



The Importance of Preaching to the Converted:

*The Strategic Use of Campaign Rallies, Campaign Promises,
Clientelism,
and Violence in African Elections*

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February 2015

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and Violence in African Elections*

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Inaugural dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Doctor of Social Sciences
in the Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences
at the University of Mannheim

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Date of the defense: 23 April, 2015

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UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM

SUMMARY OF THE DISSERTATION

This dissertation addresses one of the main puzzles concerning elections in young democracies: Why do undecided voters receive so little attention in parties' election campaigns? While most theoretical models would expect parties to focus their campaign efforts on voters who do not have strong preferences for any party, this is not what the empirical evidence from young democracies shows. Rather, parties spend much time and money on campaigning among their own supporters, which is what the standard models would simply regard as a waste of valuable resources. I provide three key answers for this puzzle. First, parties do not waste resources on courting their supporters who are certain to turn out, at the expense of campaigning among swing voters. They rather mobilize those supporters who would otherwise not go and vote. Second, in contexts where campaign promises have little credibility, the organizers concentrate their energy on voters who are likely to trust them the most, namely their core supporters. Third, in situations in which parties use electoral violence to affect election outcomes, they concentrate their intimidation strategies on citizens who would be difficult to win over, so as to disenfranchise them. This frees up resources to offer benefits to their supporters to mobilize them to turn out on Election Day.

The arguments are subjected to various empirical tests analyzing a range of campaign strategies used by presidential candidates in young democracies, and potentially in more established democracies as well. These strategies include: visits by presidential candidates to electoral constituencies to hold campaign rallies; promises of local club goods to constituencies as opposed to national programmatic promises; and attempts at winning votes using voter bribery as opposed to exercising violence. I test predictions of my argument applying a range of methodological approaches and using various original data sources. During fieldwork in Ghana, I collected event data on the journeys of presidential candidates across the country on the basis of content-analysis of two daily newspapers during the campaigning period. In addition, I compiled audio recordings from these campaign rallies and conduct content-analysis of the campaign speeches these candidates held. Furthermore, I conducted qualitative interviews with campaign managers at the national, regional and constituency level as well as focus group interviews with voters. In addition to these observational data, I carried out a survey experiment on the credibility of campaign promises. To establish external validity for the findings from campaigns in Ghana, I compile individual and regional-level data on the use of clientelism and violence in a total of 10 African countries, combining Afrobarometer survey data with regional-level election data.

The overall results show that candidates use campaign rallies, campaign promises and clientelistic benefits largely to mobilize turnout among their potential supporters. The findings further show that candidates concentrate promises of local club goods in contexts in which they enjoy a comparatively high level of credibility. In line with my expectation, the incumbent makes many of such local promises in constituencies where his partisans are concentrated. Furthermore, it is nearly exclusively the incumbent who promises local club goods in the first place. As incumbents already exercise discretion over the use of public resources at the time of the campaign and can thus make costly investments, their promises are more credible than those of opposition candidates. The results from the survey experiment conducted in Ghana's capital Accra confirm that the incumbent is regarded as more credible with his promises than the challenger. They further support my argument that partisans evaluate campaign promises made by

the candidate they support as much more credible than if the same promises are attributed to a different candidate. Finally, in line with the hypothesis that parties concentrate bribes or promises of redistribution on their partisans, because they can disenfranchise voters that do not support them, I find that independent voters and those living in contested regions are most at risk of being subjected to violent intimidation.

This dissertation thus provides key answers for the puzzle of why parties in young democracies court their own supporters so intensely. The findings also have important implications for the study of election campaigning in young democracies, beyond this puzzle. The evidence presented shows that the prevalence of mobilization as a campaigning strategy has been seriously under-estimated by past research. This informs an important debate in the literature and speaks in favor of turnout-buying rather than vote-buying, and mobilization rather than persuasion. The dissertation also advances recent efforts to integrate the use of clientelism and violence as repertoires of campaign strategies. The findings suggest that these two strategies are used among different types of voters and with different goals.

Acknowledgements

I wish to acknowledge the many individuals without whose support and guidance this dissertation would not have been possible. I would like to thank my dissertation committee, Sabine Carey, Léonard Wantchekon, and Marc Debus.

Above all, I am deeply grateful to Sabine Carey who served as my advisor and guidance throughout every stage of this project for challenging me in the best possible way and for all her invaluable questions, feedback, and comments. I also thank you for your moral support, for showing me what is possible, and for being the best advisor I could have imagined. Léonard Wantchekon's work has inspired me to study African elections and the phenomenon of clientelism in particular. He has provided excellent feedback on my project and many ideas on the research design were born in exchanges with him during my visits to the United States and Benin. I also thank him for introducing me to Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi and for generously inviting me to the Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy in Benin. I thank Marc Debus for his support in the final stages of the project and for acting as the head of my committee. I thank my co-author, Matthias Orlowski, for the inspiring and productive work with him.

Different portions of this project have benefited from the insights and feedback from a number of scholars. I would like to thank Jeremy Horowitz, Nikolay Marinov, Eric Kramon, and Lukas Stötzer who have all provided helpful feedback.

I thank my colleagues at the University of Mannheim, Anna-Lena Hönig, for help with coding and proof-reading and for keeping me company on lonely weekends at the "Parkring." I thank Katrin Paula for invaluable methodological advice and Anastasia Ershova for help with coding and Julia Semmelbeck for proof-reading.

I am particularly grateful to my dear friends and colleagues, Anita Gohdes and Adam Scharpf, for their continuous advice and support, and most importantly, for going through this together. I would not have been able to do this without you.

I also thank Catherine Gohdes for her invaluable linguistic advice and my dear friends, Vera Kern and Bontje Zängerling, for help with proof-reading.

For financial support, I thank the German Exchange Service and the University of Mannheim.

I am greatly indebted to the researchers at the Ghana Center for Democratic Development for excellent guidance and generous support. I thank Emmanuel Giymah-Boadi for advising me throughout the field work. Special thanks for generously sharing their insights on Ghanaian politics and introducing me to valuable contacts go to Franklin Oduro, Kojo Asante, Maxwell Amponsah, Kakra Duayeden, Robert Pwazaga and Isaac Owusu Asare. In Ghana, I was very fortunate to have an excellent team of research assistants. Many thanks to Justice Anafure, Pearl Asamoah, Mustapha Awudu, Hartlyne Bakah, Amma Odebea, Emmanuel Kummadey, Aziz Saaka, Linda Yeboah, and Kwaku Yeboah. I am grateful to my friend Kwaku Ofosu Appea Solomon for proof-reading translations, for his advice on the logistics of the survey experiment, and for sharing his meals with me. I thank Alexander Passaro for his excellent research assistance at the University of Mannheim.

I would also like to thank a number of important individuals who have inspired me throughout my education. I thank Rosemarie Hagen, Thomas Herden, and finally Sophie Harding who has encouraged me to take on the endeavor of a PhD.

I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Isabell and Frank Rauschenbach and thank them for their unconditional love and support.

Finally, I thank my best friend, Daniel Schumacher, for putting up with me throughout all these years and for always being by my side.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

“There is a saying that, that’s like in the Bible. The man who had [...] a hundred sheep and one got lost. He left the ninety-nine and went to look for the one. We will keep the ninety-nine and then if there’s time, you go and look for the one. What I’m trying to say is that we make sure that we protect our strongholds, before we go and look for ..., let’s say where you know are not our strongholds.”

In this quote a member of a regional campaign team of the main opposition party in Ghana explains the rationale behind choosing the electoral constituencies where the presidential campaign focused time and money during Ghana’s 2012 election campaigns. In the interview, the politician of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) goes on to emphasize how his party needed to spend considerable effort on mobilizing voters in its strongholds, because it could not be taken for granted that these constituencies would remain strongholds.¹ This short narrative paints an unusual image; the more common impression gained from observing presidential campaigns in the United States (US) is that parties focus their time and money on trying to convince undecided voters to vote for them, rather than wasting resources on voters who have already decided to vote for them, and thus campaign heavily in swing states (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002, p. 53, Hill and McKee, 2005, Shaw, 1999). The expectation that it should make more sense for a party to spend money on convincing voters who are indifferent between the party and a competing

¹MR: “Ok. So that means you go to strongholds, although you’ve already won them? Is that not a waste of energy?”

NPP: “No, it changes. Greater Accra is a swing place, it can swing to the NDC. For that matter, you need to concentrate much more [energy here] and then make sure you don’t lose what you have.”

MR: “So in Greater Accra, you don’t have these very [...] safe havens that favor you like you have in Ashanti Region or in Eastern Region where you don’t even need to go?”

NPP: “Yes. There are four constituencies, which we have never lost before. We have never lost these constituencies before. The other ones, we have lost [them] before. We have never lost these constituencies before.”

MR: “So for the ones you have never lost before, do you do rallies there or do you not have to go there?”

NPP: “Yeah, we go there. We go there. Because the dynamics changes (sic!) in Greater Accra. People go in and out and for that matter, you cannot be sure where people don’t have strong preferences. Because people come in here, because most of our businesses are concentrated and they come in here when they are old they go, retired people leave [from] here with their whole families” (Interview with a member of a regional campaign team of the NPP, 28 November, 2014).

party in the election, rather than motivating its own supporters to turn out on Election Day is based on a simple calculus: If a party offers some kind of benefit to a supporter – for example, money or a campaign promise, and if this campaigning effort has the intended effect, the voter will turn out and vote for the party she was likely to vote for anyway.² Had the supporter not been “mobilized”, she would have stayed at home. This buys the party an advantage of one additional vote. If, however, the party succeeded in gaining a vote from a new voter, this does not only win the party one additional vote, but it also might take away one vote from the rival party for whom the voter would potentially have voted, had she not been offered a benefit. Thus persuading an undecided voter buys the party net two votes, while motivating one of their supporters to turn out to vote only buys the party one vote (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014, pp. 418-419). Indeed a member of the national campaign team of the NPP confirms a picture in line with these theoretical expectations:

“The core support: For those groups, nothing you say is going to make a difference. For they vote according to the acquisitions. And the acquisitions are developed either by historical circumstances or very deep emotional circumstances. So it is not the economy, for example, that makes them change their mind. If NPP is in power, half their voters will always vote NPP. If NDC is in power, no matter how bad the economy is, supporters vote NDC. That leaves a middle ground of about five to 10% maximum. Those are the people we search for.”

1.1 Motivation and research question

Despite the fact that parties would be better off convincing new voters than focusing on mobilizing core voters, empirical studies on the types of voters which campaigns actually address, paint a mixed picture. Some find that parties focus on mobilizing their supporters in settings as diverse as Argentina (Nichter, 2008, Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013, p.67-72), India (Dunning and Nilekani, 2013), Mexico and Venezuela (Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013, p.67-72) and Taiwan (Liu, 1999), while other studies on campaigns in Argentina (Stokes, 2005) and the United States, for example (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002; Hill and McKee, 2005; Shaw, 1999) show that parties undertake great efforts to attract unaligned voters. Yet other investigations of campaigning activities in elections in Lebanon (Corstange, 2012) or Spain (Albright, 2008, p. 720), for example, contend that parties pursue a mix of strategies. These contrasting views raise an important question: *why do parties often concentrate their campaign efforts on their own supporters if there would be more to be gained from attracting new voters?*

Past research suggests that parties are more likely to campaign among their supporters if party alignment is strong (Rohrschneider, 2002, p. 377) and when parties are mass parties (Duverger, 1954, p.23, Katz

²I use the terms indifferent, undecided and independent voters interchangeably throughout this dissertation. They all refer to voters who do not prefer any of the main candidates in an election, over another candidate or party.

and Mair, 1995, p.7). Furthermore, spatial models of party competition have assumed that consensus-based systems with larger numbers of parties than two-party systems set incentives for parties to mobilize core voters, in order to avoid defection to other parties (Bowler and Farrel, 1992). In contrast, majoritarian systems are expected to provide parties with incentives to compete for independent voters, because party supporters can be relatively safely ignored, since they have few alternatives to voting for the party which they have supported in the past (Bowler and Farrel, 1992). It is not clear, however, what expectations we can draw from this literature for campaign strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter often referred to as Africa). On the one hand, party systems are generally volatile and partisan alignment is considered to be weak (Mozaffar and Scarrit, 2005), which might push parties toward a mobilization strategy. On the other hand, oftentimes voters seem to be casting their votes along ethnic lines (e.g. Bratton, Bhavnani and Chen, 2013). Given this, parties might not worry too much about their supporters defecting to rival parties with different ethnic profiles and hence concentrate on persuading independent voters who do not have a co-ethnic candidate in the race.

It is important to understand the logic of campaigning in Sub-Saharan Africa not only to inform a scholarly debate about whether it is more rational for parties to motivate their supporters to go and vote or to make voters change their vote intentions. *The relevance of the question of which type of voters African parties focus their campaign appeals on, and why, goes well beyond this scholarly debate.* Parties in African elections often use illicit campaign strategies in addition to modern campaigning tools. The (re-)introduction of multi-party competition in Africa in the beginning of the 1990s starkly raised the stakes for winning elections. This has resulted, particularly in contexts in which “restraints upon the behavior of candidates [...] [is low],” in election campaigns marred by the wide-spread use of manipulative campaign strategies such as voter bribery, fraud and violence (Collier and Vicente, 2012, p. 117).

In such contexts it is important to understand which voters parties are trying to manipulate by buying their support with small benefits and potentially to divert their attention from evaluating these parties based on their broad national policies. Furthermore, this study helps us to identify the groups of voters who are most at risk to be intimidated with violence.

1.2 Main theoretical argument

The central argument developed in this dissertation is that although concentrating campaign efforts on *undecided* voters would win parties more votes than motivating their supporters to turn out, in many contexts it makes sense to concentrate campaigning on one’s own partisans, as the benefits of doing so often outweigh the costs necessary to win over new voters. There are essentially three reasons that

might lead parties to focus their campaigning efforts on their supporters. First, parties might be *mobilizing turnout among potential supporters*, rather than wasting benefits on those supporters who are likely to vote. Second, their *supporters* might be *more responsive to parties' campaign appeals*, than other voters. Third, parties often have other strategies at hand with which they address independent voters. While they might be using campaign rallies, campaign promises and clientelistic benefits to mobilize turnout among likely supporters, parties might be *demobilizing independent voters by using intimidation and violence*, because they then avoid the costs of trying to convince these voters.

1.3 Empirical approach

I put the central argument to empirical test by analyzing the use of a range of campaign tools, using different methodological approaches. These tools are different forms of campaigning which are likely to be of particular relevance in elections in Sub-Saharan Africa, where a substantial part of the electorate does not have access to modern media, and where campaigners need to invest time and money to reach voters directly.³ The tools used are the hosting of campaign rallies, promises of local public goods and electoral clientelism as well as voter intimidation.

I investigate the strategic allocation of campaign rallies, campaign promises, and the credibility of these promises in the context of Ghana's 2012 presidential elections. I compile a *novel event dataset on campaign rally events* by the two main candidates in these elections during three months of campaigning prior to the election, using content-analysis of two daily newspapers. To investigate the strategic use of campaign promises, I collect *original recordings of speeches* by the two main candidates at these rally events during the same campaigning period. I use these two datasets to conduct quantitative analyses of the allocation of campaign rallies and campaign promises across electoral constituencies, characterized by their voting and turnout histories. To test the plausibility of various theoretical mechanisms, which I assume to be at work, I conduct *interviews with campaign managers* of the two main parties in Ghana, who organized the campaigns at the national, regional and constituency level.

To test one central assumption of my argument, I conduct a *survey experiment* among a sample of 447 respondents in the capital Accra two weeks prior to the election. In this experiment, I test whether partisans and independent voters differ in how credible they find various campaign promises. I also test whether promises of local public goods are more credible than promises about national public goods and whether the incumbent is more credible in promising future benefits than the challenger.

³See for example Bleck and van de Walle (2013) on the importance for parties of reaching voters in African elections through campaign rallies.

In the analysis of the allocation of campaign promises across electoral constituencies and of the credibility of campaign promises, I introduce a distinction between local and national promises, which is based on a number of theoretical considerations laid out in Chapter 2. To test the plausibility of this conceptualization, I conduct *focus group interviews* with groups of voters in the same areas in Accra, where I conducted the survey experiment.

The test of the predictions regarding the use of clientelism and violence as campaign strategies are performed on a sample of elections in 10 African countries. I compile a cross-sectional dataset on the use of clientelism and voter intimidation in elections which took place between 2007 and 2011, based on Afrobarometer data from the round 5 of the survey. I match these survey data with regional-level election data, which I compile from various sources. I use the resulting dataset to conduct a multi-level analysis, in which I model the likelihood of a voter to be targeted with clientelism and to suffer from violent intimidation to depend on her affiliation with the parties campaigning and her likelihood to turn out, as well as the level of competitiveness and past turnout of the region she lives in.

1.4 Case selection

Ghana was selected as the main case study for this dissertation for three core reasons. The most important one; in analyzing the question of whether parties predominantly use campaign rallies and campaign promises to mobilize their own supporters or to attract new voters, Ghana is a country which put my argument to a particularly tough test. Party alignment in Ghana is relatively strong when compared to other African countries (e.g. Osei 2012), and the number of swing voters is comparatively low (Lindberg and Morrison, 2005). In view of these characteristics, existing models in the literature on modern campaigning would lead us to expect presidential candidates in Ghana to focus on attracting independent voters and to campaigning in swing constituencies (e.g. Rohrschneider, 2002, p. 377). If my predictions hold, and parties spend considerable time and money on mobilizing their supporters, rather than predominantly campaigning among independent voters, then this is likely to also be true for other African countries, where party systems are generally more fragmented and volatile compared to Ghana (see Mozaffar and Scarrit, 2005; van de Walle, 2003).

The second reason for choosing Ghana: it lends itself to analyzing the strategic allocation of campaign resources across groups of voters, because elections in Ghana are particularly close-run races. This can be illustrated for example by the fact that the NDC won the presidential run-off election in 2008 by a mere .5% (Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013, p. 722) and by under 3% in the 2012 election.⁴ The contests

⁴My own calculation, based on official election results.

between the NDC and the NPP have been extremely competitive since the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1992 and have led to shifts in power in both 2000 and 2008 (Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013, p.722). In such a context, campaigning can be expected to be highly strategic. In addition to elections generally being competitive, the circumstance that the ruling party's candidate was only endorsed three months prior to the election, made it imperative for the NDC to be particularly strategic in allocating the candidate's limited time across the country. The original candidate who had won the primaries in 2011, the late president John Evans Atta Mills, had unexpectedly passed away on July 25, 2012. His vice president John Dramani Mahama, was only endorsed as the new flagbearer for the NDC in the presidential elections in September, 2012.

The third and final reason for choosing Ghana: parties in Ghana exhibit a considerably high level of organization (Osei, 2012), compared to parties in other African countries. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the variation in campaigning activity across the country I observe, is a function of central decisions made by the campaign management, and not simply a result of variation at the local party level.

1.5 Outline of the dissertation

The remainder of *Chapter 1* provides a brief discussion of the main theoretical and empirical contributions made by this dissertation. *Chapter 2* defines key concepts of different campaign strategies which the dissertation investigates, and reviews existing approaches to studying the logic of campaigning in young democracies, and elsewhere.

Chapter 3 develops the dissertation's central theoretical argument. It relaxes three assumptions underlying earlier models in the study of campaigning concerning the distribution of benefits to voters, which are problematic when examining campaigning in African elections: First, that voters vary in their ideological distance to parties; second, that parties always deliver on their promises; and third, that they do not *intentionally* demobilize voters.

Chapter 4 presents the approaches in measuring campaigning strategies which are used in this dissertation. It describes the data collection during field work in Ghana and the nature of the different datasets that the empirical analyses in *Chapters 5 to 8* are based on.

Chapter 5 analyzes how past levels of turnout and the distribution of supporters impact the candidates' choices of where to go on their campaign trail. Using original data, I investigate the allocation of campaign rallies across the 275 electoral constituencies in Ghana. In line with my argument that parties should be campaigning among *potential* supporters, I find that the incumbent focuses his visits on con-

stituencies where his partisans are concentrated, and in which past levels of turnout have been low.

Based on content-analysis of campaign speeches held at these rallies, *Chapter 6* investigates to which constituencies the candidates make promises of local public goods. The results suggest that candidates indeed concentrate local promises in contexts in which they enjoy a comparatively high level of credibility. In line with my expectation, the incumbent makes more promises of local public goods to his party's strongholds than in swing constituencies, and much more frequently than the challenger. This supports the argument that candidates concentrate the use of local promises in contexts where they are most credible.

Chapter 7 reports the findings from a unique survey experiment conducted in Ghana's capital immediately prior to the elections. I test whether voters do indeed regard promises of local public goods as more credible when they are made by candidates whose party they feel close to. Additionally, I test whether the incumbent is generally more credible in making such promises compared to the challenger. The findings, which are corroborated with results from qualitative focus group interviews, largely support these expectations.

In *Chapter 8*, the argument that parties should be concentrating their campaign efforts on *potential supporters*, is put to yet another test. In line with the findings from Ghana's 2012 campaigns and further corroborating my argument, I find that partisans and voters living in the main parties' strongholds are more likely to receive bribes than others. Moreover, voters living in regions that have a low turnout history are more likely to be targeted than those living in other regions. Finally, in line with the argument that parties concentrate bribes or promises of benefits on partisans, because they can disenfranchise voters that do not support them, I find that independent voters and those living in contested regions are most at risk of being subjected to violent intimidation.

1.6 Central contributions

1.6.1 Theoretical contributions

Extending turnout-buying and vote-buying models

I build on existing models of distributive campaigning (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005) by relaxing three central assumptions which are unfounded in the context of African elections. These are (a) that voters vary in their ideological distance to parties; (b) that parties always deliver on their promises; and (c) that they do not intentionally demobilize voters. My argument builds on the assumption that *voters vary in the trust they put in campaign promises made*

by different candidates more than in their preferences regarding promises made by these candidates. Voters who are affiliated with a party tend to find promises by their party's candidate more credible than other voters, and are hence more receptive to this person's campaign appeals. As parties do not always deliver benefits to voters prior to the election, but oftentimes only after voting has taken place, they could in principle renege on their promises. This, in turn, can incentivize voters to vote as they please. In order to prevent voters from doing this, parties focus their campaign effort on situations in which they enjoy most credibility. This can account for why parties focus so much time and money on courting their own supporters on the campaign trail. Lastly, I relate models of campaigning to recent studies on the use of electoral violence as a strategy to impact elections (e.g. Daxecker, 2014; Hafner-Burton and Hyde, 2014; Wilkinson and Haid, 2009), and extend the repertoire of parties' campaigning strategies to include the use of violence to demobilize voters (e.g. Bratton, 2008; Gonzalez Ocantos et al., 2013; Gutiérrez-Romero, 2014).

A wholistic model of campaigning

This dissertation makes efforts to integrate the literature on modern campaigning, clientelism, distributive politics and electoral violence. Combining the various elements is important, as the choice of a particular strategy to address a selected group of voters is likely to be conditioned by how effective parties consider another strategy might be. The fact that a group of voters who seem neglected by one strategy, might actually be targeted with a different strategy, can provide important answers to the puzzle why parties should focus campaign efforts on their own supporters. I develop an argument whereby parties can mobilize voters via campaign rallies, campaign promises and clientelistic targeting, and demobilize other voters through the use of violence.

1.6.2 Empirical and methodological contributions

Conceptualizing distributive appeals as campaign promises

To date, research investigating the logic of clientelistic targeting has mainly relied on voter surveys (Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes, 2004; Lindberg and Morrisson, 2008; Stokes, 2005; Young, 2009). Typically, these studies are interested in understanding the strategic calculations made by parties as to which types of voters they will target. However, it is far from obvious that patterns in targeting which emerge from the surveys are a direct function of electoral strategies employed by candidates. It is highly likely that a considerable amount of variation in the allocation of goods is a function of interests of those agents carrying out the distribution of benefits in the geographical units under study. Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco (2013) argue that in the case of clientelistic benefits, the patterns by which voters are tar-

geted is a function of the interests of local intermediaries directly addressing these voters, rather than the outcome of strategic decisions by the party leaders. I contribute to this literature by measuring electoral strategies directly, through studying the strategic use of promises of local public goods by presidential candidates.

An experimental test of the credibility of campaign promises

In order to investigate whether parties mobilize their supporters, or attempt to convince undecided voters, it is important to test whether partisans and independent voters vary in their receptiveness to campaign appeals. As shown in more detail in Chapter 2, this question has not been sufficiently addressed for campaigning strategies used in African elections. I address this question by carrying out an experimental test of voters' receptiveness to campaign promises among both partisans and independent voters.

Taking voters' likelihood to turn out into account

Research which has provided insight into whether parties mobilize their supporters or try to convince independent voters has so far classified voters by their political inclinations (e.g. Berry, Burden and Howell, 2010; Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002; Dunning and Nilekani, 2013; Lindberg and Morrisson, 2008; Stokes, 2005). Swing or independent voters have been characterized by their political affiliation with the parties contesting the elections, but their likelihood to turn out has not much been studied.⁵ One reason why the question of whether parties buy votes or turnout remains unresolved, is that past research has not systematically studied whether campaigners target voters who are likely or unlikely to vote. In Chapters 5 to 8, I address this shortcoming by systematically investigating the effect of both past turnout and levels of support for candidates, on how they allocate campaign rallies, campaign promises, as well as clientelistic benefits.

⁵For an exception see Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco (2013, pp. 67–72).

Chapter 2

Existing research on the use and the effectiveness of campaigning strategies in new democracies

This dissertation investigates different forms of campaigning which are likely to be of particular relevance in elections in young democracies. In such contexts, a substantial part of the electorate does not have access to modern media, and candidates and intermediaries acting on their behalf need to invest time and money to reach voters directly.¹ The strategies I investigate are the hosting of campaign rallies, the promising of local public goods, and the use of electoral clientelism and voter intimidation. In the present chapter, I introduce my conceptualization of these campaign strategies and review past research on how and why parties apply them. The chapter concludes with a summary of how the dissertation contributes to this research.

2.1 Defining key concepts

2.1.1 Campaign rallies

Personal appearances of presidential candidates are regarded by campaigners as one of the most important tools of a presidential campaign (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002, p. 50, see also Chen and Reeves, 2011, p. 539). This should be ever more true in Sub-Saharan Africa, where still considerable proportions of the electorate have only limited access to media outlets such as TV, newspapers, and the internet, and

¹See for example Bleck and van de Walle (2013) on the importance for parties of reaching voters in African elections through campaign rallies.

where campaign rallies “offer candidates an opportunity to communicate salient issues to the masses. This information sharing is particularly important in African nations characterized with high rates of illiteracy and lower access to information” (Bleck and van de Walle, 2013, p. 1413). I analyze the strategic allocation of campaign rallies, hosted by presidential candidates in various electoral constituencies across Ghana in Chapter 5. I consider each event as a presidential campaign rally where the two main presidential candidates, John Dramanai Mahama of the ruling NDC and Nana Dankwa Akufo-Addo of the opposition NPP, spoke in public, during the three months prior to the election.² The event dataset, which the analysis in Chapter 5 is based on, consists of 173 campaign rallies by the incumbent and 103 rallies hosted by the challenger.³

2.1.2 Campaign promises of local and national public goods

In addition to the strategic allocation of campaign rallies, I investigate the use and effectiveness of campaign promises in Chapters 6 and 7, and the use of clientelism in Chapter 8. The campaign promises I study are promises candidates make concerning the provision of local public goods as opposed to national public goods. There are two features that characterize public goods. They are non-rivalrous, which means that “a unit of the good can be consumed by one individual without detracting [...] from the consumption opportunities still available to others from that same unit” (Cornes and Sandler, 1999, p. 8). Take the example of a government which has passed a law to make secondary education free.⁴ One additional high school student benefiting from paying no school fees will not decrease the opportunity of another student to also enjoy free education. Besides the non-rivalry criterion, public goods are non-excludable. This means that no individual or group of voters can be denied access to the good if they are eligible to benefit from the particular policy (ibid., pp. 8-9). In the case of the free education policy, this would mean that for every student in the country being enrolled in a public institution of secondary education tuition will be free.

Local club goods, are “geographically targeted local public goods” (Kramon, 2013a, p.15), “like a community well or a school building” (Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013, p. 721).⁵ These local club goods can be enjoyed by all inhabitants of a local community (Kramon, 2013a, p.167). These are typically voters living in the same electoral constituency, as these constituencies are often geographically segregated in rural regions of African countries (ibid., p.51). Club goods are hence non-excludable on the local

²In the remainder of this dissertation, I also refer to these candidates as John Mahama and Nana Akufo-Addo.

³See Horowitz (2012, p.75) for a similar operational definition of campaign rallies.

⁴This was the most debated campaign promise made by the principal opposition candidate in Ghana’s 2012 presidential election campaigns.

⁵I use the terms local public goods and local club goods interchangeably.

level, but people living outside an electoral constituency typically do not benefit from them (Cornes and Sandler, 1999). As these local public goods significantly impact the wellbeing of both rural and urban dwellers, voters tend to evaluate candidates' past performance and competence in providing these benefits in elections in many African countries (Barkan, 1995; Baldwin, 2013; Ichino and Nathan, 2013; Kramon, 2013a; Lindberg and Morrisson, 2008). The importance of these goods to voters, coupled with the possibility to target these club goods to distinct groups of voters, make them an important tool for candidates when vying for votes. What distinguishes local club goods from national public goods is that governments can use these goods to reward or punish geographically concentrated groups of voters for their support at the polls. I analyze the use and the perception of campaign promises referring to national public goods and club goods in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. I consider any statement by the two main presidential candidates as a campaign promise that is made in public during the official campaigning period and that "contains unequivocal support for a specific action or outcome that is testable" (Costello and Throup, 2008, p. 241).⁶ If such statements refer to national public goods, they are regarded as national promises. If they refer to local public goods, they are defined as local promises.⁷

Clientelism and pork-barrel politics

One campaign activity candidates in African elections engage in is offering voters individual benefits for their support at the polls. This is referred to as clientelism (e.g Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013, p.13). The benefits involved are private goods, such as cash, or food, access to healthcare, or any other good valued by voters that candidates can provide to them. It is not the type of good that characterizes clientelism, but that the criterion of distribution that candidates use is "did you (will you) support me?" (Stokes, 2007b, p. 605). This distinguishes clientelism from a programmatic mode of distribution, where goods are distributed according to objective criteria of eligibility, which are made public (Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013, p.7-10). This distinction is illustrated in Figure 2.1.

The party using clientelism can deliver benefits to the voter before the election, which has been termed "electoral clientelism", or it can provide at least a part of the benefit only after the election, which has been termed "relational clientelism" (Nichter, 2010, p. 1). In contrast to that, patronage refers to benefits parties channel to their own members (Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013, p.13-14). Parties usually rely on intermediaries who may be low-level party members, but also individuals who are not connected


⁶Costello and Throup (2008, p. 241) use this conceptualization to define what they call a "pledge" and they base this definition on criteria for statements to be regarded as campaign pledges or promises laid out by Royed (1996). Other authors apply less strict definitions of campaign promises, including also statements in which parties make only vague assertions of support for a cause, rather than strong assertions of commitments to future actions (Thomson, 1999; Mansergh and Thomson, 2007, p. 313), which parties in coalition systems tend to make.

⁷See Chapter 4 for more details on the coding procedure of local and national campaign promises.

to the party and who are paid for their service (Wang and Kurzman, 2007) to arrange deals with voters. These are referred to as brokers (Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013).

If benefits are targeted at groups of voters, and parties try to reward or punish voters with the delivery of club goods, this is referred to as pork-barrel politics (Aldrich, 1995, Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013, p.10-12, Veiga and Veiga, 2013). As Figure 2.1 illustrates, both clientelism and pork-barrel politics are strategies of parties to distribute benefits to voters in order to win their support and where parties try to grant voters access to these benefits only if they actually vote for the party. The difference between clientelism and pork-barrel politics is that parties using clientelism provide private benefits to individuals or small groups such as families. Parties might, for example, offer a family head to pay her children's school fees. Parties engaging in pork-barrel politics will, for example, channel spending for constituency projects, such as the building of a health clinic to constituencies which have overwhelmingly supported the party at the polls.

Figure 2.1: Programmatic and non-programmatic distributive strategies



Both forms of distributive politics are non-programmatic. These different distributive strategies are operationalized as offering individuals benefits for their vote in the case of clientelism, making promises to provide local club goods, to reflect pork-barrel politics, and making national promises, to reflect the use of programmatic policies to win voters.⁸

⁸Details on the operationalizations of these concepts are provided in the empirical chapters, where I analyze the use of these

2.1.3 Violent campaigning

Observers of African elections have contended that intimidation of voters and candidates, including “harassment, imprisonment and assassination; violent riots and clashes between supporters or security elements of the competing political parties; and attacks on local party headquarters and party symbols” (Adolfo et al., 2012, p. 1) can also be part of parties’ campaigning repertoire. Such low level electoral violence has occurred in recent elections in “Cameroon, [the] Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea, Madagascar, Sierra Leone and Uganda” (ibid.). Higher levels of escalation of electoral violence have been seen in Kenya’s 2002 and 2007 elections, Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010 elections, Nigeria’s 2007 elections, and Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections (Adolfo et al., 2012; Bratton, 2008; Collier and Vicente, 2014; LeBas, 2006). Violent campaign appeals are “random or organized act[s] or threat[s] to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a political stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay, or to otherwise influence an electoral process” (Fischer, 2002, p. 3). The perpetrators of violence might range from “government forces (i.e. the police and army) and supporters of the government to opposition groups, spontaneous demonstrators and even rebel organizations that cannot or do not want to take part in the formal political life at all,” or hired thugs and youth wings, instructed by political parties (Laakso, 2007, p. 228).⁹ The form of pre-electoral violence that I am interested to explain in this dissertation is any violence or threat thereof committed against voters by the two main contenders in a presidential election or any actor connected to one of the two, with the aim to impact how or if people vote.

2.2 The use of campaign strategies: mobilization and turnout-buying versus persuasion and vote-buying

The main puzzle this dissertation seeks to address is why parties do not focus all of their time and resources on convincing new voters, and spend so much effort on courting their supporters. This question has been addressed in the campaigning literature and the literature on distributive politics, and particularly that on clientelism. There are two main opposed strategies that parties use to influence elections to their favor which have been advanced in the campaigning literature and in studies on distributive politics. At one end of the spectrum is a persuasion strategy in

“which [...] [a party] aims at maximizing its vote share, [...] predominately aims at attract-

strategies.

⁹See Carey, Mitchell and Lowe (2012) on how political parties maintain links to militias to carry out violence against civilians or opponents.

ing unaligned voters, [...] mainly emphasizes modern technology, not ideology, in designing an election message, [...] tends to emphasize leaders and [...] views organizational innovation as part of the campaign theme to increase a party's electoral attractiveness" (Rohrschneider, 2002, p. 377).

In the literature on distributive politics, more precisely in the subfield of clientelistic campaign appeals this corresponds to the model of vote-buying where a party targets supporters of the rival candidate or voters who are unaffiliated with both parties in the race, and which "requires monitoring of specific voting decisions" (Nichter, 2008, p. 21).

At the other end of the spectrum is a mobilization strategy which

"is motivated primarily by policies, [...] focuses on reaching core voters, [...] primarily relies on its ideological heritage, [...] predominately emphasizes a party's core constituencies, and [...] mainly views organizations as instruments to contact voters, not to attract new voters on the basis of attractive participatory opportunities within parties" (Rohrschneider, 2002, pp. 376-377).

In the literature on distributive politics, mobilization finds its equivalent in the model of turnout-buying in which a party "targets nonvoting supporters and [which] requires monitoring turnout" (Nichter, 2008, p. 21). The vote-buying model expects candidates to concentrate on voters who are indifferent between the two parties campaigning for their votes, or who slightly lean toward the rival candidate in their preference, but who are likely to turn out (Stokes, 2005, p. 323). The turnout-buying model predicts candidates to focus their targeting appeals on potential supporters – those who are ideologically closer to them than to the rival candidate – but who are not certain to turn out (Nichter 2008). In both models, parties try to condition the handing out of benefits to voters on whether or not voters support them. In order to avoid moral hazard on the part of the voters, parties need to observe whether voters actually fulfill their part of the "benefits-for-votes-deal" (Lehoucq, 2007, pp. 37-42, Nichter, 2008, Stokes, 2005, Stokes and Dunning, 2007). While the vote-buying model requires parties to observe *how* people vote, parties buying turnout only need to observe *whether* people vote (Nichter, 2008).

In both models candidates have no incentives to cater to their certain supporters or to supporters of the rival candidate (Nichter 2008, Stokes 2005). Neither model thus expects parties to focus their campaigning effort on their supporters who are certain to go and vote, because this would be a waste of resources (Stokes and Dunning, 2007, p. 14). At the same time, parties are not expected to try to win votes from supporters of their rival candidate who are determined to turn out, because the costs of doing so would be over-proportional (Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005; Stokes and Dunning, 2007). This is in line with an argument put forward in the literature on candidate appearances that says that campaigning in hostile areas carries the risk of polarizing these opposed voters against the candidate and hence pushing them

even further away from him (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002; Fenno, 1978).¹⁰

In many cases, it seems plausible that candidates pursue a mix of vote-buying (or persuasion) and turnout-buying (or mobilization). However, there are certain conditions under which one or the other strategy is assumed to be used predominantly. In principle, the vote-buying strategy is more powerful, because attracting a new voter potentially also takes away a voter from the rival candidate. Persuading a new voter hence buys the party net two additional votes. Motivating one's supporter to turn out only buys the party one net vote (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014). Most theoretical models in the literature on distributive politics hence assume that parties would prefer a vote-buying or persuasion over a turnout-buying or mobilization strategy (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013), but it has been recognized that it might be easier for parties to mobilize their core voters under certain conditions (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit and Londregan, 1996).

The literature on distributive politics argues that candidates will use a persuasion strategy if they are equally efficient in distributing goods to undecided or swing voters as they are in targeting their core supporters (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). If however, they are better at delivering benefits to their partisans, with "less leakage," parties will also provide benefits to their own supporters (Dixit and Londregan, 1996, pp. 1153-1154). Stokes regards the monitoring capabilities of parties as central and argues that vote-buying or persuasion is particularly attractive when candidates have a comparatively high ability to monitor how voters voted or at least signal credibly to voters that they can (Stokes 2005). She develops a model in which clientelistic party machines and voters interact in a repeated game and in which parties condition rewards on the voting behavior of their clients (Stokes 2005). Although the ballot is formally secret, and therefore parties cannot monitor voting perfectly, they can credibly signal to voters that they can make informed inferences through brokers who forge deals with voters. These brokers have private information on voters and make an effort to signal that they have the ability to monitor votes. This repeated game, according to Stokes, leads to a form of perverse accountability in which parties hold voters accountable for how they voted and reward or punish them with providing or withholding private material incentives to them (ibid., p. 316).

The campaigning literature expects candidates to predominantly apply a persuasion strategy when party alignment is strong (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002). This is because core voters in these contexts can relatively safely be ignored. As due to their strong party attachment, they are unlikely to defect

¹⁰For reasons of the legibility the male form was chosen in the text, as the candidates in the empirical analysis of this study are male. However, the information in the theoretical model refers nevertheless to members of both genders.

to another party. This is even more the case in two-party systems where supporters of one party have hardly anywhere else to go, because there are no attractive third parties which resemble “their” party in its policy positions who voters could deviate to (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002). To the contrary, the campaigning literature expects candidates to have incentives to pursue a mobilization strategy when party alignment is weak and turnout is “uneven” (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002, p. 53).

There have been a few attempts to integrate the vote- and the turnout-buying models (Stokes and Dunning, 2007; Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013). Stokes and Dunning (2007) devise conditions under which parties should be likely to follow a vote-buying or a turnout-buying logic in allocating benefits. They argue that vote-buying should be used to address weakly opposed voters who are certain to turn out and turnout-buying attempts should be concentrated on strong supporters with low turnout propensities. Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco (2013) provide an explanation for why the empirical evidence deviates from the swing voter model. They argue that while parties do have an incentive to focus benefits on undecided marginal voters, the intermediaries they rely on to distribute the benefits have different incentives and therefore over-proportionally target loyal voters which requires less effort for the brokers.

Demobilization, abstention-buying, and rewarding of loyalists

Besides using benefits to buy turnout or to induce voters to switch their vote, there are three alternative strategies known in the clientelism literature, which have received far less attention than vote and turnout-buying: double persuasion, the rewarding of loyalists, and abstention-buying. Double persuasion refers to a party paying voters a benefit to make them turn out in the first place, and secondly, to vote for the party. This is a strategy directed at independent voters, who are unlikely to vote (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014). Parties can also reward their loyalists for past support and turnout (Nichter, 2008, p.20). Abstention-buying – also referred to as “negative vote-buying” (Schaffer, 2002, p. 78) – is the targeting of voters with a benefit with the intention to making them stay at home on polling day, and is typically directed toward indifferent or opposed voters (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014, pp. 417-418). Parties might pay voters cash to stay at home, which used to be common in New York State in the 19th and early 20th century (Cox, Kousser and Morgan, 1981, p. 656), or pay registered voters for disqualifying themselves, by dipping their index finger in indelible ink so that they will not be allowed to vote anymore, something that has been observed during elections in the Philippines, for example (Schaffer, 2002, p. 78). Another example of how to induce voters to stay away from the polls also comes from elections in the Philippines, where parties have been observed to take voters on excursions out-of-town, away from the polling station, on Election Day (Schaffer, 2002, p. 78).

The campaigning literature also considers the possibility that campaign exposure might demobilize voters.

Gerstle, Sanders and Kaid (1991) argue, for example, that modern campaigning style – and particularly the increase in negative campaigning – might account for decreasing turnout rates in US elections, although findings on the effect of negative campaigning are mixed.¹¹ However, this literature on modern campaigning does not consider strategies to intentionally turn off voters.

2.2.1 Empirical evidence: targeting core or independent voters?

This section presents findings from the literature on modern campaigning tactics in established democracies as well as on the use of pork-barrel politics and clientelism which are relevant to the question of who gets targeted by campaigns and why.

Campaigning in established democracies

The campaigning literature has yielded important insights on the use of a number of campaign tactics in established democracies. With regard to where parties host campaign rallies, it has been found that candidates in the United States tend to focus campaign appearances on highly and densely populated areas (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002, Bartels, 1985, p.928, Chen and Reeves, 2011, Doherty, 2007), where turnout fluctuates (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002, p. 53), in large media markets (Herr, 2002, 906), in swing states (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002, p. 53, Shaw, 1999), and in states that yield the greatest rewards in the electoral college (Bartels, 1985; Brams and Davis, 1974). The question of the conditions under which parties predominantly mobilize core voters or persuade independent voters has also been studied in other contexts outside of American politics. Past research suggests that mobilization is more likely when party alignment is strong (Rohrschneider, 2002, p. 377) and when parties are mass parties (Duverger, 1954, p.23, Katz and Mair, 1995, p.7). Furthermore, spatial models of party competition have assumed that consensus-based systems with larger number of parties than two-party systems set incentives for candidates to mobilize core voters in order to avoid defection to other parties (Bowler and Farrel, 1992). In contrast to that, majoritarian systems are expected to provide parties with incentives to compete over independent voters because core voters can be relatively safely ignored since they have few alternatives but supporting “their” party (Bowler and Farrel, 1992).

The allocation of resources in campaigns in African elections

It is not clear, however, what expectations we can draw from this literature that focuses on established democracies for campaigning strategies in Africa. On the one hand, party systems are generally volatile

¹¹See Ansolabehere (1994); Ansolabehere, Iyengar and Simon (1999) for turnout decreasing effects of negative campaigning, but also Lau and Pomper (2001); Lau et al. (1999) for findings that do not corroborate this hypothesis.

and partisan alignment is argued to be weak (Mozaffar and Scarrit, 2005).¹² The number of voters in Sub-Saharan Africa who are affiliated with a party is expectedly lower than in the United States, for example (Keefer, 2010, p. 8). A study on 10 African countries reports that only 55.9% of respondents feel close to a political party (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2011, p. 779). The high volatility of African party systems and the low number of partisans might push parties toward a mobilization strategy. On the other hand, this volatility of many African party systems is not so much a product of voters switching between parties from one election to another, because they are unstable in their party preferences. It is rather a function of many small parties entering and exiting the party system as well as parties forging alliances and splitting up (Mozaffar and Scarrit, 2005; van de Walle, 2003). Furthermore, voters often seem to be casting their votes along ethnic lines.¹³ Given this, parties might not worry too much about their supporters defecting to rival parties with different ethnic profiles and thus concentrate on persuading independent voters who do not have a co-ethnic candidate in the race.

The current state of research on the allocation of general campaign resources in Africa mainly consists of qualitative case studies of single elections (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, 2010; LeBas, 2006; Nugent, 1999), or comparative studies that do not address the variation in campaign efforts across different groups of voters (Bleck and van de Walle, 2011). This current state of the art does not allow us to detect general patterns of campaign strategies with regard to mobilization or persuasion. Exceptions are two studies on ethnic campaign appeals across states in Nigeria, and a study on the geography of ethnic campaign messages and campaign rallies in Kenya's 2007 elections (Horowitz, 2012).

The use of clientelism

The question about whether the use of clientelism during elections follows a mobilization or a persuasion logic remains also largely unanswered. Some find that parties focus on mobilizing their supporters in settings as diverse as Argentina (Nichter, 2008, Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013, p. 67-72), India (Dunning and Nilekani, 2013), Mexico, Venezuela (Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013, p. 67-72), and Taiwan (Liu, 1999), while other studies on campaigns in Argentina (Stokes, 2005), Ghana (Lindberg and Morrisson, 2008) or Kenya (Kramon, 2013b) suggest that parties buy votes rather than turnout.

While clientelism is probably the campaign strategy which has been most explored for African elections (e.g. Bratton, 2008; Guardado and Wantchekon, 2014; Kramon, 2013b; Lindberg and Morrisson, 2008; Kramon, 2013a; Weghorst and Lindberg, 2011; Young, 2009), I am not aware of any study which explicitly tests the predictions of the vote and turnout-buying models with regard to the use of clientel-

¹²More recent studies argue that the volatility of African party systems has been exaggerated, but nonetheless consider African democracies to be comparatively volatile, as compared to democracies in Latin America, for example (Boogards, 2008; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2005).

¹³See Bratton, Bhavnani and Chen (2013) on determinants of vote choice and Posner (2005) on the salience of ethnicity.

ism. Some studies, nonetheless, report findings on the political make-up of the targets of clientelism. A study of clientelism in Kenya finds that swing voters are most targeted with clientelism (Kramon, 2013*b*, p. 110), suggesting a vote-buying logic. Similarly, in a study of clientelism in Ghana, Lindberg and Morrisson (2008, pp. 118-119) find that more people reported receiving clientelic offers in swing constituencies than in the safe havens of the two main parties. In contrast to that, in an analysis of clientelism in Benin and Kenya, Guardado and Wantchekon (2014) find that respondents who are more involved with political parties are more likely to be targeted than those with no partisan attachments, which might suggest that a mobilization or turnout-buying logic is at work. The findings from these few existing studies on the targets of clientelism in Africa are far from conclusive with regard to the question of why and when parties should cater to their core supporters during campaigns.

Pork-barrel politics

Research on the allocation of local public goods across geographic regions has emphasized political motivations in the allocation of local club goods, both in established (Grossman, 1994; Pereira, 1996; Veiga and Veiga, 2013; Worthington and Dollery, 1998) and in new democracies (Banful, 2011; Barkan and Chege, 1989; Case, 2001; Cole, 2009; Jablonski, 2014; Khemani, 2007).¹⁴ The empirical evidence with regard to the vote-buying or the turnout-buying model is mixed also for the targeting of regionally concentrated groups of voters with benefits. Some studies conducted in Ghana (Banful, 2011), Peru (Schady, 2000), Spain (Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005), Sweden (Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002), or in the United States find that parties target competitive or swing constituencies (Berry, Burden and Howell, 2010; Wright, 1974). Other research is more in line with the turnout-buying or the mobilization logic. Barkan and Chege (1989) find, for example, that under Kenya's President Daniel Arap Moi budget allocations for the constructions of new roads in his political strongholds of the Rift Valley were disproportionately high. Similarly, Miguel and Zaidi (2003) showed that in Ghana annual government expenditures per student were considerably higher in districts that had voted overwhelmingly for the ruling party in parliamentary elections than in other districts. Other studies on pork-barrel spending in Argentina (Calvo and Murillo, 2004), Brazil (Ames, 2001; Rodden and Arretche, 2004), Mexico (Bruhn, 1996; Hiskey, 1999) and the United States (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006; Levitt and Snyder, James M. Jr., 1995) also provide support for a mobilization logic in the allocation of targetable goods across regions.

¹⁴Golden and Min (2013) argue, however, that due to a publication bias against null findings, the notion that the allocation of such targetable goods follows political motivations might have been over-estimated.

2.2.2 Effectiveness of campaigning strategies

The strategy parties use in the run-up to elections is intimately linked to which voters can be influenced with campaigns. While parties might want to focus all their campaigning effort on attracting new voters, they might be constrained to do so by the fact that voters tend to vary in their receptiveness to campaign messages. In fact, studies on the political psychology of voters suggest that partisanship is one of the most important mediators of how and if campaigns influence voters' behavior (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968, pp. 137-149, Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954, pp. 118-132, Finkel and Schrott, 1995) and that voters evaluate campaign information in light of their predisposed political inclinations (Hagner and Rieselbach, 1978; Kraus, Kennedy and Nixon, 1962; LeDuc and Price, 1979; Lang and Lang, 1962; Sigelman and Sigelman, 1984). This also leads voters to evaluate campaign messages made by candidates whose party they are affiliated with much more positively (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Popkin, 1991; Zaller, 1992).

In addition, past research has found more robust effects for campaigns strengthening the vote intentions voters had at the beginning of the campaign season, than making them think in new ways (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968; Key and Cummings, 1966; Campbell, 1960). These findings might make it more compelling for parties to appeal to their own supporters and mobilize them. At the same time, existing research also suggests that people who are uninformed about politics or exhibit little interest in politics can be most influenced by campaigns (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954; Converse, 1962; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968; Zaller, 1992). This would suggest that it is very difficult for parties to change voters minds, and much easier to mobilize those who are inclined to support them. Those who do not exhibit any political inclination of which party to vote for, however, can also be responsive to campaigns.

