No imitation : on local and group interaction, learning and reciprocity in prisoners' dilemma experiments

Kirchkamp, Oliver ; Nagel, Rosemarie

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URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-27772
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2003
The title of a journal, publication series: Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung
Volume: 03-04
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series: Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: C72 R12 H41 D83 D74 C92 ,
Subject headings (SWD): Gefangenendilemma , Lernen , Test , Interaktion
Keywords (English): Local interaction , experiments , prisoner's dilemma , learning , reinforcement , repeated games
Abstract: This study disentangles experimentally imitation, reinforcement, and reciprocity in repeated prisoners' dilemmas. We compare a simple situation in which players interact only with their neighbours (local interaction) with one where players interact with all members of the population (group interaction). We observe choices under different information conditions and estimate parameters of a learning model. We find that imitation, while assumed to be a driving force in many models of spatial evolution, is often a negligible factor in the experiment. Behaviour is predominantly driven by reinforcement learning.
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