

---

# Nature and Outcome of Representation: Political Parties and Party Voters

Doctoral student: Eva H. Önnudóttir

CDSS, University of Mannheim

Email: [eva.onnudottir@gess.uni-mannheim.de](mailto:eva.onnudottir@gess.uni-mannheim.de)

Dissertation thesis written at the Center for Doctoral Studies in the Social and Behavioral Sciences of the Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences and submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Mannheim.

---



Academic Director of the Center for Doctoral Studies in Social Sciences (CDSS):

Prof. Dr. Thomas Bräuninger

Main supervisor: Prof. Dr. Hermann Schmitt

MZES, University of Mannheim

Co-supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ólafur Þ. Harðarson

University of Iceland

Doctoral thesis defended on 28 July, 2015, at the University of Mannheim



My doctoral studies have been funded by the Center for Doctoral Studies in Social Sciences (CDSS), the ‘Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung’ (MZES) and the Icelandic Research Fund for Students.

I would like to thank Professor Hermann Schmitt, who served as my main-supervisor, as well as one who challenged and encouraged me throughout my time spent studying under him. He would have never accepted anything less than my best efforts, and for that, I thank him.

I would also like to thank Professor Ólafur Þ. Harðarson, who served as my co-supervisor and mentor. His belief in me and encouragements to take on and see through doctoral studies has been invaluable, as well as his insightful and gentle comments on my work.

Finally, but most importantly, I thank my two children, Daníel and Sólrún for their patience, support and just for being there.

Eva H. Önnudóttir



to  
The Academic Director  
of the CDSS

**Affirmation in lieu of oath according to section 6 subsection 2(a) of the Regulations for the Conferral of a Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) Degree at the University of Mannheim at the Center for Doctoral Studies and Social and Behavioral Sciences affiliated with the Faculty of Social Sciences, dated August 29, 2007, revised on November 3, 2010.**

1. I hereby affirm that this submitted doctoral dissertation with the title “Nature and Outcome of Representation: Political Parties and Party Voters” is my own authored work.
2. I did not seek unauthorized assistance of a third party and I have employed no other sources or means except the ones listed. I clearly marked any quotations derived from the works of others.
3. I did not yet present this doctoral dissertation or parts of it at any other higher education institution in Germany or abroad.
4. I hereby confirm the accuracy of the affirmation above.
5. I am aware of the significance of this affirmation and the legal consequences in case of untrue or incomplete statements.
6. I affirm in lieu of oath that the statements above are to the best of my knowledge true and complete.

Family Name: Önnudóttir

First Name: Eva H.

Date: 18.Ocotber, 2016

Signature \_\_\_\_\_





## Introduction

---

Since the early days of modern democracies, studies of representation have aimed to conceptualise representation, both in normative and practical terms (e.g. Eulau et al. 1959, Wahlke et al. 1962, Pitkin 1967, Thomassen 1994, Blomberg and Rozenberg 2012a). This reflects the importance of both understanding what is expected of representative democracy as well as the success of those who represent in meeting those expectations. The content and the form of the political linkage between electors and the elected is disputed, both due to different ideas about how representation ought to work and due to differences in expectations of representation in modern democracies.

Representation is, in essence, about the link between those who represent and those who are represented. In modern democracies, voters grant political parties and/or candidates a mandate to make decisions on their behalf. Thus parties and/or candidates act as agents on behalf of the principals that are the voters (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005). In most modern democracies, political parties are the main actors as intermediates between the electors and the elected (e.g. Mair 2006, Müller 2000, Dalton 1985). Political parties present policy packages that voters can choose from and representatives of political parties act on behalf of voters within the constraints put on them both by their party and the political system within which they operate (Strøm 2012, Aldrich 2011). Studies on representation commonly focus on how individual legislators behave within the context of their party and the political system (e.g. Gauja 2012, Best and Vogel 2012) providing useful insights into how representation works in practice. Given that representation in most modern democracies is about a collective (e.g. political parties) representing a collective (e.g. party voters) (Castiglione and Warren 2006) the individual-level focus is limited when it comes to analysing the demand and the supply sides of representation together; the dyadic link between the represented and those who represent (Schmitt 2007). The approach taken in this project is to conceptualise representation at the level of those collectives as party dyads, where a dyad consists of a party and its voters, and as such is in line with the partisan-constituency model (Ezrow 2010).

The present PhD project aims to shed light on one piece in the puzzle of representation which is about how its nature affects its outcome. The nature of representation is about its input, how and whom to represent, while the outcome of representation relates to how it manifests, and

those two are commonly analysed separately (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005). Given that the nature of representation has consequences for its outcome, it is also undertaken in this project to examine what factors contribute to the variety in the nature of representation.

This PhD project consists of three papers, two of them already published in peer-reviewed journals. Those two papers are about what determines the nature of representation emphasised within parties (Önnudóttir 2014b) and the consequences of those for objective outcome of representation (Önnudóttir 2014a). The third paper is about the link between the nature of representation and subjective outcome of representation and it is currently being reviewed. Each paper is discussed in more details below.

## **Models of representation**

---

### *Nature of representation*

Two dominant models of representation have been heavily disputed, the trustee versus delegate model, and the political parties model (Thomassen 1994). The former relates to the mandate-independence controversy, whether elected representatives should behave as trustees and follow their own judgment when making decisions, or as delegates acting according to the will of voters. The political party model, often referred to as the Responsible Party Model (RPM) (American Political Science Association 1950) is based on the principle that parties offer different policy packages and representatives of the parties follow the parties' policies. Voters are both aware of the policy packages offered by parties and their own, and they vote for the party that is closest to their own preferences. Both those models of representation have been criticised for being both unrealistic and too strict.

The delegate versus trustee role was first discussed by Burke in his speech to the electors of Bristol in 1774 (e.g. Thomassen 1994). However, it was not until Eulau et al. (1959) conceptualised it as two different ideal types of roles of representation that it became a matter of academic debate as a model for representation. In Eulau et al.'s distinction between the focus and style of representation, the delegate and trustee roles are types of styles of representation that have to do with what criterion representatives should use when making decisions. Focus of

representation is about whom to represent, whether that is for example the constituency, party voters or the nation as a whole.

Thomassen (1994) points out that the idea of an instructed delegate can be traced back to the early days of parliamentarianism, when local representatives were appointed to defend the interest of their region, mainly regarding issues of taxes, against the king or head of state in feudal societies. The idea was that they were representatives of their region and as such were supposedly instructed by those living within their region. This is in line with the idea that in practice those who are delegates are also more likely to consider themselves as representatives of their region whereas trustees consider their focus of representation to be the nation as a whole (Bengtsson and Wass 2011, Wessles and Giebler 2011). Thomassen (1994) traces the ideal of the trustee back to Rousseau and the French revolution, when it became a constitutional practice to instruct representatives to follow their own judgement and not take orders from others. Using the same example, Rozenberg and Blomgren (2012) argue that the trustee style is generally promoted as the legitimate role of representation in modern Europe. Thus the trustee style might be in line with what the constitutional practice expects, but those expectations do not always reflect the reality of political representation.

