Between Secularization and Migration: Religiosity of Minority Youth in Western Europe

Inaugural dissertation

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Chapter 1:
Introduction

1 Migration and Secularization

Alongside growing ethnic diversity in North-Western European countries during the last decades (Koopmans et al. 2015, Schaeffer 2014), the religious landscape in many immigration societies underwent a multitude of changes, too (Phalet et al. 2018). Since World War II, North-Western Europe experienced extended immigration waves from various parts of the world. Guest workers from less developed countries in the European periphery, colonial migrants to former colonial powers, families reuniting with their previously migrated relatives and immigrants from Eastern Europe, resulting from the breakdown of the Soviet Union, contributed to the modification and diversification of Western European populations (Castles et al. 2014). With recent refugee immigration from crisis areas in the Middle East and Africa, these processes continue in contemporary times (Brücker et al. 2016). As a result of diverse ethnic and cultural compositions of these heterogeneous immigration waves, the traditionally Christian societies in North-Western Europe came into contact with new manifestations to live and practice religion, among them most prominently Islam (Buijs & Rath 2006, Foner & Alba 2008, Voas & Fleischmann 2012). In 2016, more than 25 million Muslims reside in Europe, making up almost 5 percent of Europe's total population, with higher shares in popular North and Western European immigration countries such as Germany (6.1 percent), the Netherlands (7.1 percent), Sweden (8.1 percent) and the United Kingdom (6.3 percent) (Pew Research Center 2017).

These immigration processes coincide with secularization tendencies in Western Europe. Empirical evidence indicates that religious institutions lost their social functions and authority (Gorski & Altınordu 2008). According to well-known secularization theory, modernization is incompatible with religion for several reasons (Ruiter & van Tubergen 2009). One line of argumentation of secularization theory assigns superior importance to the growing role of rationalization in modern societies ('rational worldview perspective'). When objectified procedures, techniques and criteria (mainly: science) develop, they replace religious authority and truth as the organizing and justifying principle in social order. Religious explanations become increasingly implausible contrasted with scientific explanations in order to understand the world. Therefore, the former is not any longer the only and even not the most important source of knowledge in modern times. Other scholars argue that functional differentiation is the key mechanism for secularization in modern societies. More precisely, religion differentiates itself from other societal systems and starts to constitute an autonomous institution within social structure (for instance, separation of church and state). Thus, social control and guidance of

religion with regard to other institutions in modern societies diminishes, institutions and actors therein are able to choose and think both freely and autonomously and finally become more and more independent from the religious sphere (Tschannen 1991). In fact, societal cohesion and solidarity, which in pre-modern times was guaranteed mainly by religion, is nowadays achieved by other means. A third argument can be derived from cultural pluralism – alternative sources of knowledge replace theological doctrines by offering alternative explanations and values (Smits & Ultee 2013). A further reason for secularization is seen in increasing welfare paired with diminishing insecurity of life. When individuals are feeling insecure, for instance in economic or existential terms (i.e. survival is not taken for granted), they seek for predictable rules and trust in a supernatural (religious) force that is capable to improve their life situation (Immerzeel & van Tubergen 2013).

As a consequence, personal religious beliefs and practices in daily life are on a lower level than they used to be in traditional societies in the past, such that North-Western European immigration societies can be considered highly secularized (Burkimsher 2014, Franck & Iannaccone 2014, Gorski & Altınordu 2008, Halman & Draulans 2006, Norris & Inglehart 2011, Phalet et al. 2008, Pickel 2010). To illustrate this with a concrete numerical example, the proportion of people who attend religious services every week has dropped considerably by about or even more than half between 1970 and 1998 (e.g. Belgium from 52 to 10 percent, Germany from 29 to 15 percent, the Netherlands from 41 to 14 percent) (Eurobarometer surveys, Norris & Inglehart 2011: 71ff.).

How do these parallel societal processes interact with each other and what are the consequences? In this dissertation, I explore one direction of these influences: How do secularized societies in North-Western Europe influence immigrants and their descendants who are residing in these countries?[1] Immigrants, which stem from rather religious world regions such as Northern Africa, Middle East, Eastern and Western Asia and Eastern Europe (Phalet et al. 2018) are confronted with highly secular societies after migration; and the question is how they react to these trends that basically contradict their families' experiences which is characterized by

[1] Throughout my dissertation, I use the terms 'immigrants', 'immigrant children', 'minorities' or 'persons with migration background' – if not otherwise specified – interchangeably for individuals who either were born outside the country they are living in, thus experienced migration themselves (first generation), or who are having parents (second generation) or at least two grandparents (third generation) who migrated to their current country of residence (Dollmann et al. 2014).

comparatively higher levels of religious involvement (e.g. Garcia-Munoz & Neuman 2013, Güveli 2015, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011). What can be expected? Drawing on theories and approaches from the sociology of migration, three possible scenarios can be identified:

According to assimilation theory, immigrants tend to become similar to members of the host societies with respect to diverse aspects of behavior and attitudes (Alba & Nee 1997, Gordon 1964, Park 1950). "In the most general terms, assimilation can be defined as the decline, and at its endpoint the disappearance, of an ethnic/racial distinction and the cultural and social differences that express it." (Alba & Nee 1997: 863). Thus, with mere exposure to the host society and increasing contact to members of the native population over time and especially over generations, immigrants lose their ethnic peculiarities, adapt their customs and identities and melt with the culture of the country they are living in. With respect to religion, this implies an adaptation to the above described secularization trends in North-Western European societies when immigrants are exposed to alternative and non-religious values and worldviews (Diehl & Koenig 2009, Güngör et al. 2011, van Tubergen 2007). A decrease in religiosity would therefore be likely, the more immigrants are integrated in structural or social terms (Maliepaard et al. 2010).

However, newer theoretical insights and empirical evidences contradict the expectation that assimilation ultimately takes place (Bankston & Zhou 1995, Kalter 2008, Portes & Rumbaut 2001, Portes & Zhou 1993, Zhou 1997b).[2] The theory of segmented assimilation posits that there is another – for some ethnic groups and under certain societal circumstances even dominant – path of assimilation: Immigrants might integrate very well into other domains of life, such as the educational system or the labor market, while not assimilating culturally but instead maintaining their cultural heritage and contacts to members of their country of origin. Which path is most likely to occur depends on several factors, among them resources that immigrants bring with them, characteristics of the receiving society – for instance, governmental policies towards minorities, characteristics of the labor market and the general population's acceptance of immigrants ("modes of incorporation", Portes & Rumbaut 2001: 46ff.), and the neighborhood in which immigrant families are living in. Accordingly, instead of religious decline as it

[2] More precisely, classical assimilation theory does not reflect empirical reality. Additionally, segmented assimilation theory objects that assimilation is an inevitable, irreversible and instable process. Finally, ethnic characteristics are not per se inferior in comparison with those of the host society.

is proposed by assimilation theory, stable religious attachments among immigrants is also possible.

An even stronger expectation has been formulated: a religious revival. In migration research, reactive ethnicity is assumed to occur when immigrants feel less welcome in host societies; experiencing discrimination and social exclusion. Extending this idea to the area of religion, this would imply immigrants strengthen their religious identities as a means to compensate for lacking upward-mobility and discrimination (Connor 2010, Diehl & Schnell 2006, Fleischmann & Phalet 2012, Lewis & Kashyap 2013a, Portes & Rumbaut 2001). Consequently, one would expect an increase in religiosity, especially for immigrant groups who are affected by prejudice and social exclusion.

To sum up, major theories in the sociology of migration suggest three possible ways in which immigrants and their descendants might react to secularized societies in North-Western Europe: Decrease, stability or increase in religious involvement. Likewise, they specify several factors that are supposed to be related to immigrants' religiosity, for instance, the degree of structural and social inclusion into the host societies or discrimination experiences. In the next section of this chapter, I will address the appertained current state of research about religiosity of immigrants.

2 State of Research

After a strong focus on structural integration such as the incorporation into the labor market and the educational system (Heath & Brinbaum 2007, Heath & Cheung 2007) – which is not surprising given that for a long time scholars have regarded them as preconditions for social, cultural and emotional integration (Esser 1980, Gordon 1964, Kalter 2008) – migration research has gradually expanded its scope to the study of other aspects of integration, including religion (Buijs & Rath 2006, Foner & Alba 2008, Voas & Fleischmann 2012).

The reasons for this interest are explained straightforwardly: Anti-Muslim sentiments and Islamophobia have grown during the last 15 to 20 years, especially as a reaction to terror attacks and other negative events disseminated by the media (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart 2009, Schlueter et al. 2019, Strabac & Listhaug 2008, Zolberg & Woon 1999). This is also evident

considering protests against Muslim practices such as wearing headscarves, building mosques and teaching Islam curriculums in schools (Voas & Fleischmann 2012). Additionally, Islam is oftentimes regarded as a problem in and of itself since its values contradict prevalent liberal and modern values and ideologies of European societies. As a consequence, Islam has been conceptualized as a "bright boundary" (Alba 2005), and Muslim immigrants are the least accepted minority group in many European countries (Spruyt & Elchardus 2012). As this is a challenge for societal cohesion and interethnic contact, a major part of this research field concentrates on Muslim religious identities. Furthermore, strong religious identities are seen as a hindrance to integration in other dimensions. For instance, strong religious identities are regarded as a reason for failure in the educational system and the labor market, as impediment to interethnic social contacts as well as cultural inclusion (Bisin et al. 2008, Carol & Schulz 2018, Connor & Koenig 2013, Damstra & Tillie 2016, Diehl et al. 2009, Foner & Alba 2008). These possible consequences of religiosity can be attributed to incentives of immigrants for (non-) integration or discrimination by the majority population (Soehl 2017). Thus, it is necessary to take a step backwards and understand the determinants for religious integration or the resistance to it.

Briefly worded, previous research on the religiosity of immigrants concentrates on descriptive and exploratory questions: How religious are immigrants in Western Europe and how does the migratory event shape religious attachments in the short and in the long run? And which explanatory factors derived from theoretical assumptions have an effect on religious beliefs and behavior?[3]

With respect to first-mentioned kind of studies, it is widely acknowledged that immigrants in North-Western Europe are more religious than natives in terms of affiliation, beliefs and practices alike (e.g. Garcia-Munoz & Neuman 2013, Güveli 2015, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011), and that Muslim immigrants stand out as ranking exceptionally high by all accounts (e.g. Güngör et al. 2012, Lewis & Kashyap 2013a, 2013b, Scourfield et al. 2012, van Tubergen 2007), although sometimes differences within the group of Muslim immigrants are observable (e.g. Brünig & Fleischmann 2015, Güveli & Platt 2011, Smits & Ultee 2013).

[3] See Table 1.A1 in the appendix for details. This overview is not exhaustive; instead, it is intended to give a rough impression about the variety of studies conducted in different countries, investigating different ethnic and religious groups, applying different methods, and yielding different results.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Studies which are interested in how religiosity develops after migration apply various methodological approaches: some compare religious attachments between synthetic generations (usually first vs. second generation immigrants) (e.g. Diehl & Koenig 2009, Güveli 2015, Maliepaard et al. 2010, McAndrews & Voas 2014), others investigate whether length of stay in the receiving society is related to changes in religiosity (e.g. Diehl & Koenig 2013, Garcia-Munoz & Neuman 2013, van Tubergen 2013), or they analyze series of repeated cross-sectional data sets in order to detect trends over time (Maliepaard et al. 2012, Phalet et al. 2008, Smits & Ultee 2013). In doing so, they seek to find evidence in favor of or against central arguments of assimilation theory: if empirical evidence confirms that immigrants and their descendants become less religious over time or over successive immigrant generations, this would point towards assimilation into the host societies, given that they are rather secularized (Diehl & Koenig 2009, Maliepaard et al. 2010, Soehl 2017). Results are inconclusive, however. Whereas some studies basically find a decrease of religious involvement among immigrants (e.g. Maliepaard et al. 2010, Phalet et al. 2008, Platt 2013, van der Bracht et al. 2013), others report a considerable stability, especially among Muslim immigrants (e.g. Diehl & Koenig 2009, Maliepaard et al. 2012, Smits & Ultee 2013), or even an increase in immigrants' religious practices (e.g. Diehl & Koenig 2013, Smits et al. 2010, van Heelsum & Koomen 2016).

Additionally, very little is known about how divergent patterns of adaptation in religiosity can be explained. More precisely, several factors have been identified that (sometimes) influence religious attachments and behaviors. With regard to structural characteristics such as educational attainment and employment, empirical results are mixed (e.g. Fleischmann & Phalet 2012, Güveli & Platt 2011, van Tubergen 2006). In contrast, contact with native and secular peers has an effect on immigrants' religiosity in the majority of studies (e.g. Leszczensky et al. 2019, Maliepaard & Phalet 2012, van der Bracht et al. 2016, 2017), whereas cultural aspects do not seem to be important (e.g. Aleksynska & Chiswick 2013, Güveli & Platt 2011). In addition, discrimination experiences and perceived acceptance are sometimes related to religiosity, sometimes they are not (e.g. Connor 2010, Fleischmann et al. 2019, Platt 2013, Torrekens & Jacobs 2015, van der Bracht et al. 2013).

However, beyond the fact that these results do not allow conclusions regarding confirmed empirical relations, they cannot fully account for differences between religious groups in general

and the exception of Muslim immigrants in particular. Therefore, why immigrants are (and stay) more religious compared to natives is still an unanswered research question.

3 Dissertation Outline and Summary

Against this background, two core questions constitute the framework of my dissertation (see Table 1.1 for a detailed chapter overview):

(1) How religious are majority and minority youths with different religious backgrounds, and how does religious attachment change over time and over generations?

Chapter 2 is intended to give a first comprehensive overview about the religiosity of immigrants and non-immigrants in North-Western Europe. It addresses majority and minority adolescents' religiosity in four major immigration societies, namely England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden; and it examines different aspects of religion, that is, affiliation, visits of religious meeting places, praying behavior and religious salience. With this chapter it is possible to gain comprehensive insights into the research area of migration and religion. In this way, it extends existing research by jointly examining different countries, various measures of religiosity and their relations to explanatory factors, such as generation or education.

After these quite descriptive and exploratory views, I apply advanced research methods and designs in order to investigate how religiosity changes after migration. Studies to date have mainly analyzed religiosity dependent on immigrant generation, length of stay or time trends (e.g. Maliepaard et al. 2010, Diehl & Koenig 2013, Smits & Ultee 2013). However, these research designs suffer from one methodological drawback since they are not able to take into account different compositions of immigrants in terms of unobserved characteristics (Borjas 1994, Diehl & Koenig 2009). In order to overcome this problem, I investigate changes in religious attachment between successive generations within one and the same family (chapters 3 and 4). Such transmission approaches became popular recently. Analyzing parent-child dyads, these studies find strong intergenerational resistance to secularization in Muslim families in comparison to Christian families with or without migration background (e.g. Güngör et al. 2011, Maliepaard & Lubbers 2012, Scourfield et al. 2012, van de Pol & van Tubergen 2013).

An additional advantage of this approach is that it enables me to directly study intrafamilial transmission processes at the micro-level to observe whether family characteristics and everyday interactions account for group differences in religious developments. Since secularization tendencies in modern societies are regarded as predominantly driven by failure of parents to successfully pass on religion to their offspring (Scourfield et al. 2012, Voas & Crockett 2005), it is essential to enlarge our exact knowledge about transmission processes (chapter 4).

Chapter 5 focuses on religious change between the age of 14 and 22 years. Applying a longitudinal approach, I am able to observe dynamics of religious change or stability in crucial years of religious identity development, which has yet to be explored in the case of immigrants in North-Western Europe. Thus, to my knowledge it is so far the first study that investigates ethnic differences in the development of religious beliefs and practice at the transition from adolescence to early adulthood.

(2) To what extent can alternative theoretical approaches be used to study religious developments in North-Western European immigrant societies?

As outlined earlier in section 2 of this chapter, research in the field of migration and religion has yet to explain ethnic and/or religious group differences in levels and changes of religious involvement. More precisely, although several factors have been identified that can influence religious attachment and behavior, these factors cannot completely account for differences between natives and immigrants in general and the exception of Muslim immigrants in particular. Therefore, the second aim of my dissertation is to theoretically examine and empirically test both existing and alternative theoretical approaches applied to the study of immigrants' religiosity in Europe.

Table 1.1: Chapter overview

Chapter	Chapter Title	Research Questions	Data	Central Results
2	Keeping or Losing Faith? Comparing Religion across Majority and Minority Youth in Europe	1. How religious are majority and minority youth in Europe today in terms of religious affiliation and level of religiosity? 2. How is the level of religiosity related to social conditions such as generational status, ethnicity and gender, and core explanations including religious socialization and education?	CILS4EU all countries, wave 1	- Immigrant youth are more often affiliated with any religious denomination, and they pray and attend religious services more often compared to natives. - Religious salience is higher among minority youths and especially among the second generation, which is largely due to the divergent composition in terms of religious affiliation. - Comparing adolescents' religious salience with that of their parents, intergenerational decline is visible for majority youth, whereas stability is most common in Muslim families.
3	Intergenerational Change in Religious Salience Among Immigrant Families in Four European Countries	1. What patterns of intergenerational transmission in religiosity can be found among different religious groups in England, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden? 2. What are the causes behind these patterns? Referring to the rivalling theoretical approaches, I am especially interested in the impact of cognitive-structural and social integration.	CILS4EU all countries, wave 1	- Muslim immigrant families display a pattern of strong intergenerational stability in religiosity in all countries; in contrast to native and Christian families who show trends of secularization that are fairly similar to each other. - I find empirical support for all lines of theoretical explanations, whereby indicators of cognitive-structural and social assimilation are rather weakly and inconsistently related to change in religious salience from parents to their children.
4	Intergenerational Transmission in Religiosity in Immigrant and Native Families: The Role of Transmission Opportunities and Perceived Transmission Benefits	1. Do family characteristics and everyday interactions influence intergenerational transmission in religiosity? 2. Do they help to explain differences in the intergenerational transmission between natives and immigrants and between religious groups?	CILS4EU Germany, wave 1	- Motivation to transmit religiosity within families and contact with a secular environment is important in predicting transmission in religiosity, whereas opportunities to transmit are less relevant. - Although raw differences decrease somewhat when taking into account transmission opportunities and benefits, strong religious transmission among Muslim immigrants cannot be explained by these factors alone.

Table 1.1 (continued): Chapter overview

Chapter	Chapter Title	Research Questions	Data	Central Results
5	Ethnic and Religious Differences in Religious Development at the Transition from Adolescence to Early Adulthood	1. How does religious salience and behavior develop between adolescence and early adulthood among natives and immigrants with Christian and Muslim affiliation? 2. What contributes to change or stability in religiosity in adolescence and early adulthood? Are these factors equally important for natives and immigrants with different affiliations?	CILS4EU + CILS4EU-DE, Germany, waves 1-6	- Muslim and Christian immigrants' religious salience decreases at a later age in comparison to Christian natives. In contrast, religious behavior remains stable or increases for Muslim adolescents, whereas Christian adolescents become less religious in terms of church visits and praying frequency. - Leaving school is positively related to change in religiousness, but moving out is not. - The share of German friends is important for immigrants' religious salience and behavior, but not for natives'.

This endeavor begins in chapter 3, which addresses the influence of cognitive-structural and social integration on the intergenerational transmission in religiosity. As a matter of fact, established theories in the sociology of religion and of migration reach different conclusions with respect to general trends in immigrants' religious attachment as well as the influence of important explanatory factors, such as education and social contacts. The empirical results again confirm that neither existing theory is able to fully account for patterns of majority's and minority's intergenerational transmission in religiosity. Thus, it is promising to extend existing theoretical perspectives by adopting arguments from a broader range of study fields (chapters 4 and 5) in order to theoretically and empirically explain divergent trends in religiosity as well as group differences therein.

In chapter 4, I develop a theoretical model of intergenerational transmission in religiosity following central ideas from psychological and social psychological approaches of socialization processes, value transmission and social learning (Bandura 1977, Bao et al. 1999, Myers 1996, Nauck 2001, Phalet & Schönpflug 2001). In this model, opportunities to pass on religion from one generation to the next and perceived transmission benefits of parents and children are of crucial importance. Testing this theory empirically, my findings suggest that family characteristics and everyday interactions influence intergenerational transmission in religiosity, but they can only partly explain Muslims' strong resistance to secularization.

Chapter 5 extends life-course research (George 1993) to the situation of immigrant children. As already mentioned, scientific knowledge about the long-lasting impact of intergenerational transmission in religiosity beyond mid-adolescence is scarce. Therefore, this chapter is intended to make use and adapt theoretical assumptions about religious developments prevalent in the literature on majority youths. In concrete terms, I examine and empirically test whether crucial transitions (leaving school, moving out) and characteristics of peers and parents have an influence on immigrants' and natives' tendency to change their religious salience and behavior.

The empirical analyses in all chapters make use of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries and its German extension (CILS4EU and CILS4EU-DE) (Kalter et al. 2016a, 2016b, 2017, 2019). This project aims at answering key questions on the integration of immigrant children in four European countries: England, Germany, the

Netherlands and Sweden (Dollmann & Jacob 2016). Applying a three-stage school-based sampling design with oversampling schools with high immigrant proportions, 18,716 adolescents with and without an immigrant background were surveyed in 480 schools in 2010/2011 (CILS4EU 2016). Participants attended the school grade in English, Dutch, German and Swedish schools in which most of the students are 14 years old in wave 1 (England: tenth grade, Germany: ninth grade, Netherlands: third grade, Sweden: eighth grade). In addition, bilingual interviews were conducted with one parent, which allow me to study the intergenerational transmission in religiosity by investigating pairs of youths and their parents (chapters 3 and 4). Five subsequent waves – with a time gap of approximately one year between each survey – enable me to study religious developments from mid-adolescence into early adulthood in the German subsample (chapter 5).

Due to the sampling design, the data set includes a considerable share of minority students (45.7 percent have at least one grandparent who was born outside the survey country) (Dollmann & Jacob 2016). In addition, the questionnaires comprise several questions of religious involvement, among them affiliation, practice and salience, as well as important explanatory factors, which can be used to explain degrees of religiosity. Many questions are also available for one parent, and they are repeated in subsequent waves of CILS4EU. Therefore, the data set is well suited to study the religiosity of minority youth in Europe.

Appendix

Table 1.A1: Studies on the religiosity of immigrants in Europe

Study	Research question	Theories	Data	Country/groups	Central results
Aleksynska & Chiswick (2013)	The aim of the paper is to broaden the knowledge about the religiosity of immigrants with a special focus on persistence of immigrants' religiosity.	Differences attributed to individual and contextual differences (secularization theory, market model)	ESS 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008	Europe* 1st generation, native born (with citizenship) Roman Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox Christian, other Christian, Muslim, Jewish no religion Age: 16-70	- Immigrants are more religious than native-born population regardless of denomination. - There are differences in the role of individual characteristics (roughly same: gender, age; different: marital status, household size, income). - Religiosity tends to decline with length of stay. Speaking the majority language at home does not have any effect. - Origin countries' characteristics still affect immigrants' religiosity, so do characteristics of the destination country.
Brünig & Fleischmann (2015)	To what extent do individual characteristics explain who veils?	Assimilation theory Secularization theory (scientific worldview, social integration theory)	SIM 2006/07	Netherlands Turkish, Moroccan 1st and 2nd generation Age: 17-79; sex: female	- First generation immigrants and Moroccans wear headscarf more often. Religious identification, education and contact with natives as well as gender role attitudes affect veiling. - Education and native contact are mediated via gender roles, education is mediated via religious identification. - Relation between identification and veiling is stronger for more educated women and weaker for those with frequent contact to natives.
Connor (2010)	How do contexts of receptivity influence immigrants' religious adaptation in their host societies?	Assimilation theory (context of receptivity)	ESS 2002, 2004, 2006	Europe** 1st generation (born outside country participating in the ESS) Muslim	- Muslim immigrants are more religious than the respective native population in the region of residence. - The less welcoming the contexts are, the more Muslim immigrants deviate from natives' religious outcomes – this pertains to attendance and prayer, but not religiosity.
De Hoon & van Tubergen (2014)	To what extent do parents affect the religiosity of their adolescent children, among minority and majority groups? To what extent do peers from their own group and that of other groups affect the religiosity of minority and majority adolescents?	--	CILS4EU 2010/11	England, Germany, Netherlands 1st, 2nd and 2.5th generation	- Immigrants are more religious than natives, Muslims are more religious than other immigrants. - Religious transmission of importance is stronger in immigrant compared to native families, and stronger in Muslim compared to other immigrant families; especially in highly religious families. - No differences for attendance and prayer. - Religiosity of peers matters.

Study	Research question	Theories	Data	Country/groups	Central results
Diehl & Koenig (2009)	How can the intergenerational stability of religiosity among Turkish families be explained?	Assimilation theory Symbolic ethnicity Value stability Compensation	GGS 2005/06	Germany Turkish citizens 1st generation, migrated after age of 6	- Descriptively decreasing religiosity between 1st and 2nd generation due to age composition of generations. - Symbolic religiosity: Practice vs. attitudes: o Decreasing: Attending religious meetings (stronger for women than men) o Increasing: Importance of religious ceremonies (stronger for women than men) o Stable: Religiosity as educational goal - Value stability: Other family-related values are subject to intergenerational decrease. - Compensation: Worse assimilated immigrants do not show higher degrees of religiosity.
Diehl & Koenig (2013)	Investigation of early religious integration dynamics, example of catholic Poles and Muslim Turks in Germany - Effects of migratory event on religiosity compared to religiosity in country of origin - Changes during time period after migration Relation to other integration dimensions (social, structural)	Opportunity argument Assimilation argument Boundary making argument	SCIP 2010/11	Germany Polish, Turkish 1st generation, max. 1 ½ years length of stay Catholic, Muslim	- Both groups are strongly religious compared to native population, but less religious than in their country of origin. - In both groups, religious practice declines after migration compared to situation before migration. This is more pronounced for Turks than Poles. Besides that, decline is less strong for praying. - With increasing length of stay, Turks become more religious, but not Poles → religious re-organization of Turks who arrive at their initial level of religiosity. - With increasing attachment to Germany (social assimilation) religious practice decreases for Poles, but no influence for Turks.
Eilers et al. (2008)	Investigation of religiosity of Muslim immigrants in Germany	--	Kiel survey 2004/05	Germany Muslim Age: 10-30	- First generation is more religious than later generations. - High correlations between religiosity of parents and respondents - The longer the duration of residence, the less religious is the respondent. - Weak correlation of religiosity with education - Gap between importance of religion and religious practice
Fleischmann & Phalet (2010)	How do second generation immigrants combine ethnic, religious, national and city identities? Are there cross-national differences?	Segmented assimilation theory (modes of incorporation)	TIES	Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden Turkish, Moroccan (not in Sweden) 2nd generation Age: 18-35	The more favorable the context is, … - the higher are identification levels in general. - the less pronounced is compatibility between ethnic/religious and national/city identification.

Study	Research question	Theories	Data	Country/groups	Central results
Fleischmann & Phalet 2012	How is religiosity among the Turkish second generation related to religious socialization in immigrant families and communities and to their structural integration into European societies? Are there cross-national differences in terms of those relationships?	Secularization theory + classical assimilation theory Religious vitality (via religious socialization) Reactive ethnicity	TIES	Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden Turkish 2nd generation Muslim Age: 18-35	- Education and interethnic partnership are related to religiosity only in Germany, not in the other three countries. - Religious socialization has an effect in all 4 countries. - Perceived discrimination experiences are not relevant for religiosity.
Fleischmann et al. (2019)	How are ethnic, religious and national identification associated with each other? Are identities related to discrimination experiences? Do associations change as a function of discrimination?	Social identity theory Rejection identification model	Friendship and identity in school 2013/14	Germany	- National and ethnic/religious identification are weakly positively or not associated. - Discrimination is related to more conflicting patterns of identification. - Identification patterns are rather stable during the 1 ½ year survey period.
Fuhse (2006)	Investigation of relevance of religion for immigrants	Modernization theory Assimilation theory Reactive ethnicity (implicit)	DJI Foreigner survey 1996/97	Germany Italian, Greek, Turkish 1st and 2nd generation	- Religion is most important for Turks, least for Italians. - Weak correlation between perceived discrimination and religiosity - (in general: descriptive, method uncertain)
Garcia-Munoz & Neuman (2013)	Are immigrants more religious than natives? What are the motives behind immigrants' religiosity and do they vary by destination context?	Religiosity as a bridge in assimilation process or a buffer	ISSP 2008 ESS 2002-2010 GSS 2002-2010	Europe*** 1st and 2nd generation Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, other Christian, Jewish, Muslim Age: 20-90	- First and second generation immigrants are more religious than natives. Second generation immigrants adapt to natives, but still significant difference. - Years since migration shows inverse U-pattern. No difference for immigrants recently arrived and with more than 20 years length of stay. Moreover, second generation immigrants are more religious than first generation immigrants with 20 years length of stay. - Hypothesis that religion is a bridge in the US and a buffer in Europe is confirmed (but not convincing).
Güngör et al. (2011)	How does religious transmission in childhood affect the adult religious life of second-generation Muslims? Is religious transmission differentially effective between acculturating groups as proximal acculturation contexts? How do individual acculturation orientations affect the transmission process?	Transmission can be: - Explicit teaching - Implicit learning Role of acculturation contexts and acculturation orientations	TIES	Belgium Turkish, Moroccan 2nd and 2.5th generation Muslim Age: 18-35	- Descriptively, Moroccans report higher religious identification and practice than Turks. - Koran lessons and father's mosque visits affect current religiosity → interpreted as transmission. - Transmission is more effective among Turks (higher explained variance). - Effect of religious transmission on current religiosity fully mediated via cultural maintenance orientations; cultural adoption orientations irrelevant in transmission process.

