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URL:
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https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/40892
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URN:
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urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-408929
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Document Type:
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Working paper
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Year of publication:
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2015
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The title of a journal, publication series:
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Working Paper Series
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Volume:
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15-18
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Place of publication:
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Mannheim
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Publication language:
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English
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Institution:
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School of Law and Economics > VWL, Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung (Orzen 2009-)
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MADOC publication series:
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Department of Economics > Working Paper Series
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Subject:
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330 Economics
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Classification:
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JEL:
D02 , D03 , D63 , D64,
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Keywords (English):
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psychological games , moral judgement , institutional design , lying aversion , sabotage aversion , spying aversion , unfair competition , distribution of decision rights
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Abstract:
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Do individuals prefer to compete fairly, or unfairly with an opponent? We study
individuals who can choose how to compete for one ex-post nonzero payoff. They can
either nudge themselves into a fair set of rules where they have the same information
and actions as their opponent, or into unfair rules where they spy, sabotage or fabricate
their opponent's action. In an experiment, we observe significant altruism under rules
which allow for fabrication and sabotage, but not under rules which allow for spying.
We provide direct evidence that this altruism emanates from an ethical concern purely
over the distribution of decision rights. How individuals deal with this concern - whether
they nudge themselves into fabrication-free, spying-free, or sabotage-free rules, or whether
they assume the power to fabricate or sabotage to compensate their opponent by giving
all payoff away - varies along with individuals' attitudes towards power.
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Working Paper Series
Mannheim
15-18
[Working paper]
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