Ex post regulation facilitates collusion


Beschorner, Patrick


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URL: http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2172
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-21720
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2008
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: K21 K23 L42 L51 ,
Subject headings (SWD): Netzzugang , Regulierung , Wettbewerbsbeschränkung , Marktzugang , Staatliche Preispolitik , Theorie
Keywords (English): entry deterrence , access regulation , network infrastructure , vertical differentiation
Abstract: Under ex ante access regulation entrants often claim that access fees are excessive. I show that this is only the case if further entry is admitted. If the entrant is protected from further entry it would agree with the incumbent upon a strictly positive access fee which may exceed the efficient level. Ex post regulation facilitates this type of collusion and should be abandoned.
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Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




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Beschorner, Patrick (2008) Ex post regulation facilitates collusion. Open Access [Working paper]
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