V=0.17^{***}$

Looking at each country in particular, Figure 3 reveals rather similar patterns in its use of these narrative roles. The role of the villain is most often used in all three countries. About one fourth of all articles contain a victim. The countries do not differ much in the share of the use of victims. There are somewhat greater differences regarding the use of the roles of villain and hero. In the Brazilian and the German coverage, a villain is named in almost half of all articles. While the German and American coverage are more reluctant to use the role of a hero, a third of all Brazilian articles contain a hero.

If we look at whom these roles are ascribed to in particular, more distinct country differences are revealed. Figure 4 specifies which kind of actor types (individual, collective, or institutional) can be found in combination with which roles in each country. One can detect several similar patterns here. Victims are most often collective actors in all three countries. There are hardly any individual victims specified. Villains

are either institutional actors or collective actors, while the heroes are dominated by institutional actors. However, individual actors are more likely to be assigned the role of a hero in all countries.

Figure 4 Narrative roles and actor types

Base: 838 actor codings in 871 newspaper articles; numbers above bars represent the share of an actor type within all codings of a particular narrative role in one country

Each actor was also coded by its name or particular labeling. Knowing which actors are assigned to which roles sheds valuable light on the stories that are actually told. It also reveals country-specific constellations and positions within the process. In Brazil, the most salient victim is the country itself, either alone or in combination with other countries or allies in similar situation, such as the BASIC countries South Africa, India, and China. Besides its own country, the Brazilian coverage mostly depicts other developing countries, small island states and poor people. The Philippines are explicitly named various times. The Brazilian coverage also depicts its own country as villain, and in particular the Brazilian government and the presidents Lula and Rousseff. However, much more prominent in the Brazilian coverage is another villain, who is specified clearly: the US. The US (either alone or in combination with other Western countries) is the most salient villain in the Brazilian coverage. This is followed by more unspecific actor constellations such as the West, rich countries, developed countries and industrialized countries. A few times, other countries such as Canada, Japan and Russia are also explicitly named. There is one very clear and salient hero in the Brazilian

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coverage, and this is again the country itself, whether it be the Brazilian government or individual politicians. No other actor is presented as hero in such a way.

A different pattern can be detected in the German coverage. The own country is hardly depicted as victim. Instead, the victims are mostly "other" and rather unspecified actors such as developing countries, poor countries, and mankind as a whole. The German coverage often highlights "poor people" (from developing countries, from specific regions such as mountains, coasts or tropics, from Africa) or future generations. The most dominant villain in the German coverage is also one of the most unspecified: It is mankind as a whole that is to blame. Besides this very general and often repeated declaration, the focus is clearly put on states that have been blocking negotiations at some point during the last years' climate change conferences, in particular Bolivia and China during Cancún, Canada and the US during Durban, and China and the US during the Doha conference. One individual villain sticks out in the German coverage: The former Minister for Economic Affairs, Philipp Rösler, who is blamed for Germany's poor performance during Durban in several articles, because he blocked the intentions of the Environmental Minister, Peter Altmaier, for the Durban negotiations. When it comes to the assignment of the role of the hero, a similar pattern as in Brazil is revealed in the German coverage, in which it is Germany and even slightly more often the European Union that is depicted as the hero.

The US coverage also focuses on unspecified others as victims of climate change. Poor people from developing countries are also salient in the US, but to a lower extent than in the German coverage. The US coverage more often points to the Philippines in particular as a victim. The US coverage does not show a very clear pattern with regard to the villains. There are also a few unspecified villains, such as humans in general or the developed world. China is named a few times as a specific villain (sometimes in combination with other countries such as India or Brazil), also the US itself and especially conservative politicians from the Republicans are presented a couple of times, but beyond that there is no especially salient villain. The US, too, is named a few times as a hero in the US coverage, but this is not as salient as in both other countries. The US coverage rather names specific individuals as heroes: Arnold Schwarzenegger, Felipe Calderon (Mexican president during the COP in Cancun), the former mayor of New York Michael Bloomberg, and also several NGO activists.

By looking at the allocation of these narrative roles, the stories that are told in the coverage of each country become more subsumable. They also give an impression of how the own domestic country is seen in the overall actor constellation in the political process.

The third hypothesis can therefore be confirmed: A country's position in the political process as well as its relation to other actors is reflected in the narrative role constellations. Brazil, suffering from climate change and representing the classical position of an emerging country, can blame the industrialized countries for climate change and demand support and compensation. Out of this position, it can easily be the hero by pushing others to act or by making any kind of concessions (even if small). Germany, which as a single small country can be held less accountable for climate change than countries like the US, for example, and which does not deny the responsibility of the developed world, tries to be a role model with its own "Energiewende". The often-assigned role of the hero that pushes negotiations in order to save the poor and week seems plausible. The confrontation with countries that block negotiations completes this picture. The impression is furthermore reinforced by the occasional blaming of German politicians as villains, such as the former Minister of Economic Affairs Philipp Rösler, who was accused of blocking the internal decision-making within the German cabinet which would have been necessary to support the Environmental Minister Peter Altmaier's progressive position in the negotiations in Doha 2012. For the US, the overall picture is more diffuse: The country has not had a clear political line during the last years except that, in order to protect own economic interests, they would not agree to any treaty as long as emerging countries such as China and India are not held responsible to the same extent. The issue itself seems to be farther away since victims are mostly "others," especially the poor and developing countries, while villains remain more unspecified and less salient (except for "humankind" and "China"), compared to both other countries. At the same time, US coverage does not see the US as being a hero either, but rather emphasizes individual actors as such.

7.1.4   Use of Narrative Features in Different Contexts

Regarding research questions 1a and 1b, we now know more about how and in which contexts narrative elements are used and what country differences could be detected. First, one fifth of all articles in the sample can be considered as having a high degree of

narrativity. The countries deviate from that average, with Brazil being above and Germany and the US below this value. The use of narrative characteristics also differs between the countries. While Brazilian coverage most often uses dramatization, the US newspapers clearly focus on narrative personalization, and Germany is a mixed case with dramatization most often used by the Süddeutsche Zeitung and narrative personalization as the dominant characteristic in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. In general, high narrativity is more closely connected to articles that deal with topics like the presentation of new technology or scientific controversy. Beyond that, higher degrees of narrativity are more closely connected to opinion-based articles.

When it comes to the application of specific story types and the assignment of narrative roles, we could also detect country differences between Brazil, Germany, and the US. Different dominant stories as well as different actor constellations reflect country particularities of journalistic traditions and roles as well as political situations. Within the transnational setting of the climate change conferences, these narrative elements are used for connecting particular audiences with the events and producing some degree of cultural resonance.

7.2   Deliberative Qualities of the News Coverage

The second set of research questions asked for the contributions of news narratives to the deliberative quality of newspaper coverage as well as whether there are country differences. Before being able to give answers to these questions, it is necessary to assess the general deliberative quality of the coverage on climate change to have a point of comparison when focusing on narrative coverage in particular.

To assess the deliberative quality of the news coverage on climate change I will focus on four indicators: the inclusiveness of actors (and in particular of actors of the political periphery in comparison to actors from the political power center) in section 7.2.1, the inclusiveness of ideas (section 7.2.2), the direct contrasting of opposing ideas within articles (section 7.2.3) and the outcome orientation (section 7.2.4). This section briefly characterizes these indicators before investigating the relationship with narrative characteristics in the next chapter.

7.2.1   Inclusiveness of Actors

The inclusiveness of actors is measured by the number of statements of different actors within articles (see Table 9). Overall, the articles of the sample contain 4.45 actor

statements on average. The first notable finding is that German newspaper articles fall below that average and contain the fewest actor statements per article (M=3.99, SD=3.07), followed by Brazilian newspaper articles (M=4.58, SD=2.99), whereas US newspaper articles contain the most (M=5.16; SD=3.85). An analysis of variance shows that these differences are significant ($F(2,897)$=8.87, df=2, p<.001), while the Scheffé post-hoc test reveals that the significant difference can be found between the US and Germany (at a significance level of p<.001) and between Germany and Brazil (at a significance level of p<.05) but not between Brazil and the US. Another set of mean comparisons show no significant differences between the newspapers of one country.

The number of actor statements alone does not give complete insights on the spectrum of actors within the coverage. A newspaper could only give voice to the political elite, which would not account for a highly inclusive coverage. In a next step, I therefore rate the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the actor sample in the coverage. One way to measure diversity or concentration is provided by the Herfindahl index (Benson, 2009). Based on this, I calculated an actor concentration index (ACI) which helps to assess how even the dispersion of different actor types in the coverage is.[23]According to this calculation, the German coverage has the smallest ACI value and therefore the highest heterogeneity (ACI = .191), closely followed by the US (ACI=.193). The presented actor statements in the Brazilian coverage are slightly less diverse (ACI=.229). This result is instructive since it reveals that even if the German coverage contains the least actor statements, those actors that are given voice are still the most diverse.

Wessler and Rinke (2014) suggest that rating inclusiveness from a deliberative perspective should especially concentrate on the appearance of actors from the political periphery (rather than the power center), such as civil society actors, experts (e.g., scientists) and politicians from the opposition, as well as ordinary citizens. Overall, the articles contain on average 1.18 actor statements from the periphery. Again, Germany is below that average (1.05 actor statements from the periphery per article), closely followed by Brazil (1.09). The US coverage scores significantly higher above the average with 1.67 actor statements from the periphery per article. The analysis of variance reveals a difference between countries when it comes to the average inclusion

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[23] The index is calculated by squaring the relative frequencies of one groups' statements (relative to all actor statements) and summing the total. The highest possible score for such an index is 1. This would mean total homogeneity (only one actor type accountable for all statements). The smaller the index, the more even the dispersion between different types of actors.

of statements from these peripheral actors ($F(2,897) = 13.31$; $p<.001$) as well as between newspapers ($F(5,894) = 8.18$; $p<.001$).

Table 9 Average number of actor statements per article

	Actor statements in general M (SD)	Civil society actor statements M(SD)
Brazil	4.58 (3.07)	1.09 (1.35)
Fohla de Sao Paulo	4.46 (2.79)	.94 (1.3)
O Globo	4.67 (3.29)	1.21 (1.36)
Germany	3.99 (2.99)	1.05 (1.45)
Süddeutsche Zeitung	4.12(2.89)	1.30 (1.5)
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	3.85 (3.07)	.79 (1.32)
USA	5.16 (3.85)	1.67 (1.72)
The New York Times	5.06 (3.51)	1.68 (1.5)
The Washington Post	5.27 (4.2)	1.66 (1.86)
OVERALL	4.45 (3.24)	1.18 (1.48)

Base: N=870 newspaper articles (Brazil n = 319, Germany n = 363, USA n = 188)

Scheffé post-hoc tests give information on where the differences are situated especially. Significant country differences are found between the US and Germany as well as the US and Brazil, while there are no significant differences between Germany and Brazil. At the newspaper level, it is Fohla de Sao Paulo that differs significantly from both US newspapers, as well as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that differs significantly from both US newspapers and the Süddeutsche Zeitung. This difference between both German newspapers again makes it difficult to only look at country differences in further analyses.

Beyond the absolute numbers of actor statements from civil society it is also the ratio between the number of actor statements from the political center and the periphery that can reveal further information on the representation of actors from civil society, scientists, politicians from the opposition, and ordinary citizens in the coverage. In this case, the US—where civil society actors have a share of 33.93 percent of all statements—differs significantly from Germany (22.93 percent) and Brazil (23.95 percent). The analysis of variance again shows significant differences in the share of actor statements from the periphery between countries ($F(2,897) = 10.45$; $p<.001$) as well as newspapers ($F(2,894) = 5.94$; $p<.001$). At the newspaper level, both US newspapers differ significantly from Fohla de Sao Paulo and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. There are no significant differences between newspapers of one country. When

it comes to the general actor inclusiveness, the US therefore would score highest on this deliberative dimension, followed by Brazil and Germany.

7.2.2 Inclusiveness of Ideas

To rate the inclusiveness of ideas in the coverage, I investigate three categories of idea elements at the article level: consequences and causes of climate change as well as suggested solutions to the problem. Each of these categories consisted of multiple elements that could have been mentioned in an actor statement or not[24]. The total number, the number of different idea elements in an article, as well as the diversity of idea elements[25], will be closely regarded in order to evaluate the inclusiveness of news coverage in the three countries.

The coverage of the US newspapers contains on average the most idea elements in the category of consequences (2.28 idea elements per article) as well as the most different idea elements (1.26 different idea elements per article). Germany finds itself in second place (1.75 idea elements per article and 1.14 different idea elements per article), while Brazil contains the fewest idea elements in general (1.12 idea elements per article) and fewest different idea elements (.69 different idea elements per article) in this category. The analysis of variance suggest significant differences between the countries in the total amount of idea elements for consequences ($F(2,897) = 14,71$; $p<.001$). The Scheffé post-hoc test reveals these differences to be significant between all three countries. For the number of different idea elements, there is also a significant overall difference ($F(2,897) = 18,57$; $p<.001$), but the Scheffé post-hoc test reveals that the significant difference is between Brazil and Germany as well as Brazil and the US, but not between Germany and the US. Also, when it comes to diversity, the idea elements in the US coverage are slightly more diverse as the index suggests (.69 compared to .71 in Brazil and Germany). However, there are no significant differences in the means.

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[24]Originally, the idea elements were coded on the statement level. For the following analysis the elements were aggregated on the article level since the article is seen as the result of deliberative construction by the journalist who chooses different sides and statements to complement or contrast them to each other. It is not to be expected that the whole range of different ideas is represented in one statement, but different statements in one article can more likely be used to show a diverse picture.

[25] The diversity index was calculated similarly to the Herfindahl index of heterogeneity by dividing the number of similar idea elements through the number of all idea elements in one article, squaring these ratios and then adding up the terms. The highest possible value would be '1', representing perfect homogeneity (only one kind of idea element in the article), while smaller terms represent more heterogeneity.

The US coverage also contains the most causes per article (1.26 causes per article compared to 1.15 in Brazil and 1.12 in Germany), but Germany contains the most different causes (.75 different causes compared to .71 in Brazil and .72 in the US), though it also has the fewest idea elements of causes compared to both other countries. However, the differences in this category are rather small, and the analysis of variance also reveals no significant country differences.

As in both other categories, the US coverage again contains the most idea elements in the category of solutions (3.51 compared to 2.81 in Brazil and 2.79 in Germany). The analysis of variance shows significant differences ($F(2,894)=4.17$; $p<.05$). The Scheffé test reveals that the significant differences are to be found between Brazil and the US as well as Germany and the US but not between Brazil and Germany. There are no significant differences between the groups in the number of different idea elements or the diversity of idea elements.