Study	Research question	Theories	Data	Country/groups	Central results
Güngör et al. (2012)	How does contact with heritage culture and mainstream culture influence adolescents' religiosity?	Socialization theory Reactive ethnicity	Survey in Flanders and Ankara	Turks in Turkey, Turkish migrants in Belgium, Belgian Age: 15-20	- Turkish immigrants in Belgium are more religious than Belgian and Turkish adolescents, this cannot be explained by mother's education. Only for Belgians, religiosity declined with age. - Religiosity is related to ethnic identification and Turkish culture maintenance, but not to Belgian culture adoption.
Güveli (2015)	How religious are first and second generation Turkish immigrants in Europe compared to native Europeans and non-immigrants in Turkey?	Secularization theory Assimilation theory Religious reliance theory Reactive ethnicity	ESS 2002-2010	Europe*, Turkey 1st and 2nd generation Turkish immigrants (Muslim) Turkish non-immigrants (all affiliations) European natives (all affiliations) Muslim	- Associations between different measures of religiosity are lowest for Turks in Turkey, highest for European natives, immigrants lie in between. - Self-assessed religiosity: 2nd generation > 1st generation = non-immigrants > European natives - Attendance: Non-immigrants = 1st generation = 2nd generation > European natives - Praying: Non-immigrants > 1st generation = 2nd generation > European natives
Güveli & Platt (2011)	Investigation of religiosity in two national contexts (United Kingdom and the Netherlands)	Secularization Assimilation/revitalization Integration/identity	NL: SPVA 1998 UK: FNSEM 1993	Netherlands, United Kingdom NL: Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Antillean (citizenship or country of birth UK: Indian, African Asian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean, Chinese, White majority Muslim	- Secularization/security: Yes in the Netherlands (education, language, employment matters), no in the United Kingdom (only language significant) - Assimilation/revitalization: No effect of length of stay in both countries, difference between 1st and 2nd generation only significant in the United Kingdom - Integration/identity: Identification is significant in both countries, but association membership and ethnic membership is inconsistent. - Origin: Turks and Bangladeshi are more religious than Moroccans and Pakistani in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, respectively.
Koopmans (2014)	What is the extent of religious fundamentalism among Muslim immigrants and Christian natives? What are the socioeconomic determinants of religious fundamentalism, are they similar for both groups? How is religious fundamentalism related to other aspects of religiosity? How are religious fundamentalism and out-group hostility related to each other, are they similar for both groups?	(Secularization theory) Reactive ethnicity approach	SCIICS 2008	Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden Turkish, Moroccan (not in AT, SW), Christian natives	- Fundamentalism is widespread among Muslims, but not universal, more among Sunnite Muslims, no difference for Alevites. - Fundamentalism is related to socioeconomic marginalization, but age and generation does not have an effect (but these factors do not explain group differences). - Religiosity is correlated with fundamentalism, stronger for Sunnites. - Fundamentalist believers show stronger out-group hostility

Study	Research question	Theories	Data	Country/groups	Central results
Leszczensky et al. (2019)	How does the share of religious in-group members as an aspect of religious classroom composition relate to the importance students attach to religion?	Optimal distinctiveness theory	CILS4EU 2010/11	England, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden Native Christian, immigrant Christian, immigrant Muslim	- Muslim have the highest importance of religion when 2/3 co-religious classmates are present (U-shaped relationship). No association is found for Christians. - A high share of Muslims increases Christians' importance of religion.
Lewis & Kashyap (2013a)	Do Muslims differ in their religiosity and attitudes compared to Christians and persons without any affiliation? Can degree of religiosity and SES explain differences in attitudes?	--	FM: British Muslims 2009 BSA 2009	Great Britain	- Muslims are more religious than British Christians and British without religious affiliation. - Muslims also hold more conservative values. - Degree of religiosity and SES can explain Muslim effect except for sex before marriage and homosexuality.
Lewis & Kashyap (2013b)	Are foreign-born more religious than native born? Are Muslims more religious than non-Muslims? Can socio-economic factors explain higher levels of Muslim religiosity? Do these factors similarly affect Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants?	Secularization theory Reactive ethnicity	Citizenship Survey 2008/09	England, Wales 1st generation and native-born Any religious affiliation	- Muslims are more religious than non-Muslims; among non-Muslims, foreign-born are more religious; no difference therein among Muslims. - Ethnicity and other background variables reduce main effects, but cannot fully explain those. - In contrast to non-Muslims, education is not related to religiosity among Muslims.
Maliepaard & Lubbers (2013)	To what extent are first generation migrants who identify as Muslim able to transmit their religion to their children, who are being raised in the Netherlands? Does the social and structural integration of the children into the Dutch society hamper the parental religious transmission?	Vertical, horizontal and oblique transmission Explicit teaching, observation and imitation etc. (only assumptions)	SPVA 1998, 2002	Netherlands Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Antillean (1st, 2nd and 2.5th generation) Families with child 15-25	- Bivariate: Children are less religious than parents - Multivariate: o Strong effect of parental religiosity on children's religiosity o Sex of parent has no effect o Small age effects: older children visiting mosques less frequently, no interaction with parental religiosity → Parental influence does not diminish with age - Ethnic differences in transmission: o Only for mosque attendance: Higher transmission in Turkish families, in contrast, in Moroccan families effect of parental religiosity becomes insignificant - Effect of friends and education: o Share of Dutch/co-ethnic friends exerts some influence on individual religiosity, education does not o No interaction effects of friends/education with parental religiosity (one exception: education and importance of religious schools)

Study	Research question	Theories	Data	Country/groups	Central results
Maliepaard & Phalet (2012)	How do minority and majority group contacts affect how often Dutch Muslims visit a mosque or how they feel about the role of religion in politics?	Social capital theory Social identity theory	SIM 2006	Netherlands Turkish, Moroccan 1st and 2nd generation Muslim	- Social contact with minority increases and social contact with majority decreases Muslims' identity expression. - Thereby, effects of minority contact effects are stronger than those of the majority for practice, but equal for assertion. - Minority effects are stronger for Turks than for Moroccans. - Those effects of social contact on religious identity expression are partly mediated by religious identification - (no net effect of immigrant generation, small education effect on assertion)
Maliepaard et al. (2010)	How strongly is second generation oriented towards parents' country of birth compared to first generation (in terms of ethnic identification and ethno-cultural practices as well as religious identification and practices)? How strongly are ethnic and religious identification and practice interrelated?	Assimilation theory Segmented assimilation theory	LAS 2004/05	Netherlands Turkish and Moroccan 1st, 2nd and 2.5th generation	- Gross differences between migrant generations - After controlling for compositional effects (ethnic origin, sex, education, employment, marital status, children), almost no differences remain for ethnic identity, but they do so for religious practice - Ethnic identity has a strong impact on religious identity, the same for religious practice (but still differences remain between generations for religious practice) - Relation between ethnic and religious identity is stronger in the second than in the first generation
Maliepaard et al. (2012)	Replication and extension of results in Phalet et al. (2008) (increasing secularization over time and generations, negative effect of education on religiosity) – How does secularization proceed in recent years?	Explanation of macro trends via compositional effects	SIM 1998-2006	Netherlands Turkish and Moroccan Muslim	- Gross trends: Decline 1998-2004, no difference 2004-06 - Decline variables: Generation and education as expected, but cannot fully explain gross trends - Vitality variables: Age, marital status, children and share of co-ethnics in local area as expected, but not presence of mosque in neighborhood. Gross effects increase slightly → Suppression of downward trends by segregation etc. - Interactions with year of survey: - Initial difference between Turks and Moroccans (T>M) disappears over time. - Sex differences (M>F) increase over time. - Generational differences reverse over time: In 2004/06, 2nd is more religious than 1st generation. - Effect of education also diminishes over time.

Study	Research question	Theories	Data	Country/groups	Central results
McAndrew & Voas (2014)	How does religiosity vary by immigrant generation for different ethnic groups? How do generation, ethnic group and religiosity affect social trust, civic engagement and volunteering?	(Secularization theory) Reactive ethnicity	EMBES 2010	United Kingdom South Asian, African, Afro-Caribbean 1st, 1.5th and 2nd generation	- There is evidence for generational decline in religiosity, but more modest for Pakistani and Bangladeshi (Muslim) groups. - Religiosity is linked to civic engagement and volunteering, but not generalized trust.
Phalet et al. (2008)	How well does secularization explain religious change of Muslims in the Netherlands? How is religiosity of Muslims related to intergenerational integration in other life domains? Under which conditions does secularization or revitalization among Muslims in the Netherlands occur?	Secularization theory Religious vitalization Reactive ethnicity Assimilation theory	SPVA 1998, 2002 LAS 2005	Netherlands Turkish and Moroccan 1st, 2nd and 2.5th generation Muslim Age: 15-65	- Decreasing religious participation and preferences between 1998 and 2005, which cannot fully be explained by composition of Muslim population - Turks visit mosques more often and have higher preferences for religious spouses than Moroccans, but Moroccans have higher preference for religious schools - Second generation practices less and has lower preferences for religious schools, but no difference in terms of preference for religious spouse (in line with thesis on enduring religiosity in private sphere) - Structural and social integration are associated with lower levels of religious practice and preferences - Decline in practice and preference spouse is less pronounced for Moroccans, but the opposite is true for school preferences
Platt (2013)	Is there assimilation in national, ethnic and religious identities? Are ethnic identities substituted by religious identities in the second generation? Can we find evidence for reactive ethnicity/religiosity?	Assimilation theory Reactive ethnicity	EMBES 2010	United Kingdom Black Caribbean, Black African, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi 1st and 2nd generation	- 2nd generation identifies more strongly with Britain and less strongly with own ethnic group than 1st generation (time since arrival is also significantly related to national but not ethnic identification). - For religious identity, there is a trend towards assimilation in the 2nd generation, but for Muslims only for private religious activities (and not for importance of religion, public religious activities and commonality with co-religious group) - There is no evidence for a shift from ethnic towards religious identification in the 2nd generation (except for Indian Hindus). - Perceived religious discrimination increases religious identification, but equally for 1st and 2nd generation.

Study	Research question	Theories	Data	Country/groups	Central results
Scourfield et al. (2012)	In which religious groups is the intergenerational transmission of religion most successful? Which variables are associated with higher rates of religious transmission?	(Socialization theory)	HOCS 2003 YPS 2003	United Kingdom, Wales No restrictions in terms of ethnicity or religious affiliation Age 16-70	- Transmission in Muslim and other non-Christian denominations is stronger compared to Christianity. - Transmission is more effective for female and for Muslim respondents (twice as common as for Christians, compared to other non-Christian religions, difference becomes non-significant after controlling for background variables).
Simon & Tiberj (2018)	Exploring religiosity of immigrants and their descendants Do families secularize, reproduce or reinforce religion from one generation to the next? Is there evidence of a withdrawal in bounded communities?	Secularization theory	TeO 2008/09 MGIS 1992	France Age 18-60	- Immigrants are more religious (Islam is the dominant denomination among immigrants) in comparison to natives and children of mixed couples. - Religiosity decreases with age for majority, it increases for immigrants. - Secularization trends between 1992 and 2008/09 are stronger for majority than minority respondents (even increase for Algerians). - Parent-child-transmission: Reinforcement is least likely for all respondents, reproduction is most common for immigrants, for natives it is secularization. - Ethnic homophily regarding friendship and union formation is higher among Muslim compared to non-Muslim immigrants.
Simsek et al. (2019)	To what extent do Christian and Muslim youth with and without immigrant background differ in their religious development during adolescence?	Assimilation theory Segmented assimilation theory Reactive ethnicity Insecurity theory	CILS4EU 2010-2013	England, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden Native Christian, immigrant Christian, immigrant Muslim	- Christian natives and immigrants become slightly more secular on all 3 indicators (no strong difference in change between these 2 groups). - Muslim do not show significant differences in development - Muslims show high heterogeneity regarding change: some become less, some become more religious; this is less the case for Christians.

Study	Research question	Theories	Data	Country/groups	Central results
Soehl (2017)	Comparison of transmission of religiosity from parents to children and degree of religious homogamy among these children as they form unions across religious denominations and immigrant generations	Assimilation theory Reactive ethnicity Selective acculturation Transmission approach	TeO 2008/09	France 1st, 1.5th, 2nd generation and 3+ generation Christians, Muslims Age 18-60	- There is a strong stability in religiosity in Muslim families compared to Christians with small variations between generations within religious groups, and more variation between generations in Christian families. - Probability of choosing a religiously homogenous partner is larger for Muslims, but disappears when controlling for generation and country of origin; religious homogamy declines over generations. In addition, tertiary education is a strong predictor for heterogeneous partnership. - Very strong influence of religious importance while growing up and having religiously homogenous parents on individual importance of religion; these effects are even stronger for Muslims. - Taken together, long-term decline in religiosity can be expected.
Smits & Ultee (2013)	Did Muslim self-identification and frequency of mosque attendance among people of Turkish and Moroccan descent in the Netherlands aged 12+ change in the period 1997–2009 and, if so, to what extent and in which direction? In which way does the trend among this subpopulation differ from the trend among other inhabitants of the Netherlands? To what extent do individual and contextual characteristics that tend to be correlated with religiosity explain over time differences in our subpopulation?	Social integration theory Scientific worldview theory Insecurity theory Religious supply theory External factors, group and gender differences	POLS 1997-2009 + municipal-level data	Netherlands Turkish, Moroccan 1st, 2nd and 2.5th generation Reference group with any religious affiliation	- Trends over time: Mainly trendless fluctuations; identification increases, and attendance decreases a little. For other Dutch inhabitants, decreasing religiosity is visible (on a lower level compared to Muslim immigrants). - Factors influencing religiosity: generation, Moroccan/Turkish, mixed marriage, individual education, time in education/work (only attendance), gender (only attendance), religiosity of Dutch in municipality, presence of co-ethnic mosque, presence of co-ethnics (only identification), anti-immigrant voters (only identification); no effect: household income, urbanization, mosque attacks, municipal level of education - Small time differences in general become larger when taking into account independent variables (exception: contextual variables for attendance)
Smits et al. (2010)	Do well-established theories developed for predominantly Christian and native-born majority in Western societies are applicable to non-Christian non-Western immigrants?	Scientific worldview Religious supply Existential insecurity Social integration	MHSM 1994-96	Belgium Turkish, Moroccan 1st generation Muslim	- Effects found for: Education (but not for Ramadan), religious supply, job stability (but: positive for sheep sacrificing (financial constraints possible explanation), co-ethnic partner, religious socialization - No effects found for: Co-ethnics in living environment, urbanization (only mosque attendance: negative effect) - Concerning time effects: Migration at older ages increases religious participation (except Ramadan, length of stay increases (!) religious participation (except Ramadan)

Study	Research question	Theories	Data	Country/groups	Central results
Torrekens & Jacobs (2015)	To what extent do discursive and political opportunity structures provoke reactive religiosity? To what extent do they impact on perceived cultural distance between Muslims and non-Muslims (with regard to the role of religion in society)?	Reactive ethnicity approach	EURISLAM 2010	Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK Moroccan, Turkish, Pakistani, Ex-Yugoslavian Muslims Reference group	- A more open discursive and political opportunity structure does not lead to higher religiosity and perceived distance between Muslims and non-Muslims. - There are group differences (country of origin) with respect to religiosity and perceived similarities between Muslims and non-Muslims.
Van der Bracht et al. (2013)	Are there intergenerational differences in religiosity? What is the influence of discrimination and religious context on immigrants' religiosity? And is the region or country level more important?	Social integration theory Religious market theory Reactive ethnicity	ESS 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008	Europe 1st, 2nd and 2.5th generation Age: 15 years or older	- 2nd generation is less religious than first generation. - Native religiosity in region affects immigrants' religiosity; this effect is larger for 2nd as compared to 1st generation (but only for behavior for non-European immigrants). Regional level is more important than country level. - Religious diversity is not important. - Discrimination has a positive effect on religiosity, and this effect is stronger for the 2nd generation, especially for non-European migrants.
Van der Bracht et al. (2016)	Is there an association between ethnic school segregation and adolescents' religious salience? Are there intergenerational differences in minorities' religious salience? What is the role of ethnic school composition for intergenerational differences?	Social identity theory Structural opportunity theory	RaDiSS 2011/12	Flanders (Belgium) 3rd grade of secondary school	- Pupils with and without migration background are more religious in schools with a higher share of ethnic minorities. - Differences between natives and immigrants only exist in schools with a high share of ethnic minorities.
Van der Bracht et al. (2017)	What is the effect of ethnic school composition on religiosity? Does this impact vary by own religiosity?	--	RaDiSS 2011-15	Flanders (Belgium) 3rd grade of secondary school	- Many students become unaffiliated between age 15 and 18. - Declines between age 15 and 18 are attenuated when minority group concentration in school is high.

Study	Research question	Theories	Data	Country/groups	Central results
Van de Pol & van Tubergen (2013)	Will Turkish and Moroccan parents be able to transmit their religiosity to the next generation in a secular Western society?	Socialization theory "Familiar preferences" Several moderators of transmission (family, community, society)	NELLS 2008-10	Netherlands Turkish and Moroccan 1st and 2nd generation Age: 15-45	- Strong transmission of religiosity for men and women alike - Transmission as well as individual religiosity is stronger if one is satisfied with relation to parents (only men) - Transmission is stronger in interethnic families (against expectations) (only women) - Transmission is stronger in Turkish compared to Moroccan families (only men) - Transmission is stronger for first generation immigrants (only women) - Social integration of parents influences individual religiosity
Van Heelsum & Koomen (2015)	How are ethnic, religious and national identity related to each other? How does ascription influence the process of identity formation? What differences are there between the first and second generation?	Social identity theory Assimilation theory	EURISLAM 2011	Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland Moroccan	- Religious identity is related to ethnic identity. Second generation Muslims identify more strongly with their religion compared to first generation. - Identity is correlated with elements of ascription. - Second generation is less affected by elements of ascription, especially regarding national identification.
Van Tubergen (2006)	Examination of two aspects of religiosity: religious affiliation and religious participation	Religiosity as result of individual and contextual factors (origin, destination and community effects)	IFIS 1974-2000	Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, USA 1st generation	- Differences between origins and destinations in affiliation and participation - Macro factors are more important for affiliation than participation - Country of origin is more important for affiliation, country of destination is more important for participation - Individual effects: Age, employment status, education, marital status as expected; but participate more - Origin effects: Modernization and dominance of Christianity as expected, no effect of religious suppression - Destination effects: Religious diversity, religiosity of natives, political landscape as expected - Community effects: No effect of group size (not hypothesized)

Study	Research question	Theories	Data	Country/groups	Central results
Van Tubergen (2007)	What happens to immigrants' religious commitment when they become more socially integrated into the secular host society?	Social integration theory Accommodation hypothesis	SPVA 1998, 2002	Netherlands Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Antillean 1st generation	- Variables who have an impact on religious attachment: ethnic composition of organizations, ethnic composition of neighborhood, Dutch partner, active employment status, level of education, language proficiency in Dutch, age of arrival. No effect in multivariate analyses: Contact with natives in free-time, education in the Netherlands. Opposite effect: Length of stay (positive effect on religiosity except for religious attitudes) - Turks and Moroccans are more religious than Surinamese and Antilleans. - Turkish and Moroccan males attend religious meetings more often, whereas the opposite is true for Surinamese and Antilleans.
Van Tubergen (2013)	Do the migration event and the subsequent stay in the host society have any consequences for religiosity of immigrants?	Social influence theory Religious market theory	SCIP 2010/11	Netherlands Bulgarian, Polish, Moroccan, Turkish, Surinamese, Antillean 1st generation, max. 3 years length of stay Any religious affiliation Age: 18-65	- Event of migration reduces religious activities, attending religious meetings more than praying. - Religious continuity vs. decline differs to a great extent by country of origin: Smaller decline for old immigrant groups compared to new immigrants from Poland and Bulgaria. The differences are more pronounced for attendance than praying. - Other individual influences are rather unimportant (only small effects for length of stay on attendance, but not praying; contact to co-ethnic is unrelated to religious practice, while contact to natives increases religious activities).

Study	Research question	Theories	Data	Country/groups	Central results
Van Tubergen & Sindradóttir (2011)	To what extent are cross-national differences in immigrants' religiosity due to individual characteristics of immigrants (composition effects) and/or characteristics of the receiving country (contextual effects)?	Secularization theory (insecurity theory, social integration theory, scientific worldview theory) Religious market theory	ESS 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008	Europe[***] 1st generation	- On average, immigrants are more religious than natives, especially with respect to praying. There are also cross-country variations in immigrants' religiosity, those are more pronounced for public forms of religiosity (attendance). - Educational level has a negative effect → scientific worldview - Unemployed immigrants are more religious → insecurity theory; but neither unemployment rate nor income inequality have a significant effect. - Religious diversity is positively related to religiosity, but uncertain whether this effect is driven by extreme cases → market model. But length of stay is negatively related to religiosity (no interaction between those 2 variables). - Natives' level of religiosity affects immigrants' religiosity as well as length of stay (but no interaction effect) → social integration theory - Immigrants from developing and predominantly Muslim countries are more religious. - No differences in terms of religious affiliation for subjective religiosity, Muslims pray more often than Catholics and Eastern Orthodox immigrants, no difference in attendance between Muslims and Catholics, but Muslims > Eastern Orthodox.

Study	Research question	Theories	Data	Country/groups	Central results
Verkuyten et al. (2012)	Are religious, national and ethnic identities complementary or contradictory? What is the role of parental religious identity for adolescents' religious, ethnic and national identification?	Acculturation theory Assimilation theory	?	Netherlands Moroccan-Dutch Muslims Age: 11-18	- Adolescents identify less with ethnic and religious identities and more with national identities than their parents. - Parents' Muslim identity strongly influences child's Muslim identity. - This effect less strong for older adolescents.

* Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Ukraine

** Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden

*** Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom

**** Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, France, Norway, Great Britain

***** Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom

BSA=British Social Attitudes, CILS4EU=Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries, EMBES=Ethnic Minority British Election Study, ESS=European Social Survey, FM=Faith Matters, FNSEM=Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities, GGS=Generations and Gender Survey, GSS=General Social Survey, HOCS=Home Office Citizenship Survey, IFIS=International File of Immigration Surveys, ISSP=International Social Survey Program, LAS=Living Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Cities, MGIS=Geographical Mobility and Social Integration Survey, MHSM=Migration History and Social Mobility, NELLS=Netherlands Longitudinal Lifecourse Study, POLS=Permanent Survey of Living Conditions, RaDiSS=Racism and Discrimination in Secondary Schools, SCIICS=Six Country Immigrant Integration Comparative Survey, SCIP=Socio-Cultural Integration Processes of New Immigrants in Europe, SIM=Survey Integration of Minorities, SPVA=Social Position and Provision Ethnic Minorities, TeO=Trajectories and Origins, TIES=The Integration of the European Second Generation, YPS=Young People's Survey

Chapter 2:
Keeping or Losing Faith? Comparing Religion across Majority and Minority Youth in Europe

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[*] For the sake of consistency across chapters, I have rewritten the published version of this chapter from a first-person perspective, harmonized citation style and American English use and reformulated several sections.

1 Introduction

Religion is an important dimension of diversity in contemporary European societies. Traditionally a Christian continent – despite considerable country differences regarding the prevalence of (a) specific type(s) of Christianity – European societies today are among the most secularized in the world (Norris & Inglehart 2011). Yet the large-scale immigration through post-colonial ties, 'guest-worker' recruitment and refugee movements that occurred in all North-Western European countries has not only increased ethnic but also religious diversity in Europe (Castles & Miller 2009). In contrast to the USA, where both the religious background and average religiosity of migrants and non-migrants are more similar (Cadge & Ecklund 2007), immigrants and the majority population differ in both respects in Europe: a substantial share of immigrants are Muslims and have higher levels of religiosity than natives (Foner & Alba 2008, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011, Voas & Fleischmann 2012). This has turned religion, and particularly Islam, into a 'bright boundary marker' between immigrants and European natives (Alba 2005). High-impact events such as terrorist attacks by Islamist extremists as well as many societal debates about the accommodation of religious diversity across European societies (e.g. Bader 2007) have contributed to the widely held belief that religion hampers immigrant integration in Europe.

Against the background of growing concern in public debates and among policy-makers that religion would stand in the way of the integration of immigrants and their offspring into secular European societies, this chapter examines how religious youth in Europe are today. I compare majority and minority youth with regard to their religious affiliation and levels of religiosity, and I relate the latter to social conditions such as generational status, ethnicity and gender, and to core explanations including religious socialization and education. So far, research on the topic of immigrant religion has focused mostly on adults, many of whom belonged to the first generation, that is, they were born and socialized in migrant sending countries with different religious backgrounds and often higher levels of religiosity (van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011). Earlier studies have shown that Muslim immigrant families and communities in Europe generally tend to transmit their religiosity to the next generation (de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014, Güngör et al. 2011, Verkuyten et al. 2012), although there is also evidence for secularization across generations and Muslim parents' limited influence when transmitting their religion to their children (Maliepaard & Lubbers 2013, van de Pol & van Tubergen 2014). In (mainstream) Christian families – both of migrant and nonmigrant origin – the pattern of

intergenerational religious decline is well known (Jacob & Kalter 2013). The latter finding in particular emphasizes the need to study religion among European youth from a comparative perspective by including affiliates of different religious groups. While the focus on Muslim minorities in previous research on immigrant religion is understandable given the argument of Islam as a particularly bright boundary marker in European societies, a more inclusive approach to the study of religion among minority and majority youth that allows for a comparison across religious groups is needed for a comprehensive understanding of the importance of religion in the life of youth growing up in Europe today.

In addition, previous research typically focused on religious minority groups or immigrants only and therefore lacks a comparison with the native majority. As a consequence, it is so far unknown whether and to what extent youth from particular religious backgrounds stand out compared to other religious affiliations and native-origin youth in terms of their religiosity. Finally, only few studies have addressed the question whether immigrant religion varies across European countries (Connor 2010, Fleischmann & Phalet 2012, Torrekens & Jacobs 2016, van der Bracht et al. 2013, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011), despite our knowledge about important country differences in historical church–state relations and how they affected the accommodation of religious minority groups (e.g. Fetzer & Soper 2005, Rath et al. 2001).

This chapter therefore addresses the question of how religious minority and majority youth in Europe are today. I ask how many are affiliated to a religion, and if so, which one? How often do they pray and attend religious meetings? Is religion important to them or not? In answering these research questions, I thus touch multiple aspects of religion. According to Foner and Alba (2008), the lack of similarity between natives' and migrants' religious affiliation is the first reason why religion would work as a barrier to immigrant integration in Europe. The second reason they describe is the high level of religiosity among immigrants, which would contrast with low average levels of religiosity among European majority populations. This chapter therefore provides important comparative insights into one of the mostly debated aspects of integration. Next to describing and explaining levels of religiosity of majority and minority youth in Europe, which is the central aim of this chapter, its findings can also inform other research questions studied in the comparative volume "Growing up in Diverse Societies" (Kalter et al. 2018) and research on immigrant integration in general. For instance, school segregation (Kruse & Kalter 2018) might contribute to the persistence of religious boundaries, as minority youth

are less likely to be exposed to the secular norms of their majority peers in more segregated schools. Moreover, because religion is seen as a more or less coherent set of beliefs and values, many of which concern family and gender relations (Brinkerhoff & MacKie 1985), it is likely to shape youth's attitudes towards gender roles, homosexuality, marriage and cohabiting (Kogan 2018). Differences in these attitudes and values are often perceived as cultural threats, which is known to affect out-group prejudice (Stephan & Stephan 1996). To the extent that majority and minority youth differ in their religious affiliation and religiosity, this might also affect their likelihood to engage in positive social contact with each other and hold positive attitudes towards one another (van Tubergen & Smith 2018, Wölfer et al. 2018). These examples show the relevance of studying religion for understanding the integration of minority youth in Europe.

Before presenting the findings, Section 2 briefly sketches the religious contexts that youth encounter in the four countries under study and relates them to general expectations regarding religious change, stability or revival.

