Institutional incentives for strategic voting : the case of Portugal


Gschwend, Thomas


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URL: https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2675
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-26751
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2005
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series: Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject: 320 Political science
Subject headings (SWD): Portugal , Wahlverhalten , Strategie , Wahlsystem
Abstract: Looking more closely at the way people form expectations about the possible outcome of the election in their electoral district I will provide evidence for the first time that strategic voting can be observed and predicted even in PR systems with large districts magnitudes, such as in Portugal. Employing district-level data from 1975-2002 I estimate that a party, who is expected to win no seat, will be strategically deserted on average by about 3 per cent of the voters. This number does systematically vary with the district magnitude of each district and is largest (> 4 per cent) in Portugal's smallest electoral districts (e.g., Beja and Évora). Nevertheless even in Portugal's largest electoral district, Lisbon, strategic voting can be observed to have a systematic impact on parties vote shares.
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Gschwend, Thomas ORCID: 0000-0002-8656-9622 (2005) Institutional incentives for strategic voting : the case of Portugal. Open Access [Working paper]
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