Ex post regulation facilitates collusion

Beschorner, Patrick

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URL:	http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2172
URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-21720
Document Type:	Working paper
Year of publication:	2008
The title of a journal, publication series:	None
Publication language:	English
Institution:	Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series:	Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject:	330 Economics
Classification:	JEL: K21 K23 L42 L51 ,
Subject headings (SWD):	Netzzugang , Regulierung , Wettbewerbsbeschränkung , Marktzugang , Staatliche Preispolitik , Theorie
Keywords (English):	entry deterrence , access regulation , network infrastructure , vertical differentiation
Abstract:	Under ex ante access regulation entrants often claim that access fees are excessive. I show that this is only the case if further entry is admitted. If the entrant is protected from further entry it would agree with the incumbent upon a strictly positive access fee which may exceed the efficient level. Ex post regulation facilitates this type of collusion and should be abandoned.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.

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