Cooperative prisoners and aggressive chickens : evolution of strategies and preferences in 2x2 games


Possajennikov, Alexandre


[img]
Preview
PDF
dp02_04.pdf - Published

Download (526kB)

URL: http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2798
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-27987
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2002
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series: Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject: 300 Social sciences, sociology, anthropology
Classification: JEL: C72 ,
Subject headings (SWD): Lernen , Gefangenendilemma , Nichtkooperatives Spiel , Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
Keywords (English): two-speed evolution , simulations , replicator dynamic
Abstract: By means of simulations I investigate a two-speed dynamic on strategies and preferences in the prisoners' dilemma and in the chicken game. Players learn strategies according to their preferences while evolution leads to a change in preference composition. With complete information cooperation in the prisoners' dilemma is often achieved, with 'reciprocal' preferences. In the chicken game a symmetric correlated strategy profile is played that is as efficient as the symmetric equilibrium. Among preferences only pure 'hawkish' preferences and 'selfish' preferences survive. With incomplete information, the symmetric equilibrium of the material payoff game is played. All types of preferences are present in the population in the medium run.
Additional information:

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




+ Citation Example and Export

Possajennikov, Alexandre (2002) Cooperative prisoners and aggressive chickens : evolution of strategies and preferences in 2x2 games. Open Access [Working paper]
[img]
Preview


+ Search Authors in

+ Download Statistics

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics



You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail


Actions (login required)

Show item Show item