Reinforcement, repeated games, and local interaction

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URL:	https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2791
URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-27913
Document Type:	Working paper
Year of publication:	2002
The title of a journal, publication series:	None
Publication language:	English
Institution:	School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series:	Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject:	330 Economics
Classification:	JEL: R12 H41 D83 D74 C92 C72 ,
Subject headings (SWD):	Gefangenendilemma , Lernen , Nichtkooperatives Spiel , Dynamisches Spiel
Keywords (English):	Local interaction , experiments , prisoner's dilemma , reinforcement , repeated games
Abstract:	We investigate and compare different approaches to derive strategies from laboratory data in prisoners' dilemmas experiments. While theory suggests more cooperation in spatial structures than in spaceless ones, we find in our experiments either the opposite or no difference. In this paper we investigate to which degree learning and reinforcement explains this dependence on structure and information. Starting from a very simple model we gradually develop a setup where players use repeated game strategies and choose among these strategies using a simple reinforcement rule. We then measure to which degree this model explain players' behaviour.
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