Effectiveness of Clientelism

There are various arguments in the literature about the types of voters we should expect to most be influenced when addressed with an offer to buy their vote or turnout. One argument is that poorer voters value private benefits more than wealthier voters, due to the diminishing marginal utility of these benefits for wealthier voters (Dixit and Londregan, 1996). Indeed, many studies find that poor voters lie at the heart of clientelistic targeting (Bratton, 2008; Kramon, 2013a; Stokes, 2005; Scott, 1969; Weitz-Shapiro, 2014, 2012). In line with this, several studies testing the effect of clientelism find that poorer voters are more likely to be influenced by it. In a survey conducted in Argentina, Stokes finds that poorer and less educated voters lie in the focus of targeting and that they are most likely to report that vote-buying

has influenced their vote (Stokes, 2005, p. 322). Nichter's findings on the effectiveness of clientelistic targeting in Brazil (Nichter, 2010, p. 52) and Kramon's analysis of Kenyan elections point in the same direction (Kramon, 2013*a*, pp. 114-121).¹⁵

Another argument suggests that the more people feel that candidates can find out how or if they voted, the more likely they are to comply with a benefits-for-votes-deal, which Stokes (2005, p. 321) finds support for. Finally, another line of argument posits that voters who highly value reciprocity are more likely to comply with offers to buy their vote. Combining a survey of brokers and voters with experimental evidence from Paraguay, Finan and Schechter (2012, p. 874) find that individuals who value reciprocity highly are more likely to be targeted with vote-buying attempts (*ibid.*, 874). This study does not directly test, however, whether these voters are indeed more likely to comply.

The findings with regard to gender are mixed. While Kramon's analysis of vote-buying in Kenya suggests that women were more likely to have their vote bought than men (Kramon, 2013*a*), Wantchekon finds the contrary in his seminal field experiment conducted in Benin (Wantchekon, 2003, pp. 418-419). He argues that men are more likely to profit from clientelistic targeting than women, which is why they are responsive to clientelistic campaigns.

Few studies report whether clientelistic targetings serves to buy votes or turnout and whether partisans and independent voters vary in their receptiveness to this strategy (Auyero, 2000; Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Finan and Schechter, 2012; Hale, 2007; Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008; Lindberg and Morrisson, 2008; Young, 2009). Exceptions are Liu (1999) who finds that clientelistic benefits are used to mobilize voters in Taiwan, or Corstange (2012) and Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes (2004) who argue that clientelistic campaigning served both to buy votes and turnout in elections in Lebanon and Argentina. Several recent studies on clientelistic campaigning in African elections suggest that it has very little effect at all on voting behavior (Guardado and Wantchekon, 2014; Lindberg and Morrisson, 2008; Young, 2009).

The evaluation of campaign messages in African elections

There is a recent, but growing experimental literature on the effectiveness of different types of campaign messages on vote choice in Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Conroy-Krutz, 2012; Kramon, 2013*a*; Wantchekon, 2003). This literature does not directly test whether independent voters differ from partisans in their responsiveness to campaign appeals, however. In an experiment conducted in Uganda, Conroy-Krutz (2012) investigates the importance of information about candidates' ethnic identity on vote intentions. In this experiment, subjects were presented with a vignette of different types of information on hypo-

¹⁵While Kramon finds that Kenyans at average income levels are most likely to be targeted, not necessarily those below average, this nonetheless speaks to poor voters being at the heart of this form of distribution, as the average income of Kenyans is just around the poverty line (Kramon, 2013*a*, pp. 114-121).

thetical candidates varying, among other characteristics, their competence and their ethnic backgrounds. Conroy-Krutz (2012) finds that the importance of ethnic cues on vote intention diminishes, the more information respondents are provided with on the candidates that is non-related to their ethnic identity. In an experiment conducted in Kenya, Kramon (2013*a*) asked participants to evaluate audio campaign messages, where he varied whether the message entailed information that a candidate had made attempts to buy votes. The findings reveal the hypothetical candidate who is said to have distributed cash in public, is perceived to be more electorally viable than the candidate who is not presented as having engaged in vote-buying. Concerning the respondents among whom the positive effect of vote-buying on vote intention is strongest, Kramon finds that this is among Kenyans at average income levels, those who are just around the poverty line (Kramon, 2013*a*, pp. 114-121). In a field experiment conducted in São Tomé e Príncipe, Vicente (2014) finds that an anti vote-buying campaign drove down turnout for the challenger and increased turnout for the incumbent. The author interprets this as evidence in favor of the fact that the challenger more frequently relies on vote-buying than the incumbent. He assumes that because the incumbent has an advantage in using what has elsewhere been termed “relational clientelism” (Nichter, 2010, p. 1) i.e. the delivery of benefits after the election, the challenger who cannot apply this strategy relies more on “electoral clientelism” (Nichter, 2010, p. 1, Vicente, 2014, p. 358).

In a series of experiments conducted in several national elections in Benin, Wantchekon studies the effectiveness of clientelistic and programmatic campaign messages, measured as local and national promises (Wantchekon, 2003; Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2013). In the seminal field experiment conducted during the campaign of Benin’s 2001 national elections, Wantchekon (2003) assigns actual candidates a local or a national message and finds that the local campaign message worked for all candidates in increasing their vote share. The national message was only effective for those candidates who had a national support base and for opposition candidates. The interpretation that Wantchekon offers is that candidates with a national support base are more credible in promising public goods than regional candidates, and that the opposition is more credible in making programmatic promises than the incumbent. This, he argues, is because the incumbent has an advantage in using clientelistic campaign messages and hence probably more widely makes use of this strategy than the opposition (*ibid.*, p. 401). Furthermore, he finds that voters in general are receptive to the local message, but that women, more informed voters, and co-ethnics of the candidates are also responsive to the national message. One of the mechanisms the author assumes links messages and voting behavior, besides varying preferences among voters over clientelistic and national goods, is the credibility of the promises. He argues that the opposition is more credible in making local promises than the incumbent, and that candidates with a national following are more credible than regional candidates in promising the provision of national public goods (Wantchekon,

2003).

This brief review of the effectiveness of clientelism illustrates that the state of the research does not allow conclusions on whether partisans or independent voters are more receptive to campaign appeals. This is one reason why the turnout-buying versus the vote-buying debate remains unresolved. We neither know much about what makes some voters more and others less receptive to clientelistic campaigns. One mechanism that has been suggested to play a role is the credibility of different campaign promises, but this has not yet been tested.

2.2.3 Violent campaign strategies

Whereas early scholarly work on election-related violence has treated it as a side effect of instability and democratic transition processes (Huntington, 1993; Snyder, 2000), more recent work has recognized the strategic use of electoral violence (e.g. Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell, Forthcoming; Cederman, Gleditsch and Hug, 2013; Daxecker, 2014). Accordingly, scholars have studied the effect of timing and the competitiveness of elections (Cederman, Gleditsch and Hug, 2013) or the effect of fraud (Daxecker, 2014; Tucker, 2007) and the presence of election observers on post-election protest and violence (Daxecker, 2014; Hyde and Marinov, 2014). Most of this research, however, has studied causes and triggers of electoral violence in general or has focused on post-electoral violence. Only few pieces of research have focused on pre-electoral violence as a campaign strategy (Bratton, 2008; Chaturvedi, 2005; Collier and Vicente, 2012; LeBas, 2006; Wilkinson and Haid, 2009). Chaturvedi (2005) argues, based on Skaperdas and Grofman's (Skaperdas and Grofman, 1995) model of negative campaigning, that a party uses violence to demobilize the supporters of the rival party. Collier and Vicente (2012) argue, to the contrary, that strong supporters of a party cannot be impacted in their vote choice or turnout propensity and will hence be ignored by campaigners. They expect parties to focus their effort on demobilizing weakly opposed voters.

Robinson and Torvik (2009) endogenize the question of who gets targeted with intimidation. Depending on the strength of party alignment (or ethnic polarization of the electorate), either independent or weak supporters of the rival party are most at risk to suffer intimidation. Depending on how many of these weakly opposed or independent voters are in the electorate, the incumbent chooses the group of voters to target with violence. If the proportion of weak supporters of the opposition is large, buying their support with benefits would be expensive and the incumbent will choose to disenfranchise these voters. If however, party alignment is relatively strong, so that opposition supporters are all strongly determined to vote for the opposition, the incumbent ignores these voters altogether and targets efforts of demobilization on independent voters (*ibid.*).

The empirical evidence about which types of voters are most at risk to suffer from pre-electoral violence is mixed. There is evidence of parties using violence both to demobilize and to persuade opposed voters (Kasara, 2014; Wilkinson, 2004; Wilkinson and Haid, 2009), and even to mobilize turnout among core supporters (LeBas, 2006). The most rigorous test of the assumptions and predictions of these three main theoretical models on voter intimidation is provided by Kuhn's study on patterns of intimidation in 20 African countries (Kuhn, 2013). He finds that partisans of the incumbent party are substantially less likely to suffer from voter intimidation than other voters. However, whether violence concentrates on swing voters (Robinson and Torvik, 2009), or whether opposition voters experience the most pre-electoral violence, as Chaturvedi (2005) and Collier and Vicente (2012) predict, varies across the countries he studies.

2.2.4 Distributive and violent strategies

While the study of electoral clientelism and that of electoral violence have emerged as two separate research agendas, scholars have recently begun to integrate these strategies. Both theoretical and empirical research emphasizes that redistributive and violent campaign strategies are used for different purposes. With regard to the political make-up of voters who are in the focus of either manipulation strategy, however, the evidence is mixed. Bratton (2008) finds that intimidation is spread quite evenly across all groups of voters in 2003 and 2007 Nigerian elections, but that what he terms vote-buying had clearer demographic correlates. Poorer voters, living in the countryside were more likely to be targeted with vote-buying attempts than their wealthier, better educated, urban counterparts. In contrast, studying Mexico's 2000 presidential elections, Cornelius (2004) finds that parties concentrated distributive appeals on urban voters and particularly in states in which they controlled governorship.¹⁶ Gutiérrez-Romero (2014) finds that while vote-buying clustered in less competitive areas, violence was concentrated in contested areas. According to the author, these findings suggest that parties mainly use distributive appeals to signal to would-be supporters that they would channel patronage to them if they won the election. However, the groups that parties target with vote-buying within these strongholds were groups that did not have a co-ethnic candidate in the race, which Gutierrez-Romero argues corresponds to the concept of swing voters. Parties concentrate intimidation attempts in those contested areas where they are in the lead and mainly target voters that were not part of the ethnic group that was their support base (*ibid.*, p. 10). Evidence from a list experiment conducted in Guatemala also points in the direction that distributive appeals might be used to mobilize most responsive voters and that violence is

¹⁶Cornelius' findings with regard to coercion are difficult to relate to the present study because his definition of coercion includes both aspects of distributive and coercive appeals as I conceptualize them (Cornelius, 2004).

used to demobilize those voters who would be difficult to persuade with vote-buying. Gonzalez Ocantos et al. (2013) find that while vote-buying attempts are concentrated on urban, middle-income voters who highly value reciprocity and often on those who had abstained in the previous election, intimidation is concentrated on mostly rural, opposed voters with a high turnout propensity, those who do not value reciprocity and who do not believe that their vote choices can be monitored.

This new research on clientelism and violence as campaign strategies suggest that they are used to address different groups of voters. The findings remain, however, inconclusive as to who the targets of both campaign appeals are.

2.3 Summary

Existing approaches to understanding the logic of campaigning in young democracies has failed to adequately address the question of which groups of voters parties target during elections and why. In particular the question whether it is more rational for parties to focus their campaign resources on attracting indifferent voters, or to mobilize their own supporters remains unresolved. Not only do we lack systematic investigations of who parties target with different campaigning appeals. We also do not know what types of voters can be influenced with the various campaign appeals that parties in young democracies use, ranging from modern campaigning strategies, promises of local club goods and from political clientelism to voter intimidation.

This chapter introduced key definitions of campaigning strategies that parties use in African elections. I reviewed the literature on the main explanations for what types of voters parties target in elections and why. The main theoretical models in the literature on campaigning and in the literature of distributive politics were discussed. I then presented an overview over what types of voters are receptive to campaign exposure in general, and to clientelistic targeting, in particular. In addition, I provided a summary of a new research agenda studying violence and clientelism as campaigning strategies, used to address different groups of voters.

The next chapter introduces the main theoretical framework of the dissertation, which investigates three conditions under which it is rational for parties to focus on mobilizing their supporters to turn out. It concludes with a discussion of the implications for the strategic use of campaign rallies, promises of local club goods, clientelism, and violence in African elections.

Chapter 3

A theory of mobilization and demobilization in African elections

In this chapter, I develop a theory of campaigning strategies in African elections. I argue that there are three reasons why parties court their own supporters, rather than exclusively trying to win new voters. First, rather than wasting benefits on those voters who will vote for them, regardless of how much (or how little) effort is spent on them, parties might be mobilizing turnout among potential supporters. These are supporters who are unlikely to turn out on Election Day, although they would rather support them, than any other party. Second, I argue that another reason why parties focus their attention on their supporters, is that their campaign promises are much more credible to their own supporters, than to those who are independent or oppose them. Finally, parties often have devised other strategies with which to address independent voters. While they might be using campaign rallies, campaign promises, and clientelistic benefits to mobilize turnout among likely supporters, parties might also try to demobilize independent voters via intimidation and violence, thereby avoiding the costs of trying to persuade them. This chapter is structured as follows. First, I discuss the points of departure for the argument. I explain ways in which existing models of distributive campaigning need to be extended and modified to account for why parties in African elections might decide to court their core supporters. Second, I develop a holistic theory of the allocation of campaign effort. It allows me to derive predictions for the use of different campaigning strategies, not just for electoral clientelism like the vote-buying and the turnout-buying model. Third, I outline a number of my theory's empirical implications, contrasting them with the predictions made by other models, which I then test in the empirical chapters of the dissertation.

3.1 Points of departure: an evaluation of existing theoretical models

The main questions this dissertation seeks to answer are (1) which groups of voters do parties in African elections focus their campaigning efforts on and, (2) what is their aim in doing this? Is it to persuade, mobilize or demobilize these voters? Past research has often focused on investigating the strategic use of one particular campaigning tool, such as candidate appearances (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002; Brams and Davis, 1974; Chen and Reeves, 2011; Colantoni and Levsque, 1975; Doherty, 2007), campaign expenditures across regions or states (Nagler and Leighley, 1992), or the allocation of money to media markets (Fletcher and Slutsky, 2011). The type of campaigning tool that has, by far, received the most attention when studying African elections is the use of political clientelism (e.g. Kramon, 2013a; Lindberg and Morrisson, 2008; Vicente, 2014; Wantchekon, 2003; Weghorst and Lindberg, 2011; Young, 2009). Focusing on one particular strategy can, however, be problematic, because it may lead to false inferences about which voters lie at the heart of a party's campaign. A group of voters who seem to be neglected by one strategy, might be offset by a different type of campaign. For example, parties might cater to their supporters by hosting most of the campaign rallies in their strongholds. At the same time, they might offset disadvantages for independent voters concentrated in competitive constituencies, by using more clientelistic targeting there.¹ Thus to understand which voters parties are actually trying to mobilize, persuade or demobilize, we need to take their broad repertoire of campaigning strategies into account. This is why I develop an argument which covers different strategies and can be used to derive predictions on a range of campaigning tools.

The argument presented in the next section is drawn from different strands of literature. These are (a) research on the allocation of campaigning efforts in general, (b) spatial models of party competition, (c) models of the logic of distributive campaigning, and particularly (d) that of electoral clientelism. While this past research has greatly advanced our understanding of the logic of campaigning in established democracies and the logic of clientelistic targeting in newer democracies, there are several assumptions – often made implicitly or explicitly – which need to be qualified in order to explain patterns of campaigning in African elections. One such assumption is that parties have different ideological profiles and that the further away a voter's ideal point is from theirs, the more the parties will need to invest in order to win this particular voter's support (e.g. Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005). Another assumption which often implicitly underlies models of distributive targeting, is that parties always deliver the bene-

¹See Kramon and Posner (2013) on a similar argument about beneficiaries of distributive politics. They argue that if our goal is to investigate which groups of voters a government is particularly responsive to with its policies, it is necessary to take into account the allocation of a range of targeted goods which are important to voters in a given country. It is not sufficient to study the spending for one type of good, because, as the authors show, a group which seems to be neglected in one field, e.g., education, often has needs offset by the government in a different area, such as the provision of a good road infrastructure.

fits that they promise to voters (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005). Lastly, past research has acknowledged that campaign exposure may not only lead voters to switch their vote intention or mobilize them to turn out, but that it can also keep voters away from the polls. What has been largely overlooked, however, is that parties can also *intentionally demobilize* voters (Ansolabehere, 1994; Ansolabehere, Iyengar and Simon, 1999; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954; Gerstle, Sanders and Kaid, 1991; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968); an important point which will be addressed in more detail later in this chapter.

Assumption of different ideological profiles of parties

A general idea underlying our understanding of rational choice models of voting, party competition and campaigning is that voters and parties have distinct ideal points and that voters support the party which is closest to them. In order to win as many supporters as possible, parties move close to the median voter, given certain constraints (Downs, 1957; Enelow and Hinich, 1982), or they try to manipulate voters' perceptions of the location of different candidates in the ideological space (Harrington and Hess, 1996). Distributive models of campaigning assume that voters' ideal points are fixed and that candidates offer voters rewards to compensate for the ideological distance between them and the voters (Stokes, 2005, pp. 319–321, Nichter, 2008, p. 23). To make sense of why campaigns would go after their core voters, which is the main goal guiding this dissertation, the turnout-buying model would attribute this to the ideological closeness between a party and its partisans. The intuition of this model is that the closer a party's ideal position is to that of a particular voter, the cheaper it is for a party to buy off this voter's support. Hence buying off a core voter is cheaper than buying off an independent or opposing voter.² Thus, one of the responses the turnout-buying model would offer to the question of why parties spend so much time and money on courting their core supporters is the argument that it is relatively cheap for parties to mobilize their supporters, as the ideological distance they need to compensate those voters for, is small. To the contrary, it is argued that compensating voters whose preferences are less aligned with those of the party is more expensive, which is why parties ignore independent and opposed voters (ibid.).

I argue that this logic is not very helpful in explaining why parties in African elections would have an incentive to mobilize their supporters. Parties in Africa rarely adopt distinct policy positions (van de

²Both the turnout-buying and the vote-buying model share this basic intuition. The difference between them is that in the vote-buying model voting is assumed to be costless so that the only source of negative utility, which a voter faces when voting, is the distance to the party she votes for. Hence, the party compensates the voter only for the ideological distance between them (Stokes, 2005, pp. 319–321). In the turnout-buying model the act of voting itself also imposes costs on the voter. In order to mobilize a voter, a party needs to compensate the voter not only for the degree to which the party's policies diverge from her preferences, but also for voting costs such as transportation to the polling station or the opportunity costs which are caused for the voter by requiring her to leave her work for the time of voting (Nichter, 2008, p. 23).

Walle, 2003, p. 304, Bleck and van de Walle, 2011, Bleck and van de Walle, 2013). That is why the ideological distance between parties and voters alone cannot account for why parties target their supporters. Most parties in Sub-Saharan Africa do not differ much on ideological grounds (Bleck and van de Walle, 2011, Bleck and van de Walle, 2013, Carey, 2002, p. 64, van de Walle, 2003, p. 304), and parties that have attempted to forge clearer ideological profiles have generally not been very successful in attracting support. The National Lima Party in Zambia is a case in point. It positioned itself as representing rural interests in the 1996 elections, and was indeed supported by the *Zambian Farmers' Association*; yet it did not receive a single seat in the parliament (van de Walle, 2003, pp. 304–305). Similarly, several parties in Francophone Africa that have positioned themselves as Marxist, have not been electorally viable (van de Walle, 2003, pp. 304–305). Even the NDC and the NPP in Ghana, which are among the parties with the most clear-cut ideological profiles (Osei, 2012, p. 147), have not been consistent in their programmatic orientations. While the NDC presents itself as a social democratic party (National Democratic Congress, 2008, p. 31) and the NPP holds a neo-liberal ideology (Obeng-Odoom, 2013, p. 79), they converge on economic policies. For example, both parties emphasize the importance of the private sector in boosting Ghana's economy (Obeng-Odoom, 2013, p. 79). Moreover, the NPP – who claims to promote market liberalism – promotes interventionist, social policies such as the introduction of free Senior High School education (Obeng-Odoom, 2013, p. 79). Instead of adopting distinct policy positions, parties in African elections seem to overwhelmingly focus on valence appeals (see Bleck and van de Walle, 2013).³

Given these general characteristics of African parties, I argue that the ideological distance between parties and voters is unlikely to be the most important explanation of why parties might decide to target core voters.

Assumption of credible campaigns

Another problematic assumption concerns the idea that parties are credible in delivering the benefit they promise to voters. Distributive models of party competition and campaigning tend to assume that

³There are various reasons which have been brought forward for why African parties have unclear programmatic and ideological profiles. A potential reason for the ideological vagueness of parties would be that issues do not mobilize African voters, but this argument has been refuted by recent research (Bleck and van de Walle, 2011). Rather, one part of the explanation of why parties do not distinguish themselves clearly on programmatic grounds might be that the different constituencies they represent – often based on ethno-regional groups – do not differ much in their preferences (van de Walle, 2003, p. 315). Even if they did, however, as parties are relatively young, they might be uncertain about their supporters' preferences and hence eschew taking distinct positions (Bleck and van de Walle, 2013, p. 1396). The low salience of ideology in party politics has also been argued to be the product of strategic considerations. Kitschelt (2007) argues, for example, that the recurrence to valence issues is more likely in party systems that are characterized by clientelistic parties which compete over their ability to deliver targeted goods and constituency-services. Bleck and van de Walle (2013) argue that parties purposively remain unclear in their campaign promises, in order to remain flexible to forge alliances with other parties in the future, given the instability of the party landscape in many African countries (Mozaffar and Scarrit, 2005, Bleck and van de Walle, 2013, p. 1398).

parties always deliver the benefit which compensates the voter for her costs of voting or for her ideological distance to the party (e.g. Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005). While much thought has gone into what prevents voters from defecting from this “benefit-for-votes-deal” (e.g. Gallego, *Forthcoming*; Lawson and Greene, 2014; Stokes, 2005), existing models of vote and turnout-buying have largely ignored the fact that parties do not necessarily follow through with their campaign promises (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005).

The paradox that parties are able to influence vote choice and turnout by offering individuals private benefits, while the ballot is secret, has attracted much scholarly attention. Stokes (2005, p. 318) has argued that well-organized party machines in Argentina are able to credibly signal to voters that they can find out how they vote, which in turn prevents voters from taking the benefit but not voting for the machine. Proponents of the turnout-buying model argue that parties mainly focus benefits on core supporters, because here they know how these voters would vote if they voted, and hence only need to observe turnout, not try to find out how individuals voted (Nichter, 2008, p. 21). Others have argued that parties target intrinsically reciprocal individuals who are unlikely to defect from the deal and vote as they please (Lawson and Greene, 2014, Finan and Schechter, 2012, p. 865). Another way in which politicians try to assure that voters to whom they offer a benefit actually do vote for them, is to only deliver benefits after the election (Nichter, 2010, p. 2). In such cases, it is argued that a voter desiring to receive a benefit is likely to fulfill her part of the deal. This is particularly effective if the politician offers a benefit whose delivery is directly tied to his electoral success (Robinson and Verdier, 2013, p. 261). Thus if candidates promise voters benefits such as jobs in the public sector, it is clear that only in case of a win will the candidate have access to the necessary state resources to provide voters with these jobs (Robinson and Verdier, 2013, pp. 261–263).

The fact, however, that it is not only voters who have an incentive to defect from the benefits-for-votes-deal, but that candidates may also have one, has received much less attention.⁴ I argue that candidates enjoy different levels of trust with their partisans than among independent and opposed voters and that promises to deliver benefits in the future are more credible to one’s own supporters than to other voters. This variation in the candidates’ credibility among different types of voters, I argue, is part of the story why candidates target core voters.⁵ To be fair, there would be no credibility problem on the part of candidates if they delivered all benefits ahead of the election.⁶ However, it is implausible to expect that

⁴Exceptions are Gallego (*Forthcoming*); Robinson and Verdier (2013); Finan and Schechter (2012).

⁵While past models of distributive campaigning have acknowledged the possibility that parties’ ability to cater to partisans is different to that of distributing benefits to other voters, to the best of my knowledge, this has not been linked to the variation in the credibility of campaign promises. Dixit and Londregan (1996, pp. 1153–1154) argue for example, that if parties can deliver goods to their core voters with less leakage than to swing voters or opposed voters, they will have an incentive to focus benefits on their partisans (Gallego, *Forthcoming*, p. 5).

⁶This is an assumption that Nichter (2008, p. 20), for example explicitly makes.

parties would exclusively do this, as voters would then have an incentive to defect i.e., take the benefit and vote as they please, as Bratton's analysis of Nigeria's 2003 and 2007 presidential elections, for example, suggests (Bratton, 2008).⁷ We lack systematic data on the type of clientelistic targeting which takes place, in order to assess how frequent the use of upfront payments is, compared to the delivery of benefits after the election. There is anecdotal evidence of clientelistic targeting, however, where the delivery of benefits also takes place – sometimes exclusively so – after the election. In such cases, candidates could potentially defect from an agreement they strike with voters. One example of relational clientelism is given in a study of clientelism in Argentina. In this study, Auyero (2000, p. 56) reports how party brokers of the Peronist Party distribute powdered milk to mothers as part of a nutritional program funded by the Argentinian welfare ministry. In order to assure continued access to these benefits, beneficiaries of this program appear at rallies of the Peronist Party and vote for candidates of this party in elections. Another example is provided in an analysis of clientelism in Northern Brazil (Nichter, 2011, p. 12). It illustrates how voters signal their support during election campaigns by campaigning for a candidate or putting up party banners at their houses, in order to receive health benefits from local politicians, ranging from priority access to a municipality's only ambulance (ibid., p. 12) to medicine that local politicians buy for their supporters at private pharmacies (ibid., p. 8). Finally, my fieldwork in Ghana also provided examples of relational clientelism. A regional campaign manager of the NPP in Ghana gave me a detailed account of how he arranges benefits-for-vote-deals in the region he was responsible for during the 2012 election campaigns. He explained that he and his team organized door-to-door campaigns, in which they asked people to vote for the NPP and listened to what potential voters would expect to receive in return for doing so.

“NPP: They demand from you. But how sure are you that they are coming to vote for you? That is the big question.

MR: So what do you do? Do you give it or you don't?

NPP: No, no, no, some of the demands are so heavy and it's our difficult zone, too, so the only thing we normally do is to promise that, 'let's strike a deal, vote for me if I come, I will speak to your need'. You see?”

He went on to explain that he takes stock of their demands – such as new fishing nets, or that the local politicians pay their children's school fees for a given time – and contacts the voters after the election to reward them with the corresponding benefits. He said that he does so if the vote share his party gains

⁷Data to investigate to which extent voters comply with the arrangement with the party trying to win their vote is naturally sparse, as vote-buying is not only illegal, but also reporting on it might put voters at risk. In an analysis of Nigeria's 2003 and 2007 elections, using exceptionally fine-grained data on vote-buying, Bratton (2008, p. 626) finds that voters who are targeted with vote-buying are actually less likely to vote than those who are not offered a reward for their vote. This, the author suggests, might be because voters are torn between complying with the vote-buying agreement and voting for the respective candidate or defecting and voting as they please. They might choose the middle-ground and abstain from voting, which Bratton regards also as a form of defection (Bratton, 2008, p. 626).

in the respective constituency indicates that these voters have indeed been mobilized through these arrangements.⁸

These insights from election campaigns in new democracies provide anecdotal evidence that even when using clientelistic campaigning strategies – as opposed to the intended implementation of national policies – candidates promise future benefits to be delivered after the election. This creates a situation in which not only voters, but also candidates could defect from such vote- or turnout-buying deals.

As I have described in this section so far, past models of distributive targeting have made the assumption that parties are always credible in promising benefits. I have argued that this is unfounded as parties often only deliver these benefits to the voters after the election. In the next paragraphs, I present my reasons for why it is particularly difficult for African parties to make credible promises to voters.

Parties in Africa generally enjoy low levels of credibility among voters (Logan, 2008, p. 9). There are various factors that help account for this. One is that party labels convey little information about what type of policies parties are likely to implement once in power, due to parties' weak ideological and programmatic profiles (Bleck and van de Walle, 2011, 2013; Carey, 2002; Mozaffar and Scarrit, 2005; van de Walle, 2003). African party systems are also unstable, with new parties entering and exiting the political arena from election to election and parties splintering or forging alliances with each other on a regular basis (van de Walle, 2003; Mozaffar and Scarrit, 2005). These characteristics of African parties make it difficult for voters to anticipate how likely a party or a candidate is to follow through with a proposed policy. Finally, it has been suggested that parties in Africa probably also have difficulty in making credible and specific campaign promises, because they are exceptionally budget-constrained, as many of these countries are highly dependent on foreign aid (Bleck and van de Walle, 2013, p. 1400). This dependency gives them little leverage in pursuing policies which their domestic constituents prefer, and which they might have promised to them, and makes them more accountable to international donors (Bleck and van de Walle, 2013).

In light of these characteristics, I argue that the credibility of campaign promises cannot be taken for granted. I further argue that the credibility with which candidates can make promises to deliver benefits is going to influence the effectiveness of such a campaigning strategy. Some candidates are likely to be more credible than others, and more so among their partisans than among other voters. Candidates not only have an advantage in targeting core voters because they do not need to pay them as much for their vote as other voters as the ideological distance they need to compensate them for is lower. I argue that parties target core voters, because these voters are more likely to believe that the party will keep its

⁸Interview with a regional campaign manager of the NPP, November 15, 2012.

promises.⁹

Assumption of campaigns exclusively intended to increase parties' vote shares

The study of electoral clientelism and that of electoral violence have emerged as two separate research agendas which have tended to talk past each other. In order to develop a holistic understanding of which groups of voters parties are trying to address during the campaign season, and of their reasons for doing so, we need to take into account that parties might intentionally demobilize voters. As mentioned above, this possibility has long been ignored in the literature. While it has been recognized that campaign exposure might demobilize voters (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968), mostly through an extensive use of negative campaigning (Ansolabehere, 1994; Ansolabehere, Iyengar and Simon, 1999; Gerstle, Sanders and Kaid, 1991), this has generally been regarded as simply an unintended side effect. Similarly, early scholarly work on election-related violence has treated violence as a side effect of instability and democratic transition processes (Huntington, 1993; Snyder, 2000). More recent work, however, has recognized the strategic use of electoral violence, to impact election outcomes, both by established parties and opposition groups (Daxecker, 2014; Ellman and Wantchekon, 2000; Hyde and Marinov, 2014; Tucker, 2007).

I argue that it is important to include plans intended to demobilize voters into the analysis of campaigning strategies in African elections. In those African countries where violence erupts around elections, evidence increasingly corroborates the interpretation that it is a product of parties' campaigning efforts (Basedau, Erdmann and Mehler, 2007; Bekoe, 2010; Goldsmith, Forthcoming). Consideration of the possibility that parties demobilize voters, can also help to account for why the organizers might choose to concentrate benefits on core, rather than on independent voters. One possibility is that parties might be mobilizing voters with benefits, while demobilizing independent voters with violence. Studying different strategies in a party's campaigning repertoire is vital because a party's calculus of which groups to target with particular strategies aimed at either increasing turnout among voters, or making them switch their vote intention, is going to be influenced by the cost-benefit calculation of the counter-factual. This counter-factual may not necessarily be the decision not to address a certain group of voters at all during a campaign. Potentially, it could be the implementation of a different strategy meant to achieve some contrasting effect on the group. In my theory, I therefore extend the campaigning repertoire of parties to allow them to use violence. I contribute to recent research studying both strategies using benefits and violence together (Bratton, 2008; Collier and Vicente, 2012; Cornelius, 2004; Gutiérrez-Romero, 2014;

⁹See also Kramon (2013a, p. 18) who argues that in Sub-Saharan Africa "[...]politics is about credibility, rather than ideological or programmatic proximity as the spatial models prescribe" (Kramon, 2013a, p. 18).

3.2 The argument

I propose an analytical framework based on the standard model of electoral competition with two parties – the incumbent party and the main opposition party – competing to win presidential elections. The incumbent and the challenger have a repertoire of different campaigning strategies, ranging from organizing campaign rallies to making promises of public goods or local club goods, or offering voters private material incentives, and even using violence against them. They can use these strategies to increase or decrease voters' likelihood to turn out.¹⁰ My main interest lies in identifying the groups of voters who are at the center of campaigning strategies for the incumbent and the challenger. I formulate and test predictions about which groups of voters parties target with different strategies, in order to increase or decrease their turnout. I suggest a probabilistic voting model based on Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), extended to enable parties to disenfranchise parts of the electorate, as in Robinson and Torvik (2009). Different from Robinson and Torvik, however, I do not constrain the ability to use force to the incumbent party.

The electorate consists of different types of voters who can be distinguished along two dimensions: their partisan status and their likelihood to turn out. Core voters have a positive bias towards the incumbent or the challenger. I apply a broad concept of the closeness of a voter to a party or a candidate. This affiliation can be based on ideological proximity to the party (Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005) or ethnic affiliation with the party or the candidate running on the ticket of the party (Wantchekon, 2003). It can also be based on any past interaction of the voter with a particular party or candidate. An example would be that she has received private benefits from the party (Harding, 2013*b*, p. 18, Kuenzi and Lambright, 2011, p. 781-782).¹¹ What is important is that these are voters who are likely to positively evaluate campaign promises made by the candidates of the party to which they feel close. This argument is based on theories developed in political psychology which assume that voters use shortcuts such as cognitive dissonance, priming, or acceptability bias which makes them hear what they knew before the campaign (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Popkin, 1991; Zaller, 1992). A third group of voters is indifferent between

¹⁰In principle, besides mobilizing or demobilizing voters, parties can also attempt to persuade voters or engage in double persuasion (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014, pp. 418–419) or abstention-buying (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014, pp. 418–419) (also referred to as “negative vote-buying” (Schaffer, 2002, p. 78). I explain in the following paragraphs why it is most rational for parties to use the strategies with the intention to mobilize or demobilize voters.

¹¹Research indicates that in African countries with lower ethnic diversity (Harding, 2013*b*, p. 21) and lower party system volatility (Harding, 2013*b*, p. 22) more people express an affiliation with a party. Individual-level factors are also important, with rural residents (Harding, 2013*b*, p. 18), educated voters in volatile party systems, and supporters of the incumbent party more likely to form partisan attachments.


the incumbent and the largest opposition party (Robinson and Torvik, 2009).

Furthermore, voters can be distinguished with regard to their likelihood to turn out and vote. While the vote-buying model has assumed that voting is costless and hence that voters always vote (Stokes, 2005), in most elections these conditions are not met. Some voters need to spend a day on the road to vote, others live only a stone's throw away from their polling station. These different costs of voting are likely to influence whether or not voters will take part in the ballot, independently of whether they feel close to a particular political party or not.¹² In addition, individual voter characteristics are also likely to make some voters more and others less likely to vote. I distinguish between certain voters who are likely to turn out, even if they are not addressed by any campaigning strategy, and potential voters who might or might not turn out on Election Day (Stokes and Dunning, 2007). We might think of certain voters as being older, more educated, as belonging to low income-level groups, living in the countryside, or being members of voluntary associations. These are individual characteristics of voters in Sub-Saharan Africa who have been shown to have the habit of turning out to vote (Bratton, 1999; Bratton, Gyimah-Boadi and Mattes, 2005; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2011). To the contrary, potential voters are likely to be younger and less educated, wealthier and urban dwellers (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2011). Institutional factors and other macro-level factors have also shown to increase people's likelihood of turning out in African elections. Turnout in legislative elections, for example, increases with media exposure per capita and the number of elections a country has held. It is also higher if legislative elections take place in concurrence with presidential elections and in electoral systems which use a proportional formula (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2007). As these factors do not vary across groups of voters within one country, however, they are not of primary interest to this project.

Figure 3.1 locates voters on the dimension of affiliation with the incumbent and the challenger and on the dimension of the likelihood to turn out from the perspective of the incumbent. Voters who are located at the top left corner feel close to the incumbent and those located at the bottom left corner feel close to the challenger. The voters who are located between these two poles, are indifferent between both candidates, either because they do not feel close to any party or because they support a third party. The other dimension, depicted on the x-axis of the graph, is continuous. Voters at the left corner are unlikely to go and vote and their probability increases as they move to the right.

These voters can be addressed with different strategies with the goal of making them switch their inclination to vote for a party or to increase or decrease their likelihood to turn out. My central argument

¹²This holds even though partisanship is an important predictor of turnout in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2011, p. 779) and elsewhere (Norris, 2002). Even with a majority of respondents who report feeling close to a party, also saying they have turned out and voted (83% in Kuenzi & Lambright's analysis), a substantial number of these partisans remain who are only potential voters.

Figure 3.1: Types of voters

is that it is most rational for parties to focus on mobilizing potential supporters and demobilizing undecided voters. I further argue that candidate visits, campaign promises, and particularistic benefits are best suited to mobilize turnout among potential supporters and that violence and intimidation is best suited to demobilize undecided voters. In the following section I explain first, why candidates should focus campaign rallies and promises and clientelistic targeting on their potential supporters and then I present my argument about why they should focus appeals to intimidate voters on undecided voters.

3.2.1 Why parties try to mobilize potential supporters rather than persuade new voters

I expect parties to focus their time and money on the campaign trail on making sure their potential supporters vote, rather than winning independent or opposed voters. This is known as mobilization (Rohrschneider, 2002, pp. 376–377) in the campaigning studies and turnout-buying in the clientelism literature (Nichter, 2008, p. 21). This is likely despite the fact that this strategy buys the party net only one additional vote (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014, p.418-419). Had the party succeeded

in convincing an unaffiliated voter or an opposed voter which is known as persuasion (Popkin, 1991) or vote-buying (Nichter, 2008, p. 21), the party would not only have gained an additional voter. It would potentially have taken one vote away from the rival candidate as well (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014, p.418-419), as explained in Chapter 2. However, the benefit to be gained from persuasion is outweighed, I argue, by the costs and risks associated with this goal which are potentially higher than if a party simply tries to make its voters go and vote.

Mobilizing one's supporters is less costly than buying the support of other voters

The reason why mobilizing one's core voters is less costly than trying to convince undecided or opposed voters, is because the ideological distance the party needs to compensate the voter for, decreases the more the voter's and the party's policy positions are aligned. In line with this central assumption made in models of distributive politics (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987, Nichter, 2008, p. 23, Stokes, 2005, pp. 319–321), I argue that the costs of winning an additional vote through the allocation or the promising of particularistic benefits will be lowest when targeting one's core voters, followed by independent voters and will be highest for core voters of the opposing party. As I have argued above, however, this is not the only reason why the benefits of mobilization may outweigh those of persuading independent voters.

Why exposing supporters to the campaign is less risky than contacting independent or opposed voters

Mobilizing one's supporters is also less risky. First, parties are uncertain about how voters will react to being addressed with campaign appeals (Cox and McCubbins, 1986, pp. 378–379). During the campaign voters both receive information about the policy positions of the different parties in the race and get to know the candidates better. There are different possible effects being exposed to the campaign of a party can have on voters. Campaigns can stabilize a vote intention held by voters at the beginning of the campaign season, known as "reinforcement" (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968, 102). Voters can also be motivated to change their vote intention throughout the course of the campaign, known as "conversion," or "reconversion" if the original intention was against their political predispositions (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968, 102). Finally, campaigns can help voters make up their minds about which party to support in the election, although they had no preference at the beginning of the campaign. This has been termed "activation" if the campaign activates the latent political inclination,

or conversion if the voter's final vote decision goes against her predisposition (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968, 102).

Past research has found that the most robust effect of exposing voters to campaigns is to strengthen their pre-existing political inclinations (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968; Key and Cummings, 1966; Campbell, 1960). While parties would certainly like their potential supporters to be strengthened in their political inclination, they would not want to make opposed voters feel even further away from them and closer to the rival party (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002; Fenno, 1978). I, therefore, argue that candidates should concentrate their appeals on those groups of voters whose demographic or economic background makes it likely that they are predisposed towards feeling close to the respective party. In this way, they can be more certain that campaigns will have the intended effect among their core voters. Or as Cox and McCubbins (1986, pp. 378–379) have put it:

“Core supporters...are well-known quantities. The candidate is in frequent and intense contact with them and has relatively precise and accurate ideas about how they will react”
(Cox and McCubbins, 1986, pp. 378–379).

Based on these considerations, I expect parties to campaign most among their supporters, followed by independent voters and, least among supporters of the rival candidate.

Why core voters will more positively react to campaign promises than independent or opposed voters

Another reason why I maintain that mobilizing one's core supporters is less risky than trying to win new voters, is because core voters are more likely to believe promises made by candidates than independent or opposed voters, as explained in the following section.

As outlined above, attending campaign rallies, watching campaign advertisements on television or listening to campaign spots on the radio might be more likely to increase voters' awareness of their political inclination than make them change their minds. In addition, voters tend to evaluate information provided by parties and candidates in the light of their own political predispositions (Hagner and Rieselbach, 1978; Kraus, Kennedy and Nixon, 1962; LeDuc and Price, 1979; Lang and Lang, 1962; Sigelman and Sigelman, 1984). Partisanship has been found to be one of the most important mediators of how and if campaign information influences voters' behavior (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968, pp. 137-149, Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954, pp. 118-132, Finkel and Schrott, 1995). Political psychologists like Weisberg and Greene (2003) have argued that identifying with a party is similar to forming a social identity as a member of that party and that this causes individuals to adopt their party's views and more favorable attitudes toward the party's leaders (see also Bartels, 2002; Gerber, Huber and Washinton,

2010). Given these considerations, it is plausible that partisans regard campaign promises of candidates of the party with which they identify as being more credible than independent or opposed voters would do. Research on the relationship between partisanship and the credibility of candidates and their campaign promises in Africa is virtually non-existent. Studies on the relationship between ethnicity – which often functions as a proxy for partisanship – and trust in government suggest that co-ethnics of the president tend to exhibit higher levels of trust in government than voters who are not affiliated with the president’s ethnic group (Kuenzi, 2008).¹³

Given that candidates in African elections can be expected to generally enjoy low levels of credibility (Logan, 2008), I expect them to focus campaign appeals in situations in which they can be expected to be most credible. If parties are using a clientelistic campaign strategy, they can pay voters the benefits upfront or after the election. If they wait with handing out the benefits until after the voter has fulfilled her part of the deal, parties might have an incentive to defect from the agreement with the voter and not deliver the reward (Finan and Schechter, 2012; Gallego, Forthcoming; Robinson and Verdier, 2013). Voters who anticipate that parties could shirk from the agreement, might be more likely to renege on the deal themselves. In order to motivate voters to fulfill their part of the arrangement, parties would henceforth have an incentive to signal their reliability by, for example, already delivering part of the benefit before the election. Recall the demands made on the regional campaign manager of the NPP in the interview quoted at the beginning of the chapter. In the region where his team campaigned, many families live off fishing, thus some demanded new fishing nets in return for a favorable vote.¹⁴ In order to show seriousness, the party pays the family a small amount of cash to repair their old fishing net and promises to supply a new one after the election, in return for support at the polls. If, however, the voter defects from the deal, parties do not lose much; at most a small amount of cash spent upfront on the voter before the election.

I argue that if parties make promises not to individuals, but to groups of voters, we have a different situation altogether. At public rallies, parties make promises about national policy programs, and often also about delivering local projects to the particular constituency where the rally takes place. These local public goods, such as clinics, schools, or clean water projects are essential for voters when making up their minds regarding which party to support at the polls, as observers of elections in various African countries have contended (Baldwin, 2013, Barkan, 1995, Ichino and Nathan, 2013, Kramon, 2013a, p. 51, Lindberg, 2010). While the types of campaign promises parties make at rallies in African elections remain under-researched, the salience of local club goods to voters makes it likely that parties address

¹³ Scholars explain this with more frequent interactions among homogeneous groups (Fearon and Laitin, 1996), better sanctioning mechanisms towards co-ethnic leaders (Greif, 1994) or the better “findability” of co-ethnics (Miguel, 2004).

¹⁴ Interview with a regional campaign manager of the NPP, December 15, 2012.

this in their campaign speeches. Indeed, my content-analysis of campaign speeches in Ghana's 2012 elections, presented in Chapter 6, confirms that the incumbent regularly made such local promises on his campaign trail.

If a party promises to implement local club goods in a specific electoral constituency and the promise does not have the intended effect of increasing the party's vote share in the way it had hoped for, it faces a dilemma. Provided that the party wins the national election, it can build the clinic in the constituency despite the disappointing results gained there. If it does so, it signals to the people living in this constituency that no matter how they vote, they can always cash in on the benefits. This is not a signal the party wants to send, as this can encourage voters to continue to vote as they please and not feel obliged to support a party, in order to benefit from it. If instead the party chooses to renege on its promise, it risks losing the reputation of a party which honors its campaign pledges. Since parties are likely to care about such damage to their reputation regarding promises (Aragones and Palfrey, 2007), this is clearly also not an option they want to pursue.

For this reason, I argue that candidates should focus their promises on situations where they are most credible for the voting public, and where these promises are most likely to increase their vote share. One such situation could be an appearance before friendly crowds, which leads to the expectation that parties should focus on making promises of future benefits to groups of voters who have a predisposition to vote for that party, rather than for the rival candidate. As such campaign promises are typically made at rallies organized by the campaign in the respective localities, I also expect parties to focus these rally events in areas where potential supporters are concentrated. The argument that candidates should focus campaign promises in situations in which they anticipate to be most credible with these promises, implies that other factors that positively impact candidate credibility can also increase the likelihood of candidates to make such promises.

One important determinant is incumbency status, as incumbents are generally thought to be more credible in promising material benefits than their challengers (Medina and Stokes, 2007; Vicente, 2014; Wantchekon, 2003). I discuss this extension of my argument in Chapters 6 and 7, in which I analyze the use of local promises by the incumbent and the challenger in Ghana's 2012 presidential elections and the credibility of campaign promises made by these two candidates.

Why observing turnout is easier than observing vote choice

Finally, in order to prevent voters from taking benefits during campaigns and not turning out to vote, or voting for a different party, parties try to make the delivery of the benefit contingent on an individual's or a group's vote. While observing votes at the level of polling stations or at the level of electoral con-

stituencies or regions is as easy as observing turnout, observing how individuals voted is much more problematic under the secret ballot (Gallego, Forthcoming; Lawson and Greene, 2014; Stokes, 2005). If a candidate knows that an individual is inclined to vote for him, rather than for any other party, based on a factor like her ethnic background, the candidate or a broker working for him only needs to observe whether this individual goes to vote or not. This is why, in line with the turnout-buying model (Nichter, 2008), I expect parties to choose to monitor turnout.

Furthermore, not only can parties more easily observe turnout than individual vote choice of any voter, they also have more information on their core voters' inclination or voting behavior than on that of independent or opposed voters. This is the case because parties relying on electoral clientelism typically use intermediaries who forge the exchanges with the voters and monitor their voting behavior. The networks of the brokers, which not only serve as vehicles to target voters with benefits but also to collect information on them, can be expected to be more dense in a party's stronghold than in competitive constituencies. These brokers are often party members, and parties have more members in their strongholds. In addition, it is plausible that brokers and parties can more easily infer voting behavior in areas which have consistently voted for one party in the past than in swing constituencies where party allegiance is more volatile. Thus, parties not only deliver benefits to their core voters more easily (Cox and McCubbins, 1986), but it is also easier for them to monitor voting behavior among their supporters compared to swing or opposed voters.

Why parties mobilize potential supporters, rather than reward certain supporters

I have presented a number of arguments why parties should focus their campaign appeals on their supporters so far. In line with previous models on distributive campaigning, I maintain that it would not be rational to spend resources on those of their supporters, who would turn out, even if they were not addressed during elections (Nichter, 2008, Stokes, 2005, Stokes and Dunning, 2007, p. 14). This is why I expect parties to concentrate their campaign rallies, campaign promises, and clientelism on those of their supporters who are unlikely to vote.

3.3 The strategic use of violence to disenfranchise unresponsive voters

So far, I have formulated expectations for the use of different campaigning strategies, such as candidates hosting campaign rallies in various electoral constituencies, making promises of local projects in these constituencies, and targeting individual voters with offers of materialistic benefits. While there is nothing

undemocratic about visiting different communities and disseminating a party's program and making campaign promises, targeting voters with particularistic benefits can be more problematic. Trying to make voters and groups of voters fear that they might be excluded from benefits if they do not support a particular candidate or party has been argued to reverse the chain of accountability. In what Stokes (2005) has termed "perverse accountability," candidates are no longer accountable to voters, but voters are accountable to candidates by delivering their vote in the hope of being granted access to vital goods such as healthcare. Such attempts to invert the chain of accountability are only one strategy in the repertoire of illicit campaigning strategies or on "the menu of manipulation" (Schedler, 2002, p. 39).

As I have mentioned in the review of existing research on campaigning in young democracies, observers of African elections have contended that intimidating voters is also part of parties' repertoire of strategies to manipulate elections in many countries, ranging from Kenya, to Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, to name but a few (Adolfo et al., 2012; Bratton, 2008; Collier and Vicente, 2014; LeBas, 2006). In the following section, I present my argument why I expect parties to concentrate violence on independent voters with the aim to disenfranchise them.

Parties will generally prefer to use distributive campaign appeals instead of voter intimidation, since they are, after all, vying for votes (Bratton, 2008; Collier and Vicente, 2012; Gonzalez Ocantos et al., 2013). The use of violence is sanctioned more heavily by both their electorate and outside observers than are attempts to bribe voters with clientelism. However, there are several reasons why parties might extend their campaigning repertoire to include voter intimidation. First, the exercise of violence requires fewer resources than do strategies involving the distribution of benefits (Gonzalez Ocantos et al., 2013; Wilkinson and Haid, 2009).