Looking at all idea elements, it becomes clear again that the US coverage contains by far the most idea elements on average (7.06 idea elements per article), followed by Germany (5.66) and Brazil (5.07). The significant overall difference ($F(2,896) = 10.91$, $p<.001$) is supplemented by a post-hoc test that reveals that the significant difference can be found between Germany and the US as well as Brazil and the US but not Brazil and Germany.

A slightly different pattern is found for the number of different idea elements per article. Again, the US has the highest average (4.12 different idea elements per article), followed by Germany (3.96) and Brazil (3.34) with a significant difference ($F(2,839) = 7.54$, $p< .001$). However, the post-hoc test here indicates that the differences are higher between Brazil and Germany and Brazil and the US but not significant between Germany and the US. There are no notable differences in the diversity of idea elements. By and large, regarding this deliberative dimension of idea inclusiveness across the complete coverage of the sample, the US scores highest, followed by Germany and Brazil on the third rank.

7.2.3 Competing Arguments
Competing arguments are idea elements that directly oppose or contradict each other. Taken together, 70 articles contain such opposing idea elements, which makes up 7.8 percent of the whole sample. The three countries differ slightly: Only 3.3 percent of all

articles in Brazil contain such directly opposing ideas, while in Germany it is 9.9 and in the US 11.7 percent of the articles.

7.2.4   Outcome Orientation

Whether an outcome to any kind of conflict is displayed or not in the coverage is an important deliberative criterion since it is assumed that it is necessary for the public to be informed about political decisions that affect processes. For an outcome to be displayed, a political decision needed to be made (or at least anticipated) in the first place. This makes this category to a certain degree dependent on the actual real-world events, e.g., the outcome of the negotiations. If there is no outcome, for example, no treaty negotiated, no outcome can be reported in the coverage. However, differences in outcome orientation nevertheless reveal how much focus is put on reporting results in the coverage of the countries. We find that, in Brazil, 43.6 percent of all articles report some kind of outcome (actually decided or at least anticipated) while only 15.6 percent of the articles in Germany and 23.7 percent in the US contain information about conflicts that have been fixed. However, all three also explicitly report if no solutions are found and conflict could not be fixed (49.5 percent of articles in Brazil, 45.3 percent of articles in Germany and 34.4 percent of articles in the US). Nevertheless, in Germany and the US there is also a large number of articles that contain no outcome orientation at all (39.2 percent in Germany, 41.9 percent in the US compared to only 6.9 percent in Brazil). Comparing newspapers does not reveal much more information. The only remarkable exceptions are again both German newspapers. While only 8.6 percent of the articles in the Süddeutsche Zeitung report about the outcome as a solution of the conflict and 50.8 percent that the conflict will not be solved, 22.9 percent of the articles in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung perceive the conflict to be fixed, and only 39.4 percent of the articles explicitly report that the conflict will not be solved. This may be due to ideological differences in the assessment of what is actually perceived as a solution for a conflict and what is not. One newspaper (FAZ) can display a roadmap towards a new treaty already as an outcome to solve the problem, while the other (SZ) would only accept an actual treaty. However, since both newspapers somehow report on the outcome (whether it is sufficient or not in the sense that it will or will not be a solution to a conflict), the overall outcome orientation is still about the same.

It is difficult to assess the overall meaning of these results and offer explanations for the differences. The Brazilian coverage seems to have the highest outcome orientation,

depicting conflicts as (about to be) fixed as well as not (about to be) fixed. For readers, this means a certain transparency about the state of events. It is, however, hard to say whether German and US newspapers concentrate less on conflicts, or whether they do not recognize the solutions offered as such. It is also difficult to assess whether varying political interpretations of the events account for the differences, in the sense that a proposal made in the negotiations is interpreted as sufficient for solving the problems by one newspaper, while it is assessed as not sufficient by the other. Comparing the depicted outcome orientation in articles with different degrees of narrativity in section 8.3 might help to find further answers. While the absolute outcome orientation is of less interest for this study, it will be relevant to see if different patterns of interpretation about the outcome (fixed or not fixed?) will be detected as a sort of alternative interpretation in narrative news coverage.

7.2.5   *Evaluating the Overall Deliberate Quality*

The second research question asked for the contributions of news narratives to the deliberative quality of newspapers and, again, whether there are country differences. As originally assumed, it cannot be concluded that determines narrative journalism to be either good or bad with regard to deliberative qualities. Instead, I proposed a hypothesis that takes the overall deliberative quality into account and suggests that narrative journalism differs less in the deliberative quality if the latter is high in the first place. If, however, deliberative qualities are lower in general, narrative journalism will have a positive relation. To test this hypothesis, it is necessary to evaluate the overall deliberative quality in the three countries. Four basic categories are used to get an idea about the deliberative quality: the inclusiveness of actors, the inclusiveness of ideas, the use of competing arguments (directly opposing ideas), and the outcome orientation. In three out of these four categories, the US coverage reaches the highest values for deliberative quality: The coverage includes most actor statements in general as well as most actor statements from civil society actors, the highest total average of idea elements per article as well as the highest average of different idea elements per article, and the highest share of articles that contained directly opposing ideas. On the dimension of the outcome orientation, US articles have the highest share of articles with no conceivable outcome. The deliberative quality of the German newspapers is generally more mixed. At the dimension of actor inclusiveness, Germany scored lowest. The coverage contains the fewest actor statements in general as well as the fewest civil society actor statements in relation to all actor statements. The general diversity of actor

statements is still high, so even if they use fewer statements from actors overall, a voice is at least given to more different kinds of actors. Looking at the idea inclusiveness, it becomes clear that less actor statements do not automatically mean a smaller range of included ideas. Germany only differs slightly from the US in this dimension. The average of idea elements per article as well as the average of different idea elements per article is only a little lower than in the US coverage. The same is true for the use of directly opposing idea elements, where the share of articles that contain such competing arguments is two percentage points lower in Germany than in the US. The outcome orientation is rather mixed in both German newspapers.

The Brazilian coverage contains the second most actor statements, and the share of civil society actor statements is slightly higher than in German coverage. The diversity of actor statements is lowest in Brazil compared to both other countries. It also has the lowest average of idea elements and the lowest average of different idea elements as well as a very low share of articles with opposing idea elements. The share of articles in which the conflict is in the end depicted as fixed is highest in Brazil.

However, one can conclude that the overall deliberative quality is highest in the US, followed by Germany and then by Brazil. The difference between the US and Germany in the inclusiveness of actor statements is in accordance with Ferree et al. (2002b), who also concluded that the US coverage is more inclusive than the German one. One can find an explanation for that in the general political system. In cooperative democracies like Germany, particular interests are expressed mainly through the parties of the multiparty system and well-organized interest groups, whereas in majoritarian systems like the US, with presidential systems and fewer political parties, civil society actors are more dependent on representing themselves in the debate. However, as one could see with regard to the idea inclusiveness, this does not make a big difference. In the mixed system of Brazil, where there is a presidential system with a highly fragmented multiparty parliament, the actor inclusiveness is slightly higher than in Germany, but the diversity of actors is still lower, as is the inclusiveness of ideas. This would consequently mean that many actors from the same type of actors (e.g., politicians from the government or opposition) repeat more or less the same messages. Due to this very low level of opposing arguments it seems that there is not much controversy exhibited or debate displayed. This could have various reasons: One interpretation could be that Brazilian newspapers tend to see themselves as the voice of the people while following

a catch-all logic (Albuquerque, 2012) and that they would therefore try to keep complexity and controversy rather low.

7.3 Relating Narrative Features and Deliberative Qualities

Further analyses in this section will shed more light on the relation of narrative characteristics, especially regarding the degree of narrativity and the story types, and deliberative qualities. The information gathered will be important to find answers to the second set of research questions that asked for the contribution of news narratives to the deliberative quality of the newspaper coverage (RQ2a) and the country-specific relationships between narrativity and deliberative quality (RQ2b). Two perspectives are important to focus on: first, whether there is a general relationship of narrative elements, story types and deliberative qualities, in the sense of very general effects, and second, whether narrative elements, story types and deliberative qualities have different relations in different contexts. Two multi-level analyses will give a general overview of the degree of narrativity (Table 10) and the story types (Table 11), before I will go into detail on the deliberative qualities in each country.

Table 10 is a multilevel linear regression to which a set of variables was added stepwise. The empty two-level model (Model 0) without any explanatory variables is not shown in the table. Models 1 to 5 gain complexity by adding explanatory variables: Model 1 uses the country context to explain the degree of narrativity.[26] Model 2 adds the format of the article. Model 3 looks at the story type, while in model 4 the deliberative qualities are added. Model 5 controls for the length of an article.

Model 1 confirms the significant influence of the country context on the degree of narrativity. Compared to Brazil, the German and US coverage have a significantly lower degree of narrativity. Model 2 reveals that especially opinion-based articles have a significantly higher degree of narrativity, while press reviews in general have a lower degree of narrativity. Looking at the story type variables in model 3 shows that only the *Business as Usual*-story type has a significantly lower degree of narrativity. Model 4 includes the deliberative qualities. There are hardly any general effects. Only a higher total number of actors from the political periphery is related to a higher degree of narrativity. But when adding the length of the article as last variable in model 5, this

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[26] Another model that also contained the media organizations significantly lowered the statistical fit of the models, which is why the final models leave out the media organizations as another context variable.

effect, as well as the effects for the *Business as Usual* story type, and the press reviews do not remain significant (while letters to the editor show a significant effect). It will therefore be important to examine the role of the length of an article and its relation to narrativity more closely in the next section. Articles with a higher degree of narrativity include more people from the political periphery, but when the articles that have a higher degree of narrativity are significantly longer and therefore simply have more room to include different voices, we will have to check if the higher inclusion is connected to the length of an article or to its narrative form.

Table 10 Multilevel linear regression of the degree of narrativity in newspapers

	Model 1: National Context	Model 2 + Format	Model 3 + Story Type	Model 4 + Deliberative Qualities	Model 5 + Length
	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)
Issue Level					
Countries (base: Brazil)					
Germany	-.37***	-.32***	-.23**	-.31***	-.46***
	(.08)	(.08)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
USA	-.4***	-.42***	-.28**	-.43***	-.69***
	(.1)	(.1)	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)
Article level					
Format (base: fact-based article)					
Opinion-based article		.37***	.36***	.44***	.29**
		(.09)	(.09)	(.24)	(.1)
Press review		-.63**	-.77**	-.54**	-.24
		(.23)	(.25)	(.25)	(.24)
Letter to the editor		-.01	-.004	.21	.6**
		(.02)	(.2)	(.25)	(.24)
Other format		.43	.24	.26	.27
		(.38)	(.4)	(.61)	(.58)
Story Type (base: Futile Struggle)					
Constant Challenge			.06	.44	.33
			(.1)	(.24)	(.23)
Business as Usual			-.3**	.17	.08
			(.09)	(.22)	(.21)
Stories of Success			-.14	.34	.12
			(.11)	(.27)	(.26)
Deliberative Qualities					
Number of CS actor statements				.11*	.04
				(.04)	(.04)

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	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Share of CS actor statements				-.21 (.22)	-.28 (.21)
Number of idea elements				.003 (.01)	-.02 (-.01)
Number of different idea elements				.05 (.03)	.03 (.03)
Diversity of idea elements				-.12 (.22)	-.09 (.21)
Contest (base: no opposing arguments)				.04 (.14)	.004 (.14)
Outcome (base: no conceivable outcome)					
Conflict fixed				-.03 (.25)	-.04 (.24)
Conflict not fixed				.37 (.22)	.3 (.21)
Length of article					.001*** (.0001)
Intercept					.98
N (Issue level)	364				
N (Article level)	870				
-2LL	2625.1	2600.59	2446.9	2265.96	2185,98
AIC	2635.11	2618.58	2470.9	2305.96	2227.98
BIC	2658.95	2661.5	2527.54	2399.12	2325.08

Note: Cell entries are fixed effects estimates from random intercept models. B(SE) denotes the unstandardized regression coefficient with standard error in parentheses; -2LL denotes -2 log likelihood; AIC denotes the Akaike's information criterion; BIC denotes the Bayesian information criterion; all models could significantly improve their fit values at a level of at least p<.05 compared to the less defined model.

Another multilevel analysis is depicted in Table 11. These four logistic multilevel regressions present the attempt to reveal the relation between the single story types as well as several context variables and deliberative qualities. Each of the models reports the estimated logit coefficients (with their standard errors) as well as the average marginal effect (AME). Again, empty two-level models without explanatory variables were calculated first. The models presented were built stepwise securing an increasing

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model fit (Menard, 2002), but in this case, only the final models are displayed. Regarding the country context, differences can be detected.[27]

The probability of the Futile Struggle story type to be present in the US coverage is significantly lower. The AME suggests that the probability is about 18 percentage points lower in the US than in Brazil. Likewise, the probability for the *Constant Challenge* narrative to be present in the German or US coverage is about 20 percentage points lower than in the Brazilian coverage, while the *Business as Usual* narrative is significantly more likely to be present in Germany (27 percentage points) and the US (34 percentage points) than in Brazil. Whether an article is an opinion-based one compared to a fact-based article makes a difference for the *Constant Challenge* as well as the *Business as Usual* narrative. While the former is about 13 percentage points more likely to be present in an opinion-based article, the latter is about 12 percentage points less likely. Only a few deliberative qualities seem to be directly connected to certain story types. The probability of having a higher share of civil society actor statements (compared to all actor statements in an article) is, for example, significantly lower in the *Stories of Success*. Regarding the diversity of ideas in an article (measured by a diversity index that is smaller the greater the heterogeneity is, with a highest value of 1 representing complete homogeneity of actors), two story types stick out: The likelihood for greater diversity is higher in the *Constant Challenge* narrative (the negative coefficient representing lower index values for more heterogeneity), while it is significantly lower in the *Business as Usual narrative*.

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[27] Again, all models were also calculated with the media organization as additional context variable but with no positive effect on the fit statistics of the models.