2 Contextual and Theoretical Background

2.1 Religious Contexts of Reception

Despite scholarly debates regarding the reasons for and universality of religious decline (Casanova 2003), the empirical finding that European societies have strongly secularized in the same period in which large-scale immigration occurred stands uncontested (Bruce 2011). In all North-Western European societies, population statistics and survey data reveal a pattern of declining rates of religious attendance and a growing share of non-affiliates (e.g. Burkimsher 2014). While secularization is contested as a theory to account for religious change (Gorski & Altinordu 2008), it is firmly established as an empirical regularity in the North-Western European societies that are the focus of the comparative volume "Growing up in Diverse Societies" (Kalter et al. 2018). From a global comparative perspective, England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden are located in the most secularized region in the world and have comparable levels of modernization and educational expansion, which are considered core driving forces

of secularization (Berger 1967a, Wilson 1982). I would therefore expect only minor differences in the levels of religiosity between England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden.

Still, there are gradual differences between the four countries in their levels of religiosity. Concerning the share of affiliates, according to the data from the European Social Survey (2002–14, authors' calculations), Sweden and the Netherlands seem to be more strongly secularized than England and Germany. Over 60 percent of the population in the former two countries declare no religious affiliation, while the share of non-religious people gravitates towards 50 percent in England and 40 percent in Germany. Keeping these differences in the share of religious persons in mind, the breakdown of affiliations is rather similar in the four countries, with 85 percent or more of all religious persons affiliated to Christianity.

Levels of religiosity among the general population in the four countries are also rather similar. In England, Germany and the Netherlands, 8-13 percent attend services weekly or more, 16-19 percent pray daily and 13-16 percent report a high level of religiosity (i.e. they score 8 or higher on the 1–10 scale of self-reported religiosity). In Sweden the corresponding percentages are rather low, with 4 percent for attendance and 8 percent for prayer and high religiosity. This quick glance at the data shows that in terms of religious contexts of immigrant reception, Sweden is the most secularized of the four comparison countries in light of the large share of non-affiliates as well as low levels of religiosity among the affiliated. The Netherlands, although similar to Sweden in terms of the share of non-affiliates, resembles England and Germany in terms of levels of religiosity. Overall, these three countries host a significant minority of actively religious persons, but the majority of the general population is not strongly involved with religion in all four countries under study.

In addition to the religiosity of the general population, the way in which religion is regulated by the state and to what extent religious minority rights are recognized is an important aspect of the religious context of reception that immigrants encounter. The four countries under study also differ in this respect. The Dutch history of religious pluralism and state neutrality – also referred to as 'pillarization' (Lijphart 1968) – has provided many opportunities for religious minority groups to build their own religious institutions. The legacy of state churches as they were historically established in both England and Sweden has been argued to have facilitated the recognition of religious minority rights, because minorities could lobby for state recognition of their religious rights on the basis of equality principles in these countries, resulting in

relatively advanced accommodation of religious minority rights (Fetzer & Soper 2005). Of the four countries under study, Germany is often described as the least favorable institutional context for religious minorities, particularly Muslims, because it has not systematically extended its system of state funding for religious activities to religious newcomers (Doomernik 1995).

The countries studied the comparative volume "Growing up in Diverse Societies" (Kalter et al. 2018) do not only constitute different religious contexts of reception for newcomers, they also host different types of migrants. In line with country-specific histories of migration (Jonsson 2018), the ethnic and religious composition of the minority population differs between the four countries. For instance, ethnic minorities in Sweden more often arrived as refugees and, compared to labor and post-colonial migrants, are likely to experience more insecurity – both existential and economic – and might therefore be more religious than other migrants (Norris & Inglehart 2011).[1] Moreover, post-colonial migrants in Britain are often Muslims and therefore religious 'others' from the majority perspective, while post-colonial migrants in the Netherlands are predominantly Christian and therefore resemble the native majority more. I will address these differences by presenting country-specific findings and by examining individual religiosity as a function of immigrant generation and origin country.

2.2 Religious Change?

Previous research on immigrant religion in Europe based on adult samples identified a common pattern: compared to non-migrants, immigrants are more often affiliated with a religion and many are affiliated to a religion that is not historically rooted in the destination country, in particular Islam (Voas & Fleischmann 2012). Moreover, immigrants in European societies are found to have higher levels of religiosity in general than natives (van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011). Some scholars have predicted that the elevated levels of religiosity among first generation immigrants in Europe would decline with increasing length of stay and across immigrant generations based on general assimilation processes. The assimilation approach in migration studies posits that over time immigrants will become more similar to the majority population

[1] Religion provides people with absolute rules and assures that following these rules will help them guarantee a secure future in this world or the next. People who experience higher levels of existential and economic insecurities are more likely to feel stressed about their unpredictable future and have the need for the rules posed by religious ideologies (Norris & Inglehart 2011).

of their host societies (Alba & Nee 1997, Gordon 1964, Park 1950). In the religious contexts of immigrant reception in the North-Western European countries I described, this would imply an adaptation to the pattern of secularization. This should be evident through a trend of intergenerational decline in religiosity.

However, the expectation of secularization among immigrants has been contrasted with the alternative scenarios of religious stability and religious revival. Religious stability can be argued from the segmented assimilation perspective (e.g. Zhou 1997a), which posits that different dimensions of assimilation need not co-occur. More specifically, assimilation in the economic domain could be accompanied by the maintenance of immigrant cultures, including religion, across generations. As parental religiosity is among the most important predictors of individuals' religiosity (e.g. Myers 1996), and given the large contrast in religiosity between the first generation and the native majority, I would also expect relatively high levels of dissimilarity between majority and minority youth in the second generation based on this perspective.

Finally, arguments for a religious revival – implying increasing religiosity over time and across generations – can be derived from the perspective of 'reactive ethnicity' and the religious market approach. 'Reactive ethnicity' implies the strengthening of immigrant identities in response to negative experiences in the host society, including low socioeconomic status (SES) and discrimination (Portes & Rumbaut 2001); this notion has been extended to and empirically confirmed in the religious realm (e.g. Fleischmann et al. 2011). The theory of religious markets (e.g. Finke & Stark 1998) posits that individuals will be more religious in contexts that offer a broader range of supply of religious goods. Therefore, the increasing religious diversity that comes with international migration would increase competition on the religious market and thus contribute to increasing religiosity.

3 Studying Religion and Religiosity with CILS4EU

In light of these contextual settings and competing theoretical perspectives regarding intergenerational change, I now study religion among youth with the help of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) data (Kalter et al. 2016a). More specifically, I start by describing how religious minority and majority youth are in Sweden, the

Netherlands, Germany and England.[2] To answer this question, I study four aspects of religion, namely affiliation, prayer, attending religious services and the subjective importance of religion, and I compare majority and minority youth on these indicators. Subsequently, I relate the religiosity of youth – mainly focusing, for reasons of readability, on subjective importance – to possible determinants of individual differences in religiosity. Specifically, in Section 3.2 I will look at differences in religiosity by immigrant generation and country of origin, and I will relate the religiosity of youth to that of their parents. In a fourth step, I examine gender differences in religiosity. Previous research has revealed a gender gap in religious participation among Christian and Muslim populations, with women being more active than men in the case of Christians (Walter & Davie 1998) and an opposite gap for Muslims in terms of service attendance (Meuleman & Billiet 2011). Accordingly, I will be focusing on religious practices as well as religious salience in this particular section (3.3). In the last empirical section (3.4), to explore more of the individual differences in religiosity I focus on education, a commonly studied predictor of religiosity. Within secularization theory, the role of a scientific worldview takes a prominent place, and suggests a negative relationship between individuals' level of education and their level of religiosity (Berger 1967a). Thus, I relate religiosity to the level of education followed by youth by focusing on Germany and the Netherlands with their tracked educational systems.

3.1 Do Minority and Majority Youth Differ in their Religion?

First, I investigate religious affiliation, which I present separately for the four countries and for majority versus minority youth in Table 2.1.[3] In England and the Netherlands most majority youth, over 55 percent in each of the two countries, are not affiliated with any religion. In Sweden and Germany, most majority students (58 and 80 percent) identify as Christians. Compared to majority youth, the share of non-religious and Christians among minority youth is lower in all four countries. Only 11 percent of minority youth are not affiliated with any religion

[2] In accordance with Kalter and Heath (2018), 'minority' students are those with at least one foreign-born parent, i.e. children of immigrants in a literal sense.

[3] For completeness, this and all subsequent tables also show the share of majority and minority youth that are affiliated with other religions than Christianity and Islam. As Table 2.1 makes clear, this concerns a very small group among both majority and minority youth. Point estimates such as the ones presented in this chapter will therefore be much less robust for members of these other religious groups, which is why I do not comment on them in the text.

in Germany, while the corresponding percentages are higher in the other three countries, reaching to over 30 percent in the Netherlands. The religious affiliation with most members among minority youth is Christians in all four countries. They constitute at least 34 percent (in the Netherlands) and up to 54 percent (in Germany) of the minority youth. Clearly, then, Islam is not the most prominent religion among minority youth; nevertheless, this religious affiliation is the most prominent difference among majority and minority youth. While the share of Muslims and other religious groups jointly does not account for over 3 percent of the majority youth population in any of the countries, almost one fourth of minority youth in all countries are affiliated with Islam. Despite the differences in the ethnic make-up of the minority population between the four countries, there are only small country differences in this share, which ranges from 24 percent in England to 31 percent in Germany.

Table 2.1: Religious affiliation by survey country and majority/minority

		Survey country			
		England	**Germany**	**Netherlands**	**Sweden**
Majority	Muslim	0.36	0.20	0.16	0.07
	Christian	42.17	80.13	40.82	57.77
	Other religion	1.80	0.54	1.23	1.48
	Non-religious	55.66	19.14	57.79	40.67
	No. of obs.	2,461	2,590	2,977	2,702
Minority	Muslim	23.55	30.92	27.40	27.91
	Christian	37.64	54.04	33.95	41.09
	Other religion	12.09	3.77	7.22	4.85
	Non-religious	26.72	11.27	31.43	26.15
	No. of obs.	1,533	2,304	1,340	2,048

Note: Design-weighted values; numbers of observations are displayed unweighted.

To assess individual differences in religiosity, I examine: (1) the frequency of prayer; (2) religious service attendance; and (3) the subjective importance of religion. These measures correspond to religious practices and religious identity and thus capture two of the most important and most widely studied dimensions of religiosity (Voas 2007).[4] I contrast those who pray daily with those who pray less frequently, and I compare youth who pay weekly visits to the church or mosque to those who attend less often. Regarding the subjective importance of religion

[4] Note that this chapter does not address religious beliefs. While considered a core element of religiosity in addition to religious practices and identity (Voas 2007), religious beliefs are more difficult to study in comparative research that includes multiple religious groups, as the content of the beliefs that are important to believers will differ across affiliations.

('religious identity'), I use the answer to the question 'How important is religion to you?' and contrast those who answered 'fairly important' and 'very important' to those who answered 'not very important' or 'not important at all'. Results are shown in Table 2.2.

I observe that, regardless of religious affiliation, daily prayer (a) is significantly less prevalent among majority adolescents compared to minority youth. The percentage of majority youth who prays daily is 10 and 8 in the Netherlands and Germany, respectively, 4 percent in England and 1.4 percent in Sweden. The share of minority youth praying daily is lowest in Sweden again, with 11 percent, and largest in the Netherlands, with 26 percent. The frequency of prayer of minority youth differs substantially across affiliations. Specifically, with rates of daily prayer between 22 percent (in Sweden) and 54.5 percent (in England), Muslim minorities take the lead in praying in all countries except the Netherlands, where the 41 percent of Christian minorities who report they pray daily surpass the 36 percent of Muslims who state the same.

Similar to daily prayers, weekly visits to religious meeting places (b) are found to be more widespread among minority than majority youth. The share of majority youth who attend services weekly is below 8 percent in all countries, falling down to as low as 3 percent in the Netherlands. However, among minority youth over 10 percent attend religious services weekly in all countries, and this share reaches 26 percent in England. This country has the largest share of highly religious minority youth in terms of attendance: 32 percent of Christians and 44 percent of Muslims in England visit religious meeting places once a week or more. In Germany and the Netherlands, the respective percentages are much lower, but in both countries Muslims more often attend religious services than Christian minority youth. The opposite is true in Sweden, however, where Muslims have the lowest rates of weekly attendance at 12 percent, which is only slightly higher than the 9 percent among affiliated majority youth and even lower than the 17 percent among Christian minority youth.

Table 2.2: Religiosity of majority and minority students by country of survey according to different indicators

a) Daily prayer (%)

		Survey country			
		England	**Germany**	**Netherlands**	**Sweden**
Majority	Religious	8.72	8.64	20.39	2.29
	Non-religious	0.17	2.95	2.04	0.11
	All	3.97	7.57	9.72	1.40
	No. of obs.	2,413	2,535	2,954	2,607
Minority	Muslim	54.46	29.86	35.66	22.28
	Christian	23.25	12.62	40.55	9.61
	Other religion	22.38	14.14	30.44	8.01
	Non-religious	0.49	0.57	0.06	0.87
	All	24.30	16.53	25.77	10.70
	No. of obs.	1,481	2,234	1,326	1,924

b) Weekly service attendance (%)

		Survey country			
		England	**Germany**	**Netherlands**	**Sweden**
Majority	Religious	14.44	6.47	6.97	8.82
	Non-religious	1.67	1.31	0.09	2.67
	All	7.33	5.50	2.99	6.32
	No. of obs.	2,408	2,542	2,954	2,605
Minority	Muslim	43.63	31.54	22.06	12.16
	Christian	31.89	13.19	17.90	16.62
	Other religion	27.97	10.25	8.42	13.71
	Non-religious	3.20	1.30	0.03	0.98
	All	26.44	17.38	12.76	11.12
	No. of obs.	1,479	2,240	1,331	1,927

c) Religious salience ('very important' and 'fairly important') (%)

		Survey country			
		England	**Germany**	**Netherlands**	**Sweden**
Majority	Religious	47.31	32.84	31.24	20.96
	Non-religious	5.50	6.06	5.34	2.63
	All	24.17	27.82	16.28	13.57
	No. of obs.	2,400	2,539	2,932	2,593
Minority	Muslim	93.42	91.61	94.15	85.66
	Christian	69.08	49.50	67.80	48.65
	Other religion	73.92	67.92	54.88	63.63
	Non-religious	9.58	3.39	8.77	7.05
	All	59.72	58.27	55.63	48.67
	No. of obs.	1,487	2,251	1,321	1,926

Note: Design-weighted values. Numbers of observations are displayed unweighted.

The two indicators of religious practices that I study – prayer and service attendance – thus show important differences between majority and minority youth, between countries and religious affiliations. Likewise, I observe these differences when asking youth about their religious identity: for majority members, the subjective importance of religion is much lower than for minority members. In Germany, 28 percent of the majority youth state that religion is (very) important to them; in England this is 24 percent. The corresponding percentages are lower in the Netherlands (16 percent) and Sweden (14 percent). When it comes to minority members, at least 49 percent (Sweden) and up to 60 percent (England) of youth indicate high levels of religious salience. Regarding differences along the lines of religious affiliation, I observe that large proportions of Christian minority youth score highly on religious salience and these shares are consistently higher than majority youth in the same country. Nonetheless, Muslims stand out most clearly on this indicator as religion is indisputably most salient among Muslims in all countries. Over 90 percent of Muslim adolescents in England, Germany and the Netherlands describe their religion as (very) important, and the corresponding percentage is only marginally lower in Sweden at 86 percent.

In summary, common patterns in all four countries can be observed: minority youth more often identify themselves as being affiliated to a religion than majority youth; minorities pray more often, they more often attend religious service meetings and religion is more important to them than it is for majority youth.

In terms of country differences, the patterns are less straightforward. Muslims are least religious in Sweden and most religious in England, with Germany and the Netherlands in-between. In terms of weekly service attendance and subjective importance of religion, majority youth and Christian minority youth are most active in England and least active in Sweden. When it comes to daily prayers, on the other hand, majority and Christian minority youth are most religious in the Netherlands. Considering that the share of the affiliated youth, both among the minority and the majority, is the smallest in England and the Netherlands in the data, those who are affiliated in those countries are also the most devoted in terms of religious practices. In contrast, in Sweden and more so in Germany, the higher rates of religious affiliation do not translate into active religious practice among the affiliated. In both countries, even though over 50 percent of youth state that they are affiliated with a religion, in practice only a small minority are engaged with religious rituals. These country differences echo the findings from the general population based

on the European Social Survey, which gives me confidence that the patterns I identified are not idiosyncratic to the CILS4EU data.

So far, I have not taken into account the ethnic background of minority youth, which also could be correlated with religion. To have a better understanding of these explanatory factors for the religiosity of youth across countries, I also conducted multivariate analyses using the full scale of religious salience as dependent variable. Country-specific findings are presented in the Appendix (Tables 2.A1-2.A4). These analyses show that the extent to which youth report religion to be important in their lives differs mainly across religious affiliations, with Muslims scoring highest in all four countries.

In Germany, ethnic group differences in religious salience disappear when religious affiliation is taken into account. In England, only Caribbeans and sub-Saharan Africans show significant differences in the full multivariate model. In the Netherlands and Sweden, however, more differences between youth from different origin countries persist even after religious affiliation is taken into account. Strikingly, the origin groups that still show significant differences are all from Muslim-majority countries such as Turkey, Kosovo, Iraq and the Middle East region. This suggests that on top of generally heightened levels of religious salience among Muslim youth compared to non-Muslim youth, youngsters from these countries report religion to be even more important in their lives.

3.2 Religion across Immigrant Generations

In this section, I compare the religiosity of majority and minority youth across generations. I focus my investigation on religious salience only. The CILS4EU data allow me to compare the religiosity of youth to that of their parents in terms of religious salience,[5] but not to other indicators of religiosity. I first relate religious salience of youth to migrant generation, distinguishing between youth without a (strong) migration background and minority youth who are first generation (foreign born), second generation, children of transnational marriages and children of mixed marriages in Figure 2.1 (see Kalter and Heath (2018) for the logic behind this

[5] One parent of each participant in CILS4EU was requested to also complete a written questionnaire, and this included the same question on religious salience that was answered by the child.

generational classification). In the next step, I move from migrant generations to generational change within one family and compare parent-child dyads in their levels of religious salience.

Comparisons across Generational Status

We have already seen that majority youth have lower levels of religious salience than minority youth. Figure 2.1 further splits up this finding among the minorities and shows that religious salience is highest among second-generation immigrant youth. Remarkably, foreign-born youth are consistently less religious in terms of salience in all four countries than the pure second generation. This comparison across migrant generations therefore points in the direction of intergenerational increase, rather than decrease, in religiosity. However, it is difficult to draw conclusions on intergenerational change based on the comparison in Figure 2.1, as foreign-born youth might have arrived in the host country at a very young age and thus be largely similar to the 'second generation' in terms of exposure to the secularized contexts of reception. Moreover, these findings may also mirror changes in the composition of religious groups between different immigrant generations. For example, religious groups with higher religiosity such as Muslims may be less prevalent among recent migrants compared to the more established second generation.

Thus, I further test the effect of migrant generation on religious salience by controlling for religious affiliation; my findings from these multivariate analyses (see Tables 2.A1 to 2.A4 in the Appendix) show that when I compare the foreign born to the second generation, I do not find any significant differences in religious salience. When comparing to the majority youth, I find that in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, even after controlling for affiliation (as well as ethnicity and gender), both foreign-born and second-generation youth are more religious than youth with no strong migration background. In terms of secularizing forces, one would expect that children of intermarried couples (e.g. Turkish-German) are less religious compared to children who have two minority parents (e.g. Turkish-Turkish), and indeed this is what my findings suggest.

Figure 2.1: Religious salience ('very important' and 'fairly important') by survey country and generational status



Note: Design-weighted. N=17,512

Comparisons across Parent-Child Dyads

To get a better understanding of intergenerational change in religiosity, I examine how the subjective importance of religion of youth relates to the importance that their parents attach to religion in their lives, as reported in parental questionnaires. Table 2.3 shows that while there is substantial intergenerational stability in terms of subjective religious importance, there are also considerable rates of change. Where change occurs, a decrease in religious salience from parents to children is more common. Yet there are also substantial shares of youth who report a higher importance of religion in their lives than their parents do.

Table 2.3: Intergenerational change in religious salience between parents and children, by religious affiliation (%)

		Intergenerational change in religious salience			
		Decrease	**Stability**	**Increase**	**Correlation**
England	*Majority*				
	Religious*	50.09	38.17	11.74	0.37
	Non-religious	22.71	50.27	27.02	-0.03
	All	42.48	41.53	15.98	0.39
	No of obs.	452	437	175	
	Minority				
	Muslim	14.06	80.87	5.07	0.56
	Christian	48.08	41.81	10.10	0.60
	Other religion	49.47	41.15	9.38	-0.17
	Non-religious	33.87	36.90	29.23	-0.10
	All	40.47	46.77	12.49	0.62
	No of obs.	140	237	64	
Germany	*Majority*				
	Religious	43.55	41.03	15.42	0.31
	Non-religious	24.93	51.93	23.14	0.12
	All	39.74	43.26	17.00	0.38
	No of obs.	784	912	370	
	Minority				
	Muslim	22.74	59.61	17.65	0.34
	Christian	50.16	38.17	11.67	0.42
	Other religion	56.49	35.08	8.44	0.45
	Non-religious	25.08	44.82	30.10	-0.00
	All	38.85	45.50	15.65	0.51
	No of obs.	534	820	308	
Nether-lands	*Majority*				
	Religious*	52.30	38.23	9.47	0.30
	Non-religious	34.09	46.00	19.91	0.03
	All	46.27	40.80	12.92	0.33
	No of obs.	1,087	1,049	301	
	Minority				
	Muslim	27.09	55.93	16.98	0.13
	Christian	42.36	45.88	11.76	0.57
	Other religion	41.39	48.43	10.18	0.29
	Non-religious	34.49	35.95	29.56	0.11
	All	38.02	45.16	16.82	0.59
	No of obs.	261	328	120	

Note: Design-weighted values; numbers of observations are displayed unweighted.
* Religious affiliation stated by parents.

Table 2.3 (continued): Intergenerational change in religious salience between parents and children, by religious affiliation (%)

		Intergenerational change in religious salience			
		Decrease	**Stability**	**Increase**	**Correlation**
Sweden	*Majority*				
	Religious	42.60	42.89	14.52	0.37
	Non-religious	18.68	57.87	23.45	0.18
	All	34.84	47.75	17.41	0.36
	No of obs.	583	840	351	
	Minority				
	Muslim	22.29	54.42	23.28	0.50
	Christian	40.37	40.20	19.43	0.49
	Other religion	44.34	30.05	25.61	0.05
	Non-religious	16.23	46.41	37.36	0.05
	All	30.77	44.35	24.89	0.52
	No of obs.	256	436	254	

Note: Design-weighted values; numbers of observations are displayed unweighted.
* Religious affiliation stated by parents.

When I further unpack this general trend, I observe that over 50 percent of majority youth have deviated from their parents' level of subjective religious importance and this deviation is largely in the direction of lower subjective religious importance. At least 35 percent of majority youth in the four countries indicated less subjective importance than their parents, and only around 15 percent more, the remainder showing intergenerational stability. Among Christian minority youth, I observe that 40 percent or more have lower levels of religiosity than their parents.

The rate of intergenerational decline in subjective religiosity is much smaller among Muslim youth. Around 17 percent of Muslim youth in the Netherlands, 18 percent in Germany and 23 percent in Sweden indicate that religion is more important to them than to their parents. In England, the corresponding share is lower at 5 percent, but at the same time the proportion of Muslim youth who report less religious salience than their parents is only 14 percent while approximately 80 percent state the same level of religiosity as their parents. This high level of stability notwithstanding, the trend goes in the direction of decrease rather than increase in England, just as in Germany and the Netherlands. Only in Sweden is the share of Muslims who have lower levels of subjective religiosity compared to their parents roughly the same as the share of Muslim youth who show intergenerational increase in religious salience.

Although Table 2.3 makes it clear that there is no perfect association between parental religious salience and the religious salience of their children, the considerable stability suggests that the association between the two is positive. Indeed, bivariate correlations are in the range of r = 0.4 to r = 0.5, which implies moderately strong associations (results not shown). When parental religious salience is entered in the multivariate analysis of youth's religious salience, I find, in line with previous research on the importance of religious socialization (e.g. Myers 1996), that this is a positive predictor in all countries (see Models 3 in Tables 2.A1 to 2.A4 in the Appendix). The association is among the few to survive in the multivariate regressions even after controls for origin group, generation, gender, affiliation and parental SES are taken into account. In fact, parental religious salience is the only predictor on top of religious affiliation that is highly significant in all countries regardless of model specifications. This attests to the central role of parental religiosity in shaping the religiosity of youth in Europe.[6]

3.3 Gender and Religion

This section examines gender differences in religious affiliation and religious practice. While I do not expect any differences in religious affiliation, the participation in religious practices is likely to differ between girls and boys. Among adult and mainly Christian populations, women have repeatedly been found to be more religiously active than men (e.g. Thompson 1991, Walter & Davie 1998). This finding stands in contrast with Muslim communities where service attendance is substantially lower among women than among men (Meuleman & Billiet 2011), although some studies suggest that this gender gap in religious participation of Muslims may diminish in the context of migration (Predelli 2008).

Looking at the CILS4EU data, I observe that having no religious affiliation is more predominant among boys than girls (results not shown). This is true for both majority and minority youth and in all four survey countries, except for minorities in Germany where a gender gap in affiliation is absent. Moreover, in all four countries the percentage of majority girls praying daily is slightly higher than that of boys. A similar gender gap in praying is observed among

[6] However, note that due to a lower response in parental over youth questionnaires, the number of valid cases in the multivariate models drops substantially in all countries once we enter parental characteristics (see Tables 2.A1-2.A4 for information about the N in each model). Comparisons between models with and without parental characteristics must therefore be conducted with great care as they are based on different samples.

Christian minority youth. However, for Muslims the difference is in the opposite direction as the percentage of Muslim girls praying daily is somewhat lower than the percentage of Muslim boys. Except for England where almost an equal proportion of majority girls and boys indicated high levels religious salience, religion is distinctly more salient among girls than boys in all countries, and most specifically in Germany. This is also the case for Christian minority girls and boys in England, Germany and Sweden, whereas the opposite holds true in the Netherlands. This gender difference in religious salience also remains significant in the three countries in multivariate analyses (see Tables 2.A1 to 2.A4 in the Appendix).

Figure 2.2: Weekly service attendance by survey country, majority/minority and gender



Note: Design-weighted. N=17,475

It is with regard to service attendance that most outspoken gender differences are expected, particularly among Muslims, based on previous research among adults. Among the majority youth and Christian minorities, I observe barely any gender gaps in service attendance (see Figure 2.2). For Muslim minority youth, however, the difference is quite sharp and consistent across all countries. The share of girls visiting religious meeting places weekly or more is evidently smaller than the share of Muslim boys. Interestingly, although the overall percentage of

Muslim minority youth visiting religious meeting places weekly is higher than the corresponding share among Christian minority youth, the proportion of Muslim girls paying weekly visits is lower than among Christian minority girls in England, the Netherlands and Sweden and also than majority religious girls in Sweden. The frequency of religious practices of Muslim girls is more similar to Christian minorities and even religious majority youth in the four countries. Therefore, the higher levels of religious practices that I found among Muslim youth are accounted for, by a substantial amount, by the elevated religiosity of Muslim boys. Overall, however, gender gaps in religiosity are minor compared to the differences I observed in Section 3.1 between majority and minority youth and between different affiliations.

3.4 Religion and Education

In the final empirical section of this chapter, I relate the religious salience of majority and minority youth to their level of education. Education is among the most widely studied predictors of individual religiosity and a prominent explanation for long-term trends of secularization. The declining rates of church membership and church attendance have been linked to processes of modernization and educational expansion (e.g. Wilson 1982). One variant of secularization theory in the sociology of religion focuses on the notion of scientific worldview (Berger 1967a). This notion holds that scientific explanations of natural phenomena increasingly render religious accounts for existential questions less important, and therefore the higher educated – who are more knowledgeable about scientific phenomena and more used to applying the scientific method of doubting and searching for empirical evidence – are likely to be less religious.