Both the delegate and the trustee role have been criticised for being outdated and unrealistic in modern mass democracies (Thomassen 1994, Rehfeld 2009), but nevertheless, they are still quite dominant both in popular and in academic debate about representation (e.g. Andeweg 2012, Fox and Shotts 2009, Rehfeld 2009, Bengtsson and Wass 2011). That is because, not without flaws, the distinction touches upon core elements of democratic representation; about whom and how to represent. The popular debate about representation is quite often focused on the idea that elected representatives should follow the will of voters, that is to say, they should behave as delegates. Even if this ignores the heterogeneity of voters and that it is unclear how the 'will of voters' on issues should be signalled to elected representatives, this shows that models of representation are not only the concern of academic debate; it concerns the interest of citizens in all modern democracies.

In Miller and Stokes' (1963) 'diamond model', representatives can either act as trustees or delegates; but their role-conception is not a necessary prerequisite for congruence between representatives and those who are represented. Their model points out that there is flexibility for shared views, even if representatives behave as trustees. Representatives can either be chosen by

voters because the voters share the views of the elected or they are chosen as instructed delegates following the voters will in their behaviour as legislators. In their model, the instructed delegate style only works for representation when representatives' (who are delegates) perception of their constituencies' attitudes are correct. In applying this model to legislators roll-call behaviour in the United States, they find that on some issues there is a greater correspondence between representatives and their voters, most notably issues concerning social welfare and civil rights, and less congruence on issues such as foreign policy.

The application of the Miller and Stokes' model in Europe has been less convincing compared to the US, for the reason that in Europe, political parties are the main actors as policy makers, not individual representatives (e.g. Müller 2000). Both the Miller and Stokes' model and the trustee versus delegate typology ignore the role of political parties in modern democracies (Thomassen 1994). For that reason, it is common to add the partisan role as a style of representation, as is done by Converse and Pierce (1986) in their study on representation in France. Under the partisan style, representatives follow their party's policy and are as such in line the RPM. As already mentioned, the ideal of RPM is that parties offer policy packages that are known to voters, and parties exercise control over their representatives to make sure they follow the party line. RPM recognises that political parties are one of the main actors in the representational bond between voters and the elected, but it is less of a theory of representation and more an ideal about how representation ought to work practice. The model is too strict assuming that voters are aware of both their own policy preferences and the policy packages offered by parties and it gives too little flexibility for individual representatives to deviate from the party line (Valen and Narud 2007, Wessels and Giebler 2011).

The criticisms on the two main strands discussed so far, the delegate versus trustee model (commonly adding the partisan style) and the RPM, both reflect that they are about normative expectations about representation and how it ought to work. The models are not necessarily failing as such, but the normative ideal has to be realistic and it should be recognised that representation in modern democracies can take on different forms under different circumstances (e.g. Thomassen 1994, Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012b). There is no such thing as only one way to represent; such as being either a delegate all the time, or following only own judgement or to always follow the party line. Representatives take on different roles under different circumstances; for example different factors can influence their behaviour as legislators as

compared to how they think about and interact with voters. In this example, the former falls under legislative roles and the latter under representative roles (Rozenberg and Blomgren 2012).

A threefold classification into trustee, delegate and partisan styles belongs to representational roles, and this classification is one of the main themes of the present PhD project. The literature has suggested several perspectives for understanding style of representation, for example the functionalist perspective, the motivational approach and the rational approach (Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012b). The functionalist perspective was largely abandoned in the early 1980s, mainly because empirical findings did not support the idea that style of representation reflects some underlying holistic function of the representational process in modern democracies. The motivational approach is to study style of representation according to how the representatives define their own roles and tasks, taking account of the institutional setting within which they operate. The rational approach is to understand styles of representation as strategies representatives use to reach their goals. In this project, I make use of the rational approach, but instead of focusing on individual representatives, I focus on the characteristics of their political parties.

Under Strøm's (2012) rational choice approach, the style representatives take on is conditioned by the requirements they have to meet in order to reach their goals. Political parties are one of the main actors conditioning their members' career paths, regardless of whether their goal is being elected as an MP or to work for the party and the party's success in any other way (Aldrich 2011). The increasing complexity of the issue space and growing number of median independent voters as opposed to ideological partisan voters has created what Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012) call the 'strain of representation'. They find that in more affluent societies where the share of independent voters is higher in the electorate compared to less affluent societies, there is less policy congruence between parties and voters. This strain, together with parties control over their members' career paths, could create different incentives for parties to emphasise different styles of representation. The trustee style might be a useful strategy to mobilise independent voters, the partisan style could be induced by constraints of parties over nomination of their candidates, and the delegate style could work better the more homogeneous party voters are. Thus, the extent to which the three styles are emphasised within parties could both depend on the variety in parties' profile (e.g. characteristics of both party and its voters) and the institutional set-up of parties.

### *Outcome of representation*

Both the normative and practical debate about the pros and cons of democracy relates to how it works in practice and is as such about the outcome of representation. It is debated whether and to what extent, parties do represent their voters on policies, commonly operationalised as congruence on a left-right scale (e.g. Golder and Stramski 2010, Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012). The outcome of representation has also been captured as congruence on more specific issue scales (e.g. Hooghe et al. 2002, Lutz et al. 2012) and as political support for the political system (e.g. Fuchs 1999, Baviskar and Malone 2004) even if not always spelled out explicitly as ‘outcome of representation’. Congruence on issues and/or policies is here labelled as ‘the objective outcomes of representation’ given that it is driven by policy preferences. Political support is labelled as ‘the subjective outcomes of representation’ driven by voters’ expectations about representation and their perceptions about its’ performance. Each is here discussed in turn.

### *Objective outcome of representation*

There is a general agreement about the importance of examining policy congruence as well as the idea that high congruence indicates good political representation (Andeweg 2012). However, there is a considerable disagreement about what congruence is or what it should be about (Hellwig 2008), whether it is elite- or mass-driven (Schmitt and Thomassen 2000, Holmberg 2011) and how best to measure it (van der Eijk 2001, Golder and Stramski 2010, Andeweg 2011). The distinction between the European party systems and the US candidate centred politics is of importance. The dividing view between the individual-level focus and the collective focus of representation is partly because of the different political realities studies of representation do focus on, whether it is a party based system or a candidate based system. Under an individual perspective on congruence, the focus is on the constituency voters and their elected representatives, while the collective perspective is on parties and party voters; and the latter is more appropriate when examining representation in Europe as compared to the US (Dalton 1985).