Second, parties can have an incentive to apply violent campaign strategies in an attempt to reach voters who are relatively unresponsive to distributive appeals. Wilkinson and Haid (2009), for example, showed that because the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party had little credibility in making distributive promises to Hindu voters at lower income levels, it resorted to violence in order to increase the salience of ethnic cleavages and stereotypes against the Muslim minority. They could thus mobilize Hindu voters they would not have reached otherwise. In such situations parties can use violence to change the issue ranking of voters, making issues, which they own, more salient (Chandra, 2004; Wilkinson and Haid, 2009).

Third, even though it seems plausible that voters do not usually develop genuine preferences for parties threatening to use violence, Ellman and Wantchekon (2000) show that they might do so temporarily, under certain circumstances. The authors argue that voters in Liberia's 1997 elections, for example, overwhelmingly voted for Charles Taylor, because he credibly signaled that he would re-instigate large-

scale violence if he lost the election (Ellman and Wantchekon, 2000, pp. 518–519). Another example cited by the same authors are the presidential elections which took place in El Salvador in 1994 in which peasants, who were in favor of a land reform, voted for a party that was against this reform, in order to prevent the latter from taking up arms if it lost the election (Ellman and Wantchekon, 2000, pp. 519).

Why violence is used to demobilize independent voters

While parties might in principle use violence to persuade new voters or mobilize their supporters to turn out, I expect parties to predominantly apply violence to demobilize voters. While there is some evidence suggesting that pre-electoral violence might be used to mobilize turnout from Zimbabwe's 2008 elections (LeBas, 2006, p. 427) and from India (Wilkinson and Haid, 2009), the most robust finding in this young literature is that violence demobilizes voters (Bratton, 2008; Hickman, 2009; Meredith, 2002; Kuhn, 2013; Sisk and Reynolds, 1998). I argue that this is because, even if parties were using violence for a different purpose, the consequence of violence is likely to be a reduction in turnout, rather than vote switching or mobilization. This is because a voter who is threatened into switching her vote is faced with a dilemma. She can either give in to the threat or vote according to her preferences. The most common reaction will be that she chooses the middle-ground and abstains.¹⁵ In fact, while there is very little empirical evidence to date on which to base predictions regarding who are likely to become individual targets of pre-electoral violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, and what the consequences of violence are, analyses of Nigeria's 2003 and 2007 elections lend support to my argument (Bratton, 2008). Bratton (2008, p. 626) finds a strong effect that voters who were threatened with campaign violence are unlikely to vote and that this effect lasts until the subsequent election, in which these respondents oftentimes also abstain. An analysis of patterns of pre-electoral violence in a range of Sub-Saharan countries further corroborates the findings from the Nigerian elections (Kuhn, 2013).

Furthermore, a similar argument which speaks in favor of the turnout-buying versus the vote-buying model also applies to the use of voter intimidation. Voters are less likely to shirk a benefits-for-votes deal, the more they think that the party, that has targeted them with a benefit, will be able to find out if and how they voted (Medina and Stokes, 2007; Stokes, 2005; Nichter, 2008). As turnout is easier to observe than vote choice, proponents of the turnout-buying model argue that this is why parties focus on mobilizing their supporters (e.g. Nichter, 2008). The effectiveness of threats is also likely to increase with the parties' ability to monitor voters' behavior. As the monitoring of turnout is more feasible than that of vote choice, compliance following a threat intended to make a voter stay away from the polls can be expected to be higher than if the intention is to make the voter alter her vote choice. The following

¹⁵See Bratton (2008) for a similar argument.

quote by a New Yorker campaign manager at the turn of the 20th century on how he paid voters to abstain from voting illustrates this point:

*“Under the new ballot law you cannot tell how a man votes when he goes into the booth, but if he stays at home you know that you have the worth of your money.”*¹⁶

I expect parties to concentrate their appeals aimed at demobilizing voters on independent voters. Again, similar arguments apply for the use of intimidation as for strategies that try to win voters with benefits and via campaign promises. Parties might indeed have the strongest incentives to demobilize ardent supporters of the opponent, but the amount of coercion they would have to apply is likely to be much higher than in trying to demobilize voters less determined to vote for the rival candidate. This is similar to the logic of the benefit having to be increasingly higher, in order to compensate a voter for her ideological distance to the party, the more she is inclined toward supporting the rival candidate (Stokes, 2005, pp. 319–321, Nichter, 2008, p. 23).

In addition, instigating violence in areas where strong supporters of the rival party are concentrated might backfire as it may increase the determination among these voters to support the rival party and alienate them further from the party who is inflicting violence. This mirrors my argument about why parties should avoid campaigning too much in their rivals’ strongholds, in order to avoid a backlash resulting in further polarization of these voters against themselves (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002; Fenno, 1978).

3.3.1 Empirical implications of the argument

In this chapter, I have argued that it is rational for parties to focus campaigning strategies, such as visiting constituencies, making campaign promises, and offering voters individual benefits, in order to mobilize their supporters. Since it would not be rational for parties to waste benefits on their faithful or “certain supporters who are likely to go and vote for them, whether or not they are addressed by the party’s campaign (Stokes and Dunning, 2007, p. 14), I expect parties to focus their campaign appeals on potential supporters. These are voters who are located in the top left corner in Figure 3.2.


Expectations on the use of campaign rallies, campaign promises and clientelism

Figure 3.2 shows the degree of affiliation of voters with a party from the perspective of the incumbent. If the expectation holds that a party mobilizes potential voters, then we should see a positive relationship between an affiliation of a voter with the party and her likelihood to be addressed by campaign rallies,

¹⁶A campaign manager in New York, quoted in a New York Times article, published on September, 29, 1900, cited in Cox, Kousser and Morgan (1981, p. 656).

campaign promises and private benefits. Further, I expect to see a negative relationship between her likelihood to turn out and the likelihood to be addressed with these campaign tools. I test this proposition in various analyses both modeling the political inclination and likelihood to turn out on the level of individual voters (Chapter 8) and on the level of groups of voters in Chapters 5 and 6. For the group-level analysis I study the targeting of electoral constituencies and regions with different strategies, in relation to levels of support for the party targeting these voters, and histories of turnout in these localities.

Figure 3.2: Mobilization of potential supporters




The empirical analyses not only serve to test the importance of mobilization of potential voters in election campaigns, but also to rule out alternative goals parties might be pursuing, illustrated in Figure 3.2. If a party were rewarding loyalists (Nichter, 2008, p. 20), we would also see a positive relationship between affiliation with this party and campaigning effort directed at these loyal voters, but the likelihood to turn out would be positively linked to being targeted by the campaign. If instead parties were following a persuasion (e.g. Cox, 2006, p. 2), rather than a mobilization logic, we would see campaigning effort cluster around independent voters. If the relationship with turnout were negative,

this would be termed “double persuasion” (Nichter, 2008, p. 20), and if it were positive then this would simply be called persuasion.¹⁷ Finally, a party might be paying opposed voters to abstain (e.g. Schaffer, 2002, p. 78) from voting, in which case we would see a negative relationship between affiliation with the party and the likelihood of a voter to be addressed by campaigns.

Another important implication of the model with regard to these strategies is that supporters should be more responsive to campaign appeals than independent or opposed voters. I made this argument specifically with regard to the credibility of campaign promises.¹⁸

Figure 3.3: Demobilization of independent voters with violence



Expectations on the use of clientelism and violence

When parties can buy voters’ support with clientelism and disenfranchise them with violence, I have argued that it is rational for them to predominantly use electoral clientelism to motivate potential support-

¹⁷ While parties, in principle, could also try to persuade opposed voters, this has been dismissed by most theoretical models as being too costly to try and has not received much support from empirical analyses (e.g. Stokes and Dunning, 2007), which is why I do not consider this strategy in this summary of alternative hypotheses.

¹⁸ Chapter 7 tests whether candidates are more credible with campaign promises among their partisans than among other voters.

ers to turn out and to demobilize independent voters with violence. Thus I expect offers of clientelism to concentrate on voters who are partisans of the party which is targeting them, but who are unlikely to turn out and vote. I expect attempts of intimidation with violence to be concentrated on voters who are indifferent between the two candidates in the race, independent of their likelihood to turn out, as is illustrated in Figure 3.3, from the perspective of the incumbent. I test this expectation with individual-level and regional-level analyses of voter intimidation during campaigns, in Chapter 8. The figure also illustrates alternative hypotheses. If a party focused attempts of intimidation on potential supporters, this would speak in favor of the party trying to increase cohesion among its supporters, and make them go and vote (LeBas, 2006). Lastly if parties concentrated violence on supporters of the rival candidate, this would indicate that their primary goal was to demobilize supporters of their opponent.

3.4 Summary

In this chapter I have proposed three theoretical answers to the question of why parties in new democracies seem to be spending more time campaigning among their own supporters than existing theories would lead us to expect. First, parties do not waste resources on courting to their certain supporters, at the expense of campaigning among swing voters. They rather mobilize those of their supporters who would otherwise not go and vote. Second, in contexts where parties' campaign promises have little credibility, the organizers concentrate their energy on those voters who trust them the most, namely their core supporters. Third, in situations in which parties use electoral violence to impact election outcomes, they concentrate their attempts of intimidation on citizens who would be difficult to convince to vote for them, and rather disenfranchise them. This frees up resources for making campaign promises and offering benefits aimed at mobilizing their core voters to turn out on Election Day.

I have further, formulated expectations on the use of different campaigning strategies which follow from the argument. The next chapter presents the data sources against which the empirical implications of the argument are tested.

Chapter 4

Data collection: measuring campaigning strategies in African elections

The analyses of the allocation of campaign rallies and campaign promises across constituencies as well as the credibility of campaign promises are based on original data I collected during field work in Ghana from August to December, 2012, during the months leading up to the general elections on December 7, 2012.¹ In addition to the data I collected in Ghana, I compiled a cross-sectional dataset on the use of clientelism and voter intimidation in 10 African countries. This dataset is based on regional-level election data, which I compiled from various sources, and Afrobarometer data from the round 5 of the survey, conducted between 2010 and 2012. The remainder of the chapter describes the data collection and the compilation of the various datasets which I test the theoretical argument with in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8.

4.1 Event data on campaign rallies

To analyze the strategic use of campaign rallies in Ghana's 2012 elections, I conducted a content-analysis of articles in two main daily newspapers. I reviewed all articles on campaign events by the two main candidates published in the Ghana's best selling newspaper *Daily Graphic* (Amponsah, 2012, p. 2) and the main opposition newspaper *Daily Guide*. I chose these two newspapers because they exhibit the most thorough coverage of the activities of the NDC and the NPP and because their coverage is biased in two opposed directions. The state-owned *Daily Graphic* had in the past shown to be slightly biased in

¹During this time, I was affiliated with the Center for Democratic Development Ghana (CDD-Ghana). The CDD-Ghana is a non-partisan civil society organization promoting democracy as well as a research institute.

its amount of coverage in favor of the ruling party (Amponsah, 2012, p.2, Ghana Center for Democratic Development, 2004) and it was hence reasonable to assume that it would thoroughly cover activities of the ruling NDC. The private daily newspaper the *Daily Guide* is a pro-NPP newspaper and was hence likely to focus in its coverage on rally events by NPP's flagbearer Nana Akufo-Addo. I reviewed these two papers on a daily basis from mid-August to December 7, 2012, the day of the election and archived every article reporting on an event in which these candidates spoke in public.

In order to be able to compare the campaigning activities by the two parties, I decided to choose a three-months period in the run-up to the elections that marked the peak of both parties' campaigning activity. The analyses are performed for the period from August, 25 to December 5, 2012. The start date is marked by the first of the two parties launching its party manifesto and with this act announcing the official start of its campaign (Dapatem and Bonney, 2012). As the end date, December 5, 2012 was chosen because this was the date after which parties were obliged by the Electoral Commission to stop campaigning, two days prior to the election on December 7, 2012.

The start date for the analysis was chosen despite the fact that the NDC only launched its campaign on October 4, 2012. The date was chosen to reflect the actual peak of campaigning, rather than the official period. The official launch of NDC's campaign was delayed due to the sudden death of the late president Atta Mills on July 25. However, the newly endorsed president and flagbearer of the NDC, John Mahama, already campaigned throughout the country on a "thank you tour" in August and September, 2012. This tour was declared by the campaign as a means to thank Ghanaians for their condolences, but the events hosted by the presidential candidate took on the same nature as the rallies that took place after the official launch of NDC's campaign (see also Myjoyonline.com, 2012). That this three-months period was indeed the time of most intensive campaigning also for the NDC was confirmed by the national campaign manager I interviewed.²

I coded the articles, counting as a rally any event where the candidates spoke in public, regardless of the size of the audience, during the campaigning period (see also Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002, p. 55, Horowitz, 2012, p. 75). I collected information on the location of campaign rallies held by John Mahama and Nana Akufo-Addo, following approaches used in studies on US election campaigns (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002; Shaw, 2006) and recently in a study on campaigns in Kenya's 2007 elections (Horowitz, 2012).

In addition, I collected information on campaign events from a third, neutral source. I obtained audio recordings from reporters from two of the largest national radio stations, Joy FM and Citi FM. These

²"The whole three months was [...] the climax" (Interview with a member of NDC's national campaign team, November 28, 2012.)

two radio stations have no known bias of devoting more attention to any of the two parties or their candidates. The four journalists I obtained the audio recordings from worked as ‘presidential reporters’ during the campaigns. This means both Joy FM and Citi FM assigned one reporter each to follow each of the two candidates. The reporters are non-partisan and were not involved in the conceptualization of the research so that there is no reason to believe that they had any incentive to hold back information on any particular rally. I collected a total of 147 articles on campaign activities referring to 252 distinct campaign events by the two candidates. In addition, I collected 97 speeches of which 50 were held by the incumbent and 47 were given by the challenger. Table 4.1 shows the number of events by the two candidates reported in the different sources. The data suggest that the two newspapers reported indeed in the way expected. While the *Daily Graphic* disproportionately covered events by the incumbent, the *Daily Guide* reported relatively more events by the challenger. This makes the inclusion of both newspaper sources and the radio recordings particularly valuable. As the different sources often reported on

Table 4.1: Rally events by the incumbent and the challenger

| Candidate | Daily Graphic | Daily Guide | Radio Recordings | TOTAL (incl. duplicates) |
|---------------------------------|---------------|-------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| John Mahama (Incumbent) | 158 | 2 | 50 | 210 |
| Nana Akufo-Addo (Challenger) | 57 | 36 | 47 | 140 |

the same event, which took place in the same constituency, on the same day, I deleted duplicates before conducting the quantitative analysis of the allocation of campaign rallies. After excluding these duplicates, I ended up with 173 campaign events hosted by the incumbent and 103 rallies by the challenger. In order to analyze whether candidates indeed focused on campaigning in their strongholds, and in particular on those with histories of low turnout, I located these events in the 275 constituencies which Ghana is divided into. I chose the constituency as the unit of measurement, because this is the level where election results on vote shares and turnout are easily observable for candidates. This allows candidates to choose places for their campaign events, based on how many people have voted for them in the past and on past turnout levels in these constituencies.³

Sometimes only the city, town, or village where the event took place was mentioned and not the name of the electoral constituency. In such cases, I conducted research on the locality that was mentioned in

³“MR: When you say difficult area, easy area, is that on the constituency level? So do you choose on constituency level?
NDC: Yes, yes.

M: Or is it within the constituency?

NDC: No, no, it’s the constituency area. Let’s say, you have 34 constituencies in Greater Accra. We have 11 constituencies, for them, whether we go there or not, they’ll vote for NDC. We have 16 constituencies. 11 are NDC strongholds. Nobody can change it. We have 16 constituencies that are marginal. So these marginal places are like ..., you have NDC, 50% and NPP, 50%” (Interview with a regional campaign manager of the NDC, October 23, 2012.)

the article. I followed a standardized procedure in which I first checked whether the name of the town mentioned in the article was a constituency headquarter, based on a list of constituencies, constituency headquarters, districts and regions, obtained from CDD-Ghana. If the town or city mentioned in the article did not correspond to the constituency headquarter, I obtained longitude and latitude of the location from the website <http://itouchmap.com/latlong.html>. Using the software QGIS I located the village, town or city mentioned in the article within the constituency, by matching the information on longitude and latitude with that of the constituency list.

4.2 Compilation of campaign speeches

In addition to testing whether candidates allocated their campaign events with the aim to mobilize their *potential* supporters, I also analyze the use of campaign promises. I test two central predictions of my theory with data I collected on promises of local club goods which candidates made at their campaign rallies. First, I perform an additional test of whether candidates predominantly focused campaign efforts on mobilizing turnout among their supporters who are unlikely to vote, rather than wasting benefits on certain supporters. Second, analyzing the use of campaign promises on local club goods by the incumbent and the challenger allows me to test whether they are making such promises in situations where they are likely to be most credible with these promises.

The targeting of local club goods to geographically concentrated groups of voters, in order to reward or punish them for their voting behavior, has been referred to as pork-barrel politics.⁴ Past research has measured pork-barrel politics as spending on a particular good by governments (e.g. Berry, Burden and Howell, 2010; Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005; Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002; Wright, 1974), such as national infrastructure spending in regions (Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005), for example. My approach differs from existing research, as I do not analyze a particular good, but promises of any type of local club good.⁵ The advantage of this approach is twofold. I directly measure the strategy intended by presidential candidates rather than actual spending. This closely reflects the use of targeted spending as a campaign strategy. It also potentially more closely mirrors the intention of candidates of which groups of voters to address in a campaign than if I analyzed actual spending, which can potentially be influenced by many other factors that are not under the direct control of incumbent presidents.

In order to analyze the use of promises of local club goods by the incumbent and the challenger, I con-

⁴See Chapter 2 for a detailed definition.

⁵For an exception see Wantchekon (2003) who has measured clientelistic versus programmatic campaigning strategies as local and national promises.

ducted a content-analysis of their campaign speeches made at their campaign rallies. The campaign speeches I coded were the same that were used for coding rally events. Coding these original recordings of speeches was preferential to coding campaign promises reported by any media outlet such as newspaper articles, for example. This is because these speeches were unfiltered by any media and thus do not reflect any bias by journalists on what types of promises they regard as interesting to report on, or any political bias (see also Horowitz, 2012, p. 103).

The audio files containing the speeches were translated into English from various Ghanaian languages, mainly Twi, by a Ghanaian research assistant. Having all speeches translated and transcribed by the same interpreter avoids bias in the data due to different styles of interpretation or punctuation. I coded the transcriptions of the speeches by hand. A promise is considered local if its geographical scope does not exceed the boundaries of the constituency in which the rally is held at which the promise is made. For each promise that made reference to a certain locality, I researched whether or not the place was located within the constituency where the campaign rally was held. For example the following is considered a local promise because the projects the incumbent mentions are to be implemented within the boundaries of the Pusiga constituency.

“In this area there are many communities waiting for electricity. I want to assure you, we have signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the Chinese government and some poles have been delivered. I want to assure you as president of this country that in no time your electricity is coming and the next time I come to Pusiga all your communities will be shining as bright as the stars.”⁶

The following is considered a national promise:

“But before jobs are created [...], a country’s finances need to be strong so trading shall be profitable and thereby creating more jobs. The NDC has weakened our currency and so trading has become a big challenge for you. We shall work to restore the value of the Cedi to aid you in your trade.”⁷

Besides local and national promises, candidates also make appeals which promise benefits to one of Ghana’s 10 administrative regions. An example of a regional promise is the following:

“I have also heard that of the sixty scholarships being given to the youth to go study in oil and gas management, only one person from the Western region has benefited. This is not right. We are going to train the young people of this region to get involved in the development of our oil and gas.”⁸

⁶ John Mahama, Pusiga, November 10, 2012.

⁷ Nana Akufo-Addo, Amasaman Constituency, August 28, 2012.

⁸ Nana Akufo-Addo, Takoradi Constituency, November 24, 2012.

I adopted a conservative coding rule and only considered promises as local where a project which is promised by a candidate does not cross the borders of the constituency where the promise is made. This is why the following promise, for example, although it makes reference to a location within the constituency where the incumbent is holding a campaign rally, is not considered a local promise.

“I am promising you that your road from Kasoa to Swedru shall be rehabilitated.”⁹

This promise is not considered local because the road the incumbent is talking about is supposed to go from Kasoa, which is in the Awutu Senya Constituency, to Swedru, which is in the Agona West Constituency. I checked to what degree the measure of local versus national promises reflect the theoretical concepts underlying this dichotomy in focus group interviews, which I discuss later in this chapter.

4.3 Semi-structured interviews with campaign managers

To test the plausibility of various theoretical mechanisms, which I assume to be at work, as discussed in Chapter 3, I conducted interviews with campaign managers of the incumbent NDC and the opposition NPP. Conducting qualitative interviews also helped me to draw my attention to possible alternative explanations for the pattern of campaigning I observe, which need to be addressed in the statistical models, in order to avoid omitted variable bias (Bennett, 2007). I followed a method of selection applied by Osei in her analysis of party-voter linkages in Ghana and Senegal (Osei, 2012). I selected a member of each of the national campaign teams of both parties, and a member each of the regional campaign teams of the Ashanti Region, which is an NPP stronghold, the Volta Region, which is an NDC stronghold, and the competitive region of Greater Accra. Furthermore, I conducted interviews with a few constituency-level campaign organizers. I interviewed a local campaign manager of the NDC in one constituency of its regional stronghold, the Volta Region, and one local campaign manager of the NPP in its regional stronghold of the Ashanti Region. In addition, I interviewed one constituency organizer each in a competitive constituency in the region of Greater Accra. Table 4.2 provides a list of the interviews that were conducted. For reasons of confidentiality, I do not cite the name of the regions or constituencies when I report findings from these interviews.

The procedure of selection of interview partners applied has two important advantages. First, it was important to select campaign managers from both the parties' strongholds and competitive areas, as the strategies parties apply in their safe havens are likely to differ from those they apply in competitive or swing areas, or the rival party's strongholds. This is why choosing interview partners from these differ-

⁹John Mahama, Awutu Senya West, November 1, 2012.

ent areas increased the representativeness of the sample and hence the quality of the inferences drawn from these interviews. Carefully selecting cases for qualitative small-N analyses like the present one is particularly important, to assure the representativeness of the results (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Second, interviewing campaign managers at different levels of the party hierarchy had the advantage that they were likely to report on different aspects of the campaign. National and regional campaigners were more likely to explain the national strategy to me, as intended by the party executive, which was of primary interest to me. At the same time, however, local constituency-organizers were likely to be more open and frank about socially unaccepted or potentially even illegal strategies, such as how the parties organize vote and turnout-buying. It turned out that these expectations were met in the interviews.¹⁰

Table 4.2: List of semi-structured interviews

| Interview | Date | Place |
|---|-------------------|----------------------|
| NDC National campaign team | December 18, 2014 | Accra |
| NDC Ashanti regional campaign team | October 23, 2012 | Kumasi |
| NDC Greater Accra regional campaign team | October 23, 2012 | Accra |
| NDC Volta regional campaign team | October 26, 2012 | Dzodze |
| NDC Weija Gbawe constituency campaign team | December 1, 2012 | Anyaa Sowotuum |
| NDC South Tongu constituency campaign team | October 23, 2012 | South Tongu |
| NPP National campaign team | November 28, 2012 | Accra |
| NPP Ashanti regional campaign team | October 22, 2012 | Kumasi |
| NPP Greater Accra regional campaign team | November 29, 2012 | Accra |
| NPP Volta regional campaign team | December 15, 2012 | Hohoe |
| NPP Afigya Sekeyere West constituency campaign team | October 24, 2012 | Afigya Sekeyere West |
| NPP Anyaa Sowotuum constituency campaign team | December 14, 2012 | Weija |

My principle interest in the interviews was to understand the logic of which groups of voters these campaign teams targeted. I asked interview partners about where they organized most campaign rallies and why. I posed the same questions about campaign promises candidates made at presidential campaign rallies. I also asked the campaign managers where they distributed most cash, party paraphernalia and other small benefits to voters. The questionnaire in Appendix A.1 provides details on the questions I asked. Asking interview partners to describe how and in which areas they campaign not only helped me understand the rationale of these campaign managers, but also served to validate the findings from the quantitative analyses. I interviewed most campaign managers in their offices or on the road, in their cars, on way to a meeting or a campaign rally. Conducting interviews in settings familiar to interview partners, where they feel at ease is generally advised in qualitative research methodology, because it lets interview partners behave most naturally (Girtler, 1992).

As it is common practice, I began the interviews with easy to answer and non-controversial questions and posed more sensitive questions after the interview partners seemed at ease to talk to me about their work (see Mishler, 1986). The interviews I conducted were semi-structured, which have the advantage

¹⁰See Osei (2012) for similar observations.

to assure comparability of the interviews, as I asked the same, or nearly the same set of questions in each interview. At the same time, these semi-structured interviews allow the researcher an important degree of flexibility to ask additional questions, and leave out questions that seem less relevant, if the interview is taking an interesting turn. This flexibility was also assured by recording interviews which allowed me to “think through potential follow-up questions when the conversation takes an interesting turn without worrying about taking down the exact text” (Rathbun, 2008, p. 697).

4.4 Survey experiment

The survey was conducted among a random sample of 447 respondents in 16 polling station areas and four selected constituencies in Accra. The constituencies were purposively selected with the aim to maximize ethnic diversity and variation in income-levels of respondents. The four constituencies in the sample – Ayawaso Central, East, and West-Wogoon and Anyaa Sowutuom – were selected to reflect average levels of competitiveness of constituencies in the Greater Accra Region.¹¹ Therefore, we can rule out possible biases in trust towards either of the candidates due to particular linkages of a constituency to a particular party. A list of the places and times of the data collection is provided in Table 4.3.

Each constituency in Ghana is comprised of up to 100 polling stations. Using a random number generator, I sampled four polling stations in each constituency. The selection of the respondents followed a methodology used in the Afrobarometer survey. In the absence of household lists or maps of the polling station areas, my research assistants and I adopted the method of a random walk (Afrobarometer Network, 2011b, p. 31-32). Arrived at the polling station, we walked into the direction of the constituency border which was farthest away from the polling station, in order to avoid walking into another constituency. The date of the data collection determined the interval between households. On November 21, for example, surveyors sampled every third household, adding the digits 2 and 1 of the 21st day of the month. Further following Afrobarometer sampling methodology, the researchers then entered the house and took down the names of all people in the household on a numbered list.¹² They then asked the first person they had met in the household to draw a number from a deck of cards the researchers handed to them. The person who correspondent to the number chosen was then interviewed. If the person was not at home, the researchers returned to the house once more later in the day and if the person was still not home, they sampled another household. We altered between interviewing women and men, to assure

¹¹The average difference in vote shares between the ruling NDC and the NPP in the Greater Accra Region is 9726.92 votes. The difference in votes shares in Ayawaso Central is 8027.33, in Ayawaso East it is 11784, in Anyaa Sowutuom it is 9227.33., and the average difference in votes between the ruling NDC and the opposition NPP party in Ayawaso West-Wogoon is 9637.14 (my own calculation, based on the average difference in vote shares between the NDC and the NPP per constituency across the 2000, 2004 and 2008 elections).

¹²See also Hillier et al. (2014) on the methodology of door-to-door sampling of interview respondents.

that the sample would be balanced with regard to gender, by noting down only the names of female residents of one household and only those of the male residents of the subsequent household.

The data collection took place between November 12 and November, 21, 2012. Prior to this, I conducted a pre-test on November 9, 2012, in one of the constituencies where the survey experiment was to be conducted, in Ayawaso Central. This was done in a polling station area, which had not been sampled for the actual survey experiment, in order to avoid sampling a respondent twice in the pre-test and the actual data collection. The pre-test was performed on a small sample of 15 respondents with the aim to assure the comprehensiveness of the items in the questionnaire. After the pre-test, some minor adjustments in wording were made such as changing the term “ethnic group” to the more idiomatic “tribe.” In the experiment, participants were asked to evaluate the credibility of experimental campaign promises. After the pre-test the response options for the credibility ranking was reduced from a 5-point to a 4-point-Likert-scale (see Likert, 1932). This was done to pre-empt the tendency of respondents to avoid voicing an opinion and choosing the safe option that a promise was neither likely nor unlikely to be fulfilled, which the pre-test was indicative of. This tendency is commonly known as the “central tendency”, which results from the fact that respondents tend to shy away from choosing an opinion and taking a stand on controversial issues (Brill and Jonathan, 2008). The scale was modified to a ‘forced-choice’ Likert-scale (Wivagg, 2008), where respondents were read four options to rank the credibility of the experimental promises. They also had the option to opt out by choosing “Don’t know” if they did not want to or felt unable to make a choice, but this option was not read out by the interviewers so that its unnecessary use was discouraged.

The interviews were conducted by a group of seven Ghanaian research assistants, who were well-experienced in conducting household surveys. These research assistants had worked in numerous projects of data collection on behalf of the CDD. Among other projects, they had collected Afrobarometer survey data. As the methodology of household sampling and the selection of respondents I used was essentially the same as that used in the Afrobarometer, these assistants were hence well-skilled to conduct these interviews. The research assistants worked in teams of two in one polling station area. Whenever possible, I paired a male research assistant with a female one, as respondents in the survey tended to be more willing to let women enter their compound or house and speak to them, than men. In the case that respondents were afraid to talk to the male researcher he could call his female colleague to demonstrate that he was indeed part of a research team, which typically reassured respondents so that they were willing to be interviewed by the male researcher.

I also made sure that the team of researchers spoke the lingua franca of the respective polling station area. In addition to the English version, I had the questionnaire translated into the Ghanaian languages

Ewe, Twi and Dagbani, which are the most commonly spoken languages besides English in Accra.¹³ Translating the questionnaires, rather than the research assistants translating the questions from the English version on the spot, was important to assure that interviewers did not introduce variation in the questions through their different styles of translation. The reason why the interviews were conducted in various languages was to assure that the sample did not exclude persons at low levels of education whose command of English would not suffice to participate in the survey. The reason why I did not conduct any interviews myself, but only supervised the research assistants, was not only that I did not speak any Ghanaian languages. The main reason was that I did not want to introduce an interviewer bias, as I would have certainly been perceived much different from the Ghanaian researchers by the participants of the survey.

In this survey, respondents were asked about the likelihood of the two main presidential candidates fulfilling different kinds of campaign promises, if elected. In addition, the questionnaire contained questions on demographic and political background information with survey items taken mainly from the Afrobarometer round 5 questionnaire. The questionnaire I developed for the survey experiment is available in Appendix A.2.¹⁴ There were four experimental conditions. Each group of respondents that fell in one experimental condition was confronted with a set of three either local or national experimental promises assigned to either the incumbent or the main opposition candidate. The local and the national promises differed only in their framing, but not with regard to the content of the promise. Both candidates were assigned the same kinds of promises. The promises all covered infrastructure issues concerning the provision of electricity, clean water and streetlights. These topics were chosen, because these were the issues where the two parties proposed to implement policies in their manifestos that resembled each other most closely. I hence assured that these promises were compatible with both parties' manifestos (New Democratic Congress, 2012; New Patriotic Party, 2012). The following is an example of a promise framed as a national promise:

“Imagine President John Dramani Mahama, who is also the flagbearer of the NDC, had made the following promise at a rally held in your constituency: ‘If I win this election, I will improve the availability of clean water in all urban communities across the country by connecting more households to pipe water and by building more treatment plants.’ Do you think by the end of his term in 2016 he would have improved the availability of clean water in all urban communities across the country?”

The local framing of the same promise is:

¹³The Afrobarometer survey is also conducted in these same languages in Ghana (Afrobarometer Network, 2012).

¹⁴The appendix contains one of the four versions of the questionnaire. It is the version where promises are assigned to the incumbent and where they are framed as national promises.

“If this constituency votes massively for me and my party in the presidential elections, I will connect more households to pipe water in your constituency.’ Do you think by the end of his term in 2016 he would have connected more households to pipe water in your constituency?”

The answer options were “Yes definitely”; “Yes probably”; “No, probably not”; “No definitely not”. The other two promises are referred to as the energy and the street lights promises. Exact wording of these other two experimental promises is provided in Appendix A.2.

Table 4.3: List of places and dates of the data collection for the survey experiment

| Constituency | Polling station | Date |
|--------------------|---|-------------------|
| Ayawaso East | Nurudeen Islamic School Ruga (B) | November 19, 2012 |
| | Roman Catholic School Nima | November 20, 2012 |
| | Information Services 2 Kanda | November 16, 2012 |
| | Pentecost Church Nima | November 15, 2012 |
| Ayawaso Central | Alajo 3 & 4 Primary School (A) | November 9, 2012 |
| | (Pre-test) | |
| | Wilberforce JHS Kotobabi (B) | November 14, 2012 |
| | Sem Cinema Hall Alajo (A) | November 16, 2014 |
| | New Town Experimental School JHS 1 | November 17, 2014 |
| Anyaaa Sowutuom | Esther’s Day Care Centre Kokomlemle 2 | November 15, 2012 |
| | Kubinson International School Kwashie (A) | November 16, 2012 |
| | Optimist School, Kwashie Bu | November 17, 2012 |
| | Santa Maria School Complex (A) | November 18, 2012 |
| Ayawaso West-Woguo | Amy’s Blessed School, Awoshie | November 19, 2012 |
| | Association International School 2 | November 14, 2012 |
| | The Word of God Ministry International | November 15, 2012 |
| | Mensah Sarbah Hall 2 (A) | November 20, 2012 |
| | Akuaffo Annex B | November 21, 2012 |

4.5 Focus group interviews

I conducted four focus group interviews in one of each of the constituencies in Accra where I also conducted the survey experiment. The purpose of the focus groups was to test the “content validity” (Miller, 2011, pp. 89–90) of my concept of local and national campaign promises, by asking ordinary voters about their perception of these campaign promises (Morgan, 1988, p. 11).¹⁵ This helped me validate the findings on the use and the credibility of campaign promises, gained in the analysis reported in Chapter 6, and the survey experiment reported in Chapter 7. I randomly sampled one polling station

¹⁵I thank Eric Kramon for suggesting to me to check the validity of my concepts used in the quantitative analyses with a qualitative investigation.

(PS) per constituency and one compound in the street of this polling station. Compounds are houses in which typically several families live. I then asked all residents at the age of 18 and older to participate in the focus groups. There were five to eight participants in each group. The places and dates of the focus groups are provided in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4: List of focus group interviews

| Focus group interview | Date | Constituency |
|--|-------------------|--------------------|
| PS Akuaffo Annex B | December 21, 2012 | Ayawaso West-Woguo |
| PS Esther's Day Care Centre Kokomlemle | December 21, 2012 | Ayawaso Central |
| PS Nurudeen Islamic School Ruga 1 | December 22, 2012 | Ayawaso East |
| PS Santa Maria School Complex | December 22, 2012 | Anyaa Sowotuo |

In the focus groups, participants were presented with examples of promises the challenger and the incumbent had made at public rallies across the country. These were promises that I had extracted from the transcriptions of the campaign speeches held by the incumbent and the challenger. Participants were handed cards that entailed a particular campaign promise. There were three local promises, five national promises, and one regional promise which promised benefits to a particular region. The regional promise was only presented to the participants to cross-validate that they would understand it as different from local and national promises. I do not analyze the use of regional promises in the dissertation. In order to engage all participants in the discussion of the promises, they were asked to read the promise on the card they had received. In cases where respondents did not speak English or were not literate, my Ghanaian research assistant read and translated the promises for them. We showed participants a map of where the promises had been made and told them which candidate had made the promise. We then asked them to give us their opinion about who would be the main beneficiaries if the promise were implemented and whether the benefit promised could be withheld from a constituency if it did not support the candidate making the promise. The questionnaire is provided in Appendix A.3. As is general practice when conducting focus group interviews, we began the interviews with a warm-up phase in which we asked participants to talk about the campaign promises they had come across during the campaigning period (Flick, 2007), before they were asked to evaluate the campaign promises that I presented to them.

The focus group interviews thus investigated whether local, as compared to national campaign promises were perceived to differ in two characteristics, as I had conceptualized them.¹⁶ These were first, that local promises mainly benefit only the constituency where the rally was held at which the promise was made and that national promises would benefit people beyond one constituency. Second, I was interested in investigating whether voters would anticipate that the candidate would renege on the promise if it was

¹⁶See Chapter 2 for a detailed definition of local versus national campaign promises.

a local promise, and was less likely to do so in case of a national promise, given that the candidate won the election, but a constituency in which a certain promise was made did not support the candidate at the polls.

Below I present the evidence from the focus group interviews, which largely validate my conceptualization of local versus national campaign promises.

Beneficiaries of local versus national campaign promises

When I asked respondents who the beneficiaries of the (examples of) national promises were, in line with my theoretical concept, they overwhelmingly said it would be all Ghanaians. None of them regarded the beneficiaries of national promises as local. The picture was less clear regarding local promises. The response that people beyond the constituency would profit from a local promise was almost as common (approx. 54%) as the response that it would be the inhabitants living in the constituency, who would benefit from a local promise (approx. 43%).¹⁷ Participants gave several reasons why, in some cases, they considered a local promise's scope to go beyond a particular constituency. One participant said that the local promise of building a new Senior High School in the constituency of Awutu Senya East would directly benefit the inhabitants of this constituency, but also indirectly other Ghanaians, because applicants for Senior High Schools are placed in schools across the country, using a central allocation system, which the individual student has little influence over (Dery, 2014). Due to this system, somebody living in Accra might actually end up going to a high school in Kumasi and hence profit from the SHS being built in Kumasi.¹⁸ Another participant, discussing the same promise said that he had relatives in Awutu Senya East and would hence benefit from a school being built there.¹⁹ Yet other participants argued that people travel and can use local infrastructure in constituencies they do not live in themselves.²⁰

Despite these affirmations that local promises can benefit people living beyond a constituency, it should

¹⁷The numbers do not add to 100 percent, because one participant said that the beneficiaries of a local promise would be the people living in a particular region.

¹⁸"It will be indirectly national but directly Kasoa. This is because, in Ghana, our educational policy like placement doesn't care where you come from. They just put everything into a raffle wherever the schools will be selected by the computer. So that computer placement can send someone from Kumasi to Kasoa. So, automatically, it is national by itself. Because, at the end of the day, somebody will come from Takoradi, Tamale etc. in the way they do the computer placement, you will not be sure of where you will be sent especially when you don't get the right grade for the schools you chose" (Focus group Ayawaso Central, December 21, 2012). "This is for Ghana because someone may be attending that school from Tamale, so if he can do it, it will benefit all Ghanaians" (Focus group Anyaa Sowotuo, December 22, 2012).

¹⁹"I think all of us will benefit. This is because the people of Kasoa are also our relatives and friends and getting access to something like that [a new school] will make them better off and in the long run we can also benefit from their achievements" (Focus group Anyaa Sowotuo, December 22, 2012).

²⁰"Not only will the people in the area benefit but rather, all Ghanaians. If he wins [the challenger] and opens up the market, it's a good thing for all Ghanaians. Not only for the inhabitants of Amasaman, because anybody can go and buy or trade there. So if he wins the election and he expands the market, all Ghanaians will benefit" (Focus group Ayawaso Central, December 21, 2012). "The market will be expanded. As you are saying, in Ga West Municipal. It's not only the people of Amasaman that are going to benefit more, there are lots of variety of goods and services. Most people will be coming in from various areas of the country to the market" (Focus group Ayawaso West-Woguo, December 21, 2012).

be considered that participants in the focus group interviews might have felt a need to show socially desirable behavior (Callegaro, 2008), which would probably make them more likely to affirm that all Ghanaians will profit and that they would not envy people living in a constituency far away from theirs to receive some local infrastructure projects. Hence the interview situation might have biased participants toward sometimes saying that a local promise's beneficiaries are national.

These findings with regard to the beneficiaries show that my conceptualization of national and local promises was largely in line with the understanding of the participants in the focus groups, with the exception that they sometimes estimated the beneficiaries of local club goods to go beyond one constituency. As I have suggested, however, this might, at least in part, be due to social desirability bias.

Possibility of political punishment

The results with regard to the possibility that a candidate makes the fulfillment of a promise conditional on how many votes he gained in a constituency, are similar. In line with my conceptualization of national promises, no participant considered it possible for a candidate to punish a constituency for not supporting him in the election, by not fulfilling a national promise. Participants said that when a promise specifically referred to a nationwide program, politicians would not be able to single out a particular constituency and exclude it from benefiting from this program.²¹ Others gave more concrete reasons. One participant emphasized that national projects get published in the budget, which obliges the executive to follow through with these projects.²² Another participant referred to a promise where a candidate announced to connect all communities with 500 inhabitants and more to the national electricity grid. The participant argued that when there are such criteria specified, and the constituency meets them, then the promise needs to be fulfilled.²³ Finally, a reason which was also brought forward by several participants for why it should not be rational for politicians to punish a constituency for not supporting him, was that politicians care about future elections, and will hence avoid excluding it from a national policy.²⁴ These pieces of qualitative evidence largely support my conceptualization of national campaign promises.

In line with my expectation, participants considered such political punishment more likely in case of local promises than in case of national promises (23%, compared to none in the case of national prom-

²¹“I think it was a nationwide thing so you can't just single them out because they didn't vote for you” (Focus group Ayawaso West-Woguo, December 21, 2012).

²²“They are still going to profit from it because there is a Zongo there. And since it's a national policy, it's going to be initiated in the budget and the budget covers those people too” (Focus group Ayawaso West-Woguo, December 21, 2012).

²³“There can't be punishment because even if you don't vote for him, it's a promise to the whole nation. So the only thing he can bring on is when the community is not more than 500” (Focus group Ayawaso West-Woguo, December 21, 2012).

²⁴“If Wenchi had not voted for the NDC, I think they would still get the jobs because he [the president] needs more votes the next time there is going to be an election” (Focus group Ayawaso East, December 22, 2012). “Yes I think he would still do it because he needs votes for the next election so he will still fulfill his promise” (Focus group Ayawaso East, December 22, 2012).

ises). A participant argued that a candidate and a constituency enter a contract when the candidate promises to provide a club good to a constituency. According to him, if the inhabitants of the constituency do not fulfill their side of the contract, then the politician is also not obliged to fulfill his part of the “deal”.²⁵ Some participants argued that in case that voters in a constituency had not delivered the desired votes for a candidate, he could, after the election, shift his attention to neighboring constituencies instead of fulfilling the promise in the constituency which had not supported him.²⁶ Another participant said that even though the leverage of the president to withhold local club goods to a constituency after the election is limited, as the allocation of some funds goes via the district assemblies common fund (see Ichino and Nathan, 2013, p. 348), the president does have the discretion to withhold funding that goes beyond what is channeled through the district fund.²⁷

Overall these findings show that participants were more likely to consider political punishment possible in the case of local than in the case of national promises, further lending support to the validity of the conceptual difference between local and national promises.

4.6 A cross-sectional dataset on sub-national variation in the use of clientelism and violence

In addition to the data I collected in Ghana, I compiled a cross-sectional dataset on the use of clientelism and voter intimidation in ten African countries. This dataset is based on regional-level election data and Afrobarometer survey data.²⁸ The fifth round of the Afrobarometer, conducted between 2010 and 2012, relates questions about presidential elections to those held in the respective country between 2007 and 2011. In this survey respondents were asked about their exposure to clientelism and their fear of

²⁵“There can be a political punishment because they didn’t vote for him. I promised I will give you a senior high school and you didn’t vote for me. There is a contract between Kasoa and John Mahama. If you vote for me, I will build the school and you have breeched the contract”(Focus group Ayawaso West-Wogoon, December 21, 2012).

²⁶“Its not he excluding Kasoa, he [the president] can choose to build the thing at Buduburam. He didn’t do it in Kasoa but yet still he has built the 250 Senior High Schools but it was not in Kasoa. So the people have to move from Kasoa to Buduburam to school”(Focus group Ayawaso West-Wogoon, December 21, 2012). “I think opposite. They are one out of 45 so supposing they the people appointed him but didn’t vote for him as he expected it, then it means in four years, he will concentrate on others more. It’s a fact that that place is his homeland. They are fond of Mahama so this is a constitutional promise. District promise so then, he can decide to concentrate more on the others if they disappoint him so he will pretend as if he is not looking at them so much”(Focus group Ayawaso West-Wogoon, December 21, 2012).

²⁷“I strongly disagree with you because every district is entitled to those infrastructures. And at the end of the year, it is being given to them quarterly and at the end of every quarter, every district assembly has to be given the fund by the government so even if I vote or did not vote for you, it is stated in the constituency that am entitled to a district common fund so you being the sitting president cannot choose whether to give me my fund or not. The only thing he can do in this case is that, if I am to provide you with the common fund and I am to give you your water project, I won’t. If there should be an extra ordinary project I won’t bring it there. That’s where he can chose not to give you that development. But for your one million out of that 45 million, it is compulsory” (Focus group Ayawaso West-Wogoon, 21.12.2012).

²⁸See Afrobarometer Network (2014) for country-specific data sets.

intimidation in the preceding election in their country.²⁹

To test whether clientelism and intimidation are targeted at voters with different political makeup and with different habits to turn out, I derive a number of variables at the regional and the individual level. Voters' likelihood to vote and their political inclinations are measured with the Afrobarometer survey. I also measure past levels of turnout and the vote shares for the main parties in the elections under study in the regions the respondents live in. The data on election results were compiled from various sources, reported in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5: Sources of election results used to calculate regional-level competitiveness and turnout levels

| Country | Year of Election | Sources Election Results |
|--------------|------------------|--|
| Burkina Faso | 2005 | African Elections Database (2014) |
| Ghana | 2004 | Electoral Commission of Ghana (2014) |
| Kenya | 2002 | Throup (2003); Wanyande (2006) |
| Liberia | 2005 | National Elections Commission Republic of Liberia (2014) |
| Malawi | 2004 | African Elections Database (2014) |
| Mozambique | 2004 | Carr (2014) |
| Namibia | 2004 | Carr (2014) |
| Tanzania | 2005 | African Elections Database (2014) |
| Zambia | 2008 | African Elections Database (2014) |
| Zimbabwe | 2002 | Kubatana (2014) |

4.7 Summary

This chapter has described the data sources I compiled for this project, and the range of different methodological approaches to test the predictions of the dissertation's central argument. I compiled a constituency-level event data set on campaign rallies, and a constituency-level dataset on the allocation of campaign speeches. I further conducted semi-structured and focus group interviews. Moreover, an original survey experiment was conducted. In addition to the data collected during fieldwork in Ghana, I also compiled a novel cross-sectional dataset on subnational variation of campaigning strategies. This multi-methods approach to analyzing the mobilization and demobilization of voters in African elections allows for triangulation between the findings from the various studies in this project. First, I measure similar concepts in different ways i.e. the use of distributive campaigning strategies as promises of local club goods versus national promises and as the promising and distribution of individual benefits. If the findings from both ways of operationalizing the concept of distributive campaign strategies point to a similar logic of campaigning, which my findings suggest is the case, this increases the external validity of my findings.

²⁹Details on the measurement of these campaign strategies are provided in Chapter 8.

Second, I use different methodologies: quantitative and qualitative data analysis and the analysis of observational and experimental data. This allows for “between-method” triangulation (Denzin, 1970), exploiting the advantages of the various methodological approaches (Bryman, 2003). While the quantitative, cross-sectional, subnational analyses are best suited to detect general patterns and establish external validity, the experiment is best suited to establish causal effects. Finally, the qualitative analyses serve not only to investigate the plausibility of the causal mechanisms that I have assumed to be at work (See Chapter 3). They also help to detect new and alternative hypotheses, which can then be accounted for in the statistical analyses.

Chapter 5

The strategic allocation of campaign visits

“We look where is our stronghold, where is our good areas. And, economically, it is better to concentrate much more on areas where they seem to be a lot [NPP supporters]. And for us as a party, the most cosmopolitan areas are areas where we win a lot of votes. [...] In our case, we think it’s about numbers, we think it is about numbers and we need to canalize our effort in getting the numbers at where the converted are. So that is what we are doing.”¹

This quote from an interview with a regional campaign manager of Ghana’s main opposition party emphasizes the importance of hosting campaign rallies in the party’s strongholds. In this chapter I test whether the presidential candidates of the NPP and the NDC allocated their rallies with the aim to reach their core voters and to “preach” to these already “converted.” Further, I test whether these parties used campaign rallies to mobilize turnout among their supporters. The chapter, thus, presents a first test of the theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation established in Chapter 3: that parties focus campaign rallies and benefits on their supporters who are unlikely to turn out, and that they attempt to disenfranchise voters who are difficult to win over with such strategies.

First, my findings show that the incumbent and his main challenger spent a bulk of their time on the campaign trail in constituencies where their traditional support base was concentrated. This suggests, as argued in Chapter 3, that they used campaign events to address their supporters. In the case of the incumbent these were areas where his party’s ethnic partisans were concentrated and where past vote shares for his party have been high. The challenger also concentrated his visits in constituencies where his ethnic partisans were concentrated, but combined those visits with campaigning in swing constituencies. Both candidates hence used campaigns to court their supporters. The challenger combined this with a strategy of attracting indifferent voters.

Second, I find that while the incumbent mobilized turnout across both his *potential supporters* and in-

¹Interview with a member of one of NPP’s regional campaign teams, November 28, 2012.

different voters, the challenger mobilized turnout only among his *ethnic partisans*. These findings lend partial support to the argument that parties use campaign rallies with the aim to mobilize those of their supporters, who are unlikely to turn out if they are not addressed in a campaign.

The chapter is structured as follows: I, first, derive the theoretical expectations on the use of the campaigning tool of rallies, based on the argument developed in Chapter 3. Second, I present the research design and the nature of the sample of rally events. Third, descriptive and statistical results are presented and discussed in the light of the findings from the qualitative interviews with campaign managers. Fourth, I summarize the findings and link them to the dissertation's key research question.