Throughout the comparative volume "Growing up in Diverse Societies" (Kalter et al. 2018) we study adolescents whose eventual educational attainment is not yet known. Therefore, it is difficult to assess the relation between education and religiosity in the data. However, the tracked educational systems in Germany and the Netherlands provide an opportunity to study this association, assuming that youth attending more academically oriented educational tracks will have more of a scientific worldview than those attending more vocationally oriented tracks.[7] Table 2.4 therefore shows the share of majority and minority youth, by religious affiliation,

[7] I also examined self-reported school performance, which is available for youth in all countries. However, unlike the distribution across tracks, self-reported performance does not differ between majority and minority students and therefore cannot illuminate the majority-minority gap in religiosity that I find.

who report high levels of religious salience as a function of the educational track they are currently attending. In Germany, I differentiate between lower secondary tracks ('Hauptschule'; note that this category also includes special needs education), intermediary tracks ('Realschule'), upper secondary tracks ('Gymnasium') and comprehensive schools (this category includes schools offering multiple tracks and Rudolf Steiner schools). In the Netherlands, I differentiate between more applied and more theoretical tracks at the lower secondary level (vmbo-b/k v. vmbo-g/t, respectively), the intermediate (havo) and upper secondary level (vwo, including international schools).

Table 2.4: Religious salience ('very important' and 'fairly important') by majority/minority and educational tracks

Survey country			**Educational tracks**			
			Lower secondary	**Interme-diary secondary**	**Upper secondary**	**Comprehen-sive**
Germany	*Majority*	Religious	28.28	30.33	40.97	25.49
		Non-religious	3.76	13.90	8.85	3.88
		All	24.95	29.31	36.44	16.50
		No. of obs.	**597**	**750**	**625**	**567**
	Minority	Muslim	91.59	89.02	91.81	95.51
		Christian	53.14	46.44	47.85	52.95
		Other religion	80.24	24.99	87.49	74.18
		Non-religious	5.67	3.10	2.71	3.66
		All	68.59	55.39	50.21	59.44
		No. of obs.	**916**	**555**	**351**	**429**
			vmbo-b/k	**vmbo-g/t**	**havo**	**vwo/es/ib**
Nether-lands	*Majority*	Religious	27.80	25.59	47.24	40.91
		Non-religious	2.36	5.76	6.23	7.34
		All	13.35	15.50	20.38	17.70
		No. of obs.	**642**	**1,059**	**628**	**603**
	Minority	Muslim	94.80	91.25	96.50	96.69
		Christian	77.28	65.33	85.23	51.89
		Other religion	86.44	24.20	78.23	87.79
		Non-religious	9.31	6.80	7.82	10.88
		All	65.66	54.65	59.11	43.96
		No. of obs.	**494**	**394**	**240**	**193**

Note: Design-weighted values; numbers of observations are displayed unweighted.

The findings show an interesting contrast between majority and minority students in Germany. Among German majority youth I observe that religious salience is highest among students in

the upper secondary track and lowest at the lower secondary level. Among minority youth in Germany, however, the opposite trend is visible: the share of students with high religious salience is highest at the lower secondary level and decreases systematically in the intermediate and upper secondary tracks. However, this pattern does not hold for Muslim youth, as the share of Muslim youth with high religious salience is more or less the same in each school track.

In the Netherlands, majority youth show a pattern of higher religious salience in higher tracks, namely intermediary and upper secondary tracks. With respect to minority youth, I find that students in the applied tracks at the lower secondary level have higher levels of religious salience than those in the more academically oriented variants. However, there is no clear decreasing trend for religious salience among minority youth across the higher tracks, as the share of youth with high religious salience is higher in the intermediate tracks than those in the upper secondary tracks.

The pattern of increasing religiosity with higher tracks among German majority youth and decreasing religiosity with higher tracks among Christian minorities in Germany already suggests that there is no straightforward, universal link between higher education and lower religiosity among youth. The results from multivariate analyses (not shown) provide further support for this interpretation. In Germany, educational track is no longer significant when origin country, generation, gender, affiliation and parental characteristics, that is, religiosity and socioeconomic background, are included. In the Netherlands, I find the same pattern observed among majority youth in Table 2.4, as religious salience is significantly higher in higher tracks in the multivariate models. This suggests that the patterns I observe among the largest share of youth in Table 2.4 are robust and not due to composition effects shaped by the selectivity of different school types in terms of the ethnicity, generational status and parental religiosity of the students they attract.

4 Conclusion

Because religion has moved to the center of scholarly and societal debates about the integration of immigrants and their children, this chapter examined religion among majority and minority youth growing up in Europe today. The answer to our first research question – how many youths are affiliated to a religion, and if so, which one? – is that minority youth on average are more

often affiliated than majority youth, in line with previous findings among adult samples (van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011). Contrary to what the emphasis on Islam in European debates about immigrant religion would suggest (Alba 2005, Foner & Alba 2008), however, Christianity is a more common religious affiliation among minority youth, and only between a fourth and a third of the minority youth in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden self-identify as Muslims. However, Muslim youth were revealed to be the most religious on all accounts and therefore clearly stand out from youth with other affiliations. They were found to engage in daily prayer and attend weekly religious services much more frequently than Christian minority youth, who in turn practice more than religious majority youth. These high levels of religious practice among Muslims were particularly strong among boys, with Muslim girls showing lower levels of involvement in religious practices in terms of mosque visits. This suggests that the gender difference in religious practice that is typical in Muslim communities is not reversing among youth growing up in Europe, but rather that religiosity is most persistent among male members of the Muslim community, in line with earlier research (Diehl & Koenig 2009).

My findings about systematic differences in the levels of religious practice across religious groups, and among Muslims between boys and girls, need to be appreciated in the light of overall low levels of religiosity among the adolescents that I studied. The majority of youth do not engage in daily prayer or attend weekly services. Yet this does not mean that religion has ceased to be important in their lives. Considerable shares of youth, also in the majority population, reported that religion is fairly or very important for them. Furthermore, with regard to religious salience, Muslim youth were found to stand out as an overwhelming majority in all four countries indicating high or very high levels of importance of religion. This finding is in line with earlier research among adult Muslim minorities who have repeatedly scored extremely highly on measures of religious identification, including the importance of religion to the self (Verkuyten 2007).

Combining this finding of very high levels of religious importance, particularly among Muslim youth, with the moderate levels of religious participation that I observed, this overview of the religiosity of youth in Europe suggests that at this life stage for many youth attachment to religion is quite symbolic and does not translate into strict observance of religious rituals. It might be that some youth intend to and eventually will practice more when they become older, but it

is equally conceivable that the subjective importance of religion – as the identity component of religiosity – is the longest-lasting element where underlying religious practices point in the direction of religious decline and differences between religious groups have become merely symbolic (Gans 1994). With the notable exception of Muslim minorities, the religion of youth in Europe can best be described as a form of 'fuzzy fidelity' (Voas 2009), where religion continues to have meaning as an identity marker without strong implications for individual behavior. Sociologists of religion have linked both symbolic religion and fuzzy fidelity to further religious decline, and the expectation would therefore be that, particularly among majority and Christian minority youth, the rates of religious practice and ultimately also religious identification would further diminish in the future.

This expectation of religious decline is further supported by my comparison of the religious salience of youth with that of their parents. In all groups, including Muslim minorities, and most countries, the changes were in the direction of religious decline rather than increase, though I also found quite a lot of stability (de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014, Jacob & Kalter 2013). However, we should be careful of drawing strong conclusions about a clear trend towards secularization based on these findings. For one, the comparison of parent-child dyads and the age of the youth samples under study imply that we are comparing individuals at very different stages of their life cycle. It is possible that religiosity increases over the life course, particularly at crucial events such as marriage and childbirth (Stolzenberg et al. 1995). Thus, the youth who now report lower levels of religiosity than their parents may step up their religious practice as well as salience by the time they reach the age their parents were when completing the questionnaire. On the other hand, however, one study on adolescent and adult Muslim minorities, aged 15 to 45 in the Netherlands, suggested a decline of religious practices with increasing age (van de Pol & van Tubergen 2014), which is in line with other research on the increasing risk of losing faith later in life among Christians in the Netherlands (Need & de Graaf 1996). At the same time, my intergenerational comparison also revealed that a share of youth – both among the majority and the minority – are more devoted to religion than their parents (Maliepaard & Alba 2015). Among Muslims in Sweden this share was actually just as large as the share that showed intergenerational decline. This is particularly interesting in light of the finding that, on all other accounts, Muslims in Sweden are the least religious compared to Muslims in the other three survey countries. Together, these findings suggest that despite overall low levels of religious practice and a pattern of intergenerational decline rather than

increase among majority and minority youth, Christians and Muslims, religion still has significance in the daily lives of youth growing up in Europe today. To what extent religion also matters for other outcomes of youth, such as their family values, interethnic ties and attitudes, is addressed in other chapters in the comparative volume "Growing up in Diverse Societies" (Kalter et al. 2018).

Appendix

Table 2.A1: Multivariate analysis of religious salience, England

	M1		M2		M3	
Origin groups *(Ref.: Majority and North-West-South Europe)*						
Eastern Europe	0.149		0.075		0.339	
	(0.243)		(0.192)		(0.337)	
Caribbean	0.444	***	0.476	***	0.563	**
	(0.159)		(0.145)		(0.225)	
Middle East & North Africa	-0.053		-0.305		-0.290	
	(0.208)		(0.187)		(0.246)	
Pakistan	1.319	***	0.447	***	0.170	
	(0.147)		(0.148)		(0.167)	
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.888	***	0.636	***	0.620	**
	(0.175)		(0.155)		(0.238)	
Asia	-0.213		-0.027		-0.167	
	(0.174)		(0.129)		(0.201)	
India	0.656	***	0.307	*	0.084	
	(0.211)		(0.174)		(0.196)	
Other	-0.016		0.113		0.330	*
	(0.235)		(0.169)		(0.200)	
Generational status *(Ref.: Majority)*						
Born abroad	0.416	*	0.090		-0.041	
	(0.179)		(0.141)		(0.187)	
2nd generation	0.826	***	0.229		0.082	
	(0.148)		(0.139)		(0.148)	
Child of transnational marriage	0.480	**	0.066		0.214	
	(0.174)		(0.165)		(0.146)	
Child of intermarriage	0.063		-0.068		-0.121	
	(0.127)		(0.121)		(0.155)	
Gender *(Ref.: Male)*						
Female	0.158	**	0.049		-0.005	
	(0.047)		(0.039)		(0.059)	
Religious affiliation *(Ref.: non-religious)*						
Muslim			1.864	***	1.616	***
			(0.091)		(0.190)	
Christian			1.068	***	0.826	***
			(0.046)		(0.077)	
Other religion			1.394	***	1.121	***
			(0.102)		(0.290)	
Highest parental occupation (ISEI)/10					0.028	*
					(0.014)	
Parental religious salience					0.221	***
					(0.045)	
% non-religious peers in school/10					-0.017	
					(0.020)	
Intercept	0.826	***	0.394	***	0.171	
	(0.041)		(0.029)		(0.148)	
No. of obs.	3,879		3,879		1,467	
R^2	0.207		0.477		0.430	

Note: Deign-weighted, accounting for clustering; standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Religious salience ranges from 0 (not at all important) to 3 (very important)

Table 2.A2: Multivariate analysis of religious salience, Germany

	M1		M2		M3	
Origin groups *(Ref.: Majority and North-West-South Europe)*						
Italy	0.246		0.210		0.019	
	(0.146)		(0.143)		(0.127)	
Eastern Europe	-0.092		-0.126		-0.251	
	(0.205)		(0.196)		(0.220)	
Poland	-0.033		-0.031		-0.078	
	(0.125)		(0.123)		(0.139)	
Russia	-0.223		-0.197		-0.109	
	(0.147)		(0.146)		(0.135)	
Serbia	0.500	**	0.027		-0.121	
	(0.178)		(0.184)		(0.219)	
Middle East & North Africa	0.420	*	0.132		-0.012	
	(0.183)		(0.187)		(0.176)	
Turkey	0.834	***	0.294	*	0.003	
	(0.122)		(0.148)		(0.148)	
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.473	**	0.313	*	0.240	
	(0.158)		(0.143)		(0.156)	
Asia	-0.230		-0.164		-0.081	
	(0.209)		(0.208)		(0.242)	
Other	-0.064		-0.101		0.000	
	(0.180)		(0.175)		(0.186)	
Generational status *(Ref.: Majority)*						
Born abroad	0.404	**	0.349	**	0.173	
	(0.134)		(0.119)		(0.126)	
2nd generation	0.581	***	0.383	***	0.217	
	(0.114)		(0.107)		(0.121)	
Child of transnational marriage	0.220		0.070		0.141	
	(0.133)		(0.122)		(0.120)	
Child of intermarriage	0.051		0.061		0.007	
	(0.116)		(0.112)		(0.114)	
Gender *(Ref.: Male)*						
Female	0.241	***	0.207	***	0.185	***
	(0.047)		(0.046)		(0.041)	
Religious affiliation *(Ref.: non-religious)*						
Muslim			1.582	***	1.431	***
			(0.109)		(0.114)	
Christian			0.839	***	0.595	***
			(0.055)		(0.076)	
Other religion			1.219	***	1.084	***
			(0.164)		(0.224)	
Highest parental occupation (ISEI)/10					0.012	
					(0.009)	
Parental religious salience					0.289	***
					(0.025)	
% non-religious peers in school/10					0.011	
					(0.011)	
Intercept	0.957	***	0.288	***	0.023	
	(0.039)		(0.043)		(0.093)	
No. of obs.	4,790		4,790		3,628	
R^2	0.188		0.324		0.358	

Note: Deign-weighted, accounting for clustering; standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Religious salience ranges from 0 (not at all important) to 3 (very important)

Table 2.A3: Multivariate analysis of religious salience, the Netherlands

	M1		M2		M3	
Origin groups *(Ref.: Majority and North-West-South Europe)*						
Eastern Europe	0.245		0.067		0.175	
	(0.256)		(0.230)		(0.203)	
Caribbean	0.263		0.148		-0.062	
	(0.221)		(0.207)		(0.219)	
Suriname	0.234		0.009		-0.038	
	(0.159)		(0.175)		(0.231)	
Middle East & North Africa	1.008	***	0.736	***	0.865	***
	(0.159)		(0.208)		(0.208)	
Morocco	1.067	***	0.756	***	0.502	
	(0.146)		(0.207)		(0.256)	
Turkey	1.078	***	0.741	***	0.646	**
	(0.119)		(0.190)		(0.204)	
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.892	***	0.717	***	0.555	**
	(0.182)		(0.161)		(0.204)	
Asia	0.132		0.161		0.166	
	(0.177)		(0.155)		(0.178)	
Other	0.104		-0.080		-0.040	
	(0.257)		(0.219)		(0.247)	
Generational status *(Ref.: Majority)*						
Born abroad	0.673	***	0.545	***	0.319	*
	(0.133)		(0.126)		(0.130)	
2nd generation	0.757	***	0.659	***	0.597	**
	(0.127)		(0.139)		(0.207)	
Child of transnational marriage	-0.007		0.082		0.120	
	(0.163)		(0.164)		(0.159)	
Child of intermarriage	0.013		0.074		0.059	
	(0.097)		(0.094)		(0.091)	
Gender *(Ref.: Male)*						
Female	0.186	**	0.146	*	0.125	*
	(0.068)		(0.058)		(0.062)	
Religious affiliation *(Ref.: non-religious)*						
Muslim			0.713	***	0.651	***
			(0.177)		(0.188)	
Christian			0.652	***	0.581	***
			(0.064)		(0.060)	
Other religion			0.660	**	0.534	*
			(0.211)		(0.255)	
Highest parental occupation (ISEI)/10					0.016	
					(0.014)	
Parental religious salience					0.195	***
					(0.035)	
% non-religious peers in school/10					0.016	
					(0.010)	
Intercept	0.742	***	0.485	***	0.105	
	(0.047)		(0.047)		(0.118)	
No. of obs.	4,250		4,250		3,099	
R^2	0.265		0.4397		0.374	

Note: Deign-weighted, accounting for clustering; standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Religious salience ranges from 0 (not at all important) to 3 (very important)

Table 2.A4: Multivariate analysis of religious salience, Sweden

	M1		M2		M3	
Origin groups *(Ref.: Majority and North-West-South Europe)*						
Finland	-0.009		-0.013		-0.148	
	(0.141)		(0.133)		(0.148)	
Eastern Europe	0.268	*	0.186		0.191	
	(0.132)		(0.112)		(0.140)	
Bosnia & Herzegovina	0.711	***	0.310	*	0.340	
	(0.165)		(0.134)		(0.183)	
Kosovo	0.967	***	0.428	***	0.429	*
	(0.138)		(0.124)		(0.196)	
Middle East & North Africa	0.906	***	0.572	***	0.409	**
	(0.137)		(0.118)		(0.153)	
Iraq	1.110	***	0.710	***	0.485	**
	(0.141)		(0.124)		(0.160)	
Turkey	1.214	***	0.830	***	0.690	***
	(0.157)		(0.162)		(0.189)	
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.890	***	0.649	***	0.596	**
	(0.163)		(0.141)		(0.204)	
Somalia	1.588	***	1.001	***	0.653	**
	(0.124)		(0.113)		(0.203)	
Asia	0.011		-0.142		-0.062	
	(0.119)		(0.102)		(0.148)	
Other	0.098		0.093		0.045	
	(0.137)		(0.121)		(0.169)	
Generational status *(Ref.: Majority)*						
Born abroad	0.558	***	0.434	***	0.286	*
	(0.115)		(0.099)		(0.129)	
2nd generation	0.606	***	0.464	***	0.296	*
	(0.126)		(0.109)		(0.131)	
Child of transnational marriage	0.456	***	0.376	***	0.469	***
	(0.121)		(0.104)		(0.132)	
Child of intermarriage	0.004		0.097		0.132	
	(0.096)		(0.086)		(0.111)	
Gender *(Ref.: Male)*						
Female	0.110	***	0.067	*	0.088	**
	(0.031)		(0.030)		(0.033)	
Religious affiliation *(Ref.: non-religious)*						
Muslim			1.174	***	0.826	***
			(0.082)		(0.102)	
Christian			0.704	***	0.538	***
			(0.032)		(0.041)	
Other religion			1.194	***	1.075	***
			(0.116)		(0.154)	

Note: Deign-weighted, accounting for clustering; standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Religious salience ranges from 0 (not at all important) to 3 (very important)

Table 2.A4 (continued): Multivariate analysis of religious salience, Sweden

	M1		M2		M3	
Highest parental occupation (ISEI)/10					-0.015	
					(0.009)	
Parental religious salience					0.272	***
					(0.019)	
% non-religious peers in school/10					-0.031	**
					(0.012)	
Intercept	0.574	***	0.168	***	0.238	**
	(0.027)		(0.022)		(0.073)	
No. of obs.	4,519		4,519		2,670	
R2	0.274		0.411		0.412	

Note: Deign-weighted, accounting for clustering; standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Religious salience ranges from 0 (not at all important) to 3 (very important)

Chapter 3:
Intergenerational Change in Religious Salience Among Immigrant Families in Four European Countries

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Abstract

This article investigates religiosity among immigrant children in four European countries: England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Drawing on major strands of theories in the sociology of religion and of migration, I analyze intergenerational change in religiosity within immigrant families of different religious affiliation and test how far common arguments can contribute to explaining existing patterns. I overcome several challenges and shortcomings in this field by studying adolescent-parent dyads. Using strictly comparable and comprehensive data from the new Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU), I find a considerable stability of religiosity or even an increase therein within Muslim immigrant families, in contrast to Christian immigrant families, whose religiosity declines over generations. This finding is astonishingly stable across the four countries. My analyses furthermore suggest that interfamilial change in religiosity is only weakly related to assimilation processes in other domains of life.

[*] Financial support is acknowledged from NORFACE research programme on Migration in Europe – Social, Economic, Cultural and Policy Dynamics.

[†] For the sake of consistency across chapters, I have rewritten the published version of this article from a first-person perspective, harmonized citation style and American English use and reformulated several sections.

1 Introduction

The role of religion in the intergenerational integration process of immigrants is a topic of major concern in immigration countries on both sides of the Atlantic. Whereas in the United States religion is perceived as a means for successful structural and social integration, in Western European immigration countries strong religious attachment is often assumed to be a barrier rather than a bridge to overall integration (Foner & Alba 2008, Hirschman 2004, but see Connor 2011). Strong religious identities are seen as a reason for failure of immigrant children in the educational system and in the labor market, and as a hindrance to adequate contact with members of the majority population as well as to cultural inclusion (Bisin et al. 2008, Diehl et al. 2009, Foner & Alba 2008). While a large proportion of immigrants in the United States share their Christian background with the on average strongly religious majority population (Cadge & Ecklund 2007), the story is different in Western European countries, where the religious landscape is much more diverse, with Muslim immigrants constituting a considerable part of the overall population (Buijs & Rath 2002; Voas & Fleischmann 2012). Accordingly, the questions of how the religiosity of immigrant groups develops over generations and how it is related to other areas of life are of key interest in almost all European receiving countries (Voas & Fleischmann 2012).

Theoretical arguments in the field of religion and migration research arrive at conflicting expectations about the development of religion and religiosity among immigrants and their descendants in rather secular Western European countries (e.g. Bankston & Zhou 1995, Connor 2010, Diehl & Koenig 2009, Phalet et al. 2008, Smits et al. 2010, van Tubergen 2007). The empirical picture is also far from clear: Whereas some empirical studies basically find a decrease of religious involvement among immigrants (e.g. Connor 2010, Diehl & Schnell 2006, Maliepaard et al. 2010, Phalet et al. 2008, van Tubergen 2007, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011), others report a considerable stability, especially among Muslim immigrants (Diehl & Koenig 2009, Güveli & Platt 2011, Maliepaard et al. 2012, Phalet & ter Wal 2004), or even an increase in immigrants' religious practices (Güveli & Platt 2011, Maliepaard et al. 2012, Smits et al. 2010).

However, comparative research on religious trends among immigrants in Europe suffers from at least two major methodological drawbacks. First, given the various measures of religious affiliation and religiosity, there is no easy way to compare studies that were conducted in

different countries and that examined different immigrant groups and surveyed different points in time (see as a rare exception a recent study by Fleischmann and Phalet 2012). Second, secularization trends among immigrants are often analyzed via trend designs or by analyzing immigrants' religiosity dependent on their length of stay in the country of destination, focusing on trends over time within generations. If it comes to intergenerational change, studies to date have mainly compared synthetic generations. In addition, only a few studies take into account a reference group, thereby neglecting to control for trends in religiosity among the majority population.

This article contributes to research on intergenerational change in religiosity by using data from the new Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU). On the one hand, the study provides strictly comparable measures and designs, which allows me to study immigrant youth and their peers by means of identical analyses across countries. On the other hand, the data include information given by one of the parents; thus I am able to assess trends of religiosity by looking at intergenerational change within adolescent-parent dyads. Two research questions guide this article. The first one is descriptive: What patterns of intergenerational transmission in religiosity do I find among different religious groups in England, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden? The second aim of the article is to analyze the potential causes behind these patterns. Referring to the rivalling theoretical approaches, I am especially interested in the impact of cognitive-structural and social integration.

2 Theory and Past Research

Major strands of theoretical argument from different fields of study would lead us to expect that the importance of religion to immigrants and their descendants is likely to decline. In the field of the sociology of religion this expectation could be derived from general secularization theory, which states that comparatively higher levels of modernization in the receiving countries will delimit the salience of religious beliefs and practices in daily life among minorities as well (Berger 1967b, Bruce 2002, Phalet et al. 2008, Wilson 1982).[1] In the field of migration,

[1] However, the applicability of this trend, which is mainly a generalization of the historical experience of predominantly Christian societies in Northern and Western Europe, to non-Christian religions and non-European contexts, is at least questionable (Gorski & Altinordu 2008, Smits et al. 2010, Stark 1999). Counterexamples can for instance be found in on average highly religious societies such as the United States, or in non-Christian religions such as Islam (Phalet et al. 2008).

the same expectation would be in line with general assimilation theory, which predicts that over time and especially over generations immigrants tend to become similar to members of the host societies with respect to diverse aspects of behavior and attitudes (Alba & Nee 1997, Gordon 1964, Park 1950). This implies an adaptation to the secularization trend of Western European societies when immigrants are exposed to alternative and non-religious values and worldviews (Diehl & Koenig 2009, Güngör et al. 2011, van Tubergen 2007). Accordingly, some empirical studies find a decline in religiosity in the second generation and with an increasing length of stay (Bisin et al. 2008, Connor 2010, Eilers et al. 2008, Güveli & Platt 2011, Maliepaard et al. 2010, Phalet & ter Wal 2004, Smits et al. 2010, van Tubergen 2007), as well as over time (Diehl & Schnell 2006, Phalet et al. 2008). Implicitly assumed is that mere exposure to the host society and increasing contact with members of the native population enhance familiarity with the mainstream culture, eventually leading to assimilation in different life domains. A decrease in religiosity would therefore be more likely, the more immigrants participate in central institutions of the host society, the more frequent their social contact to the native population and the greater their fluency in the destination language, since cognitive-structural and social assimilation can be seen as accelerators of religious assimilation (Maliepaard et al. 2010).

However, secularization trends among immigrants and their descendants are not always supported empirically. Some studies detect a remarkable stability of religiosity, especially among Muslim immigrants (Diehl & Koenig 2009, Güveli & Platt 2011, Maliepaard et al. 2012, Phalet & ter Wal 2004). As a flipside of assimilation theory, this could be explained by the fact that if parents are weakly assimilated in cognitive-structural and social terms, they put stronger efforts into the intergenerational maintenance of culture. But there are also competing theoretical perspectives, like the theory of segmented assimilation, which stresses that immigrants might integrate very well into other domains of life, such as the educational system or the labor market, while not assimilating culturally but instead maintaining their cultural heritage (Bankston & Zhou 1995, Portes & Rumbaut 2001, Portes & Zhou 1993, Zhou 1997).[2] Consequently, cognitive-structural and social assimilation would not necessarily be positively related to a decline in religiosity among immigrants.

[2] Similar predictions follow from other theoretical approaches, mainly from cultural capital theory (Bourdieu 1977, Sullivan 2001) and value transmission research (Idema & Phalet 2007, Nauck 1989, 2007, Phalet & Schönpflug 2001).

An even stronger expectation has been formulated: a religious revival. In the sociology of religion it has been argued that also modern societies provide some crucial structural conditions that foster religious revival and reactivity (Connor 2009, Stark 1999, Stark & Finke 2000) by encouraging competition among religious organizations, which in turn raises religious identification and participation by offering more attractive and diverse religious products (Smits et al. 2010). One empirical study shows such an increase in Muslims' religious participation relative to their length of stay in Belgium (Smits et al. 2010; see also Güveli & Platt 2011, Maliepaard et al. 2012). In migration research, reactive ethnicity is assumed to occur when immigrants feel less welcome in host societies, experience discrimination and social exclusion and in turn, as a means of compensation, strengthen their ethnic and religious identities (Connor 2010, Diehl & Schnell 2006, Portes & Rumbaut 2001). Consequently, one would expect an intergenerational increase in religiosity to occur due to missing cognitive-structural and social assimilation.

In sum, we find arguments for an intergenerational decrease in religiosity, as well as for stability or an increase. How assimilation in other areas of life might influence the outcomes is also theoretically debatable. Empirical evidence is likewise ambiguous, suggesting that results might depend on receiving countries and groups. However, research to date has suffered from at least two major methodological shortcomings: First, when looking at intergenerational change, most studies have compared synthetic immigrant generations, and thus are not able to account for different compositions of immigrants in different generations in terms of unobserved characteristics (Borjas 1994, Diehl & Koenig 2009). Second, a lack of truly comparable data prevents the study of immigrants' religiosity between countries. Results usually cannot be compared to each other since they refer to different target groups and use different indicators of religion and religiosity (but see Fleischmann & Phalet 2012).

In the following, I will try to overcome both of these problems by investigating adolescent-parent dyads, employing the data of a recent comparative study on the integration of immigrant children in Europe.

3 Data, Measures and Methods

3.1 Data

The empirical part of this article uses data from the new Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) (Kalter et al. 2013). Funded by NORFACE (New Opportunities for Research Funding Agency Co-Operation in Europe) since October 2009, this project seeks to answer key open questions on the integration of children of immigrants in four European countries: England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Strictly comparable designs and measures in all countries allow me to study religious integration patterns of immigrant children between countries. Between October 2010 and July 2011, the first wave of the study was conducted and 18,716 14-year old adolescents of native and immigrant origin were surveyed within their schools. In order to achieve a high number of adolescents with an immigration background, a three-stage disproportional stratified sampling design, oversampling schools with higher proportions of immigrant students, was applied. Within these schools, two school classes were randomly selected and all students within these classes were surveyed. Additionally, using bilingual survey instruments, self-completion and telephone interviews were conducted with 11,201 parents.[3] This offers the unique opportunity to investigate transmission processes and intergenerational change in religion and religiosity rather directly. Identical questions on religion were asked in the youth and parental questionnaires.

The empirical analysis uses the first wave of CILS4EU data. I start with the whole student sample to detect trends in religiosity by looking at synthetic generations in the canonical way. In my core analyses, I then only use cases with complete youth and parental interviews (n = 11,201) in order to investigate transmission processes among immigrant compared to native families. Here, I also further restrict my sample to 8,259 families who belong to any religious affiliation. Additionally, in the multivariate analyses I only investigate cases with no missing values on any of the model variables (n = 7,275).