Table 11 Logistic multilevel regressions of story types in newspapers

	Futile Struggle		Constant Challenge		Business as Usual		Stories of Success	
	B (SE)	AME	B (SE)	AME	B (SE)	AME	B (SE)	AME
Issue Level								
Countries (base: Brazil)								
Germany	-.12 (.17)	-.03	-1.36*** (.24)	-.2	2.33*** (.31)	.27	-.48 (.31)	-.04
USA	-.81*** (.22)	-.18	-1.34*** (.3)	-.2	2.7*** (.34)	.34	.25 (.33)	.02
Article Level								
Format (base: fact-based article)								
Opinion-based article	-.2 (.21)	-.05	.85*** (.23)	.13	-.88** (.29)	-.12	.16 (.3)	.02
Press review	.95 (.51)	.22	.27 (.79)	.04	-1.4* (.69)	-.17	-.37 (.08)	-.03
Letter to the editor	.002 (.51)	.00	.6 (.7)	.09	-.81 (.56)	-.11	.74 (.79)	.08
Other format	-.56 (1.3)	-.12	1.7 (1.3)	.32	-.25 (.44)	-.04	-	-
Deliberative Qualities								
Number of CS actor statements	-.07 (.08)	-.02	.13 (.11)	.02	-.02 (.11)	-.002	.04 (.16)	.003
Share of CS actor statements	.72 (.45)	.17	-.43 (.56)	-.06	.45 (.55)	.07	-1.75* (.8)	-.16
Number of idea elements	.04 (.03)	.01	-.03 (.05)	-.005	-.08 (.05)	-.01	.04 (.05)	.004
Number of different idea elements	.07 (.07)	.02	-.13 (.1)	-.02	.12 (.09)	.02	-.15 (.12)	-.01
Diversity of idea elements	-.15 (.46)	-.04	-1.89** (.65)	-.26	1.92*** (.57)	.28	-.2 (.7)	-.02
Contest (base: no opposing arguments)	.04	.01	-.19 (.42)	-.02	.22 (.34)	.03	-.13	-.01
N (Issue level)	364							
N (Article level)	870							
-2LL	1028.72		672.68		719.74		601.48	
AIC	1056.72		700.7		746.74		627.48	
BIC	1121.94		765.91		811.95		687.98	

Note: Cell entries are fixed effects estimates from random intercept models. B(SE) denotes the unstandardized logit coefficient with standard error in parentheses; AME denotes the average marginal effect on predicted probabilities; -2LL denotes -2 log likelihood; AIC denotes the Akaike's information criterion; BIC denotes the Bayesian information criterion; all models could significantly improve their fit values at a level of at least p<.05 compared to the respective empty model (Futile Struggle: -2LL = 1136.3, AIC = 1140.31, BIC = 1149.75; Constant Challenge: -2LL = 786.5, AIC = 790.49, BIC = 799.94; Business as Usual: -2LL = 911.88, AIC = 915.88, BIC = 925.32; Stories of Success: -2LL = 645,16, AIC = 649.16, BIC = 658.6)

These analyses give first insights into general relationships of narrativity and certain context factors as well as into deliberative qualities. The countries seem to differ significantly in their use of dominant story types. Also, important deliberative qualities, such as the inclusion of civil society actors and the diversity of the ideas presented, do not seem to apply to all story types in the same way, which would support the assumption that narratives are not in general positive or negative for the deliberative quality but that it obviously depends, on the type of story that is told (e.g. in what country and in which format).

To further disentangle country-specific relationships and effects, I will go into detail on each of the deliberative qualities in the next paragraphs and regard the relation of the degree of narrativity and deliberative qualities as well as the deliberative quality of the different story types for each country separately.

7.3.1 Deliberative Quality and the Degree of Narrativity

7.3.1.1 Inclusiveness of Actors

To bring narrativity and deliberative elements together, I initially looked at the inclusiveness of actors on the input dimension, because it is an important requirement of deliberation to allow popular inclusion of actors, speakers and ideas into the debate. Table 12 compares how many actor statements per article can be found in Brazilian, German and US newspaper articles with high narrativity (two and more narrative elements) and lower narrativity. An analysis of variance between the newspapers in each country revealed no significant differences between the newspapers within the countries themselves. For this reason, in the following analyses I only look at differences between countries.

Table 12 Mean actor statements per article and actor statement concentration index (ACI)

	Low narrativity	High narrativity	Overall
Brazil			
M	3.55	5.5	4.58
SD	2.5	3.25	2.99
n	141	178	319
ACI	.223	.243	.229
Germany			
M	3.48	4.79	3.99
SD	2.78	3.17	3.07
n	211	152	363
ACI	.197	.194	.191
USA			
M	4.89	5.63	5.16
SD	3.54	4.32	3.85
n	118	70	188
ACI	.207	.194	.193
Overall			
M	3.86	5.29	4.45
SD	2.97	3.44	3.24
n	470	400	870
ACI	.203	.213	.202

Base: N=870 newspaper articles (Brazil n = 319, Germany n = 363, USA n = 188)

Across all three countries, articles with low narrativity contain less actor statements than articles with higher narrativity. American narrative news articles also include more actor statements on average (*M*=5.63) than Brazilian (*M*=5.5) and German narrative news articles (*M*=4.79).

However, we can also detect that narrative articles are significantly longer (Pearson's r=0.31, p<0.01 for the relationship of the degree of narrativity and the length of an article), which simply gives articles more space for actor statements. Hence, the length of an article functions as a mediator[28] between the degree of narrativity and the total number of actor statements, as already became obvious in the last model of the multi-level regression above. The significant indirect effect of the degree of narrativity on the number of actor statements in an article through the length of the article is b=0.43, BCa CI [.34, .54]. This represents a small but notable effect, κ^2=.15, 95% BCa CI [.12, .18], which we can interpret as the indirect effect being 15% of the maximum value that it could have been if the length would explain the number of actor statements all by itself.[29]

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[28] Analysis was performed with the Process Macro for SPSS by Andrew Hayes (Hayes 2013)

[29] The countries differ regarding the relation of the degree of narrativity, the length of an article and the number of actor statements. In Brazil, the indirect effect is stronger with b=0.8, BCa CI [.62, 1.03] and κ^2= .31, 95% BCa CI [.25, .37]. In Germany, the indirect effect is slightly stronger than the overall

Looking at the actor concentration index (ACI) in Table 12, we detect that German news stories are in general most even in their dispersion of types of actors; the Brazilian news stories are the least even in their dispersion of types of actors compared to German and American articles. At the same time, the actor ensembles in news stories with higher narrativity are less concentrated in Germany and the US than in news stories with lower narrativity, while it is the other way around in Brazilian news stories. Therefore, in the cases of Germany and the US, narrative news stories seem to give more room for different voices. Figures 5 to 7 shed more light on the actor statements in both articles with a low and a high degree of narrativity. In all three countries, statements from political actors have the highest share in articles with low as well as with high narrativity. In Brazil and Germany, the share of statements from political actors is even higher in articles with a higher degree of narrativity. In the US, the share is slightly smaller than in articles with lower narrativity, but statements from political actors by far remain the most often quoted. In Brazil and Germany, statements directly made by journalists decrease with higher narrativity of an article. The presence of NGO representatives differs between the countries. While in Brazil the share of statements made by NGO representatives is similar in articles with high and low narrativity, in Germany and the US the share is slightly higher in articles with higher narrativity. It is also interesting to note that in the US the share of business and industry representatives increases in articles with higher narrativity. However, comparing measures of association in all three countries (below each figure), one will note that it only makes a significant difference in Germany and Brazil whether articles have a higher or lower degree of narrativity and which actors are represented.

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indirect effect with b=0.47, BCa CI [.34, .62] and κ^2=.16, 95% BCa CI [.12, .21]. In the US, the indirect effect is b=0.6, BCa CI [.3, 1.00] and κ^2=.16, 95% BCa CI [.08, .25].

Figure 5 Brazil: Relative frequencies of actor statements in newspaper articles with a low or high degree of narrativity

Note: N=1480 actor statements; numbers above bars are percentages based on all articles with either a low or high degree of narrativity; $\chi 2$=24.35*** df(8); λ=0. 00 (asymmetric with 'type of actor' as dependent variable); V=0.13***

Figure 6 Germany: Relative frequencies of actor statements in newspaper articles with a low or high degree of narrativity

Note: N=1481 actor statements; numbers above bars are percentages based on all articles with either a low or high degree of narrativity; $\chi 2$=15.72** df(8); λ=0.03* (asymmetric with 'type of actor' as dependent variable); V=0.1**

Figure 7 USA: Relative frequencies of actor statements in newspaper articles with a low or high degree of narrativity

Note: N=971 actor statements; numbers above bars are percentages based on all articles with either a low or high degree of narrativity; $\chi 2$=11.32 df(8); λ=0. 01 (asymmetric with 'type of actor' as dependent variable); V=0.12

Looking at the direct relationship between the degree of narrativity and the inclusiveness of actors, further country differences can be found. Since we have learned above that both German newspapers differ in their degree of narrativity as well as in their average presentation of actors from the political periphery, I will also consider newspapers in the following analysis.

Table13 depicts regression coefficients for the degree of narrativity of an article and the number of actor statements made by actors from the political periphery. Across all countries, there is a general significant relationship of higher narrativity and a higher number of actor statements from the periphery. This significant relationship can also be found in Brazil and Germany but not in the US.

Table 13 Within-regressions of 'number of actor statements from the periphery' on 'degree of narrativity'

	Actor statements M (SD)	Regression Constant b_0	Regression Coefficient b	Pearson's r	R^2 in %
Brazil	1.09 (1.35)	.79	.18**	.15**	2.3
Fohla de Sao Paulo	.94 (1.3)	.8	.09	.08	0.6
O Globo	1.21 (1.36)	.76	.26**	.22**	4.7
Germany	1.05 (1.45)	.74	.24***	.175***	2.8
Süddeutsche Zeitung	1.30 (1.5)	.93	.25*	.18**	3.2
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	.79 (1.32)	.59	.17*	.135*	1.8

USA	1.67 (1.72)	1.53	.11	.06	.4
The New York Times	1.68 (1.5)	1.34	.26	.18*	3.2
The Washington Post	1.66 (1.86)	1.83	-.14	-.06	.4
OVERALL	1.18 (1.48)	.95	.17***	.12***	1.5

Base: N=870 newspaper articles (Brazil n = 319, Germany n = 363, USA n = 188)

However, since the degree of narrativity differs between newspapers, especially between the German ones, we cannot take it for granted that the relationship between the degree of narrativity and the number of actor statements from the periphery is the same in the newspapers of one country. Regression coefficients and correlations for each newspaper are therefore included in Table 13. Figure 9 clearly illustrates that the relationship between the number of actor statements from the periphery and the degree of narrativity varies between newspapers. Intercepts as well as slopes differ, as is also expressed in the different regression constants and coefficients in Table 13.

While we see positive relationships between the degree of narrativity and the number of actor statements from the periphery in German and Brazilian newspapers, one of the American newspapers deviates from this pattern: For the Washington Post, the regression coefficient is negative, but this result has to be handled with some caution since there are only six WP articles that contain three narrative elements and only one article that contains all four narrative elements. I would therefore not draw a general conclusion from this small number of examples.

Figure 8 Regression lines for within-regression of 'number of actor statements from periphery' on 'degree of narrativity'

As we have learned above, there is also a relationship between the length and the number of actor statements in the article. Therefore, the question remains whether civil society actors are more or less likely to appear in articles with a higher degree of narrativity compared to other actors, while all appear more often in narrative articles because of their length. As Table 14 indicates, about one fourth of all articles contain actor statements from the periphery. The highest share of actor statements from civil society, scientists, and politicians from the opposition and ordinary citizens is found in the US, where these actors give one third of all statements in the coverage. In Brazil and Germany, the share is slightly below the average at about 23 (Germany) and 24 (Brazil) percent. Only in Germany, however, there is a significant positive correlation between the share of peripheral actor statements and the degree of narrativity. At newspaper level, there are no significant correlations, and the explanatory power of within-regression tended against 0, which is why these results are not reported for the sake of parsimony.

Table 14 Correlations between the degree of narrativity and the share of peripheral actor statements

	Brazil	Germany	USA	ALL
Share of Peripheral Actor Statements	23.95 %	22.93%	33.93 %	25.6 %
Pearson's r	.038	.111	-.011	.044

Base: N=870 newspaper articles (Brazil n = 319, Germany n = 363, USA n = 188)

Germany is the only country in which the share of peripheral actor statements continuously increases with the degree of narrativity, as Figure 9 reveals. In the US and Brazil, articles with the highest degree of narrativity have the lowest share of peripheral actor statements. Again, we have to keep in mind that there are only five articles in the US sample that contain all four narrative elements and it is therefore difficult to confirm if these results account for a general trend. In the Brazilian sample, there are 17 articles with all four narrative elements and the drop in the share of the peripheral actor statements is most obvious. Regarding the headlines of these 17 articles, one gets an impression about the content of these articles and one easily notices that they mostly focus on COP proceedings and the actions of specific countries (10 out of 17 articles mention countries as protagonists of the stories), e.g. "Bolivia to Contest Climate Deal", "Islands Propose New Protocol at COP 16", "Poland Clings to Coal Use" or "Obama and the Fear of a Green China" (complete list in the appendix, headlines translated from Portuguese to English). As these headlines suggest, Brazilian narrative articles focus on countries as actors and obviously give less room for peripheral voices.

Figure 9 Degree of narrativity (number of narrative elements contained) and share of peripheral actor statements

Base: N=870 newspaper articles (Brazil n = 319, Germany n = 363, USA n = 188); numbers represent the relative frequencies of articles that contain statements from peripheral actors within all articles of a country, which have the same degree of narrativity

7.3.1.2　Inclusiveness of Ideas

To assess the relation of the inclusiveness of ideas and the degree of narrativity, Table 15 summarizes the average number of idea elements per article, the average number of different idea elements, the diversity of idea elements for each of the three dimensions (consequences of climate change, causes and solutions), and the total amount of idea elements across all dimensions as well as correlation coefficients with the degree of narrativity for each variable.

Consequences of Climate Change

In this category, Germany is the only country in which we find significant correlations between the degree of narrativity and the amount of idea elements. The higher the degree of narrativity, the more idea elements as well as the more different idea elements are included in the coverage. Also, the diversity significantly increases with a higher degree of narrativity (a negative correlation here means higher diversity, since the index represents homogeneity at the level of '1').

Causes of climate change

The US coverage contains the most causes per article, but Germany contains the most different causes, though it also has the least idea elements of causes compared to both other countries. However, the differences in this category are rather small and the analysis of variance has also shown no significant country differences, as reported above. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that there are significant correlations between the total number of idea elements and the number of different idea elements and the degree of narrativity in Brazil and Germany. In all three countries, the diversity of idea elements increases slightly with a higher degree of narrativity but not to a significant degree.

Solutions for climate change

In the category of solutions, it is only Brazil that has notable correlations with the degree of narrativity. The higher the degree, the more idea elements as well as the more different idea elements are contained; but the diversity also significantly increases, which hints at a lower concentration of more of the same elements in one article.

