Equivalence between best responses and undominated


Zimper, Alexander


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URL: http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2670
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-26703
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2005
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series: Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject: 330 Economics
Subject headings (SWD): Spieltheorie , Erwarteter Nutzen , Theorie
Abstract: For games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are finite, Pearce (1984) shows that a strategy is strictly dominated by some mixed strategy, if and only if, this strategy is not a best response to some belief about opponents' strategy choice. This note generalizes Pearce's (1984) equivalence result to games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are arbitrary compact sets.
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Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




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Zimper, Alexander (2005) Equivalence between best responses and undominated. Open Access [Working paper]
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