How the institutional setting of the electoral system affects congruence has received a considerable attention. Golder and Stramski (2010) find that in majoritarian systems, there is

higher policy congruence between voters and the government (many to one) and in proportional systems between voters and the parliament (many to many). The focus of their study is on the link between all citizens and those who represent which is a general electoral model of congruence, whereas the partisan constituency model focuses on the link between parties and their voters (Ezrow 2011). Contrasting the general electorate model and the partisan constituency model brings to attention what is the unifying link between those who represent and those who are represented. When voters vote for parties, the unifying link on policy between the represented and those who represent are the parties. The difference between position issues and valence issues (e.g. Green 2007) can be of importance here. The partisan constituency model is the appropriate focus when theorising about and analysing congruence in party based systems on position issues, which are issues where there is a disagreement about, such as social security and privatisation. Whereas the general electorate model might be more appropriate when theorising and analysing congruence on valence issues, which are issues that voters and parties do in general agree about, such as on economic prosperity and fighting crime.

The most common way to measure policy congruence is to use the left-right scale as a denominator for various issues that unite or divide the elected and the electors (e.g. Powell 2009, van der Eijk 2001). Even if the left-right scale incorporates various issues and might be less relevant than it used to be historically (Powell 2009) it still distinguishes between parties' policy positions. Parties and voters have a similar understanding about what issues constitute the left-right scale, even if the content changes over time and differs between countries (van der Eijk and Schmitt 2010). Thus the left-right scale reflects position issues to a greater extent than valence issues (because parties differ on the scale), and congruence on the left-right symbolically unites the represented and those who represent (e.g. Eulau and Karps 1977, Belchior 2013). Congruence on the left-right scale is as such a relevant measure for an objective outcome of representation.

### *Subjective outcome of representation*

Political support of the public is important for the consolidation and legitimacy of the political system (Diamond 1999, Mishler and Rose 2001) and as such can be regarded as a subjective outcome of representation. Determinants of political support are commonly studied either on the individual level (e.g. Aarts and Thomassen 2008, Dalton 2008), on the level of political systems

(e.g. Norris 2011) or as an interplay between those two levels (e.g. Kubbe 2013, Stokemer and Sundstrøm 2013). This PhD project takes a different approach focusing on political support on the level of political parties.

What people expect of democracy is important when it comes to understanding what drives political support. Different groups of voters differ in what they expect of democracy. Some groups emphasise the importance of the means of democracy in terms of the formal setting of the representative system while others emphasise its ends in terms of what it delivers (e.g. Fuchs 1999, Baviskar and Malone 2004). Céka and Magelhães (2015) find that those that have higher social status are more likely to defend and support the status quo of democracy, while the underprivileged are more likely to support a change such as more support for referendums or other means that are not present in their political system. They argue that this reflects a ‘winners and losers’ status, where the underprivileged have more to gain from a change while the winners feel securer in their position and feel no need for a change in the democratic system.

Models of representation, considering political support, have to take into account both the different expectations voters have of representation and the difference in how it is carried out under different circumstances and settings. With the loosening of a traditional social-class system and Rohrschneider and Whitefield’s (2012) ‘strain of representation’, parties in modern democracies are faced with the challenge of how to represent increasingly heterogeneous voters; where diverse groups of voters might have different expectations about representation. Different groups of party voters can hold different expectations about democracy and they can express different levels of political support depending on their expectations. For example, it has been found that satisfaction with democracy, a common indicator of political support, is higher among voters of government parties than opposition parties (Holmberg 1999). Given that parties are one of the main actors in carrying out representation, it is meaningful to theorise and examine party voters’ political support as a subjective outcome of representation, as is undertaken in the present PhD project.

Summing up, the three papers that constitute the present PhD are about the nature and outcome of representation and they are all on the level of party dyads. The first paper is about what explains the variety in the nature of representation emphasised within parties. The second and third papers are about how the variety in the nature of representation explains objective outcome in terms of policy congruence between parties and party voters, and how it explains



subjective outcome of representation in terms of party voters' political support. The main results of each paper are discussed briefly below, followed by a more extensive discussion about the implications of the results.

## **A summary of the main results**

---

The first published paper, '*Political parties and styles of representation*', is about how parties' characteristics, and to some extent characteristics' of party voters, explain the nature of representation (Önnudóttir 2014b). The nature of representation is divided into the extent to which the partisan, delegate or trustee styles are emphasised within parties. The main results are that the more control the parties' leaderships' have over nomination and greater party socialisation, both go together with the partisan style being the prevalent style within parties. The findings also show that the more often parties have been represented in government, the more likely they are to contain a high number of trustees. This is suggested to be explained by both a socialisation effect of parties' governing experience and the 'strain of representation'; the dilemma about how parties should represent both the median independent voter and the partisan ideological voter. Under this strain, parties might promote the trustee style as a strategy to maximise their share of votes to make them a viable candidate for government. Greater experience in representing might also socialise representatives of government parties into the trustee style, given that they more often have to justify their actions as being for 'the greater good' – a focus of representation that is closely linked to the trustee style.

For the delegate style, the results are not as clear as for the partisan and trustee style, but the findings show that delegate parties have a higher proportion of voters that do identify with their party. A possible explanation for this is that party identifiers of a given party agree both with their party and with other party identifiers of that party to a greater extent than independent voters, and thus it is easier for those parties to emphasise the delegate style.

The second published paper, '*Policy congruence and style of representation: Party voters and political parties*', is about how policy congruence, as objective outcome of representation, is determined by the extent to which the partisan, delegate or trustee style are prevalent within parties (Önnudóttir 2014a). The main findings show that a higher proportion of partisans results in less congruence between parties and party voters on the left right scale, whereas the trustee

style results in more congruence. For the objective outcome of representation, the extent to which the delegate style is emphasised has negligible effect on policy congruence. The low congruence between partisan parties and their voters contradicts the Responsible Party Model (RPM), and it is suggested that parties that exercise greater control over its representatives to keep them in line with the parties' policy, do so at the cost of congruence with voters on the left-right scale. The positive link between the trustee style and greater congruence supports that the trustee style might be a successful strategy when it comes to mobilising independent median voters in modern mass democracies.

