Equivalence between best responses and undominated

Zimper, Alexander

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URL:	http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2670
URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-26703
Document Type:	Working paper
Year of publication:	2005
The title of a journal, publication series:	None
Publication language:	English
Institution:	School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series:	Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject:	330 Economics
Subject headings (SWD):	Spieltheorie , Erwarteter Nutzen , Theorie
Abstract:	For games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are finite, Pearce (1984) shows that a strategy is strictly dominated by some mixed strategy, if and only if, this strategy is not a best response to some belief about opponents' strategy choice. This note generalizes Pearce's (1984) equivalence result to games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are arbitrary compact sets.
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Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.

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