media economics , mergers , entry , advertising , aggregative games
Abstract:
We customize the aggregative game approach to oligopoly to study asymmetric media
markets. Advertiser, platform, and consumer surplus are tied together by a simple
summary statistic. When media are ad-financed and ads are a nuisance to consumers we establish see-saws between consumers and advertisers. Entry of a lower-quality platform increases consumer surplus, but decreases advertiser surplus if industry platform profits decrease with entry. Merger decreases consumer surplus, but advertiser
surplus increases when the profits of the higher-quality platform within the merger increase. By contrast, when platforms use two-sided pricing or consumers like advertising,advertiser and consumer interests are often aligned.
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