Measuring and Explaining Strategic Voting in the German Electoral System


Thurner, Paul W. ; Pappi, Franz Urban


URL: http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/publications/wp/wp...
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 1998
The title of a journal, publication series: Arbeitspapiere / Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, Arbeitsbereich 2
Volume: 21
Place of publication: Mannheim
ISSN: 0948-0080
Publication language: English
Institution: Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > Mannheim Centre for European Social Research - Research Department II (until 2/1999)
Subject: 320 Political science
Abstract: Contrary to Duvergers hypothesis, new theoretical and empirical insights demonstrate that strategic voting is a common feature of nearly every electoral system. The aim of this paper is to provide an operational definition of strategic voting in a given institutional context. In order to identify strategic voters we compare the voters complete preference ordering with his actual stated vote intention. Ordinal rank orderings of parties are achieved by pairwise comparisons conducted in a representative national sample. Relative effects of theoretically identified factors conducive to strategic voting are estimated by means of (nested multinomial) logit models.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.




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Thurner, Paul W. ; Pappi, Franz Urban (1998) Measuring and Explaining Strategic Voting in the German Electoral System. Arbeitspapiere / Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, Arbeitsbereich 2 Mannheim 21 [Working paper]


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