All idea elements

Looking at all idea elements across all articles in the three countries, there are significant correlations between the degree of narrativity and the number of idea

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elements as well as between the number of different idea elements and the diversity of ideas. However, this effect can be detected in Brazil and Germany, but not in the US. In the US, where the number of idea elements is generally quite high, it initially seems that there is not much difference between articles with lower or higher degrees of narrativity.

But the means are misleading here, as Figure 10 clearly demonstrates. In Brazil and Germany, there clearly are linear relationships between idea elements and the diversity of idea elements and the degree of narrativity. However, there are no such relationships in the US. The articles with the highest degree of narrativity have the least total number of idea elements and different idea elements per article as well as the highest homogeneity of idea elements. However, there are only five articles in the US sample that have a degree of narrativity of '4' (meaning that they include all four narrative characteristics at the same time). When looking into these five articles, they reveal what they are about and give an idea about the use of idea elements. To give two short examples: A first short letter to the editor titled "Bloomberg and Climate" from the New York Times (November 19, 2012) tells from a first-person perspective how the author (a former Chair Woman of the democratic party in New York) highly respects New York City's Mayor Michael Bloomberg's endorsement of Barack Obama due to the severity of the climate change issue, for which the US should provide leadership. There is nothing said about causes or solutions to the problem but rather a personal call for bipartisan action is made. A second article titled "Rising Temperatures Threaten Fundamental Change for Ski Slopes" (New York Times, December 13, 2012) focuses the 18 year old college student and college ski –team member Helena Williams in Newbury (New Hampshire) and the difficulties of the region to guarantee a full snow season. The detailed article provides statistic information about temperature and the amount of snow in this region and others, but when counted for idea elements, only these three consequences of climate change can be detected: rising temperatures, extreme weather, and economic difficulties. The article does not shed light on either causes or remedies. It nevertheless makes an important contribution to the debate by emphasizing the severe consequences of global climate change for local communities and businesses. However, those two articles as well as the other three US articles with the highest degree of narrativity, all focus on specific details of the climate change issue. They are examples of rather straightforward individual stories with a clear focus

on a person or an event rather than a complex narratives that tries to draw a bigger picture.

Figure 10 Degree of narrativity and (1) average of all idea elements per article; (2) the average of different idea elements per article; and (3) the average diversity index per article

Base: N=870 newspaper articles (Brazil n = 319, Germany n = 363, USA n = 188)

Table 15 Inclusiveness of idea elements and correlations with the degree of narrativity

		Brazil		Germany		USA		All	
		M (SD)	Pearson's r	M (SD)	Pearson's r	M (SD)	Pearson's r	M (SD)	Pearson's r
Consequences	Idea elements per article total	1.12 (1.93)	.087	1.75 (2.23)	.107*	2.28 (3.3)	.058	1.63 (2.46)	.054
	Different idea elements per article	.69 (1.09)	.089	1.14 (1.21)	.149**	1.26 (1.3)	.062	1 (1.2)	.070
	Diversity index	.71 (.29)	-.039	.71 (.29)	-.2**	.69 (.3)	-.112	.71 (.29)	-0.129**
Causes	Idea elements per article total	1.15 (1.14)	.143**	1.12 (1.45)	.166**	1.26 (1.45)	.077	1.16 (1.46)	.137***
	Different idea elements per article	.71 (.76)	.167**	.75 (1.44)	.185***	.72 (.7)	.104	.73 (.75)	.159***
	Diversity index	.86 (.22)	-.025	.87 (.22)	-.128	.89 (.2)	-.066	.87 (.21)	-.085
Solutions	Idea elements per article total	2.81 (2.77)	.261***	2.79 (2.75)	.127*	3.53 (4.0)	.110	2.95 (3.07)	.159***
	Different idea elements per article	1.94 (1.68)	.266***	2.07 (1.73)	.102	2.14 (2.12)	.108	2.04 (1.8)	.153***
	Diversity index	.55 (.27)	-.274***	.58 (.38)	-.067	.59 (.36)	-.023	.58 (.34)	-.132***
All Idea Elements	Idea elements per article total	5.07 (4.06)	.273***	5.66 (4.21)	.199***	7.06 (6.21)	.124	5.73 (4.7)	.176***
	Different idea elements per article	3.34 (2.38)	.282***	3.96 (2.51)	.198***	4.12 (2.93)	.130	3.77 (2.58)	.187***
	Diversity index	.44 (.28)	-.308***	.39 (.26)	-.177*	.43 (.29)	-.141	.41 (.27)	-.183***

Base: N=870 newspaper articles (Brazil n = 319, Germany n = 363, USA n = 188)

7.3.1.3　Competing Arguments

Since there are only a few articles that actually contain directly opposing arguments, I will again only look at differences between articles with a high or a low degree of narrativity rather than calculating correlations for each country. Table 16 provides information on the absolute and relative frequencies of opposing idea elements in articles with a low and high degree of narrativity. In Brazil, there is no difference between articles with low and high narrativity. In Germany, articles with a high degree of narrativity have a slightly higher share of opposing arguments but the difference is only one percentage point. The difference in the US is higher. There, opposing idea elements in articles with a high degree of narrativity have a share that is more than six percentage points higher than in articles with a low degree of narrativity.

Table 16 Opposing arguments in articles with low and high narrativity (absolute and relative frequencies)

	Brazil		Germany		USA		All	
	n	*%*	*n*	*%*	*n*	*%*	*n*	*%*
Low	5	3.5	20	9.5	11	9.3	36	7.7
High	6	3.4	16	10.5	11	15.7	33	8.3
ALL	11	3.4	36	9.9	22	11.7	69	7.9

Base: N=870 newspaper articles (Brazil n = 319, Germany n = 363, USA n = 188), relative frequencies relate to the number of articles of either low or high narrativity in a country

However, across all three countries, there is only a very small (and not significant) correlation between the degree of narrativity and the amount of opposing idea elements in an article.

7.3.1.4　Outcome Orientation

There are two consistent patterns across countries when we regard outcome orientation and the degree of narrativity. First of all, in all three countries the stories with a lower degree of narrativity have a higher share of stories with no conceivable outcome than those with a higher degree of narrativity. The difference in Brazil is smallest with a margin of three percentage points, second highest in Germany with about 10 percentage points, and highest in the US with a difference of 12 percentage points. The general outcome orientation is therefore higher in stories with a higher degree of narrativity. The second pattern is that in all three countries the share of stories in which a conflict could not been fixed is considerably higher in stories with higher narrativity than in stories with lower narrativity. Only in the US, however, the share of stories in which a conflict could be fixed is higher in stories with higher narrativity (with a difference of 10 percentage points), while in Germany and Brazil the share is a few percentage points lower. The difference of the share of stories in which the conflict is not fixes in stories

with a higher degree of narrativity compared to stories with a lower degree is remarkably high in Germany: About 39 percent of all stories with a low degree of narrativity report an outcome that is not fixed while about 53 percent of the stories with a high degree of narrativity end with an unsolved conflict. This might indicate that there is more critical assessment of the events in stories with a higher degree of narrativity.

7.3.1.5 Interim conclusion

The analyses above revealed mixed results about the general relationship of narrativity and deliberative quality. Articles with a higher degree of narrativity contain more actor statements but the actors represented are less diverse (higher actor concentration index). There is a higher number of statements from actors from the periphery, but the share of those actor statements does not increase. As for the ideas represented in the articles: a higher degree of narrativity has as a consequence more ideas, more different ideas and a more even dispersion of different ideas. There are also more competing arguments in articles with a higher degree of narrativity, as well as a higher outcome orientation.

However, a closer look at each country revealed stark differences and individual patterns for the relation of narrativity and the respective deliberative qualities. Hypothesis 4 suggested that, if the deliberative quality is higher in general, the difference between narrative and less narrative news is smaller. This seems to be partly supported. In the US coverage, it hardly makes a difference in the deliberative quality whether narrative or non-narrative writing is applied: There is only a small positive relationship between the number of actor statements in the New York Times and a very small negative relationship in the Washington Post, but no relation with the share of civil society actor statements. There is also no link between a higher degree of narrativity and the number of idea elements, different idea elements or more or less diversity of idea elements. However, especially the diversity of ideas would need further investigation since there are indications that one cannot assume a linear relationship between the degree of narrativity and the number of idea elements (see Figure 10). Articles with the highest degree of narrativity seem to have very low numbers of idea elements, but since there were only very few of these articles, it is risky to draw general conclusions from that. The low diversity of the strongly narrative articles would nevertheless support Benson (2009), who criticizes the low frame diversity of narrative-driven US journalism.

There is a greater difference between articles with high and low narrativity with respect to the opposing arguments criterion. Articles with a higher degree of narrativity have a share of opposing ideas that is five percentage points higher compared to articles with lower narrativity. The outcome orientation (referring to those articles that report about conflicts that are either solved or remain unsolved) is also higher in articles with a higher degree of narrativity: The latter more often explicitly contain a kind of conflict that is either (about to be) fixed or not fixed. So, for the US coverage, one can conclude that narrativity and inclusiveness do not seem to be connected to each other, but that narrative articles display more controversy as well as outcomes of conflicts.

In the Brazilian coverage, the link between the degree of narrativity and the deliberative qualities is ambiguous. There is only a positive relation between the number of actor statements and the degree of narrativity in the newspaper O Globo, but in both newspapers, there is no correlation between the share of civil society actor statements and the degree of narrativity. However, there is a positive relationship between the degree of narrativity and the number of idea elements and different idea elements as well as the diversity of idea elements. Narrative articles are therefore more inclusive towards ideas than towards actors. There is no difference between articles with a higher or lower degree of narrativity with regard to opposing arguments, where the levels are equally low. The outcome orientation is in general slightly higher in articles with a higher degree of narrativity. These articles less often display no conceivable outcome. Within the narrative articles, stories in which the presented conflict will not be solved in the end prevail, while stories in which the conflict is actually fixed have a lower share than in articles with a lower degree of narrativity. In the case of Brazil, which has a high general degree of narrativity and a low level of deliberative quality, this means that narrativity does not make it better or worse.

The picture is clearer in the German coverage, which up until now was rated as a mixed case with regard to narrativity as well as deliberative quality. Narrative news stories contain more actor statements in general and a higher share of civil society actors. They also contain more idea elements as well as different idea elements, and the diversity of ideas is also higher. The share of articles with opposing ideas is also slightly higher among articles with a higher degree of narrativity. Also, articles with a higher degree of narrativity contain less articles with no conceivable outcome, and the stories with a higher degree of narrativity assess the described conflicts as not solved which may be a sign for more debate and more critical assessment of the events, which would be in

accordance with the result that more civil society voices are represented in articles with higher degrees of narrativity. Concluding from this, the relation between the degree of narrativity and deliberative quality is most positive in the case of Germany.

7.3.2 *Deliberative Quality and Story Types*

7.3.2.1 Inclusiveness of Actors

The next set of analyses aims at assessing the deliberative qualities of the four different story types. Comparing the average number of actor statements, the four story types do not differ significantly. Recalling that the average number of actor statements across all articles was 4.45, the three story types *Futile Struggle* (4.77), *Constant Challenge* (4.71) and *Stories of Success* (4.91) have actor statement numbers above and the *Business as Usual* (4.41) below that average. If we look at actor statements from the periphery, this pattern only differs slightly. While the general average was 1.18 peripheral actor statements per article, all story types range close to that with 1.28 for the *Futile Struggle*, 1.21 for the *Constant Challenge*, 1.21 for *Business as Usual* and the lowest value of .94 for the *Stories of Success*.

Looking at each country in particular, story types vary more in their average inclusion of actors in general and from the periphery (Table 17). For example, in articles with the *Futile Struggle* story type, US articles are well above the average of all actor statements within this story type and compared to peripheral actor statements. Compared to the average, all four story types are above average when it comes to actor statements in general and actor statements from the periphery in particular. Articles with the *Constant Challenge* story types in Germany, for example, are well below the average of all articles of this story type. The low value of only 0.36 average actor statements from the periphery in Brazilian *Business as Usual* stories also stick out in this direct comparison.

Table 17 Story types and average numbers of actor statements

Story Type	Country	All actor statements		Peripheral actor statements
Futile Struggle	Brazil	M	4.52	1.10
		N	151	151
		SD	2.744	1.355
	Germany	M	4.42	1.20
		N	154	154
		SD	2.878	1.466
	USA	M	6.36	1.98
		N	58	58
		SD	4.352	1.811
	All	*M*	*4.77*	*1.28*
		N	*363*	*363*
		SD	*3.176*	*1.510*
Constant Challenge	Brazil	M	5.31	1.41
		N	93	93
		SD	3.356	1.476
	Germany	M	3.26	.56
		N	39	39
		SD	3.210	1.119
	USA	M	4.74	1.58
		N	19	19
		SD	3.619	1.805
	All	M	4.71	1.21
		N	151	151
		SD	3.444	1.481
Business as Usual	Brazil	M	3.09	.36
		N	22	22
		SD	2.136	.727
	Germany	M	3.94	1.08
		N	108	108
		SD	2.485	1.361
	USA	M	4.41	1.66
		N	73	73
		SD	3.166	1.758
	All	M	4.01	1.21
		N	203	203
		SD	2.733	1.515
Stories of Success	Brazil	M	4.67	.79
		N	48	48
		SD	3.663	1.129
	Germany	M	4.59	.85
		N	34	34
		SD	4.398	1.258
	USA	M	5.67	1.27
		N	30	30
		SD	4.302	1.484
	All	M	4.91	.94
		N	112	112
		SD	4.059	1.275

Again, the study looked at the share of peripheral actor statements (Figure 11). Here too, there is a high share of peripheral actor statements in the US: Within all story types,

the US coverage is the most inclusive. In Brazil, civil society has the highest chance to be represented in stories on the constant challenges of climate change. In Germany, it is the *Futile Struggle* in which peripheral actors are most likely to be quoted. Probably the most striking is the difference in the *Business as Usual* story type, where the share of peripheral actors in the US is almost 37 percent, while in Brazil it is only about 10 percent. Since these are stories that chronicle the ongoing political process and the progress of the negotiations, it seems that civil society actors are more naturally part of them in the US than in Brazil, where the focus clearly lies on the political elites. In Germany, the story type that represents the most urgency regarding climate change, is also the one with the highest share of peripheral actors, which points to the assumption that in the German coverage, civil society actors represent a specific urgent perspective in the media coverage.