The third paper, *'Styles of representation and voters' evaluations of democratic performance: Parties and party voters'* (currently being reviewed), shows that the variety in the nature of representation has consequences for party voters political support as a subjective outcome of representation. Political support is captured as party voters' evaluations of the performance of democracy on a scale of ten items, where each item is weighted by its' perceived importance for democracy. The findings show that the trustee style is positively related to political support; the higher the proportion of trustees within parties, the more positively do party voters rate the performance of democracy. The relation for the delegate style is reverse; the more that style is emphasised, the more negatively democratic performance is rated, while the effect for the partisan style is negligible. It is argued that the negative relation between the delegate style and party voters' evaluations of democratic performance reflects that the delegate style is both an unrealistic and a populist model for representation. It is unrealistic in the sense that there is no such thing as a 'single will of voters' that can be made known to representatives. Referring to voters' as a united group' and that a party is representing the 'will of voters' is a common thread among right-wing populist parties (Jagers and Walgrave 2007). Such parties commonly mobilise on voters' discontent and that could thus explain the negative relation found between delegate parties and their voters' evaluation of democratic performance. Again, the negligible effect on voters' subjective evaluation of performance found for the partisan style contradicts RPM, and the positive one for the trustee style shows the success of that style as a model for representation.

## Discussion

---

The discussion about models of representation is important because it reflects a normative and a practical debate about how representation ought to be carried out. Implicit in this discussion is that the nature of representation has consequences for its outcome; but it is rarely spelled out how and in what form. For example, at first sight, it could seem to be implicit that the delegate style should result in a closer bond between the policy preferences of delegate representatives and their voters. This assumption wrongly assumes that delegates follow the will of voters because they agree with voters. The only thing that the delegate style requires is that the will of the voters should be decisive, regardless of representatives' own opinion, or the policy of their party. Thus there is no obvious link between the delegate style and an agreement between the elected and the electors on policy, unless it is assumed that representatives take on the delegate style because they agree with voters.

Of importance here is that the difference between styles of representation, divided into partisan, trustee and delegate styles, is what criterion representatives use for (or claim to use) decision making. In the delegate and partisan styles, the criterion is in both cases a collective; the voters for delegates and the party's policy for the partisans. In both cases it is considered appropriate for decision making that the 'will of the collective' should be decisive regardless of representatives' own opinion or the opinions of other groups than those that constitute the relevant collective. In both cases representatives' own policy preferences can deviate from the preferences of the relevant collective. The emphasis is on that representatives' policy choices and decision makings reflect the preference of the 'collective' whether that is voters or the party's policy. Only in the case of the trustee style, the criterion for decision making coincides with the policy preferences of the representatives' themselves. This is because they supposedly use their own judgement when making decisions.

The trustee versus delegate typology has been criticised for being outdated and not relevant for modern European party systems. Still, this typology commonly adding the role of a partisan, does reflect both a normative discussion about representative democracy and how it should and does work in practice. Considering that those three styles of representation are representative roles in the sense that they do reflect how representatives think about their role, and they are not legislative roles in the sense how they cast their vote in the parliament, draws attention to that representatives can and do take on different roles under different circumstances.

For example, styles of representation are a much more plausible explanation for how representatives differ in how they approach their voters than legislative roles are. For example, Andeweg shows (2012) that representatives that favour a ‘bottom-up’ representation (policy preferences of voters should be incorporated into their party’s policy), which is in line with the delegate style, are in more contact with voters compared to representatives who favour ‘top-down’ representation (elite-driven politics), which is in line with the trustee and/or partisan style, and the latter group are in more contact with ministers and officials to discuss voters’ affairs. When considering how representatives cast their vote in the legislative, they do in an overwhelming majority of cases cast their vote according to their parties’ policy (e.g. Kristinsson 2011). However, representative styles are more likely to come into play considering the difference in how representatives approach their work that leads up to a roll-call vote (e.g. committee work and formal and informal negotiations between parties) (Thomassen 1994).

Notwithstanding the criticism on RPM, that it is unrealistic and too strict, it does have some truth to it. The most plausible part relates to the constraints the parties put on their representatives to follow their party’s policy and some parties exercise more control than others. Most notably is that the more dependent candidates are on their party for nomination and election, the more likely they are to be partisans (Wessels and Giebler 2011, Zittel 2012) and this is confirmed in the present PhD. Because this link is dependent upon the extent to which parties have and do exercise control over their representatives’ career paths, one cannot state that RPM works as a model, because it only works for some parties and not for others. What RPM does however, is to draw attention to the role of political parties in representative democracies and reflects a normative discussion about how political parties ought to work.

The findings of this present PhD, that there is a systematic difference in the extent to which the partisan, trustee or delegate styles are emphasised within parties, depending on characteristics of parties and party voters, show that this threefold classification does reflect a political reality. Under the rational choice approach, it is hypothesised and tested how different characteristics of parties and party voters are systematically linked to the extent to which each style is emphasised within parties. Finding that parties’ leadership’s control over nomination increases the proportion of partisans within parties and decreases the proportion of trustees tells two things. When representatives’ career paths are constrained by their party, they take on the partisan role as a strategy to advance their career for and within the party. The less

representatives' career path is dependent upon their party, the trustee style is emphasised at the cost of the partisan style. In that case, the trustee style might be more rational for them to help them advance their political career. Parties' leaderships control over nomination is also positively related to the proportion of the delegate style within parties. This relation becomes more interesting when looking at the effect of party socialisation on styles of representation. More party socialisation goes together with greater emphasis on the partisan style and a lesser emphasis on the delegate style. Taken together, parties' leaderships control over nomination seems to induce both the partisan and the delegate styles, whereas party socialisation has an opposite effect on the two styles. This could indicate that young and idealistic party members might be more likely to support the idea that the 'will of voters' should be decisive, but once they have gained experience in working within and for the party, and in that party the leadership controls nomination, they take on the partisan role if they want to succeed.

Regarding the outcome of representation, the greater the number of partisans the less congruence there is between parties and party voters on left right as an objective outcome of representation. For political support, as a subjective outcome of representation, the proportion of partisans has a negligible effect. It is notable that this negligible effect is in the same direction as for policy congruence, that is to say, a higher proportion of partisans goes together with both less congruence on left-right and party voters' negative evaluation of the performance of democracy, even if the latter is not statistically significant. Less policy congruence between partisan parties and their voters shows (again) that RPM does not work as an overarching model for representation. A possible explanation for the lack of congruence between partisan parties and their voters, is that those parties are further to the ends of the left-right spectrum. That those are ideological parties, that follow a doctrine of a political thought and as such they have to exercise greater control over their representatives to keep them in line with the party's policy. Given that voters are in general less polarised, those parties keep their representatives in line at the cost of policy congruence with voters.

