Institutional incentives for strategic voting : the case of Portugal

Gschwend, Thomas

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URL:	https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2675
URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-26751
Document Type:	Working paper
Year of publication:	2005
The title of a journal, publication series:	None
Publication language:	English
Institution:	School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series:	Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject:	320 Political science
Subject headings (SWD):	Portugal , Wahlverhalten , Strategie , Wahlsystem
Abstract:	Looking more closely at the way people form expectations about the possible outcome of the election in their electoral district I will provide evidence for the first time that strategic voting can be observed and predicted even in PR systems with large districts magnitudes, such as in Portugal. Employing district-level data from 1975-2002 I estimate that a party, who is expected to win no seat, will be strategically deserted on average by about 3 per cent of the voters. This number does systematically vary with the district magnitude of each district and is largest (> 4 per cent) in Portugal's smallest electoral districts (e.g., Beja and Évora). Nevertheless even in Portugal's largest electoral district, Lisbon, strategic voting can be observed to have a systematic impact on parties vote shares.
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