5.1 Theoretical expectations on the allocation of campaign rallies

I expect candidates to focus their time on the campaign trail in constituencies where their *potential supporters* are concentrated. This expectation rests on two main arguments. First, candidate appearances are much better suited to activate predisposed identities than to change them. This idea is based upon the finding that the most robust effect that the exposure to campaigns can have is to increase awareness among voters about their existent predispositions (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954, Brams and Davis, 1974, p. 115, Campbell, 1960, Key and Cummings, 1966, Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968, p. 102) and motivate them to turn out for the candidate they feel closest to (Finkel, 1993; Gelman, 1993; Iyengar and Petrocik, 2000). As parties have no interest in strengthening voter identities which make these voters feel further away from them and closer to another candidate, I expect candidates to visit mainly areas where the demographic or economic backgrounds of voters predispose them to feel close to these parties. If a candidate visited a constituency populated by indifferent voters, or supporters of the rival party, his chances of making these voters vote for him are lower than if he addressed likely supporters. If he did not succeed in convincing these voters to support him by the campaign promises he makes, he runs the risk of polarizing the electorate against himself and of increasing turnout for the rival candidate (see also Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002; Fenno, 1978), which he would like to avoid. Campaigning among his own supporters does not carry the same risk, as voters tend to evaluate campaign messages made by candidates whose party they identify with much more favorably, than messages by other candidates (Bartels, 2002; Gerber, Huber and Washinton, 2010).

Second, I have argued that in contexts in which candidates are expected to promise local investments to constituencies in which these events are hosted,² candidates need to be particularly strategic in choosing

²See Baldwin (2013); Barkan (1995); Ichino and Nathan (2013); Kramon (2013a); Lindberg (2010) on the importance voters attach to the provision of such local club goods, as they directly impact their living conditions.

the places they travel to. As I have laid out in Chapter 3, for campaign promises to be effective, they need to be credible. I have argued that candidates are likely to be more credible with their campaign promises among their supporters than among voters who are not affiliated with them. In addition, candidates are likely to be more credible in constituencies that have supported his party in the past than in others, assuming that past levels of support in a constituency are a function of how much a party has channeled benefits to that constituency in the past. As candidates want to avoid making campaign promises in situations in which they anticipate these promises to be little credible, they should hence avoid traveling to areas where they have few supporters.

Base on these considerations, I derive the following expectation:

H1: The likelihood of a candidate visiting a constituency increases with levels of affinity of voters with himself or his party.

I have further argued, however, that it would not be rational for candidates to concentrate mobilizing efforts on core supporters who are *certain voters* – regardless of how much (or how little) effort they spend on them. I rather expect candidates to target their *potential supporters*, which implies that parties concentrate campaign rallies in those of their strongholds where past turnout has been low.

H2: Among the constituencies in which partisans are concentrated, a candidate should allocate more visits to those with low levels of past turnout.

These expectations contrast with findings from studies on the patterns of presidential travel during US election campaigns. Analyses of the allocation of candidate appearances across US states have found that presidential campaigns focus on swing states (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002; Colantoni and Levsque, 1975; Kelley, 1961, p. 65). While there is not much research outside the US on the location of campaign rallies,³ the nearly exclusive focus on swing states is likely not to be reproduced in other presidential systems where the president is elected by popular vote. This is because the focus on swing states in US election campaigns is due to the fact that campaign resources are allocated with the aim to “yield the greatest reward in the electoral college,” (Chen and Reeves, 2011, p. 537 see also Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002, Bartels, 1985, Brams and Davis, 1974). Since in US presidential elections a presidential candidate needs to win a majority of the electors, this boils down to winning as many states as possible, rather than winning a majority of the popular votes. This renders trying to win swing states a vital strategy in US elections.⁴

³ An exception is the analysis of campaign rallies in Kenya’s 2007 elections by Horowitz (2012).

⁴ In addition to winning as many states as possible, a strategy designed to win the majority of electors in the electoral college also implies trying to win over the most populous states, as the number of electors per state is proportional to its population size (e.g. Brams and Davis, 1974).

The mobilization of core voters will likely be more important in any presidential system using popular vote, than in US presidential elections. However, I can only speculate on this, as presidential travel outside US elections is completely under-researched. Besides the fact that presidential systems in Sub-Saharan Africa elect presidents through popular vote, I have argued in Chapter 3 that candidates in these young democracies are likely to place particular importance on the mobilization of core voters due to a number of other factors: These are (a) weak party attachment, (b) a greater uncertainty about the electorate than in established democracies, (c) their difficulty to appeal across ethnic groups, and, finally, (d) the need to promise specific benefits to localities they visit on the campaign trail.

5.2 Testing the theory

The empirical tests of the hypotheses concerning the use of campaign rallies are based on data collected during my field work in Ghana. In this chapter, I perform a quantitative analysis based on the event dataset on campaign rallies I compiled. I interpret the results in light of findings from interviews with campaign managers.⁵ The quantitative analysis is cross-sectional and exploits subnational variation of campaign rallies by the two main candidates across the 275 constituencies in Ghana. The dependent variable throughout the analysis is the number of constituency-level campaign appearances by the two main presidential candidates, John Dramanai Mahama of the ruling NDC, and Nana Dankwa Akufo-Addo of the main opposition NPP, during the three months prior to the election from August 25, to December 7, 2012. I also refer to these candidates as the incumbent and the challenger respectively. I gathered these data on campaign events from published accounts reported in two Ghanaian newspapers *Daily Graphic* and *Daily Guide* and from a compilation of campaign speeches by these two candidates, obtained from radio reporters. Chapter 4 presents a detailed account of this data collection. I define the general election campaign as the period beginning with the launch of the NPP's party manifesto (August 25, 2012) and ending on December 5, 2012, the date after which parties were obliged to stop campaigning for the election to be held on December 7, 2012.

5.2.1 The sample

I merged the events reported in the two newspapers and the compilation of campaign speeches, based on candidate, constituency, and the date of the event and deleted repeated observations by different sources on the same event.

⁵See sections 4.1 and 4.3 of Chapter 4 on the details of the collection of these data.

Table 5.1: Speeches sample, support

(a) All rallies based on speeches, over support

| Candidate | Swing | NDC stronghold | NPP stronghold | TOTAL |
|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-------|
| John Mahama (Incumbent) | 15 (50) 30% | 23 (50) 46% | 12 (50) 24% | 50 |
| Nana Akufo-Addo (Challenger) | 20 (47) 43% | 7 (47) 15% | 20 (47) 43% | 47 |

(b) Rallies based on speeches with complete information, over support

| Candidate | Swing | NDC stronghold | NPP stronghold | TOTAL |
|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|-------|
| John Mahama (Incumbent) | 14 (42) 33% | 19 (42) 45% | 9 (42) 21% | 42 |
| Nana Akufo-Addo (Challenger) | 15 (28) 54% | 4 (28) 14% | 9 (28) 32% | 28 |

I refer to this dataset as the *deduplicated sample*. There were 27 out of the 97 events in the sample based on the speeches, where the date of the rally at which a speech was held was unknown. Due to the missing information, I was unable to include these events into the deduplicated sample, so that only 70 events from the speeches were incorporated into this dataset. If the missings in the sample based on the speeches were non-random, and particularly if they were correlated with the key explanatory variables of partisanship and turnout, this could bias the deduplicated sample. To check for a possible bias, I compare the distribution of the rallies by the two candidates held in swing constituencies, NDC, and NPP strongholds between all rallies coded from the speeches, and a restricted sample. This restricted sample is also based on the speeches, but only includes the 70 events with full information. The comparison, illustrated in Table 5.1, shows that there is no concern of missings being systematic and hence biasing the deduplicated sample. The incumbent held 30% of his rallies in swing constituencies, 46% in his strongholds and 24% in the opposition's strongholds (Table 5.1a). This compares to a very similar distribution in the sample without missings of 33% of the incumbent's rallies located in swing constituencies, 45% in his strongholds, and 21% being held in NPP strongholds (Table 5.1b). The comparison of the distribution of rallies by the challenger suggests that, according to the restricted sample, the challenger held more events in swing constituencies and fewer rallies in his strongholds than in the full sample. This biases the results slightly against finding support for the hypothesis that the challenger focuses his rallies in his stronghold and is, hence, not a concern for the present analysis.

In addition to the distribution of events across constituencies with different political makeup, I also compare the proportion of campaign rallies in constituencies with different levels of turnout in the two samples.⁶ The results displayed in Table 5.2 alleviate any concern that including only events with com-

⁶In the tables, numbers of percentages do not always add up to 100 percent, due to rounding.

plete information will bias the results of the analysis reported later in this chapter.⁷

Table 5.2: Speeches sample, turnout

(a) All rallies based on speeches, over turnout

| Candidate | Turnout low | Turnout high | TOTAL |
|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|-------|
| John Mahama (Incumbent) | 32 (50) 64% | 15 (50) 30% | 50 |
| Nana Akufo-Addo (Challenger) | 30 (47) 64% | 15 (47) 32% | 47 |

(b) Rallies based on speeches with full information, over turnout

| Candidate | Turnout low | Turnout high | TOTAL |
|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|-------|
| John Mahama (Incumbent) | 27 (42) 64% | 15 (42) 36% | 42 |
| Nana Akufo-Addo (Challenger) | 20 (28) 71% | 8 (28) 29% | 28 |

Constituency characteristics

To estimate the effect of partisanship and past turnout on campaign strategies used by the two candidates, I use data on the demographic makeup of constituencies from Ghana's 2010 census and data on the 2000, the 2004, and the 2008 presidential elections. Census data are available on the district level, not on the constituency level. Districts in Ghana comprise typically one or two constituencies. As the census data are not available on the constituency level, following a method used in similar analyses,⁸ the district data were used in this analysis and all constituencies in one district are, hence, assumed to share the same demographic characteristics. District data from the 2010 Household Census were available for the 170 districts which existed in the year 2010.⁹ I match these data according to the name of these districts with a list of districts and constituencies from the year 2012 obtained from the Electoral Commission of Ghana (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2012), which comprised 230 districts. In cases, for which it was not evident which district in the year of 2012 corresponded to which district in the year of 2010, I conducted research on each district's history. The data on past election results and turnout were obtained from the Electoral Commission of Ghana (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2000, 2004, 2008). I repeated the same procedure to match constituencies from the years, 2004 and 2008 to those of 2012.¹⁰

⁷Turnout was coded as low if turnout in the 2008 presidential election was larger or equal to the median of 71.2%. It was coded as high if it was above the median turnout level.

⁸See Horowitz (2012, p. 30).

⁹Data were obtained from the Minnesota Population Center (Minnesota Population Center, 2014). I also wish to acknowledge the statistical office that provided the underlying data making this research possible: Ghana Statistical Services, Ghana.

¹⁰See Appendix B.1 for details on this procedure.

I used these election data to construct several measures of past support. I calculate the victory margin of the NDC (NPP) in past elections by subtracting the NPP's (NDC's) vote share from that of the NDC's (NPP)'s share. I code several dummies to obtain categorical measures of past support. If the NDC (NPP) has won a plurality of votes in a constituency across the 2000, 2004, and the 2008 presidential elections, I code it as an NDC's stronghold (NPP's stronghold). If a constituency has not been won consistently by one of the two parties, I code it is a swing constituency. I also code a measure of past turnout per constituency in the 2008 election, reflected in the percentage of voters who voted out of the total electorate.

Besides the direct measures of partisanship, reflected in voting histories in the various constituencies, I code several indirect indicators of partisanship. The most important determinant of voting behavior in Ghana remains ethnicity (Lindberg and Morrison, 2005; Fridy, 2007). The Census reports over 50 ethnic groups, which I grouped, based on past research, into politically relevant groups. While the Ewe, the Ga, and the loose ethnic coalition of "Northerners" tend to support the ruling NDC, Akan-speakers and particularly the subgroup of the Ashanti tend to support the NPP (Fridy, 2007; Lindberg and Morrison, 2005). While Fridy (2007) and Lindberg and Morrison (2005) only test the importance of ethnic identity for support of the ruling party for the speakers of Northern languages and the Ewe, I also code members of the ethnic group of the Ga as NDC's ethnic partisans, as several campaign managers emphasized that this group is part of the NDC's traditional support base. This quote by a national campaign manager of the NDC illustrates my reasoning:

*"we have [...] the Ga-Adangbes who vote NDC; we have the Ewes; we have the Northerners. And the Northerners, I talk of the three Northern Regions. They are more sympathetic towards our course [...]. But the Ashantis and then the Akyems are more sympathetic toward the NPP."*¹¹

The classification of ethnic subgroups reported in the Census into Akan-speakers and into speakers of Northern languages is based on La Verle (1994), Fridy (2007) and the Afrobarometer Network (2011b). Apart from ethnicity, Fridy (2007) as well as Lindberg and Morrison (2005) suggest that support for the NDC and the NPP might be structured along class and income cleavages in Ghana, similar to those that traditionally structure partisanship in mature democracies in Europe (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). The authors suggest that the NDC tends to gain support in rural areas and among poorer voters and generally those with a lower Socio-Economic Status (SES) and that the NPP tends to be supported by richer, more educated voters with a higher SES, respectively (Fridy, 2007; Lindberg and Morrison, 2005). However, these studies do not find robust effects of these cleavages on vote choice. I include these factors, non-

¹¹Interview with a member of the national campaign team of the NDC, December 18, 2012.

etheless, as robustness checks for the measures of partisanship that are based on past vote share and ethnicity. Following Lindberg and Morrison (2005), I divide respondents into those who have no formal or only primary education, those that have completed secondary education and those who have an education higher than secondary education. With respect to respondents' occupational status, the census reports six categories of class of worker. I divide them into high status groups ("employer," "working on own account," "wage/salary worker," and low status groups ("domestic worker" and "unpaid family worker"). In addition, I include various measures of poverty into the analysis. One measure is the percentage of households in a constituency without electricity in their homes. Another is the percentage of households without pipe-borne water. Another proxy for poverty on the constituency level is the percentage of households without sanitary facility in their homes.

Research on US elections has found that candidates concentrate campaign rallies in urban areas and in states with large population sizes (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002). The possibility that population size impacts the variation in candidate appearances in this study can, however, largely be excluded since, as per the constitution, the boundaries of the constituencies in Ghana are drawn in a manner to assure that every constituency has the same population size (Republic of Ghana, 1992). The degree of urbanization of constituencies is likely to play a more important role in campaigning in Ghana. First, it serves as an indicator of population density. Urban constituencies are smaller in their geographic size, but contain the same number of inhabitants as rural constituencies so that the concentration of the population is higher than in the countryside.

Second, urbanization is also an indicator for the costs of traveling to a constituency. Traveling to urban centers is likely to require less time and money for the campaign than organizing rallies far away from main cities which may impact the decision of where to hold campaign rallies. As an additional measure of traveling costs and time, I also include the distance to the capital of each constituency. It is likely to be cheaper to travel to constituencies that are closer to the capital, since both parties' headquarters are located there, and since the road network around the capital is more densely developed than in the rest of the country. This might motivate campaigns to focus campaign rallies in constituencies close to Accra.¹²

Third, the degree of urbanization of a constituency in Ghana, as in many other African countries, also serves as an indicator of where the parties' supporters are concentrated. It has been observed that incumbents tend to gain more support in the rural areas and opposition parties gaining more votes in the cities (Conroy-Krutz, 2006; Harding, 2010). In addition to this general rural-urban divide in elections

¹²This proxy for traveling time and costs was calculated using the software Quantum GIS. I estimated the distance between the center of each constituency (spatial mean) to the city of Accra.

in Africa, voters in Accra have shown a tendency to support the opposition, no matter which party is in government (Harding, 2010, p. 3). Given that I expect the presidential candidates in Ghana's 2012 election to aim at addressing their supporters on their campaign trail, I expect the challenger to focus his visits in urban centers and in Accra, and the incumbent to campaign more in the countryside. I expect the incumbent to campaign less in Accra than the challenger, but only when controlling for the share of ethnic partisans of the NDC in the constituencies in Accra. This is because the Ga-Adangbe – one of the ethnic groups that traditionally vote for the NDC – constitute the major ethnic group in some of Accra's constituencies.

5.3 Results: the allocation of campaign effort

I have argued that the presidential candidates should focus their visits in constituencies where their partisans are concentrated. Figure 5.1 maps the allocation of rally events by the incumbent (a) and the challenger (b) across NDC and NPP strongholds and swing constituencies. The number of events in a constituency – represented by the size of the black dots – ranges from 0 to 8 for both candidates.¹³ The incumbent seems to have allocated his rallies across both his NDC strongholds (dark gray shading) and swing constituencies (dotted shading). The pattern is less clear for the challenger, and needs to be investigated in the subsequent statistical analysis.


Past research has shown that support for the NDC and the NPP is to a large extent determined by voters' ethnic identity (Fridy, 2007; Lindberg and Morrison, 2005). Therefore, the ethnic makeup of the constituencies can also serve as an important source of information for candidates of where likely supporters are concentrated. Figure 5.2 illustrates the allocation of rally events by the incumbent (a) and the challenger (b) over the percentages of the ethnic groups who tend to support the NDC (a) and the NPP (b). The allocation of the incumbent's rally events by the incumbent shows some patterns of ethnic targeting (a). He held rallies in almost all densely Ewe-populated areas in the East in the Volta Region. In addition, his rallies cluster in Accra, which can be indicative of him trying to address the Ga-Adangbe. As I have explained above, however, the concentration of the incumbent's campaign on Accra would be in line with various explanations and needs to be further analyzed in the statistical analyses.

The allocation of visits by the challenger shows similar, yet even clearer patterns.


¹³See also Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.9.

Figure 5.1: Campaign rallies by the presidential candidates, over past support for the ruling and the main opposition party

(a) Campaign rallies by the incumbent, over past support for the ruling party




(b) Campaign rallies by the challenger, over past support for the NPP




Notes: The black dots represent rally events held in a constituency; the larger the dots, the more rallies a candidate held in a constituency. Dark gray means that a constituency is a stronghold of the NDC (a) or NPP (b). Dotted shading indicates that a constituency is a swing constituency. White shaded constituencies are strongholds of the respective rival party.

Figure 5.2: Rally events by the presidential candidates, over percentages of their respective ethnic partisans per constituency

(a) Campaign rallies by the incumbent, over ethnic partisans of the NDC



(b) Campaign rallies by the challenger, over Ashanti population



Notes: The black dots represent rally events held in a constituency; the larger the dots, the more rallies a candidate held in a constituency. Shading reflects percentages of Ewe, Ga-Adangbe and speakers of the Northern languages per constituency in (a) and percentages of Ashanti in (b). Darker shading reflects a higher percentage of members of these ethnic groups. Gray lines mark constituency boundaries.

The challenger seems to have concentrated his visits in constituencies where the Ashanti are concentrated and, like the incumbent, seems to have hosted many rallies in the capital.


So far the results lend some support to the expectation that the candidates mainly allocated their visits across the country with the aim to address their supporters. The question is whether the candidates actually mobilized turnout in the constituencies populated by their partisans or if they paid these visits to these voters with the aim to reward them for past support. As explained in Chapter 3, if campaigns are concentrated in constituencies with a high share of a party's supporters and low turnout histories I interpret this as a strategy of mobilizing *potential supporters*. If candidates campaigned predominantly in constituencies where their partisans are concentrated, but turnout has been high, this corresponds to the strategy of the rewarding of loyalists (Nichter, 2008, p. 20).¹⁴ Figure 5.3 maps rally events by the incumbent (a) and the challenger (b) across levels of past turnout. While the incumbent seems to indeed have allocated quite a large share of his visits to constituencies with low levels of turnout in the 2008 elections, the challenger seems to have more frequently targeted areas of medium to high levels of past turnout. The descriptive statistics with regard to turnout, hence, suggest that while the incumbent might have mobilized turnout, the challenger seems to have rather rewarded voters for past turnout. However, whether the effect of turnout varies across constituencies where the candidates faced more or less support, needs to be investigated with a statistical analysis.

To more carefully examine the targeting of groups of voters with candidate visits, I run a series of negative binomial models to estimate the relationship of affinity with the candidates and turnout levels across constituencies and the number of times the candidates visited these constituencies.


¹⁴See Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3.

Figure 5.3: Rally events by the presidential candidates, over levels of past turnout

(a) Campaign rallies by the incumbent over past turnout



(b) Campaign rallies by the challenger over past turnout



Notes: The black dots represent rally events held in a constituency; the larger the dots, the more rallies a candidate held in a constituency. Darker shading indicates higher levels of turnout in the 2008 presidential elections. Gray lines mark constituency borders.

The dependent variable is the number of events by the incumbent or the challenger per constituency. As for such data OLS regression is inappropriate (Long, 1997), I use a count model. The negative binomial model class is more appropriate than a poisson distribution, since the mean is larger than the variance both for the rallies of the incumbent and those of the challenger.¹⁵ The data are hence displaying signs of over-dispersion. This is also indicated by the over-dispersion parameter alpha. The regression output of the models reported in Tables 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 show that alpha is significantly different from zero and thus reinforces the notion that modeling the data as a negative binomial distribution is more suitable than modeling a poisson distribution.¹⁶ The dependent variable is the number of visits per constituency. To estimate the effect of partisanship and past turnout on the frequency with which the candidates visited a constituency, I estimate the following equation

$$Rallies_c = \alpha + \beta_1 Partisanship + \beta_2 Turnout + \beta_3 Distance + \epsilon_c, \quad (5.1)$$

where $Rallies_c$ is the number of rallies per constituency held by either of the candidates. *Partisanship* is measured through various specifications of past vote shares of the parties in the constituency, the concentration of ethnic partisans and socio-demographic characteristics of the constituencies, as explained above. *Turnout* reflects turnout in the 2008 presidential election, which preceded the 2012 elections. *Distance* represents the distance from each constituency to the capital. The error term ϵ_c denotes unobserved characteristics that determine how often a rally was hosted in a constituency.

To assess whether candidates mobilized turnout predominantly among their partisans, I estimate the following equation

$$Rallies_c = \alpha + \beta_1 Partisanship + \beta_2 Turnout + \beta_3 Partisanship * Turnout + \beta_4 Distance + \epsilon_i, \quad (5.2)$$

where $Partisanship * Turnout$ denotes the interaction between the various measures of partisanship and past turnout.

5.3.1 The incumbent


I first present the results with respect to the allocation of the incumbents' campaign visits. Figure 5.4 shows the distribution of the dependent variable. It indicates that the incumbent visited almost half of the constituencies at least once (125 constituencies). Of those that he visited, he held between 1 and

¹⁵The mean number of rallies by the incumbent per constituency is .63 and the variance is .95. It is .43 and .96 for the challenger respectively.

¹⁶See the test statistic *LR Alpha* at the bottom of the regression tables.

8 rallies there. The results of the statistical analyses, shown in Table 5.3, partly lend support to the hypothesis that a logic of mobilizing supporters was at work. While indicators of partisanship, such as the margin of victory of the NDC in past elections and the share of ethnic partisans, is positively related to the number of rallies the incumbent held in a constituency, the level of turnout in the 2008 election is negatively correlated with how often he visited a constituency. Before I further investigate the effect of turnout, I discuss the results concerning the effect of the political makeup of a constituency on how many campaign events were held here.

Figure 5.4: Distribution of the dependent variable



The effect of past support on the incumbent's campaign

The direct measurements of partisanship, based on past votes that the NDC has gained in the 2000, the 2004, and the 2008 elections, show ambiguous effects. On the one hand, the NDC's victory margin in the three elections prior to the 2012 election has a positive and statistically significant effect on the number of times the incumbent visited a constituency, lending support to Hypothesis 1 (see model 1). As the interpretation of raw coefficients in non-linear models is not straightforward, I simulate the expected number of rallies per constituency, depending on different levels of the key independent variables.¹⁷ According to model 1, the incumbent hosted on average .45 campaign rallies (+/- .06) in a constituency at mean levels of NDC victory margin over the NPP, and only .10 rallies (+/- .07) in constituencies at minimum levels of NDC's past vote share. If the victory margin of the ruling party increased to its

¹⁷ All the following simulations were conducted using Stata's clarify software (Tomz, Wittenberg and King, 2003); control variables were held at their median.

maximum, the incumbent hosted 2 events (+/- .89) in such constituencies. This result suggests that the incumbent aimed at reaching his party's supporters with his rallies.

At the same time, when past support for the NDC is operationalized as a categorical concept, the

Table 5.3: Effect of co-partisanship on incumbent rallies

| | (1) Victory margin | (2) Support categorical | (3) Ethnic partisanship |
|------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Victory margin | 0.377*** (3.06) | | |
| Turnout08 | -1.343 (-0.97) | -1.848 (-1.45) | -3.047** (-2.48) |
| No sanitary | 0.111 (0.14) | -0.111 (-0.14) | 0.497 (0.63) |
| Urban | 0.598 (0.93) | 0.667 (1.06) | 0.440 (0.68) |
| Distance to Accra | 0.0811 (0.85) | 0.122 (1.28) | 0.0881 (0.90) |
| Primary | -2.497 (-1.19) | -1.401 (-0.66) | -2.457 (-1.14) |
| Ethnic partisan | 0.414 (1.08) | 0.818** (2.29) | 1.069*** (3.25) |
| Low status occupation | -0.0736 (-0.06) | -1.184 (-0.96) | -1.229 (-0.96) |
| NDC stronghold | | 0.563+ (1.90) | |
| Swing constituency | | 0.768*** (3.18) | |
| Constant | 1.844 (0.87) | 0.904 (0.42) | 2.875 (1.35) |
| lnalpha | -1.507** (-2.30) | -1.706** (-2.25) | -1.366** (-2.26) |
| Wald χ^2 | 42.33*** | 43.34*** | 32.85*** |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.06 |
| Pseudo Log-Likelihood | -275.24 | -274.73 | -279.98 |
| LR Alpha | 3.56*** | 2.54*** | 4.32*** |
| Number of observations | 274 | 274 | 274 |

Values are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis


+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

results indicate that the incumbent visited swing constituencies slightly more frequently than constituencies that his party had consistently won in the past. The variable *NDC stronghold* is a dummy, taking on the value 1 if the constituency has been won by the NDC in the 2000, 2004, and 2008 elections, and 0 otherwise. The variable *Swing* is coded as 1 if a constituency has not consistently voted for the NDC or the NPP, and 0 otherwise. Both the effect of *NDCstronghold* and *Swing* is positive, which indicates that the incumbent visited both his strongholds and swing constituencies more often than strongholds of

the opposition. To further shed light on these effects, I simulate the expected number of rallies, based on model 2, in Table 5.3, and plot the results in Figure 5.5. The graph shows that the number of times the incumbent visited a constituency is highest in swing constituencies, followed by NDC strongholds and is lowest in NPP strongholds. As the confidence intervals between swing constituencies and NDC strongholds overlap, however, we can only infer that the incumbent campaigned more in his strongholds *and* in swing constituencies, than in the opposition's strongholds.

This pattern in the event data, which suggests that the incumbent spent most of his time in his party's strongholds and in swing constituencies, is supported by the interviews I conducted with various of NDC's campaign organizers. While the campaign managers I interviewed recognized the necessity to also campaign in swing constituencies, they all emphasized the need to campaign in their own strongholds, and none of them pointed toward a strategy exclusively aimed at attracting indifferent voters.

Figure 5.5: Effect of past support on incumbent rallies



Asked whether campaigning in one's strongholds was not a waste of money and of the president's valuable time, a national campaign manager of the NDC disagreed:

*"So it's not necessary that this is my stronghold so my campaign strategy should be different, no. You can lose in your stronghold."*¹⁸

The explanation he gave for why he regarded it necessary to campaign in NDC strongholds was that

¹⁸Interview with a member of NDC's national campaign team, December 18, 2012.

voters would expect the candidate to visit their constituency, and if he did not, they might turn away from the party and decide to stay at home on polling day:

“Coming to them, makes you get the vote. If you don’t show them that respect [by coming to their region][...], then you’ll not get the votes. Some will decide not to vote at all.”¹⁹

Regional campaign managers also confirmed the strategy of focusing presidential campaign rallies in the party’s strongholds, as the following statement illustrates:

“When the president comes, you take him to the strongholds, [...]. We have about 47 constituencies [in one particular region]. The president cannot [...] visit all the constituencies.[...] If he’s able to come back again, you can do it [visit areas that are not strongholds]. If he’s not able to come [back], you concentrate on our safe areas. So that’s how we do it. [...] What I’m saying is that, actually, [...] you know we have our difficult areas and you have our safe areas. When you talk about safe area, it means you have your member of parliament at the place. That’s your safe area. So you need to hold that place very well. And then you have other places that are very difficult and it wouldn’t work anyway.

MR: But you concentrate your effort of campaigning on the...?

NDC: You concentrate your efforts on the safe areas.”²⁰

Another regional campaign manager explained to me that he hosted an equal amount of rallies in swing constituencies and in his party’s safe havens. However, he then further explained the need to mobilize turnout among NDC supporters as well:

“We want to make sure we get all our supporters there to come out and vote for us [...].

MR: This is about mobilizing those that are already on your side?

NDC: Yes.

MR: But you also go to swing areas for persuading those ...

NDC: Those who are not on our side and those who are not decided.”²¹

Various campaign managers of the NDC pointed to the difficulty of convincing opposition supporters, as the following statement shows:

“You can’t go to those that say ‘no, no, I’m NPP, I don’t like you, NDC’. You can’t make them... if he don’t (sic!) want to greet you, no, if you want to greet the person [...] they’ll say ‘I don’t like NDC, I’m NPP.’”²²

Even in cases in which the NDC campaigned in opposition strongholds, one campaigner manager explained that he tried to reach voters who are sympathetic toward the NDC in opposition strongholds, rather than trying to persuade supporters of the NPP to switch toward voting for the ruling party:

¹⁹Interview with a member of NDC’s national campaign team, December 18, 2012.

²⁰Interview with a member of a regional campaign team of the NDC, October 23, 2012.

²¹Interview with a member of a regional campaign team of the NDC, October 23, 2012.

²²Interview with a member of a constituency campaign team of the NDC, December 1, 2012.

“[...] you cannot have a particular area being for only one political party. Definitely, you’ll have one or two people who will sympathize with you. So you don’t say that because this area is an opposition area, you don’t go there. You go there.”²³

The anticipation that convincing supporters of the opposition would be very difficult could account for why the findings from the quantitative analysis indicate that the incumbent campaigned least in NPP strongholds.

The effect of the ethnic makeup of constituencies on the incumbent’s campaign

To further investigate to what extent the incumbent targeted constituencies where his supporters were concentrated, I look at a more indirect measure of partisanship; namely the share of members of the ethnic groups that tend to vote for the NDC. The coefficient of the variable *Ethnic partisan* suggests that the frequency of campaign rallies is positively related to the share of the ethnic groups of the Ga-Adangbe, the Ewe and the Northerners, reported in models 1 to 3 in Table 5.3. The relationship between the share of ethnic supporters and rallies also holds when a dichotomous measure is used, where the dummy variable *Ethnic partisans dominant* takes on the value 1 if these three ethnic groups taken together constitute the largest ethnic coalition in a constituency, and 0 otherwise.²⁴ The effect of this dichotomous measure of ethnic partisanship is plotted in Figure 5.6.²⁵ Simulating the expected number of rallies suggests that the incumbent on average held .35 rallies (+/- .05) in constituencies where these ethnic partisans were in the minority, and .74 campaign events (+/- .11) in localities where this ethnic coalition constituted the largest ethnic group.

Interviews with campaign managers of the ruling party confirmed that they used ethnic profiles of constituencies to infer where their likely supporters were concentrated. One illustration of this is the quote cited earlier in this chapter on page 72, in which a member of the national campaign team of the NDC explained which ethnic groups he regarded as his party’s ethnic partisans.²⁶ Other interviews further underline the importance for NDC’s campaigners to allocate campaign rallies with respect to ethnic arithmetics in the various constituencies.²⁷ These investigations of the relationship between the concentration of actual and likely supporters on the number of rallies hosted in a constituency point to the following: On the one hand, the incumbent seems to have visited swing constituencies potentially

²³ Interview with a member of one of NDC’s regional campaign teams, October 23, 2012.

²⁴ See models 1-2, reported in Table 5.4.


²⁵ Simulations are based on model 1, reported in Table 5.4.

²⁶ Interview with a member of the national campaign team of the NDC, December 18, 2012.

²⁷ “NDC: Yes, we have NDC strongholds and NPP strongholds, you see. Stronghold of NPP is New Weija. Then afterwards typical NPP, because of the tribe, more Ashantis. Because when you see Mallam ward, we have Gas, we have Ewe, we have Haussa, you see, so Mallam is fifty-fifty [...], fifty-fifty [between] NDC and NPP. So if you try hard, because we have Gas and Haussa here at Mallam. When you go to Gbawe it’s the same thing. But when you enter the new side - Akan who normally vote for NPP [concentrated there], so there’s nothing you can do.” (Interview with a constituency-level campaign manager of the NDC, December 1, 2012.)

slightly more often than his strongholds. However, the difference is marginal and not statistically significant. The safest conclusion to draw from this finding is that there was a tendency for the incumbent to travel more often to swing constituencies *and* his party's strongholds than to NPP strongholds.²⁸ On the other hand, the effect of actual past support in these constituencies, operationalized with a continuous measure of past vote share, and the effect of two different operationalizations of the share of ethnic partisans corroborate the Hypothesis 1 that campaign efforts were concentrated on NDC partisans.

Figure 5.6: Effect of share of ethnic partisans on incumbent rallies



The findings regarding the effect of the share of ethnic partisans are in line with the the positive correlation between past vote share for the ruling party and how many times the incumbent visited a constituency. Taken together, these findings suggest that the incumbent's campaign followed a logic of targeting his likely supporters.

Other characteristics of constituencies that could be indicative of where partisans of the NDC are likely to be concentrated, do not show statistically significant effects on the incumbent's campaign travel. This is in line with past research on the determinants of voting behavior in Ghana that has found more robust effects for ethnicity on voting behavior than for other socio-demographic voter characteristics (Fridy, 2007; Lindberg and Morrison, 2005). If past support and ethnicity were better indicators of how

²⁸I discuss potential motivations of candidates to travel to swing constituencies later in this chapter, after I present the findings on the strategy of the challenger.

Table 5.4: Effect of partisanship and turnout on incumbent rallies

| | (1) Turnout | (2) Interaction turnout, ethnicity | (3) Interaction turnout, support |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Turnout08 | -2.168 ⁺ (-1.68) | -2.948 ⁺ (-1.83) | -1.026 (-0.47) |
| No sanitary | 0.559 (0.75) | 0.398 (0.52) | 0.612 (0.79) |
| Urban | 0.426 (0.65) | 0.399 (0.61) | 0.524 (0.83) |
| Distance to Accra | 0.0924 (0.97) | 0.0997 (1.05) | 0.0738 (0.77) |
| Primary | -1.887 (-0.86) | -1.883 (-0.86) | -2.306 (-1.10) |
| Ethnic partisans dominant | 0.759*** (3.76) | -0.742 (-0.39) | |
| Low status occupation | -1.446 (-1.13) | -1.388 (-1.09) | -1.058 (-0.83) |
| Ethnic partisans*Turnout | | 2.116 (0.79) | |
| Swing*Turnout | | | 0.0782 (0.03) |
| NDC stronghold*Turnout | | | -2.697 (-0.73) |
| NDC stronghold | | | 2.770 (1.05) |
| Swing constituency | | | 0.842 (0.40) |
| Constant | 1.787 (0.81) | 2.428 (1.03) | 1.047 (0.43) |
| Inalpha | -1.496** (-2.27) | -1.512** (-2.27) | -1.582** (-2.26) |
| Wald χ^2 | 36.92*** | 37.54*** | 38.82*** |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.07 |
| Pseudo Log-Likelihood | -277.94 | -277.63 | -276.99 |
| LR Alpha | 3.54*** | 3.45*** | 3.07*** |
| Number of observations | 274 | 274 | 274 |

Values are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis


+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Ghanaians are likely to vote than other voters characteristics, it would be rational that candidates mainly look at these factors when allocating campaign effort. However, I will show later in this chapter that the challenger did consider other demographic characteristics than ethnicity when deciding where to campaign.

The effect of past turnout on the incumbent's campaign

In order to identify whether the incumbent targeted areas of support and partisanship with the goal to mobilize turnout, I present the findings on the effect of turnout in the following paragraphs. In all models the size of the coefficient of past turnout is negative, as we would expect, based on the expectation that parties mobilize turnout. Figure 5.7 plots the expected number of rallies per constituency by the incumbent, relative to levels of turnout in the 2008 elections. The graph is based on model 3, reported in Table 5.3. It indicates that constituencies at minimum levels of turnout of around 40% (in the 2008 election), received on average 1.3 visits by the incumbent ($\pm .6$) and constituencies at maximum levels of 98% turnout, were only visited .22 ($\pm .08$) times, lending support to Hypothesis 2.


Figure 5.7: Effect of past turnout on number of rallies per constituency



The results so far suggest that the incumbent visited constituencies in order to mobilize turnout. In the following section, I investigate the effect of turnout, conditional on levels of past support and ethnic partisanship, to see whether he only mobilized turnout among his likely supporters or also among other voters. I estimate interactions between the dummy variables *NDC stronghold* and *Swing* and past turnout. The results are reported in model 2 in Table 5.4. Neither the coefficient of the interaction *NDC*

*stronghold*Turnout*, nor that of *Swing*Turnout* reach statistical significance. However, a graphical investigation of the effect shows the expected tendency. Figure 5.8 illustrates the expected change in the number of rallies by the incumbent if turnout increases from its minimum to its maximum value, in NPP and NDC strongholds and in swing constituencies. The effect of an increase of turnout is always negative. This is in line with the direct negative effect of turnout histories on incumbent visits. It means that the incumbent mobilized turnout across constituencies, not only in his strongholds, but also among NPP supporters and indifferent voters. However, confirming my expectations, the effect of past turnout is substantially stronger in NDC strongholds, than in other constituencies, and only here is the effect significantly different from zero, providing support for Hypothesis 2.

Figure 5.8: Effect of change in past turnout on number of rallies per constituency



I also investigate whether the effect of past turnout on the number of times the incumbent visited a constituency varies between areas where his ethnic partisans constitute the majority and where they are in the minority. There is, however, no statistically significant difference.²⁹

Summary of the findings on the incumbent's campaign

The investigations of turnout and various measures of partisanship allow me to differentiate between different goals the incumbent's campaign has pursued, which are graphically illustrated in Chapter 3 in

²⁹See model 3, reported in Table 5.4.

Figure 3.2. The findings suggest that the incumbent concentrated campaign efforts on voters who are likely to have a positive bias toward the candidate, based on their past voting behavior and their ethnic background. Further in line with my expectation, the incumbent's campaign concentrated efforts on constituencies with low turnout histories, where it could anticipate unlikely voters to be concentrated. These findings corroborate the hypothesis that the incumbent allocated his campaign rallies with the aim to mobilize *potential supporters*, rather than to waste resources on his supporters who were likely to turn out, had they not been addressed by him. He, hence, did not apply a strategy of "rewarding" his "loyalists" (Nichter, 2008, p. 20), as the latter would have implied a positive relationship between partisanship and the number of rallies hosted in a locality *and* with past turnout. However, the findings do not speak for a strategy designed to mobilize turnout exclusively among *potential* supporters. The findings rather indicate that the incumbent also mobilized turnout in swing constituencies, where indifferent voters were likely to be concentrated. The strategy of mobilizing turnout among indifferent voters has been referred to as double persuasion (Nichter, 2008, p. 20), as is illustrated in Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3.

5.3.2 The challenger

I now turn to the logic behind the allocation of rally events by the challenger. Figure 5.9 shows the distribution of the dependent variable. It suggests that the challenger campaigned in fewer constituencies than the incumbent. According to the data, he visited only 69 out of the 275 constituencies during the three-months campaigning period under investigation. This is likely due to the fact that the challenger had visited many constituencies before the launch of the official campaigning period, as the national campaign manager of the NPP confirmed in an interview.³⁰ The incumbent was unable to engage in early campaigning as he was only endorsed as the flagbearer of the NDC in August. In the visited constituencies, the challenger organized between one and 8 campaign rallies per constituency.


I first estimate the effect of various measures of support, partisanship and turnout on the number of times the challenger visited a constituency. The results are reported in Table 5.5. The results with respect to ethnic partisanship are similar to those of the strategy of the incumbent. The percentage of the ethnic partisans of the NPP – the Ashanti – is positively related to a constituency being visited by the challenger, as the positive coefficient of the variable *Ashanti (logged)* suggests, lending support for Hypothesis 1.³¹

³⁰“The phase started in July 2011 and ended in March, 2012. That was the long phase, where we exposed him to the public for them to be able to define him for themselves and also begin to get our message across. We came to a medium phase. [...] The idea was to give him exposure, also to take information and to engage small communities [...]. The phase ended in March 2012. In April 2012 began the medium phase and ended in August 2012.” (Interview with a member of the national campaign team of the NPP, November 28, 2012).

³¹See models 1-3, reported in Table 5.5.

In a constituency at average levels of Ashanti, the challenger held .37 rallies (+/- .05). This drops to .14 rallies (+/- .09) in a constituency at minimum values of the share of the percentage of Ashanti and increases to .85 (+/- .29) at maximum levels. of Ashanti residing in a constituency.³² Different from the incumbent, however, whether or not his ethnic partisans were in the majority or minority does not have an effect on the challenger's campaign, when measured as a dichotomous variable (not shown).

Figure 5.9: Number of rallies per constituency by the challenger



In contrast to this, the strategy of the challenger with respect to past vote shares of the NPP and histories of turnout differed from that of the incumbent. The victory margin of his party over the ruling party in past elections is negatively related to how often the challenger visited a constituency, as the negative coefficient of *Victory margin* indicates.³³ The challenger hosted .10 (+/- .07) rallies in constituencies where his party had gained a maximum margin of victory. The expected number of rallies increases to .29 (+/- .05) in constituencies at average levels of victory margin and it increases to 1.21 rallies (+/- .75) in constituencies where the NPP victory margin has been lowest in past elections. These unexpected findings suggest that the challenger, different from the incumbent, tried to win new voters both in competitive constituencies and in strongholds of the ruling party.

To further shed light on this strategy, I investigate the effect of how many times a constituency has been won by the NPP and the NDC on how many opposition rallies were hosted here. The results are

³²Calculations are based on model 1, reported in Table 5.5.

³³See models 1 and 3, reported in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5: Effect of partisanship on challenger rallies

| | (1) Victory margin | (2) Support categorical | (3) Constituency characteristics |
|------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Ashanti (logged) | 0.214** (2.18) | 0.133 (1.63) | 0.153 (1.48) |
| Turnout 2008 | 0.923 (0.47) | | 0.683 (0.35) |
| Victory margin | -0.265 (-1.58) | | -0.355** (-2.14) |
| Distance to Accra | -0.358*** (-3.40) | -0.335*** (-3.27) | 0.00377 (0.03) |
| NDC stronghold | | -0.0955 (-0.23) | |
| Swing constituency | | 0.556+ (1.90) | |
| Urban | | | 1.941** (2.13) |
| Primary | | | 1.279 (0.41) |
| Low status occupation | | | -4.461+ (-1.75) |
| Constant | -0.235 (-0.16) | -0.0869 (-0.31) | -2.252 (-0.74) |
| lnalpha | 0.534+ (1.81) | 0.463 (1.52) | 0.130 (0.38) |
| Wald χ^2 | 25.10*** | 27.82*** | 49.26*** |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.11 |
| Pseudo Log-Likelihood | -220.51 | -219.44 | -208.43 |
| LR Alpha | 38.73*** | 35.14*** | 24.99*** |
| Number of observations | 273 | 274 | 273 |

Values are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis


+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

illustrated in Figure 5.10.³⁴ They suggest that the challenger campaigned most in swing constituencies, followed by his rival's strongholds and least in his own party's safe havens. It is also underlined by the qualitative evidence gained that the NPP campaign strategically chose constituencies where it hoped to be able to persuade voters. Explaining why his campaign chose to host a rally in a particular constituency in the South of the Volta Region, compared to in another constituency located in the North of the same region, a national campaign manager of the NPP explained:

*“we are more sure of the support up north than south. So there is no need to go and preach to the converted. Secondly, Dzodze Aflao has lot of persuadables and we believe that holding the rally there [...] may sway some people onto the bandwagon. So we chose Dzodze.”*³⁵

So far the results suggest that the challenger campaigned among his ethnic partisans, but combined this strategy with trying to attract new voters, mostly in swing constituencies, but also in the rival party's strongholds.

Figure 5.10: Effect of past support on the number of rallies by the challenger



Among other characteristics of constituencies, the degree to which a constituency consisted of urban or rural neighborhoods and the share of inhabitants with low status jobs seem to have affected the challenger's campaign. He held .36 rallies (+/- .07) in a constituency at average levels of the number of households living in urban neighborhoods. He only held .17 rallies in most rural constituencies (+/- .07),

³⁴The graph is based on model 2, reported in Table 5.5.

³⁵Interview with a member of NPP's regional campaign Team, November 28, 2012.

and 1.3 rallies (+/- .84) in the most urbanized constituencies. This relationship between urbanization of a constituency and the number of rallies held there is illustrated in Figure 5.11. The positive effect of the degree to which a constituency was urban on how many times it was visited could be driven by various motivations. One aspect certainly is that the challenger targeted urban centers, because the population density is higher here than in rural areas and he could, thus, reach more people at a rally. This is underpinned by the following statement by a member of NPP's national campaign team:

*"Yes, there are variables that determine our core and our weak areas. In planning the rallies, for example in Volta Region... If you want to host a national or regional rally, where do you host it? Within Volta Region we have bases of support, like Dzodze-Aflao. We have a good number of supporters there. We get something close to 12,000 votes. Or all the way up in the North, in Nkwanta we get around 16,000 votes. We chose Dzodze for a number of reasons: Population density, as opposed to Nkwanta, where villages are scattered all over the place. There, aggregating people will be time consuming and expensive."*³⁶

The NPP's focus on centers of population density is in line with campaigning strategies observed in studies on US elections (e.g. Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002).

In addition to cities exhibiting a higher concentration of the population, the positive effect of the urbanization of a constituency on the frequency with which the challenger campaign here, is driven by a concentration of the challenger's campaign rallies in the NPP's main strongholds Kumasi and the capital Accra. This is indicated by the positive and statistically significant effect of the distance of a constituency to Accra (*Distance to Accra*) on how many times it was visited by the challenger.³⁷ The concentration of rallies around Kumasi and Accra is also evident in Figure 5.1b. Indeed, one of the opposition's regional campaign managers confirmed the strategic concentration of campaign rallies in Accra, due to the fact that the party generally gains more support in the capital, than anywhere else in the region of Greater Accra:

*"In Greater Accra, most of the concentration of votes are in the city itself.[...] For that matter we have concentrated much more here than the on the rural [Greater] Accra, when we greet them to vote in this election."*³⁸

Moreover, the frequency with which the NPP's campaign hosted rallies in urban centers is indicative of the attempt to reach the party's potential supporters who tend to be richer, more educated voters with generally a higher SES who are most likely to be concentrated in urban areas (Fridy, 2007; Lindberg and Morrison, 2005). This is underpinned by the statement of one of NPP's regional campaign managers, which I cited in the beginning of this chapter, on page 66, in which he explained that the NPP focused


³⁶Interview with a member of NPP's national campaign team, November 28, 2012.

³⁷See Table 5.5.

³⁸Interview with a regional campaign manager of the NPP, November 29, 2012.

campaign rallies on “cosmopolitan areas” where the party “win[s] a lot of votes.”³⁹ Finally, the interpretation of the focus on urban centers as a strategy to address NPP partisans is also supported by the negative effect of the share of inhabitants with low status jobs on how many times the challenger visited a constituency. These are voters who, based on their income profiles, are likely to be rather partisans of the NDC (see also Fridy, 2007; Lindberg and Morrison, 2005).

Figure 5.11: Effect of degree of urbanization on the number of rallies by the challenger



Speaking about the rural constituencies in Greater Accra where the NDC has gained a plurality of the votes, a regional campaign manager of the NPP said the following:

“The numbers there, the NDC wins there, but the numbers are not great. That is the rural [Greater] Accra and then the Zongos.⁴⁰ These are the areas NDC wins. The places are [...] less endowed areas, [where][...] illiteracy and economic [hardship are higher].”⁴¹

Conditional effect of turnout

In order to test whether the challenger allocated his campaign rallies with the aim to motivate voters to go to the polls, I now turn to the effect of past turnout.

³⁹Interview with a member of one of NPP’s regional campaign teams, November 28, 2012.

⁴⁰“Zongos” are communities of mostly Muslim Northerners who have emigrated out of the Northern Regions to live in Southern Ghana.

⁴¹Interview with a regional campaign manager of the NDC, November 29, 2012.

Table 5.6: Effect of partisanship and turnout on challenger rallies

| | (1) Interaction turnout, support | (2) Interaction turnout, ethnicity |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Turnout 2008 | 0.0786 (0.03) | 3.565 (1.41) |
| Swing constituency | -1.078 (-0.35) | |
| NDC stronghold | 0.259 (0.05) | |
| Ashanti (logged) | 0.120 (1.29) | 0.381*** (2.73) |
| Distance to Accra | -0.351*** (-3.24) | -0.265** (-2.38) |
| NDC Stronghold*Turnout | -0.534 (-0.08) | |
| Swing*Turnout | 2.300 (0.55) | |
| Ashanti*Turnout | | -3.406** (-2.27) |
| Constant | -0.153 (-0.07) | -1.385 (-0.83) |
| Inalpha | 0.459 (1.51) | 0.502 ⁺ (1.70) |
| Wald χ^2 | 28.45*** | 27.90*** |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.06 | 0.06 |
| Pseudo Log-Likelihood | -218.84 | -219.11 |
| LR Alpha | 35.23*** | 38.42*** |
| Number of observations | 273 | 273 |

Values are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis

+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

My findings do not suggest a direct effect of turnout on the allocation of the challenger's campaign rallies across constituencies. Compared to the incumbent, turnout in the preceding election does not show a statistically significant effect on the number of times the challenger visited a constituency.⁴² In order to test whether the challenger mobilized potential supporters, I also investigated the effect of turnout conditional on the political makeup of a constituency. I did not find that the effect of turnout varied between strongholds of one of the two parties and swing constituencies.⁴³ However, the effect of past turnout differed across constituencies with a different share of NPP's ethnic partisans, lending support to Hypothesis 2. The negative size of the interaction term of the share of the Ashanti and past levels of turnout suggests that the positive effect of the proportion of ethnic partisans decreases with increasing levels of turnout. This means that the challenger campaigned more in constituencies with a high share of ethnic partisans the lower past turnout was. This result speaks for a strategy of mobilizing potential supporters, which is in line my theoretical expectations.