Figure 11 Share of peripheral actor statements in story types

Base: 829 newspaper articles; numbers above bars represent the relative frequencies of articles in which actor statements from civil society actors are included within all articles belonging to a particular story type in a country

7.3.2.2 Inclusiveness of Ideas

The inclusiveness of ideas in the four story types differs between countries and newspapers. Overall, the *Futile Struggle* story type has the highest average of idea elements, the highest average of different idea elements, and the lowest diversity index. Within this story type, US newspapers both stand out with particular values of the

average numbers of idea elements and different idea elements. Both German newspapers also have the highest average values of idea elements and lowest value of the diversity index for stories within this *Futile Struggle* story type. That it is especially the *Futile Struggle* story type that is most inclusive is remarkable, since one would probably not expect such a pessimistic story type to be inclusive but to contain a limited and repeating set of arguments. However, these stories actually comprise the whole range of cause and consequence idea elements. Climate change is obviously depicted as a highly complex phenomenon, which makes it especially difficult to handle. When it comes to the solutions that are offered, this story type is weak and only in third place compared to the other story types. However, since this story type is also the one with the highest inclusiveness of actors from the political periphery, it seems that this is one of the most important story types for civil society in which the dramatic urgency of the situation is expressed, which can raise awareness of the need for action.

The *Constant Challenge* story type is generally less inclusive. Only in Brazil it is more inclusive at the idea element level, which goes hand in hand with a high inclusiveness of civil society actor statements. In Germany as well as in Brazil, the story types with the highest shares of actor statements from the periphery are also the ones with the highest inclusiveness of idea elements. This is not true for the US coverage, however, where most of the actor statements from the periphery are found in the *Business as Usual* story type, which actually is the least inclusive at the level of idea elements.

The *Business as Usual*-story type is the least inclusive one, especially because of the remarkably low values of both Brazilian newspapers. In Germany, the inclusiveness of this story type does not differ to this extent from the other story types. At the same time, however, the story types in the German newspapers have the smallest range in the average inclusiveness of idea elements in general, compared to the other newspapers.

Differences in the inclusiveness of the *Stories of Success* are again especially obvious due to the high level of idea inclusiveness in US newspapers. For the German Süddeutsche Zeitung, this story type is the least inclusive of all, for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung the second least inclusive.

Table 18 Inclusiveness of idea elements in story types per country and newspaper

	n	Average number of idea elements per article	Average number of different idea elements per article	Idea diversity index
Brazil	151	5.16 (4.26)	3.39 (2.47)	.44 (.31)
Fohla de Sao Paulo	74	4.43 (3.3)	3.03 (2.02)	.48 (.31)

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		N			
	O Globo	77	5.86 (4.94)	3.74 (2.81)	.4 (.28)
	Germany	154	6.6 (4.56)	4.53 (2.45)	.32 (.19)
	Süddeutsche Zeitung	88	6.75 (4.21)	4.75 (2.45)	.31 (.21)
	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	66	6.41 (5.0)	4.23 (2.45)	.34 (.19)
	USA	56	9.55 (7.29)	5.07 (3.19)	.37 (.29)
	New York Times	30	10.5 (8.76)	5.19 (3.54)	.4 (.31)
	Washington Post	25	8.46 (5.38)	4.93 (2.79)	.34 (.26)
	OVERALL	**361**	**6.46 (5.19)**	**4.14 (2.67)**	**.38 (.26)**
Constant Challenge	**Brazil**	93	5.82 (3.87)	3.71 (2.06)	.39 (.21)
	Fohla de Sao Paulo	36	5.28 (3.46)	3.39 (1.96)	.4 (.19)
	O Globo	57	6.16 (4.11)	3.91 (2.11)	.38 (.23)
	Germany	39	4.9 (3.7)	3.72 (2.46)	.38 (.26)
	Süddeutsche Zeitung	25	5.24 (3.78)	3.76 (2.44)	.39 (.3)
	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	14	4.29 (3.06)	3.63 (2.59)	.34 (.15)
	USA	19	6.11 (4.57)	4.16 (2.41)	.38 (.23)
	New York Times	9	6.44 (4.04)	5.0 (2.35)	.31 (.2)
	Washington Post	10	5.8 (5.2)	3.4 (2.32)	.45 (.21)
	OVERALL	**151**	**5.62 (3.9)**	**3.77 (2.2)**	**.38 (.23)**
Business as Usual	**Brazil**	22	3.23 (3.3)	2.5 (2.57)	.55 (.37)
	Fohla de Sao Paulo	10	4.1 (4.28)	3.0 (3.3)	.45 (.38)
	O Globo	12	2.5 (2.15)	2.08 (1.83)	.62 (.35)
	Germany	108	5.32 (4.22)	3.55 (2.61)	.46 (.3)
	Süddeutsche Zeitung	56	5.07 (4.08)	3.09 (2.29)	.53 (.32)
	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	52	5.6 (4.09)	4.04 (2.86)	.39 (.28)
	USA	72	5.51 (5.32)	3.45 (2.78)	.5 (.33)
	New York Times	38	4.95 (5.43)	3.19 (2.68)	.57 (.36)
	Washington Post	34	6.15 (5.21)	3.76 (2.9)	.42 (.27)
	OVERALL	**202**	**5.16 (4.59)**	**3.4 (2.68)**	**.48 (.31)**
Stories of Success	**Brazil**	48	4.79 (3.85)	3.02 (2.14)	.51 (.3)
	Fohla de Sao Paulo	22	4.45 (2.94)	2.86 (1.73)	.47 (.26)
	O Globo	26	5.08 (4.52)	3.15 (2.85)	.55 (.32)
	Germany	34	5.15 (3.05)	3.65 (1.82)	.43 (.27)
	Süddeutsche Zeitung	6	4.5 (2.17)	3.17 (2.14)	.48 (.3)
	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	28	5.29 (3.22)	3.76 (1.78)	.41 (.27)
	USA	30	7.9 (5.73)	4.63 (2.68)	.36 (.18)
	New York Times	13	6.85 (3.56)	4.15 (2.15)	.38 (.18)
	Washington Post	17	8.71 (6.96)	5.0 (3.04)	.34 (.17)
	OVERALL	**112**	**5.73 (4.4)**	**3.64 (2.39)**	**.44 (.27)**

7.3.2.3 Competing arguments

Comparing story types according to their competing arguments does not prove to be particularly revealing. Within all articles written with the *Business as Usual* story type, 8.9 percent contain competing arguments (18 articles). 32 articles (or 8.8 percent) of the articles in the *Futile Struggle* story type, 7 articles (6.3 percent) of the *Stories of Success* and 8 articles (5.3 percent) of the *Constant Challenge* stories contain competing

arguments. Due to small absolute numbers, a distinct country comparison is not instructive.

7.3.2.4 Outcome Orientation

The outcome variable was one of the variables included in the cluster analysis and is therefore also decisive for the interpretation of the resulting story types. Table 4 depicted the relative frequencies of the outcome variable in each story type cluster. According to this table, there are two story types with a high outcome orientation and two with either a low or no outcome orientation. The story types *Constant Challenge* and *Stories of Success* both have a very high share of articles in which a certain conflict is solved in some way. These story types therefore reflect events that lead to some kind of (political) decision or solution. The *Futile Struggle* story type has the highest share of articles in which a certain conflict is not solved. The events reported in those articles do not lead to political action. The *Business as Usual* story type is the one where there is no conceivable outcome.

Beyond looking at the outcome of the overall conflict, one can also approach the outcome orientation by assessing the inclusion of solution idea elements more closely. Table 11 depicted that there is a positive correlation of idea elements on the dimension of solutions to climate change and the degree of narrativity in all countries (though this correlation is only significant in Brazil and Germany for the total number of idea elements and in Brazil also for the number of different idea elements).

Further comparing the story types for differences in the outcome orientation, an analysis of variance reveals that, indeed, the *Stories of Success* also contain the most idea elements on the dimension of solutions ($M = 3.97$, $SD = 3.5$), followed by the *Constant Challenge* ($M = 3.17$, $SD = 2.73$), and the *Futile Struggle* ($M = 3.1$, $SD = 2.1$). The *Business as Usual* story type is the one with the least solution elements ($M = 2.4$, $SD = 2.1$). There is a significant difference ($F(3,822) = 6.46$, $p < .001$), while the Scheffé post-hoc test discloses that the significant difference lies between the *Stories of Success* and *Business as Usual* narrative.

Figure 12 more particularly shows how the solution orientation differs between countries within the different story types. At first sight, the average use of solution idea elements in the US compared to both other countries is noticeable, especially within the *Futile Struggle* and *the Stories of Success* narrative. However, especially in the *Stories of Success,* solution elements are used above average in all countries. The *Business as*

Usual narrative uses the least solution idea elements in all countries. While in Brazil the *Constant Challenge* narrative is the one with the second highest average of solution idea elements, this is the case for *Futile Struggle* narrative in Germany.

Figure 12 Solution idea elements in story types

Base: 829 newspaper articles; numbers above bars denote the average representation of solution idea elements per article in articles of the respective story type within a country

7.3.2.5 Interim conclusion

Comparing the deliberative qualities of the different story types revealed some notable country differences. Within each country, the story types vary greatly in their deliberative quality. In the Brazilian coverage, it is the *Constant Challenge* story type that scores highest on deliberative qualities with the highest inclusiveness of civil society actors, the most idea elements as well as the most different and diverse idea elements and a higher outcome orientation (conflicts with prospect of solution as well as explicit solution idea elements). In the German coverage, the *Futile Struggle* story type contains most actors from the periphery (and the highest share), most idea elements as well as the most different and diverse idea elements. The *Futile Struggle* is a story type with a high outcome orientation in the sense that it depicts conflicts that are either not solved or are not expected to be sufficiently approached with the solutions at hand. In the German coverage, solution ideas are often included in this story type which indicates that proposed solutions are at least up for debate. In the US coverage, the *Futile Struggle* story type contains on average most actor statements from the periphery, but the share of those actor statements is highest in the *Business as Usual* story type.

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The *Futile Struggle* also has the highest average of idea elements per article but the most even inclusion of different ideas is found in the *Business of Success* story type, which also has the highest average of solution elements. Therefore, for the US it is most difficult to judge which story type would be the one with highest deliberative quality while we can state this for the *Constant Challenge* story type in the Brazilian, and the *Futile Struggle* story type in the German coverage.

With this information, we can come to conclusions on the fifth hypothesis that stated that in the US and in Germany the dominant story types score lower when it comes to deliberative quality, while in Brazil the dominant story type is the one with highest deliberative quality. The results presented are not unambiguous enough to confirm this hypothesis. The dominant story types in Brazil were the *Futile Struggle* as well as the *Constant Challenge*. Both of them score higher in deliberative qualities than the other two (while the *Constant Challenge* is the second most often used story type but scores highest in deliberative quality). This could partly confirm the second part of the hypotheses. However, for Germany, the dominant story type – the *Futile Struggle* – has the highest deliberative quality, while for the US no such clear conclusion can be reached. We should keep in mind though that the deliberative quality is high in the US coverage (across all story types) and the idea and actor inclusiveness in almost all story types exceeds the values found in the German and Brazilian coverage.

7.3.3   Contribution of News Narratives to the Deliberative Quality

With regard to the second set of research questions concerning the contribution of news narratives to the deliberative quality, the results presented above support the overall assumption of this study that narrativity in the news context can hardly be judged as being either good or bad, or whether it has universal effects. Instead, we have seen that there are significant effects of for example the higher degree of narrativity and for certain deliberative qualities. Usually, they still do not apply to all countries in the same way. Chapter 8 will therefore further engage in pointing out the circumstances that facilitate a positive relationship between narrativity and deliberative qualities. Before, section 7.4 will give a summary of all the results of this research.

7.4   Summary

In this result section, different analyses gave insight into the use of narrative features in the coverage of Brazil, Germany, and the US. For the purpose of clarity, Table 19

summarizes the results and reveals a mixed picture for final conclusions in the next chapter.

Table 19 Summary of results

		Brazil	Germany	USA
Narrative features	***Degree of Narrativity***	High (strong dramatization)	Mixed (SZ: dramatization, FAZ: personalization)	Low (strong personalization)
	Story Types	Futile Struggle and Constant Challenge	Futile Struggle and Business as Usual	Business as Usual
	Narrative Roles	Brazilian victim and hero, West as villains	Others as victims, nations or humankind as villains, Germany and EU as heroes	Others as victims, others as villains, especially individual heroes
Actor inclusiveness	***Actor Inclusiveness in General***	Second most actor statements in general Highest ACI (less diverse) Slightly higher number and share of CS actors than Germany	Least actors statements in general Smallest ACI (highest diversity) Smallest number and smallest share of CS actor statement	Most actor statements in general Slightly higher ACI Highest number and highest share of CS actor statement
	Actor Inclusiveness and Narrativity	Significant relation of number of civil society actor statements only in O Globo Share of statements: no significant relation	Strongest positive relation of civil society actor statements in both newspapers Share of statements: small positive significant relation	Small positive relation in NYT, negative (but not significant) relation in WP Share: no significant relation
	Actor Inclusiveness in Story Types	Highest share in Constant challenge	Highest share in Futile Struggle	Highest share in Business as Usual
Idea Inclusiveness	***Idea Inclusiveness in General***	Lowest total average of idea elements per article Lowest average of different idea elements per article (significantly different from US and Germany)	Second highest total average of idea elements per article Second highest average of different idea elements per article (but not significantly different from US)	Highest total average of idea elements per article Highest average of different idea elements per article (but not significantly different from Germany)
	Idea Inclusiveness and	Positive significant relationship between average of total number of idea	Positive significant relationship between average of total number of idea	No significant relationship between average of total number of idea

	Narrativity	elements and number of different idea elements (linear relationship)	elements and number of different idea elements (linear relationship)	elements and number of different idea elements (NO linear relationship)
		Strongest relationship of higher diversity and higher degree of narrativity	Positive relationship of higher diversity and higher degree of narrativity (but less strong than in Brazil)	No relationship between diversity and degree of narrativity
	Idea Inclusiveness in Story Types	Highest inclusiveness in constant challenge (also highest inclusiveness of civil society actor)	Highest inclusiveness in Futile Struggle (also the one with the highest inclusiveness of civil society actor)	Highest inclusiveness in Futile Struggle (NOT the one with the highest inclusiveness of civil society actor)
			Story types differ least from each other in their inclusiveness of idea elements	
Opposing Arguments	*Opposing Arguments in General*	3.3 percent of all articles	9.9 percent of all articles	11.7 percent of all articles
	Opposing Arguments and Narrativity	No difference between articles with low and high degree of narrativity	Only small difference: articles with higher degree have slightly more often opposing arguments	Largest difference between articles with low and high degree of narrativity: higher degree of narrativity with 5 percentage points higher level of opposing arguments
	Opposing Arguments in Story Types	Country differences not instructive because of small number of overall occurrence; no big differences between story types in general but slightly more opposing arguments in Business as Usual and Futile Struggle compared to Constant Challenge and Stories of Success		
Outcome orientation	*Outcome Orientation in General*	Highest share of articles with an outcome in which the conflict is fixed	Mixed outcome orientation in both newspapers	Highest share of articles with no conceivable outcome

	Outcome Orientation and Narrativity	Less stories with no conceivable outcome in stories with lower degree of narrativity	Less stories with no conceivable outcome in stories with lower degree of narrativity	Less stories with no conceivable outcome in stories with lower degree of narrativity
		Stories in which conflict not fixed with higher share, stories in which context is fixed with lower share in stories with higher degree of narrativity	Stories in which conflict not fixed with higher share, stories in which context is fixed with lower share in stories with higher degree of narrativity	Stories in which conflict not fixed with slightly higher share, stories in which context is fixed with remarkably higher share (13 percentage points) in stories with higher degree of narrativity
	Outcome Orientation in Story Types	Higher solution orientation in Constant Challenge and Stories of Success, lowest in Business as Usual	Not much difference between story types	Highest share of solution elements in all story types (except for Business as Usual)

8 Discussion and Conclusion

It has become clear from this study that there are different relations between the narrativity of news stories and their deliberative qualities. This last chapter will offer explanations built on the context knowledge gained in Chapter 5 for the dispersion and the deliberative quality of news narratives, as research question 3 had asked for. Since this is a small-N case study comparing three countries, this question cannot be answered finally. With the theoretical understanding of the concepts of narrativity and deliberation, the context knowledge previously gained about the countries and the results of the analyses at hand, we can still try to come to conclusions about under which circumstances news narratives are more likely to occur and what influences their deliberative qualities.

