Information Disclosure and Consumer Awareness


Li, Sanxi ; Peitz, Martin ; Zhao, Xiaojian


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URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/37377
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-373775
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2014
The title of a journal, publication series: Working Paper Series
Volume: 14-28
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Industrieökonomik, Wettbewerbspolitik u. Regulierung (Peitz 2007-)
MADOC publication series: Department of Economics > Working Paper Series
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: L51 , M38,
Keywords (English): Information disclosure , informative advertising , targeted advertising , consumer awareness , behavioral bias , non-common prior , consumer protection , behavioral industrial organization
Abstract: Whether consumers are aware of potentially adverse product effects is key to private and social incentives to disclose information about undesirable product characteristics. In a monopoly model with a mix of aware and unaware consumers, a larger share of unaware consumers makes information disclosure less likely to occur. Since the firm is not interested in releasing information to unaware consumers, a more precise targeting technology that allows the firm to better keep unaware consumers in the dark leads to more disclosure. A regulator may want to intervene in this market and impose mandatory disclosure rules.




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