Ex post regulation facilitates collusion

Beschorner, Patrick

Preview

PDF
dp08099.pdf - Published
Download (150kB)

URL:	http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2172
URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-21720
Document Type:	Working paper
Year of publication:	2008
The title of a journal, publication series:	None
Publication language:	English
Institution:	Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series:	Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject:	330 Economics
Classification:	JEL: K21 K23 L42 L51 ,
Subject headings (SWD):	Netzzugang , Regulierung , Wettbewerbsbeschränkung , Marktzugang , Staatliche Preispolitik , Theorie
Keywords (English):	entry deterrence , access regulation , network infrastructure , vertical differentiation
Abstract:	Under ex ante access regulation entrants often claim that access fees are excessive. I show that this is only the case if further entry is admitted. If the entrant is protected from further entry it would agree with the incumbent upon a strictly positive access fee which may exceed the efficient level. Ex post regulation facilitates this type of collusion and should be abandoned.
Additional information:

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.

BASE: Beschorner, Patrick

Google Scholar: Beschorner, Patrick

Downloads per month over past year

You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail

Show item