For delegate parties, it is hypothesised and tested whether their voters are more homogeneous compared to voters of other parties. That is based on Strøm's (2012) rational approach; that it is easier to advocate the delegate style when voters are alike. Under such circumstances, it is more likely that one and united 'will of voters' exists and can be mobilised on. Given that issue positions of party identifiers are more alike than issue positions of

independent voters (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012), it is tested and found that parties that have a large base of party identifiers among their voters are more likely to emphasise the delegate style. This effect is weak, but nevertheless statistically significant.

A possible explanation for the link between the delegate style and the proportion of party identifiers among their voters, and for this there are some indicators that should be considered for a future research, is that the delegate style is more prominent among populist parties. That is, the few parties in the present data, where the delegate style is emphasised by half or more of its candidates, are all extreme right-wing parties (National Front and *List DeDecker* in Belgium and *Jobbik* in Hungary). Furthermore, in the 'True Finns', the Finnish anti-immigration party, the delegate style is emphasised to a greater extent compared to other Finnish parties, even if it does not exceed the fifty percent limit applied to the aforementioned parties. In addition to this, political support, as in party voters' evaluations of democratic performance, is less when the proportion of delegates is higher. Given that right-wing populist parties mobilise on and/or fuel voters discontent and anti-establishment sentiments (van der Brug 2003, Rydgren 2005) gives a reason to believe that the delegate style fits the populist messages of those parties, referring to the idea that the 'will of the voters' should be decisive as opposed to the political elites'. Thus, in terms of subjective outcome of representation, voters of delegate parties express lower political support compared to voters of other parties. Considering the objective outcome of representation, policy congruence on left-right, there seems to be no relation at all between that and whether parties promote the delegate style or not. That could possibly be because delegate parties do not campaign on the issues that line up along the left-right scale, and instead they campaign and mobilise on voters' dissatisfaction with democratic performance. This line of thought, the link between the delegate style and the campaign style of populist parties is a clear avenue for a future research.

Apart from the aforementioned link between parties' leaderships control over nomination with the trustee style, that style is also linked to parties' representation in government. The more often a party has been represented in government, the more likely it is to contain a high proportion of trustees. As such, the trustee style is in line with modernisation and post-materialist values emphasising self-autonomy and individual expression (Rozenberg and Blomgren 2012). Modernisation and post-materialist values have brought about less emphasis on class-based politics, leading to a lesser focus on representing a specific class and more on representing

different interests that cut across traditional social classes (Inglehart and Rabier 1986). As discussed by Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012), voters in modern democracies are more heterogeneous than they used to be; this, together with a more complex issue space, is a challenge political parties are faced with as representative agents. It can be reasoned that in more heterogeneous societies both the delegate and the partisan style are less successful as strategies to mobilise votes, given that the aim of parties is to secure as many voters as possible to be a viable option for government. Under such circumstances, the trustee style might be more successful as a useful strategy to mobilise voters that are heterogeneous.

The link between representation in government and the trustee style can also be due to a socialisation effect. Representatives of parties that have more often been part of the government should be more used to justifying their actions as being for the greater good. That is, they are more accustomed to considering themselves to represent the nation as a whole, a focus of representation that generally coincides with the trustee style. The argument here is that the link between representation in government and the trustee style is a mix of both; a socialisation effect on the one hand and on the other hand a strategy to get as many votes as needed to be considered as a government party. Strengthening this argument is that policy congruence is greater the higher the proportion of trustees. Government-seeking parties have to capture the votes of as many voters as possible, and given that the majority of voters are around the centre, the best strategy to capture votes that are both a little bit to the left and a little bit to the right of the centre, is to campaign on competency; that the party's representatives are competent enough to both make compromises and to deal with the political problems they will be faced with in government.

The trustee style is not only positively linked with policy congruence as objective outcome of representation; it is also positively linked with political support as subjective outcome of representation. Voters of trustee parties evaluate democratic performance more positively than voters of other parties. It is argued that this reflects that the trustee style is a successful strategy to mobilise heterogeneous voters, on an issue space that has become increasingly diverse. As argued by Rozenberg and Blomgren (2012), the trustee style is in line with post-materialist values, self-autonomy and genuine deliberation. It is not fashionable to take orders from others such as voters or a party. Again, under Rohrschneider and Whitefield's 'strain of representation', the trustee style might be a successful strategy to mobilise diverse voters. This

does not have to indicate that political parties and partisanship are outdated. Rather, this could reflect that the old class-based party system is less relevant today than it used to be and that party competition is now based on different cleavages. ‘New’ cleavages on the political agenda, such as the protection of the environment or immigration (Hooghe et al.2001) do not cut as clearly through social-class as ‘older’ traditional issues such as privatisation and social-security. The ‘new’ issues are an add-on to the political issue space, and given that parties cannot mobilise on those issues related to social-class as they could on the ‘older’ issues, they have to convince voters that they are competent enough to deal with all those issues. Under those circumstances, the trustee style might work better, than both the partisan and the delegate style, to maximise votes. It could work better than the partisan style, because following the partisan style, could send the message that representatives of such parties have to follow a rigid party doctrine that does not necessarily incorporate all relevant issues on the political agenda. The trustee style would work better than the delegate style, because the latter style would be unsuccessful in capturing the votes of diverse voters.

Even if the analysis in this present PhD is on the collective level of parties and their voters, the findings give insights into what to expect on the individual level; what factors determine which style of representation individual candidates take on, and what affects congruence and political support of different groups of voters. Here, the difference in what voters expect of democracy should be taken into account as well as the institutional settings of political systems and make-up of political parties. To conclude, this present PhD project shows that characteristics of parties and party voters are important factors explaining the variety in nature of representation emphasised within parties, and that this variety explains differences in both objective and subjective outcome of representation.

Hereafter are the three papers in the following order: *‘Policy congruence and style of representation: Party voters and political parties’* (Önnudóttir 2014a), *‘Political parties and styles of representation’* (Önnudóttir 2014b) and *‘Styles of representation and voters’ evaluation of democratic performance: Parties and party voters’* (manuscript under review).