[3] Parental response rates are 37 percent, 78 percent, 74 percent and 49 percent for England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, respectively.

3.2 Measures

The central dependent variable is the intergenerational change in religious salience between adolescents and their parents. I use answers to the question "How important is religion to you?" included identically in both questionnaires, with answer categories ranging from "not at all important" to "very important". Intergenerational change in religious salience then falls into one of three categories: decrease, stability or increase. Increase means that the adolescent rates religion higher than their parent does, stability indicates identical answers given by child and parent, and decrease is observed when religion is less important to the adolescent than to the parental generation.[4] Of major interest in our empirical analyses are differences in religious salience between immigrants and natives belonging to different religious affiliations. In order to define religious groups I use self-reported religious affiliation and categorize it into the following broader categories: no religion, Christianity, Islam and other religion. Immigrant background is based on the respective country of birth of the respondent adolescent, the biological parents and the biological grandparents. An immigrant child is defined as a student belonging to one of the following generational categories: a) student born abroad (1st generation), b) student born in the survey country, both parents born abroad (2nd generation), c) student and one parent born in the survey country, the other parent born abroad (2.5 generation or mixed marriages), d) student and both parents born in the survey country, at least two grandparents born abroad (3rd generation). Consequently, natives are students who do not belong to any of these categories.

Measures of cognitive-structural and social assimilation are used for both the adolescent and the parental generation. Since respondents and their parents are located in different life situations, structural assimilation is not operationalized identically for both generations. For parents, I use the degree of education (no education, lower secondary education, upper secondary education or university education) and the current employment status. School performance is my measure of adolescents' structural integration. Students were asked to assess their school performance by answering the question "How well are you doing in the following subjects?" using the answer options "very well", "quite well", "OK", "not that well" or "not well at all". I created

[4] In contrast to Maliepaard and Lubbers (2013), who find that intergenerational increase in religiosity occurs in only 0.5 percent of their sample, I find that this is anything but a rare phenomenon. It occurs in 13 percent of families in our sample on average, and it is even more pronounced in Muslim immigrant families. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between stability and increase in our empirical analyses, besides the theoretical rationale outlined before.

a mean index from three subjects – math, the survey country's language, and English (in England, only math and English). In Germany and the Netherlands – both countries with a stratified school system – I use the type of school attended as an additional indicator of structural assimilation. Social assimilation is operationalized by the proportion of native friends. The question is: "Think about all of your friends. How many of them have a [survey country] background?" Answers in both the youths' and the parents' questionnaires range from "almost all or all" to "none or very few". Finally, language is one central dimension of cognitive assimilation. In school surveys, we conducted an objective language test (synonyms in England, Germany and the Netherlands, antonyms in Sweden). For parents, I use self-assessed language proficiency, which is a mean index of how well the respondent parent thinks he/she (him-/herself) can speak, understand, write and read [the survey country's language], using a 5-point scale with "not at all" and "excellently" constituting the negative and positive ends of the scale.

In addition to these variables, I control for the sex of the respondent youth and the parent, as well as for parents' religiosity in every model. All metric variables are standardized separately for England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden and have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

3.3 Methods

I start analyzing religiosity among immigrant and native children by looking at trends over synthetic generations; as this is done in many other studies too, this should be telling for reasons of comparison. I then examine how the level of religiosity changes over generations within one and the same family, analyzing adolescent-parent dyads. This method has successfully been applied to studying the transmission of cultural values among immigrant families in general (Idema & Phalet 2007, Jacob & Kalter 2011, Nauck 1989, Phalet & Schönpflug 2001, Schönpflug 2001) and religious transmission among non-immigrant families (Bao et al. 1999). To my knowledge, only one study investigates religious transmission using parent-child data (Maliepaard & Lubbers, 2013). This study, however, is restricted to one country only.

After these descriptive views, I test theoretical expectations about the influence of assimilation in various dimensions on the probability of intergenerational change in religiosity among families in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, using a series of logistic regression

models. For this purpose, I use two distinct dependent variables. Decrease models estimate the probability of a decrease in religious salience compared with intergenerational stability. A rise in religiosity is contrasted to stability in the increase models. All families in which an increase in religious salience occurs are excluded in the decrease models, and vice versa. Basically, this is estimating a multinomial logit model using individualized regressions (Begg and Gray, 1984). I pursue this approach instead of using common MNLM-estimates for reasons of statistical modelling: Models should control for parents' religious salience because the base level of religiosity in the parental generation crucially affects the likelihood of change in religious salience across generations. However, there exist several cases for which the predicted probability cannot be estimated due to logical impossibility. These are parents who state that religion is "not at all important" in the decrease models, and parents to whom religion is "very important" in the increase models. Therefore, I run different models and exclude these families in the decrease and increase models, respectively.

4 Results

4.1 Descriptive results

Starting with the canonical approach, Figure 3.1 illustrates how immigrant adolescents' religious salience develops over synthetic generations (black lines) compared with that of the native population (grey reference lines). Immigrants and natives are further differentiated according to the religious affiliation stated by the respondent youth: Non-religious adolescents (dashed-dotted lines) are contrasted to Christian (dotted lines), Muslim (solid line) and other-religious respondents (dashed lines).

In general, I find that the pattern with respect to relative differences in the importance attached to religion is basically the same in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Unsurprisingly, Figure 3.1 reveals that immigrant and native respondents who do not belong to any religion are very similar, each stating a very low importance of religion. Muslim immigrants show the highest values in terms of religious salience, and Christian respondents and respondents belonging to another religion lie between these two extremes. With respect to trends over synthetic generations, Christian immigrants' religious salience adapts to that of the Christian native

population. While first- and second-generation Christian immigrants are more religious than native Christians, those who belong to the third generation do not significantly differ from native Christians in Germany and Sweden. In contrast, religiosity among Muslim immigrants is more or less stable over generational categories. Moreover, second-generation Muslim immigrants are even significantly (at the 10 percent level) more religious than those in the first generation in the Netherlands. However, later Muslim immigrant generations display some minor assimilatory religious trends, though these are not statistically significant. The question arises whether I can observe this pattern as well when I look into families and examine changes between generations within one and the same family.

Figure 3.1: Religious salience of natives and immigrants, by immigrant generation



For this purpose, I look at intergenerational change in religiosity within immigrant and native families of different religious groups, which are defined by parents' religious affiliation. Table 3.1 displays differences in terms of the importance of religion to adolescents and to their parents. Families who affiliate with Christianity, both with and without an immigration background, display a declining importance of religion over generations in all countries. In contrast, religious salience remains considerably stable among Muslim families. At the same time, Muslim families are much less likely to secularize over generations, that is, to experience a decrease in religiosity, compared with native and immigrant respondents of other religious denominations. In addition, the amount of intergenerational decrease in religiosity is almost outweighed by a considerable proportion of Muslim families in which adolescents are even more religious than their parents. Again, I find these patterns in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden alike.

To summarize, both methodological designs arrive at basically the same result. In line with Diehl and Koenig (2009) and contradictory to many empirical studies addressing the development of religion and religiosity of Muslim immigrants in Western immigration countries (e.g. Connor 2010, Maliepaard et al. 2010, Phalet et al. 2008, van Tubergen 2007), I find descriptively an impressive stability or even an increase in religiosity among Muslim families. In contrast, Christian immigrants in later generations seem to adapt to the Christian majority population, and their intergenerational change in religious salience resembles the pattern observable in native Christian families. The multivariate analyses in the next part of the article aim at investigating whether this pattern remains when I additionally consider important background variables and measures of cognitive-structural and social assimilation.

Table 3.1: Intergenerational change in religious salience among native and immigrant families

	Native: No religion	Native: Christianity	Native: Other religion	Migrant: No religion	Migrant: Christianity	Migrant: Islam	Migrant: Other religion	Total (N)
England								
Decrease	24.30	49.40	86.63	26.23	50.61	13.72	48.66	560
Stability	48.99	38.53	3.53	44.29	41.12	80.65	43.27	630
Increase	26.71	12.08	9.84	29.48	8.27	5.63	8.06	219
Total (N)	286	616	5	72	252	107	71	1,409
Germany								
Decrease	25.31	42.89	84.59	25.32	49.26	23.24	55.08	1,256
Stability	50.68	41.65	8.21	48.68	38.86	59.32	35.43	1,618
Increase	24.01	15.47	7.20	26.00	11.88	17.44	9.49	637
Total (N)	310	1,546	9	129	785	702	30	3,511
Netherlands								
Decrease	35.91	52.02	87.22	28.10	45.14	25.52	42.27	1,251
Stability	46.69	38.52	7.75	39.96	44.21	56.45	47.83	1,277
Increase	17.40	9.46	5.04	31.94	10.65	18.02	9.89	385
Total (N)	1,002	1,168	26	176	282	203	56	2,913
Sweden								
Decrease	18.64	41.61	66.39	18.61	40.64	24.10	52.50	622
Stability	55.30	42.74	23.06	50.87	42.62	51.67	22.27	915
Increase	26.06	15.65	10.55	30.52	16.74	24.23	25.23	458
Total (N)	423	880	6	155	341	152	38	1,995

Source: “Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries”, own calculations.
Values are weighted; numbers of cases are displayed unweighted.

4.2 Multivariate results

Tables 3.2a to 3.2d show the results of my multivariate analyses. For every country, I estimate separate logistic regression models, using the likelihood of intergenerational change within families as the dependent variable. Due to the problem of comparing regression coefficients in logistic regressions models using different samples or different sets of independent variables (Mood 2010), average marginal effects are shown instead of logit coefficients or odds ratios. The base models display gross differences in intergenerational change in religious salience between religious immigrant groups, controlling only for adolescents' and parents' sex and parents' religiosity. Almost all religious immigrant groups differ from the reference group – native Christian families – showing a lower likelihood of a religious decrease and a higher likelihood of a religious increase over generations. However, whereas in all countries these effects are weak and (with one exception) not significant for Christian immigrants, Muslim families display a pronounced pattern of intergenerational stability or even increase in religiosity that is almost identical across countries.

Table 3.2a: Logistic regression models: Intergenerational change in religious salience among native and immigrant families; England

	Base model		Complete model		Immigrants' model	
	Decrease	**Increase**	**Decrease**	**Increase**	**Decrease**	**Increase**
Immigrant-religion group *(Ref.: Native: Christianity)*						
Native: Other religion	0.535 +	0.406	0.571 *	0.359	-	-
Migrant: Christianity	-0.053	0.000	-0.034	-0.046	-	-
Migrant: Other religion	-0.111	0.022	-0.055	-0.101	0.044	-0.049
Migrant: Islam	-0.585 ***	0.516 **	-0.472 ***	0.410 *	-0.390 ***	0.324 +
Parent's education *(Ref: No education)*						
Lower secondary education			0.101	0.163	0.184	0.024
Upper secondary education			-0.023	0.193 +	-0.123	-0.026
University education			0.081	0.198 +	0.023	-0.016
Parent's employment status *(Ref.: Not employed)*						
Employed			0.106 +	-0.031	-0.011	-0.106
Parent's proportion of native friends			0.053 +	-0.021	0.019	-0.057
Parent's language proficiency			-0.052 *	0.035	-0.039	0.070
Adolescent's school performance			-0.088 ***	0.008	-0.103 ***	-0.036
Adolescent's proportion of native friends			0.013	-0.071 +	0.019	-0.050
Adolescent's language proficiency			-0.007	0.018	0.026	-0.038
Parent's religious salience *(Ref.: Fairly important)*						
Not at all important	-	0.240 *	-	0.242 **	-	0.451 *
Not very important	-0.107 *	0.022	-0.140 **	0.032	0.073	0.032
Very important	0.059	-	0.036	-	0.110	-
Sex *(Ref.: Female)*						
Parent Male	-0.007	-0.053	0.010	-0.061	-0.148 +	0.078
Adolescent Male	0.070	0.016	0.077 +	0.004	0.065	-0.087
N	917	400	917	400	387	126
R^2	0.044	0.036	0.087	0.056	0.180	0.168

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Source: "Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries", English subsample, own calculations.
Results are weighted; regression coefficients are displayed as average marginal effects.

Table 3.2b: Logistic regression models: Intergenerational change in religious salience among native and immigrant families; Germany

	Base model		Complete model		Immigrants' model	
	Decrease	**Increase**	**Decrease**	**Increase**	**Decrease**	**Increase**
Immigrant-religion group *(Ref.: Native: Christianity)*						
Native: Other religion	0.330	0.245	0.276	0.254	-	-
Migrant: Christianity	-0.003	-0.015	0.011	-0.054	-	-
Migrant: Other religion	-0.094	0.272 +	0.015	0.104	0.012	0.183
Migrant: Islam	-0.411 ***	0.252 ***	-0.364 ***	0.156 **	-0.320 ***	0.227 ***
Parent's education *(Ref: No education)*						
Lower secondary education			-0.099	-0.052	-0.118 +	-0.014
Upper secondary education			-0.103	-0.063	-0.219 **	-0.073
University education			-0.103	-0.082	-0.100	-0.035
Parent's employment status *(Ref.: Not employed)*						
Employed			-0.073 *	-0.016	-0.073 +	0.007
Parent's proportion of native friends			0.019	-0.020	0.052 *	-0.044
Parent's language proficiency			0.028	-0.024	-0.023	0.023
Adolescent's school performance			-0.032 *	0.017	-0.020	-0.024
Adolescent's school type *(Ref.: Special needs school)*						
Lower secondary school			-0.072	0.023	-0.078	-0.010
Intermediate secondary school			-0.062	-0.050	-0.057	-0.123
Upper secondary school			-0.149	0.028	-0.059	-0.017
Comprehensive school			-0.005	0.022	-0.036	-0.067
Adolescent's proportion of native friends			-0.019	-0.032 +	-0.017	-0.051 *
Adolescent's language proficiency			0.052 **	-0.005	0.100 ***	-0.020

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Source: "Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries", German subsample, own calculations.
Results are weighted; regression coefficients are displayed as average marginal effects.

Table 3.2b (continued): Logistic regression models: Intergenerational change in religious salience among native and immigrant families; Germany

	Base model		Complete model		Immigrants' model	
	Decrease	**Increase**	**Decrease**	**Increase**	**Decrease**	**Increase**
Parent's religious salience *(Ref.: Fairly important)*						
Not at all important	-	0.418 ***	-	0.418 ***	-	0.382 ***
Not very important	-0.291 ***	0.095 *	-0.296 ***	0.095 *	-0.115 *	0.135 *
Very important	0.122 **	-	0.114 **	-	0.163 ***	-
Sex *(Ref.: Female)*						
Parent Male	-0.019	0.094 *	-0.015	0.100 *	0.015	0.067
Adolescent Male	0.091 **	-0.072 *	0.077 **	-0.080 *	0.048	-0.040
Mode parental interview *(Ref.: Self-completion)*						
Telephone	0.065 *	0.101 **	0.070 *	0.074 +	0.001	0.092 +
N	2508	1443	2508	1443	1239	569
R^2	0.116	0.108	0.134	0.121	0.134	0.150

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Source: "Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries", German subsample, own calculations.
Results are weighted; regression coefficients are displayed as average marginal effects.

Table 3.2c: Logistic regression models: Intergenerational change in religious salience among native and immigrant families; Netherlands

	Base model		Complete model		Immigrants' model	
	Decrease	**Increase**	**Decrease**	**Increase**	**Decrease**	**Increase**
Immigrant-religion group *(Ref.: Native: Christianity)*						
Native: Other religion	0.308 *	0.192	0.295 +	0.194 +	-	-
Migrant: Christianity	-0.125 +	0.073	-0.135 +	0.023	-	-
Migrant: Other religion	-0.114	0.068	-0.130	0.050	0.045	-0.011
Migrant: Islam	-0.383 ***	0.351 ***	-0.395 **	0.074	-0.286 ***	0.239 *
Parent's education *(Ref: No education)*						
Lower secondary education						
Upper secondary education			0.185 +	-0.068	0.143	0.188
University education			0.205 +	-0.147	0.236	0.293
Parent's employment status *(Ref.: Not employed)*						
Employed			-0.012	-0.154 *	-0.013	0.186 +
Parent's proportion of native friends			-0.003	-0.092 *	-0.027	-0.098 *
Parent's language proficiency			0.001	-0.048 +	-0.019	-0.041
Adolescent's school performance			-0.019	-0.013	-0.039	0.008
Adolescent's school type *(Ref.: Lower secondary school)*						
Intermediate secondary school			-0.040	0.023	0.060	-0.291 *
Upper secondary school			0.070	0.073	0.268 **	-0.100
Adolescent's proportion of native friends			-0.033	-0.067 *	0.034	-0.113 ***
Adolescent's language proficiency			-0.008	-0.008	-0.005	-0.018

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Source: "Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries", Dutch subsample, own calculations.
Results are weighted; regression coefficients are displayed as average marginal effects.

Table 3.2c (continued): Logistic regression models: Intergenerational change in religious salience among native and immigrant families; Netherlands

	Base model		Complete model		Immigrants' model	
	Decrease	**Increase**	**Decrease**	**Increase**	**Decrease**	**Increase**
Parent's religious salience *(Ref.: Fairly important)*						
Not at all important	-	0.368 ***	-	0.404 ***	-	0.571 ***
Not very important	-0.337 ***	0.079	-0.343 ***	0.108	-0.398 ***	0.080
Very important	0.035	-	0.033	-	-0.013	-
Sex *(Ref.: Female)*						
Parent Male	-0.084	0.087	-0.092	0.086 +	-0.267 ***	0.033
Adolescent Male	0.148 **	0.106	0.149 **	0.106 +	0.048	-0.056
Mode parental interview *(Ref.: Self-completion)*						
Telephone	-0.061	-0.181 *	-0.042	-0.194 **	-0.086	-0.122
N	1548	721	1548	721	462	201
R^2	0.153	0.161	0.160	0.258	0.234	0.426

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Source: "Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries", Dutch subsample, own calculations.
Results are weighted; regression coefficients are displayed as average marginal effects.

Table 3.2d: Logistic regression models: Intergenerational change in religious salience among native and immigrant families; Sweden

	Base model		Complete model		Immigrants' model	
	Decrease	**Increase**	**Decrease**	**Increase**	**Decrease**	**Increase**
Immigrant-religion group *(Ref.: Native: Christianity)*						
Migrant: Christianity	-0.054	0.046	-0.031	-0.016	-	-
Migrant: Other religion	-0.014	0.475 ***	0.107	0.204	0.171	0.213
Migrant: Islam	-0.371 ***	0.238 ***	-0.301 ***	-0.002	-0.226 **	-0.060
Parent's education *(Ref: No education)*						
Lower secondary education			0.152	-0.346	0.171	-0.245
Upper secondary education			0.149	-0.419	0.165	-0.024
University education			0.202	-0.402	0.313 +	-0.103
Parent's employment status *(Ref.: Not employed)*						
Employed			0.010	0.117	0.122	0.144
Parent's proportion of native friends			0.020	-0.046 +	-0.011	-0.082
Parent's language proficiency			0.015	-0.081 **	-0.005	-0.100 *
Adolescent's school performance			-0.028	0.032	-0.092 ***	0.048
Adolescent's proportion of native friends			0.015	-0.038	-0.022	0.012
Adolescent's language proficiency			-0.013	-0.024	0.062 +	-0.089 *
Parent's religious salience *(Ref.: Fairly important)*						
Not at all important	-	0.129 *	-	0.185 ***	-	0.140
Not very important	-0.255 ***	-0.017	-0.251 ***	0.037	-0.162 *	0.008
Very important	-0.017	-	-0.006	-	-0.005	-re
Sex *(Ref.: Female)*						
Parent Male	-0.065	0.023	-0.058	-0.002	-0.171 *	-0.055
Adolescent Male	0.083 *	-0.086 *	0.084 *	-0.092 *	0.096	-0.125 +
N	959	787	959	787	369	269
R^2	0.063	0.038	0.071	0.071	0.118	0.137

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Source: "Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries", Swedish subsample, own calculations.
Results are weighted; regression coefficients are displayed as average marginal effects.

In a next step, I look at the influence of parents' and adolescents' cognitive-structural and social assimilation on intergenerational change in religious salience within families (complete model). As briefly sketched in the theoretical section, I assume that parents' assimilation moderates the strength of change in religiosity by affecting the efforts parents put into the religious socialization of their children. Additionally, the question is whether – controlling for parents' cognitive-structural and social assimilation – adolescents' assimilation weakens the religious transmission process within families. However, my results suggest that the parents' cognitive-structural and social assimilation does not seem to play a major role with respect to religious assimilation. Only a few coefficients reach statistical significance and the main effects of religious groups are only slightly reduced. The picture is not very clear over countries. On the one hand, current employment is related to the probability of an intergenerational decrease in religious salience in England and Germany (though in different directions), but not in the Netherlands and Sweden. In Sweden and the Netherlands, on the other hand, language skills reduce the likelihood of an increase in religiosity within families, and this is partly true also for Germany, but not for England. No clear conclusions are possible either with regard to the influence of parents' social assimilation on intergenerational religious assimilation.[5] When looking at the effects of adolescents' assimilation, I find some evidence for a link between structural and religious assimilation in England and Germany. In these two countries, self-assessed school performance is negatively related to intergenerational decrease.[6] This result contradicts theoretical expectations derived from assimilation theories that structural and religious integration should co-occur. With respect to social contacts and proficiency in the language of the country of destination, I find some effects supporting assimilation theory, but only in some countries and only for some assimilation dimensions. In England, Germany and the Netherlands, for instance, the proportion of native friends is related to an intergenerational increase in religious salience. Language skills matter for a decrease in religious salience in Germany only, with better skills enhancing the likelihood of such a decrease within families.

[5] Since parental indicators of assimilation in different dimensions might differ by whether the mother or the father filled out the parental questionnaire, I estimated all models with respective interaction effects (results not shown). Overall, only some of these interaction effects become significant. A comparison of the fit between models with and without interaction effects shows that only some models with interaction effects show a better model fit.

[6] Using an objective measure of school performance for the German subsample where questions about school grades were asked we obtain similar results. Therefore, this effect cannot be explained by an overestimation of school performance by a selective group in the sample.

To make sure that the effects of certain variables are not dominated by the reference groups, the last models leave out native families and estimates effects only for immigrants. I can observe that some assimilation indicators are slightly more pronounced and become statistically significant in the immigrant models; this mainly applies to indicators of adolescents' assimilation. Thus, cognitive-structural and social assimilation exert some influences on intergenerational change in religiosity among immigrants. However, even when looking at immigrant youth only, the overall impact is rather weak, and – most importantly – the differences between Muslim and Christian immigrants can hardly be explained.

Table 3.3: Logistic regression models: Intergenerational change in religious salience among native and immigrant families; separated by country of origin within Muslim immigrant group

	Muslim model	
	Decrease	**Increase**
Immigrant-religion group *(Ref.: Migrant: Christianity)*		
England		
Migrant: Other religion	0.045	-0.049
Migrant: Islam, Pakistan	-0.363 ***	0.316 +
Migrant: Islam, other country of origin	-0.410 **	0.331
Germany		
Migrant: Other religion	0.008	0.186
Migrant: Islam, Former Yugoslavia	-0.207 *	0.167 +
Migrant: Islam, Turkey	-0.311 ***	0.222 ***
Migrant: Islam, other country of origin	-0.434 ***	0.305 **
Netherlands		
Migrant: Other religion	0.047	-0.023
Migrant: Islam, Morocco	-0.258 *	0.286 *
Migrant: Islam, Turkey	-0.337 **	0.364 **
Migrant: Islam, other country of origin	-0.254 *	0.082
Sweden		
Migrant: Other religion	0.172	0.208
Migrant: Islam, Former Yugoslavia	-0.432 ***	-0.026
Migrant: Islam, other country of origin	-0.154 +	-0.090

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$

Source: "Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries", own calculations.
Results are weighted; regression coefficients are displayed as average marginal effects.
Controlled for: parent's education, parent's employment status, parent's proportion of native friends, parent's language proficiency, adolescent's school performance, adolescent's school type (only Germany and the Netherlands), adolescent's proportion of native friends, adolescent's language proficiency, parent's religious salience, parent's sex, adolescent's sex, mode parental interview (only Germany and the Netherlands)

Finally, I wanted to check whether intergenerational transmission of religiosity differs across groups stemming from different regions of the world. For this purpose, I reran the immigrants' models for England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden separately, and additionally differentiated Muslim immigrant groups by their country of origin. Table 3.3, however, shows that there are only marginal (and non-significant) differences in the likelihood of an intergenerational decrease or increase between Muslim immigrants from different countries of origin in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden (in contrast to Güngör et al. 2011, Maliepaard & Lubbers 2013).

To summarize, the cognitive-structural and social assimilation of both parents and adolescents is only weakly related to intergenerational change in religiosity. In addition, the pattern of Muslim immigrants' intergenerational religious stability cannot be explained by adding measures of cognitive-structural and social assimilation dimensions for both parents and adolescents.

5 Summary and Discussion

This contribution aimed to improve our knowledge about the development of immigrant children's religiosity in four European countries: England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Drawing on major theoretical contributions in the sociology of religion and of migration, previous studies have revealed several challenges and shortcomings of research: On the one hand, theoretical approaches in both fields differ in their expectations about the general direction of trends and about the role of assimilation in other areas of life (e.g. Bankston & Zhou 1995, Connor 2010, Diehl & Koenig 2009, Phalet et al. 2008, Smits et al. 2010, van Tubergen 2007). On the other hand, a lack of appropriate data prevents the comparative and direct study of immigrants' intergenerational religious assimilation. As a consequence, studies have reached different conclusions with respect to immigrants' religious assimilation (e.g. Connor 2010, Diehl & Koenig 2009, Fleischmann & Phalet 2012, Güngör et al. 2011, Güveli & Platt 2011, Maliepaard & Lubbers 2013, Maliepaard et al. 2010, 2012, Phalet et al. 2008, Smits et al. 2010, van Tubergen 2007, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011). I tackled some of these problems by investigating in four European countries adolescent-parent dyads and intergenerational change in religiosity within one and the same family, thereby using highly comparable designs and

instruments. Furthermore, I am able to relate intergenerational change in religiosity in immigrant families to secularization tendencies that take place in the majority population as well.

In line with previous research on group differences in religiosity, I find that Muslim immigrants in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden are on average highly religious, both compared to the majority population and to immigrants with non-Muslim religious backgrounds (e.g. Connor 2010, Eilers et al. 2008, van Tubergen 2007, but see Connor 2009). One central result of my study is the remarkable intergenerational stability of religious salience among Muslim families. In contrast to Christian immigrant respondents who are subject to secularization trends within their country of destination, Muslim immigrants and their parents on average differ less in the importance they attach to religion. For a considerable subsample, even an intergenerational increase in religiosity is visible. This pattern is identical in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. In addition, it does not change substantially when I control for several assimilation measures both in the parent and in the adolescent generation. Thus, similar to Diehl and Koenig (2009), I show that general assimilation cannot sufficiently explain why Muslim immigrants in Europe do not adapt to secularization trends taking place in the majority population. Overall, the effects of cognitive-structural and social assimilation are rather weak and inconsistent across countries. Again, this pertains to all countries I investigate in this study.

All in all, I find empirical support for all three lines of theoretical reasoning outlined in the first part of this article. Contact with native peers affects intergenerational change within families, which speaks in favor of classical assimilation theories (Smits et al. 2010, van Tubergen 2007). At the same time, in line with arguments for segmented assimilation, structural assimilation is barely related to religious developments within immigrant and native families (Connor 2010, van Tubergen 2007; in contrast to Smits et al. 2010; but see for ambiguous effects Fleischmann & Phalet 2012, Maliepaard et al. 2010). Parents' and adolescents' structural assimilation is even inversely related to an intergenerational decrease in religious salience within families in some of the countries. A potential explanation for this result is that especially immigrants who possess a large amount of human capital are able to develop and maintain an ethnic counterculture in order to deliberately demarcate themselves from the mainstream culture (DiMaggio & Ostrower 1990, Portes & Rumbaut 2001, Zhou 1997). All in all, these findings challenge a well-known assumption of assimilation theory that assimilation trends in different life domains accompany each other. Instead, my results suggest that assimilation must be conceptualized as a

multi-faceted process, whereby the strength and direction of the interplay between different assimilation dimensions urgently needs further research. Finally, I can also find some indirect evidence of a religious revival in later generations. Religious revival as a result of parents' efforts to compensate for lacking acceptance by the native population can be detected when assimilation is important in the increase models; but this again is only sometimes the case and not consistent across countries. Thus, the exact mechanisms responsible for ethnic resilience, especially the role of perceived discrimination, need further research.

