Election cycles , municipal expenditures , council and mayor elections , instrumental variables approach
Abstract:
We advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing separately for
cycles in expenditures for elections in the legislative and the executive. Using
municipal data, we can separately identify these cycles and account for general
year effects. For the executive branch, we show that it is important whether the
incumbent re-runs. To account for the potential endogeneity associated with this
decision, we apply a unique instrumental variables approach based on age and
pension eligibility rules. We find sizable and significant effects in expenditures
before council elections and before joint elections when the incumbent re-runs.
Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.
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