Summary of the findings on the challenger's campaign

The findings on the strategic allocation of campaign rallies by the challenger suggest that he combined a strategy of attracting independent voters with that of mobilizing ethnic partisans. This resonates with the strategic calculations a member of the NPP's national campaign team explained to me. On the one hand, his main goal during the 2012 campaigns was to attract independent voters. The reason for this, he said was that he evaluated partisan alignment among NPP and NDC supporters to be so strong that there was not much to gain from trying to persuade opposed voters. In addition, he argued that there was not much to lose from campaigning less among his own supporters.⁴⁴ On the other hand, he argued that rallies were better suited to addressing one's supporters than to reach new voters:

*"My thinking was that rallies only preach to the converted. If you hold a big rally, those who will attend, are those who are going to vote NPP anyway."*⁴⁵

This can account for why the challenger, in addition to holding rallies in swing constituencies, also concentrated rallies in constituencies where its ethnic partisans were concentrated. The fact that the challenger campaigned more in swing constituencies than in his own strongholds speaks for an attempt to attract new voters. It is difficult, however, to further disaggregate this strategy. As I illustrated in Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3, targeting indifferent voters, who are likely to be concentrated in swing

⁴²See models 1 and 3, reported in Table 5.5.

⁴³See model 1, reported in Table 5.6. See also Figure B.1 in the appendix for a graphical illustration of this result.

⁴⁴"If NPP is in power, half their voters will always vote NPP. If NDC is in power, no matter how bad the economy is, supporters vote NDC. That leaves a middle ground of about five to ten percent maximum. Those are the people we search" (Interview with a member of NPP's national campaign team, November 28, 2012).

⁴⁵Interview with a member of the national campaign team of the NPP, November 28, 2012.

constituencies, can be indicative of a strategy of pure persuasion or double persuasion. A pure persuasion strategy would target voters who are indifferent between both candidates, but likely to turn out. A strategy of double persuasion would motivate indifferent voters to develop an affinity for the candidate and motivate them to turn out. As I neither found a direct effect of past turnout nor did I find a conditional effect of turnout, depending on past voting behavior in a constituency, it is difficult to say whether the NPP's campaign followed a logic of pure or double persuasion. As the size of the coefficient for past turnout is positive, however, it might be more likely that the NPP applied a pure persuasion strategy, but the findings do not allow for certain inferences on this.

Differences in the incumbent's and the challenger's campaigns

The results with regard to the effect of turnout on the challenger's rallies differ from how past turnout has shaped the incumbent's campaign. It seems that the incumbent more widely mobilized turnout among both partisans and possible new voters, while the challenger only mobilized turnout in constituencies, where the share of his ethnic partisans was high. One plausible explanation for why these candidates' campaigns differed was that it was less important for the challenger to campaign in his strongholds than for the incumbent. One reason might be that turnout rates have been higher in NPP strongholds than in NDC strongholds or swing constituencies. Average turnout in NPP strongholds across the 2000, 2004 and 2008 elections was 78.5% (+/- 0.4), compared to 74% in swing constituencies (+/- .08), and 72.2% (+/- .04) in the NDC's safe havens.

Another reason for why the incumbent campaigned more among his potential supporters than the challenger, was probably that the NDC was more risk averse than the NPP. The NPP campaign was likely to be more certain about how its supporters would react to its flagbearer Nana Akufo-Addo, than the NDC's campaign team was about their candidate. While the NPP's candidate contested the office of the president already for the third time, it was the first time for John Dramani Mahama to run for president. In addition, it was the first time since Ghana's re-introduction of multiparty elections that a Northerner ran in a presidential election. This created a level of uncertainty for the NDC, because it was unclear how the traditional ethnic partisans, the Ewe and the Ga-Adangbe would embrace this Northern candidate. In addition, like in many West African countries, there is a North-South divide in Ghana, based on religion, with an overwhelmingly Christian South and Muslim North. The country is further divided along income levels, with poverty being more severe in the Northern regions. The support for John Dramani Mahama among NDC partisans in the South could hence not be taken for granted.

Moreover, there was even uncertainty involved in how Northerners would react to John Dramani Mahama. While he does belong to the loose coalition of speakers of the Northern languages, Mahama hails

from an ethnic and a religious minority in the North. He belongs to the ethnic minority of the Gonja, and is a Christian. While his rival candidate was a Southerner, Nana Akuffo Addo's running mate, who vied for the office of the vice president, was a Northerner. This running mate, Mamadu Bawumiah is a Mamprusi, which are part of the majority Dagomba ethnic group of the North. He is also a Muslim such as 60 percent of Ghanaians who live in the three Northern regions (Ofori-Atta, 2012). The NPP thus campaigned with a vice presidential candidate who was likely to appeal to a majority of Northerners which might have created uncertainty for the NDC about how its traditional ethnic support base would react to its own flagbearer.

The patterns I observe are in line with the theory of how party alignment structures campaigning strategies. It has been argued in studies on campaigning in established democracies that in context where party alignment is strong, parties will be likely to direct their campaign at indifferent and swing voters (e.g. Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002, p. 53). When party alignment is weak or turnout is uneven, campaigns have been argued to be more likely to be preoccupied with maintaining their support base (ibid.). The difference between the incumbent's and the challenger's campaign might, hence, stem from lower past turnout rates among NDC partisans, than among NPP voters. In addition, the NPP likely estimated alignment among its supporters to be stronger than the NDC. The fact that two presidential candidates pursued different strategies, also resonates with past research on US campaigns. In a study of campaigning across counties within swing states in the 2008 elections, Chen and Reeves (2011, p. 549-550) found that the incumbent Republican party pursued a mobilization strategy, while the challenger followed a strategy of attracting new voters.

5.4 Summary

This chapter presented a first test of the dissertations key argument, that parties in African elections should focus campaign efforts with the aim to mobilize *potential* supporters. I showed that both candidates campaigned among their supporters, but that the challenger combined this with a quest for attracting new voters, living in swing constituencies. By characterizing groups of voters by their partisan status *and* their habit to turn out, I was able to further disaggregate the strategies these candidates used. My findings suggest that the incumbent mobilized his *potential supporters*, combined with a strategy of double persuasion, which aims at making independent voters develop a vote intention for the candidate and motivate them to turn out. I, further, found that the challenger combined a strategy of mobilizing support among the NPP's ethnic partisans with attracting new voters, mainly in swing constituencies, but to a lesser extend also among opposed voters. Had I only investigated the distribution of partisans

across different constituencies and ignored the likelihood of voters in these constituencies to turn out – like past research on campaign rallies has (Bartels, 1985, Hill and McKee, 2005, p. 706, Charnock, McCann and Tenpas, 2009, Chen and Reeves, 2011, Doherty, 2007) – I would not have been able to identify these strategies.

The next chapter tests whether the use of local promises made at these rallies also followed a logic of mobilizing potential supporters. In addition, it puts the argument to test that candidates concentrate local promises in contexts in which these promises can be expected to be most credible.

One of the statements by a national campaign manager of the NPP (cited on page 96) could raise the concern that the pattern of campaigning observed is due to a particularity of campaign rallies, compared to other campaigning strategies. The campaign manager explained that he organized rallies in his party's strongholds, because he thought rallies only "preach to the converted," and are little suitable to convince new voters. He, further, explained that to reach indifferent voters, he used door-to-door campaigning in swing constituencies.⁴⁶ Based on this information, the pattern of mobilization I identified could be an artifact of the particular campaigning strategy applied. To rule out this concern, I test the argument that parties use campaign efforts to mobilize their potential supporters in Chapter 8, in which I analyze the use of clientelistic targeting. My interviews with lower-level campaign organizers suggest that such targeting of voters with individual benefits is part of the door-to-door campaigning in Ghana.⁴⁷ I will

⁴⁶“The most effective way, I consider to reaching the persuadables, was to get them in their own environment, either their homes or their work places or their villages, where they feel comfortable. Where they feel in control of their emotions. There you can talk to them. So we designed the campaign on the basis of small outreach programs”(Interview with a member of NPP's national campaign team, November 28.)

⁴⁷“As for the door-to-door we enter houses. We enter this house and we see this man and we approach him with great care that we are NPP. We want to seek your support. We want to you to vote for our big man Nana Addo. Nana Addo is a man of substance, is a man that is taking this country at the heart. It's a man that wants to push every Ghanaian in this country to go to school because education, education brought civilization. So from there we leave our party paraphernalia to them. Then we go to another that's house-to-house. Then offices to offices, too. [...] Some accommodate you because they need fertilizer. They thought if they accommodate you that you can assist them by getting them fertilizer. Some even demanded for fishing nets. Some even divided woods to construct boats, canoeing. You see, and then they...

MR: ...demand from you?

NPP: They demand from you. But how sure are you that they are coming to vote for you? That is the big question.

MR: So what do you do? Do you give it or you don't?

NPP: No, no, no, some of the demands are so heavy and it's our difficult zone, too, so the only thing we normally do is to promise that, 'let's strike a deal, vote for me if I come, I will speak to your need'. You see?

MR: Would you be able to get back to that individual farmer then again after the campaign?

NPP: Yes, normally we hold a book like this. So when you're talking your campaigners will be writing their names, their phone numbers so you communicate [with] them through phone, through text to assure them that no, you haven't forgotten them. So you'll be in close touch. This is some of the campaign strategy.

MR: But then after the election, you still don't know if they voted for you?

NPP: Yes, when the voting finished and you go to that polling station you'll realize that your strategy, you haven't seen it [the expected turnout]. You don't need to talk to them again, you don't need to talk to them again.

MR: But if you've seen it?

NPP: If you've seen, if you've seen the mark. Even though you didn't win, but you've seen the mark which you are not expecting. Then that means the people have tried to buy your ideas. So you need to be interacting with them. [...].

MR: So that means, you will then provide what you promised them?

NPP: No you cannot.

MR: Because you didn't win?

show in the analysis of campaigning in Ghana and nine other African countries in Chapter 8, that also clientelistic benefits are concentrated on parties' supporters, and not on indifferent voters.

NPP: Yes, but if you are in a position, assuming you have some contact with some companies, you can start with exchange. You have the means, you can do it.

MR: You can give jobs or...?

NPP: Yes, you can give jobs.

MR: When it's your own company?

NPP: Yeah, or a friend's company" (Interview with a regional campaign manager of the NPP, December 15, 2012.)

Chapter 6

Credible candidates and responsive constituents: the strategic use of local promises

The preceding chapter has shown that presidential candidates in Ghana spent a substantive amount of their time on the campaign trail motivating potential supporters to vote. I also found partial support for the argument that candidates visit their party's strongholds on their campaign trail if voters with a low probability to turn out are concentrated there. The findings with regard to the candidate visits to the various constituencies in Ghana lend support to the dissertation's key argument that parties and candidates focus their campaign resources on potential supporters, rather than exclusively targeting undecided voters. This chapter puts this argument to a further test. It analyses the campaign promises made at the campaign rallies investigated in Chapter 5. I investigate the promising of local club goods versus national public goods at rallies held in constituencies across Ghana during the three-months campaigning period in the run-up to the 2012 presidential elections. In this analysis, I test whether candidates indeed made such local promises in situations where they were most credible in making them.

“All politics is local. The country is not unified in terms of levels of development. There is a lot of isolation in terms of [...] developmental needs. So the men sitting in Bongo care less about roads. Because their world view and lifestyle does not lead them outside. So if we are talking about roads, he (sic!) is not going anywhere. The key thing for him is that there is no water in Bongo, right?! So his issue then becomes drilling more holes, so that he has access to potable water for himself, his crops and his animals. If we are not able to address their local issues, they are not interested. Politics is about solving the daily problems of people. And identifying we are addressing the problems and get the attention much more than with broad national programs, which may benefit them in the long run, but in the short

*run it will not benefit them. Or which may benefit them immediately, but they might not even be aware of the benefits. [...]. Therefore, our messaging has to be localized. [...] So that the candidate can walk into [...] [a community] and say 'Yes, you live in a cocoa growing area [...]. Fishing is one of your most important off-season activities. But there is no bridge to the other side of your cocoa farms. You have to go in canoes all the time with all the crocodiles and risk your life. It is the government's intention that, if you vote for us, we will build a bridge over the river and allow you easy access to the other side of your [...] lands.'"*¹

This quote by a member of the national campaign team of Ghana's main opposition party NPP illustrates the importance for presidential candidates to include promises of local policies into their campaign message. The campaign manager gives two reasons for why the promising of local policies to voters can be a beneficial strategy when vying for votes. First, he emphasizes that voters might prefer parties to implement local versus broad-based programmatic policies, because their impact can be felt much quicker than that of national policies. In addition, the ramifications of local policies, he suggests, are more visible than those of national policies. This evaluation is in line with research on the types of policies that Ghanaian voters consider most when evaluating their members of parliament. In a study on accountability pressures MPs face in Ghana, Lindberg finds the following. When making up their minds of whom to vote for in parliamentary elections, voters consider the provision of local club goods by their MPs more than their performance with respect to national public goods (Lindberg, 2010, p. 123-132). The second feature of local promises, the campaign manager alludes to, is that the provision of local policies can be made conditional on voting in an electoral constituency. As the benefits that are being promised, such as the building of a new Senior High School, first and foremost benefit constituents living in one electoral constituency, politicians can use the implementation of such projects as a means to reward or punish voters for voting behavior in a constituency. This feature of local campaign promises makes it a particularly effective strategy as voters might feel compelled to support a candidate, because they want the High School to be built in their constituency. They might be less compelled to vote for the party based on a national, programmatic promise such as the introduction of free SHS education, for example. I argue that this is because voters know that the party cannot use the realization of free tuition to target certain constituencies and reward or punish them. If a national programmatic policy, such as the abolishment of school fees, is implemented, every child eligible for the policy will benefit from it, no matter whether the constituency he or she lives in has supported the victorious party in the election or not.

Of course, if the promising of local club goods is a particularly effective campaign strategy, parties would like to apply it as widely as possible. The need for the provision of local club goods and basic

¹Interview with a member of the national campaign team of the NPP, November 28, 2012.

local infrastructure is certainly wide-spread enough in a country with almost 40% of the population without electricity and more than half of the population without access to pipe-borne water in their home.² In addition, voters use the attention they receive during the campaign season to make politicians aware of their most urgent needs. Often they also signal to candidates that they will only support them if candidates address the issues that are dear to them (see also Harding, 2013a).³ In the 2000 national election campaigns Ghana's newspapers featured headlines such as the following: "Mafi villages say, 'no power, no vote'" (Ghanaweb, 2000). It referred to voters demanding to be connected to the national electricity grid and threatening not to vote if the relevant steps were not taken. The urgency of such demands and their nation-wide scope is underscored by the fact that such demands are not limited to rural, so-called 'deprived' areas, but that they are also raised by urban dwellers in the capital as the following quote illustrates:

"No Water, No Vote [...] The people of Teshie, a suburb of Accra have threatened not to vote in the 2004 general elections if steps are not taken to solve the perennial water shortage affecting the town"(Ghanaweb, 2003).

Not only Ghanaian voters make use of the increased attention ordinary folk receive from politicians during the campaign season. The "No land, No house No vote"-campaign, which was born in the run-up to South Africa's 2004 elections, is another example (Symphony Way Pavement Dwellers, 2011).

These observations suggest that the use of local promises might be a particularly effective and hence attractive strategy to campaigners in young democracies. Hence candidates would like to broadly apply this strategy. However if a candidate is concerned with his reputation in keeping campaign promises once in office, he cannot respond to all needs in the run-up to an election. Candidates can rather be expected to strategically choose groups of voters whom they target with election promises. I have argued that they should focus their promises of local club goods in situations in which these promises can be expected to generate additional votes. This is the case first, in situations where candidates are most credible. Second, candidates should make local promises when they face voters who are unlikely to turn out without being promised the provision of local club goods. Candidates' credibility hinges on incumbency status and the level of affinity residents in a constituency exhibit for them.

The remainder of the chapter discusses the expectations on the use of local promises that can be derived from the central argument. In addition, I extend the argument, presented in Chapter 3, by formulating hypotheses on how the incumbent's use of local promises is likely to differ from the challenger's. I then

²According to the most recent census, conducted in the year of 2010, 64.2% of households use electricity as their main source of lighting (p. 17) and 46.5% of households use pipe-borne water as their main source of drinking water (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012, p. 16).

³See Auyero (2000, p. 72) for evidence that this is a strategy also used by voters in Latin America.

describe the data used in the analysis and present the results. The chapter concludes with discussing the implications of these findings for the subsequent empirical chapters and the dissertation's central research question.

6.1 Theoretical expectations on the use of local promises as a campaign strategy

I have argued in Chapter 3 that candidates should overwhelmingly make promises of local club goods in situations, in which they are most credible in making these promises. I have further argued that their credibility hinges on the audience they face in these constituencies. As candidates can be expected to be more credible in making local promises in constituencies where their partisans are concentrated,⁴ promises are likely to be more effective here. Candidates have incentives to use those local promises in contexts in which they anticipate them to be most effective. Therefore, I argue that they should concentrate these appeals on constituencies, in which their partisans are concentrated.

I have, furthermore, argued in Chapter 5 that it would not be rational for candidates to target core supporters who are certain to turn out with campaign rallies. The same logic also applies to their decision of promising local club goods to voters. I expect candidates to focus such campaign promises on those of their supporters, who would potentially abstain from voting, were they not promised local benefit.

In the following paragraphs, I present an additional expectation regarding the use of local promises. I expect the credibility of campaign promises to hinge not only on whether voters support a particular party or not. I argue that incumbents are more credible in promising benefits to voters than opposition candidates, independent of the types of voters they make promises to. This argument is based on research on political clientelism which regards incumbents as more credible in promising individual benefits to voters than opposition candidates. This is the case, as at the time of making the promise, incumbents already have discretion over the distribution of these goods (Medina and Stokes, 2007; Wantchekon, 2003, p. 422). They can, hence, make costly investments already at campaigning time which increases the credibility that they will follow up on the promise after the election. A candidate can, for example, promise to build a local road and already start the delivery of materials needed to build the road at the time of the promise. This strategy is illustrated by the following example of a local promise made by the incumbent in the Pusiga constituency, in the Upper East Region during the 2012 campaign period:

“In this area there are many communities waiting for electricity. I want to assure you, we

⁴This expectation is based on past research indicating that partisans evaluate campaign messages by candidates whose party they feel close to more favorably than those by other candidates (see Bartels, 2002; Gerber, Huber and Washinton, 2010).

*have signed the Memorandum of Understanding with the Chinese government and some poles have been delivered. I want to assure you as president of this country that in no time your electricity is coming and the next time I come to Pusiga all your communities will be shining as bright as the stars.”*⁵

In most political systems in Africa, the executive enjoys a large leeway over state spending (e.g. van de Walle, 2003). This includes the allocation of local club goods in many countries and also in Ghana (Ichino and Nathan, 2013, p. 348).⁶ In such a context, incumbents can strategically allocate local club goods just as they can distribute clientelistic benefits. Since they have access to state resources at the time of the campaign and discretion over the allocation of resources, they can be expected to be more credible when promising local club goods than opposition candidates.⁷ Against this backdrop, I expect the incumbent to rely more on the strategy of promising local club goods than the challenger.

H1: The incumbent makes use of local promises more frequently than the challenger.

Based on the theoretical expectations summarized above, and in Chapter 3, I further formulate the following hypotheses:

H2: A candidate makes more local promises, the higher the levels of affinity with himself or his party are in that constituency.

H3: Among constituencies where supporters are concentrated, candidates make more local promises the lower levels of past turnout.

6.1.1 Testing the theory in Ghana

The empirical tests of the hypotheses on the strategic use of local promises is based on a content-analysis of campaign speeches by the two main candidates in Ghana’s 2012 election. The collection of these data is described in Chapter 4. As in Chapter 5, I perform a quantitative cross-sectional analysis where the unit of analysis is the constituency. The results of this quantitative analysis are interpreted in the light of the evidence gained from the interviews conducted with campaign managers.

Representativeness of the sample

The sample of campaign speeches includes 50 speeches by the incumbent and 47 speeches by the challenger. One important question is whether this sample is representative of the population of all rally events held by the incumbent and the challenger. While there is no account of all campaign events

⁵ John Dramani Mahama, Pusiga, November 10, 2012.

⁶ See also the qualitative evidence of this in section 4.2, in Chapter 4.

⁷ On the weakness of the parliament in decision making in Ghana see Lindberg (2010).

available, against which to compare the sample used here,⁸ I can compare the subsample of speeches against a deduplicated sample of rally events, which is based on information from two daily Ghanaian newspapers and the speeches. These are the data that the analysis in the previous chapter was based on.⁹ It is important that the sample of speeches not be biased with regard to the share of rallies held by the incumbent versus the challenger, with regard to the levels of support by the two candidates, or turnout histories. If the sample of speeches contained significantly more rallies by the incumbent than the deduplicated sample, this would bias the sample in favor of finding support for my hypotheses. It would be equally problematic if the speeches sample contained more rallies held in areas of high support for the candidate campaigning there, or in constituencies with low levels of past turnout. Such concerns can, however, largely be ruled out.¹⁰

The distribution of events by the incumbent compared to the challenger is similar across the deduplicated sample and the sample based on only the speeches. The percentage of rallies held by the incumbent is 51.5% (50 out of 97) compared to 48.5% (47 out of 97) held by the challenger in the speeches sample. It is 60% (173 out of 290) and 40% (117 out of 290) respectively in the deduplicated sample.¹¹ This comparison suggests that in case of a bias in the recordings of the speeches, it goes against finding support for the hypothesis that the incumbent more frequently made use of local promises than the challenger. The more events of the challenger are included, the more local promises will also be included in the sample. This means that only an over-representation of rally events by the incumbent in the speeches would be problematic for the present analysis.

Table 6.1 shows that the distribution of events across strongholds of the two candidates and swing constituencies is slightly different in the sample of speeches compared to the deduplicated sample. According to the speeches, the incumbent devoted 30% of his rallies to swing constituencies, 46% of his campaign events to his strongholds and 24% of his rallies to the opposition party's strongholds. This compares to 50% of the incumbent's rallies in swing constituencies, 29% of his rallies in NDC strongholds and 20% of rallies by the incumbent in opposition strongholds, according to the deduplicated sample. This difference is likely driven by pure chance. The content-analysis of the newspapers shows that the candidates oftentimes went on two to four-day tours throughout one region, before moving back to the party's headquarter in Accra, or to the next region. One of the presidential reporters might not have been present at one of these tours of the president or on a few events of such a tour. Given the

⁸The most comprehensive and unbiased account of rally events are most certainly the itineraries of the candidate schedules during the campaigning period compiled by the campaign managements of the two parties. Unfortunately, despite several requests such itineraries were either inexistent or unavailable from the campaign management of the two parties.

⁹See Chapter 4 for a detailed description of this event dataset.

¹⁰Turnout was coded as low if turnout in the 2008 presidential election was lower or equal to the median of 71.2%. It was coded as high if it was above the median turnout level.

¹¹The unit of observation is the rally. Percentages do not always add up to 100% due to rounding.

relatively small size of the sample, this might have slightly biased the speeches sample towards more coverage of strongholds.

Table 6.1: Distribution of rallies across NPP and NDC strongholds and swing constituencies

| | <i>Swing</i> | | <i>Stronghold NDC</i> | | <i>Stronghold NPP</i> | |
|-----------------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-----------------|
| | Speeches | Dedup. sample | Speeches | Dedup. sample | Speeches | Dedup. sample |
| John Mahama (NDC) | 15 (50) 30% | 88 (173) 50% | 23 (50) 46% | 51 (173) 29% | 12 (50) 24% | 34 (173) 20% |
| Nana Akufo-Addo (NPP) | 20 (47) 43% | 60 (117) 52% | 7 (47) 15% | 15 (117) 15% | 20 (47) 43% | 42 (117) 36% |

As for the rallies by the challenger, the speeches report 43% of his rallies being held in swing constituencies, 15% of rallies in NDC strongholds and 43% of the challenger's rallies being hosted in his party's strongholds. This compares to 52% of the challenger's campaign events being located in swing constituencies, 15% of his rallies hosted in ruling party strongholds, and 36% of his campaign rallies organized in opposition strongholds in the deduplicated sample. Both samples indicate that the incumbent devoted most of his time to his strongholds, followed by swing constituencies, and opposition strongholds. Likewise, both samples suggest that the challenger devoted about an equal amount of time on the campaign trail to his strongholds and to swing constituencies. Furthermore, he largely avoided safe havens of the ruling party. While the ranking of the types of constituencies the candidates visited is the same in both samples, the comparison also suggests that swing constituencies are somewhat under-represented in the sample based on the speeches. I consider this in the interpretation of the results.

To compare the distribution of rally events across constituencies with low and high histories of turnout (in the two samples) consider Table 6.2. According to the speeches, the incumbent allocated 61% of his campaign events to constituencies with low turnout levels and 30% to constituencies with high levels of past turnout respectively. The deduplicated sample suggests that the incumbent held 70% of his campaign events in constituencies with low turnout histories and 44% of his campaign events in constituencies with high levels of past turnout. Concerning rally activities of the challenger, the speeches indicate that he spent 62% of his time in constituencies with low and 32% of his time in constituencies with high turnout histories. In the deduplicated sample this compares to 47% of his rallies being located in constituencies with low levels of turnout and 53% of his rallies located in constituencies with histories of high turnout. While both samples suggests that the incumbent held more rallies in areas of low past support and that the opposite is true for the challenger, rallies in constituencies with high turnout histories seem to be slightly under-represented in the sample which is based on the speeches. I take this into consideration when interpreting the results.

Table 6.2: Distribution of rallies across constituencies with low and high turnout histories

| | <i>Turnout Low</i> | | <i>Turnout High</i> | |
|--------------------------|--------------------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| | Speeches | Dedup. sample | Speeches | Dedup. sample |
| John Mahama (NDC) | 35 (50) 61% | 97 (173) 70% | 15 (50) 30% | 76 (173) 44% |
| Nana Akufo-Addo (NPP) | 31 (47) 62% | 55 (117) 47% | 16 (47) 32% | 63 (117) 53% |

6.2 Results

While the hypothesis concerning the difference in use of local promises between the two candidates can be tested using the full sample, Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 need to be tested separately for the incumbent and the challenger. There are two specifications of the dependent variable. The first is a dummy which takes on the value of one if a promise is made at a rally event and zero otherwise. The second is a count variable reflecting the number of promises made at a rally, ranging from 0 to 7, as illustrated in Table 6.3. Since neither of these variables are normally distributed, OLS regression is inappropriate and maximum likelihood estimation is more suitable. However, the sample sizes are very small, which makes maximum likelihood estimation unfeasible (Long, 1997).

The sample size for estimating the effect of candidate identity on the use of local promises is 97 speeches. The tests of the effect of co-partisanship and turnout need to be run separately for each candidate so that the sample size here is only 47 for the challenger and 50 for the incumbent. Since such small samples sizes do not lend themselves well to multivariate regression techniques, based on maximum likelihood,¹² I limit the analyses to descriptive results and bivariate hypothesis tests.

To test the three hypotheses formulated above for the case in which the dependent variable is a dummy, I apply chi square tests if the independent variable has two categories. If the independent variables takes on more than two categories, I apply the Marascuilo procedure (Marascuilo and MacSweeney, 1977). The results are reported in Table 6.4.

When the dependent variable is measured as a count variable, I use Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) tests for the cases in which the independent variable takes on two categories.¹³ In the cases where the explanatory variable has more than two values, I use Kruskal-Wallis tests (Kruskal and Wallis, 1952), which are an extension of the WMW tests. Hereby, I test whether the overall difference in proportions of the number of promises for different values of the independent variable is statistically significant.

¹²Long (1997) argues that the minimum number of cases to run multivariate regression analysis based on maximum-likelihood estimation is 100.

¹³Different from the two-sample t-test this test does not depend on the assumption of normality for the two populations that are being compared (Hollander and Wolfe, 1999).

Table 6.3: Variation in rally events held by the incumbent and the challenger and local promises made at these rallies



| Variable | Incumbent | Challenger | Total |
|---|-----------|------------|-------|
| <i>Local</i> (at least one local promise per event) | | | |
| 0 | 30 | 45 | |
| 1 | 20 | 2 | 97 |
| <i>Number of local promises</i> (per event) | | | |
| 0 | 30 | 45 | |
| 1 | 8 | 2 | |
| 2 | 8 | | |
| 3 | 2 | | |
| 4 | 1 | | |
| 7 | 1 | | |
| | 50 | 47 | 97 |

6.2.1 Did the incumbent make use of local promises more widely than the challenger?

I argue that the incumbent is more credible in making promises of local club goods than the challenger, because he can underscore his determination to realize a proposed project by making costly investments already at the time of the campaign. I hence expect the incumbent to turn to the strategy of making local promises more widely instead of only disseminating the national promises entailed in his party's manifesto. Indeed, in many cases in which the incumbent John Dramani Mahama made a local promise he emphasized that work related to the promise was already ongoing or that it was to begin within a short delay. In a speech at the Pusiga constituency on November 10, 2012, cited on page 53, he promised residents in the constituency to connect them to the national electricity grid. In order to underline the credibility of this promise, he assured the audience that a memorandum of understanding with the Chinese government for the funding of the project had been signed. In addition, he drew people's attention to the fact that some poles had already been delivered. The rally in Pusiga by no means stands out as an exceptional example as the following quote illustrates:

*"All the communities in this area that are on the electrification project are going to get electricity. This is because we have secured the counterpart funding. [...] We have secured money from the Chinese government credit. We were to pay a 15% counterpart funding which we have done; I spoke to SADA and SADA has helped and so all the communities are going to get their lights. As president I am assuring you, the poles have started coming and you are going to get your lights very soon."*¹⁴

¹⁴John Dramani Mahama, Navrongo Central, November 11, 2012.


Figure 6.1: Rallies at the which candidates made local promises**(a)** Incumbent's rallies**(b)** Challenger's rallies

Notes: The black dots represent a rally event held in a constituency, the red dots indicate that the candidate made at least one local promise at at least one rally in the constituency.

Figure 6.1 maps the campaign rallies of the incumbent and the challenger across Ghana (black dots), and shows those rallies, where they made local promises (red dots). It is already evident from these descriptive statistics that the incumbent resorted to promising local club goods at many more of his rallies, than the challenger. In fact, while the challenger only made two promises of local club goods at two campaign rallies, the incumbent made as many as 41 promises at 20 campaign rallies, out of the 47 and 51 rallies recorded in the sample. Figure 6.1a shows the proportion of rallies at which the incumbent made local promises. The incumbent made local promises at 20 of his 50 rallies (40%). The proportion of rallies where the challenger promised local club goods, shown in Figure 6.1b, is as low as (4%) for the challenger. He only made local promises at 20 of his 47 campaign events. This difference in the use of local promises by the incumbent and the challenger is also illustrated in Figure 6.2a. The difference is not only substantial in size, but also statistically significant at the 1%-level, as reported in Table 6.4. This finding is robust to restricting the sample to speeches of full length, as shown in Table C.1 Appendix C.¹⁵

The same trend is evident when considering the average number of promises made per rally event which is .82 (+/- .19) for the incumbent and only .04 (+/- .03) for the challenger. See Figure 6.2b. The results concerning the determinants of the average number of promises made per rally are reported in Table 6.5.¹⁶

Figure 6.2: The use of local promises by the incumbent and the challenger



The WMW test suggests that this difference is also statistically significant at the 1%-level. While these results could be influenced by the differences in the parties' programmatic or ideological profiles and not only by their incumbency status, this is unlikely to account for this striking difference in the use

¹⁵ As a number of observations of five and smaller per cell might distort results of the chi square test (e.g. Conover, 1971), I also ran a Fisher's exact test. The difference remained significant at a p-value of 0.000.

¹⁶ They are robust to restricting the sample to speeches recorded in full length, as reported in Table C.2 in Appendix C.

of local promises.

In order to rule out the possibility that the variation in the use of local promises across the incumbent and the challenger is driven by other differences between the parties than the fact that one was in government and the other was in opposition, I would ideally compare the 2012 election campaign to the one in 2000 or in 2004, where the NPP was in government and the NDC was in opposition. In fact, the present study is the first attempt to systematically analyze the allocation of promises of local club goods. Consequently, there are no previous findings to compare the 2012 election campaign to. Evaluating another strategy where an incumbent candidate is similarly expected to have an advantage over the challenger, we can largely alleviate potential concerns. Such a case is the distribution of individual benefits. Concerning such clientelistic targeting of voters, incumbents are also expected to have an advantage over the challenger for similar reasons as in the case of local campaign promises. As they have access to state funds, they have more resources at hand to distribute during election campaigns than opposition parties. Hence they not only have more resources to distribute, but are also believed to be more credible in promising the delivery of private benefits after the election (e.g. Wantchekon, 2003). Indeed, a regional campaign manager of the opposition party emphasized how the ruling party made use of this advantage in the 2012 campaign, distributing benefits such as “money, soap,[...], lanterns, mattresses, roofages,”¹⁷ and even giving out cars to party faithfuls:

“And you know then from then [from September 2012 onwards, four months to the election] they [the ruling NDC] are even buying cars for some ladies. Those who can convince their colleagues. Assuming you are somebody who a lot of people follows (sic!) you. So they buy you a car, so you can talk to the other people that if they vote for your party what they did to you, they can also do it for them. Because you, they are using as a big example, an [...] example. So if they follow that train, they follow that train. That disturb (sic!) us.”¹⁸

Asked, why his party did not distribute benefits in the same way, the campaign manager explained that his party had less money in the 2012 election than the ruling party. He alluded that his party had also more frequently relied on distributing benefits to individual voters in the 2008 campaigns when it was in government.

“We don’t have the money like they have. They are in government. Don’t forget this is the second time Nana Addo [NPP’s candidate] is going. But this time, you know, we don’t have a lot of money. We don’t have the money to match them, you see. [...] In the last campaign, in the last campaign I can say that Nana Addo have (sic!) used a lot of money, a lot of money.”¹⁹

¹⁷Interview with a member of a regional campaign of the NPP, December 15, 2012.

¹⁸Interview with a member of a regional campaign of the NPP, December 15, 2012.

¹⁹Interview with a member of a regional campaign of the NPP, December 15, 2012.

This anecdotal evidence supports the assumption that parties adopt their strategy to whether they are in government or in opposition, and that the incumbent party has an advantage in using campaign strategies that involve the promising or distribution of benefits to small groups of the electorate and to individual voters.

Table 6.4: Hypothesis testing, proportion of rallies with local promises

| Hypothesis | Implication | Significant | Type of test | Test statistic | p-value |
|------------|--|-------------|------------------|---------------------|---------|
| H1 | Proportion of rallies with local promises incumbent > challenger | Yes | Chi ² | 17.65 (1) | 0.000 |
| | Proportion of rallies with local promises differs across levels of past support | No | 1.0870(2) | 0.581 | |
| H2 | Rallies with local promises in NDC strongholds > swing constituencies | No | Marascuilo | 14.5 (dif), 39 (cv) | – |
| | Rallies with local promises in NDC strongholds > NPP strongholds | No | Marascuilo | 14.5 (dif), 42 (cv) | – |
| | Rallies with local promises if ethnic partisans majority > ethnic partisans minority | No | Chi ² | 0.4076 | 0.523 |
| H3 | Rallies with local promises in NDC strongholds if past turnout low > turnout high | No | Chi ² | 0.0154 (1) | 0.901 |

Notes: Results are the difference in proportion of rallies with local promises across different values of the independent variables. Values displayed in column 5 are Pearson's Chi-values for Chi² tests, degrees of freedom in brackets; differences (dif) and critical values (cv) for Marascuilo tests. Except for the test of the effect of candidate identity, where rallies of both candidates are studied, all tests are performed for campaign events by the incumbent.

These findings with the regard to the use of local promises by the incumbent and the challenger provide strong support for Hypothesis 1. Whether the causal mechanism at work is that the incumbent was more credible than the challenger in promising local club goods, will be tested in Chapter 7, which reports the results of the survey experiment. In the remainder of this chapter, I restrict the analysis of the use of local club goods to the incumbent, as the results, presented so far, show clearly that the challenger did not make use of local promises.

Table 6.5: Hypothesis testing, number of promises per rally

| Hypothesis | Implication | IV | Significant | z-value | p-value |
|------------|---|-------------------------|-------------|---------|---------|
| H1 | Promises per rally incumbent > challenger | <i>Candidate</i> | Yes | 4.259 | 0.000 |
| H2 | Local promises per rally if ethnic partisans majority > minority | <i>Ethnic partisans</i> | No | -0.528 | 0.5977 |
| | Local promises per rally in NDC strongholds > swing const. or NPP strongholds | <i>NDC stronghold</i> | No | -0.818 | 0.4136 |
| H3 | Local promises in NDC strongholds if past turnout low > past turnout high | <i>Turnout</i> | No | -0.343 | 0.7315 |

Notes: Results of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests of the difference in proportion of rallies with local promises across different values of the independent variables. Except for the test of the effect of candidate identity, which uses the full sample, all tests are performed for the incumbent.


6.2.2 Did the incumbent focus local promises on his partisans?

I have posited that candidates should focus most of their promises of local club goods in areas where potential supporters are concentrated, because such promises are likely to be most credible and thus effective with these voters. In the following, I analyze to what extent the incumbent targeted constituencies where his partisans were concentrated with local promises. I first apply a direct measure of partisanship, reflecting how many times a constituency has been won by the NDC and the NPP over the 2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential elections. As in Chapter 5, strongholds of the NDC (NPP) are those where the NDC (NPP) has won a plurality in all these three elections. Swing constituencies are areas where not the same party has gained a plurality of votes across all these elections. Subsequently, as in Chapter 5, I also apply a more indirect measure of partisanship, based on the share of ethnic partisans living in the various constituencies.

Local promises in NDC and NPP strongholds, and in swing constituencies

Figure 6.3 maps rallies at which the incumbent made local promises, over levels of past support for the NDC party in the 2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential elections.

Figure 6.3: Rallies by the incumbent, over past support for the ruling NDC



Notes: The red dots represent local promises, the larger the dots, the more local promises the incumbent made at rallies in a constituency. Dark gray shading indicates ruling party strongholds. Dotted shading reflects swing constituencies. NPP strongholds are shaded white.

The map suggests that the incumbent targeted both his party's strongholds (dark-gray shaded) with local promises and swing constituencies (dotted shading). As expected, he made least promises in opposition strongholds (white shaded). The incumbent made 41 promises of local club goods in total. Out of all the promises, he made 19 (46%) in his party's strongholds, 11 (27%) in swing constituencies, and 11 (27%) in the rival party's strongholds.


In line with Hypothesis 2, the incumbent did not only allocate most promises to his strongholds. Also, the proportion of rallies at which he made local promises is higher for constituencies that have consistently supported the NDC party in the past than for swing constituencies and opposition strongholds, as Figure 6.4a illustrates. He made local promises at 48% (11 out of 23) of the rallies held in ruling party strongholds, only at 33% (5 out of 15) of the rallies held in swing constituencies, and at 33% (4 out of 12) of the rallies organized in NPP strongholds. However, the overall difference in the proportion of rallies with local promises across these past levels of support does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, as the results reported in Table 6.4 show. The same is true for the restricted sample, including only speeches of full length, as reported in Table C.1 in Appendix C. While it is in line with my argument that the incumbent made local promises at more of the rallies that were held in his strongholds, than in other constituencies, I would have expected him to make least promises in the opposition strongholds. Instead, he made local promises at as many of his rallies held in swing constituencies as at rallies hosted in opposition strongholds. This is likely due to the fact that he avoided campaigning in opposition strongholds in the first place, which the findings reported in Chapter 5 show. In the few instances where the incumbent did host rallies in NPP strongholds, the campaign might have regarded it as particularly important to offer some local public goods to the voters living there. In doing so, the incumbent's aim most likely was to avoid to activate voters' predispositions to vote for the opposition NPP. Such an "activation" (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1968) might have been the consequence of the incumbent campaigning in NPP strongholds without convincing these opposed voters with local promises. I turn to this point again below.

The Marascuilo test on the difference in the proportion between NDC strongholds and swing constituencies and between these strongholds and opposition strongholds paints a similar picture. According to this test, the proportion of rallies where the incumbent made local promises is indeed 14.5 percentage points higher than in swing constituencies. However, this difference does not cross the critical value of 39 percentage points defined by the test and hence does not reach statistical significance. The test suggests that the proportion of rallies with local promises which the incumbent held in NDC strongholds was 14.5 percentage points higher than that in NPP strongholds. Again, this difference does not reach the critical value of 42 percentage points, defined by the test. The same is true for the comparison

between swing constituencies and opposition strongholds, as reported in Table 6.4. The results are robust to restricting the sample to those speeches that are recorded full length, as shown in Table C.1 in Appendix C.

Concerning the average number of local promises the incumbent made across NDC and NPP strongholds and swing constituencies consider Figure 6.4b. While the incumbent made most of his promises to his strongholds in absolute terms, the average number of promises per rally is highest for strongholds of the rival party. This unexpected finding is not that surprising at a second look. While the incumbent seems to have avoided holding rallies at opposition strongholds – by holding only 12 rally events out of the 50 rallies in the sample in such constituencies – once he visited such hostile crowds, he might have been compelled to promise his rival’s supporters some local projects.

Figure 6.4: Allocation of local promises by the incumbent across past support for the ruling party



A member of a regional campaign team of the ruling party explained that he tries to avoid sending the president to areas where the party does not intend to make a local promise and more importantly, start delivering on it before the election. Asked why the campaign in the region of Greater Accra had focused so much on holding rallies in strongholds, and if his party had traveled more to swing constituencies, had it had more time,²⁰ he provided the following answer:

“Yes, we would have gone to swing states more than necessary. We would have visited, whatever would be their demands – we didn’t have time on our side. Because when you go, they will make demands. We are in government and we have to make sure that those things are addressed, before you go again. Because if you go again, you came, we asked, we said this, this is no good. At least we need to be able to do some, then you can go back.”²¹

²⁰As mentioned in Chapter 4, the original candidate, late president John Evans Atta Mills passed away unexpectedly on 25 July 2012, so that the NDC began its official campaigns only on October 5, 2012. Not only did the party have to endorse a new candidate, but also respect a period of mourning, before officially entering the campaigning period.

²¹Interview with a member of the national campaign team of the NDC, December 18, 2012.

The strategy this campaign manager describes is similar to the attempt of avoiding to polarize an unfriendly crowd against supporting the party that is campaigning, as Fenno (1978) describes for US election campaigns. The finding that the number of promises per rally held in opposition strongholds is relatively high should not be overemphasized, however, as the Kruskal-Wallis test does not suggest that the difference between the average number of local promises made across these different types of constituencies is statistically significant. The same is true for the sample restricted to speeches recorded in full length, as reported in Table 6.5 and in Table C.2 in Appendix C.

Did the incumbent target his ethnic partisans with local promises?

Besides using the direct measure of support for the incumbent to assess its effect on the local promises he makes, I use a more indirect proxy. Here, I investigate to what degree the concentration of ethnic partisans affected where the incumbent promised local club goods. The classification of the Ewe, the Ga and the speakers of the Northern languages, as partisans of the ruling NDC, is the same as in Chapter 5. The results of the chi square test, reported in Table 6.4, show that there is no significant difference in the proportion of rallies with local promises between constituencies which are dominated by the incumbent's ethnic partisans and others (chi value of -0.4076, p-value of 0.523). I neither find a difference in the number of promises the incumbent made at those of his rallies held in localities where his ethnic partisans were in the majority compared to those where they constituted a minority. The result is reported in Table 6.5 (z-value of -0.343, p-value of 0.7315). The most plausible interpretation for these results is that the incumbent almost only campaigned in constituencies where his ethnic partisans were in the majority. In fact, he hosted 46 of his campaign events in constituencies where his ethnic partisans were dominant and only four rallies in other constituencies, according to the sample based on the speeches. It seems that a similar logic applies to the targeting of his strongholds compared to other constituencies. He campaigned much more in constituencies where his likely supporters were concentrated, but the few times he visited more hostile areas, he also made local promises.


Consequently, the results with regard to the targeting of partisans with local promises only provide weak support for Hypothesis 2. Although the incumbent made most of his promises in his strongholds, the results with regard to the proportion of rallies with local promises do not support Hypothesis 2. The same is true for the number of local promises per rally. To conclude that the incumbent did not aim to reach his supporters on his campaign trail from these findings, would not be safe either, however. The results presented in this chapter and in Chapter 5 rather suggest that he campaigned more in his strongholds than anywhere else in the first place.

6.2.3 Did the incumbent use local promises to mobilize turnout?

I argue that it is not rational for candidates to concentrate resources on targeting strong supporters who are likely to turn out but rather to allocate local promises with the goal to mobilize potential supporters. Figure 6.5 maps the allocation of local promises by the incumbent over levels of past turnout. The map suggests that the incumbent made most of his campaign promises at medium levels of past turnout. To analyze whether the incumbent did indeed focus his local promises on those constituencies that have supported his party in the past, but where levels of turnout have been low, I conduct hypothesis tests on a restricted sample, including only those rallies that he held in NDC strongholds. Overall, the incumbent made 13 local promises in his party's strongholds where past turnout was at median or below median turnout levels in the 2008 presidential election. He made 6 such promises in constituencies with comparatively high levels of turnout. Figure 6.6a illustrates this.

The results do not support my expectation. The proportion of rallies at which the incumbent made local promises in constituencies of low levels of past support is with 47% slightly lower compared to constituencies with high past turnout levels (50%). However, we should not place too much weight on this finding, as the difference is minor and does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, as reported in Table 6.4. The same is true for when the sample is restricted to speeches of full-length, as shown in Table C.1 in Appendix C.


Figure 6.5: Local promises by the incumbent over turnout in 2008



Notes: The red dots indicate that the candidate made at least one local promise at at least one rally in the constituency, larger dots reflect more promises. Shading reflects level of turnout in 2008 per constituency, darker shading reflects a higher percentage.

Figure 6.6: Local promises by the incumbent held in his strongholds over past turnout

(a) Rallies with and without local promises, over levels of turnout in 2008 (b) Number of local promises per rally, over levels of turnout in 2008



The findings concerning the average number of local promises the incumbent made at rallies in constituencies with histories of low and high turnout among his strongholds are more in line with Hypothesis 3. I find that the incumbent made on average .72 promises (± 2.3) in constituencies where turnout was comparatively low and .5 promises (± 2.9) on average in constituencies with high past turnout levels, as illustrated in Figure 6.6b.²² The evidence presented in this chapter, and in Chapter 5, suggests that the incumbent avoided hosting campaign rallies in constituencies with high levels of turnout. This might account for why we cannot identify a statistically significant effect of past turnout on the number of promises he made at these campaign rallies.

6.3 Summary

In line with the theoretical expectations derived from the dissertation's key argument, I have found that the incumbent made much more use of the strategy to promise the implementation of local club goods to electoral constituencies than the challenger.

The evidence presented in this chapter is also in line with some, but not all predictions derived from the argument that the candidates use promises of local club goods to mobilize turnout among their likely supporters. In line with my argument, the incumbent seems to have made the bulk of these local promises in his strongholds and in constituencies where past turnout has been low. As the sample of campaign rallies analyzed in this chapter is slightly biased towards the incumbent's strongholds and constituencies with low turnout histories, however, we should not place too much emphasis on these

²²The results are again robust to restricting the analysis to the sample of speeches that were recorded in full length, as reported in Table C.2 in Appendix C.

results regarding the question of the mobilization of core supporters. In addition, I did not identify strong and robust effects of past support and turnout on the proportion of rallies at which the incumbent made local promises, or on the average number of promises made per rally.

The most important finding in this chapter is that making campaign promises to provide local benefits to communities is a strategy nearly exclusively used by the incumbent. This result lends support to the assumption that the incumbent is more credible in making local promises than the challenger. The data used in this chapter do not allow us to rule out other explanations for this finding, however. To further investigate the plausibility of my argument, I test central assumptions regarding the credibility of candidates and their promises in the survey experiment reported on in Chapter 7.

Chapter 7

The credibility of local campaign promises: evidence from a survey experiment

The preceding chapter has shown that local promises in Ghana's 2012 election campaign were made strategically. It was a strategy nearly exclusively applied by the incumbent and mainly used in areas where the incumbent's (potential) supporters were concentrated. The content-analysis of the speeches the candidates held at various rallies further revealed that the incumbent often tied his campaign promises of local club goods to immediate investments. Moreover, the interviews conducted with various campaign managers suggested that the incumbent focused promises of local projects in areas where he had already secured funds to implement these promises. These observations lend support to the argument that candidates apply promises of local club goods overwhelmingly in situations in which they anticipate to be most credible with them. If this is true, this could account for why parties spend so much time and resources on campaigning among their supporters in young democracies.

The present chapter analyzes the conditions under which campaign promises are credible and why. To address this question, I test several assumptions underlying the argument. I analyze whether there is a general credibility advantage of incumbents vis-à-vis opposition candidates. Another central assumption that is tested is whether partisans regard promises made by candidates of the party they feel close to as more credible than other voters. Lastly, I test whether local promises are per se more credible than national promises. If the latter were the case, then this could explain why local promises were used in a more strategic manner than national promises in Ghana's 2012 election campaigns.

