Sequential two-player games with ambiguity


Eichberger, Jürgen ; Kelsey, David


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URL: http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2758
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-27582
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2003
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series: Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: D81 C72 ,
Subject headings (SWD): Verhandlungstheorie , Signaling , Nash-Gleichgewicht , Nichtkooperatives Spiel , Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit , Dempster-Shafer-Theorie
Keywords (English): Uncertainty-aversion , capacity , Dempster-Shafer rule , bargaining , signalling game
Abstract: If players' beliefs are strictly non-additive, the Dempster-Shafer updating rule can be used to define beliefs off the equilibrium path. We define an equilibrium concept in sequential two-person games where players update their beliefs with the Dempster-Shafer updating rule. We show that in the limit as uncertainty tends to zero, our equilibrium approximates Bayesian Nash equilibrium by imposing context-dependent constraints on beliefs under uncertainty.
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Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




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Eichberger, Jürgen ; Kelsey, David (2003) Sequential two-player games with ambiguity. Open Access [Working paper]
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