Experimental economics , demand for climate protection , climate change , willingness to pay
Abstract:
In this paper, we investigate the real demand for climate protection when the purely individual
perspective of existing revealed preference studies is relaxed. This is achieved in two treatments; first, we
determine the information subjects receive about the demand revealed by other subjects in a similar decision
making situation, second, collective action is implemented whereby all subjects are required to purchase the
group’s median quantity at a given price. Participants in the experiment were offered the opportunity to
contribute to climate protection by purchasing European Union Allowances. Allowances purchased were
withdrawn from the European Emissions Trading Scheme. In our experiment, information about other subjects’
behaviour has no treatment effect on the demand for climate protection. Under collective action however, the
probability of purchasing allowances is higher compared to the reference treatment situation, an individual
contribution mechanism. Furthermore, we observe a strong correlation between subjects’ demand and their
expectations about other participants’ behaviour. When collective action is not available, subjects’ expectations
are consistent with free rider behaviour.
Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.
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