I test these assumptions in a survey experiment conducted during the presidential campaigns of the 2012

Ghanaian elections. The sample consists of 447 randomly chosen respondents in 16 polling station areas and four selected constituencies in Ghana's capital Accra. In this experiment, respondents were asked about the likelihood of the two main presidential candidates fulfilling different kinds of campaign promises, if elected. In addition, the questionnaire contained questions on respondents' exposure to news, their political inclinations, their ethnic backgrounds, and on other demographic characteristics. There were four experimental conditions. Each group of respondents was confronted with a set of either local or national experimental promises, assigned to either the incumbent, or the main opposition candidate. The local and the national promises differed only in their framing, but not with regard to the content of the promises. Both candidates were assigned the same kinds of promises.¹

7.1 Theoretical expectations

7.1.1 Incumbency status

One of the dissertation's key theoretical arguments is that candidates make use of distributive campaigning strategies under conditions where these strategies should be most effective, the least costly, and the least risky. I have further argued that the effectiveness of campaigning hinges not only on the types of voters a candidate tries to address, but also on his credibility in promising future distribution. The analysis of the allocation of promises of local projects across electoral constituencies in Ghana, presented in Chapter 6, revealed that the incumbent made use of local promises much more frequently than the challenger. I argued that this is due to a credibility advantage the incumbent has over the challenger in promising such local club goods. As I have described in more detail in Chapter 6, this resonates with an argument in the literature on political clientelism. Incumbents have been assumed to be more credible in promising clientelistic redistribution than opposition candidates, because at the time of making the promise, they already have discretion over these goods (Medina and Stokes, 2007; Wantchekon, 2003, p. 422). This allows them to make costly investments already at campaigning time and thus increases their credibility that they will follow up on the promise after the election. In the survey experiment I test the following expectation:

H1: The incumbent is more credible in making local promises than the challenger.

¹Details on the research design of the experiment are provided in Chapter 4.

7.1.2 Local versus national promises

I have argue that candidates should be more strategic in making local promises at campaign rallies than in promising national public goods. This is because making national promises at an additional rally does not change the cost of providing the public good, which by definition is non-excludable (Cornes and Sandler, 1999, pp. 8–9). To illustrate this point with an example, one of the opposition’s main campaign promise was that it would provide free secondary education. The cost of implementing this policy would have been the same had the NPP disseminated this promise at campaign rallies in twenty or in eighty constituencies. However, had the party concentrated its campaign on promising the building of new schools in particular constituencies, making this promise to yet another constituency would have increased costs considerably.

Wantchekon (2003) suggested that promises of local club goods might be more credible to African voters than those regarding national policies. This is because voters can more easily hold candidates accountable for local than for national promises. The implementation of a local promise – like finding out whether the promised clinic was built in a constituency – is straightforward. To evaluate to what extend the government has followed up on the promise of increasing the nationwide doctors-patient ratio is more difficult.² Knowing that candidates might avoid making local promises in constituencies where they do not intend to follow up on them (given that these candidates care about their reputation) might increase the credibility of local promises among voters. If this is true, then respondents in the experiment should consider a promise as more credible if it is framed as a local promise than if it is framed as a national campaign promise. These considerations lead me to formulate the following expectation:

H2: Local promises are perceived by voters to be more credible than national promises.

7.1.3 Partisans versus independent or opposed voters

The credibility of campaign promises might not only hinge on voters’ ability to assess the consequences of a promise, but also on general trust levels towards a particular candidate (Wantchekon, 2003). I have argued in Chapters 5 and 6 that the reason why the presidential candidates in Ghana’s 2012 election focused their campaign visits in constituencies where their potential supporters were concentrated and the incumbent focused promises of local club goods in his strongholds, is because supporters perceive campaign promises as more credible and are hence more likely to positively react to them. This is consistent with research on the political psychology of voters that voters adopt favorable attitudes toward candidates whose party they identify with (Bartels, 2002; Gerber, Huber and Washinton, 2010; Weisberg

²See Atchade, Wantchekon and McClendon (2012, p. 6) for similar examples.

and Greene, 2003) and that voters exhibit greater levels of trust in government, if they identify with the party who is in power (e.g. Keele, 2005). The relationship between partisanship and voters' evaluation of campaign messages remains under-researched for African election. Studies on the relationship between ethnicity – which often functions as a proxy for partisanship – and trust in government suggests that co-ethnics of the president tend to exhibit higher levels of trust in government than voters who are not affiliated with the president's ethnic group (Kuenzi, 2008).

I have further argued in Chapters 3 and 5 that the effect of partisanship on the evaluation of campaign promises should be particularly pronounced with respect to local promises, as voters know that different from public goods, the provision of local club goods can be used to reward or punish voting behavior in a locality. Based on these considerations, I expect voters to judge promises as more likely to actually be fulfilled if they are made by a candidate whose party they support and posit the following:

H3: Voters perceive local promises as more credible if they are attributed to the candidate they are affiliated with, than if they have been made by another candidate.

7.2 The survey

The survey was conducted among a random sample of 447 respondents in 16 polling station areas and four selected constituencies in Accra. Details on the sampling procedure of the experiment and the data collection are provided in Chapter 4. Accra was chosen as a sampling site for two central reasons. First, Accra's population is very diverse in terms of their socio-economic background and in particular with regard to ethnicity. Conducting the experiment in the capital hence allowed me to maximize the diversity of respondents while operating with budget constraints that would not have allowed me to conduct a country-wide experiment. Second, conducting the experiment in Accra allowed for a conservative test of the hypothesis that incumbents are more credible with local campaign promises than challengers. As I have described in Chapter 5, election data from Ghana's 1992 to 2008 elections show that incumbent governments tend to receive substantially lower support in the capital than in rest of the country, no matter which party is in power (Harding, 2010, p. 3). Choosing Accra as a testing ground hence biased the results against finding support for my hypothesis that incumbents are more credible in making local promises than opposition candidates. In this survey, respondents were asked about the likelihood of the two main presidential candidates fulfilling different kinds of campaign promises, if elected. In addition, the questionnaire contained questions on demographic and political background information with survey items taken mainly from the Afrobarometer round 5 questionnaire. There were four experimental conditions, as illustrated in Table 7.1. Each group of respondents that fell in one experimental condition

was confronted with a set of three either local or national experimental promises assigned to either the incumbent or the main opposition candidate. The local and the national promises differed only in their framing, but not with regard to the content of the promise. Both candidates were assigned the same kinds of promises. All promises covered infrastructure issues concerning the provision of electricity, clean water and streetlights. The promises were designed to be compatible with both parties' manifestos (New Democratic Congress, 2012; New Patriotic Party, 2012).³ Details on the conceptualization of local and national promises are provided in Chapters 2 and 4. The following is an example of a promise framed as a national promise:

“Imagine President John Dramani Mahama, who is also the flagbearer of the NDC, had made the following promise at a rally held in your constituency: ‘If I win this election, I will improve the availability of clean water in all urban communities across the country by connecting more households to pipe water and by building more treatment plants.’ Do you think by the end of his term in 2016 he would have improved the availability of clean water in all urban communities across the country?”

The local framing of the same promise is:

“If this constituency votes massively for me and my party in the presidential elections, I will connect more households to pipe water in your constituency. Do you think by the end of his term in 2016 he would have connected more households to pipe water in your constituency?”

The answer options were “Yes definitely”; “Yes probably”; “No, probably not”; “No definitely not”. The other two promises are referred to as the energy and the street lights promises. Exact wording of these other two experimental promises is provided in Appendix A.2.

Table 7.1: Four experimental conditions in the survey

| Condition | Candidate | Type of Promises |
|-----------|------------------|------------------|
| 1 | Incumbent | National |
| 2 | Incumbent | Local |
| 3 | Challenger | National |
| 4 | Challenger | Local |

There are a number of advantages to the experimental design. First, it was designed explicitly to test the credibility argument. Because the only difference between the two treatment groups was candidate

³I chose to identify the pledges the parties were making to their voters, during the 2012 election, from their manifestos, because manifestos have shown to indeed affect policy outcomes (Bäck, Debus and Dumont, 2011; Bäck, Debus and Klüver, Forthcoming; Costello and Throup, 2008). They were hence likely to serve as a valuable source of information on the policies parties were intending to pursue. In addition, the parties were making an effort to widely disseminate the pledges entailed in their manifestos (Frimpong, 2012; Peace FM, 2012) so that if participants in the experiment were informed about the campaign promises by the NDC and the NPP, this information was likely to be in line with the manifestos.

identity, we can attribute any difference in credibility ranking to the identity of the candidate. The same holds true for testing the effect of the local versus the national version of the promises. Despite these advantages, this experimental method has limitations. First, the hypothetical nature of the experiment could call into question its external validity. However, the setup of the experiment was designed to maximize external validity. I conducted the experiment during ongoing election campaigns, with names of real candidates. Furthermore, the formulation of the experimental promises was closely guided by actual promises made in the parties' manifestos. Additionally, I tested the external validity of the inferences drawn from the credibility of local versus national promises through focus group interviews. The evidence from the focus groups supports the "content validity" (Miller, 2011, pp. 89–90) of my measurements of local and national promises.⁴

I should note that this experiment does not contain a control group, as experiments commonly do. In order to make the treatments as realistic as possible, it was not feasible to design a campaign message that neither contained a local or a national promise or a campaign message that was assigned to no candidate. This is why the effects of candidate and voter identity and those of the local or the national message the credibility of the promises should always be understood as the difference between one framing and another.

7.3 Results

7.3.1 Balance between different treatment groups


I begin by assessing whether the randomized selection of respondents into the four different treatment conditions was successful in identifying comparable groups of respondents. To do this, I conduct two-sample tests of equal proportions of respondents with certain characteristics in the different treatment groups. Differences across the groups are documented in terms of a wide range of observable characteristics. In Figure 7.1, I contrast the group assigned local promises with that which was asked to evaluate national promises. I compare the groups based on their basic demographic profiles (age, gender, schooling), a number of proxies reflecting their income-level, their exposure to news, ethnicity, their political affiliation, and their degree of cosmopolitanism – namely how many of their relatives live outside their constituency and the region of Greater Accra (GA) and how often they travel outside the constituency and this region. The graph shows the proportion of respondents with certain characteristics in each of the treatment groups. Because demographic and baseline political variables are unaffected by the in-

⁴The details on the nature of these focus groups and the findings with regard to the validity of the concepts tested are presented in Chapter 4.

tervention, any difference occurring between the different groups should be understood as a product of chance. There are generally no differences between the group assigned local promises to that assigned national promises that reach conventional levels of statistical significance.


In Figure 7.2, I compare groups of respondents who were asked to evaluate promises ascribed to the incumbent to those who were presented promises attributed to the challenger. Again, there are generally no differences between the two treatment groups. The exception is that there is a higher proportion of partisans of the ruling party in the group which was assigned promises by the incumbent than in the group that was asked to evaluate promises by the challenger. Likewise, the proportion of respondents who report that they feel close to the main opposition party is slightly higher in the group which evaluated promises assigned to the opposition candidate, than the group which was asked to assess the credibility of promises ascribed to the incumbent. In addition, the proportion of people who report intending to vote for the ruling and opposition party and that of people consuming news on a weekly basis also differs across the treatment conditions. Such differences can arise, particularly when the sample size is small, even if the protocol of randomized selection of respondents was strictly adhered to (Diekmann, 2005, p. 299), which was the case in this survey experiment.⁵ In order to rule out the possibility that these variables, for which balance has not been achieved, influence the estimates, I run a series of multivariate ordered logit regressions, in which I include these variables as controls.

Figure 7.1: Proportion of respondents who were asked to evaluate local or national promises



⁵See Chapter 4 for a detailed description of the sampling process.

Figure 7.2: Proportion of respondents who were asked to evaluate promises attributed to the incumbent or the challenger



7.3.2 Estimation strategy

I run a series of ordered logistic regressions, testing the hypotheses on each of the three experimental promises separately. The dependent variable for each promise takes on four values, ranging from “No, definitely not” to “Yes, definitely.” To establish robustness, I also run a series of logistic regressions, measuring the dependent variable as a binary concept. This dichotomous measure takes on the value 1 if respondents said that a promise was probably or definitely going to be fulfilled, and 0 otherwise. Such a validation is advised as respondents might have discriminated more between whether or not a promise was going to be fulfilled, and less between the degree to which they thought a promise was going to be followed up on, or not. As the results presented in Appendix D show, however, the findings produced in this chapter are robust to the two specifications of the dependent variable. I cluster standard errors on the polling station level, to account for spatial dependency. To test whether the incumbent is indeed more credible than the challenger in making local promises, I estimate the following equation

$$Credibility_i = \alpha + \beta Incumbent + X_i' \delta + \epsilon_i, \quad (7.1)$$

where *Credibility* is one of the experimental promises, ranging from one to four, *Incumbent* denotes a dummy, taking on the value 1 if the promises were assigned to the incumbent and taking on the value of 0 if they were assigned to the challenger. The vector X_i' represents a set of observable characteristics at the

individual level for which balance was not achieved. The error term ϵ_i denotes unobserved characteristics that determine how credible a voter estimates the promises to be.

To assess whether local promises are more credible than national promises, I estimate the following equation

$$Credibility_i = \alpha + \beta Local + X'_i \delta + \epsilon_i, \quad (7.2)$$

where *Local* denotes a dummy, taking on the value 1 if the promises were framed as local promises, and taking on the value of 0 if they were framed as national promises.

To assess the effect of co-identity with a candidate on the credibility of promises, I estimate the following equation

$$Credibility_i = \alpha + \beta Partisan + X'_i \delta + \epsilon_i, \quad (7.3)$$

where *Partisan* denotes a dummy, taking on the value 1 if the respondent is a partisan of the respective candidate's party and 0 otherwise.

7.3.3 Is the incumbent more credible than the challenger?

The analysis of the allocation of promises of local projects across electoral constituencies in Ghana, presented in Chapter 3, revealed that the incumbent much more frequently made use of local promises than the challenger. I argued that this was due to a credibility advantage the incumbent has over the challenger in promising such local club goods. I now turn to the results of the survey experiment, which directly tests this claim. Table 7.2 reports the results. In line with my expectation, the sign of the coefficient for the dummy *Incumbent* is positive, indicating that the same promises are regarded as more likely to be implemented by the respondents if they are ascribed to the incumbent than if they are assigned to the challenger. This is true for all three experimental promises, but the effect only attains statistical significance for the energy promise and only at the 10%-level (p-value of 0.085). These findings are robust to estimating the same models with the dependent variable being binary, as reported in Table D.1 in Appendix D.

As the interpretation of raw coefficients in non-linear models is not straightforward, I illustrate the effect of candidate identity on the assessment of the likelihood that a promise is being fulfilled by graphing predicted probabilities. The predicted probabilities of respondents saying that the energy promise will “Yes definitely,” “Yes probably,” “No, probably not,” or “No definitely not” be fulfilled are presented in Figure 7.3. In line with the hypothesis that promises are evaluated as more credible when made by the incumbent, the probability that a respondent says that he or she thinks that a promise will “Yes, definitely” be fulfilled is higher when the promise is ascribed to the incumbent, than if the same promise

is ascribed to the challenger.

Conversely, the probability of a respondent saying that no, a local promise will *definitely* or *probably not* be fulfilled is higher when assigned to the challenger, than to the incumbent. Furthermore, the most frequent category respondents chose when evaluating the promise assigned to the incumbent is “Yes, definitely,” whereas respondents evaluating the same promise ascribed to the challenger were as likely to choose this category, as the category “Yes, probably.” However, these differences are statistically not significant, as the overlapping confidence intervals indicate.

Table 7.2: Effect of incumbent status on the credibility of campaign promises

| | (1) Energy promise | (2) Water promise | (3) Street lights promise | (4) Interaction |
|------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|
| Incumbent | 0.527 ⁺ (1.72) | 0.360 (1.20) | 0.232 (0.85) | 0.228 (1.21) |
| News | 0.0905 (1.33) | 0.0907 (1.26) | 0.123 (1.40) | 0.0486 (1.38) |
| Education | 0.0126 (0.19) | 0.00369 (0.07) | −0.00261 (−0.04) | −0.00990 (−0.28) |
| NPP partisan | 0.978 ⁺ (1.81) | 0.687 (1.58) | 0.694*** (2.69) | 0.614*** (2.58) |
| NDC partisan | 0.101 (0.30) | 0.159 (0.49) | 0.0860 (0.25) | 0.168 (0.72) |
| Local | | | | −0.104 (−0.35) |
| Incumbent*Local | | | | 0.192 (0.49) |
| cut1 | −0.587 (−1.34) | −0.601 (−1.08) | −1.039** (−2.43) | −1.315*** (−4.67) |
| cut2 | 0.813 ⁺ (1.84) | 0.540 (1.05) | −0.0524 (−0.13) | 0.124 (0.52) |
| cut3 | 2.000*** (3.71) | 1.746*** (2.93) | 1.280*** (3.00) | 1.310*** (5.26) |
| Wald χ^2 | 10.03 ⁺ | 5.20 | 14.39** | 22.18*** |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.01 |
| Pseudo Log-Likelihood | −244.87 | −248.66 | −222.67 | −524.31 |
| Number of clusters | 15 | 15 | 15 | 16 |
| Number of observations | 188 | 189 | 191 | 396 |

Models 1-3 use the local framing of the promises as the dependent variable

Model 4 uses local and national versions of the energy promise as the dependent variable

Values are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis


+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

It is only the difference in the probability that a respondent will choose the highest compared to the lowest category of credibility of the energy promise, which attains statistical significance. If the promise

is assigned to the incumbent, a respondent has a probability of more than 34% (+/- .06) to say that yes, the promise will be fulfilled and will only choose to say that a promise will definitely not be fulfilled at a probability of just 13% (+/- .02).

The most plausible explanation for why the effect of candidate identity only reaches conventional levels of statistical significance for the energy promise, but not for the clean water and the street lights promise, lies in the specific salience of the provision of energy in the country during the data collection. In September 2012, three months prior to the election, the Ghana Grid Company began a nationwide “load-shedding,” which is a deliberate measure to cut power in a particular neighborhood. The reason for this power curtailment was that a damage to the West African Gas Pipeline in Togo and the shutting down one of Ghana’s thermal plants for routine maintenance had caused a severe shortfall of power production. Power was cut at least once a week in each of the different neighborhoods of the city of Accra (Quartey, 2012). Load-shedding was still under way in November 2012 during the data collection. It is thus a plausible assumption that the issue of load-shedding was of particular salience to respondents in the survey, which might have caused them to choose their answers particularly carefully.

Figure 7.3: Effect of candidate status on the credibility of the energy promise



Respondents might not have discriminated as clearly between the different answer options of the other two experimental promises, because they were not of the same salience to them as the energy promise.

Among the controls, only the frequency with which respondents consume news, and whether or not they are NPP partisans have a statistically significant effect on the credibility of campaign promises. NPP partisans seem to find the campaign promises more likely to be fulfilled than respondents who do not feel close to the opposition, independent of whether a promise is ascribed to the incumbent or the challenger. This finding requires further investigation in subsequent replications of this experiment.

In order to see whether the credibility advantage of the incumbent is particular to local promises, I also estimated an interaction between incumbency status and the framing of a promise on the credibility of the energy promise. The positive sign of the coefficient of the interaction term is positive, suggesting that the incumbent's credibility advantage might be stronger in case of a local promise. However, the effect does not attain statistical significance. A graphical inspection of effect confirms that the difference is not statistically significant, which suggests that the incumbent is more credible than challenger with both types of promises (not shown). This is in line with Down's argument (Downs, 1957) that incumbents might be more credible in proposing any type of policy. Evaluating the credibility of any proposition by incumbents might be easier for voters, because they have information about the policies the incumbent has implemented in the past (*ibid.*). An incumbent might therefore be more credible with any promise than opposition candidates, provided that he has shown to adhere to his promises. To the contrary, voters might be less certain about anticipating the credibility of promises by opposition candidates, as these candidates might have never been in government (*ibid.*).

Another interesting finding is that the more frequently respondents read or listen to the news, the more likely they are to believe that these experimental campaign promises will be fulfilled.⁶ A plausible interpretation for this effect is that the more often these respondents consumed news, the better they were informed about the candidate's campaign platforms. All experimental promises were designed to be in line with the parties' manifestos and the better informed respondents were, the more likely they were to know this. Aragonés and Palfrey (2007, p. 853) argue that voters evaluate campaign promises in the light of prior information and that they are more likely to believe a promise if it is in line with positions candidates usually take; what they term "incentive-compatibility." This might mean for the present analysis, that the more informed voters are about the parties' manifestos and the policies they tend to propose, the more likely they recognized that the experimental promises were in line with the information candidates usually disseminate. This could account for why more informed respondents

⁶The phrasing of the item measuring news consumption is taken from the Afrobarometer round 4 questionnaire and reads as follows: *How often do you get news from the following sources (Radio, newspapers, TV, internet)?* The answer options are: *Every day; a few times a week; a few times a month; less than once a month; never* (Afrobarometer Network, 2011a). I use an index combining radio, newspaper, and internet consumption which ranges from 1 to 13. I exclude the item on news consumption on TV, because including this item would decrease the internal consistency of the measure, reflected in a lower Cronbach's alpha. See Cronbach (1951) on Cronbach's alpha as a measure of internal consistency of an index.

regarded the promises as more credible.

The findings on the credibility of promises attributed to the incumbent compared to those assigned to the challenger, provide support for Hypothesis 1.

7.3.4 Are local promises more credible than national promises?

Past research has assumed that the fulfillment of local promises is easier to observe than that of national campaign promises (Atchade, Wantchekon and McClendon, 2012, p. 6).⁷ Based on this assumption and on experimental evidence from Benin, which showed that a local campaign message was more effective in delivering votes for candidates (Wantchekon, 2003), I argued that voters might perceive local promises as more likely to be fulfilled. This is because candidates might avoid making promises of local club goods in instances where they do not intend to follow up on them, as it is easy for voters to find out whether a local promise was fulfilled or not. For the present experiment this implies that local promises are generally judged as more credible than national promises.

However, there is a caveat in order. The survey was conducted in Accra, not in the rural countryside. Past research has argued that local club goods might actually take on the nature of public goods in urban centers (Ichino and Nathan, 2013, p. 344). This is because the two defining features of local club goods, which I have described in Chapter 2, might not characterize local club goods provided in cities. First, the main beneficiaries might not be those voters living within the boundaries of a constituency, as city dwellers move daily from constituency to constituency. City dwellers might benefit nearly as much from local infrastructure, like schools or clinics, in neighboring constituencies as from those located in their constituency (Ichino and Nathan, 2013). Second, if this is the case, then the targeting of club goods to particular constituencies to win their votes is not going to be as effective, as on the countryside, where constituencies are more geographically segregated from each other (Kramon 2013a, p. 51). A voter living in a large city, might know that not only the voters in her constituency would profit from a local promise, but also those living in neighboring constituencies. She will feel less pressured to vote for the candidate who is making the promise, because it is unlikely that the candidate will renege on the promise if he does not attain the desired number of votes in her constituency. This is because denying the benefit to one constituency will also punish voters living in the neighboring constituencies where the candidate might have gained more support.⁸ Based on these considerations, respondents in Accra might not have understood differences between the local and the national promises.

The results of the quantitative analysis are reported in Table 7.3. The coefficient for the dummy variable

⁷See also Harding and Stasavage (2014, p. 232) on a similar argument.

⁸This in line with the patterns of ethnic voting Ichino and Nathan (2013) have detected in Ghana, which vary across rural and urban areas.

Local takes on a positive sign in all three models, but the effect is not only minimal in size, but also does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in any of the models. The results are the same if I use the binary dependent variable, as Table D.2 in Appendix D reports. Figure 7.4 graphically illustrates the credibility of the energy promise, depending on its framing. The graph shows that the predicted probabilities for each category of the dependent variable do not differ between the local and the national version of the promise.

Table 7.3: Effect of framing of the promises on their credibility

| | (1) Energy promise | (2) Water promise | (3) Street lights promise |
|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Local | 0.00822 (0.04) | 0.0624 (0.31) | 0.101 (0.64) |
| News | 0.0552 (1.51) | 0.0830 ⁺ (1.77) | 0.117** (2.11) |
| Education | -0.0175 (-0.51) | -0.0300 (-0.67) | -0.0468 (-1.04) |
| NPP partisan | 0.555** (2.46) | 0.254 (1.05) | 0.229 ⁺ (1.90) |
| NDC partisan | 0.217 (0.89) | 0.169 (0.72) | 0.0821 (0.47) |
| cut1 | -1.406*** (-5.19) | -1.127*** (-4.46) | -1.476*** (-5.43) |
| cut2 | 0.0219 (0.10) | 0.0505 (0.17) | -0.518 ⁺ (-1.87) |
| cut3 | 1.199*** (5.33) | 1.223*** (3.87) | 0.804*** (3.06) |
| Wald χ^2 | 8.56 | 5.92 | 10.75 ⁺ |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Pseudo Log-Likelihood | -525.87 | -531.45 | -476.49 |
| Number of clusters | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Number of observations | 396 | 397 | 397 |

Values are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis

+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Furthermore, respondents who were presented a local promise and those who were asked to evaluate the national promise on the curtailment of energy both chose the same category the most often, that is that the promise will “Yes, definitely” be fulfilled. The results from the experiment thus indicate that local promises are not per se more credible than national promises and do not provide support for Hypothesis 2. The qualitative evidence gained in focus group interviews can help to interpret this finding. The results, presented in Chapter 4, validate my conceptualization of local and national promises. The majority of the participants of the focus groups thought that the main beneficiaries in case of local promises would

be the inhabitants living in one constituency. Conversely, they thought that the beneficiaries of national promises would go beyond one constituency. Further in line with my coding of promises as local and national, no participant considered it likely that a candidate would resort to political punishment in the case of national promises, but many thought it was possible that this could happen in the case of local promises.

However, while punishment was considered more likely in case of local than in case of national promises, the majority of participants did not consider it likely that the winner of the election would punish a constituency, even when they were asked to evaluate local promises. They participants gave several reasons for this. One of the promises that I asked them to talk about had been made by the incumbent in the area where he is from. Some participants argued that no matter how the inhabitants of the particular constituency voted, the president was going to fulfill the promise, because it was his hometown.⁹ Another argument brought forward was that as the candidate had made the promise in public and to a large audience, he was obliged to stick to it.¹⁰ Others thought it would not be rational to punish a constituency, because the candidate should consider the next election and be interested in gaining votes in this same constituency in the future.¹¹

Talking about this point, one participant emphasized that candidates should be particularly reluctant to punish swing constituencies.¹² Another participant argued that punishment was a risky strategy in general, as it would hurt a president's reputation of catering to all Ghanaians.¹³ Finally, those who had considered the beneficiaries of a local club good to exceed the boundaries of a single constituency, argued that political punishment was unlikely, as it would not only harm one constituency, but potentially also the beneficiaries living in other areas who might have actually supported the candidate.¹⁴

⁹“He’d still do it. It’s his hometown” (Focus group Anyaa Sowotuum, December 22, 2012). “I also hold the same view: that he will fulfill his promise because it is his home town”(Focus group Anyaa Sowotuum, December 22, 2012).


¹⁰“He has to do it because this is a promise he made and everyone is aware of it so he should make sure he does it”(Focus group Anyaa Sowotuum, December 22, 2012).

¹¹“Yes he will if he has the resources. He will definitely build it because he knows that even though they did not vote for him, if he builds it, it will enhance his chances of winning more votes the next time” (Focus group Ayawaso Central, December 21, 2012). “I think that he will work for them so they will vote for him next time” (Focus group Ayawaso East, December 22, 2012).

¹²“As I said before, normally those constituencies that are labeled for a particular party, those are the places the parties in power tend to punish them if they are not for them. But if it’s a swing constituency, they tend to develop there either ways because they want their votes in the next election but I don’t know about Amasaman. [...] if Amasaman is a swing [constituency], then I think they will still develop the place”(Focus group Ayawaso West-Wogoon, December 21, 2012)

¹³“It is a national cake. If you want to be a statesman, sometimes you have to be very careful about the way you speak. When you utter any word, you will have to by it. So if you say the people of Kasoa don’t have a school and you know it’s a problem there, you have to do it. You said it yourself whilst they did not complain. You promised them you will build the school for the inhabitants and they didn’t trust whether you can do it or not. But after the whole national election, you have won, then as a president, you know where the problem is. You have to make sure you fulfill your promise so they know that you are a statesman” (Focus group Ayawaso Central, December 21, 2012).

¹⁴“If he wins the election and fulfills his promise, it would benefit everyone. This is because people can come from Kumasi or Accra to buy things they need. So if he can do it, it will benefit all of us. He can continue to do it for them because if he does so it will help everyone” (Focus group Anyaa Sowotuum, December 22, 2012). “I really disagree. It wasn’t a contract. It was

Figure 7.4: Effect of framing on the credibility of the energy promise

There are two reasons why the participants in the survey experiment seem to have regarded local and national promises as equally credible as the focus groups suggest. First, the participants of the focus groups seemed to be rather optimistic of candidates' intentions to fulfill any kind of promise, after it had been made in public. This tendency might be somewhat overrated by the responses given by participants, however, as they might reflect not opinions, but rather wishful thinking. Some of the following statements suggest that some participants were expressing what they thought was morally right for a candidate to do, rather than a rational assessment of how candidates would likely behave, as the following statements illustrate:¹⁵

an appeal for vote. In their manifesto, you said they are going to build 250 schools. They haven't mentioned the areas that they will build those schools at but we are assuming that most of them will be in the Northern Region because they are deprived. Here is the case that he has specifically mentioned one of the places that he is planning to build those schools. It is a national project and we don't know where he is building those schools at. And he has come at a rally and he has mentioned Kasoa as one of them so you can mark Kasoa. So me, I think even though he lost at Kasoa, but because it's a national project, he can't exclude Kasoa" (Focus group Ayawaso West-Wogoon, December 21, 2012). "If Nabdam hadn't voted for him and he wins, will they still get the new districts because it's something for the whole country. They are splitting districts that are too big. You can't say you won't do it for Nabdam because they didn't vote for you" (Focus group Ayawaso West-Wogoon, December 21, 2012).

¹⁵"You have promised and as a father of a nation, you have to fulfill it. You can't say part of the people didn't vote for me so I will fulfill the promises of those who voted for me. If you have that attitude, you can't stay for that four years" (Focus group Ayawaso Central, December 21, 2012). "He will build it at Kasoa because he promised to build the school at Kasoa. Though he has lost there, he promised them, so he will do it for them" (Focus group Ayawaso East, December 22, 2012). "I think they will benefit from it because Ghana is not only for one person. Ghana is for all of us so there is no need for one person to say that this place has not voted for me so when am in power, I will not help this district because Ghana is for all of us. So I think if he is power and Amasaman did not vote for him, he will still fulfill his promise" (Focus group Ayawaso East, December 22, 2012).

“Yes they will still benefit from the promise because he has promised them and he is supposed to fulfill his promise, so they will benefit from it.”¹⁶

“Just that because they have just promised them, whether he loses the vote there or not, because he has just promised them, they can benefit.”¹⁷

Second, the participants of the focus group interviews exhibited a tendency to sometimes understand local promises as national promises. This is quite astonishing as in electoral contexts where provisions of particularistic benefits are wide-spread (e.g. Chandra, 2004; Kramon and Posner, 2013) and where voters’ evaluation of office-holders will hence most likely be that redistribution hardly follows a need-based logic, and that parties favor their political support base. In such contexts, we might rather expect voters to understand national promises as local, than the other way around. To illustrate this with an example, a politician might promise to increase the teacher-student ratio across the country, in order to ameliorate the quality of education. He might specify some objective criteria of how many extra teachers schools will receive. Based on the definitions presented in Chapter 2, this would be programmatic or national campaign promise (Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013, p. 7-10).¹⁸ However, in contexts where the distribution of resources is perceived to be used to cater to one’s supporters or to one’s ethnic group (see Kasara, 2007), voters might – upon hearing this promise – understand that the politician will create many more additional jobs for teachers in the schools in his strongholds.¹⁹ This does not seem to be the case in Ghana, or at least among the urban population of Accra. The most plausible explanation for this is that, as the analysis of campaign speeches has shown, candidates make many more national promises at public rallies than local promises. Voters hence hear much more often about candidates’ national, than local promises. This might make national promises more incentive-compatible with what candidates typically say in public, and increase their credibility. Overall, the focus group evidence hence suggests that part of the reason why respondents in the experiment did not discriminate between local and national promises is that they sometimes might have understood a local promise as a national promise. However, as participants in the interviews did in general differentiate between local and national promises in the same way as I conceptualized these promises, this cannot alone account for the non-finding of the survey experiment.

Rather, it is plausible that the reason why respondents did not consider local promises as more or less likely to be fulfilled than national promises in the experiment, is due to the fact that the experiment was conducted in Accra. First, as said above, in a city like Accra, local club goods might essentially function

¹⁶Focus group Ayawaso East, December 22, 2012.

¹⁷Focus group Ayawaso East, December 22, 2012.

¹⁸See Chapter 2 for details on local and national promises and programmatic and political modes of distribution.

¹⁹I thank Eric Kramon for drawing my attention to this point.

as national or public goods to all inhabitants of the city, as these urban dwellers move across constituency borders constantly (Ichino and Nathan, 2013, p. 344, see also Velasquez, 2013). Second, the reason why respondents considered any promise as quite credible, be it one that was framed as a local or as a national promise, might be that they know that Accra is of strategic importance for any candidate. The experimental promises all referred to infrastructure development. It might be of particular importance to the government to develop the infrastructure in the capital, in order to foster the industrial and the business sector, which is concentrated here, but also because these projects are particularly visible in the capital, as media attention is likely to be higher here than on the rural countryside. Furthermore, according to the ‘urban bias’ thesis (Lipton, 1977), governments might be particularly careful to avoid dissent among urban populations, who are more essential to their political survival, than rural populations. Bates’ seminal work on the political economy of rural Africa has indicated that such an urban bias was particularly pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa under autocratic rule (Bates, 1981). While recent research suggests that this urban bias has been alleviated since the (re-)introduction of multiparty politics (Harding, 2010; Stasavage, 2005), the perception of voters might still be that the support of urban dwellers, and particularly those living in the capital is crucial to the government, and that politicians will avoid making promises here, which they do not intend on fulfilling:

“Somewhere like Greater Accra, he was talking of Ledzokuku and its being a swing region (sic!) [participant means constituency, not region], no matter what happens, when you get votes here or not, you will have to develop there. This is the capital. Even if he [the incumbent] lost [here] but won the national election, he will have to develop that place.”²⁰

Participant 1: “I quite remember when that policy was brought about. It was for the people in the Northern Region and for girl child education.[...] It was just that the nation looked at Ashanti Region who are (sic!) into cocoa. The government gave subsidies for cocoa farmers to sponsor their fertilizers. They looked at the Northern Region and saw they don’t have too many good schools. [...]”

Participant 2: “You were saying government subsidized the fertilizers [in the South]. Have you ever heard government subsidizing cereals and tuber for the Northerners?”

Participant 1: “I have never heard of it.

Participant 2: So it means they are deprived. So in actual fact, the southern sector is closer to the government. So the farther you go from Accra, the more deprived you are.”²¹

The fact that urban dwellers in the capital of Ghana perceive election promises as generally quite credible might account for why the survey experiment did not provide any support for the hypothesis that local promises are more credible than national promises. In the following section, I turn to the results of the survey experiment, concerning the effect of partisanship on the credibility of campaign promises.

²⁰Focus group Ayawaso West-Wogoon, December, 21, 2012.

²¹Focus group Ayawaso West-Wogoon, December 21, 2012.

7.3.5 Do partisans regard promises by candidates of the party they feel close to as more credible ?

I have argued that the reason why the incumbent allocated so many of his local promises in his strongholds is that he is more credible here than elsewhere. To assess whether partisans do indeed perceive the same campaign promises to be more likely to be implemented if they are made by the candidate whose party they feel close to, than by another candidate, I estimated a series of models, reported in Table 7.4. I coded respondents as partisans if they reported to feel close to the party of the candidate making the promise.²² In line with my expectation, partisanship has a strong and statistically significant effect on the credibility of all three experimental campaign promises. According to the model, reported in column 1, in Table 7.4, the probability that a partisan says that he or she thinks that the energy promise will “Yes, definitely” be fulfilled is 66.5% (+/- .05). It is only 25.1% (+/- .03) for a respondent who does not identify with the candidate’s party. This means that partisans are nearly three times as likely to think that the promise will definitely be fulfilled than other respondents.²³ Conversely, the likelihood that a partisan will say that the promise will definitely not be fulfilled is as low as 3.5% (+/- 0.00). Non-partisans on the other hand are much more likely to think that the promise will definitely or probably not be fulfilled (over 17% and over 25%, respectively).

While the presented findings indicate that partisans do indeed regard promises assigned to candidates whose party they feel close as much more credible than other respondents, this is comparing partisans to both undecided and opposed voters. I further disaggregate non-partisans in undecided voters, those who reported to not feel close to any party, and voters who said they felt close to the candidate whose promise they were not presented with. Figure 7.5 graphs the results for the energy promise. It shows that undecided voters regard promises as substantially less likely to be fulfilled than partisans, even though they regard promises by a candidate as more likely to be fulfilled than supporters of the main competitor of the candidate whose promise is being evaluated, lending support to Hypothesis 3. The results are the same for the other two experimental promises (not shown). This supports the assumption made in my argument that opposed voters are least receptive to campaign promises, followed by undecided voters and that supporters are most likely to believe a campaign promise made by the candidate whose party they are affiliated with.

²²The phrasing of these survey items is taken from the Afrobarometer round 4 questionnaire. Respondents were asked “Do you feel close to any particular party?” and if they responded yes, then the second question read “Which party is that?”.

²³All other characteristics are held at their median so that this is calculated for a respondent who has completed secondary school, is not an ethnic partisan and who has a level of news consumption of 8 on a 13-point scale, higher values indicating more regular news consumption.

Table 7.4: Effect of co-identity with the candidates on the credibility of their promises

| | (1) Energy promise | (2) Water promise | (3) Street lights promise | (4) Interaction |
|------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|
| Partisan | 2.709*** (11.16) | 2.177*** (7.32) | 2.245*** (8.54) | 2.566*** (7.79) |
| Ethnic partisan | -0.0820 (-0.48) | -0.399** (-2.09) | -0.274** (-1.97) | -0.0736 (-0.44) |
| Independent | 1.028*** (4.51) | 0.776*** (3.48) | 0.961*** (4.41) | 0.823*** (3.03) |
| News | -0.0130 (-0.34) | 0.0316 (0.69) | 0.0700 (1.24) | -0.00864 (-0.22) |
| Education | 0.0234 (0.57) | -0.00854 (-0.16) | -0.0141 (-0.30) | 0.0227 (0.54) |
| Local | | | | -0.476 (-1.61) |
| Partisan*Local | | | | 0.351 (0.78) |
| Independent*Local | | | | 0.465 (0.92) |
| cut1 | -1.043*** (-3.18) | -1.025*** (-3.37) | -1.136*** (-4.02) | -1.231*** (-3.77) |
| cut2 | 0.607 ⁺ (1.83) | 0.267 (0.73) | -0.0931 (-0.34) | 0.431 (1.27) |
| cut3 | 2.121*** (5.95) | 1.669*** (4.56) | 1.452*** (5.11) | 1.949*** (5.15) |
| Wald χ^2 | 205.17*** | 57.13*** | 84.28*** | 417.94*** |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.12 |
| Pseudo Log-Likelihood | -493.59 | -514.22 | -462.90 | -492.30 |
| Number of clusters | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Number of observations | 416 | 417 | 418 | 416 |


Values are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis

Model 4 is uses the energy promise as the dependent variable

+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Contrary to my expectations, however, the effect of partisanship is not stronger for local than for national promises, as the non-significant coefficient of the interaction term between the framing of the promise and whether or not a respondent was a candidate's partisan, reported in column 4, in table 7.4 suggests. This is in line with the results described above that the participants of the experiment do not seem to have considered local promises as more credible than national promises. A graphical inspection of the interaction confirms that there is no difference (not shown). All findings with regard to the effect of co-identity with a candidate are robust to using the binary conceptualization of the dependent variable.²⁴

²⁴See Table D.3 in Appendix D.

Figure 7.5: Effect of voter identity on the credibility of the energy promise

I also run robustness checks using ethnic identity as a proxy for partisanship. I code Ewes, Northerners, and Ga as ethnic partisans of the incumbent and Akyems and Ashanti as co-ethnics of the challenger, in line with previous codings of ethnic partisans in Chapters 5 and 6.²⁵ While the incumbent concentrated rally events and local promises in constituencies where these ethnic partisans were concentrated, ethnic partisans did not seem to regard campaign promises as more likely to be fulfilled than other respondents. To the contrary, the negative sign of the coefficient of *Ethnic partisan* suggests that they were less likely to believe promises ascribed to the candidate whose party their ethnic groups tends to support. The most plausible explanation for this observation lies again in the location of the data collection. Afrobarometer evidence suggests that people tend to trust more in co-ethnics than in non-coethnics (Kuenzi, 2008) and experimental evidence shows that they are also more likely to cooperate with members of their own ethnic group than with others (Habyarimana et al., 2009). However, Foddy and Yamagishi (2009) also show in various experiments on co-identity and trust that participants only expect to be favored by another player whose identity they share, if they are told that this other player knows about their identity. Transferring this to voters' perception of how likely a candidate will follow up on a campaign promise, this might mean that voters are only going to trust the co-ethnic candidate

²⁵In the experiment I also coded Akyems as co-ethnics of the challenger, not only NPP's traditional support base of the Ashanti. This was done as the candidate, Nana Akufo-Addo, is an Akyem and not an Ashanti. A shared identity with the candidate and not only with the party might affect the credibility of the candidates' campaign promises among these respondents so that I also coded members of the Akyem group as co-ethnics in the experiment.

more than the non-co-ethnic candidate if they think that they can be identified as in-group members by the candidate. If they cannot be identified as being ethnic partisans, then the candidate cannot favor them or reward them for past support and hence they do not expect to receive more benefits from the co-ethnic candidate than from another candidate. This idea is supported by patterns of ethnic voting in Ghana's 2008 elections (Ichino and Nathan, 2013). Ichino and Nathan (2013) show that voters tend to vote for a candidate who belongs to the dominant ethnic group in the locality they live in, no matter whether these voters themselves are of this dominant ethnic group, or whether they belong to an ethnic minority.²⁶

The rationale put forward by Ichino and Nathan (2013) is that voters have an incentive to vote with the dominant ethnic group, because they anticipate that candidates reward co-ethnics for support at the polls with the provision of public goods. The more support these candidates receive, the more benefits they will deliver to a locality (*ibid.*). As at the level of the community, no voter can be excluded from a public local good, also those of a different ethnic group than the candidate will benefit from it. This means, that all voters have an incentive to drive up the vote share of the candidate from the dominant ethnic group in the locality. In the sample of the present study there are constituencies where one ethnic group dominated, as is often the case in rural constituencies. Participants in the experiment might hence consider it unlikely that they can be identified as ethnic partisans of the candidates. These considerations serve to explain why there is no positive effect of ethnic partisanship on the credibility of these experimental promises.

However, why ethnic partisans regarded campaign promises as less credible than others, requires further investigation. One possible explanation is that these co-ethnic voters are better informed about the extend to which candidates engage in ethnic favoritism (e.g. Kasara, 2007) toward their group than others. Because they might be aware that these candidates tend to cater to the constituencies where ethnic partisans are concentrated – which is not in Accra – they might consider it unlikely that the candidates fulfill promises elsewhere. The present study advances our knowledge on the effectiveness of campaign promises, particularly those involving targeted transfers. It shows that the credibility of campaign promises hinges both on candidate and voter identity. Furthermore, it helps to identify one of the mechanisms that makes promises effective; that is credibility. However, a limitation of the findings is that the sample is exclusively urban. Future research should improve on this by conducting similar analyses on the countryside. Sampling various polling stations in four purposively selected constituencies in Accra had the advantage of achieving great variation on ethnic backgrounds and various socio-demographic variables that might influence voters' perception of the credibility of the experimental campaign promises.

²⁶See also Carlson (2010, p. 15) who finds in a voting experiment in Uganda that the strongest predictor of ethnic voting is whether somebody is part of the dominant ethnic group in the locality she lives in.

However, while I was able to produce a sample of great variety in terms of these characteristics of respondents, they all share one important trait, which is that they are urban dwellers, living in the capital. As I have suggested, the responsiveness of voters to local versus national promises and the credibility of promises made by co-ethnic candidates might be different in the countryside, future research should replicate the study on a rural sample, which I was unable to do in the context of this dissertation, due to time and budget constraints. Follow-up studies should, however, go beyond a mere replication of the results as the same treatments in different contexts can produce quite different results. Rather, it would be advisable to combine a replication of the treatments of the present experiment with a more profound investigation of the causal mechanisms at work (Wantchekon and De la O, Ana L., 2011, pp. 292–293). Subsequent studies could, for example, identify *why* partisans regard promises as more credible if they are made by candidates whose parties they feel close to. They could investigate whether this is because the candidates they support have catered to them in the past and hence have a reputation among supporters of keeping campaign promises or whether this is independent of the expected future performance of candidates and simply an outcome of a social identity formation (see Weisberg and Greene, 2003).

7.4 Summary

This chapter tested one of the central assumptions made in past research on clientelistic targeting: Voters vary in their responsiveness to promises of particularistic benefits and this variation is grounded in the credibility of such campaign appeals (Wantchekon, 2003). The evidence from the survey experiment conducted during Ghana's 2012 election campaigns provides support for the argument that incumbents are more credible in promising particularistic benefits (to voters) than challengers (see Medina and Stokes, 2007; Wantchekon, 2003). I have provided qualitative evidence to underscore that this finding is not an artifact of a difference between these two particular candidates, but that they are likely grounded in one of them having been the incumbent and the other the challenger. As the results from one single experiment can never be considered conclusive, however, these findings need to be replicated in other elections in Ghana, or elsewhere to further establish external validity.

The evidence presented in this chapter does not provide support for another argument made in some studies on clientelism, which is that promises of local club goods are more credible to voters than promises of broad-based national promises (Atchade, Wantchekon and McClendon, 2012; Wantchekon, 2003). Further tests of this argument are needed to establish whether the responsiveness of voters to local compared to national public goods has been over-estimated, or whether Ghana differs from other African countries. As Ghanaian parties have clearer programmatic profiles than parties in most other

African countries, the consequences of promises concerning macro-economic policies might be easier for them to anticipate. This might make national promises more credible to them than to African voters in countries where parties' profiles are less clear-cut.

The results of this survey experiment resonate with findings from the literature on the political psychology of voters. They underscore the argument that partisanship is an important filter of campaign information (Hagner & Rieselbach 1978, Kraus et al. 1962, LeDuc & Price 1979, Lang & Lang 1962, Sigelman & Sigelman 1984) and that voters evaluate campaign messages made by candidates whose party they are affiliated with much more positively, than those by other candidates (Iyengar & Kinder 1987, Popkin 1991, Zaller 1992).²⁷ These findings challenge the argument in favor of a persuasion or vote-buying logic that it would be most rational for parties to focus their campaign appeals on attracting new voters (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Stokes, 2005; Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013).

The chapter's findings provide support for one of the central arguments I have proposed for why parties campaign so much among their own supporters. The fact that candidates can more credibly make campaign promises to their own partisans can serve as an explanation for why the main candidates in Ghana's 2012 elections spent so much time travelling to constituencies where likely sympathizers of their party were concentrated and why the incumbent focused local promises mainly in these same areas.

The evidence gained in the survey experiment, furthermore, underpins the plausibility of a central interpretation I have made with respect to the use of local promises in these campaigns in Ghana. The incumbent seems to have more frequently made use of local promises, *because he was regarded as more credible* by the voters than the challenger.

²⁷This literature is reviewed in more detail in Chapter 2.

Chapter 8

Clientelism and voter intimidation

The previous chapters have analyzed campaign rallies and campaign promises, and have provided evidence that these strategies are applied by candidates to mobilize turnout among likely supporters. The two explanations advanced in the theoretical argument that I have tested so far are first, that parties cater to their supporters if these supporters are unlikely to turn out, and second, that parties campaign among their partisans, because they are much easier to influence than other voters, as they trust more in what the candidates promise them. The present chapter tests the third explanation, formulated in my theory; namely that parties concentrate benefits on their supporters, because they use violence and intimidation to demobilize voters, whose support would be too costly to gain. In addition to testing this theoretical proposition, this chapter provides yet another test of whether benefits are used by parties to mobilize their supporters, studying the strategic allocation of individual benefits.

Observers of elections in young democracies have contended that the use of clientelism is often only one strategy on parties' "menu of manipulation" (Schedler, 2002). Anecdotal evidence from Kenya's 2007 (Gutiérrez-Romero, 2014), Nigeria's 2007 (Bratton, 2008), Uganda's 2011 (Common Wealth Observer Group, 2011) or Zimbabwe's 2008 elections illustrate how parties combine the manipulation of electoral outcomes through the distribution of gifts to some, with the intimidation of other voters. The mix of clientelism and violence by the ruling ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe's 2008 elections serves as a case in point. On the one hand, the government engaged in clientelism, by giving out farm tools and even land to rural constituents, as the following example illustrates:

"He [President Mugabe] also attempted to bolster support through the 'agricultural mechanization programme', a thinly disguised vote-buying exercise in which mountains of farm equipment have been given away at Zanu-PF election rallies. The tactic appeared to have persuaded some supporters to stay loyal. Christine Machada, 46, a mother of six who received a harvester and a tractor, said she had voted for him again, although her 25-acre farm was producing few crops" (Birch, Dziva and Thornycroft, 2008).

On the other hand, President Mugabe and his ruling party militia engaged in large scale intimidation, warning voters not to “vote wrongly,” which would have meant to vote for the opposition (Zvomuya, Roussouw and Moyo, 2008). Examples of a mix of illicit campaigning strategies, ranging from paying voters for their support to intimidating them with violence, are not restricted to African elections, as recent elections in Bulgaria (Mares, Petrova and Tsveta, 2013), Honduras (Global Research, 2013) or Guatemala (Gonzalez Ocantos et al., 2013) illustrate. The literature on clientelism has, however, largely failed to acknowledge both in theoretical models and in empirical analyses, that the costs and benefits associated with its use, are also impacted by other strategies, such as voter intimidation. The present chapter provides one of the first attempts to systematically analyze the use of clientelism and violence as two strategies in a party’s campaigning repertoire.¹

I have argued in Chapter 3 that benefits are used to mobilize turnout among likely supporters and that violence is used to demobilize voters. If electoral violence is indeed applied to disenfranchise voters, whose support parties find difficult to win with benefits, this can be part of the answer to why independent voters receive so few benefits during election campaigns. So far, I have investigated the targeting of groups of voters at the constituency level. The present investigation is based on a joint research project, in which we analyze the targeting of individual voters with clientelism and intimidation, using data from the Afrobarometer survey.² Our data cover elections in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, held between 2007 and 2011. In the following, I summarize the expectations regarding the goals that parties apply clientelism and violence with, and the groups of voters they address. Then the empirical implications of the argument and the results are presented. The chapter concludes with linking the findings to the dissertation’s central research question.