## Bibliography

---

- Aarts, K. and Thomassen, J. (2008). Satisfaction with democracy: Do institutions matter? *Electoral Studies*, 27(1), 5-18.
- Aldrich, J. H. (2011). *Why Parties?: A Second Look*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- American Political Science Association. (1950). Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties. *APSR*, 44(3).
- Andeweg, R. B. and Thomassen, J. (2005). Modes of political representation: Towards a new typology. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 30(4), 507-528.
- Andeweg, R. B. (2011). Approaching perfect policy congruence: Measurement, development and relevance for political representation. In Martin Rosema, Bas Denter and Kees Aarts, *How Democracy Works: Political Representation and Policy Congruence in Modern Societies*, pp. 39-52). Amsterdam: Pallas Publication.
- Andeweg, R. B. (2012). The consequences of representatives' role orientations: attitudes, behaviour, perceptions. In Magnus Blomgren and Olivier Rozenberg, *Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures*, pp. 66-84. Oxon: Routledge.
- Baviskar, S. and Malone, M. F. (2004). What democracy means to citizens - and why it matters. *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, 76(April), 3-23.
- Belchior, A. M. (2013). Explaining left-right party congruence across European party systems: A test of micro, meso and macro level models. *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(3), 352-386.
- Bengtsson, Å. and Wass, H. (2011). The representatives roles of MPs: A citizen perspective. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 34(2), 143-167.
- Best, H. and Vogel, L. (2012). The emergence and transformation of representative roles. In Magnus Blomgren and Olivier Rozenberg, *Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures*, pp. 37-65). Oxon: Routledge.
- Blomgren, M. and Rozenberg, O. (2012a). Introduction. In Magnus Blomgren and Olivier Rozenberg, *Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures*, pp. 1-7. Oxon: Routledge.
- Blomgren, M. and Rozenberg, O. (2012b). Legislative roles and legislative studies: The neo-institutional turning point? In Magnus Blomgren and Olivier Rozenberg, *Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures*, pp. 8-36. Oxon: Routledge.

- Castiglione, D. and Warren, M. E. (2006). Rethinking democratic representation: Eight theoretical issues. Paper presented at 'Rethinking Democratic Representation' at the Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions, University of British Columbia 18-19 May.
- Céka, B. and Magalhães, P. (Unpublished manuscript). The determinants of citizens' views of democracy. In Hans-Peter Kriesi and Monice Ferrín, *How European View and Evaluate Democracy?*
- Converse, P. E. and Pierce, R. (1986). *Political Representation in France*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University.
- Dalton, R. J. (1985). Political parties and political representation: Party supporters and party elites in nine nations. *Comparative Political Studies*, 18(3), 267-299.
- Dalton, R. J. (2008). *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, (5 ed.). Washington DC: CQ Press.
- Diamond, L. (1999). *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
- Eulau, H. and Karps, P. D. (1977). The puzzle of representation: Specifying the components of responsiveness. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 2(3), 233-254.
- Eulau, H., Wahlke, J. C., Buchanan, W. and Ferguson, L. C. (1959). The role of the representative: Some empirical observations on the theory of Edmund Burke. *The American Political Science Review*, 53(3), 742-756.
- Ezrow, L. (2010). *Linking Citizens and Parties*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fox, J. and Shotts, K. W. (2009). Delegates or trustees? A theory of political accountability. *The Journal of Politics*, 71(4), 1225-1237.
- Fuchs, D. (1999). The democratic culture of unified Germany. In Pippa Norris, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance* pp. 123-145. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gauja, A. (2012). Party dimensions of representation in Westminster parliaments: Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. In Magnus Blomgren and Olivier Rozenberg, *Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures*, pp. 121-144. Oxon: Routledge.
- Golder, M. and Stramski, J. (2010). Ideological congruence and electoral institutions. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(1), 90-106.

- Green, J. (2007). When voters and parties agree: Valence issues and party competition. *Political Studies*, 55, 629-655.
- Hellwig, T. (2008). Explaining the salience of left-right ideology in postindustrial democracies: The role of structural economic change. *European Journal of Political Research*, 47(6), 687-709.
- Holmberg, S. (1999). Down and down we go: Political trust in Sweden. In Pippa Norris, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, pp. 103). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Holmberg, S. (2011). Dynamic representation from above. In Martin Rosema, Bas Denters and Kees Aarts, *How Democracy Works: Political Representation and Policy Congruence in Modern Societies*, pp. 53-76). Amsterdam: Pallas Publications.
- Hooghe, L., Marks, G. and Wilson, C. J. (2002). Does left/right structure party positions on European integration? *Comparative Political Studies*, 35(8), 965-989.
- Inglehart, R. and Rabier, J.-R. (1986). Political realignment in advanced industrial society: From class-based politics to quality-of-life politics. *Government and Opposition*, 21(4), 456-479.
- Jagers, J. and Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46, 319-345.
- Kristinsson, G. H. (2011). Party cohesion in the Icelandic Althingi. *Stjórnmal og stjórnsýsla*, 7(2), 229-251.
- Kubbe, I. (2013). Corruption and trust: a model design. In Tobias Debiel and Andrea Gawrich, *(Dys-)Functionalities of Corruption: Comparative Perspectives and Methodological Pluralism*, pp. 117-136. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
- Lutz, G., Kissau, K. and Rosset, J. (2012). Policy congruence beyond left-right: Evidence from the Swiss 2007 election. Paper presented at the '2nd CCS Plenary Conference', University of Mannheim, Mannheim 27-29 January.
- Mair, P. (2006). *Polity-scepticism, party failings, and the challenge to European Democracy*. Wassenar: NIAS, Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences.

- Miller, W. E. and Stokes, D. E. (1963). Constituency influence in congress. *The American Political Science Review*, 57(1), 45-56.
- Mishler, W. and Rose, R. (2001). What are the origins of political trust?: Testing institutional and cultural theories in post-communist societies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 34(1), 30-62.
- Müller, W. C. (2000). Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work. *European Journal of Political Research*, 37(3), 309-33.
- Norris, P. (2011). Does democratic satisfaction reflect regime performance? In Martin Rosema, Bas Denters and Kees Aarts, *How Democracy Works: Political Representation and Policy Congruence in Modern Societies*, pp. 115-135). Amsterdam: Pallas Publications - Amsterdam University Press.
- Önnudóttir, E. H. (2014a). Policy congruence and style of representation: Party voters and political parties. *West European Politics*, 37(3), 538-563.
- Önnudóttir, E. H. (2014b). Political parties and styles of representation. *Party Politics*, published online before print December 8.
- Pitkin, H. (1967). *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley: University California Press.
- Powell, G. Bingham Jr. (2009). The Ideological Congruence Controversy: The Impact of Alternative Measures, Data, and Time Periods on the Effects of Election Rules. *Comparative Political Studies*, 42(12), 475-497.
- Rehfeld, A. (2009). Representation rethought: On trustees, delegates, and gyroscopes in the study of political representation and democracy. *The American Political Science Review*, 103(2), 214-230.
- Rohrschneider, R. and Whitefield, S. (2012). *The Strain of Representation: How Parties Represent Diverse Voters in Western and Eastern Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rozenberg, O. and Blomgren, M. (2012). Bringing parliamentary roles back in. In Magnus Blomgren and Olivier Rozenberg, *Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures*, pp. 211-230. Oxon: Routledge.
- Rydgren, J. (2005). Is extreme right-wing populism contagious?: Explaining the emergence of a new party family. *European Journal of Political Research*, 44(3-4), 413-437.