The three cases investigated in this project are very different from each other on many dimensions, as we have seen throughout this work. Their journalistic traditions and role perceptions are embedded in different political and media system environments. A relevant constant within this research design, however, is the occasion that is covered by the investigated news media: the climate change conferences. Newspaper reports on the phenomenon of climate change as well as on climate politics are triggered by these transnational events year by year. Furthermore, as one could see, these reports cover the event in different ways with regard to narrativity of the news as well as to deliberative qualities.

Three patterns could be detected. In the US, a low level of narrativity and the dominant *Business-as-Usual* story type that tells the stories about climate change and its politics as a recurring event in the least agitated way comes with a generally high level of deliberative qualities on the dimensions measured here. There are almost no relations between narrativity and deliberative qualities. A higher degree of narrativity neither implies more deliberative quality nor entails less. None of the story types stick out with significantly higher or lower deliberative quality across the measured dimensions.

Contrary to the low level of narrativity in the US, Brazil is characterized by the highest degree of narrativity and two dominant story types, that emphasize the utmost urgency of the situation. But deliberative qualities are rather mixed in the general coverage here, and though narrative writing is not worse in terms of deliberative quality, there is no consistent pattern that it would increase the quality either. On the side of story types, one of the two dominant story types, the *Constant Challenge*, is also the one with the

highest deliberative qualities. This story type also emphasizes the urgency but is less pessimistic than the *Futile Struggle* narrative.

Pertaining to a positive contribution of narrativity to the deliberative quality of the coverage, the German case meets the hopes of the supporters of narrative journalism best. These scholars, who emphasize that narrative styles could have positive effects towards reaching deliberative ideals, would see their arguments probably confirmed in this case. Exhibiting inconsistent patterns of narrativity and a general degree of deliberative quality, the increase in deliberative quality of narrative news compared to less narrative news is most salient. Narrative news includes a wider range of actors in general and from the periphery, it presents more idea elements, more different idea elements, and a higher diversity of those. There are more articles in which opposing arguments are contained in articles with higher narrativity than in those with lower. Articles with higher narrativity more often point to insufficient outcomes (e.g. in conference proceedings) in terms of solutions (while overall more solution idea elements are presented), accounting for a higher outcome orientation. One of the dominant story types, the *Futile Struggle*, diverges slightly in its deliberative quality because of its higher inclusiveness of actors and idea elements.

However, what are the specific circumstances that facilitate the positive relation of narrative news writing and deliberative qualities in Germany compared to the US and Brazil? What we have learned from the journalistic role perceptions is that German journalists very strongly support the detached observer role. At the same time, providing interesting information as well as motivating people to participate in civic activity plays a more important role for German journalists compared to their colleagues in Brazil and the US (Hanitzsch et al., 2011). This suggests that watchdog journalism can appear in different forms and that a certain variety can increase diversity. Especially since the inclusion of civil society is less common in Germany due to the political representation of various groups in the multi-party consensus system (Ferree et al., 2002b), narrative writing seems to allow exceptions to the rules in two ways, namely variation in the conventional news form as well as allowing different points of view by explicitly including different speakers, more ideas, and more controversy.

What should not be forgotten, though, is that both German newspapers differ quite remarkably in their overall use of narrativity as well as in their overall inclusion, especially of civil society voices. The conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung has

the lowest degree of narrativity compared to all other newspapers in the sample. It also has the lowest average of civil society actor statements within an article. However, the relationship between a higher degree of narrativity and a higher average of civil society actor statements is found in both newspapers. In the more left liberal Süddeutsche Zeitung, we also detected an even higher degree of narrativity in opinion-based articles. As the separation of fact and opinion is also an important element in the role perception of German journalists, it may be the case that SZ reporters use narrative writing also to distinguish both these types of reporting, and while civil society actors may express their assessments of the situation in strong opinions, they are more likely to find their way into this more narrative opinion-based coverage. As we have learned from the historic contemplations, narrative writing has been an attempt to break with the notion of objectivity, which was already perceived by leftist writers as a bourgeois ideal decades ago. This demarcation effort could resonate into the present by finding an expression in this combination of narrative commentary writing that includes more perspective and more controversy. This is also supported by the higher outcome orientation of articles with a higher degree of narrativity, especially since these articles assess conflicts as not (to be) fixed and therefore seem to take a more critical standpoint towards the events.

A higher degree of narrativity in opinion-based articles is also the case in Brazil and the US. But since the relation of higher inclusiveness of civil society actors and idea elements is not in the same way detectable, the same argument – that narrativity is used to promote opinion-based debate and controversy – cannot be applied for these cases.

The results found for the US seem to be in line with our notion of the US as representative of the liberal media system, as proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004). Lower levels of narrativity and high deliberative quality go along with high professionalism, a strong tradition of detached writing style with the inverted pyramid as the dominant form, and the inclusion of different sides of the story. In this light, the higher levels of narrative personalization and the higher representation of individual actors within stories in the US can also be a sign of increasing commercialization that Hallin and Mancini emphasize for the liberal model:

> Another important manifestation of the new logic of commercial media is the tendency to focus on the experience and perspective of the "common citizen". [...] Many analysts have noted, these changes very likely have contributed to the erosion

of the influence of the traditional mass party and the social organizations connected

to it. (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 278)

Against the normative deliberative background, such a development would have to be viewed critically. It also supports Benson's (2014) concerns, who criticizes that, compared to French media, the US media depict individuals without affiliation to any organization or societal structure, which in consequence contributes to the circumstance that, in his view, narrative journalism can hardly transport abstract political ideas:

[T]here seems to be an underlying rhetorical tension between personalized narrative

and the "deliberative exchange of ideas." In the midst of telling a story, trying to

inject "abstract political ideas" almost inevitably comes across as an inelegant, even

tangential, disruption. (Benson, 2014, p. 77)

Lastly, the results of the Brazilian case confirm some of the previous assumptions that were made about the constitution of Brazilian climate change coverage but certainly still leaves many questions open. From the high levels of narrativity in the Brazilian coverage, one can discern its roots within a French essayistic journalism style. However, Brazilian journalism has been trying to adapt to the American model for some time, creating its own journalistic practices and a mixture of styles and values (Albuquerque, 2005). It may be due to widely differing political and economic contexts within the country, the minor relevance of the press within the wider population, and a perceived distance between society and political institutions(ibid.), that the public discourse is limited to a certain extent and deliberation. A clear connection between narrativity and deliberative quality is nevertheless most difficult to draw for Brazil.

There is one last research question that has to be answered. Research question 4asked for an evaluation of the usefulness of deliberative qualities as a measurement for assessing narrative writing in the newspaper environment. To come to a conclusion on this, one has to start with reflecting on the measurement of narrativity first. Narrativity is a complex concept, which is why investigating it with quantitative measures is an uncommon approach in the first place. The approach suggested in this study covers basic narrative characteristics such as the degree of narrativity that refers to formal narrative features, the story types with which I tried to characterize the content, and three narrative roles to characterize relations of central actors in the text. These narrative elements are not all-embracing and cannot capture every particularity in detail. However, for the purpose of this study, these aspects already enabled us to get a comprehensive idea about the use of narrative elements within the news coverage of

climate change and climate politics – managing to process greater amounts of content analysis data from three countries and four climate change conferences. Nevertheless, several aspects, such as the temporal layers and sequential order (Berning, 2011; Franzosi, 2010; Neiger & Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2016), the point of view from which a story is told and the handling of subjectivity (Harbers & Broersma, 2014), as well as the stylistic ornamentation and its poetic form (Lucaites & Condit, 1985), were not part of this analysis. The latter was originally included in the coding scheme but turned out to be too hard to measure reliably comparative in different linguistic context. The attempt, however, reminded our team of researchers (who had developed the coding scheme quite straightforwardly) that narrativity is a culturally sensitive construct which also finds its expression in the use of language through culturally specific metaphors, comparisons, examples, allusions, and so on. There is certainly a lot of potential for future studies to improve the measurement in these points to characterize narrative forms in the non-fictional environment more comprehensively. In an ideal scenario, future content analysis projects with similar aims should be conducted by teams that include members from all countries investigated to discuss such problems when developing the instrument. The indicators used in this study can nevertheless give insights into narrative structures and reveal several similarities and differences between the countries that make further engagement and enhancement in future studies worthwhile.

One of the research's aims was to characterize narrative elements in the news coverage of the three countries Brazil, Germany, and the US, but the study also attempted to assess the deliberative quality of narrative writing and the different stories that are told to contribute to a scholarly debate on the benefits and harms of narrative news writing. Again, measurements that were chosen for the analysis are quite basic indicators for deliberative qualities. More sophisticated elements such as the true dialogic form, the use of civil language, forms of rebuttal, and different forms of reasoning and justification could not be part of this study. By investigating the inclusiveness of actors and ideas, the presentation of opposing arguments and the outcome orientation, very basic but also necessary deliberative categories were used to get a first idea about the different deliberative constitutions of narratives in the news context. Further investigations can build on the findings as a starting point. In order to truly confirm the hypothesis, for example, that narratives would bring marginalized and alternative ideas into the debate, even more detailed analyses of the roles of different actors and their

respective ideas and arguments would be required. Questions of power and resources of different kinds of actors would also need more attention in that case (keeping in mind also that civil society groups or NGOs can vary vastly according to the financial and personal resources with which they try to get heard in public debates). However, the basic analysis of who is represented and whether actors from the political periphery have more chances to be included in narrative writing could be gauged with the instrument as well as the recording of the diversity of ideas.

The assessment of opposing arguments within one article could also be conducted to a certain extent. A finer measurement for future investigations would try to capture whether an opposing argument was a direct reply to the first idea or whether the presentation of both was rather coincidental (regarding the situations in which they were uttered), and the result of journalistic juxtaposition. A direct reply to an argument of another actor can also entail a new argument without rejecting the first one: If actor 1 proposes solution X and actor 2 directly replies that solution Y would be a better alternative without explicitly rejecting solution X, such a case would not have been captured in this analysis, but it would certainly be an important indicator of deliberative debate. Context knowledge about positions and the actors' respective interest would be needed here to assess whether arguments truly compete. Additional qualitative analysis could help to further investigate the role of such replies for narrative purposes. Narratives evolve around a conflict that triggers the story to be told in the first place. A dialogic form of some competing protagonists could be an important stylistic device.

The measurement of the outcome orientation could probably be improved for deliberative purposes. The distinction between 'no conceivable outcome,' a 'conflict that is displayed but not solved/not about to be solved,' and a 'conflict that is displayed and solved/about to be solved' was useful for characterizing the story types and their outcome orientation (as part of the cluster analysis) but rather difficult to interpret in a general way. Also, the deliberative significance of this outcome orientation remains insufficiently resolved without further qualitative analysis. Results have shown that the Brazilian coverage most often depicts a conflict that has been solved. However, this plain information does not help to understand whether, for example, a political decision is seen as valid and will be translated into political action. If a newspaper article reports, for example, that negotiations have come to an agreement, then a conflict has been solved but the wider consequences remain unclear. If the writer of an article accepts the outcome as a solution to the conflict and expresses his or her approval while the author

of another article refers to the same outcome but does not recognize it as a solution to a conflict at hand (e.g., measurements taken will not solve climate change), then the first would have been classified as "conflict fixed" while the latter would be referred to as "conflict not fixed". And what would that mean for the deliberative debate and its proceeding? By using only these two categories it is not possible to assess the degree of closure of the debate or even recognize a premature ending. Especially when comparing articles with a higher or lower degree of narrativity, it is difficult to evaluate the value of a debate if a conflict is depicted as fixed or not fixed. If articles with higher degrees of narrativity more often tend to depict a conflict as not fixed, they can of course still be a good contribution to the debate which is not yet terminated. But without further investigation, the mere quantitative coding of the three options of an outcome loses a lot of information that would help to assess the overall outcome orientation.

To sum up: It is possible and meaningful to use deliberative measures for evaluating the quality of narrative writing in a non-fictional news environment. Setting deliberative standards as ideals for the evaluation of narrative news helps preventing one-sided conclusions about whether the phenomenon is good or bad and can show under which conditions deliberative ideals are met or not. Especially the country comparison helped to reveal specific constitutions of news narratives in order to gain a better understanding of the relation of deliberative and narrative elements. Measurements can certainly be further improved, but the findings of this study nevertheless shed more light on narrative elements in news writing and conditions in which narrative writing adds to the deliberative quality of a debate. By emphasizing the context dependency of the deliberative performance of narrative news, the approach contributes to a debate on potential chances and harms of narrative writing.

