Verhandlungstheorie , Asymmetrische Information , Informationsverhalten , Auktionstheorie , Theorie
Keywords (English):
double auction , endogenous lemons problem , information acquisition , speculation
Abstract:
Two ex ante identically informed agents play a double auction over the division of a trading surplus with endogenous information and common values. This paper shows that if information acquisition is not observable, three types of inefficiencies can arise. If the information cost is in an intermediate range, no pure strategy equilibrium with trade exists although the agents maintain symmetric information. If the information cost is low, any trading equilibrium exhibits costly information acquisition. If the agents face asymmetric information cost the Akerlof’s lemons problem arises as a self-fulfilling equilibrium and only partial trade occurs.
Additional information:
Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.
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