- Schmitt, H. (2007). Determinants of dyadic correspondence in European Parliament Elections. Paper presented at the 'Fourth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics', at the University of Latvia, Riga, 25-27 September.
- Schmitt, H and Thomassen, J. (2000). Dynamic representation: The case of European integration. *European Union Politics*, 1(3), 318-339.
- Stokemer, D. and Sundstrøm, A. (2013). Corruption and citizens' satisfaction with democracy in Europe: what is the empirical linkage? In Tobias Debiel Andrea Gawrich, (*Dys-)Functionalities of Corruption: Comparative Perspectives and Methodological Pluralism*, pp. 137-158. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
- Strøm, K. (2012). Roles as strategies: Towards a logic of legislative behavior. In Magnus Blomgren and Olivier Rozenberg, *Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures*, pp. 85-100. Oxon: Routledge.
- Thomassen, J. (1994). Empirical research into representation: Failing democracy or failing models. In M. Kent Jennings and Thomas E. Mann, *Elections at Home and Abroad: Essays in honor of Warren E. Miller*, pp. 237-264. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
- Valen, H. and Narud, H. M. (2007). The conditional party mandate: A model for the study of mass and elite opinion patterns. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46(3), 296-316.
- Van der Brug, W. (2003). How LPF fuelled discontent: Empirical tests of explanations of LPF support. *Acta Politica*, 38(1), 89-106.
- Van der Eijk, C. (2001). Measuring agreement in ordered rating scales. *Quality and Quantity*, 35(3), 325-41.
- Van der Eijk, C. and Schmitt, H. (2010). Party manifestos as a basis of citizens' left-right perceptions: A study across 10 European countries. Paper presented the 'Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association', Washington DC, 2-5 September.
- Wahlke, J. C., Eulau, H., Buchanan, W. and Ferguson, L. C. (1962). *The legislative system: Explorations in legislative behavior*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Wessels, B. and Giebler, H. (2011). Choosing a style of representation: The role of institutional and organizational incentives. Paper presented at the '6th ECPR General Conference', at the University of Iceland, Reykjavik, 25-27 August.

Zittel, T. (2012). Legislators and their representational roles. In Magnus Blomgren and Olivier Rozenberg, *Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures*, pp. 101-120. Oxon: Routledge.

# Party Politics

<http://ppq.sagepub.com/>

---

## Political parties and styles of representation

Eva H Önnudóttir

*Party Politics* published online 8 December 2014

DOI: 10.1177/1354068814560934

The online version of this article can be found at:

<http://ppq.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/12/05/1354068814560934>

---

Published by:



<http://www.sagepublications.com>

On behalf of:

Political Organizations and Parties Section of the American Political Science Association

**Additional services and information for *Party Politics* can be found at:**

**Email Alerts:** <http://ppq.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts>

**Subscriptions:** <http://ppq.sagepub.com/subscriptions>

**Reprints:** <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav>

**Permissions:** <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav>

>> [OnlineFirst Version of Record](#) - Dec 8, 2014

[What is This?](#)

# Political parties and styles of representation

Eva H Önnudóttir

University of Mannheim, Germany

Party Politics

1–16

© The Author(s) 2014

Reprints and permission:

sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav

DOI: 10.1177/1354068814560934

ppq.sagepub.com



## Abstract

This paper focuses on how characteristics of parties and party voters explain the styles of representation emphasised within parties. Styles of representation are defined at the party level as the proportion of representatives within parties who are partisans, delegates or trustees. Each style manifests due to different incentives related to the characteristics of their party and/or their party voters. The findings show that the main explanatory factors for the proportion of partisans are parties' leadership control over nomination and party socialisation. The main determinant for the proportion of trustees is how often parties have been represented in government. For delegates the results are mixed, but it is indicated that a high proportion of party identifiers among party voters is related to a high proportion of delegates within parties.

## Keywords

candidates, empirical research, political parties, representative democracy, styles of representation

## Introduction

In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in studying politicians' styles of representation and legislative roles (e.g. Blomgren and Rozenberg, 2012b). There is a growing consensus that the Responsible Party Model (American Political Science Association, 1950) (RPM) that has heavily influenced studies of representation is too simplistic (e.g. Bengtsson and Wass, 2011; Valen and Narud, 2007; Wessels and Giebler, 2011). One of the requirements of the RPM to be effective is that representatives should follow their party's policies; that is to say, they should ideally all be partisans for representation to work. This contradicts the classic notion originally used to explain representation in the US that divides representatives into either trustees or delegates, where trustees use their own judgment to make decisions while delegates supposedly follow voters' opinion regardless of their own stand on particular issues (e.g. Eulau et al., 1959). Examining representation in France, Converse and Pierce (1986) show that the partisan style together with the trustee and delegate styles are closer to capturing the practice of political representation. Rozenberg and Blomgren (2012) argue that this same threefold classification is linked to both a normative and a philosophical debate on representation, with the major question being how elected representatives should make decisions in modern democracies. These three different roles reflect

the different sources representatives use, or claim to use, to make decisions in their work as representatives – specifically when there are conflicting opinions.

The core of political representation is that there is a political relation between representatives and those they represent (Castiglione and Warren, 2006). Political representation is socially constructed, and it is important to understand the context within which it emerges and operates. In the early days of democracy, the concept of political representation was attributed to legislatures as a whole and only later did it become a feature of individual representatives and parties (Pitkin, 1967, in Castiglione and Warren, 2006). This shows that representation was first, and still is, a collective (e.g. a legislature or a party) representing a collective (e.g. the nation or party voters). The representation of those collectives is carried out by individuals operating within parties, and the electorate votes for those parties. This indicates that it is meaningful to analyse styles of representation at the party level, and how parties

Paper submitted 16 February 2014; accepted for publication 26 October 2014

## Corresponding author:

Eva H Önnudóttir, University of Mannheim, Schloss, 68131 Mannheim, Germany.

Email: [eva.onnudottir@gess.uni-mannheim.de](mailto:eva.onnudottir@gess.uni-mannheim.de)



differ in the emphasis of their representatives (those who constitute a collective) on different styles of representation. In this paper, styles of representation are divided into the proportions of representatives within each party who are trustees, partisans or delegates. The four main explanatory factors for which style is prevalent within parties are: the proportion of candidates who are nominated by the leadership of their respective parties; the proportion of representatives who have a background as locally and/or regionally elected representatives; how often parties have been represented in government; and the proportion of party identifiers among their voters. In this paper, I use the term 'representatives' interchangeably with 'candidates', referring to both actual and potential representatives for their respective parties.

