Polls, coalition signals and strategic voting : An experimental investigation of perceptions and effects

Meffert, Michael F. ; Gschwend, Thomas

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01986.x
URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j...
Additional URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/23753406_...
Document Type: Article
Year of publication: 2011
The title of a journal, publication series: European Journal of Political Research
Volume: 50
Issue number: 5
Page range: 636-667
Place of publication: Oxford
Publishing house: Wiley-Blackwell
ISSN: 0304-4130 , 1475-6765
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Social Sciences > Politische Wissenschaft, Quantitative Sozialwissenschaftliche Methoden (Gschwend 2007-)
Subject: 320 Political science
Abstract: Polls and coalition signals can help strategic voters in multiparty systems with proportional representation and coalition governments to optimise their vote decision. Using a laboratory experiment embedded in two real election campaigns, this study focuses on voters’ attention to and perception of polls and coalition signals. The manipulation of polls and coalition signals allows a causal test of their influence on strategic voting in a realistic environment.The findings suggest that active information acquisition to form fairly accurate perceptions of election outcomes can compensate for the advantage of high political sophistication.The theory of strategic voting is supported by the evidence, but only for a small number of voters. Most insincere vote decisions are explained by other factors. Thus, the common practice to consider all insincere voters as strategic is misleading.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

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