An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations

Preview

PDF
dp00_10.pdf - Published
Download (427kB)

URL:	https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2833
Additional URL:	http://www.kirchkamp.de/pdf//auc.pdf
URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-28336
Document Type:	Working paper
Year of publication:	2000
The title of a journal, publication series:	Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung
Volume:	00-10
Place of publication:	Mannheim
Publication language:	English
Institution:	School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series:	Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject:	330 Economics
Classification:	JEL: D44 C92 ,
Subject headings (SWD):	Auktionstheorie , Pareto-Optimum
Abstract:	We study experiments in an auction setting with interdependent valuation. Groups of three players receive private signals and then bid for a single, indivisible item. Valuations for the item differ within groups and depend asymmetrically on a bidder's own and other bidders' signals. Theoretically, the English auction yields efficient allocations, while other standard auction formats fail to do so. Consistent with equilibrium predictions, we find that an English auction yields significantly more efficiency than a second price sealed bid auction. We also study the seller's expected revenue and the bidders expected payoff, and find that the experimental results are close to the theoretical predictions.
Additional information:	Version 2001: http://www.kirchkamp.de/pdf//auc.pdf