Strategic voting under proportional representation and coalition governments : a simulation and laboratory experiment


Meffert, Michael F. ; Gschwend, Thomas


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URL: https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2513
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-25134
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2007
The title of a journal, publication series: Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung
Volume: 07-55
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series: Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject: 320 Political science
Subject headings (SWD): Wahlverhalten , Strategie , Demokratie , Koalition , Entscheidung , Spieltheorie
Abstract: The theory of strategic voting has been tested in experiments for elections in single member districts with three candidates or parties. It is unclear whether it can explain strategic voting behavior in a fairly common type of political system, multi-party systems with proportional representation, minimum vote thresholds, and coalition governments. In this paper, we develop a (non-formal) strategic voting game and show in a simulation that the model produces election scenarios and outcomes with desirable characteristics. We then test the decision-theoretic model in a laboratory experiment. Participants with a purely instrumental (financial) motivation voted in a series of 25 independent elections. The availability of polls and coalition signals by parties was manipulated. The results show that voters are frequently able to make optimal or strategic vote decisions, but that voters also rely on simple decision heuristics and are highly susceptible to coalition signals by parties.
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Meffert, Michael F. ; Gschwend, Thomas ORCID: 0000-0002-8656-9622 (2007) Strategic voting under proportional representation and coalition governments : a simulation and laboratory experiment. Open Access Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung Mannheim 07-55 [Working paper]
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BASE: Meffert, Michael F. ; Gschwend, Thomas

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ORCID: Meffert, Michael F. ; Gschwend, Thomas ORCID: 0000-0002-8656-9622

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