You play (an action) only once


Schlag, Karl H. ; Sela, Aner


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URL: http://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2901
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-29010
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 1997
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series: Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject: 330 Economics
Subject headings (SWD): Spieltheorie
Abstract: Consider an N-player normal form game played repeatedly in which each player should choose each strategy exactly one time (payoffs are aggregated). such "play only once" situations occur naturally in the context of scheduling. assume that each player has the same number of strategies. Then, regardless of the players' preferences, for each player to mix uniformly in each round over his remaining strategies consitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium.
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Schlag, Karl H. ; Sela, Aner (1997) You play (an action) only once. Open Access [Working paper]
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