In sum, my results demonstrate that it does not make much sense to view any of these major approaches as a candidate for a theory that would suffice to explain intergenerational change in religious salience among immigrant families. It will be an important and challenging task for future theoretical work to establish a more integrative framework; we need a more explicit account of the mechanisms underlying intergenerational stability or change, and we need more precise overarching hypotheses on the exact conditions under which the one or the other mechanism is more likely to occur.

On the empirical side, I am able to overcome some methodological shortcomings of previous findings; but, of course, my study still has limitations: The relatively low response rate, especially in England and in Sweden, might be seen as problematic due to selective parental non-response. Indeed, I find that immigrant families in general and Muslim families in particular are underrepresented in my core sample of adolescent-parent dyads. However, given the structure of our analysis, this is not as problematic as it might seem. Taking into account my dependent variable – intergenerational change in religiosity – results would only be biased if the distance between parents and their children in terms of religious salience were subject to selectivity. In this context, it is reassuring that the trends in the canonical account using synthetic generations, which do not suffer from the same non-response problem, confirm the major trends underlying my core analyses.

Another criticism might be raised due to my measure of religiosity, since I only examine religious salience but not religious participation. This is an important objection in light of current discussions about symbolic religiosity (Diehl & Koenig 2009, Gans 1994). Unfortunately, in all but one country I only have information about the frequency of adolescents' visits to mosques and praying, but none about that of their parents. Only for the Dutch subsample am I able to investigate adolescent-parent dyads with respect to intergenerational change in religious

practice. These results (not shown) indicate that Muslim immigrants have a higher likelihood of decrease in private, but not public forms of religious practice. At the same time, intergenerational increase in religiosity is more common in Muslim immigrant families, and this pertains to both visiting religious meeting places and praying. If the assumption of symbolic religiosity were true, an intergenerational change in praying should resemble my results on religious salience, and only mosque visits should be subject to decline. But still we have to be aware that the importance of religion is not a perfect indicator of individual religiosity and that its meaning might differ according to an individual's religious affiliation.

To conclude, religion is still a major part of Muslim immigrant children's lives. The most important follow-up question is whether this has serious consequences for their life chances in general. My results using the first wave of the CILS4EU data suggest that the link between religiosity and integration into other domains of life is rather weak. Future research should focus on the precise causal relationships between religiosity and cognitive-structural as well as social assimilation, using longitudinal information. The crucial questions are certainly not about trends in religiosity among immigrant children per se, but rather about their long-term consequences for social exclusion, educational outcomes and labor market success.

Chapter 4:
Intergenerational Transmission in Religiosity in Immigrant and Native Families:
The Role of Transmission Opportunities and Perceived Transmission Benefits

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Abstract

In this paper I investigate intergenerational transmission in religiosity among immigrants and natives, comparing families affiliating with Christianity, Islam or any other religious denomination in Germany. Thereby, I focus on the role of transmission opportunities and perceived benefits of religious transmission within and outside the family on the chance of successfully passing on religious attachment from parents to children. Furthermore, I investigate whether these factors contribute to explain group differences in the intergenerational transmission in religiosity. Using data from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU), my empirical results show that family characteristics and everyday interactions influence the strength of intergenerational secularization, but they can only partly account for differences in divergent transmission patterns.

[*] For the sake of consistency across chapters, I have slightly rewritten the published version of this article, harmonized citation style and American English use and reformulated several sections.

1 Introduction

In the last decades, research on immigration and the role of religion thereby experienced a continuous boom (Buijs & Rath 2006, Foner & Alba 2008, Voas & Fleischmann 2012). Growing interest in this topic is straightforwardly explained. Besides negative attitudes and public prejudice particularly towards Islam in Western European immigration societies, strong religious identities are seen as a reason for failure of immigrant children in the educational system and in the labor market, as a hindrance to adequate contact with members of the majority population as well as to cultural inclusion (Bisin et al. 2008, Damstra & Tillie 2016, Diehl et al. 2009, Foner & Alba 2008, Connor & Koenig 2013).

Studies in recent years consistently show that immigrants are more religious than their native counterparts, and that immigrants affiliating with Islam tend to be more religious than non-Muslim immigrants (Aleksynska & Chiswick 2013, Connor 2010, de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014, Diehl & Koenig 2009, Garcia-Munoz & Neuman 2013, Jacob & Kalter 2013, Lewis & Kashyap 2013b, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011). In contrast, empirical evidence on general trends in religious attachment among immigrants after migration is still inconclusive. Whereas some studies basically find a decrease of religious involvement among immigrants (Aleksynska & Chiswick 2013, Brünig & Fleischmann 2015, Connor 2010, Diehl & Koenig 2013, Garcia-Munoz & Neuman 2013, Maliepaard et al. 2010, Phalet et al. 2008, Smits & Ultee 2013, van Tubergen 2007, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011), others report a considerable stability, especially among Muslims (Diehl & Koenig 2009, Güveli & Platt 2011, Lewis & Kashyap 2013b, Maliepaard et al. 2012, Platt 2013, Soehl 2017, van Tubergen 2013). In addition, very little is known about how divergent patterns of adaptation in religiosity can be explained. More precisely, although several factors have been identified that (sometimes) influence religious attachments and behaviors, these factors cannot fully account for differences between religious groups in general and the exception of Muslim immigrants in particular.

This paper investigates intergenerational transmission processes among immigrant and native families in one Western European destination country. Using data from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) (Kalter et al. 2016a), I examine parent-child dyads of families with and without immigrant background affiliating with Christianity, Islam or any other religion in Germany. This approach overcomes one important methodological problem of previous research. Studies analyzing intergenerational change in

religiosity to date have mainly compared synthetic immigrant generations (exemplary exceptions are de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014, Jacob & Kalter 2013, Maliepaard & Lubbers 2013, Soehl 2017, van de Pol & van Tubergen 2014), and thus are not able to account for different compositions of immigrant generations in terms of unobserved characteristics (Borjas 1994, Diehl & Koenig 2009). Furthermore, well-known secularization theory (Berger 1967b, Bruce 2002, Wilson 1982) postulates that declining levels of religiosity in modernized societies are driven predominantly by failure of parents to successfully transmit religion to their children (Scourfield et al. 2012, Voas & Crockett 2005). Thus, in order to understand trends of secularization in the overall population, it is necessary to scrutinize how religious transmission from one generation to the next takes place and under what conditions parents are (not) able and/or motivated to pass on their religious attachment to their offspring. Finally and most importantly, analyzing parent-child dyads enables to directly examine these interfamilial transmission processes and to what extent family characteristics and everyday interactions within and outside the family affect them.

For these reasons, I apply a micro foundation (Coleman 1990) in order to theoretically and empirically explain divergent trends in religiosity mentioned above, that is, developments in religious attachments over time and over generations as well as group differences in the intergenerational transmission in religiosity. Building on established theories addressing the topic of immigration and religion, which illustrate these macro-level trends, this paper focuses on micro-level processes within families to detect whether they may account for group differences in the intergenerational transmission in religiosity between native Christians and between immigrants affiliating with Christianity, Islam or any other religious denomination. Two research questions stand in the center of this paper: First, do family characteristics and everyday interactions influence intergenerational transmission in religiosity? And second, do they help to explain differences in the intergenerational transmission between natives and immigrants and between religious groups? To answer these questions, I develop a theoretical model that combines several research strands of intergenerational transmission research and assimilation theory. In a nutshell, I postulate that transmission opportunities within families and motivation to pass on religion from one generation to the next are of crucial importance. Although these two ideas have been occasionally applied to investigate intergenerational transmission in religiosity (e.g. Kelley & de Graaf 1997, de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014), to my knowledge no study systematically investigates transmission opportunities and transmission benefits together. In addition,

explaining religious group differences regarding the strength of intergenerational transmission by using transmission opportunities and motivation has largely been neglected in previous research. Testing this model empirically by making use of the first wave of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU), my results show that although family characteristics and everyday interactions within and outside the family have an impact on intergenerational transmission in religiosity, they cannot fully explain the Muslim exception of strong resistance to secularization.

2 Theoretical Background

2.1 Previous Research on Intergenerational Transmission in Religiosity

Secularization mainly operates via generational change, which means that cohort effects are crucially important for trends towards declining religiosity in the overall population, whereas age and period effects are negligible (Grotenhuis & Scheepers 2001, Scourfield et al. 2012, Voas & Crockett 2005, but see Need & de Graaf 1996). 'If there is a process of secularization, this is in part due to the failure of the intergenerational transmission of religion. It is difficult to separate these two domains – secularization and transmission. To understand secularization we need to consider what is happening to religious transmission [...].' (Scourfield et al. 2012: 92). This implies that religious upbringing is subject to change in modern societies, and secularization trends on the societal level are resulting from less successful intergenerational transmission in religiosity from parents to children (Myers 1996).[1]

Previous research on the intergenerational transmission in religiosity usually takes intergenerational transmission for granted (Arránz Becker et al. 2016, Bader & Desmond 2006, Bao et al. 1999, Bengtson et al. 2009, Erickson 1992, Francis & Brown 1991, Grotenhuis & Scheepers 2001, Maliepaard & Alba 2016, Myers 1996, Soehl 2017, Stolzenberg et al. 1995). Assuming that transmission takes place universally, it particularly stresses that parents form the main (or

[1] The same argument is also implicitly assumed in assimilation theory (Alba and Nee 1997, Gordon 1964, Park 1950). Since differences between immigrants and natives are expected to diminish especially over successive immigrant generations, transmission within families is a reasonable place to start when investigating religious assimilation. If transmission within families is strong, assimilation to the mainstream culture consequently is weakened.

in its strongest form: the only) socialization agents responsible for evoking religious values, attitudes and behaviors in their descendants. Most prominently, following social learning theory (Bandura 1977) the existence of socialization processes is rarely scrutinized; parents reinforce religious norms, monitor their children and sanction deviant religious behavior (de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014). However, these theories are hardly able to explain group differences in intergenerational transmission. Simply put, they state that transmission takes place, but are not qualified to explain why some families are more effective in passing on religion from one generation to the next than others.

There are several ad-hoc explanations for group differences in the intergenerational transmission in religiosity – both between immigrants and natives and between immigrants with different ethnic or religious backgrounds, yet still a theoretical foundation is largely lacking, not to mention an empirical test. Although some scholars have pointed out that the intergenerational stability of cultural values and attitudes is particularly pronounced in immigrant families while host-country specific values and attitudes are not necessarily internalized (de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014, Idema & Phalet 2007, Nauck 1989, 2001, 2007, Phalet & Schönpflug 2001, Schönpflug 2001), they are usually less interested in ethnic and/or religious differences within the immigrant population.

With respect to transmission in religiosity, some recent studies have taken into account family (van de Pol & van Tubergen 2014), peer (de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014, Maliepaard & Lubbers 2013, Soehl 2017) and community characteristics (van de Pol & van Tubergen 2013), but do not comprehensively and systematically relate them to divergent patterns of transmission. Likewise, it has been found that transmission in Muslim immigrant families is more effective than in native and in non-Muslim immigrant families (de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014, Jacob & Kalter 2013, Scourfield et al. 2012), and more effective in Turkish compared to Moroccan families (Güngör et al. 2011, Maliepaard & Lubbers 2013, van de Pol & van Tubergen 2014), however, reasons for these findings remain unclear.

2.2 Intergenerational Transmission in Religiosity Revised

Transmission from one generation to the next involves two ‘actors’ – parents who transmit religious values and behaviors, and children who adopt them. I distinguish between conscious

('concerted cultivation'; Lareau 2011) and unconscious transmission (Francis & Brown 1991, Maliepaard & Alba 2016, Soehl 2017): On the one hand side, parents consciously and deliberately put effort in shaping their children, for example, they explicitly teach their children about culture, norms and values, reinforce appropriate behavior and sanction deviant behavior, or they invest in the inculcation of values they hold in other ways. On the other hand side, in line with Bandura's (1977) social learning theory, children passively learn attitudes and behaviors by role-model learning. More precisely, they indirectly adopt religious values from their parents – by processes of observation and imitation.

I postulate that the central factors influencing the level of success of interfamilial transmission of religiosity are a) transmission opportunities, and b) perceived transmission benefits. Crucial for a) is the ability to transmit, that is, to what extent family members get into contact to each other. When family members spend much time together, it is more likely that children become acquainted with the religious values their parents believe in and that they eventually adopt these values. Thus, the presence of transmission channels is decisive (Jæger 2009) because this enables parents to provide their offspring with religious experiences and strengthen familiarity with religious contents. In addition, parents who actively engage in religious practices are better able to transmit religion to their children since in this way they act as role models, which facilitates passive role-model learning via observation and imitation (Bandura 1977, Erickson 1992, Saka 2016, Vermeer 2014). Transmission opportunities are also related to family structure: it has been shown that children of traditional families with two biological parents are more religious (Bader & Desmond 2006, Myers 1996) and that transmission is especially effective if mothers and fathers affiliate with the same religious denomination ('belief homogamy'; Erickson 1992, Francis & Brown 1991, Myers 1996, Need & de Graaf 1996, Soehl 2017, but see Grotenhuis & Scheepers 2001).[2]

However, mere opportunities to transmit religion from one generation to the next does not necessarily lead to effective transmission. In addition, b) perceived transmission benefits contribute to it, that is, parents are more or less inclined to influence their children's attitudes and children are more or less motivated to listen and respond to their parents and perceive their parents' behavior as worth imitating (Saka 2016). First and foremost, religious parents will perceive

[2] Although these associations are a stable result in the literature, it is disputable whether family composition truly affects child's level of religiosity, or whether it is rather a composition effect, that is, that highly religious parents more often live in traditional family forms and tend to have more religious children.

transmitting religion to their offspring as more important than non-believing parents, thus, they will put more effort in active religious socialization of their children (Bader & Desmond 2006, Myers 1996, Scourfield et al. 2012, Voas & Crockett 2005, but see Kelley & de Graaf 1997). Furthermore, research among the majority population suggests that authoritative parenting is particularly effective when it comes to the intergenerational transmission of religious beliefs and practices (Bao et al. 1999, Bader & Desmond 2006, Ozorak 1989, Vermeer 2014). An authoritative parenting style is characterized by a warm and supportive home climate combined with a general interest in children. Thus, transmission should be stronger in families, in which love plays a major role, family cohesion is high and in which parents are interested and involved in their child's lives.

Although growing up is a sensitive and important period for the development of religious attachments (Ozorak 1989), parents are not the only socialization agents in the lives of young people. Especially during adolescence, c) relationships outside the family, especially to peers, become more and more important for religious beliefs and practices (Bebiroglu et al. 2015, Erickson 1992, Grotenhuis & Scheepers 2001, Need & de Graaf 1996). Highly religious persons in the surrounding might support one's own religiosity, they might also serve as role models or support one's own religiosity via shared religious activities. In contrast, if peers are less attached to religion, the opposite can be expected. It is fair to say that this is especially relevant for descendants of immigrants: given their on average higher religiosity, exposure to secular host-country environments enhances familiarity with their cultural values and makes it more likely to adopt them, which is in line with central arguments of assimilation theory (Alba & Nee 1997, Gordon 1964, Maliepaard & Alba 2016, Park 1950, Soehl 2017). Consequently, I expect that contact to secular peers alters the opportunity to get in touch with secular values and attitudes and perceived benefits of adopting the religion of the parents, thus suppresses or supports the transmission in religiosity within families (Soehl 2017).

2.3 Group Differences in Intergenerational Transmission in Religiosity

After describing general mechanisms of intergenerational transmission in religiosity within families, this section addresses group differences in the strength of religious transmission. 'Religious transmission in minority ethnic communities may be a very different phenomenon than

in the ethnic majority population and understanding the process may require some distinctive theoretical insights.' (Scourfield et al. 2012: 93).

In order to answer the question why intergenerational transmission in religiosity among immigrant families deviates from the native population, one of the most prominent theoretical arguments is that maintaining ethnic and religious identities functions as a means to ensure in-group solidarity, to maintain ethnic and/or religious group ties, and to protect families against risks at higher ages (Maliepaard & Alba 2016, Nauck 1989, 2007, Phalet & Schönpflug 2001). Thus, as a result of shared migration experiences, family cohesion is stronger, and relationships between family members are tight-kniter in immigrant, especially Muslim families (Arends-Tóth & van de Vijver 2008, Merz et al. 2009, Nauck 1989, 2001, 2007, Steinbach 2013). As outlined in the previous section, perceived transmission benefits in religiosity are associated with relationships between family members. Since religion is an important part of the cultural heritage of many immigrant groups, these families perceive religious transmission as key to cultural reproduction. This should be especially relevant in secular Western European societies; thus, parents have higher incentives in investing explicitly in their child's religious upbringing. Additionally, since interfamilial transmission of Islam as a minority religion is not reinforced and supplemented by the wider social Christian environment, Muslims are particularly affected (Duderija 2007, Kelley & de Graaf 1997, Soehl 2017, Voas & Fleischmann 2012, Voas & Storm 2012). Consequently, I expect that immigrant families, especially those who affiliate with Islam, subjectively assess benefits for religious transmission higher than native families.

With respect to transmission opportunities, I expect that immigrants grow up in a more home and family-oriented environment, and, as a consequence, religiosity is passed on to a greater extent compared to native families. This might have several reasons: first, immigrant parents, especially those from countries dominated by Islam, show lower risks of divorce (Feng et al. 2012, Kalmijn et al. 2005, Milewski & Kulu 2014). Second, chances to interact are larger in immigrant families because their leisure-time activities and personal social networks are more home-oriented (Anderson 2014, Granato 2002, Heß-Meining 2004). Third, parents of Muslim denomination show themselves more overt religious behavior (Aleksynska & Chiswick 2013, Connor 2010, Diehl & Koenig 2009, Garcia-Munoz & Neuman 2013, Lewis & Kashyap 2013b; van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011), and this gives children the opportunity to observe this

behavior. On the other hand side, opportunities to get into contact with secular worldviews outside the families should be less frequent for immigrants, and again, especially for Muslims.

To sum up, I assume that the degree of intergenerational transmission in religiosity is basically influenced by a) opportunities to pass on religious values and attachments from parents' to child's generation, b) parents' and child's perceived transmission benefits, and c) child's opportunities to get in contact with non-religious worldviews outside the family. Families with an immigration background – and among them especially families with Muslim affiliations – are expected to display stronger transmission rates because their family members assess religious transmission more valuable and because they interact more frequently with each other and less frequently with their rather secular environment.

3 Data and Measures

3.1 Data

The empirical analyses of this paper use data from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) (Kalter et al. 2016a). Funded by NORFACE (New Opportunities for Research Funding Agency Co-Operation in Europe), the project aims at answering key open questions on the integration of immigrant children in four European countries: England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Applying a three-stage school-based sampling design with oversampling schools with high immigrant proportions, 18,716 adolescents with and without an immigrant background were surveyed in their schools in 2010/2011 (CILS4EU 2016). In addition, using bilingual survey instruments, 11,714 interviews with one parent were conducted, which allow me to study the intergenerational transmission of religion directly by investigating parent-child dyads since identical questions concerning religion and religiosity were asked in the survey instruments for youth and parents.

The empirical analyses are based on the first wave of the German subsample of CILS4EU, which is a representative sample of students attending 9th grade in German secondary schools (in 14 federal states) (n=4,637). I only use cases with a complete parental interview with either the biological mother or father; in addition, I restrict my sample to 3,145 native Christian

families and immigrant families who belong to any religious affiliation (see section "measures"). In addition, only cases without missing information on any of the model variables are included (n=2,693).

3.2 Measures

The central dependent variable is the intergenerational change in religious salience between adolescents and their parents. The question 'How important is religion to you?' is included identically in the student and the parents' questionnaires, with answer categories ranging on a four-point scale from 'not at all important' to 'very important'. Intergenerational change in religious salience falls into one of three categories: decrease, stability or increase. Increase means that the adolescent rates religion higher than their parent does, stability indicates identical answers given by child and parent, and decrease is observed when religion is less important to the adolescent than to the parental generation.[3]

Of major interest in the empirical analyses are differences in religious salience between immigrant and native families affiliating with different religious denominations. Thereby, immigrant background is based on the respective country of birth of the respondent youth, the biological parents and grandparents (Dollmann et al. 2014). An immigrant child is defined as born abroad (first generation) or as born in Germany with at least two grandparents born abroad (second and third generation). Natives are respondents who do not belong to any of these categories. To define religious groups, I use self-reported religious affiliation (information from parents if available, from adolescents otherwise) and categories it into the following broader categories: Christianity, Islam and other religion (for instance, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Yazidism). A combination of these two indicators forms the central independent variable; it distinguishes between native Christians, immigrant Christians, immigrant Muslims and immigrants with another religion. Thus, I excluded families who do not belong to any religious denomination

[3] An alternative option to construct the dependent variable is to use a difference measure between parents' and youths' religious salience, ranging from -3 to +3. However, only 11 percent of adolescents deviate from their parent by more than one answer category. In addition, using such a metric scale requires that the effects of all independent variables are similarly important for any position of the scale, and also for positive (increase) and negative (decrease) values. Since these are unrealistic assumptions, I decided to use categories to estimate the chances whether intergenerational change in religiosity occurs or not.

(n=434; 12 percent) as well as 6 native families with non-Christian religious denominations and 1 immigrant family with missing religious denomination from all analyses.

Opportunities to transmit religiosity between generations are operationalized by the frequency of youths' free time activities. Respondents were asked on a 5-point scale, how often they pursue certain hobbies in their leisure time. I distinguish between outgoing activities (go to the cinema; go out to a pub/bar/nightclub/party; spend time in a sports/music/drama/other club; go to a concert/DJ event) and in-home activities (visit relatives; read a book (not for school); read a newspaper) as a proxy how often adolescents are at home, and thus they can interact with their parents (assuming that they are present, too, and that youth engage in outside-home activities without their parents). Both variables simply count the number of activities that are pursued on a regular basis (at least 'once or several times a month'). Further indicators for transmission opportunities are the employment status of the responding parent and information about family structure – whether the responding adolescent lives with both biological parents in one home.[4]

For perceived transmission benefits, I use the level of agreement about the following statements: "Germans should do all they can to keep their customs and traditions" and "Immigrants should do all they can to keep their customs and traditions.[5] I combine these two variables into one single indicator, whereby the first statement is used for Germans and the second statement for immigrants. These questions are available both for adolescents and their parents.

To operationalize family relations, respondents were asked how strongly they agree to several statements about family life. In a first step, I perform an exploratory factor analysis in order to separate different meaningful dimensions of these family relations; the resulting four-factor solution is displayed in Table 4.1. Cronbach's alpha lies between 0.71 (good atmosphere) and 0.87 (loveliness) for these scales, thus, all of them reach a satisfactorily level of internal consistency. In addition, I use the question 'How well do you get along with your mother/father?' as a general assessment about the relationship between respondent and his/her parent.

[4] Unfortunately, measures about religious behavior are not included in the parental questionnaire. Thus, it is not possible to include these as important opportunities to pass on religiosity to children via role-model learning in my analyses.

[5] I would prefer to use a direct question on the importance of preserving religious rather than ethnic customs and traditions. However, religion and religiosity can be regarded as a significant part of one's ethnic heritage (Foner & Alba 2008, Soehl 2017).

Table 4.1: Family relation indicators

Factor	Items	Cronbach's alpha
Loveliness	Whenever I feel sad, my parents try to comfort me. My parents try to help me when I have a problem. My parents show me that they love me. My parents try to understand what I think and feel. We like to spend free time with each other. We feel very close to each other.	0.869
Good atmosphere	It becomes tense when everyone is at home. When were together, the atmosphere is uneasy. We fight about small things.	0.706
Strictness	My parents often tell me to be quiet. My parents are very strict with me, even over small things. My parents often criticize me.	0.759
Involvement	My parents say that I must tell them everything that I do. My parents want to know parents of people I hang out with. I always need to tell my parents exactly where I am and what I am doing when I am not home.	0.717

The school-based sampling design of CILS4EU allows me to depict my theoretical ideas more accurate since I am able to use religious rather than ethnic characteristics of everyday contacts outside the family. Furthermore, reversed causality issues should be less problematic when using characteristics of classmates rather than characteristics of friends, that is, that respondents' own level of religiosity affects contact to a more or less religious environment. For these reasons, I use two different variables to depict opportunities to get into contact with religious vs. secular influences outside the family: First, I include the share of classmates who affiliate with any other religious denomination than the respondent or who do not have any religious attachment at all. In addition, I use the average level of religious salience as described above among all students in classroom. To facilitate the interpretation of this variable, it is reversed in all analyses such that higher values stand for lower religious salience and thus contact to a more secular surrounding outside the family.

In addition to these variables of immediate theoretical interest, I control for adolescents' school type[6] and parents' education as rough measures for the general degree of integration into the host society, sex of parent and child as well as for parents' religious salience and mode of parental interview in every multivariate model. All metric variables are standardized and have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Furthermore, all results are design-weighted in order to account for peculiarities of sampling design and for non-response on school, class and students' level (CILS4EU 2016).

4 Empirical Results

4.1 Descriptive Results

Figure 4.1 shows the frequency distribution of the dependent variable 'intergenerational change in religious salience' between adolescents and their parents separately for religion-immigrant groups. Already descriptively I can confirm that there are pronounced differences regarding the importance of religion to adolescents and their parents, which is in line with existing research on the intergenerational transmission in religiosity among immigrant and native families (de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014, Jacob & Kalter 2013, Maliepaard & Lubbers 2013, Soehl 2017, van de Pol & van Tubergen 2014). As can be seen in Figure 4.1, families affiliating with Christianity, both with and without immigrant background, display a declining importance of religion over generations. In contrast, the level of religious salience remains considerably stable among Muslim families: almost 60 percent do not change their level of religious attachment over generations. At the same time, the probability for these families to secularize is only about half as high as for Christian families. This finding is even more remarkable when taking into account the level of religiosity in the parental generation (see Table 4.2): although Muslim parents are on average highly religious – two third of them rate religion as 'very important', stability is the

[6] Respondent adolescents' eventual educational achievement, which is a common indicator of immigrants' integration, is not yet known (Jonsson et al. 2018). However, in the German tracked educational system, attended school type can be used as a proxy for their aspired educational degree, thus their structural integration into the host society. The variable distinguishes between lower, intermediate and upper secondary schools, in ascending order of level of structural integration, and comprehensive schools including all of the above mentioned school types.

modal category. Therefore, the picture in Figure 4.1 displays an impressive picture of strong intergenerational transmission in religiosity in Muslim immigrant families on a very high level.[7]

Figure 4.1: Change in religious salience over generations; distribution of dependent variable separately for religious-immigrant groups



The following section describes all central explanatory variables as described in Section 3.2, that is, transmission opportunities, transmission benefits, and secularization opportunities outside the family, separately for native Christians and immigrants affiliating with Christianity, Islam or another religious denomination (Table 4.2).

Concerning transmission opportunities, immigrant children are less often engaged in outgoing activities such as going to the cinema, going out or spending time in clubs compared to their native Christian counterparts. At the same time, they spend less time doing home-oriented

[7] This pattern does not change substantially when I look at change in religiosity separately for different levels of parental religiosity (available upon request). Two third of children of Muslim parents in the highest religious salience category do not deviate from their parents; and the chances of intergenerational secularization goes down to 5 percent for families in which religion is 'not very important' to parents. As opposed to this, intergenerational decrease in religiosity is about as likely as stability in Christian families when parents are moderately religious.

activities like reading or visiting relatives, although the difference between Muslim immigrants and Christian natives is not statistically significant. In addition, Muslim immigrant parents are less often employed and tend to live in traditional families with two biological parents present. Consequently, we can expect that divergent opportunities to pass on religion from parents to children might lead to more effective transmission processes in Muslim immigrant families.

Children of Muslim parents report the highest degree of loveliness in their family, which significantly differs from Christian families, both Germans and immigrants. In contrast, Christian immigrant families show the lowest levels in this regard. Despite some slight differences in size and significance, the same pattern can be identified with respect to subjective relationship assessment to the responding parent and atmosphere in the home environment, which is least favorable in Christian immigrant families and most favorable in Muslim immigrant families.

Furthermore, immigrant parents are stricter with their children, and at the same time they are to a greater degree involved in their children's lives. Particularly among Muslim immigrant families, parents are highly interested in what their children are doing when they are not at home. Muslim immigrant youth think that maintaining immigrant customs and traditions is more important than Germans and Christian immigrants do, whereby Christian immigrant show the lowest values on these variables. Interestingly, German Christian parents assess preserving their cultural heritage as equally important as Muslim immigrants. Basically, these results are in line with my theoretical expectations: Muslim immigrant families are cohesive entities characterized by a lovely atmosphere combined with parents who are involved in their children's lives (authoritative parenting). Unlike these families, Christians display lower levels of love and cohesion accompanied by high levels of parental strictness and involvement.

Finally, opportunities to get into contact with religious vs. secular worldviews outside the family were operationalized by religious characteristics of the school class. Descriptive results show the well-known picture of ethnic school segregation: Muslim adolescents visit school classes with lower shares of co-religious classmates and with a higher average level of religious salience among all students. This pertains to a lesser extent to Christian immigrant students as well.