8.1 Theoretical expectations

My expectation with regard to the use of violence is that it is applied to intimidate independent voters, to induce them to stay away from the polls. In Chapter 3, I have presented three main arguments in favor

¹See Collier and Vicente (2012) for a theoretical paper on the use of vote-buying and violence to impact elections outcomes, and Bratton (2008), Gonzalez Ocantos et al. (2013), Gutiérrez-Romero (2014), Mares, Petrova and Tsveta (2013) on empirical studies of elections in Nigeria, Kenya, Guatemala, and Bulgaria, respectively.

²This chapter is based on a conference paper, which was co-authored with Matthias Orłowski, PhD candidate at the Humboldt University, Berlin. The paper was entitled “Political Geography and the Strategic use of Redistributive and Coercive Campaigning Strategies,” and was presented at 4th Annual General Conference of the European Political Science Association, June 19-21, 2014, in Edinburgh. In this paper, my co-author particularly focused on the empirical analysis of how electoral competition affects the use of clientelism and voter intimidation. He developed the measure of electoral competitiveness at the regional level, merged data from different sources, and implemented the statistical procedures we applied in order to test our theoretical expectations. See the declaration of co-authorship provided in Appendix E for further details on this.

of this thesis. First, based on past empirical studies, I have assumed that the most common consequence of pre-electoral violence is that voters shy away from the polls (Bratton 2008, Hickman 2009, Meredith 2002, Kuhn 2013, Sisk & Reynolds 1998). Realizing this, I have argued that it is most rational for parties to apply violence with the aim to demobilize voters, rather than to persuade voters to vote for them, or to mobilize turnout among their supporters. Second, I argued that as observing turnout is easier than to find out how voters vote, it is rational for parties to use violence with the aim to impact turnout, rather than vote choice. Third, I have posited that it is more rational for parties to use violence to demobilize independent voters, rather than supporters of their rival party. This is because while parties might indeed have the strongest incentives to demobilize strong supporters of their opponent, the amount of coercion they would have to apply is likely going to be much higher than if they are trying to demobilize voters who are less determined to vote for the rival candidate.³ In addition, instigating violence in strongholds of the rival candidate risks polarizing these voters against the party.⁴

8.2 Empirical implications of the argument

In the present analysis, we characterize voters by their political affiliation and their likelihood to turn out. All the elections we study are presidential elections, which mostly constitute a race between the candidates of two major parties. We identify voters as supporters of either of the two main parties or as unaffiliated with any of these two parties. In addition, we characterize them as more or less likely to participate in elections. As it can be difficult for parties to find out about individuals' political makeup and to anticipate how likely these individuals will turn out in the election, we also take the political makeup and turnout histories of the locality where voters live into account. This aggregate-level information can serve parties as easily available indicators on where their own supporters, those of the rival candidate, and independent voters are likely to be concentrated. One meaningful unit of analysis for campaigns to infer the political inclination of voters they aim to address in a campaign is the electoral constituency, as I have argued in Chapter 5. The number of respondents per constituency in the Afrobarometer survey is too small to conduct constituency-level analyses, however. In addition, the information of where respondents reside is only given at the district, not at the constituency-level, which makes it difficult to locate respondents in a particular constituency. Given these constraints, we move our analysis to the regional level, where past turnout and vote share is also publicly available. Regions not only serve as meaningful units of observations for parties because past election results and turnout levels are

³See Stokes 2005 (pp. 319–321) and Nichter (2008, p. 23) for a similar argument, regarding the use of clientelistic benefits.

⁴See Althaus et al. 2002, or Fenno 1978 for a similar argument about why parties might avoid campaigning in their rival party's strongholds.

available, but also because the borders of regions oftentimes coincide with the concentration of specific ethnic groups (Conteh-Morgan, 1997).⁵ As ethnicity is an important determinant of voting behavior in Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Bratton, Bhavnani and Chen, 2013), it serves as a vital source of information for parties of where partisans are likely to be found. We hence expect parties to condition their attempts to bribe and intimidate voters both on voters' individual characteristics and on the political makeup and turnout history of the region they live in. The number of regions in the countries we study range from four regions in the small country of Sierra Leone to 25 regions in Tanzania.

Several observable implications can be derived from the argument that it is rational for parties to predominantly use clientelism to mobilize core voters who are uncertain to turn out and to use coercive appeals to demobilize independent voters. In order to evaluate these expectations with the regional and individual-level data described below, we need to introduce two additional assumptions. The Afrobarometer survey offers exceptionally fine-grained data on characteristics of those individuals being addressed with clientelism and those fearing violence. The survey not only provides information about personal experience with clientelism and an individual's assessment of the risk to be intimidated with violence, but also contains information on the political inclination of voters and their habit to turn out. This is an improvement over studies of politically motivated targeting with violence that use information only on the group-level (e.g. Balcells, 2011; Wilkinson and Haid, 2009), where the use of such data would mean equating violence in swing regions, for example, with violence directed at swing voters. However, the Afrobarometer data also come with a caveat, namely that they do not contain information on which party has targeted voters with clientelism, or which party voters feel threatened by. Lacking this information, we make the assumption that the bulk of campaigning reported on is a function of the activity of the two main parties in the election who are likely to have more campaigning resources than small third parties. We further assume that parties largely avoid campaigning in their rival's strongholds, so that the campaign appeals we observe here can predominantly be attributed to campaigning by the party whose strongholds this region is. This is in line with literature on candidate visits to different regions or states during campaigns, where it has been argued that candidates avoid campaigning in hostile areas, because this carries the risk of polarizing these opposed voters against the candidate and hence pushing them even further away from him (Althaus et al. 2002, Fenno 1978).

The assumption also seems reasonable, as parties have frequently tried to prevent rival candidates to campaign in their strongholds. Kenya's then ruling party KANU, for example, prevented its main challenger from campaigning in its safe havens through its organs "Youth for KANU" (YK '92) and "Operation

⁵This is particularly relevant, as the geographic concentration of ethnic groups is higher in Sub-Saharan Africa, than anywhere else (Gurr, 1993, Mozaffar, 2006, p. 241).

Moi Win” and “with the backing of [the] provincial administration” (Laakso, 2007, p. 231). The EU’s elections observation of Kenya’s 2007 elections also states that the two main presidential candidates avoided campaigning in the other party’s strongholds, “in order to avoid hostile receptions” (EU Elections Observation Mission, 2008, pp. 19–20). Another example are Ghana’s 2008 election campaigns, in which the main parties contesting the general elections “declared their respective [...] strongholds ‘no-go-areas’ for their opponents” (Gyimah-Boadi et al., 2008, p. 1). With this assumption, different implications about the effect of individual turnout propensity, partisanship, and regional competitiveness, and turnout on the likelihood of a voter to be targeted with any of the two campaign strategies can be derived, depending on whether the strategy is meant to mobilize, demobilize, or persuade voters. The different implications are summarized in Tables 8.1 and 8.2.

8.2.1 Expectations on the use of clientelism

Characterizing voters by their affiliation with the parties campaigning in the election, and by their likelihood to turn out, allows us to distinguish the strategy of the *mobilization of potential supporters* from alternative strategies parties could use. These are rewarding their loyalists, persuasion, and double persuasion (Nichter, 2008, p. 20), which are illustrated in Table 3.2 in Chapter 3. Table 8.1 summarizes the implied effects of regional and individual-level factors on an individual’s likelihood to be targeted with clientelism, when parties follow the goal of mobilization. It also illustrates the implied effects we would need to see if parties were rather pursuing the goal of rewarding their loyalists, or that of persuasion or double persuasion.

If the dominant party in a region employed a strategy to *mobilize its own supporters*, we expect it to target voters living in those of its strongholds, where past turnout has been low. These strongholds in our data are characterized by a low level of competitiveness. Within these regions, we expect parties to concentrate clientelistic appeals on their partisans, and particularly on those of them who are unlikely to go and vote. This means that a voter’s affiliation with the dominant party in a region should increase her likelihood to be targeted with clientelism and her probability to turn out should decrease her likelihood to receive an offer to buy her support with clientelism. The competitiveness and the level of past turnout of the region she lives in should decrease her probability to be targeted with clientelism. This leads us to formulate the following expectations:

Individual-level factors

H1: Voters who are affiliated with the dominant party in a region are more likely to be targeted with clientelism than other voters.

H2: The lower a voter's likelihood to turn out, the more likely she is to be targeted with clientelism.

H3: Voters who are affiliated with the dominant party in a region are more likely to be targeted with clientelism, the lower their likelihood to turn out.

Regional-level factors

H4: The less competitive the region a voter lives in is, the more likely she is to be targeted with clientelism.

H5: The lower the level of past turnout was in the region a voter lives in, the more likely she is to be targeted with clientelism.

As we expect parties to mobilize turnout predominantly among their supporters, we expect them to campaign most in those of their strongholds (non-competitive regions) where turnout has been low. This leads us to the following expectation:

H6: The negative effect of regional-level competitiveness on a voter's likelihood to be targeted with clientelism becomes stronger, the lower past turnout has been in the region she lives in.

To the contrary, if clientelism were used to *reward loyalists*, we would expect parties to focus this appeal also on their strongholds, but on those regions where past turnout has been high. In addition, we would expect parties to predominantly target those partisans who are likely to turn out. This means that an individual's affiliation with the dominant party in the region she lives in and her habit to turn out would then increase her likelihood to be addressed with clientelism. Regional-level competitiveness would decrease and regional-level turnout would increase her probability to be targeted with clientelism.

Another option is that parties use clientelism to attract independent voters. If they focused clientelistic targeting in competitive regions with high past turnout, and among independent voters, who are likely to turn out, this would imply a goal of *persuasion*. What we would observe is that a voter's affiliation with the dominant party in a region would decrease, but her habit to turn out would increase her likelihood to be targeted. Regional-level competitiveness and past turnout would increase her likelihood to be addressed with clientelism.

If parties rather concentrated clientelistic appeals on those competitive regions where turnout has been low and on those independent voters, who are unlikely to go and vote, this would imply the aim of *double persuasion*. We would observe that the affiliation with the dominant party and her habit to turn

out decreased a voter's probability to receive an offer to buy her support with clientelism. The competitiveness of the region she lives in would increase and past regional turnout would decrease her probability to be targeted with clientelism. Lastly, parties could be using clientelism to pay voters to stay away from the polls. As has been described in Chapter 2, this strategy has not been studied as much as turnout-buying and vote-buying. Findings from a formal model suggest that parties should concentrate attempts to buy the abstention of opposed voters who are likely to turn out (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014, pp. 417–418). If parties were pursuing such a strategy, we would hence see that partisans with a high likelihood to turn out are targeted and those voters living in non-competitive regions with histories of high turnout. This would empirically not be distinguishable from a strategy directed at rewarding loyalists. We have not included this strategy in Table 8.1, because we have made the assumption that parties avoid campaigning in rival parties' strongholds. However, if parties were predominantly using clientelism to pay opposed voters not to vote, this would mean that they overwhelmingly campaign in strongholds of the rival party. We discuss this possibility, nonetheless, when we interpret our results on the use of clientelism.

Table 8.1: Implied effects of regional and individual-level factors on an individuals' likelihood to be targeted with **clientelism**

| <i>Individual level</i> | | <i>Regional level</i> | | GOAL |
|---------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---|
| Affiliation with dominant party | Likelihood to turn out | Competitiveness | Turnout level | |
| Increases likelihood | Decreases likelihood | Decreases likelihood | Decreases likelihood | MOBILIZATION REWARDING OF LOYALISTS PERSUASION DOUBLE PERSUASION |
| Increases likelihood | Increases likelihood | Decreases likelihood | Increases likelihood | |
| Decreases likelihood | Increases likelihood | Increases likelihood | Increases likelihood | |
| Decreases likelihood | Decreases likelihood | Increases likelihood | Decreases likelihood | |

8.2.2 Expectations on the use of violence

We have argued that parties should apply violent intimidation of voters with the aim to *demobilize independent voters*. We expect voters who are unaffiliated with the dominant party in a region to be most at risk to experience violence and those living in competitive regions, as is illustrated in Table 8.2. A voter's affiliation with the dominant party in a region should hence decrease her risk to suffer from intimidation. Regional-level competitiveness should increase her likelihood to be intimidated. We do not have any expectation with regard to whether parties demobilize certain or potential independent voters, as there are good reasons for them to use either strategy. On the one hand, parties would probably be most interested in demobilizing those of the independent voters, who are likely to vote, in order to prevent them from voting for the other party. On the other hand, however, intimidating voters who

already have high voting costs, is likely to be cheaper for parties, and might hence be an option they prefer. Our considerations lead us to formulate the following expectations:

Individual-level factors

H7: Voters who are unaffiliated with the dominant party in the region they live in are more at risk to suffer from violent intimidation than partisans of this party.

Regional-level factors

H8: The more competitive the region voters live in is, the more at risk they are to suffer from violent intimidation.

Alternatively, parties could also apply violence to discipline their own partisans and coerce them into turning out for them (e.g. LeBas, 2006), as is illustrated in Figure 3.3, in Chapter 3. If parties were following such a goal, we would expect them to concentrate attempts to intimidate voters on their own strongholds and on their own partisans, as is summarized in Table 8.2. A voter's affiliation with the dominant party in a region would then increase her risk to suffer from intimidation and regional-level competitiveness would decrease her likelihood to be addressed with violence.

Table 8.2: Implied effects of regional and individual-level factors on an individuals' risk to be targeted with **violence**

| <i>Individual level</i> | | <i>Regional level</i> | | GOAL |
|---------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|--|
| Affiliation with dominant party | Likelihood to turn out | Competitiveness | Turnout level | |
| Decreases likelihood | No expectation | Increases likelihood | No expectation | DEMOBILIZATION OF INDEP. VOTERS INCREASE COHESION |
| Increases likelihood | No expectation | Decreases likelihood | No expectation | |

8.2.3 Data and methodology

We test the expectations formulated above on a sample of 10 African countries. Sub-Saharan Africa serves as a good testing ground for our arguments, as these countries represent a combination of relatively competitive elections and yet a prevalence of the use of illicit campaigning strategies.⁶ Our sample includes Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. These are the countries for which regional-level election results were available, from various sources, and data on the use of campaign strategies were available from the Afrobarometer round 5 survey. In addition, these countries share important similarities. They all (re-)introduced multiparty

⁶See Lindberg (2003); van de Walle (2003); Young (2009); Weghorst and Lindberg (2011); Collier and Vicente (2014); Vicente (2014) for studies on clientelism and Basedau, Erdmann and Mehler (2007); Bekoe (2010); Goldsmith (Forthcoming) for the occurrence of pre-electoral violence in Sub-Saharan Africa.

democracy in the 1990s so that parties have a similar history of campaigning and – more importantly – they all are presidential systems where the president is elected through popular vote and with a majoritarian electoral formula. At the same time, this sample exhibits substantial variation in turnout levels and competitiveness across subnational regions.

Our main data source to test the propositions outlined above is the fifth round of the Afrobarometer.⁷ Two items lend themselves as measurements for the dependent variables of interests. First, respondents are asked whether and if so, how often a candidate or party representative offered them something in return for their vote in the last national election.⁸ We recoded this item to an indicator variable that distinguishes between respondents who report any bribery attempts and those who do not.⁹

Unfortunately, there is no equally valid measure for individuals' personal experiences with election related intimidation or violence we could use. There is, however, an item asking respondents about how much they fear political intimidation or violence in election campaigns in general.¹⁰ This item is not ideal for our purposes since it neither relates to a specific election nor to the personal experience of respondents. Lacking a better measure of intimidation, we content ourselves with this item as a proxy, as others have done before (Bratton, 2008; Kuhn, 2013). It is reasonable to assume that respondents with personal experience are more likely to report fear of electoral violence or intimidation than others, and that they weight recent experiences more heavily in their responses than events further in the past. As with the vote buying item, we recoded the original variable from ordinal level to a binary, where zero indicates no fear of violence at all and one subsumes the three categories indicating any fear of intimidation.¹¹

We derived the two main independent variables at the regional level from regional-level election results from various sources.¹² The fifth round of the Afrobarometer relates questions about presidential elections to those held in the respective country between 2007 and 2011. To measure levels of turnout and competitiveness preceding these elections, we collected election results for the previous election between 2002 and 2008. Whereas the measurement of turnout is straightforward, the measurement of electoral competition at the regional level has to ensure comparability across countries and regions with different party systems. Even though presidential election campaigns mostly constitute a race between the candidates of two major parties at the national level, there is considerable variation in the structure

⁷Country specific data sets are available at www.afrobarometer.org.

⁸Question Q61F: "And during the last national election in..., how often, if ever, did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you something, like food or a gift or money, in return for your vote?"

⁹We also report results of our analyses, using the original variable in Appendix E.

¹⁰Question Q54: "During election campaigns in this country, how much do you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence?"

¹¹Results of our analyses, using the original variable, are reported as robustness checks in Appendix E.

¹²A list of all data sources is provided in Table 4.5 in Chapter 4.

of electoral competition at the regional level. Whereas election results in some regions indicate a clear victory of either one, or a close race between the incumbent and one challenger party, opposition is split among several equally sized parties in other regions. In order to account for this variation in our measurement of competitiveness, we employ an entropy-like index developed by Endersby, Galatas and Rackaway (2002) who compare competitiveness across districts with differing numbers of candidates.¹³ The index is bound between zero and one with larger values indicating a more competitive situation.¹⁴ We coded individuals' partisan status in relation to the dominant party in the region the respondent lives in. The Afrobarometer data contain a filter for party identification and ask for the party a respondent identifies with if applicable.¹⁵ We used these two items to generate a nominal variable indicating subjects who (1) do not feel close to any political party, (2) identify with the dominant party in their region, or (3) feel close to some other party. The dominant party is defined based on the election results we collected at the regional level. It is the party that received the plurality of votes in the region.

In order to measure individuals' likelihood to vote independently from potential effects of clientelism and intimidation, we applied a two-step procedure. First, we split the full sample of nearly 11,000 observations into respondents who reported bribery attempts or any fear of intimidation or violence on the one hand, and those who did not do so, on the other. From the sample with only respondents who neither reported bribery nor intimidation, we then created two subsamples. For each region, respondents were randomly assigned to one of these samples. One of the two subsamples was then merged back into the data set with respondents who were targeted by illicit campaigning strategies and set aside for the subsequent analyses. These data, containing both those respondents who reported to have been targeted with (at least) one of the strategies and those who were not targeted with any of the strategies were to be used in the analyses of the use of illicit campaigning tactics.

We estimated an individual's propensity to vote for the other subsample, fitting a hierarchical logistic model with a random intercept, similar to that described in Table 8.2.¹⁶ Based on the model estimates, we then predicted the probability to vote for all respondents in the sample set aside for the analysis of

¹³ In a given region, competitiveness among k candidates is measured as:

$$c_k = k^k \prod_{i=1}^k p_i \quad (8.1)$$

where p_i is the vote share of candidate i in the region. k is set to the nearest integer to the effective number of electoral parties in the constituency calculated as $1 / \sum_{i=1}^k p_i$.

¹⁴ $c_k = 1$ if all candidates receive the same vote share in a region and $c_k = 0$ if a single candidate gains all votes.

¹⁵ Question Q89A: "Do you feel close to any particular political party?" and Question Q89B: "Which party is that?"

¹⁶ Question Q27: "With regard to the most recent national election in ..., which statement is true for you?". Respondents are given a choice between "You voted in the elections" and several alternatives providing excuses for non-voting in order to reduce bias due to social desirability. We recoded the item into a binary where all options containing information about non-voting were coded zero.

illicit campaigning strategies. Since our interest is to capture individuals' propensity to vote as perceived by political parties rather than that derived from a fully specified model, we only included predictors in the turnout model that are easily observable by parties:¹⁷ respondents' (1) age, (2) gender, whether they contacted (3) local or (4) party officials, (5) how often they attend community meetings, (6) whether they attended electoral campaigns, and (7) an indicator for them belonging to the dominant ethnic group in their region. We centered all non-binary variables to the region mean. Descriptive statistics are available in Table E.1 in Appendix E.

Posterior means, standard deviations and 95% highest posterior density intervals for all parameters are reported in Table 8.3. We included a second order polynomial of age to allow for a non-linear relationship between the probability of voting and a voter's age. Indeed, the probability of voting increases with age until respondents are about 18 years older than the average adult citizen in their region.¹⁸ We do not find an effect of gender or of being a member of the predominant ethnic group in a region. Contrary to these demographic factors, the variables capturing community and political activity all have relatively strong effects in the expected direction. The odds that a respondent voted in the last national election are more than twice as large for those who attended at least one campaign meeting as compared to others, holding constant all other factors in the model. Slightly weaker but still substantial is the difference between respondents who had contact to party officials and those who did not.

Despite their strength, these effects cannot be interpreted as being causal. There are a whole range of unmodeled factors that might affect both respondents' turnout decision as well as their choice to attend community meetings, for example. We are not interested in estimating causal effects, however. The goal is to use easily observable indicators to specify a sparse model that predicts individual turnout reasonably well. Figure 8.1 depicts the ROC curve for model predictions in and out of sample, based on the model reported in Table 8.3. Of course, predictions of individual turnout for the subsample set aside

¹⁷The following Afrobarometer items were used to code these variables:

1. Q1: "How old are you?"
2. Q101: "Respondent's gender" (question to interviewer)
3. Q30A: "During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views: A local government councilor?"
4. Q30D: "During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views: A political party official?"
5. Q26A: "Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Attended a community meeting?"
6. Q29A: "Thinking about the last national election in ..., did you: Attend a campaign meeting or rally?"
7. Q84: "Let us get back to talking about you. What is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?"

¹⁸Our sample is restricted to citizens being 18 or older.

Table 8.3: A model of individual turnout based on easily observable covariates

| Mean | SD | Lower | Upper | |
|---------------------------------|--------|-------|--------|--------|
| Age | 0.081 | 0.006 | 0.069 | 0.094 |
| Age ² | -0.002 | 0.000 | -0.003 | -0.002 |
| Female | -0.169 | 0.127 | -0.424 | 0.072 |
| Member of dominant ethnic group | 0.202 | 0.140 | -0.087 | 0.451 |
| Contact local official | 0.311 | 0.160 | 0.026 | 0.651 |
| Contact party official | 0.123 | 0.051 | 0.031 | 0.228 |
| Attends community meetings | 0.759 | 0.131 | 0.506 | 1.022 |
| Attended campaign | 0.637 | 0.208 | 0.229 | 1.039 |
| (Intercept) | 1.533 | 0.199 | 1.169 | 1.919 |
| ICC | 0.111 | 0.028 | 0.057 | 0.167 |
| Observations | | 2913 | | |
| Regions | | 115 | | |


Dependent variable is an indicator of individual turnout in last election. ICC is the intra-class correlation. Lower and Upper indicate 95 % Bayesian credibility intervals. All independent variables are centered to the region mean. Results of two MCMC chains with 100,000 simulations stored after discarding the first 50,000 iterations.

for further analysis below are worse than the in-sample predictions. Still, the model performs reasonably well. Even when marginalizing the information contained in the intercept estimates, information about the observable factors contained in the model allows to predict individuals' choice to turnout to vote to a reasonable degree. We therefore accept the model predictions as a plausible measure of individuals' propensity to vote which parties consider in their allocation of different campaigning strategies.

8.3 Results

Several individual and regional-level variables that can affect both voters' probability to vote or to support a certain party and their likelihood to be targeted with illicit campaigning strategies are added as controls in the models reported below.¹⁹ These are voters' poverty level, their consumption of news, whether they live in urban or rural areas, their level of education, their gender and age. Past research suggests that poorer voters are more likely to be targeted with clientelism than wealthier voters (Bratton, 2008; Kramon, 2013a; Stokes, 2005; Scott, 1969; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012, 2014). At the same time, turnout tends to be higher among poorer voters in Africa than among their wealthier counterparts (Bratton, 2008, pp. 624–625, Kuenzi and Lambright, 2011, p. 784). To control for this, we include a measure of experiential poverty that has shown strong construct validity and reliability when trying to capture individual-level poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa (Mattes, 2008). Following Mattes (ibid.), we constructed a lived poverty index from five items in the Afrobarometer survey asking respondents about their

¹⁹See Tables 8.4 and 8.5.

Figure 8.1: In-and out-of-sample predictions of individual turnout

regular access to food, water, health care, cooking fuel, and cash income. These items were included in a principal component factor analysis from which a single factor was extracted for the entire sample.²⁰ Factor scores are used as an interval-scaled indicator of individuals' poverty level with higher values indicating poorer living conditions.

Another factor that has shown to impact the prevalence of clientelism are settlement patterns, although the findings are mixed. In a study on Nigeria's 2003 and 2007 elections, Bratton (2008, p. 625) finds that rural voters are more likely to be targeted with clientelism, but detects no correlation with settlement and voter intimidation. An analysis of Mexico's 2000 elections suggests that clientelism clusters around urban dwellers (Cornelius, 2004). Settlement patterns have also shown to affect turnout. Rural voters tend to be more likely to participate in elections than urban voters in Africa (Bratton, Gyimah-Boadi and Mattes, 2005, Kuenzi and Lambright, 2011, Bratton, 2008, pp. 625–626). We therefore control at the individual level whether a respondent lives in an urban area.²¹ Since turnout and competition are correlated with settlement structures at the macro level, we also control for urbanity at the regional level.

²⁰The respective questions are: "Over the past year, how often if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without:"

Q8A: "Enough food to eat?"

Q8B: "Enough clean water for home use?"

Q8C: "Medicines or medical treatment?"

Q8D: "Enough fuel to cook your food?"

Q8E: "A cash income?"

We recoded the items such that higher values indicate a lack of access to the respective resources.

²¹Question URBRUR: "Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit?"(Question to interviewer)

The share of respondents living in urban areas in a region serves as the respective indicator. A second control variable we added at the regional level is the group mean of the poverty index as a measurement of regional differences in wealth. To distinguish between macro- and micro level effects, all non-binary individual-level independent variables were centered to the region mean and the regional-level indicators to the grand mean. Table E.2 in Appendix E provides descriptive statistics on all variables before centering.

Individuals who are better informed about political issues might be more likely to identify with a political party and have a higher propensity to vote. A study on turnout in African elections has found that media exposure increases participation in elections (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2007). In addition, past research suggests that the more information voters have about parties, the more likely they are to form partisan attachments (Huber, Kernell and Leoni, 2005). The frequency with which respondents consume news is, however, also a potential correlate with our measure of intimidation. The item might partly capture individuals' perception of intimidation and political violence independent of personal experience. The more respondents read the news or listen to them on the radio, or watch them on TV, the more their individual assessment of the risk to experience violence might be in line with what is reported on in the media. In order to control for this effect, we included an indicator that captures subjects' exposure to media. We create an index using the average of four items asking respondents about their usage of different information resources on an ordinal scale, ranging from "never" to "every day".²²

In addition, respondents' educational attainment is included as a control variable in all models.²³ Educated individuals have been shown to be more likely to vote in African elections (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2011, p. 784). Bratton's study on Nigerian elections shows that these voters were at the same time less likely to be targeted with intimidation (Bratton, 2008, p. 624) and clientelism (*ibid.*, p. 635).

We further include the respondent's gender as a control variable in all the analyses. Wantchekon found in his experiment conducted in Benin that men are more receptive to clientelism than women (Wantchekon, 2003, pp. 418–419) and argued that this is due to the fact that men are more likely to profit from clientelistic benefits such as jobs in the public sector. As gender has shown to also play a role in turnout in Africa, with men more likely to participate in elections than women (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2011, p. 783), we include gender as a control variable.

Lastly, we also control for the age of respondents. Turnout has been shown to be higher among older

²² The respective questions are: "How often do you get news from the following sources?"

Q13A: "Radio?"

Q13B: "Television?"

Q13C: "Newspapers?"

Q13D: "Internet?"

²³ Question Q97: "What is the highest level of education you have completed?" (answers on a ten point scale from "No formal schooling" to "Post-graduate")

than among younger individuals (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2011, p. 783). In addition, older voters might be more likely to profit from clientelistic benefits than younger voters (Wantchekon, 2003) and hence receive more offers to buy their support than their younger counterparts.

We fit the following hierarchical logistic random intercept model to the binary indicators for bribery and intimidation:

$$Pr(y_{ij} = 1) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-\alpha_j - \beta \mathbf{X}_i)} \quad (8.2)$$

$$\alpha_j \sim \mathcal{N}(\gamma \mathbf{Z}_j, \sigma^2) \quad (8.3)$$

The dependent variable is the probability that an individual reports to have been targeted with clientelism or to fear electoral violence. Subscript i indicates the individual which is nested in regions which are indexed by j . \mathbf{X} is a matrix with individual-level covariates and β the vector with the corresponding regression weights. We model the region average as being randomly distributed with common variance σ^2 . The mean regional intercept is conditional on a set of regional-level covariates \mathbf{Z}_j and the vector of corresponding coefficients γ .

We estimated all model parameters using Markov Chain Monte Carlo Methods with weakly informative priors. We put an inverse Wishart prior $\mathcal{W}^{-1}(1, 0.002)$ on σ^2 and used normal priors $\mathcal{N}(0, 10^8)$ for all fixed effects.²⁴ Results are reported for two chains with 100,000 simulations after discarding the first 50,000 iterations.

8.4 Estimation results

8.4.1 Clientelism

Table 8.4 depicts summary statistics of the posterior distribution for the parameters of three models of our clientelism indicator. Most demographic control variables have effects in the expected direction. According to our model estimates and in line with past studies (Bratton, 2008; Kramon, 2013a; Stokes, 2005; Scott, 1969; Weitz-Shapiro, 2014, 2012), individuals living in poverty are more likely to be targeted with clientelism compared to wealthier residents in the same region. We do not find an effect of regional-level poverty on the average level of bribery in a region, however, as the 95% credibility interval covers zero.²⁵

²⁴We used Hadfield's package `MCMCglmm` for \mathcal{R} to fit all models. Details on the prior specification can be found in the excellent Course Notes that come with the package vignette.

²⁵The 95% credibility interval serves as a measure of the certainty associated with the effects. The larger the interval is, the more uncertain we are about the effect. If the credibility interval covers zero, we cannot be sure that there is any effect at

The effect of the information indicator is positive with a probability of more than 95%. Subjects who inform themselves from different sources more regularly have a higher probability to receive favors in return for their vote. The corresponding credibility interval is comparatively large, however, indicating great uncertainty about the size of this effect. The result contrasts to a certain extent with findings gained in an experiment in India which suggested that better informed voters are less receptive to clientelistic campaign appeals (Banerjee et al., 2011, p. 2). If this were true, then we would not expect parties to target these voters more than those with less information. A plausible interpretation of the positive correlation between voter information and clientelism is that parties target individuals who are influential in their communities and who can motivate others to vote as they do. These individuals might also be more informed about the ongoing election campaign than others. This relationship is discussed in more detail below when we turn to the results concerning individual-level turnout and clientelism.

In contrast to previous research (Bratton, 2008; Cornelius, 2004), we do not find an effect for urban residency within a given region, as the Bayesian credibility interval covers zero. The same is true for regional-level urbanity. We neither find an effect of education on respondents' likelihood to be targeted with clientelism, contrary to Bratton's findings from Nigeria (Bratton, 2008, p. 625). Controlling for the demographic characteristics in the model and for respondents' usage of different information sources, educational attainment does not affect the probability for them being targeted with clientelism.

The probability to be targeted with clientelism decreases with age and is lower on average for women, compared to men. This is in line with Wantchekon's argument that women and younger voters might be less receptive to clientelism, because the type of benefit which is often used in clientelistic distribution are public sector jobs, which men and older voters disproportionately profit from.²⁶

Is clientelism used to mobilize turnout among partisans?

We now turn to the effects of the key independent variables of interest. In line with Hypothesis 1, partisans of the dominant party in a region have more than 40% higher odds to be targets of bribery attempts than non-partisans in the same region. Generally, these independent voters have the lowest probability to be targeted with clientelism in a given region. Their odds to be targeted are also about 35% lower than those for partisans of any other party than the dominant one. This finding speaks in favor of parties targeting their supporters rather than independent voters.

Contrary to our expectations, formulated in Hypothesis 2, however, we find a strong positive effect of

all.

²⁶See Robinson and Verdier (2013, p. 261) on why the promising of jobs in the public sector serves politicians well to attract voters.

Table 8.4: Effect of the political makeup of voters and the regions they live in on their likelihood to be targeted with clientelism

| | Individual | | | | | Regional | | | | | Interaction competitiveness, turnout | | | | |
|------------------------------|------------|-------|--------|--------|--|----------|-------|--------|--------|--|--------------------------------------|-------|--------|--------|--|
| | Mean | SD | Lower | Upper | | Mean | SD | Lower | Upper | | Mean | SD | Lower | Upper | |
| (Intercept) | -1.710 | 0.141 | -1.989 | -1.432 | | -1.843 | 0.197 | -2.238 | -1.464 | | -1.837 | 0.198 | -2.232 | -1.462 | |
| Poverty | 0.213 | 0.036 | 0.146 | 0.286 | | 0.214 | 0.036 | 0.144 | 0.283 | | 0.214 | 0.036 | 0.146 | 0.284 | |
| Information | 0.112 | 0.041 | 0.029 | 0.187 | | 0.113 | 0.041 | 0.034 | 0.193 | | 0.113 | 0.040 | 0.035 | 0.191 | |
| Age | -0.030 | 0.003 | -0.036 | -0.023 | | -0.030 | 0.003 | -0.036 | -0.023 | | -0.030 | 0.004 | -0.037 | -0.023 | |
| Education | 0.033 | 0.022 | -0.006 | 0.078 | | 0.033 | 0.022 | -0.010 | 0.075 | | 0.033 | 0.022 | -0.011 | 0.077 | |
| Urban | -0.168 | 0.084 | -0.327 | 0.003 | | -0.161 | 0.086 | -0.333 | 0.003 | | -0.157 | 0.085 | -0.327 | 0.002 | |
| Female | -0.202 | 0.065 | -0.328 | -0.076 | | -0.201 | 0.065 | -0.328 | -0.074 | | -0.206 | 0.065 | -0.327 | -0.077 | |
| Vote propensity | 3.315 | 0.344 | 2.665 | 4.014 | | 3.328 | 0.345 | 2.653 | 3.997 | | 3.329 | 0.342 | 2.655 | 3.994 | |
| Id winning party | 0.370 | 0.084 | 0.221 | 0.545 | | 0.374 | 0.084 | 0.209 | 0.538 | | 0.376 | 0.085 | 0.214 | 0.545 | |
| Id with other party | 0.298 | 0.084 | 0.139 | 0.468 | | 0.302 | 0.084 | 0.133 | 0.463 | | 0.308 | 0.083 | 0.155 | 0.478 | |
| Region urban | | | | | | -0.088 | 0.441 | -0.955 | 0.775 | | -0.107 | 0.442 | -1.014 | 0.714 | |
| Region poverty | | | | | | 0.005 | 0.300 | -0.607 | 0.567 | | 0.027 | 0.296 | -0.545 | 0.620 | |
| Region turnout | | | | | | -3.304 | 0.813 | -4.897 | -1.748 | | -3.282 | 0.808 | -4.813 | -1.678 | |
| Region competitiveness | | | | | | -1.490 | 0.404 | -2.287 | -0.721 | | -1.464 | 0.398 | -2.256 | -0.702 | |
| Reg. turnout*competitiveness | | | | | | | | | | | 2.084 | 2.788 | -3.348 | 7.615 | |
| ICC | 0.211 | 0.030 | 0.154 | 0.270 | | 0.155 | 0.025 | 0.111 | 0.205 | | 0.193 | 0.029 | 0.138 | 0.249 | |

individuals' propensity to turn out to vote on the probability for them being targeted by election-related bribery. Holding constant the other covariates, individuals whose turnout propensity is one standard deviation above the mean likelihood to turn out in their region have 55% higher odds to be approached with clientelism compared to individuals with an average likelihood to turn out. We discuss plausible interpretations of this effect and our expectation on a conditional effect of turnout (Hypothesis 3) below. The findings with regard to the competitiveness and turnout histories of the regions voters live in provide strong support for Hypotheses 4 and 5. Electoral competitiveness in a region, independent of turnout levels, has a negative effect on respondents being targeted with clientelism. With all individual-level variables at their regional mean and an average level of turnout, the predicted probability of respondents from a region where the competitiveness is one standard deviation above the mean have 35% higher odds to be addressed with clientelism than those living in a region at average levels of competitiveness. The effect of regional-level turnout is also negative, as we expected, and even stronger than that of the competitiveness of a region. The odds of respondents to be targeted with clientelism in a region where turnout is one standard deviation above the mean are almost 40% lower than for voters living in a region with an average level of past turnout.


To test whether clientelism is used by a party to mobilize turnout among its potential supporters, we estimated an interaction between regional-level competitiveness and turnout. Figure 8.2 illustrates the effect of the competitiveness of a region on a voter's likelihood to be targeted with clientelism, at different levels of regional turnout. The graph illustrates that voters in regions that are not competitive and where past turnout has been low are more likely to be targeted than voters living in more contested regions where turnout has been high. The slope of the effect of competitiveness is slightly steeper for regions with low turnout histories than for those regions where turnout has been high, suggesting that the effect of competitiveness is stronger in regions with histories of low turnout. This provides support for our expectation formulated in Hypothesis 6 that parties mobilize turnout among their partisans.

We did not find support for Hypothesis 3, however. The effect of respondents' likelihood to turn out on their probability to be targeted with clientelism did not differ between partisans of the dominant party, and other respondents (not shown). We also estimated the same models, using a respondent's ethnic identity as a proxy for partisanship. We replaced the measure of self-reported support for a region's dominant party with the affiliation with the ethnic group that tends to support the dominant party. The effect of individual turnout propensity and regional-level turnout and competitiveness are robust to this specification. The results are provided in Table E.4 in Appendix E. However, while the sign of the coefficient for co-ethnicity with the dominant party is positive, as we would expect, the credibility interval

covers zero, so that we cannot be sure that there is an effect at all.²⁷

As outlined above, we consider clientelism as a strategy to mobilize potential support. Accordingly, we expected voters who are unlikely to vote and who are affiliated with the dominant party in a region to be the principal targets of clientelism used by that party. Furthermore, we expected voters who live in a region with low past turnout levels to have a higher probability to be targeted with attempts of clientelism, than voters living in regions with comparatively high turnout histories. Thus, while the findings concerning partisanship and regional-level turnout are in line with our expectations, the positive effect of individual-level turnout is not. The latter does not support the idea that clientelism is predominantly used to mobilize support rather than to persuade or demobilize voters.

Figure 8.2: The effect of regional-level turnout and competitiveness on clientelism



Notes: Simulated predicted probabilities of the likelihood of a voter to be targeted with clientelism, based on the model with the interaction between competitiveness and turnout, reported in Table 8.4. The red area illustrates the effect of a region's competitiveness if turnout is at its 10th quantile, the blue shaded area shows the effect of competitiveness if turnout is at the 90th quantile.

²⁷The classification of the ethnic groups that tend to support the dominant parties in the regions in our sample is based on Ishiyama (2012, pp. 771-775).

There are at least three potential interpretations for the positive relationship between individual-level turnout and the likelihood to be targeted with clientelism. First, parties might be rewarding their loyal supporters. While this would be in line with the individual correlates of clientelism, we would expect parties to reward voters not only for their vote choice, but also for consistency in their turnout for them (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014; Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013). This would imply a positive correlation between regional-level turnout and clientelism, which we do not observe.

Second, parties might be paying voters to stay away from the polls (Cox, Kousser and Morgan, 1981, p. 656, Schaffer, 2002, p. 78). For several reasons, we regard it as unlikely that this is a strategy parties in our sample predominantly apply, however. If parties were buying abstention, we would expect them to focus campaigning on opposed voters with a high likelihood to turn out (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014, p. 423). On the regional level, this would imply a positive correlation between clientelism and regional-level turnout, which is not what we find. In addition, if clientelism were predominantly used to demobilize opposed voters, then given our findings on partisanship, we would have to conclude that parties campaign more in their opponents' strongholds than in their own strongholds. As the survey data we use do not entail information on which party the respondents are targeted by, we cannot rule out this possibility, but we regard it as unlikely. We do not make the assumption that only the dominant party in a region campaigns in this region. However, based on evidence from elections in Ghana, Kenya, and the United States which indicates that parties avoid campaigning in their rival candidate's strongholds (Althaus, Nardulli and Shaw, 2002; Fenno, 1978; Gyimah-Boadi et al., 2008; Laakso, 2007, p. 53), we consider it unlikely that the majority of campaigning activity in a party's stronghold we observe can be ascribed to the rival party.

A third explanation for the discrepancy between the effect of turnout at the regional level and on the individual level would be a divergence of preferences between the central campaign managers and the local brokers who are responsible for forging the "benefit-for-vote" deals with voters. This argument is developed by Stokes and co-authors (2013) in their explanation of a similar puzzle. Observing that central government spending clusters in swing regions or constituencies, while individual loyal core voters receive the bulk of clientelistic benefits during elections, Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco (2013) argue that campaigners have an interest in directing funds to marginal voters, whereas local brokers rather choose the less costly strategy of targeting loyalists.²⁸ If we followed this logic, our findings would suggest that campaigners are targeting regions with comparatively high levels of potential support (low competitiveness) but low turnout levels, but that local brokers within these regions target loyal voters

²⁸One reason why brokers mainly target loyalists according to the authors is that by targeting loyalists, brokers spend fewer resources on mobilizing support than if they were targeting swing voters, which allows them to extract rents for themselves (Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013).

who would turn out anyway. While our findings are in line with this idea, the data do not permit us to subject it to further tests.

Finally, whether what we observe on the individual level is a function of broker or party interests, voters with comparatively high turnout propensities might plausibly be targeted because they act as multipliers and convince others to vote as they do. Since our measure of turnout propensity includes information on political activism and information on whether a respondent is a community leader, the positive correlation between this and the propensity to be targeted with distributive appeals is in line with this idea. This interpretation also resonates with findings from a recent study of the use of clientelism in Benin and Kenya. The study finds that respondents who are more involved with political parties are more likely to be targeted with attempts to buy their vote, than those with no partisan attachments (Guardado and Wantchekon, 2014). This interpretation is further supported by qualitative information I collected in the interviews with campaign managers in Ghana. A regional campaign manager of the NPP, for example, explained how the ruling party targeted individuals who are influential in their communities with gifts during the campaign, hoping that these persons would motivate others to support the NDC:

And you know [...] from then [from September 2012 onwards], they [the NDC] are even buying cars for some ladies. Those who can convince their colleagues. Assuming you are somebody who a lot of people follows (sic!) you. So they buy you a car so you can talk to the other people that if they vote for your party what they did to you, they can also do it for them. Because you, they are using as a big example.”²⁹

The findings with regard to the individual and regional-level correlates of clientelism are robust to using the original scale of the variable. See Table E.3 in Appendix E for the results.

8.4.2 Intimidation

Summary statistics for the posterior distributions of all parameter estimates for the intimidation models are presented in Table 8.5. Regarding the individual demographic characteristics, the effects largely correspond to those reported for the clientelism models. The lived poverty index is positively associated with individuals’ likelihood to report fear of intimidation and the effect of age is negative. This can be seen as an indication that the young and the poor are targets of both, electoral violence and clientelism. In contrast to the experiences with bribery, women are more likely to fear electoral violence than men with the effect being of the same magnitude as the one reported in 8.4. Whereas women seem to suffer more from electoral violence, men are more likely to be paid for their vote. As in the case of clientelism, the effect of our information indicator is positive. The variable thus accounts for one problem with our

²⁹Interview with a regional campaign manager of the NPP, December, 15, 2012.

dependent variable. We control for the fact that better informed people are more likely to recognize incidents of election related violence in their region and therefore report greater fear of violence irrespective of their personal experience with it. Again, controlling for news consumption and the other covariates, we do not find an effect of respondents' educational attainment, nor is there a credible difference between individuals from urban or rural areas within a region.

We do not find an effect of an individual's likelihood to turn out on her probability of fearing intimidation. This suggests that parties do not differ in their use of intimidation against voters with a lower or a higher likelihood to turn out. The same holds for regional-level turnout histories.

Regional-level poverty and urbanity also do not affect individuals' fear of intimidation, as the credibility intervals for these effects also cover zero.

Is intimidation used to demobilize independent voters?

In line with our expectation, formulated in Hypothesis 7, we find a negative effect of identifying with the dominant party on intimidation. Subjects identifying with the dominant party in their region have almost 20% lower odds to fear intimidation than non-partisans, suggesting that independent voters might be more at risk than partisans of the two main parties. However, the credibility interval of the corresponding coefficient covers zero, indicating that there is less than 95% certainty that a difference between these groups exists at all. In accordance with previous findings (Gutiérrez-Romero, 2014), and Hypothesis 8, we furthermore, find a strong effect of electoral competitiveness on average probabilities to fear intimidation at the regional level. Compared to respondents from regions with average levels of competitiveness, respondents living in a region where competitiveness is one standard deviation above the mean have more than 90% higher odds to be intimidated. These results are robust against the inclusion of the two regional-level control variables for both of which we do not find an effect. Our findings indicate that indeed, independent voters and those living in competitive regions are the principal targets of voter intimidation, which is what our argument predicted. Our findings are largely robust to measuring the dependent variable on the original scale. See Table E.5 in Appendix E for the results. We also estimated the same models as reported in the chapter, replacing partisanship by membership in the ethnic group that supports the dominant regional party. As for clientelism, the effects of the key independent variables and the covariates remain robust to this modification. However, while the effect of membership with the ethnic group affiliated with the dominant party is negative, as we would expect, the credibility interval covers zero. See Table E.6 in Appendix E for the results.

Table 8.5: Effect of the political makeup of voters and the regions they live in on their likelihood to be targeted with intimidation

| | Individual | | | | Regional | | | |
|------------------------|------------|-------|--------|--------|----------|-------|--------|--------|
| | Mean | SD | Lower | Upper | Mean | SD | Lower | Upper |
| (Intercept) | 0.776 | 0.135 | 0.504 | 1.029 | 0.757 | 0.195 | 0.387 | 1.150 |
| Poverty | 0.137 | 0.034 | 0.070 | 0.205 | 0.137 | 0.034 | 0.071 | 0.203 |
| Information | 0.082 | 0.041 | 0.003 | 0.162 | 0.086 | 0.040 | 0.010 | 0.160 |
| Age | -0.010 | 0.003 | -0.015 | -0.004 | -0.010 | 0.003 | -0.015 | -0.004 |
| Educ | 0.031 | 0.021 | -0.011 | 0.071 | 0.030 | 0.021 | -0.013 | 0.070 |
| Urban | 0.110 | 0.079 | -0.041 | 0.262 | 0.084 | 0.081 | -0.065 | 0.253 |
| Female | 0.211 | 0.062 | 0.083 | 0.326 | 0.210 | 0.061 | 0.089 | 0.332 |
| Vote propensity | -0.144 | 0.300 | -0.745 | 0.424 | -0.173 | 0.309 | -0.792 | 0.407 |
| Id winning party | -0.187 | 0.078 | -0.338 | -0.032 | -0.167 | 0.078 | -0.323 | -0.022 |
| Id with other party | -0.138 | 0.079 | -0.308 | 0.005 | -0.123 | 0.077 | -0.274 | 0.026 |
| Region urban | | | | | 0.609 | 0.440 | -0.255 | 1.447 |
| Region poverty | | | | | 0.569 | 0.297 | -0.023 | 1.146 |
| Region turnout | | | | | -0.542 | 0.804 | -2.076 | 1.081 |
| Region competitiveness | | | | | 2.250 | 0.399 | 1.508 | 3.056 |
| ICC | 0.216 | 0.028 | 0.162 | 0.272 | 0.160 | 0.024 | 0.115 | 0.206 |

8.5 Summary

We have argued that clientelism and violence are used for different purposes during election campaigns. We evaluated these claims using regional-level election data and fine-grained individual-level survey data. We showed that while clientelism was concentrated in strongholds of the main contenders of the electoral race with low turnout histories and among partisans, intimidation was most pronounced in competitive regions and among non-partisan voters. These findings largely corroborate the notion that these two manipulative strategies follow different logics. We further argued that distributive appeals are predominantly used to mobilize potential support and that intimidation appeals are used to demobilize independent voters. Our findings are in line with some, but not all predictions derived from this argument. On the one hand, our results with regard to clientelism lend more support to our idea that parties mobilize turnout and cater to their own supporters, than to the alternative use of clientelism to attract swing voters. In line with other findings of this dissertation, presented in Chapters 5 and 6, our results speak more in favor of a turnout-buying than a vote-buying logic. On the other hand, however, the fact that individual's likelihood to turn out is positively correlated with the likelihood of being targeted with clientelism suggests that on the individual level, parties channel benefits to loyalists or multipliers who are likely to convince others to vote the way they do. This suggests that parties campaign among certain rather than potential supporters and is against both the vote-buying and the turnout-buying model (Stokes, 2005; Nichter, 2008), but in line with other empirical studies (Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013, pp. 67–72). To further discriminate between different strategies that clientelistic and violent campaigns are used for would require data on the parties targeting individuals, which so far is only available for single countries.³⁰

Finally, our results corroborate the validity of the third answer that I have proposed in Chapter 3 to the question of why swing voters receive so few benefits during election campaigns in young democracies. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that parties indeed attempt to disenfranchise independent voters, rather than trying to persuade them with benefits. This most likely frees resources for parties to spend on motivating their supporters to vote, which might be why we see parties spend so much time and money on their campaign trail on courting their own supporters.

³⁰See the survey data Bratton (2008) uses for his analysis of vote-buying and violence in Nigeria, for example.