What should be kept in mind is that there are other narrative values that can enhance the deliberative quality that were not a direct part of this analysis but that can be paid attention to in further studies. Scholars have argued, for example, that narratives can help to understand other perspectives and to enable role-taking. It would be the strength of narratives to open up the readers' view to other social realities (Neveu, 2014; Benson, 2014). This goes beyond the mere representation of voices and ideas as they were invetigated. How these realities are described, how authors relate to them and their protagonists would be important aspects to investigate closely in order to confirm or reject the assumption that narrative writing can help to foster understanding for different situations. If, for example, people from civil society groups are represented but their

demands are at the same time repelled as illegitimate or extreme, it could to an exclusion from a societal debate. However, the question of role-taking through narrative writing is of course one that needs to be investigated on the reception side of communication. Under which circumstances would people accept a view and respond with more openness to other people's situations (and arguments)? Oliver et al. (2012) have investigated with an online experiment if narrative news formats can foster empathy and compassion for stigmatized groups and found evidence to support such considerations. A next step for further reflections would be to assess if this has consequences for a deliberative debate and if people would take arguments into account that specifically apply to the situation of people of such groups. This form of recognition would imply an even stronger degree of inclusiveness.

However, inclusiveness is not an end in itself. The deliberative idea of inclusiveness aims at creating the best informational basis for finding a solution to a problem (Gastil, 2008). Different arguments and perspectives must be made transparent to weigh alternatives and let the best argument prevail in the end. In this process, interests need to be laid out and balanced. To ensure this, the particular interests need to be revealed in the first place. Not every perspective can be brought into a debate by direct representatives of an affected group. Small children, very old people, or people who cannot express themselves for whatever reason still need representation by advocates or interest groups that can transport their contribution to a debate. Whatever constitution it is, to really contribute to a debate, a connection must be drawn to the problem at hand. Therefore Benson (2014) urges that narratives can only be useful in an educational way if they connect stories to the systemic context in which they evolve. Stories used in a news context need to make a point and show connections in order to avoid distraction from what is at stake. In how far the narrative news stories in this study fulfill this criterion could not be clarified. This again would certainly leave room for further studies that engage in the role and performance of narrative writing in the news context.

In how far narrative news writing can also be more entertaining, and if this has possible positive effects for deliberation processes when people can more easily engage in an important topic and learn about societal debates, could also not be answered in this study. However, it is plausible to assume such an effect, since climate change and climate politics are both complex and abstract issues which are not easy to fully comprehend. Comprehension is not only dependent on the issue itself but also on how it is presented. The inverted pyramid provides information quickly and efficiently, but it

does not necessarily foster understanding and interest (Bird & Dardenne, 1997). Lowering the threshold to enter a debate by offering a variety of forms for people to choose from, may be one possibility to raise interest in a topic. Some kind of mixture, in which narrative news writing can be one element, would also come closer to what Benson (2010) calls a "debate ensemble." As the results of this study have also shown and as Lück, Wessler, and Wozniak (2016) investigated in more detail by comparing framing and narratives in the news coverage in five countries, narrative elements relate to a countries' wider (political) context, and global media frames are balanced by nationally colored narratives. Qualitative analysis could build on this to investigate how and through which specific devices narratives in the news context can create cultural resonance and relate to audiences' life worlds. Again, this may be worthwhile especially in the context of climate change coverage in order to find out how the issue can be communicated meaningfully to people. Nerlich, Koteyko, and Brown (2010) also emphasize the importance of diverse approaches when it comes to raising awareness for climate change issues:

> What is needed is a mix of measures of which communication is only one, and it will only work when it is embedded in other approaches which are more directly linked to practical behavior in social life. Communication also has to use a mixture of modes and strategies, from verbal to visual, from the spoken word to the digital message. Communicators can only be sure that their messages will be understood if they understand their audiences, their values, fears, hopes, and the situation of communication. (Nerlich, Koteyko, & Brown, 2010, p. 101)

This dissertation started off with thoughts on the crisis of the press, which is also often connected to a crisis of (traditional) journalism in times of information availability through a variety of channels that are out of editorial control, e.g. because of direct reports from people eye witnessing or commenting on events and communicating their impressions through social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, and the like. Traditional newspapers adapt to this development and increase their online representation. The barriers between offline and online staff and editorial offices vanish.[30] And while time pressure is nothing new for the media, these developments further increase competition and economic pressure. Breaking news that is reported instantly may have been an invention of television, but online news reaches people via mobile devices virtually everywhere, and classical media outlets have to keep up with

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[30] As, for example, in the case of the Süddeutsche Zeitung, see: http://reportagen.sueddeutsche.de/20-jahre-sz-im-netz(Retrieved May 16, 2016)

this. News that is consumed through these devices receives less attention and is perceived more superficially. Concerns about the decline of news quality accompany this development when newsmakers react by increasing audience or service orientation, replacing so-called hard news by soft news, or introducing more entertaining elements that catch more attention and are more easily consumable. The question remains: What will this mean for newspapers and traditional journalism in the near future? From a normative democratic and deliberative perspective, the function of traditional news media and journalism of facilitating public debate and contributing to opinion formation is still needed. This is true for established democracies like the US and Germany but also for emerging countries with a more unstable democracy like Brazil, in which the printed press is weaker. But also in Germany and the US an open public debate is needed in times when political alienation and radical right-wing populism rapidly enter public debates. If newspapers provided these debates by offering well-investigated background information, commentary, and assessment (offline as well as online), they could still play an important part in society in the future ahead. A certain stylistic creativity can contribute to diversion, which may help classical journalism to compete with the variety of alternatives that aim at entertaining and providing easily consumable products.

However, especially since there is such a wide variety of alternatives today, investigating nationwide quality newspapers as done in this study can only provide limited conclusions on the state of journalism or the media as a whole, since only a very small part of the media landscape of the three countries was actually researched. This study also provided a first glimpse into the public debates on the issue. Which role narrative forms of journalism play in different kinds of media, which quality they have, and what they contribute to a general discourse, are certainly questions for a further engagement that aims at tracking down developments in journalism and the constitution of the public sphere.

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10 Appendix

10.1 Intercoder Reliability

Table 20 Intercoder reliability overall and across countries[31]

Variables	Overall				Germany				United States			
	N	PA	κ_n	α	N	PA	κ_n	α	N	PA	κ_n	α
Actor-statements												
Type of actor		95.4	.93	.86		99.0	.99	.91		95.3	.93	.85
Occupation/office of actor		82.3	.82	.80		89.4	.89	.84		89.0	.89	.75
Origin of actor		85.3	.85	.82		93.2	.93	.91		81.5	.82	.66
Type of quotation		93.9	.91	.91		94.4	.91	.91		93.0	.90	.89
Length of statement	205	75.9	.70	.83	55	76.3	.70	.86	78	73.5	.68	.84
Type of 'We' reference		88.6	.85	.62		97.7	.98	.73		86.5	.85	.54
Denial of reality of climate change		97.1	.96	.04		98.9	.99	-.01		97.1	.96	.09
Denial of problematic character		95.9	.95	.11		98.9	.99	-.01		95.1	.93	.08
Problem definition												
Consequences of climate change[32]	1,230	87.5	.86	.60	330	90.0	.88	.73	468	81.9	.79	.51

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[31] For computing and reporting the agreement coefficients for the consequence, cause, and remedy variables as well as for objects and persons depicted in photos, the variables were re-coded into their respective categorical variables, e.g., the five binary cause variables were re-coded as five parameter values of one categorical variable "cause of climate change." The number of coding decisions that feed into the reliability scores for such composite categorical variables increases accordingly (in this case 5 x 205 = 1,025 coding decisions).

Causal interpretation												
Causes of climate change[33]	1,025	95.3	.94	.56	275	94.2	.93	.62	390	96.7	.96	.48
Countries responsible for climate change because of greenhouse gas emissions	205	98.2	.98	.69	55	98.3	.98	.78	78	99.2	.99	.66
Moral evaluation												
Countries responsible for solving the problem by reducing their greenhouse gas emissions	205	97.7	.98	.43	55	96.4	.96	-.01	78	98.9	.99	.40
Treatment recommendation												
Remedies for climate change[34]	1,435	93.1	.92	.56	385	94.4	.93	.67	546	94.6	.94	.56
Narration												
Narrativity												
Dramatization*	76	80.5	.62	.60	18	91.7	.84	.80	20	80.0	.60	.60
Emotion*		81.1	.62	.55		89.8	.80	.78		71.0	.42	.37

32 The following variables could be coded (0 = not mentioned, 1 = mentioned): Extreme weather events, melting ice/glaciers or rising sea levels, economic opportunities, economic difficulties and hardships, societal consequences.

33 The following variables could be coded (0 = not present, 1 = present): Natural causes, burning of fossil fuels/greenhouse gas emissions, deforestation, colliding national interests, other causes.

34 The following variables could be coded (0 = not present, 1 = present/endorsed, 2 = present/rejected): No action, clean energy, reforestation and avoided deforestation, adaptation in agriculture, adoption of legally binding, all-inclusive emissions treaty, more focus on ground level/'grassroots' efforts, financial assistance to disadvantaged countries.

	N	PA	κ_n	α	N	PA	κ_n	α	N	PA	κ_n	α
Narrative personalization*		82.5	.66	.64		84.3	.68	.70		88.0	.76	.71
Fictionalization*		81.7	.64	.57		75.9	.52	.45		70.0	.40	.38

Narrative genre

	N	PA	κ_n	α	N	PA	κ_n	α	N	PA	κ_n	α
Theme		63.4	.56	.56		66.7	.60	.60		61.5	.55	.50
Tone	76	66.6	.60	.57	18	75.0	.70	.65	20	59.5	.52	.46
Outcome		71.5	.63	.56		72.2	.63	.55		69.5	.60	.52

Narrative characters

	N	PA	κ_n	α	N	PA	κ_n	α	N	PA	κ_n	α
Victim present*		79.1	.58	.57		87.0	.74	.63		81.0	.62	.54
Victim – type of actor	76	78.1	.67	.54	18	87.9	.82	.64	20	74.5	.61	.43
Victim – name		81.8	.81	.65		87.0	.86	.66		82.0	.81	.61
Victim – action taken		74.3	.71	.47		85.2	.83	.6		73.0	.70	.43
Villain present*		78.8	.58	.60		88.9	.78	.73		77.0	.54	.46
Villain – type of actor	76	71.3	.57	.59	18	81.5	.73	.72	20	71.5	.58	.40
Villain – name		77.5	.77	.73		88.9	.88	.86		81.0	.80	.63
Villain – action taken		62.7	.58	.49		77.8	.75	.69		67.5	.64	.38
Hero present*		81.6	.64	.56		92.6	.86	.81		80.0	.60	.46
Hero – type of actor	76	78.0	.67	.53	18	89.8	.85	.78	20	75.0	.63	.38
Hero – name		80.8	.80	.58		89.8	.90	.79		79.5	.79	.49
Hero – action taken		80.8	.79	.57		92.6	.92	.81		79.0	.76	.49

Note: Cell entries are average percent agreement (PA), Brennan and Prediger's kappa (κ_n), and Krippendorff's alpha (α) values indicating agreement between coders. N is the number of coding decisions in the pretest on which the calculations are based.
*denotes binary variable (0 = not present, 1 = present)

10.2 Examples for Articles with Low and High Degree of Narrativity

Süddeutsche Zeitung
MÜNCHNER NEUESTE NACHRICHTEN AUS POLITIK, KULTUR, WIRTSCHAFT UND SPORT

November 29, 2012

Der sichtbare Wandel

2012 geht als Jahr der Wetterextreme in die Statistik ein

Die ersten zehn Monate des Jahres 2012 waren geprägt von Wetterextremen, stellt die Meteorologische Weltorganisation (WMO) fest. Fast alle Weltregionen haben Hitzewellen, Dürren, schwere Regenfälle, Überflutungen oder extreme Kälte erlebt, manche Länder sogar mehrere davon, teilweise unmittelbar nacheinander. In Europa zum Beispiel folgte der extremen Kälte im Januar und Februar von Ende März an eine Hitzewelle. China erlebte Dürre wie Fluten.

  Die WMO hat ihre vorläufige Bilanz an ihrem Sitz in Genf und in Doha am Rande des Klimagipfels vorgelegt. Sie erwartet, dass 2012 zu den zehn wärmsten Jahren der Klimastatistik gehören wird. In den Monaten Januar bis Oktober habe die globale Durchschnittstemperatur 0,45 Grad Celsius über dem langjährigen Mittel gelegen. Das entspricht Platz neun, obwohl das Jahr mit einer La-Niña-Phase begonnen hat. Diese Verschiebung der Wetterverhältnisse im Pazifik bewirkt eine leichte globale Abkühlung. Das halbe Jahr nach dem Abklingen von La Niña, Mai bis Oktober, war dann die viertwärmste solche Periode.

  Natürliche Klimavariabilität „ändert nichts am langfristigen Trend der steigenden Temperaturen", sagte WMO-Generalsekretär Michel Jarraud. „Der Klimawandel passiert vor unseren Augen und wird wegen steigender Spiegel der Treibhausgase in der Atmosphäre weitergehen."

  Viele Schwergewichte bei den Verhandlungen in Doha waren von den Extremen betroffen. Die USA haben bisher das wärmste Jahr in den Aufzeichnungen und außergewöhnliche Dürre in vielen Bundesstaaten erlebt. Kanada hatte den wärmsten Sommer der Statistik, Russland den zweitwärmsten seiner Geschichte, übertroffen nur vom Jahr der Waldbrände 2010. Brasiliens Norden verzeichnete die schwerste Dürre seit 50 Jahren, so die WMO, in China traf es den Süden heftig.
Neue Temperaturrekorde meldeten Ende Mai Grönland mit 24,8 und Norwegen mit 31,1 Grad. In Australien erreichte das Thermometer im Frühling früher die 40-Grad-Marke als je zuvor, am 20. September. Rekorde meldete auch Frankreich, wo es heißer war als während der Hitzewelle von 2003. Großbritannien hingegen hatte den nassesten Sommer seit 1912.

Bei keinem dieser Ereignisse ist mit Sicherheit nachzuweisen, dass sie durch den Klimawandel ausgelöst wurden. Aber viele Forscher sind inzwischen bereit zu sagen, dass die globale Erwärmung Wetterexterme deutlich wahrscheinlicher mache. In den USA kursierte im Sommer die Formulierung: „So also fühlt sich der Klimawandel an."

Christopher Schrader

December 13, 2010

Allein gegen den Rest der Welt

Bolivien akzeptiert Ergebnis nicht

Allmählich kommt den Teilnehmern des Klimagipfels die Kritik von Pablo Solón bekannt vor. Schon im Laufe der Verhandlungen hatte sich der bolivianische UN-Botschafter immer wieder gegen ihre Entwürfe gestellt; zwischenzeitlich hatte Solón auch einmal die Konferenz verlassen, weil er die Position seines Landes zu wenig repräsentiert fand. Erst unterstützten befreundete südamerikanische Staaten den Bolivianer noch, doch am Schluss ficht Solón einen Kampf alleine gegen den Rest der Welt.