Table 4.2: Distribution of independent variables, separately for religious-immigrant groups

	Native Christian	Immigrant Christian	Immigrant Muslim	Immigrant other	Total
Transmission opportunities					
Two biological parents present (freq.)	72.94	66.79 *	88.82 *	87.32	73.18
Child's outgoing activities (mean)	0.066	-0.065 *	-0.368 *	0.084	0.000
Child's in-home activities (mean)	0.053	-0.193 *	-0.007	0.662 *	-0.000
Parent employed (freq.)	86.96	73.97 *	57.52 *	79.22	81.61
Transmission benefits					
General relationship assessment (mean)	-0.002	-0.084	0.221 *	-0.239	-0.000
Loveliness (mean)	0.011	-0.113 *	0.170 *	0.057	0.000
Good atmosphere (mean)	0.012	-0.092 *	0.114	0.067	-0.000
Strictness (mean)	-0.069	0.194 *	0.063	0.581 *	-0.000
Involvement (mean)	-0.083	0.067 *	0.481 *	0.109	0.000
Importance to keep traditions (child) (mean)	-0.004	-0.228 *	0.513 *	0.561 *	-0.000
Importance to keep traditions (parent) (mean)	0.115	-0.472 *	0.183	-0.013	0.000
Secularization opportunities outside family					
Average religiosity in class (reversed)	0.167	-0.195 *	-0.835 *	-0.278	0.000
Share of classmates with other or no religion	-0.262	-0.132 *	2.170 *	2.869 *	-0.000
Parent's religious salience (freq.)					
Not at all important	5.29	4.77	1.63	0.00	4.83
Not very important	41.76	31.45	6.45	11.75	36.31
Fairly important	42.48	34.87	26.01	22.85	39.34
Very important	10.47	28.90	65.91	65.40	19.52
Parent's education (freq.)					
No education	0.34	3.74	15.33	12.14	2.45
Lower secondary education	60.18	56.36	62.50	65.07	59.63
Upper secondary education	22.69	25.03	14.49	18.38	22.41
University education	16.80	14.86	7.68	4.41	15.52
School type (freq.)					
Lower secondary school	12.38	20.88	33.52	17.87	16.05
Intermediate secondary school	34.37	31.65	27.65	15.17	33.11
Upper secondary school	37.51	31.22	19.56	53.77	34.69
Comprehensive school	15.74	16.25	19.27	13.18	16.15
Type of sex dyad (freq.)					
Mother - Daughter	41.67	44.12	38.12	23.09	41.76
Father – Daughter	8.50	11.12	17.93	2.66	9.86
Mother – Son	39.75	37.89	32.08	16.12	38.56
Father – Son	10.08	6.87	11.87	58.13	9.83
Mode parental interview (freq.)					
Self-completion	72.05	66.47	59.17	64.97	69.71
Telephone	27.95	33.53	40.83	35.03	30.29
N	1,414	689	568	22	2,693

* Difference (t-test) compared to native Christians is significant at $p < 0.05$.

Source: "Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries", German subsample, own calculations. Results are weighted; numbers of cases are displayed unweighted.

With respect to control variables, the descriptive findings are in line with previous research: Muslim parents are predominantly located in the highest religious salience category, whereas Christian parents are moderately religious. At the same time, immigrants perform worse in terms of educational attainment than natives. An interesting side result is that Muslim fathers are more likely to participate in the parental interview compared to their Christian counterparts.

4.2 Multivariate Results

This section intends to show whether group differences in transmission opportunities, perceived transmission benefits and opportunities to secularize outside the family affect the degree of intergenerational transmission in religiosity, and in how far these factors can explain religious group differences therein.

Table 4.3 shows the results of these multivariate analyses. These are logistic regression models, using the probability of intergenerational change in religiosity among families as the dependent variable. In order to account for my initial research interest in the intergenerational transmission vs. secularization, I summarize intergenerational increase and stability in religiosity into one (reference) category. Although intergenerational increase in religiosity can be seen as a failure of intergenerational transmission as well, very different processes drive these familial developments (Diehl & Koenig 2009, Jacob & Kalter 2013, Soehl 2017). Furthermore, the number of cases in the "increase" category is rather small (see Figure 4.1). Thus, for the sake of simplicity, all models estimate the probability of secularization over generations compared to stability or increase in religiosity.[8] However, there exist several cases for which the predicted probability cannot be estimated due to logical impossibility. These are parents who state that religion is 'not at all important'; therefore, I exclude these families in all multivariate models (n=133). In addition, due to the problem of comparing regression coefficients in logistic regressions models using different samples or different sets of independent variables (Mood 2010), average marginal effects are shown instead of logit coefficients or odds ratios.

Model 1 displays gross differences in intergenerational change in religious salience between religious-immigrant groups, controlling for parents' religiosity, adolescent's school type,

[8] Estimating secularization vs. stability and leaving out cases for which an intergenerational increase in religiosity over generations occurs do not substantially alter the results (available upon request).

parent's education, sex and mode of parents' interview. As in the descriptive section of this paper, the main effects reveal that Muslim families differ significantly from the reference group, native Christian families, by showing a lower likelihood of a decrease over generations compared to stability and increase. Whereas this indicates a pronounced pattern of intergenerational stability in religious salience among Muslim families or even an increase therein, the coefficients for immigrants affiliating with Christianity or other religious denominations are marginal in size and not statistically significant. Thus, secularization patterns in these families are comparable to German Christians once controlling for higher religiosity in the parents' generation and other background variables.

In the next step, I examine the impact of explanatory variables on the likelihood of intergenerational secularization, and whether they contribute to explain this outstanding pattern of intergenerational transmission among Muslim immigrant families.

Whether immigrant children live in families with two biological parents present is not important for the likelihood of intergenerational decrease in religiosity. The same pertains to parents' employment status (in contrast to Myers 1996). Furthermore, indicators used to depict how often adolescents are at home show that home-oriented leisure time activities make intergenerational stability in religiosity more likely, whereas outgoing activities such as going out or spending time in clubs do not make a significant difference concerning the intergenerational transmission in religiosity. Thus, children who spend more time with their parents are more likely to adopt the religious level of their parents. In sum, opportunities to pass on religiosity from one generation to the next do not seem to be of major importance. Although in-home leisure time activities diminish chances of secularization over generations, the other indicators do not.[9]

As described in the theoretical part of this paper, I expect that an authoritative parenting style (that is, warmth and love in the parent-child relationship and interest in child) affects intergenerational transmission positively. Results of my multivariate analyses confirm this assumption: a better subjective assessment of the parent-child relationship and a more loving relationship

[9] Sub-group analyses according to the level of religiosity in the parents' generation (available upon request) show, however, that in families with high initial religious salience intergenerational secularization is significantly more likely when youth spend more time outside the household. It is possible that sufficient transmission opportunities are mainly relevant when it comes to the preservation of high levels of religious attachment.

among family members significantly diminish the likelihood of a decline in religiosity over generations. Furthermore, parental involvement and interest in child's activities contributes to intergenerational stability or increase in religious salience. These results are consistent with previous research on intergenerational transmission in religiosity in the majority population (Bao et al. 1999, Bader & Desmond 2006, Myers 1996, Ozorak 1989, Vermeer 2014). Variables covering the interest in maintaining the customs and traditions of one's own group display divergent results: whereas the likelihood of an intergenerational decrease in religiosity is significantly smaller when children assess that keeping customs and traditions is important, the opposite is the case for parents. However, this unexpected finding is mainly attributable to Christian families (see model 3b including additional interaction effects with religion-immigrant groups). Native and immigrant Christian parents who think it is important to keep German/ethnic customs and traditions increase the likelihood that their children are less religious than they are; thus: intergenerational secularization. This relationship, however, is negative for Muslims immigrants. To conclude, perceived benefits to transmit religiosity are important: the kind of relationship between parents and children alters the chances of passing on religious attachment to children in the expected direction, as well as adolescents' opinions whether the cultural heritage of one's ethnic group should be maintained.

Finally, I expected that social contact to secular peers outside the family influence the intergenerational transmission process within families, more precisely, that spending time with persons who do not support (the same) religion weakens it. In fact, the more secular classmates are (in terms of their own religious salience), the more likely secularization over generations occurs. The share of peers with another religion, however, is not important. Thus, it is not contact to peers who are different in terms of religious affiliation per se that is decisive, but rather the general religious climate in young people's everyday environment, the classroom.

All in all, however, the outstanding transmission pattern in Muslim immigrant families (model 1) cannot be explained by all of these explanatory variables. Although the initial main effect decreases by about one fourth in size from -0.419 to -0.309, it is still significant in the final model. Thus, although transmission opportunities, perceived transmission benefits and secularization opportunities outside the family exert some influence on the intergenerational transmission in religiosity, it cannot fully account for the strong stability in religiosity in Muslim immigrant families.

Table 4.3: Logistic regression: Chances of intergenerational secularization among immigrant and native families

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 3b	Model 4	Model 5
Immigrant-religion group *(Ref.: Native Christian)*						
Migrant Christian	-0.007	-0.026	0.004	0.173	0.027	0.021
Migrant Muslim	-0.419 ***	-0.430 ***	-0.358 ***	0.470 +	-0.343 ***	-0.309 ***
Migrant other religion	0.023	0.055	0.027	1.684 **	0.051	0.057
Transmission opportunities						
Two biological parents present		-0.034				-0.025
Child's outgoing activities		0.006				0.006
Child's in-home activities		-0.063 ***				-0.048 ***
Parent employed		-0.059				-0.037
Transmission benefits						
General relationship assessment			-0.051 **	-0.051 **		-0.040 *
Loveliness			-0.047 **	-0.049 **		-0.042 *
Good atmosphere			0.021	0.020		0.016
Strictness			0.017	0.016		0.024
Involvement			-0.035 *	-0.036 *		-0.031 *
Importance to keep traditions (child)			-0.047 ***	-0.034 *		-0.039 **
x Migrant Christian				-0.031		
x Migrant Muslim				-0.092 +		
x Migrant other religion				-0.066		
Importance to keep traditions (parent)			0.039 **	0.052 **		0.035 **
x Migrant Christian				-0.037		
x Migrant Muslim				-0.154 **		
x Migrant other religion				-0.050		

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$

Source: "Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries", German subsample, own calculations.
Results are weighted; regression coefficients are displayed as average marginal effects.

Table 4.3 (continued): Logistic regression: Chances of intergenerational secularization among immigrant and native families

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 3b	Model 4	Model 5
Secularization opportunities outside family						
Average religiosity in class (reversed)					0.117 ***	0.113 ***
Share of classmates with other or no religion					0.004	0.007
Parent's religious salience *(Ref.: Fairly important)*						
Not very important	-0.299 ***	-0.311 ***	-0.304 ***	-0.302 ***	-0.313 ***	-0.324 ***
Very important	0.171 ***	0.172 ***	0.173 ***	0.177 ***	0.193 ***	0.196 ***
Parent's education *(Ref.: No education)*						
Lower secondary education	-0.036	-0.022	-0.044	-0.043	-0.068	-0.064
Upper secondary education	-0.015	0.000	-0.004	0.001	-0.047	-0.028
University education	0.004	0.026	0.023	0.029	-0.033	0.001
School type *(Ref.: Lower secondary school)*						
Intermediate secondary school	0.036	0.060	0.022	0.016	-0.024	-0.018
Upper secondary school	-0.037	-0.003	-0.030	-0.034	-0.063	-0.035
Comprehensive school	0.072	0.075 +	0.040	0.034	0.003	-0.025
Type of sex dyad *(Ref.: Mother - Daughter)*						
Father – Daughter	-0.072	-0.055	-0.080	-0.078	-0.083 +	077
Mother – Son	0.103 ***	0.096 **	0.107 ***	0.108 ***	0.096 ***	093 ***
Father – Son	0.067	0.076	0.074	0.080 +	0.038	.047
Mode parental interview *(Ref.: Self-completion)*						
Telephone	0.039	0.028	0.024	0.024	0.044	0.021
N	2,560	2,560	2,560	2,560	2,560	2,560
R^2	0.144	0.160	0.185	0.191	0.187	0.237

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1

Source: "Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries", German subsample, own calculations.
Results are weighted; regression coefficients are displayed as average marginal effects.

5 Discussion

This paper aimed at investigating intergenerational transmission in religiosity among families with and without immigrant background in Germany. Building on existing approaches in the field of transmission research and assimilation theory, I developed a theoretical model of intergenerational transmission in order to explain group differences therein between native Christian, immigrant Christian and immigrant Muslim families. Opportunities to pass on religiosity from one generation to the next, perceived transmission benefits and opportunities to get in contact with secular values of the receiving country built the core elements of this model.

My empirical results using data from the first wave of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) reveal that motivation to transmit religiosity within families, and contact with a secular environment outside the family are important determinants in the transmission of religiosity from parents to children, whereas opportunities to transmit are less relevant. Especially an authoritative parenting style – that is, a warm and supportive parent-child relation combined with high levels of involvement in children's life – and child's motivation to maintain customs and traditions of the heritage culture significantly influence the level of religious transmission (Bao et al. 1999, Bader & Desmond 2006, Myers 1996, Ozorak 1989, Vermeer 2014). The well-known picture of intergenerational stability of religious salience in Muslim immigrant families, who are subject to secularization trends within their country of residence to a lesser extent than Christian immigrants and the native population (de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014, Jacob & Kalter 2013, Scourfield et al. 2012, Soehl 2017), does not change substantially when I take into account transmission benefits and transmission opportunities. Although the initial difference decreases somewhat in size, it remains highly significant. Thus, strong religious transmission among Muslim immigrants cannot be explained by these factors alone.

Following from these insights, Muslims' strong preservation of religious traditions remains an unsolved pattern in Western European immigration societies. Religious transmission from parents to children seems to be more important in Muslim compared to Christian families; however, this is only one part of the story. Has religion a different status for Muslims compared to their Christian counterparts? In other words, the importance of being religious might be an inherent religious element in Islam that is responsible for individual tendencies not to secularize. Alternatively, the institutional status of Christianity in Germany might serve as a signal of

individual religiosity that Muslims are not able to possess. Thus, the only way for them to be religious is to feel and behave religious.

Of course, data limitations might matter as well. Transmission opportunities were operationalized rather indirectly – by using free time activities and parent's employment situation, which implies that family members interact more frequently when they are at home more often. At the same time, it cannot be excluded that adolescents undertake outgoing activities with their parents. This might explain its minor importance in my statistical analyses. Direct measures of contact among family members might improve future elaborations in this respect. Furthermore, the cross-sectional character of the data set enables to depict only a snapshot in adolescents' lives, whereas transmission is a long-term process that starts at a very young age and is probably never completed. In this way, the causal interplay between parents' and adolescents' religiosity and factors that are influencing religious transmission from one generation to the next is difficult to disentangle. In particular, the possibility that children's acceptance of parents' values and attitudes influence the quality of family relations (Arránz Becker et al. 2016, Vermeer 2014) is hard to exclude. It might also be the case that more religious parents do not allow their children to engage in outgoing-activities, thus supporting direct interactions, which might enhance opportunities for intergenerational religious transmission. Furthermore, transmission might operate in the opposite direction as well, that is, that – especially with increasing age – adolescents influence their parents' religious attachments. Not only for this reason, an important follow-up question pertains to long-term consequences of parental influences of adolescents' religiosity. Studies among the majority population found a weakening direct influence of parents during adolescence and at the transition to marriage (Francis & Brown 1991, Grotenhuis & Scheepers 2001, Need & de Graaf 1996, Ozorak 1989, Stolzenberget al. 1995), yet it is not known whether this applies to minority groups as well.

Chapter 5:
Ethnic and Religious Differences in Religious Development at the Transition from Adolescence to Early Adulthood

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Abstract

This contribution investigates developments of religious salience and behavior between adolescence and early adulthood among natives and immigrants with Christian and Muslim affiliation. Transferring life-course research arguments to the situation of immigrants in Germany, I furthermore test which factors are linked to change or stability in religiosity, and analyze whether they are similarly important for different immigrant-religion groups. While most research on religious identity development of young immigrants stems from the US, comparable European studies typically do not focus on migration and/or solely study adults. Using the first six waves of the German sample of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU and CILS4EU-DE), my results demonstrate delayed secularization tendencies among minority youths in comparison to majority youths between the age of 14 and 22, and stability or even an increase in religious practice among immigrants who affiliate with Islam – in contrast to Christians. Further analyses support that transitions from school to vocational training or work are positively related to religiousness, whereas leaving the parental home is not relevant in this regard.

1 Introduction

How the religiosity of immigrants develops in the short and in the long run is of central importance for immigration societies. Strong religious identities are is supposed to be negatively related to other integration dimensions, such as inclusion into the labor market and the educational system (Carol & Schulz 2018, Connor & Koenig 2013) and detrimental to the creation of social ties (Damstra & Tillie 2016) since they might generate negative attitudes and prejudice in the majority population and might reduce immigrants' incentives to integrate into the receiving society (Soehl 2017).

Previous research suggests that immigrants – and among them especially those with Muslim affiliations – are more religious than the majority population in terms of beliefs and practice (e.g. Aleksynska & Chiswick 2013, Jacob & Kalter 2013, Lewis & Kashyap 2013b, van Tubergen 2007, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011). In addition, by comparing adolescents' religious attachment with that of their parents, various studies find that intergenerational transmission in religiosity within Muslim immigrant families is considerably strong in comparison with natives and immigrants with Christian denominations (de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014, Jacob 2018, Jacob & Kalter 2013, Scourfield et al. 2012, Soehl 2017). Taken together, these results imply that high levels of religiousness are likely maintained in subsequent immigrant generations. If religion is actually linked to further disadvantages, it is crucial to broaden our knowledge about whether these patterns stabilize beyond adolescent years. This period of life is understudied, however, or more specifically, little is known how religious beliefs and behavior of immigrants develops when they advance in age and reach adulthood eventually.

In scholarly literature addressing the majority population it is well-known that late adolescence and early adulthood is the period in life in which most frequently religious change occurs, by tendency in the direction of decreasing religious attachments (Denton et al. 2008, Desmond et al. 2010, Lee et al. 2017, Need & De Graaf 1996, Petts 2009, Regnerus & Uecker 2006, Smith et al. 2002, Uecker et al. 2007). This is supposed to result from the shifting focus of primary social relations from the parental home environment to peers, friends and potential future spouses, and from important life-course transitions such as moving out, leaving school and entering vocational training, university or the labor market, and getting married and having children (Desmond et al. 2010, Gunnoe & Moore 2002, Levenson et al. 2005, Petts 2009, Regnerus et al. 2004, Schweitzer 2000, Stolzenberg et al. 1995, Willits & Crider 1989).

Combining these two research strands, this paper extends the life-course perspective (George 1993) to the situation of immigrants and their descendants in Germany. Two research questions stand in the center of this paper: The first one is rather explorative: How does religious salience and behavior develop between adolescence and early adulthood among natives and immigrants with Christian and Muslim affiliation? Very few studies investigate this period of life; they find that there is a slight decrease in religious attachment among Christians, whereas Muslims' religiosity is characterized by stability or even increase (Dimitrova 2014, Güngör et al. 2012, Simsek et al. 2019, van der Does 2018, Verkuyten et al. 2012, see Phalet et al. 2018 for an overview). However, either this empirical evidence is based on cross-sectional or retrospective data, or it covers a small period of time of about two years. In contrast, applying a longitudinal research design, in the current study I am able to pursue religious change between the age of 14 and 22. Second, I test hypotheses about the reasons behind these trends, derived from life-course research addressing the majority population and adapted to the situation of immigrants in their receiving societies: transition from school to vocational training, work or university, leaving the parental home, and characteristics of parents and peers. What contributes to change or stability in religiosity in adolescence and early adulthood? And are these factors similarly important for natives and immigrants with Christian and non-Christian religious affiliation?

The statistical analyses use six waves of the German sample of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU and CILS4EU-DE). My results demonstrate that Christian and Muslim immigrants secularize with respect to religious beliefs, but at a slightly later age than Christian natives. Religious behavior, however, remains stable or even increases in young Muslims' adolescence, whereas it becomes less frequent for Christians. When it comes to explanations of these trends, leaving school is weakly related to an increase in religiosity, but leaving the parental home is not. For immigrants, the composition of friendship networks matters.

2 Theoretical Background

2.1 Religious Change in Adolescence and Early Adulthood

It is widely accepted in past research that religious change happens most frequently in late adolescence and early adulthood (Albrecht & Cornwall 1989, Lee et al. 2017, Need & de Graaf 1996, Petts 2009, Regnerus & Uecker 2006, Schweitzer 2000, Smith et al. 2002, Uecker et al. 2007). This is not only evident because it concerns a crucial developmental stage of identity formation, but also since this period of life is characterized by changes and transitions that are supposed to be related to religion (Desmond et al. 2010, Levenson et al. 2005, Ozorak 1989). Accordingly, numerous studies show that a considerable share of young people becomes entirely disaffiliated, or reduces attending religious meeting places like churches or mosques and being involved in religious organizations. In addition, private religious practices such as regular praying becomes less frequent, and a shift occurs towards negative attitudes about being religiously attached (e.g. Denton et al. 2008, Desmond et al. 2010, Lee et al. 2017, Petts 2009, Schweitzer 2000, Smith et al. 2002, 2003, Uecker et al. 2007). In contrast, internal dimensions of religion such as religious salience and beliefs seem to diminish less strongly (Desmond et al. 2010, Denton et al. 2008, Smith et al. 2003, Uecker et al. 2007). However, these aggregate figures alone might be misguiding in order to understand the whole story of changes in religiosity in adolescence and early adulthood. As a matter of fact, there are also young people whose religious involvement remains stable or even increases. Therefore, macro trends of decreasing religiosity simply result from secularizing individuals hiding these divergent tendencies (Denton et al. 2008, Lee et al. 2017, Petts 2009). Therefore, it is necessary to take into account micro level explanations, that is, under what conditions individuals deliberately or unconsciously decide to change their religiosity, be it in one or the other direction, or not.

2.2 Theoretical Explanations for Religious Change

Shifts in religious attachments and behavior in the life period of early adulthood are attributed to two different processes: first, gradual changes in the social composition of significant networks, and second, changes that occur through biographical events – in the language of life-

course research: trajectories and transitions (George 1993, Ingersoll-Dayton et al. 2002, Petts 2009).

In general, social surroundings change and diversify during adolescence. According to Durkheim's (1897) social integration theory, the more socially integrated individuals are into a certain group, that is, the more interaction they have to its members, the more they conform to the values, norms and beliefs of that group. Applying this basic idea to religion, social relations affect both opportunities to get in touch with secular or religious values and attitudes as well as perceived benefits of feeling and behaving religiously (Desmond et al. 2010, Gunnoe & Moore 2002, Need & De Graaf 1996, Petts 2009). More specifically, significant others act as important role models whose behavior is observed and imitated (Bandura 1977). Furthermore, religious values and norms are supported via shared activities; or they are reinforced or devalued by positive or negative feedback within the group, depending on whether they are recognized or not (Brechwald & Prinstein 2011, de Hoon & van Tubergen 2014, Leszczensky 2013, Munniksma et al. 2015, Grotenhuis & Scheepers 2001, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011).

Adolescents become less attached to their parents and engage more and more with peers and other persons outside their family of origin (Phalet et al. 2018). Younger children tend to take over their parents' attitudes and behavior without scrutinizing them. With increasing age, however, they seek to gain emotional independence from their parents, decide autonomously from them in terms of what they think and do.[1] As a consequence, it is more and more adolescents' own voluntary decision to what extent they believe in or practice religion. Thus, intergenerational transmission in religiosity becomes less significant (Denton et al. 2008, Levenson et al. 2005, Regnerus et al. 2004, Smith et al. 2002, Willits & Crider 1989).[2] Instead, relationships outside the family, especially to friends and peers, become more and more important for religious beliefs and practices (Bebiroglu et al. 2015, Erickson 1992, Grotenhuis & Scheepers 2001, Need & de Graaf 1996). Consequently, if adolescents move into new environments that are more secular compared to their family of origin, they should become less religious, and vice versa (Regnerus & Uecker 2006, Simsek et al. 2019).

[1] Some scholars argue that youth tend to even actively rebel against their parents by deliberately not adopting their ideals and attitudes in order to distance themselves from their parents (Willits & Crider 1989).

[2] This stands in contrast to assumptions of socialization theory (e.g. Bader & Desmond 2006, Bandura 1977, Erickson 1992, Myers 1996) that assumes long-lasting influences of early socialization, therefore, religious attachment should be stable over time (Petts 2009).

In addition to these trajectories, crucial transitions (George 1993, Ingersoll-Dayton et al. 2002, Petts 2009) during late adolescence and early adulthood possibly affect contact with others of similar or different faith. They can also have direct effects when they initiate re-evaluations of religious thinking and behavior, thus, making religious change more or less likely (Albrecht & Cornwall 1989, Denton et al. 2008, Schweitzer 2000).

Moving out is probably one of the most important events in young adults' lives and it is related to religiousness (Petts 2009). When children stop living together with their parents, the influence of intergenerational transmission is less strong since the relationship between parents and their children is weakened. Previous research has shown that closeness and quality of parent-child relations has an influence on intergenerational transmission in religiosity (Bao et al. 1999, Bader & Desmond 2006, Jacob 2018, Petts 2009, Regnerus & Uecker 2006, Vermeer 2014, but see Desmond et al. 2010). Thus, when children stop living together with their parents, it can be expected that the effect of parents on their offspring's' religiosity decreases.

It has been shown that marriage and child births raise religious involvement, while cohabitation and premarital sexual intercourse reduces it (Petts 2009, Regnerus & Uecker 2006, Uecker et al. 2007, Stolzenberg et al. 1995, Thornton et al. 1992). Recently married couples are supposed to find emotional support and valuable interactions with similar others in religious organizations, and parents of young children are interested in offering religious upbringing for their children (Petts 2009, Stolzenberg et al. 1995). In contrast, cohabiting individuals are less likely religiously engaged since these kinds of behavior contradict religious norms of many religious denominations. Thus, the motivation to attend religious services is expected to diminish due to negative sanctions by these institutions and its members, as well as to compensate for negative feelings due to cognitive dissonance between actual behavior and religious teachings (Petts 2009, Regnerus & Uecker 2006, Uecker et al. 2007, Stolzenberg et al. 1995, Thornton et al. 1992).[3]

Transitions in the educational and occupational career suddenly change the persons that you interact with in everyday life. This is especially evident when adolescents leave school and

[3] However, one has to be careful whether this effect is actually causal: It is also possible that those who are religious marry more often, cohabite less frequently and have children earlier (Petts 2009, Thornton et al. 1992, Uecker et al. 2007). Alternatively, the relation can be simply the result of unobserved heterogeneity with both related to age, for instance (Stolzenberg et al. 1995).

enter vocational training or the labor market, or start studying at university. If this comes together with a change in the religious composition of these new environments, change in religious attachment can be expected. In addition, these new and unknown activities might offer new, more attractive and useful alternatives as being religious (Denton et al. 2008, Smith et al. 2002).[4]

To summarize my theoretical considerations so far, different pathways exist with respect to religious developments in adolescence and early adulthood, whereby decline in religiosity is most common, but this pertains to a lesser extent to religious salience compared to religious affiliation and practice. These changes in religious attachment and behavior can be explained by changing opportunities and benefits of being religious when networks of young people diversify, with parents becoming less and peers becoming more important; or they can be regarded as consequences of important life events. Among these, moving out of the parental home, starting serious romantic relationships and transitions into higher education or the labor market affect incentives to be religious.

2.3 Religious Change of Majority and Minority Youths

After describing empirical findings and theoretical explanations for changes in religiosity in adolescence and early adulthood, this section aims at transferring these arguments to immigrant youth in Western Europe. So far, very few studies examine religious attachments of young immigrants in the European context (Dimitrova 2014, Güngör et al. 2012, Simsek et al. 2019, van der Does 2018, Verkuyten et al. 2012, see Phalet et al. 2018 for an overview). They find that immigrants and natives with Christian background secularize in a similar manner, whereas Muslims' religiosity stabilizes or even increases during adolescent years. However, only two studies (Simsek et al. 2019, van der Does 2018) use a longitudinal design and even those merely cover a time span of approximately two years. In addition, to my knowledge reasons for divergent developments of religious beliefs and behavior are yet to be explored.

[4] Furthermore, according to secularization theory, education itself has often been regarded as a force that causes people to become irreligious (Levenson et al. 2005, Need & De Graaf 1996, Uecker et al. 2007). Higher education expands knowledge about alternative explanations and doubts about religious reasonings about facts and questions in life. Empirical results are mixed, however (Need & De Graaf 1996, Uecker et al. 2007).

