This paper examines whether risk-taking in a lottery depends on the opportunity to
respond to the lottery outcome through additional labor effort and/or tax evasion.
Previous empirical attempts to answer this question face identification issues due
to self selection into jobs that facilitate tax evasion and labor effort
exibility.
We address these identification issues using a laboratory experiment (N = 180).
Subjects have the opportunity to invest earned income in a lottery and, depending
on randomly assigned treatment states, have the opportunity to respond to the
lottery outcome through evasion and/or extra labor effort. We find strong evidence
that ex-post access to labor opportunities reduces ex-ante risk willingness while
access to tax evasion has no effect on risk behavior. We discuss possible explanations
for this result based on the existing literature.
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