In den letzten Stunden der Konferenz liefert er sich mit der Gipfel-Präsidentin Patricia Espinosa ein Rededuell. Erst beklagt er sich, dass er vom Sicherheitspersonal nicht in den Verhandlungssaal gelassen worden sei, dann meldet er sich im Plenum nach der langen Verhandlungsnacht unermüdlich zu Wort, um aufs Neue seine Bedenken gegen die angestrebten Beschlüsse der Konferenz auszudrücken. Solón schaltet auf stur: Die Vorschläge gingen nicht weit genug; sein Land werde keinem Abkommen zustimmen, das einen Anstieg der Temperaturen mit sich bringe, sagt er. Unnachgiebig fordert er, dass die reichen Länder ihre Treibhausgas-Emissionen bis 2017 im Vergleich zu 1990 halbieren sollen. Er fühlt sich im Recht, auf der Seite der Wissenschaft: Das Abkommen führe dazu, dass sich die Erde nicht um zwei, sondern um vier Grad erhitze, sagt Solón – das sei „Völkermord", ein sogenannter Ökozid; ein Wort, das Boliviens Präsident Evo Morales geprägt hatte. Mit einer Entourage aus 15 farbenfroh gekleideten Ureinwohnern und Maya-Priestern war er der wohl markanteste Politiker in Cancún. „Bolivien ist nicht bereit, ein Dokument zu unterzeichnen, das noch mehr Menschen sterben lässt, als ohnehin schon durch den Klimawandel umkommen", sagt sein Botschafter Solón vor den Delegierten.

Doch in der entscheidenden Stunde ist Bolivien isoliert. Befreundete Staaten plädieren bloß dafür, die Kritik von Solón im Plenum zu hören – sie unterstützen ihn dabei aber nicht. Dann nimmt Patricia Espinosa ihr Hämmerchen in die Hand. Als die Gipfel-Präsidentin damit auf ihren Tisch schlägt, hat Pablo Solón verloren. Seinen Widerstand will Bolivien trotzdem nicht aufgeben. „Wir werden weiterhin alleine in den Kampf ziehen", kündigte Präsident Evo Morales bereits an.

Martin Kotynek

Chinese set terms for climate deal by 2020

By Juliet Eilperin

Chinese negotiators raised the prospect of negotiating a legally binding climate pact at U.N. talks over the weekend in South Africa, but they laid out stringent requirements.

In separate remarks to reporters and nongovernmental groups, two of China's top climate officials suggested they might participate in talks aimed at forging a new, enforceable agreement on global warming by 2020. That issue, along with the question of whether industrialized countries will agree to a new set of emissions reductions under the 1997 climate treaty, are key stumbling blocks in the ongoing talks in the coastal city of Durban.

But it remains unclear how much China - which ranks as the world's biggest emitter of greenhouse gases linked to climate change - would commit to as part of a future international treaty.

"We do not rule out the possibility of [a] legally binding" agreement, China's lead climate negotiator, Su Wei, said in a news conference Saturday. "It is possible for us, but it depends on the negotiations."

In a subsequent meeting with environmental groups on Sunday, Xie Zhenhua, vice chairman of China's National Development and Reform Commission, elaborated on what his country needs before it would negotiate a binding treaty. According to several meeting participants, he laid out demands that have bedeviled negotiators for the past few years.

The list included ensuring a second commitment period of emissions targets under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol; delivery of $30 billion in climate aid to poor countries by the end of 2012 and a process for raising $100 billion annually in climate aid by 2020; the fulfillment of several programs aimed at helping developing nations cope with climate change and cut their emissions; an international framework for reporting on greenhouse-gas emissions; a scientific review to determine by 2015 whether deeper emissions cuts are needed; and a pact that recognized nations have "common but differentiated responsibilities" under any global agreement.

"China is signaling that they are trying to be flexible and constructively negotiate over the next week," Alden Meyer, who directs strategy and policy for the advocacy group Union of Concerned Scientists and attended Sunday's meeting with Xie, wrote in an e-mail.

Negotiators from several nations, however, were more skeptical about the possibility of reaching a broad compromise with China, which has taken action to slow the growth of

its carbon output but has resisted the idea of enshrining these commitments as part of an international pact.

"Minister Xie spoke warmly about the need for a legally binding deal," E.U. Commisioner for Climate Action Connie Hedegaard tweeted. "Does that then mean that China will also be legally bound?"

Europeans have called upon the nearly 200 countries that participate in U.N. climate talks to finalize a new treaty by 2015, which could take effect five years later.

"What is their commitment to an international legally binding agreement for all?" the official asked.

Chinese government officials could not be reached for comment Sunday. State Department officials declined to comment because negotiations are underway.

Jake Schmidt, international climate policy director for the advocacy group Natural Resources Defense Council, said that if Chinese officials agree to negotiate a binding treaty, it will put pressure on the Obama administration, which has argued that the details of such a pact still need to be fleshed out.

"We'll have to see if they take the next step of committing in Durban to a mandate to negotiate a new treaty by 2015," Schmidt, who also attended the session with Xie, wrote in an e-mail. "If they do, it sure makes it hard for the U.S. to block [the] agreement [just] because every single aspect of their conditions weren't met."

Following in the carbon footprint of Thanksgiving's first diners

by Brian Palmer

It's easy to romanticize the 1621 coming-together of the Wampanoag tribe with the struggling European settlers, which many people now view as the original Thanksgiving.

From an environmental perspective, the nostalgic urge is stronger still. The carbon footprint of the first Thanksgiving meal was approximately zero. Seventeenth-century farmers grew food, ate food and used those calories to grow more food. The energy loop was closed, and the climate was unaffected.

Fossil fuels changed that equation. The modern idea of "food miles," or the distance your food travels from farm to table, would have left the Wampanoag bemused. When they needed corn, they walked from their wetu - communal huts made of saplings and cattail mats - to their assigned cornfields. They hunted for meat on communal lands adjacent to their villages.

By contrast, despite some local corn production in the summer and early fall, much of the corn coming to the Washington area now originates in states as far away as Illinois and Iowa. Most of the turkeys sold in the region come from North Carolina, Arkansas and Minnesota.

As you prepare to gather your family together for Thanksgiving, it's worth taking a moment to consider the impact your meal will have on the Earth and the climate. Using data compiled by the Environmental Working Group, it's possible to estimate the carbon footprint of each element of your meal. It takes fossil fuels to plant, fertilize and transport the food, but not everything on the menu contributes equally. (All of these numbers are national averages.)

Let's start with the turkey. Compared with other meats, turkey is fairly easy on the planet. Overall, producing and delivering a pound of beef to your home emits 21 / 2 times as much greenhouse gas as bringing a turkey to the table. Poultry, in general, requires far less feed per pound of meat produced than beef does. Also, a bird emits a significantly smaller amount of the greenhouse gas nitrous oxide in its waste than a cow or a sheep does. (Chicken, on the other hand, produces 63 percent as much greenhouse gas as turkey; this is probably because chickens have been bred to grow really fast on very little food.)

In total, a 31 / 2-ounce serving of turkey is responsible for approximately 2.4 pounds of carbon dioxide equivalents, which is about the same as you produce by driving a car three miles. Of course, you're not really going to limit yourself to one serving of turkey,

so the actual footprint is likely to be larger. I'll put you down for two servings, or the equivalent of six miles of driving.

Look down the table at those mashed potatoes. Plant-based foods are generally better for the environment than meats. Potatoes, however, are among the more carbon-intensive plant foods on a pound-for-pound basis. Although it takes very little energy to grow tubers, transporting and cooking them emits large amounts of carbon. One cup of mashed potatoes will release approximately 1.5 pounds of carbon dioxide equivalents. (Mashed potatoes typically include some milk and butter, which are responsible for slightly less greenhouse gas than potatoes per pound, but they constitute such a small proportion of the dish that we can ignore them.) Again assuming that you go for seconds, that means the equivalent of driving 3.7 miles.

What about your vegetables? Whether it's green beans, broccoli or something more exotic, the green veggies are likely to be the most Earth-friendly part of your Thanksgiving meal. A one-cup serving of broccoli is responsible for only 0.4 pounds of carbon dioxide equivalents. Even if you go for seconds of your green vegetables, you'd be on the hook for only about one mile of driving.

If you have a taste for wine - or a particularly difficult family - alcohol may be another significant contributor to the carbon footprint of your Thanksgiving meal. According to numbers generated by the beverage industry, drinking half a bottle of North American wine accounts for nearly two pounds of carbon dioxide equivalents, which is equal to 2.4 miles of driving. (This is for illustrative purposes only. I do not condone drinking and driving.)

When you add up the turkey, potatoes, vegetables and wine, your Thanksgiving meal might be responsible for emitting more than 10 pounds of greenhouse gas into the atmosphere. If you're traveling fewer than 10 miles, there's a good chance you'll emit more carbon dioxide eating than driving to and from your meal.

I'm not one to idealize the past. Our exploitation of fossil fuels has brought us the joys of the Internet and global travel, among many other things, and it has played a part in the spectacular lengthening of the human life span. Especially at this time of year, we ought to be thankful for those things. I have no desire to turn back the clock to 17th-century life, which strikes me as having been cold, boring and rather sickly. But we also ought to give thanks for the resources that remain available to us, and that means using them thoughtfully, both in our cars and in our kitchens.

10.3 Lists of Articles with High Degree of Narrativity

Brazil

Title	English translation	COP	Date	Medium
A tormenta de Durban	The Durban Storm	COP17 Durban	11.12.2011	O Globo
Bolivia vai contestar acordo do clima	Bolivia to contest climate deal	COP16 Cancún	13.12.2010	Folha de Sao Paulo
Canadá é favorito ao Fóssil do ano	Canada is the favorite Fossil of the Year	COP17 Durban	02.12.2011	O Globo
Choro de diplomata cala cúpula do clima	Diplomat's cry makes climate summit silent	COP18 Doha	07.12.2012	Folha de Sao Paulo
Clima do clima	The state of the climate	COP17 Durban	13.12.2011	O Globo
Conferência do clima quer manter a bola rolando	Climate conference wants to keep the ball rolling	COP16 Cancún	29.11.2010	Folha de Sao Paulo
De resíduo industrial à matéria-prima	From industrial waste to the raw material	COP18 Doha	04.12.2012	O Globo
EUA não acreditam em acordo definitivo	US does not believe in definitive agreement	COP16 Cancún	29.11.2010	Folha de Sao Paulo
Falta coragem em Cancún, diz diplomata	"There's a lack of courage in Cancún", a diplomat says	COP16 Cancún	09.12.2010	Folha de Sao Paulo
Falta de consenso pode suspender COP-17	Lack of consensus may suspend COP-17	COP17 Durban	11.12.2011	Folha de Sao Paulo
Ilhas propoem novo protocolo na COP 16	Islands propose new protocol at COP 16	COP16 Cancún	02.12.2010	Folha de Sao Paulo
Lula "cacarejou" sobre clima, dizem EUA	Lula "cackled" about climate, says US	COP16 Cancún	09.12.2010	Folha de Sao Paulo
Metas de reducao de emissoes sao trunfo do Brasil	Emission reductions targets are Brazil's trump card	COP16 Cancún	23.11.2010	O Globo
Obama e o medo de uma China verde	Obama and the fear of a green China	COP16 Cancún	13.12.2010	O Globo
País de Gales, um exemplo internacional	Wales, an international example	COP18 Doha		O Globo
Para vice boliviano, país nao se isolou na cúpula do clima	For Bolivian vice, country has not isolated itself at the climate summit	COP16 Cancún		Folha de Sao Paulo
Polônia se aferra ao uso do carvão	Poland clings to coal use	COP19 Warsaw		Folha de Sao Paulo

Germany

Title	English translation	COP	Date	Medium
Allein gegen den Rest der Welt	Alone against the rest of the world	COP16 Cancún	13.12.2010	Süddeutsche Zeitung
Bis einer umfällt	Until one falls over	COP17 Durban	08.12.2011	Frankfurter Allgemeine
Die neue Generation: Im Gespräch mit Ricarda Winkelmann	The new generation: Talking to Ricarda Winkelmann	COP17 Durban	07.12.2011	Frankfurter Allgemeine
Gelübde auf Eis	Vow on ice	COP16 Cancún	30.11.2010	Süddeutsche Zeitung
Im Namen der Kohle	In the name of coal	COP19 Warsaw	20.11.2013	Frankfurter Allgemeine
Kolonien in der Atmosphäre	Colonies in the atmosphere	COP16 Cancún	06.12.2010	Süddeutsche Zeitung
Labor Deutschland	Laboratory Germany	COP17 Durban	10.12.2011	Süddeutsche Zeitung
Mutiger Rückblick eines Klimawissenschaftlers	Brave review of a climate scientist	COP17 Durban	07.12.2011	Frankfurter Allgemeine
Südafrikas schwarzes Gold gerät ins Zwielicht	(literally)South Africa's black gold gets into twilight	COP17 Durban	29.11.2011	Frankfurter Allgemeine
Superminister gesucht	Wanted: Super minister	COP18 Doha	11.12.2012	Süddeutsche Zeitung
Tore gegen den Untergang	Gate against sinking	COP18 Doha	27.11.2012	Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zwei Wochen, eine Chance	Two weeks, one chance	COP17 Durban	28.11.2011	Süddeutsche Zeitung

USA

Title	COP	Date	Medium
Bloomberg and climate	COP18 Doha	20.11.2012	The New York Times
Following in the carbon footprint of Thanksgiving's first diners	COP19 Warsaw	12.11.2013	The Washington Post
For first time, E.P.A. proposes reducing ethanol requirement for gas mix	COP19 Warsaw	16.11.2013	The New York Times
In lab lit, fiction meets science of the real world	COP18 Doha	04.12.2012	The New York Times
rising temperatures threaten fundamental change for ski slopes	COP18 Doha	13.12.2012	The New York Times

11 Ehrenwörtliche Erklärung

Ich erkläre hiermit, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit ohne unzulässige Hilfe Dritter und ohne Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Hilfsmittel angefertigt habe. Die aus anderen Quellen direkt oder indirekt übernommenen Daten und Konzepte sind unter Angabe der Quelle gekennzeichnet. Insbesondere habe ich nicht die entgeltliche Hilfe von Vermittlungs- bzw. Beratungsdiensten in Anspruch genommen.

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