Following the reasoning outlined in section 2.2, it can be expected that descendants of immigrants become less religious irrespective of their religious background and adapt to the religiosity of their native peers. Given that immigrant families are usually more religious (Aleksynska & Chiswick 2013, Jacob & Kalter 2013, van Tubergen 2007, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011), a shift in the social environment of young immigrants towards peers outside the family increases the likelihood of being exposed to secular values and attitudes. Basically, this argument corresponds to assimilation theory, which also claims that contact with members of the receiving society enhances familiarity with prevalent attitudes and behavior and eventually makes it more likely to adopt them (Alba & Nee 1997, Gordon 1964, Maliepaard and Alba 2016, Park 1950, Soehl 2017). This is what Simsek and colleagues (2019: 162) label "universal secularization". However, in the context of migration the expectation of 'automatic' secularization requires to be scrutinized and refined.

First, it can be argued that the level of parental religiosity possibly affects to what extent new social environments outside the family of origin matter for religious developments. On the one hand, contacts with secular norms and values should be especially influential for individuals without extended prior exposition, that is, those who grow up in highly religious families. Combined with the circumstance that immigrant parents are more religious, this would result in stronger declines in religiosity for immigrants in comparison to natives. On the other hand, polarization hypothesis (Martin et al. 2003, Ozorak 1989, Regnerus & Uecker 2006) argues that adolescents with highly religious parents maintain or even increase their level of religiosity, while moderately religious individuals are more likely to secularize. Proponents of this hypothesis argue that highly religious families put more effort in religious transmission and also tend to select environments that are consistent with their own religious worldviews.[5] Applied to the situation of minority youths, it can be expected that they depict stability in religiosity to a greater extent. A similar reasoning follows from segmented assimilation theory (Bankston & Zhou 1995, Portes & Rumbaut 2001, Portes & Zhou 1993, Zhou 1997a), which also argues that immigrants tend to maintain their ethnic and religious heritage in their host societies in order to ensure in-group solidarity and cohesion (Nauck 2007, Phalet & Schönpflug 2001, Simsek et al. 2019). In addition, it depends on characteristics of these new social environments whether contact with secular values eventually increases. Thus, if immigrants do not establish contacts with

[5] This hypothesis is heavily debated, however, and also not consistently confirmed empirically (Regnerus & Uecker 2006).

secular segments of the receiving society, but instead maintain intra-ethnic ties, their religiosity is less likely to decline.

Second, it is likewise debatable whether parents' influence diminished in an equal manner during adolescence. Empirical research shows that there are ethnic differences with respect to parent-child relations: Family cohesion is stronger, and relationships between family members are more tight-knit in immigrant, especially Muslim families (Arends-Tóth & van de Vijver 2008, Heß-Meining 2004, Jacob 2018, Merz et al. 2009, Steinbach 2013). Thus, these groups might stay attached to their families of origin, probably even after they moved out, and as a consequence, maintain their religious identities.

In sum, I hypothesize that there are plausible arguments for both stability or decrease in religious developments at the transition from adolescence to early adulthood. Furthermore, it depends on specific circumstances if one or the other scenario is more likely, among them the level of parental religious attachment and characteristics of social environments immigrants enter during adolescence. In the empirical part of this paper, I explore how religiosity develops and whether these factors have varying effects for immigrants and natives affiliating with Christianity or Islam.

3 Data and Measures

3.1 Data

The empirical part of this paper uses data from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) (Kalter et al. 2016a, 2016b, 2017). Funded by NORFACE (New Opportunities for Research Funding Agency Co-Operation in Europe), this project seeks to answer key questions on the integration of children of immigrants in four European countries: England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Applying a three-stage school-based sampling design with oversampling schools with high immigrant proportions, 18,716 adolescents with and without an immigrant background were surveyed in their schools in 2010/2011 (CILS4EU 2016). The first wave of data collection was followed by two subsequent waves, with a time gap of approximately one year between each survey. In addition, I make use

of the German extension of CILS4EU (CILS4EU-DE; Kalter et al. 2019), a follow-up research project which is funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and which follows the original sample of CILS4EU in their early adulthood.

The empirical analyses are based on the first six waves of the German sample of CILS4EU and CILS4EU-DE. Yearly repeated measures of religious beliefs and practice offers the unique opportunity to investigate intraindividual dynamics of religious change between the age of 14 and 22, applying longitudinal data analysis techniques. I only use cases who participated in at least two waves; and I restrict my sample to 3,649 native Christian, immigrant Christian and immigrant Muslim respondents. In addition, only cases without missing values on any of the model variables are included (n=3,351).

3.2 Measures

Three central dependent variables are used in the empirical analyses: religious salience, visits of religious meeting places and frequency of prayer. Religious salience is operationalized using answers to the question "How important is religion to you?" with answer categories ranging on a four-point scale from "not at all important" to "very important". The questions "How often do you visit a religious meeting place (e.g. a church, a mosque, a synagogue or a temple)?" and "How often do you pray?" are used to represent the two measures of religious behavior. The scale for these two variables ranges from "never" to "every day".

Of major interest in the empirical analyses are differences in religious salience between immigrant and native families affiliating with different religious denominations. Thereby, immigrant background is based on the respective country of birth of the respondent youth, the biological parents and grandparents (Dollmann et al. 2014). An immigrant child is defined as born abroad (first generation) or as born in Germany with at least two grandparents born abroad (second and third generation). Natives are respondents who do not belong to any of these categories. To define religious groups, I use self-reported religious affiliation (information from wave 1 is replaced by information of subsequent waves if missing). A combination of these two indicators forms the central independent variable; it distinguishes between native Christians, immigrant Christians and immigrant Muslims. Thus, I excluded respondents who do not belong to any religious denomination (n=525; 12 percent) as well as 70 respondents with another religious

denominations and 1 immigrant with missing information about religious denomination from all analyses.

The influence of two important life-course transitions in adolescence and young adulthood are tested in the empirical section of this paper. First, the event of leaving school is derived from changes in self-reported main educational or vocational activity, which is included annually in the questionnaire since wave 3.[6] I do not only take into account the occurrence of this event, but also distinguish whether respondents (a) start vocational training in school or (b) in a company and in school ('duale Ausbildung'), (c) work, (d) study at university or (e) do something else after leaving school. Second, I identify when respondents move out and leave their parents' home using two different data sources: In waves 1, 2 and 3 and in wave 6, information whether adolescents are living together with their parents are available. In addition, moves can be determined using changes in address information, which is particularly necessary between wave 3 and 6 because no question about the living situation is available in wave 4 and wave 5.[7]

The influence of parents cannot be estimated using repeated measures. Instead, I make use of wave 1 information about parents' religious salience included in the parental questionnaire.[8] The question and answer categories are identical to those in the regular questionnaire (see above). The impact of friends is operationalized by the proportion of native friends. The question is: "Think about all of your friends. How many of them have a German background?" Answers range from "almost all or all" to "none or very few".

In addition to these variables of immediate theoretical interest, I control for adolescents' sex and language proficiency and parents' education (as rough measures for the general degree of integration into the host society) in every model.

[6] In wave 1, all respondents attended school since a school-based sample design was applied, in which schools were selected as primary sampling units and all students in two randomly school classes were asked for participation (CILS4EU 2016). This also applies to the majority of cases in wave 2 who were re-interviewed in their schools. The remaining cases were already asked in wave 2 what they are currently doing.

[7] Unfortunately, I am not able to test the effect of marriage and childbirth on religiosity. Only 12 respondents are married at the time point when wave 6 was conducted in 2016, and 31 children were born to 28 respondents. Thus, the number of cases is too small for meaningful statistical analyses.

[8] Parallel to wave 1, bilingual self-completion and telephone interviews were conducted with one parent. The response rate of the parental survey was 78 percent; thus, I add a variable for missing information in each model.

4 Empirical Results

4.1 Changes in Religious Salience and Religious Behavior

The empirical section starts by investigating the development of religious attachments and behavior of native Christians, migrant Christians and migrant Muslims aged between 14 and 22 years. To this end, Figure 5.1 depicts predicted values of three dependent variables – religious salience, frequency of praying and visits of religious meeting places – derived from random-effects models, displayed as growth curves (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008).[9]

Figure 5.1: Change in importance of religion, frequency of praying and visits of religious meeting places, separately for religion-immigrant groups (growth curves)



Source: Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries (CILS4EU), German subsample, waves 1-6, own calculations
Predicted values are displayed for: Girls; Parents' highest education: Secondary school; Language proficiency: "very well"

[9] All models additionally control for sex, parental education and language proficiency. Detailed results are available from the author upon request.

With respect to religious salience, the corresponding graph implicates that there is a trend towards decreasing religiosity for all investigated groups. However, this process does not occur simultaneously: Whereas religious salience drops in a steady manner from age 14 onwards for young people of German origin until they turn 20 years old, the same happens delayed for minority adolescents with Christian and Muslim affiliation, at around the age of 17. Younger respondents seem to remain as religious as in their early teenage years, but they become less religious after they turn 18 years old. In addition, the importance immigrants attach to religion falls less strongly for both immigrant groups in comparison to their native counterparts. Thus, the initial differences between religion-immigrant groups concerning the degree of religious attachment even increases at the transition into early adulthood.

The picture is quite different when focusing on religious behavior (upper right and bottom graph of Figure 5.1). For native and immigrant Christian youths, a more or less clear downward trend is visible for both indicators (praying frequency and church attendance). In stark contrast, Muslim immigrants remain rather stable on average, or even enhance their mosque visits when they are around 16 to 17 years old, but these respondents return to their initial frequency of mosque visits later on. Taken together, these results correspond to the results by Simsek et al. (2019) and van der Does (2018) who analyzed the first three waves of CILS4EU. However, my results expand those by improving our knowledge about what happens afterwards. They suggest that Muslims religious beliefs drop in their late teenage years, whereas mid-adolescence is a temporary time span in which religious behavior increases temporarily and drops again later on.

In a second step, I examine how individual religious salience develops over the survey period. More precisely, I compare answers given to the question "How important is religion to you?", which was asked in every wave; and I distinguish between increase, stability and decrease in religious salience: 'stability' means that identical answers are given at the start and end of the survey period (including respondents with temporary drop or rise in religious salience in between). Participants are assigned to the 'decrease' category when religion is less important to them in later waves (for instance, when it changes from "very important" in wave 1 to "not very important" in wave 6), and 'increase' means a rise in religious salience.[10]

[10] I do not show results of religious conversion or religious disaffiliation (Regnerus & Uecker 2006), that is, whether respondents switch their religious denomination or become completely non-religious. In the data set

Figure 5.2 shows that stability in religious salience is the modal category for all religion-immigrant groups. However, one can also see that this is most common among migrant Muslims, with almost two third showing the same level of religiosity in the first and last occasion they participated in CILS4EU, in comparison to approximately 50 percent among Christians with and without immigrant background. When looking at individual change in religiosity, this pattern is primarily attributable to variations in the tendency to secularize in adolescence and early adulthood: Whereas decline is most common among native Christians (32.7 percent), followed by migrant Christians (27.7 percent) and migrant Muslims (22.2 percent), there are hardly any group differences when it comes to religious increase.

Figure 5.2: Individual changes in religious salience, separately for religious-immigrant groups



more than 90 percent do not change religious affiliation over time, 5 percent become non-affiliated and 2 percent change their religious denomination from one to another. Another 3 percent are non-affiliated in between, but stay religiously attached eventually). Therefore, with the data at hand it is not reasonable for substantial and statistical reasons to consider these developments in early adulthood.

Combining these two single results, previous research can be replicated for the majority population (Denton et al. 2008, Lee et al. 2017, Petts 2009). For all three indicators, I find decrease in the development in religiosity in early adulthood among native Christians, whereas at an individual level stability is still the most common pattern. Immigrant Christian youths also experience a decline in religious beliefs and behavior, which is by and large comparable to that of the majority population, but on a slightly higher overall level of religiousness. Muslim immigrants also display reduced religious salience; however, this does not pertain to religious behavior. My results suggest that even a temporary increase in mosque visits during mid-adolescence occurs, and this stands in contrast to empirical evidence among the majority population (Desmond et al. 2010, Denton et al. 2008, Smith et al. 2003, Uecker et al. 2007), which finds that religious beliefs and attitudes do not diminish as much as open forms of religiousness.

4.2 Explanations for Changes in Religious Salience and Religious Behavior

After concentrating on the first research question in the previous section, I will now proceed to the explanation of religious developments in the transition to adulthood. In the theoretical part of this paper, several factors have been identified that have an impact on religiosity, that is, the family of origin, friends and peers, and important life-course transitions. Tables 5.1 to 5.3 display the results of random-effects models testing these assumptions for three indicators of religiosity. The models are calculated separately for religious-immigrant groups in order to find out whether explanatory factors are equally important for these groups or not.

With respect to transitions, leaving school is positively related to religiousness, especially when individuals transition into vocational training. For instance, starting a school-based vocational training after school leads to a significant increase in religious salience for native Christian and migrant Muslim adolescents, and enhances religious practice among migrant Christians. Entering the labor market, either as an apprentice in a company or by starting to work immediately, affects religious salience and church visits of natives, respectively. Entering university for study reasons, in contrast, does not yield significant effects in any model. It thus seems to be essential whether young people stay in the educational system or not.

Table 5.1: Random-effects model predicting religious salience, separately for immigrant-religion groups

	Native Christian		Migrant Christian		Migrant Muslim	
Age trend *(Ref.: 14 and younger)*						
15	-0.086	*	-0.013		-0.023	
16	-0.147	***	-0.104		-0.013	
17	-0.210	***	-0.163	*	-0.076	
18	-0.316	***	-0.200	*	-0.180	**
19	-0.377	***	-0.287	***	-0.201	**
20	-0.347	***	-0.282	**	-0.236	***
21	-0.373	***	-0.251	**	-0.260	***
22 and older	-0.528	***	-0.100		-0.416	***
Main activity after leaving school						
Vocational training (in school)	0.055	+	0.054		0.068	+
Vocational training (in a company and in school)	0.071	*	0.018		0.075	
Work	0.114		-0.039		0.091	
University	-0.020		-0.031		-0.083	
Something else	0.077	*	0.100	+	-0.009	
Moving out	-0.017		-0.100		0.051	
Share of German friends	-0.007		-0.045	***	-0.025	**
Parent's importance of religion	0.285	***	0.385	***	0.375	***
Missing	0.372	***	0.733	***	0.992	***
Sex *(Ref.: Female)*						
Male	-0.176	***	-0.050		-0.068	+
Language proficiency	-0.002		-0.050	*	-0.021	
Parental education *(Ref.: No secondary education)*						
Secondary education	-0.315		-0.131		-0.005	
Tertiary education	-0.242		-0.170		-0.163	*
Constant	2.055	***	2.021	***	2.446	***
N person years	7,511		3,775		3,814	
N persons	1,610		844		897	
R^2 (within)	0.040		0.026		0.031	
R^2 (between)	0.106		0.194		0.191	
R^2 (overall)	0.093		0.158		0.148	

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$

Source: "Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries" (CILS4EU, CILS4EU-DE), German subsample, waves 1-6, own calculations.

Table 5.2: Random-effects model predicting visits of religious meeting places, separately for immigrant-religion groups

	Native Christian		Migrant Christian		Migrant Muslim	
Age trend *(Ref.: 14 and younger)*						
15	-0.078		-0.131		0.136	
16	-0.119	*	-0.161	+	0.217	*
17	-0.106	*	-0.164	+	0.268	**
18	-0.198	***	-0.164		0.139	
19	-0.324	***	-0.425	***	0.080	
20	-0.292	***	-0.368	***	0.123	
21	-0.258	***	-0.354	**	0.032	
22 and older	-0.350	***	-0.248	+	-0.061	
Main activity after leaving school						
Vocational training (in school)	0.022		0.116	*	-0.011	
Vocational training (in a company and in school)	0.002		0.029		0.006	
Work	0.179	*	-0.142		0.043	
University	0.053		0.037		0.051	
Something else	0.104	**	0.099	+	0.070	
Moving out	0.018		-0.099		0.069	
Share of German friends	0.014		-0.018		-0.020	
Parent's importance of religion	0.287	***	0.369	***	0.464	***
Missing	0.323	***	0.695	***	1.322	***
Sex *(Ref.: Female)*						
Male	-0.062	*	0.005		0.627	***
Language proficiency	-0.018		-0.056	*	-0.099	**
Parental education *(Ref.: No secondary education)*						
Secondary education	0.257		0.130		0.181	+
Tertiary education	0.437	+	0.161		0.043	
Constant	1.088	***	1.316	***	0.836	***
N person years	6,336		3,192		3,241	
N persons	1,610		844		897	
R^2 (within)	0.031		0.045		0.018	
R^2 (between)	0.123		0.145		0.192	
R^2 (overall)	0.099		0.120		0.151	

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$

Source: "Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries" (CILS4EU, CILS4EU-DE), German subsample, waves 1-6, own calculations.

Table 5.3: Random-effects model predicting frequency of praying, separately for immigrant-religion groups

	Native Christian		Migrant Christian		Migrant Muslim	
Age trend *(Ref.: 14 and younger)*						
15	0.013		-0.193	+	0.026	
16	-0.070		-0.240	*	0.041	
17	-0.194	**	-0.309	**	0.125	
18	-0.239	**	-0.411	**	0.092	
19	-0.353	***	-0.477	***	0.069	
20	-0.394	***	-0.532	***	0.203	
21	-0.419	***	-0.375	**	0.136	
22 and older	-0.620	***	-0.549	**	-0.223	
Main activity after leaving school						
Vocational training (in school)	0.045		0.184	*	-0.046	
Vocational training (in a company and in school)	0.006		0.063		-0.084	
Work	0.068		-0.092		0.070	
University	0.079		-0.022		0.045	
Something else	0.158	**	0.087		0.015	
Moving out	0.009		-0.162	+	0.230	
Share of German friends	0.008		-0.050	*	-0.015	
Parent's importance of religion	0.459	***	0.482	***	0.562	***
Missing	0.579	***	0.756	***	1.413	***
Sex *(Ref.: Female)*						
Male	-0.233	***	-0.087		0.177	*
Language proficiency	0.012		-0.016		-0.058	
Parental education *(Ref.: No secondary education)*						
Secondary education	0.696	***	0.239		0.152	
Tertiary education	0.799	***	0.335		0.042	
Constant	0.439	*	1.368	***	1.259	***
N person years	6,328		3,185		3,223	
N persons	1,610		844		897	
R^2 (within)	0.038		0.023		0.006	
R^2 (between)	0.119		0.123		0.088	
R^2 (overall)	0.104		0.096		0.071	

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.1$

Source: "Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in 4 European Countries" (CILS4EU, CILS4EU-DE), German subsample, waves 1-6, own calculations.

In contrast to my theoretical expectations, moving out of the parental home does not significantly affect religiosity, with one exception – praying frequency of migrant Christians. By tendency, the direction of the coefficients hint at a negative effect for Christian migrants and a positive effect for Muslims, whereas no relation is observable for natives. This would imply that Muslims become more religious when they leave their parental home, whereas the opposite pertains to Christian immigrants.

The share of German friends as an indicator for contact with secular segments of the receiving society is influential only for immigrants; and it plays a more important role for religious salience compared to practice. The interpretation of coefficients corresponds to theoretical expectations: Having a higher share of German friends is linked to diminishing religiosity. Furthermore, parents' religious salience is by and large the most important factor for religious attachments of their children.

Comparing R^2 (between) and R^2 (within), the model explains variance between individuals to a greater extent than variance within individuals. This means that, although some coefficients of time-varying variables reach significance, their explanatory power is restricted.

5 Summary

This study aimed to improve our knowledge about the development of religiosity at the transition from adolescence to early adulthood. Combining life-course research with the sociology of migration, it investigates how immigrants' and natives' religious salience and behavior changes between the age of 14 and 22. Research among the majority population suggests that this period of life is crucial for religious identity development, and religious change happens most frequently at that time (Albrecht & Cornwall 1989, Lee et al. 2017, Need & de Graaf 1996, Petts 2009, Regnerus & Uecker 2006, Schweitzer 2000, Smith et al. 2002, Uecker et al. 2007). Furthermore, I examine the explanatory power of several factors that are supposed to be related to religious change or stability and whether these explanations are applicable to the situations of immigrants in Germany. More specifically, I test whether leaving school, moving out and characteristics of significant others affect developments in religiousness (Desmond et al. 2010, Gunnoe & Moore 2002, Levenson et al. 2005, Petts 2009, Regnerus et al. 2004, Schweitzer 2000, Stolzenberg et al. 1995, Willits & Crider 1989).

Analyzing six waves of the German sample of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Survey in Four European Countries (CILS4EU and CILS4EU-DE), my results demonstrate that decline in religious salience occurs for all religion-immigrant groups, whereby this process starts at a slightly later age for Muslim and Christian immigrants in comparison to natives. Similar patterns are observable for visits of religious meeting places among Christian immigrants and natives who secularize in a similar manner during their adolescent years. However, Muslims' mosque visits and praying behavior do not change substantially during the survey period, even a temporary increase in mosque visits is observable. Thus, there is a trend towards secularization among Muslim immigrants with respect to religious salience, but not behavior. This contradicts insights of life-course research that religious beliefs change to a lesser extent compared to religious practice (Desmond et al. 2010, Denton et al. 2008, Smith et al. 2003, Uecker et al. 2007).

When turning to possible explanations for religious stability or change, leaving school and entering the labor market seems to be related to increases in religiosity, whereas no effect was found for the transition from school to university. Combining these results with the overall trend, it is possible that higher rates of religious decline among native Christian adolescents can at least partly be attributed to their longer stay in the educational system. On the other hand, entering the vocational system or the labor market, which leads to increases in religiosity, might be linked to a less secular environment. Opposed to educational transitions, moving out is not relevant for religious developments in early adulthood. However, although this study covers a longer time span in comparison to existing research in this area (Simsek et al. 2019, van der Does 2018), it is possible that respondents are still too young for meaningful interpretations of life-course effects in general. The effects of leaving the parental home are based on 587 cases only; therefore, lacking effects might be the result of insufficient statistical power. The same applies to the effect of getting married and having children, which I was not able to take into account since the number of cases is too low. Thus, future research in this area should further elaborate on the impact of these significant transitions. However, appropriate data that covers a sufficiently long period in young people's lives and entails a sufficiently high number of immigrants is rare.

Chapter 6:
Conclusion

Chapter 6: Conclusion

1 Summary of Dissertation

This dissertation examined how secular societies in North-Western Europe influence immigrants and their descendants who are living in these countries in terms of religious beliefs and practice. Given that these families stem from rather religious regions in the world in comparison to their respective host societies (Garcia-Munoz & Neuman 2013, Güveli 2015, Phalet et al. 2018, van Tubergen & Sindradóttir 2011), it is interesting to know how their religious attachments develop in the short and in the long run after migration. Especially assumptions about negative consequences of strong religious identities on immigrants' structural and social inclusion and prejudice against Islam demonstrate the scientific and societal relevance of this topic (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart 2009, Carol & Schulz 2018, Connor & Koenig 2013, Damstra & Tillie 2016, Schlueter et al. 2019, Soehl 2017, Strabac & Listhaug 2008).

In the introductory chapter, I illustrated that empirical research about immigrants' religiosity is ambiguous with respect to confirmed empirical findings. Some studies find that religious attachments of immigrants tend to decrease over time or successive immigrant generations (e.g. Maliepaard et al. 2010, Phalet et al. 2008, Platt 2013, van der Bracht et al. 2013), others provide evidence for stability (e.g. Diehl & Koenig 2009, Maliepaard et al. 2012, Smits & Ultee 2013) or an increase in religious practices (e.g. Diehl & Koenig 2013, Smits et al. 2010, van Heelsum & Koomen 2016). Furthermore, empirical research has yet to provide satisfying explanations for these trends. Not only do their results differ with respect to factors that are supposed to be related to religiousness (for instance, education, employment situation, discrimination experiences) (e.g. Fleischmann & Phalet 2012, Fleischmann et al. 2019, Güveli & Platt 2011, Leszczensky et al. 2019, Maliepaard & Phalet 2012, van Tubergen 2006), the clarification of religious and ethnic differences rarely stands in the center of research attention.

Against this background, two research questions guided this dissertation. I built on existing research by applying advanced research methods and designs that overcome several methodological shortcomings, and I attempt to broaden existing theoretical approaches to the study of immigrants' religiosity by making use of arguments of adjacent disciplines:

Chapter 6:
Conclusion

(1) How religious are majority and minority youths with different religious backgrounds, and how does religious attachment change over time and over generations?

(2) To what extent can alternative theoretical approaches be used to study religious developments in North-Western European immigrant societies?

Starting with a rather descriptive approach, chapter 2 investigated how religious majority and minority youth in Europe are in terms of religious affiliation and level of religiosity; and how the level of religiosity is related to social conditions such as generational status, ethnicity and gender, and core explanations including religious socialization and education. Analyzing the religiosity of young people in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, I was able to demonstrate that immigrant youths are more often affiliated with any religious denomination, and pray and attend religious services more often compared to natives. Likewise, religious salience is higher among minority youths. Comparing adolescents' religious salience with that of their parents, intergenerational decline is visible for majority youth, whereas stability is most common in Muslim families.

Chapter 3 intended to comprehensively test hypotheses derived from established theories in the sociology of religion and of migration (assimilation theory, secularization theory, segmented assimilation theory, market model of religion, reactive ethnicity approach). I asked what patterns of intergenerational transmission in religiosity can be identified among different religious groups, and whether cognitive-structural and social integration contributes to explain these divergent trends. My analyses demonstrated that Muslim immigrant families display a pattern of strong intergenerational stability in religiosity in all countries; in contrast to native and Christian families who show trends of secularization that are fairly similar to each other. In addition, I found empirical support for all lines of theoretical explanations, whereby indicators of cognitive-structural and social assimilation are rather weakly and inconsistently related to change in religious salience from parents to their children. The central conclusion of this chapter was that neither of these existing theories is able to fully account for patterns of intergenerational transmission in religiosity.

Therefore, chapter 4 was a first attempt to theoretically examine and empirically test an alternative approach to explain divergent transmission patterns in religiosity. Making use of theoretical ideas in psychological and social psychological research, a theoretical model was

developed that highlights the importance of opportunities to pass on religion from one generation to the next and perceived transmission benefits. My results, however, showed that although raw ethnic differences concerning the likelihood of intergenerational secularization decrease somewhat when taking into account transmission opportunities and benefits, and motivation to transmit religiosity within families and contact with a secular environment is important in predicting transmission in religiosity, strong religious transmission among Muslim immigrants cannot be explained by these factors alone.

Finally, chapter 5 focused on religious developments at the transition from adolescence to early adulthood. Thereby, I transferred theoretical arguments of life-course research to the situation of immigrants in Germany, which emphasize the role of significant others and important transitions in young people's lives, such as leaving the parental home and transitions in the educational career. Random-intercept models showed that Muslim and Christian immigrants' religious salience decreases at a slightly later age in comparison to Christian natives. In contrast, religious behavior remains stable or increases for Muslim adolescents, whereas native and immigrant Christian adolescents become less religious in terms of church visits and praying frequency. Additionally, leaving school is positively related to change in religiousness, but moving out is not.

2 Need for an Answer

After summarizing the central results of the substantial chapters of my dissertation, I am able to formulate answers to both research questions:

With respect to the first question, my results again replicate the well-known fact that immigrants are more religious than natives, and that Muslim immigrants stand out as an exceptional case in this regard by being more religious on all accounts. The same conclusion can be drawn with respect to religious change after migration: Using various statistical designs, I detected that Christian immigrants are basically rather similar to Christian natives, but Muslims show a considerable pattern of resistance to secularization in their receiving societies. Analyzing intergenerational transmission in religiosity, Muslim immigrant families are characterized by religious stability rather than decline. However, results of chapter 5 indicate that, although to a slightly lower degree in comparison to natives, young Muslim immigrants decline in religious salience,

but this is not true for religious behavior. An open question is how these developments proceed in adulthood. Therefore, data is urgently needed that covers this crucial period of life in which changes in religiosity can be expected. Especially the interesting question whether they become more religious when starting their own family as research among the majority population suggests is by now a blind spot in empirical research.

The answer to my second research question is quite disillusioning. While I was able to identify several factors that influence majority's and minority's religious attachment, none of these, however, are qualified to completely explain Muslims' exceptional case of stability in religiosity. While Christian immigrants are fairly similar to their Christian native counterparts, Muslims depict stronger resistance to secularization. Among these influential factors are certainly characteristics of family life such as family cohesion and parenting styles as well as characteristics of social contacts outside the family.

However, these are only few pieces of the puzzle. It is compelling to conclude that the enduring importance of religion might simply be an inherent element of Islam. In other words, that Muslims simply are socialized in a way that they "cannot be Muslims without being highly religious". Thus, although there are tendencies visible that Muslim immigrants react to secularization in their current countries of residence, at my current state of knowledge I can say I do not know the answer. Therefore, the central takeaway message is that further research should continue to search for an answer.

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