Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations


Kittsteiner, Thomas


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URL: http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2809
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-28096
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2001
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series: Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject: 330 Economics
Subject headings (SWD): Partnerschaftsgesellschaft , Unternehmensbewertung , Verhandlungstheorie , Asymmetrische Information , Auktionstheorie
Abstract: In a symmetric independent private values setting a sealed-bid double auction dissolves a partnership efficiently. This well known result remains valid in a model with interdependent valuations. However, if common values components are large agents might prefer not to participate in a double auction. Therefore a simple extention of the rules of double-auctions is suggested that ensures participation. Even though these modified double auctions are not incentive efficient, they still realize gains from trade and can be implemented without knowledge about the specifications of the model.
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Kittsteiner, Thomas (2001) Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations. Open Access [Working paper]
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