The Influence of Elections on Compliance with World Bank Conditionality and IMF Program Interruptions

Dreher, Axel

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URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-10079
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2001
The title of a journal, publication series: Discussion Papers / Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik
Volume: 604
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series: Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik > Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: D72 F33 F34 ,
Subject headings (SWD): Weltbank , Internationaler Währungsfonds , Wahl
Abstract: Using panel data, this paper tries to explain compliance with World Bank conditionality as well as interruptions of IMF programs around election dates in the recipient countries. Compliance with World Bank conditionality is lower in election years and pre-election years. Using a proxy for IMF program interruptions it is shown that breakdowns are less likely in election years. However, no other political factors seem to influence interruptions and compliance systematically. The paper concludes with implications for reform.
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Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.

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