Mechanisms according to which private intermediaries or governments charge
transaction fees or indirect taxes are prevalent in practice. We consider a setup with
multiple buyers and sellers and two-sided independent private information about
valuations. We show that any weighted average of revenue and social welfare can be
maximized through appropriately chosen transaction fees and that in increasingly
thin markets such optimal fees converge to linear fees. Moreover, fees decrease with
competition (or the weight on welfare) and the elasticity of supply but decrease
with the elasticity of demand. Our theoretical predictions fit empirical observations
in several industries with intermediaries.
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