Chapter 9

Conclusion

This dissertation has addressed one of the main puzzles regarding elections in young democracies: why do swing voters receive so little attention during election campaigns? I develop a theoretical argument which provides three key answers for this puzzle and I present empirical support for them. First, parties do not waste resources on courting their supporters who are likely to turn out, at the expense of campaigning among swing voters. They rather *mobilize those of their supporters who would otherwise not go and vote*. Second, in contexts where parties' campaign promises have little credibility, the organizers *concentrate their energy on those voters who trust them the most, namely their core supporters*. Third, *in situations in which parties use electoral violence to impact election outcomes, they concentrate their attempts of intimidation on citizens who would be difficult to convince to vote for them, and rather disenfranchise them*. This frees up resources for making campaign promises and offering benefits aimed at mobilizing their core voters to turn out on Election Day. In the remainder of this last chapter, I summarize the main theoretical contributions the dissertation makes and relate them to my key findings. I then discuss the methodological contributions and the broader ramifications of my findings.

9.1 Theoretical contributions

9.1.1 Adapting theories of distributive campaigning to African elections

The dissertation's central argument advances existing models of distributive campaigning by addressing three central assumptions which are unfounded in the context of African elections. These are that voters vary in their ideological distance to parties, that parties are credible and deliver on their promises, and that parties do not intentionally demobilize voters. I argue that voters vary in how much they trust in the

parties' promises more than in their ideological distance to the parties. Related to this is my argument that partisans are more receptive to appeals by the party they feel close to, than indifferent or opposed voters.

In addition, I relax the assumption that parties always deliver on their promises, which is particularly relevant in African elections, where parties have been shown to be inconsistent in their policies (Bleck & van de Walle 2011, Bleck & van de Walle 2013, Carey 2002, p.64, van de Walle 2003, p.304). One central assumption underlying my argument is that supporters believe campaign promises made by the candidates whose party they support more than campaign promises by other candidates. Based on this, I argue that parties should focus campaign promises in situations where they are most credible. The investigation of the use of campaign promises at campaign rallies in Ghana, presented in *Chapter 6*, underpins this argument. It shows that candidates avoid making promises of future benefits in contexts in which they have little credibility with their audience. The incumbent, who was likely to be more credible than the challenger in promising future benefits (see also Medina and Stokes, 2007; Wantchekon, 2003), much more frequently promised local club goods than the latter. In addition, he focused these promises in areas where his likely supporters were concentrated. The results from the survey experiment, presented in *Chapter 7*, confirm that voters tend to regard promises of future benefits as more credible, when they are made by the incumbent than by the challenger. They further show that supporters tend to find campaign promises made by the candidate whose party they are affiliated with much more credible than when the same promise is said to have been made by a different candidate. This finding corroborates my argument that core voters are most responsive to campaign messages by the party they are affiliated with, and that this is why parties spend so many resources on their partisans during election campaigns. Lastly, I challenge the assumption implicitly made in the literature on modern campaigning that parties do not *intentionally* demobilize voters (Ansolabehere 1994, Ansolabehere et al. 1999, Gerstle et al. 1991, Berelson et al. 1954, Lazarsfeld et al. 1968). The analysis of the use of clientelistic targeting and voter intimidation in 10 African countries, presented in Chapter 8, shows that candidates can indeed combine the use of clientelism with efforts to demobilize voters. It shows part of the answer to the puzzle this dissertation addresses: *parties may choose not target the support of independent voters with benefits and instead demobilize this group with violence.*

9.1.2 Advancing the vote-buying versus turnout-buying debate

Most models of distributive politics and in the subfield of clientelism, have assumed that it is most rational for parties to buy votes, not turnout, and to target swing voters, rather than wasting benefits on their own supporters (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Stokes, 2005; Stokes,

Nazareno and Brusco, 2013). Dixit and Londregan (1996, pp. 1153–1154) have acknowledged that parties can have an incentive to target their supporters if they are better at delivering benefits to them, compared to swing voters. They maintain the key assumption, however, that parties would like to deliver most benefits to swing voters if they could (Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013, pp. 33). At the same time, scholars have observed a gap between theoretical predictions and empirical evidence, with too many benefits being targeted at core voters, for the swing voter model to hold (Dunning and Nilekani, 2013; Liu, 1999; Nichter, 2008; Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013). Stokes and her co-authors offer an explanation for this “puzzle of distributive politics” (Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013). They argue that while parties have an incentive to focus benefits on undecided voters, the intermediaries they rely on to distribute the benefits, have different incentives and therefore over-proportionally target loyal voters as this is less costly than attracting new voters. The evidence presented in this dissertation in Chapters 5 and 6 challenges this explanation. The analyses of the use of campaign rallies and promises of local club goods reveal that parties buy turnout among likely supporters, rather than trying to sway independent voters. This is true despite the fact that these are strategies that do not require the use of brokers, different from clientelism.

The findings of this dissertation are more in line with the turnout-buying model (Nichter, 2008). However, the evidence presented also suggests that the reason which the turnout-buying model offers as to why independent voters receive few benefits, is not sufficient to solve this puzzle. When targeting takes place at the group level, and groups are geographically concentrated, votes are as easy to observe as turnout. My analyses of the use of campaign rallies and local promises show that parties also pursue a strategy of mobilization at this group level. The fact that if people vote is easier to observe than how, can thus no longer serve as the only explanation for why parties target their core voters. The evidence gained in this dissertation rather supports the argument that candidates consider how credible they are with campaign appeals when choosing which group to address during elections.

9.1.3 Integrating various campaigning strategies into one model

This dissertation develops a model which integrates modern campaigning strategies and illicit strategies, like the manipulation of voters with particularistic benefits and their intimidation via violence, into one model. By extending the repertoire of strategies that candidates can use, it acknowledges that the incentive for a party to use one strategy is conditional on the costs and benefits associated with using another strategy. I develop an argument whereby parties can mobilize voters with campaign rallies, campaign promises, and clientelistic targeting and they can demobilize voters by using violence. Considering the counter-factual for strategic decisions which campaigners take is crucial for understanding their motiv-

ations. The analysis of the use of clientelistic targeting and voter intimidation in 10 African elections, presented in Chapter 8, provides support for this approach. While clientelism is concentrated on partisans who were unlikely to vote, intimidation concentrates on independent voters. Parties hence seem to mobilize some voters with particular strategies and demobilize other voters with another strategy.

9.2 Methodological contributions

9.2.1 Measuring campaigning strategies directly

Research investigating the logic of clientelistic targeting has mainly relied on voter surveys (Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes, 2004; Lindberg and Morrisson, 2008; Stokes, 2005; Young, 2009) or on observing patterns of the allocation of pork-barrel spending across regions or other geographical units (Banful, 2011; Barkan and Chege, 1989; Case, 2001; Cole, 2009; Grossman, 1994; Jablonski, 2014; Khemani, 2007; Pereira, 1996; Veiga and Veiga, 2013; Worthington and Dollery, 1998). Typically, these studies are interested in understanding the strategic calculations made by parties regarding which types of voters to target. However, it is far from obvious that the patterns in targeting are a direct function of electoral strategies by the candidates contesting national elections. A considerable amount the allocation of goods across voters might be a function of specific interests by those agents carrying out the distribution of benefits at the geographical units being studied (Stokes, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013). I contribute to this literature by measuring electoral strategies directly, through the study of the strategic use of promises of local public goods by presidential candidates. This allows me to be more certain in concluding that the patterns of targeting observed actually reflect strategic decisions by the presidential candidates and their campaign teams.

9.2.2 An experimental test of the responsiveness of voters to campaign promises

In order to shed light on the vote-buying versus the turnout-buying debate, it is important to test what types of voters are receptive to campaign appeals and why. This is a question that has not sufficiently been tackled with respect to campaigning in African elections. In a survey experiment conducted during Ghana's presidential election campaign, I was able to directly test and provide support for my assumption that the credibility of a campaign promise hinges on the relationship between candidates and voters. The findings from this experiment also raise doubts on the assumption that promises of the provision of particularistic benefits are more credible to African voters than campaign promises about public goods (Atchade, Wantchekon and McClendon, 2012; Wantchekon, 2003). While the results from one single experiment can never be considered conclusive, and certainly need to be replicated in other elections,

my findings caution against taking this assumption as given.

9.3 Broader implications

The findings produced in this dissertation have broader implications for the study of the quality of elections in young democracies and for democratization processes in Africa.

9.3.1 Clientelism, accountability and democratization

The use of particularistic benefits to impact the outcome of elections is problematic for the quality of democracy for at least two reasons. First, when voters sell their vote, it does not carry much information about their preferences on broader national policies. Hence, their interests cannot be inferred by parties, nor adequately represented (Stokes, 2007a, p.90). This is exacerbated by the fact that parties target some groups of voters more than others, which excludes the aggregation and representation of the interests of certain segments of the electorate. This violates Dahl's equal consideration principle which posits that the interest of every voter must be known and voiced in an election (Dahl, 1987). Second, vote-buying reduces the power of elections to "throw the rascals out," as those whose votes are bought do not cast their vote on the basis of the evaluation of the government's performance on macro-economic policies (Stokes, 2007a, p. 92). What is even more grave, is that clientelism can reverse the chain of accountability. In what Stokes (2005) has termed "perverse accountability," candidates are no longer accountable to voters, but voters are accountable to candidates by delivering their vote in the hope of being granted access to individual benefits that are vital to them, such as scholarships to attend school, and access to healthcare or food. This is because voters might fear that they will be excluded from these benefits if they do not continue to support a particular party (Stokes, 2005).

If parties buy turnout, rather than vote choice, as my findings suggest, this may induce voters to participate in elections, but allow them to vote as they please (Kramon, 2013a, p.260). If this is true, then concerns about the representation of voter preferences in these elections and preoccupations with perverse accountability can be assuaged to a certain extent. My findings raise doubts about the ability of parties to co-opt elections and to manipulate the evaluations of voters. Indeed, recent studies on determinants of vote choice in Africa suggest that voters do not allow parties to completely divert their attention from their governments' performance on macro-economic policies. Rather, they point to African voters behaving in similar ways to voters in established democracies, who cast their votes less on clientelistic or ethnic grounds, and more on economic performance by their governments (e.g. Bratton, Bhavnani and Chen, 2013; Young, 2009).

9.3.2 Incumbency advantage, turnover, and democratization

The findings concerning the use of local promises and the credibility of these promises support the argument made in the literature on clientelism that incumbents have a credibility advantage in promising future benefits, compared to opposition candidates (Medina and Stokes, 2007; Wantchekon, 2003). This has implications for the study of democratization in Africa, more broadly-speaking. The ability of incumbent governments to divert public funds and use them to co-opt dissidents and to buy support among the electorate has been regarded as one of the main reasons why we have seen so few turnovers of power since the (re-)introduction of multiparty politics in the beginning of the 1990s (e.g. van de Walle, 2003). My findings suggest that incumbents not only have an advantage in distributing benefits, as they have more resources at hand than opposition parties, but that even their promises of future delivery of goods are deemed more credible. This underlines the importance of leveling the playing field in these elections, by curbing ruling parties' discretion over the use of public funds e.g. by institutionalizing public funding provisions in order to increase campaigning funds for opposition parties.

9.3.3 The strategic use of violence

Lastly, the evidence provided in this dissertation also has important implications for efforts to ameliorate the quality of elections in Africa. One important contribution is that my findings help identify those voters who are most at risk to suffer from violent intimidation. The evidence suggests that these are voters who are unaffiliated with the main parties contesting in the elections and those living in contested regions. At the same time, however, the finding that the use of one illicit strategy seems to be conditional on the use of another complicates propositions of how to curb the use of manipulative strategies. This is because, in principle, efforts to curb the use of clientelism by incumbent governments, could, as an unintended consequence, increase their incentives to use less costly means to impact election outcomes, like violence. In fact, Mugabe's extensive use of violence in Zimbabwe's 2008 elections has been interpreted as being triggered by a collapse of the economy (Collier and Vicente, 2012, p.137), which had severely limited the government's resources to buy votes.

9.3.4 Outlook

This dissertation has provided important insights into the logic of campaigning strategies in African elections. The findings presented point to several avenues for future research. My findings suggest that voters' likelihood to participate in elections is an important determinant of which groups of voters parties address. To further advance our understanding of the goals parties pursue during election campaigns,

future studies should hence include voters' likelihood to turn out, in addition to their political makeup. My findings, further, suggest that studying only one campaigning tool in isolation might only reveal part of the motivations of why parties target a particular group of voters. This should encourage future research to analyze several campaign strategies simultaneously. Lastly, my findings suggest that parties can pursue different goals with the benefits they offer voters during elections. They can use benefits to groups of voters, such as club goods, to motivate voters living in areas with low turnout histories to participate in the election, for example. At the same time, they can choose to channel individual benefits to voters who are likely to turn out, because they might motivate others to follow suit. Parties might thus target different profiles of voters, depending on the type of benefit they use to address them. Future research interested in understanding parties's rationale should hence study the use of campaigning strategies at different levels of analysis.

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Appendix A

Additional material Chapter 4

A.1 Questionnaire semi-structured interviews with campaign managers

1. What is the strategy you are using in the current campaign?
2. How does this year's strategy compare to the election campaigns in 2008?
3. In what way do the campaign strategies differ between those for the presidential and those designed for the parliamentary election?
4. What do you think the NDCs/NPPs strategy is?
5. What do you think voters expect from you during the campaigns?/ what has worked well for you?
 - Big rallies
 - Mini-rallies
 - Door-to-door campaigns?
6. What is a stronghold for you?
 - What is a competitive constituency for you?

- Do you make the difference between strongholds and competitive electoral circumscriptions only on the regional or also on the constituency-level?
7. Besides whether a constituency is competitive or a stronghold or a stronghold of the other party, what are other characteristics you take into consideration when you design your campaign strategy?
- Ethnicity?
 - Urban or rural areas?
 - Poorer or wealthier voters?
 - More educated or less educated voters?
8. What strategy do you use in an area where
- Majority is Ashanti?
 - Majority is Akan?
 - Majority is Ewe?
 - Majority are Northerners?
 - Urban areas
 - Poorer areas?
 - More educated?
9. Where do you think it is particularly important to translate the national program into promises specific to the constituency?
10. In which way has your campaign strategy changed over time?

A.2 Survey experiment

Questionnaire Version: 1 *ENGLISH*

Name of Constituency: _____

Name of Polling Station: _____

Name of Interviewer: _____

| | |
|--|-----|
| NOCALL | |
| Reasons for Unsuccessful Calls | |
| Refused to be interviewed | 1 |
| Person selected was never at home after at least two visits | 2 |
| Household/Premises empty for the survey period after at least two visits | 3 |
| Not a citizen/Spoke only a foreign language | 4 |
| Deaf/Did not speak a survey language | 5 |
| Did not fit gender quota | 6 |
| No adults in household | 7 |
| Other (specify) | 8 |
| Not Applicable | 997 |

Good day. My name is _____. I work for the University of Mannheim, in Germany. The university is an independent German research and teaching institute. I do not represent the government or any political party. We are picking the views of citizens in Accra on the needs of different constituencies. We would like to discuss these issues with a member of your household. All information will be kept confidential. Your household has been chosen by chance. We would like to choose an adult from your household. Will you help us pick one?

If participation is refused, walk away from the household. Substitute the household using an interval of the day number households.

Now that you have selected a household, you will select an individual respondent within the household to interview. You are responsible for alternating respondents between men and women using the table below. Note that "First Interview" should ONLY be used for your very first interview on the first day of fieldwork, NOT your first interview every day.

| | First Interview | Male | Female |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|------|--------|
| Previous Interview was with a: | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| This Interview must be with a: | | 1 | 2 |

Please tell me the names of all males / females [select correct gender] who presently live in this household. I only want the names of males / females [select correct gender] who are citizens of Ghana and who are 18 years and older.

If this interview must be with a female, list only women's names. If this interview is with a male, list only men's names. List all eligible household members of this gender who are 18 years or older, even those not presently at home but who will return to the house at any time that day. Include only citizens of Ghana.

| Women's Names | Men's Names |
|---------------|-------------|
| 1 | 1 |
| 2 | 2 |
| 3 | 3 |
| 4 | 4 |
| 5 | 5 |
| 6 | 6 |
| 7 | 7 |
| 8 | 8 |
| 9 | 9 |
| 10 | 10 |

Take out your deck of numbered cards. Present them face-down so that the numbers cannot be seen. Ask the person who is selecting respondents to pick any card, by saying:

Please choose a card. The person who corresponds to the number chosen will be the person interviewed.

*If the number on the card is higher than the number of people of that gender in the household, ask the person to keep selecting cards until a card number corresponds to a respondent in the table above. [Interviewer: **REMEMBER** to circle the code number of the person selected on the table above.]*

If the selected respondent is not the first person you met, repeat the introduction: Good day. My name is _____. I work for the University of Mannheim, in Germany. The university is an independent German research and teaching institute. I do not represent the government or

any political party. We are picking the views of citizens in various regions in Ghana on the needs in different constituencies.

To ALL respondents:

Your answers will be confidential. They will be put together with hundreds of other people we are talking to, to get an overall picture. It will be impossible to pick you out from what you say, so please feel free to tell us what you think. This interview will take about 30 minutes. There is no penalty for refusing to participate. Do you wish to proceed?

The person must give his or her informed consent by answering positively. If participation is refused, walk away from the household. Substitute the household using an interval of 10 households.

Q1. How old are you?

*[Interviewer: Enter three digit number. Don't know=999]
[Interviewer: If respondent is aged less than 18, stop interview and use cards to randomly draw another respondent in the same household]*

If person is below 18, ask her to pick a card from deck of numbered cards. Do the interview with the person on the list who corresponds to the number.

Let us begin with a small thought experiment. We are picking peoples' views on campaign promises made by different candidates. Through a scientific and random selection process you have been chosen to be asked some questions concerning the president and the flagbearer of the NDC. Other people will be asked about another candidate.

Imagine President John Dramani Mahama, who is also the flagbearer of the NDC, had made the following promise at a rally held in your constituency:

| | |
|--|-----|
| Q2. "If I win this election, I will drastically bring down load shedding in Ghana by increasing Ghana's power generation from the current 2,400 megawatts to 5000 megawatts". If he made this promise and if he got elected, do you think by the end of his term in 2016 he would have drastically brought down load shedding in Ghana? | |
| Yes, definitely | 1 |
| Yes, probably | 2 |
| No, probably not | 3 |
| No, definitely not | 4 |
| Don't know | 999 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| Q3. What if he had promised the following: "If I win this election, I will improve the availability of clean water in all urban communities across the country by connecting more households to pipe water and by building more treatment plants." Do you think by the end of his term in 2016 he would have improved the availability of clean water in all urban communities across the country? | |
| Yes, definitely | 1 |
| Yes, probably | 2 |
| No, probably not | 3 |
| No, definitely not | 4 |
| Don't know | 999 |

Q4. Let's talk one more time about the President and flagbearer of the NDC John Dramani Mahama. What if he had promised the following: If I win this election, I will significantly increase the number of streetlights in all urban communities across the country". Do you think by the end of his term in 2016 he would have significantly increased the number of streetlights in all urban communities across the country?

| | |
|--------------------|-----|
| Yes, definitely | 1 |
| Yes, probably | 2 |
| No, probably not | 3 |
| No, definitely not | 4 |
| Don't know | 999 |

Now, let's record a few facts about yourself.

Q5. What is your tribe or your ethnic or cultural group? *[Do NOT read options. Code from responses. If mentions subcategory such as Ashanti, write Ashanti under other, do not tick broader category, Akan in that case.]*¹

| | |
|---|-----|
| Akan | 1 |
| Ewe/Anglo | 2 |
| Ga/Adangbe | 3 |
| Dagomba | 4 |
| Ghanaian only or "doesn't think of self in those terms" | 5 |
| Don't know | 999 |
| Other: | |

Q6.: *[Interviewer: if respondent mentioned an umbrella category like Northerner or Akan, for example, ask:] Please, can you be more specific, which is your subgroup?*

| Q7. How often do you get news from the following sources? ² | | | | | | |
|---|-----------|--------------------|---------------------|------------------------|-------|------------|
| | Every day | A few times a week | A few times a month | Less than once a month | Never | Don't know |
| a. Radio | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 999 |
| b. Television | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 999 |
| c. Newspapers | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 999 |
| d. Internet | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 999 |

Q8. What is the highest level of education you have completed? *[Interviewer:Code from answer. Do not read options]*

| | |
|---|---|
| No formal schooling | 1 |
| Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling) | 2 |
| Some primary schooling | 3 |
| Primary school completed | 4 |

¹ Adapted from question 85, Afrobarometer, Round 5, Ghana.

² Question 13, Afrobarometer Round 5, 2012, Ghana.

| | |
|---|-----|
| Some middle school | 5 |
| Middle School completed | 6 |
| Some secondary school / high school | 7 |
| Secondary school / high school completed | 8 |
| Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a polytechnic or college | 9 |
| Some university | 10 |
| University completed | 11 |
| Post-graduate | 12 |
| Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i> | 999 |

| Q9. Please tell me whether each of the following are available inside your house, inside your compound, or outside your compound: <i>[Read out options]</i> ³ | | | | | |
|--|----------------------------|------------------|---------------------|----------------------|------------|
| | None, no latrine available | Inside the house | Inside the compound | Outside the compound | Don't know |
| a. Your main source of water for household use | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 999 |
| b. A toilet or latrine | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 999 |

| Q10. Do you have a job that pays cash income? <i>[If yes, ask:] Is it full-time or part-time? [If no, ask:] Are you presently looking for a job?</i> ⁴ | |
|---|---|
| No (not looking) | 0 |
| No (looking) | 1 |
| Yes, part time | 2 |
| Yes, full time | 3 |
| Don't know <i>[Do not read]</i> | 9 |

| Q11. Please tell me all the languages you speak <i>[Interviewer: check all those listed and note down those not listed]. Which ones do you speak fluently? [Interviewer: if mentions subcategory, note down under others, do not note down umbrella category in that case]</i> | |
|--|---------|
| | Fluent? |
| English | |
| Akan | |
| Dagomba | |
| Ga | |
| Hausa | |
| French | |
| Spanish | |
| Others: | |

³ Question 95, Afrobarometer Round 5, 2012, Ghana.

⁴ Question 96, Afrobarometer Round 5, 2012, Ghana.

| Q12. Do you feel close to any particular party? ⁵ | |
|--|-----|
| No (does NOT feel close to ANY party) | 0 |
| Yes (feels close to a party) | 1 |
| Refused to answer [Do not read] | 888 |
| Does not know [Do not read] | 999 |

| Q13. [Interviewer: if “Yes” to Q] Which party is that? [If answer to Q was “No”, “Don’t Know”, or “Refused to answer”, circle 997=Not applicable.] ⁶ | |
|---|-----|
| National Democratic Congress (NDC) | 1 |
| New Patriotic Party (NPP) | 2 |
| Convention People’s Party (CPP) | 3 |
| People’s National Convention (PNC) | 4 |
| Progressive People’s Party (PPP) | 5 |
| Democratic People’s Party (DPP) | 6 |
| Other [Specify]: | 7 |
| Not applicable [ONLY if response to Q was “No”, “Don’t Know”, or “Refused to answer”] | 777 |
| Refused to answer [i.e. if answered yes to Q, but will not identify party] | 888 |
| Don’t know | 999 |

| Q14. Do you have relatives living outside of [Interviewer: say name of constituency] ⁷ | | | | | | |
|---|---------------|--------------|--------------|------------------------|--------------|------------|
| | A few of them | Many of them | Half of them | More than half of them | Most of them | Don’t know |
| [Interviewer: name of constituency] | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 999 |
| Greater Accra | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 999 |

| Q15. How often do you travel outside of [Interviewer: say name of constituency] ⁸ | | | | | |
|--|-----------|--------------------|---------------------|------------------------|------------|
| | Every Day | A few times a week | A few times a month | Less than once a month | Don’t know |
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 999 |
| Greater Accra | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 999 |

⁵ Question 89, Afrobarometer Round 5, 2012, Ghana.

⁶ Question 89, Afrobarometer Round 5, 2012, Ghana.

⁷ Adapted from Atchade and Wantchekon 2007.

⁸ Adapted from Atchade and Wantchekon 2007.

| | |
|---|-----|
| Q16. If a presidential election were held tomorrow, which party's candidate would you vote for? <i>[Interviewer: DO NOT read options. Code from response.]</i> | |
| NDC | 1 |
| NPP | 2 |
| CPP | 3 |
| DPP | 4 |
| PNC | 5 |
| NRP | 6 |
| GCPP | 7 |
| EP | 8 |
| UGM | 9 |
| GDRP | 10 |
| DFP | 11 |
| Don't know | 999 |
| Refused to answer | 888 |
| Undecided | 777 |
| Other (specify) _____ [Postcode] | |

A.3 Guide focus group interviews

A.3.1 Research questions

1. LOCAL VERSUS NATIONAL SCOPE

Upon hearing a local campaign promise at a rally in their constituency:

- Do participants understand that the candidate promises goods only to their constituency?
- Or do they think that he will also deliver the same goods to other constituencies?

Upon hearing a national campaign promise at a rally in their constituency:

- Do participants understand that the candidate promises goods to the whole of the country?
- Or do they think that he will only deliver the particular good to some constituencies?
- If so, what do they think determines where he will deliver these goods?
 - Voting behavior?
 - Ethnicity?
 - Personal connections?
 - Other conditions?

2. CONDITIONALITY

Upon hearing a local campaign promise at a rally in their constituency:

- Do participants actually think that the delivery of local promises is contingent on how they and their constituency vote?
- How do they think parties find out how they vote?
- At what level of disaggregation do participants think their votes can be monitored?
- How many votes do participants think a candidate needs to win to deliver upon his promises?

Upon hearing a national campaign promise at a rally in their constituency:

- Do participants actually think that the delivery of national promises is independent and therefore not conditional on how they and their constituency votes?
- Or do they think particular constituencies can and will be excluded even from public goods such as the provision of free Junior High School, for example?

A.3.2 Protocol

A) Introduction

- Explain the purpose of the exercise and lay out the rules
- All participants introduce themselves
- Mascha and Hartlyne begin and provide detailed background information on them, hoping that participants will do the same

B) Warm-up

May I ask each of you to share with us what kind of promises you remember the two candidates of the NDC and the NPP, John Mahama and Akufo-Addo made during their campaigns? I am sure each of you can remember at least one.

C) Local versus national scope of promises

Let me also share some of the promises with you that I have heard of. *Ask participants to read out their promises aloud or read them for them.*

If you hear this promise, what do you think? If the candidate who promised this wins, and he fulfills the promise, who will benefit from it ?

Prompt answers with the following questions:

- Why do you think the candidate would only give X to some people?
- Whom do you think he would give X to?
- Would he be able to give X to everyone if he only wanted to?
- Why do you think the candidate would give X to everybody?

BREAK

Some politicians I have talked to, have told me that during the campaigns they tried to find out whether people were one their side or not. How do you think they tried to find out on which side people in your area were before the election?

Now, lets turn back to some other campaign promises. Look at this promise. If a candidate made this promise in a constituency, say X [say name of some constituency, or show them a map with different constituencies?], and he wins the election. Who do you think will get X?

- What if the candidate made this promise, but he lost the election. Would the candidate still give the people X in this constituency?

- What if this constituency (show on the map) votes massively for him, but he loses the election. Would they get any of this X?
- What if the constituency disappoints him, but he wins the election. Would this constituency get any of X?
- Ask about different candidates
- Encourage participants to provide examples of the past

D) SUMMARY

We have discussed your views on many promises now. Please grant me some more patience to sum up what we have talked about so that I am sure I have heard you well. Would this constituency get X or not? *Briefly go through all promises again.*

E) Round-up

Thank everybody and explain to them what the information will be used for.

A.3.3 List of promises

National promises

“Most often, it is not the case that after school everyone will find jobs but we must also be able to create jobs for ourselves and that is what we are intending to do in Ghana.”

“Firstly, I shall rekindle the private sector to help the youth find jobs to improve their living conditions. This is the way to improve the economy of this country.”

“Again, since independence, there has not been any budget that makes reference to our Zongo Muslim community in this country. But we have promised that in the first budget of an Akuffo Addo government there shall be a provision for a Zongo Development Fund which shall see to the development of the Zongo communities in Ghana.”

“The free education covers not only grammar education but also vocational and technical education. Education is not going to be for the only the rich. Free secondary education shall be a reality should I assume the high office of this country.”

“We are also coming out with the electricity for all policy which is going to provide electricity for any community that has a population of 500 or more.”

Local promises

“The Headmaster has made some requests; I will appreciate it if you can put them in the form of a letter and send it through the District Chief Executive to my office. I will advise the GETFUND accordingly. One thing that I will personally do is to ensure that the Girls dormitory is built for you.”

“This market does not merit Amasaman as a district capital. We shall assist the district assembly to expand your market for you..”

“Secondly, it is sad that Kasoa with over 3000 inhabitants has no senior high school. Someone has promised free SHS but here we, what will be the benefit if SHS is free and yet the kids have no SHS in Kasoa to attend. I promise you, after winning the election we shall build a modern SHS here in Kasoa. So please work hard for the party. We need volunteers to spend some few hours of their time to work for the party and I believe Kasoa will provide us the people to help the party successfully.”

Regional promise

“Currently we are negotiating with the Chinese Exim Bank for the money to close the gap from Nakpanduri to Gulungungu through Garu. Once that road is done it is going to bust economic activity here in Garu because it means Garu will become a major town on the North-Eastern transit route as the shortest route from Bawku or Gulungungu to Accra. It will therefore be easier to cart your agriculture produce from here to Accra.”

Appendix B

Additional material Chapter 5

B.1 Procedure to code constituencies in which campaign rallies took place

I checked the newspapers Daily Graphic and Daily Guide on a daily basis from August, 17 to December, 7, 2012 and made photocopies of every article containing information on any event in which NDC's or NPP's running mates speak in public. I then extracted information into a dataset on the candidate speaking (John Mahama of NDC or Akufo-Addo of NPP); the date of the event; the constituency in which the event took place. If the date of the event was not given in the article, the general rule used was to assume the event took place one day prior to the day when the article was published. This rule was chosen because the most common pattern was that if the article gave precise information on the date of the event, it referred to an event that took place on the day prior to the day on which the article was published (61 out of 189 cases or 32.3 percent). If in the article an event in the future was announced without information on a precise date, I assumed the event took place the day after the article was published. If the article referred to a weekend and it was not clear whether the event took place Saturday or Sunday, I always coded the later date, Sunday. In many cases, the constituency the event took place in was not given in the article. In these cases I recorded all other information related to the location of the event such as region, city, town, village, neighborhood or even the place itself if it was mentioned, such as e.g. the city hall of Accra.

In the cases where the constituency was not mentioned in the article, I researched which constituency the event was located in, based on the information available. I followed a standardized procedure in which I first checked whether the name of the town mentioned in the article was a constituency headquarter, based on a list of constituencies, constituency headquarters, districts and regions, obtained from CDD-Ghana. If the town or city mentioned in the article did not correspond to the constituency headquarter, I obtained longitude and latitude of the location using the website <http://itouchmap.com/latlong.html>. If

the article only contained information on the city, but not on any location within the city and if the city was divided in several constituencies, I assumed the event to have taken place in the central constituency. E.g. Tamale Central, North, South. In such cases, I indicated the constituency as inferred and I conduct robustness checks using a subsample containing events in which the constituency is not inferred. Using the software QuantumGis I located the village, town or city mentioned in the article within the constituency, by matching the information on longitude and latitude with that of the constituency list. If the information in the article was unclear because e.g. a politician inaugurated a road that goes from one constituency to another, but is unclear where the event took place or the article only refers to an administrative unit that encompasses more than one constituency, supplementary information on the event was obtained from online media reporting on the same event. The unit of observation in the dataset is event per day and constituency. Even if a candidate visited several places in one day within one constituency, I coded this as only one event. This was done for reasons of reliability, since different lengths of articles or differences in style between the two newspapers might account for the variation in how many places per constituency the article mentions.




Figure B.1: Effect of turnout on challenger rallies, conditional on past support

Appendix C

Additional material Chapter 6

Table C.1: Hypothesis testing, proportion of rallies with local promises, only full-length speeches

| Hypothesis | Significant | Type of test | Test statistic | p-value |
|--|-------------|------------------|------------------------|---------|
| Proportion of rallies with local promises incumbent > challenger | Yes | Chi ² | 14.5997 (1) | 0.000 |
| Difference in number of rallies with local promises by incumbent across past support | No | Chi ² | 3.3099 (2) | 0.191 |
| Rallies with local promises in NDC strongholds > swing constituencies | No | Marascuilo | .31 (dif), .50 (cv) | – |
| Rallies with local promises in NDC strongholds > NPP strongholds | No | Marascuilo | .36 (dif), .52 (cv) | – |
| Rallies with local promises in NDC strongholds if past turnout low > turnout high | No | Chi ² | 0.2800 (1) | 0.597 |

Notes: Except for the test of the effect of candidate identity, all tests are performed for campaign strategies by the incumbent. Test values displayed in column 6 are Pearson Chi-values for Chi² tests, degrees of freedom in brackets; difference (dif) and critical value (cv) for Marascuilo tests and z-values for Mann-Whitney tests (WMW). All tests performed on the restricted sample, including only speeches that are full in length.

Table C.2: Hypothesis testing, number of local promises per rally, only full-length speeches

| Hypothesis | IV | Significant | Type of test | Test statistic | p-value |
|---|--------------------|-------------|--------------|----------------|---------|
| Promises per rally incumbent > challenger per rally than challenger | <i>Candidate</i> | yes | WMW | -3.923 | 0.0001 |
| Local promises per rally if Northerners majority > Northerners minority | <i>Northerners</i> | No | WMW | -1.616 | 0.1061 |
| Local promises in NDC strongholds if past turnout low > past turnout high | <i>Turnout</i> | No | WMW | -0.736 | 0.4617 |

Notes: Results of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney and Dunn-tests of the difference in number of local promises per rally, across different values of the independent variables. Test statistics displayed in column 5 are z-values for the WMW-tests and ... for the Dunn-tests. Except for the test of the effect of candidate identity, all tests are performed for campaign strategies by the incumbent. All tests performed on the restricted sample, including only speeches that are full in length.

Appendix D

Additional material Chapter 7

Table D.1: Effect of incumbency status on the credibility of campaign promises, dep. variable is binary

| | (1) Energy promise | (2) Water promise | (3) Energy promise | (4) Interaction |
|------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|
| Incumbent | 0.679 ⁺ (1.82) | 0.289 (0.85) | 0.436 (1.25) | 0.164 (0.65) |
| News | 0.0563 (0.81) | 0.0830 (1.24) | 0.112 (1.21) | 0.0103 (0.23) |
| Education | 0.0526 (0.84) | −0.0212 (−0.32) | −0.0989 (−1.24) | 0.0248 (0.68) |
| NPP partisan | 1.221 ^{**} (2.09) | 0.480 (1.00) | 0.457 (1.45) | 0.775 ^{***} (2.90) |
| NDC partisan | 0.566 (1.41) | 0.237 (0.77) | −0.175 (−0.61) | 0.379 (1.28) |
| Incumbent*Local | | | | 0.442 (0.91) |
| Local | | | | −0.236 (−0.64) |
| Constant | −1.121 ⁺ (−1.69) | −0.272 (−0.42) | 0.801 (1.29) | −0.156 (−0.38) |
| Wald χ^2 | 7.81 | 3.31 | 6.41 | 17.81 ^{**} |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.02 |
| Pseudo Log-Likelihood | −117.46 | −121.64 | −98.99 | −258.09 |
| Number of clusters | 15 | 15 | 15 | 16 |
| Number of observations | 188 | 189 | 191 | 396 |

Values are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis

Model 4 uses the energy promise as the dependent variable

+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table D.2: Effect of framing of the promises on their credibility, dep. variable is binary

| | (1) Energy promise | (2) Water promise | (3) Street lights promise |
|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Local | −0.00872 (−0.03) | 0.0829 (0.34) | 0.0704 (0.28) |
| News | 0.0205 (0.45) | 0.0808 ⁺ (1.95) | 0.0989 (1.61) |
| Education | 0.0128 (0.34) | −0.0500 (−1.14) | −0.105** (−2.06) |
| NPP partisan | 0.708*** (2.94) | 0.130 (0.45) | 0.0219 (0.12) |
| NDC partisan | 0.409 (1.36) | 0.0510 (0.20) | −0.0431 (−0.34) |
| Constant | −0.0667 (−0.17) | 0.144 (0.33) | 1.139*** (3.11) |
| Wald χ^2 | 10.14 ⁺ | 5.37 | 5.66 |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Pseudo Log-Likelihood | −260.15 | −261.11 | −213.66 |
| Number of clusters | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Number of observations | 396 | 397 | 397 |

Values are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis

+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table D.3: Effect of co-identity with the candidates on the credibility of their promises, dep. variable is binary

| | (1) Energy promise | (2) Water promise | (3) Street lights promise | (4) Interaction |
|------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Partisan | 3.509*** (5.10) | 2.267*** (4.20) | 2.309*** (5.86) | 1.545*** (2.93) |
| Ethnic partisan | 0.0540 (0.20) | -0.338 (-1.25) | -0.184 (-0.84) | -0.293 (-1.17) |
| Independent | 0.744*** (3.09) | 0.635*** (2.69) | 0.802*** (2.78) | |
| News | -0.0527 (-0.88) | 0.0219 (0.57) | 0.0499 (0.75) | 0.0279 (0.72) |
| Education | 0.0600 (1.57) | -0.0189 (-0.42) | -0.0674 (-1.19) | -0.0203 (-0.47) |
| Local | | | | -0.152 (-0.64) |
| Partisan*Local | | | | 0.924 ⁺ (1.67) |
| Constant | -0.541 (-1.45) | -0.0936 (-0.23) | 0.634** (2.06) | 0.226 (0.51) |
| Wald χ^2 | 35.12*** | 22.88*** | 54.31*** | 22.60*** |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.21 | 0.12 | 0.11 | 0.11 |
| Pseudo Log-Likelihood | -220.89 | -241.93 | -203.40 | -244.43 |
| Number of clusters | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Number of observations | 416 | 417 | 418 | 417 |

Values are coefficients with t-statistics in parenthesis

+ p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Model 4 is uses the energy promise as the dependent variable

Appendix E

Additional material Chapter 8

Table E.1: Descriptive statistics for the subsample used to fit the individual turnout model

| | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
|---------------------------------|--------|--------|-----|-----|
| Voted | 0.821 | 0.383 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 38.861 | 14.431 | 18 | 99 |
| Member of dominant ethnic group | 0.484 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 |
| Contact local official | 0.277 | 0.448 | 0 | 1 |
| Contact party official | 0.159 | 0.366 | 0 | 1 |
| Attends community meetings | 2.291 | 1.302 | 0 | 4 |
| Attended campaign | 0.476 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 |
| Observations | 2913 | | | |
| Regions | 115 | | | |

Table E.2: Descriptive Statistics for the subsample used to fit models on clientelism and intimidation

| | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
|---------------------|--------|--------|--------|-------|
| Vote-buying | 0.244 | 0.430 | 0 | 1 |
| Intimidation | 0.705 | 0.456 | 0 | 1 |
| Poverty | 0.045 | 0.998 | -1.398 | 3.184 |
| Age | 38.202 | 13.707 | 18 | 100 |
| Female | 0.494 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 |
| Urban | 0.375 | 0.484 | 0 | 1 |
| Education | 3.392 | 1.938 | 0 | 9 |
| Information | 1.509 | 1.038 | 0 | 4 |
| Vote propensity | 0.808 | 0.136 | 0.176 | 0.978 |
| Non-partisan | 0.312 | 0.463 | 0 | 1 |
| Id winning party | 0.361 | 0.480 | 0 | 1 |
| Id with other party | 0.327 | 0.469 | 0 | 1 |
| Turnout | 0.633 | 0.137 | 0.378 | 0.924 |
| Competitiveness | 0.604 | 0.284 | 0.056 | 0.984 |
| Observations | 8992 | | | |
| Regions | 91 | | | |

Table E.3: Effect of the political makeup of voters and the regions they live in on their likelihood to be targeted with clientelism, dep. variable on original four-point-scale

| | Individual | | | | Regional | | | | Interaction Competitiveness and Turnout | | | | |
|------------------------------|------------|-------|--------|--------|----------|-------|--------|--------|---|-------|--------|--------|--|
| | Mean | SD | Lower | Upper | Mean | SD | Lower | Upper | Mean | SD | Lower | Upper | |
| (Intercept) | 0.403 | 0.039 | 0.327 | 0.477 | 0.378 | 0.056 | 0.265 | 0.484 | 0.412 | 0.065 | 0.280 | 0.535 | |
| Poverty | 0.061 | 0.012 | 0.039 | 0.086 | 0.061 | 0.012 | 0.038 | 0.086 | 0.055 | 0.015 | 0.026 | 0.084 | |
| Information | 0.021 | 0.014 | -0.006 | 0.047 | 0.021 | 0.014 | -0.007 | 0.048 | 0.013 | 0.017 | -0.019 | 0.046 | |
| Age | -0.007 | 0.001 | -0.009 | -0.005 | -0.007 | 0.001 | -0.009 | -0.005 | -0.007 | 0.001 | -0.010 | -0.005 | |
| Education | 0.014 | 0.008 | -0.001 | 0.028 | 0.014 | 0.008 | -0.001 | 0.028 | 0.018 | 0.009 | -0.001 | 0.035 | |
| Urban | -0.037 | 0.028 | -0.089 | 0.021 | -0.034 | 0.029 | -0.088 | 0.025 | 0.006 | 0.034 | -0.059 | 0.074 | |
| Female | -0.073 | 0.023 | -0.117 | -0.028 | -0.073 | 0.022 | -0.115 | -0.029 | -0.082 | 0.028 | -0.136 | -0.028 | |
| Vote propensity | 0.761 | 0.107 | 0.548 | 0.963 | 0.762 | 0.107 | 0.549 | 0.967 | 0.786 | 0.132 | 0.541 | 1.054 | |
| Id winning party | 0.100 | 0.028 | 0.047 | 0.157 | 0.102 | 0.028 | 0.049 | 0.159 | 0.078 | 0.033 | 0.013 | 0.144 | |
| Id with other party | 0.091 | 0.028 | 0.039 | 0.148 | 0.093 | 0.028 | 0.037 | 0.146 | 0.085 | 0.033 | 0.018 | 0.147 | |
| Region urban | | | | | -0.013 | 0.123 | -0.252 | 0.226 | -0.051 | 0.143 | -0.321 | 0.232 | |
| Region poverty | | | | | -0.008 | 0.084 | -0.178 | 0.152 | -0.013 | 0.096 | -0.202 | 0.180 | |
| Region turnout | | | | | -0.810 | 0.226 | -1.249 | -0.361 | -0.591 | 0.280 | -1.136 | -0.045 | |
| Region competitiveness | | | | | -0.308 | 0.111 | -0.530 | -0.094 | -0.347 | 0.134 | -0.602 | -0.078 | |
| Reg. turnout*competitiveness | | | | | | | | | 0.232 | 0.975 | -1.699 | 2.184 | |
| ICC | 0.016 | 0.003 | 0.011 | 0.022 | 0.013 | 0.002 | 0.008 | 0.018 | 0.015 | 0.003 | 0.010 | 0.020 | |

Table E.4: Effect of the political makeup of voters and the regions they live in on their likelihood to be targeted with clientelism, ethnic group affiliated with dominant party

| | Individual | | | | Regional | | | | Interaction Competitiveness and Turnout | | | |
|---|------------|-------|--------|--------|----------|-------|--------|--------|---|-------|--------|--------|
| | Mean | SD | Lower | Upper | Mean | SD | Lower | Upper | Mean | SD | Lower | Upper |
| (Intercept) | -1.438 | 0.175 | -1.789 | -1.106 | -1.523 | 0.238 | -1.994 | -1.069 | -1.516 | 0.236 | -1.979 | -1.050 |
| Poverty | 0.219 | 0.042 | 0.133 | 0.298 | 0.215 | 0.042 | 0.132 | 0.298 | 0.219 | 0.043 | 0.129 | 0.298 |
| Information | 0.072 | 0.049 | -0.018 | 0.177 | 0.067 | 0.048 | -0.028 | 0.160 | 0.069 | 0.049 | -0.024 | 0.168 |
| Age | -0.031 | 0.004 | -0.040 | -0.024 | -0.031 | 0.004 | -0.039 | -0.023 | -0.031 | 0.004 | -0.040 | -0.024 |
| Education | 0.052 | 0.026 | -0.000 | 0.101 | 0.053 | 0.026 | -0.000 | 0.103 | 0.053 | 0.026 | 0.001 | 0.104 |
| Urban | -0.072 | 0.097 | -0.262 | 0.116 | -0.044 | 0.099 | -0.232 | 0.149 | -0.047 | 0.099 | -0.237 | 0.151 |
| Female | -0.248 | 0.079 | -0.399 | -0.087 | -0.245 | 0.079 | -0.393 | -0.081 | -0.250 | 0.078 | -0.405 | -0.106 |
| Vote propensity | 3.421 | 0.414 | 2.628 | 4.255 | 3.461 | 0.427 | 2.619 | 4.284 | 3.452 | 0.423 | 2.650 | 4.326 |
| Id ethnic group affiliated with winning party | 0.104 | 0.133 | -0.163 | 0.356 | 0.066 | 0.132 | -0.194 | 0.314 | 0.067 | 0.136 | -0.189 | 0.339 |
| Region urban | | | | | -0.269 | 0.494 | -1.215 | 0.710 | -0.267 | 0.490 | -1.207 | 0.744 |
| Region poverty | | | | | 0.014 | 0.316 | -0.603 | 0.648 | -0.002 | 0.326 | -0.606 | 0.664 |
| Region turnout | | | | | -2.088 | 0.949 | -4.066 | -0.362 | -2.095 | 0.978 | -3.951 | -0.103 |
| Region competitiveness | | | | | -1.567 | 0.451 | -2.407 | -0.639 | -1.581 | 0.474 | -2.515 | -0.654 |
| Reg. turnout*competitiveness | | | | | | | | | -0.289 | 3.412 | -7.037 | 6.443 |
| ICC | 0.209 | 0.034 | 0.146 | 0.277 | 0.166 | 0.030 | 0.112 | 0.228 | 0.167 | 0.031 | 0.111 | 0.228 |

Table E.5: Effect of the political makeup of voters and the regions they live in on their likelihood to be targeted with intimidation, dep. variable on original four-point-scale

| | Individual | | | | Regional | | | |
|-------------|------------|-------|--------|--------|----------|-------|--------|--------|
| | Mean | SD | Lower | Upper | Mean | SD | Lower | Upper |
| (Intercept) | 1.229 | 0.061 | 1.116 | 1.354 | 1.278 | 0.083 | 1.125 | 1.448 |
| poverty | 0.095 | 0.012 | 0.071 | 0.118 | 0.095 | 0.012 | 0.070 | 0.119 |
| information | -0.008 | 0.013 | -0.032 | 0.020 | -0.008 | 0.014 | -0.036 | 0.018 |
| age | -0.003 | 0.001 | -0.005 | -0.001 | -0.003 | 0.001 | -0.005 | -0.001 |
| educ | 0.007 | 0.008 | -0.009 | 0.021 | 0.007 | 0.008 | -0.009 | 0.021 |
| urban | 0.054 | 0.029 | -0.004 | 0.108 | 0.050 | 0.029 | -0.009 | 0.106 |
| female | 0.074 | 0.022 | 0.031 | 0.118 | 0.074 | 0.022 | 0.032 | 0.119 |
| vpred_mre | -0.161 | 0.107 | -0.363 | 0.057 | -0.163 | 0.108 | -0.386 | 0.041 |
| win_ident)2 | -0.125 | 0.028 | -0.179 | -0.071 | -0.119 | 0.028 | -0.176 | -0.065 |
| win_ident)3 | -0.060 | 0.028 | -0.119 | -0.009 | -0.057 | 0.028 | -0.113 | -0.005 |
| urban | | | | | 0.135 | 0.188 | -0.249 | 0.489 |
| poverty | | | | | 0.307 | 0.131 | 0.041 | 0.553 |
| turnout | | | | | -0.592 | 0.352 | -1.305 | 0.092 |
| comp | | | | | 1.190 | 0.179 | 0.827 | 1.526 |
| ICC | 0.060 | 0.009 | 0.045 | 0.080 | 0.038 | 0.006 | 0.026 | 0.050 |

Table E.6: Effect of the political makeup of voters and the regions they live in on their likelihood to be targeted with intimidation, ethnic group affiliated with dominant party

| | Individual | | | | Regional | | | |
|--------------|------------|-------|--------|--------|----------|-------|--------|--------|
| | Mean | SD | Lower | Upper | Mean | SD | Lower | Upper |
| (Intercept) | 0.775 | 0.178 | 0.432 | 1.128 | 0.676 | 0.219 | 0.246 | 1.104 |
| poverty | 0.101 | 0.042 | 0.019 | 0.181 | 0.097 | 0.043 | 0.009 | 0.177 |
| information | 0.107 | 0.048 | 0.015 | 0.203 | 0.108 | 0.050 | 0.009 | 0.203 |
| age | -0.012 | 0.004 | -0.019 | -0.004 | -0.011 | 0.004 | -0.018 | -0.004 |
| educ | 0.025 | 0.025 | -0.023 | 0.074 | 0.025 | 0.025 | -0.026 | 0.072 |
| urban | 0.013 | 0.095 | -0.161 | 0.216 | -0.009 | 0.095 | -0.197 | |
| female | 0.237 | 0.078 | 0.086 | 0.389 | 0.239 | 0.077 | 0.088 | 0.391 |
| vpred_nre | -0.279 | 0.367 | -1.022 | 0.431 | -0.331 | 0.372 | -1.063 | |
| win_ethnic)1 | -0.140 | 0.128 | -0.374 | 0.124 | -0.156 | 0.124 | -0.400 | 0.085 |
| urban | | | | | 0.771 | 0.478 | -0.152 | 1.682 |
| poverty | | | | | 0.616 | 0.311 | 0.041 | 1.262 |
| turnout | | | | | -1.124 | 0.921 | -2.923 | 0.686 |
| comp | | | | | 2.490 | 0.431 | 1.713 | 3.385 |
| ICC | 0.238 | 0.035 | 0.176 | 0.310 | 0.161 | 0.028 | 0.110 | 0.217 |