## Styles of representation

Eulau et al. (1959) make the distinction between the focus and style of representation. Focus refers to the group represented, such as constituency voters, party voters or the nation as a whole, and style refers to the manner in which representatives approach their role, traditionally classified into trustees and delegates. In practice, the focus and those two styles are closely related since trustees are more prone to consider themselves to represent the nation as a whole and delegates to focus on specific group(s) (e.g. Bengtsson and Wass, 2011; Wessels and Giebler, 2011).

Due to the seemingly limited impact of styles of representation on the behaviour of individual representatives, studies on those and other role orientations became less popular in the 1980s but are now appearing again on the academic agenda (e.g. Bengtsson and Wass, 2011; Blomgren and Rozenberg, 2012a; Wessels and Giebler, 2011). It is apparent from both the early and recent literature that there is little consensus about how to define representatives' role-orientation, what terms to use, what best explains them and their consequences. Many authors have proposed other terms and definitions than the trustee, delegate and partisan style, such as purposive roles (Wahlke et al., 1962), position and preference roles (Searing, 1994), and policy representation and interest representation (Thomassen and Esaiasson, 2006). Rozenberg and Blomgren's (2012) distinction between legislative and representation roles clarifies the subject; legislative roles are concerned with how representatives organize their work in the legislative, while representational roles are about how to represent as the trustee, delegate and partisan styles reflect.

Another important distinction exists between the output and input of styles of representation; the former about the consequences of different styles and the latter referring to what explains them. Only if styles of representation explain a difference in their output is it meaningful to study what explains their input. While the analysis in this paper

concerns the input, I first discuss research about the consequences of different styles of representation in order to establish the importance of examining what explains them.

## *The output of styles of representation*

Most studies on the output of representation focus on whether different styles of representations have different behavioural or attitudinal consequences at the individual level (e.g. Andeweg, 2012; Gauja, 2013). It is generally not presumed that if there are behavioural consequences the same or similar behaviour can be expected under all circumstances (e.g. Andeweg, 1997). There are numerous other factors that could potentially explain how decisions are made such as party discipline (Kristinsson, 2011) and the limited number of issues on which representatives can be experts (Andeweg, 2012). Even if role orientation lacks explanatory power when studying legislative behaviour, commonly operationalised as representatives roll-call vote (e.g. Converse and Pierce, 1986; Kuklinski and Elling, 1977), it could very well explain other behaviours of MPs such as how they approach their work in parliamentary committees and, as pointed out by Andeweg (2012), their interaction and attitudes towards voters.

Using the terms trustees and delegates, adding the role of politicians, which is between the trustee and the delegate role (sometimes follow voters and sometimes use own judgment), Andeweg (2012) finds that delegates in the Netherlands are in less contact with voters and are more cynical about them. These findings are contrary to what might be expected, if it is to be assumed that delegates should have a more favourable view of voters compared to trustees and politicians. However, Andeweg's findings do show that there is systematic difference related to how representatives think about their role, even if it is contrary to what is expected. In the same study, Andeweg shows that representatives that emphasise that the policy preferences of voters should be incorporated into their party's policy (bottom-up representation) are in more contact with voters while representatives who favour elite-driven party politics (top-down representation) have more frequent contact with ministers and officials to discuss the problems of individual citizens.

Önnudóttir (2014) establishes that styles of representation do explain policy congruence as the outcome of representation between parties and their voters. She shows that parties with a high number of partisans have lower policy congruence with party voters compared to parties with a high number of trustees who have higher policy congruence with their voters. Her findings repudiate the RPM, which assumes that adhering to the prevailing party policy is the optimal way for representatives to represent the voters of their party; who should have voted for the party that is closest to their own policy preferences. These findings do call for an explanation of why parties differ in their

emphasis on styles of representation, which is the subject of this paper.

### *The input of styles of representation*

An important feature of the trustee, partisan and delegate styles is that those are about how representatives think about their representational role and what source(s) they use, or claim to use, when making decisions. Under the trustee style, the source for decision making is the representative themselves, under the partisan style it is the party policy and under the delegate style the source is the voters. Considering this main difference, it is reasonable to hypothesise that there are different factors linked to each source that encourage different styles within parties. When the source for decision making is the party, as in the partisan style, characteristics of that source should explain whether the partisan style is prevailing within parties. The very same goes for the promotion of the delegate style; in that case, the characteristics of the voters of each party (party voters) may explain a high or a low proportion of delegates within parties. When those factors are absent, parties have more flexibility to promote the trustee style which is the only one where the source for decision making is not a collective. However, as elaborated on below, I argue that parties' representation in government promotes the trustee style within parties along with the absence of the abovementioned factors.

The effect of the institutional setting of the political and electoral system on political representation has received considerable attention (e.g. Golder and Stramski, 2010; Wessels, 1999; Wessels and Giebler, 2011). Those studies that focus exclusively on representatives' role-orientation commonly include one country or a handful of countries (e.g. Costa et al., 2012; Ilonski, 2012; Saalfeld, 2007). The low number of countries means that the effect of the political and electoral system can only be speculated on. To this there are a few exceptions. Wessels (1999) finds that the smaller the district magnitude the more both European and national MPs focus on their constituency. Farrell and Scully (2010) show that as electoral systems become more open, with greater flexibility for voters to indicate a preference for certain candidates, the more prone elected representatives in the European Parliament (EP) are to focus on their constituency. More recently, Wessels and Giebler (2011) find that the higher the chance candidates for the EP consider themselves to have of getting elected the less likely they are to be partisans, indicating that the more secure the candidates' election is, the less of a stronghold their parties hold over them.

The main question in this paper is whether there is a difference in the emphasis of styles of representation on the level of parties and party voters. As such, my approach differs from many earlier studies where the focus is on individual representatives or candidates operating within

different parties and under different electoral settings. My argument is that representation is, at its core, about a collective representing a collective. Thus it is meaningful to analyse whether and how different styles of representation are promoted on the level of those collectives. Due to the past focus in the literature on what explains individuals' role-orientation and the fact that political parties are collectives made up of individuals, my hypotheses are formulated based on expectations about how different political context affects representatives within parties, but focusing on the party level.

Strøm (2012) casts styles of representation as strategies representatives use to attain their political goals, whether that is for example (re-)selection on the party list or (re-)election. These strategies are conditioned by contextual factors such as the electoral system and the parties' characteristics. One obvious contextual factor is the control the party leaderships' have over the nomination of candidates. The greater their control the more likely it would be for representatives within those parties to adopt the partisan style because it increases their chances of advancement for and within the party, or:

H1: The higher the proportion of party candidates who are nominated by the parties' leaderships, the higher the proportion of partisans within parties.

Zittel (2012) explains styles and focus of representation in Germany with the main contextual factors as party competition, party socialisation and the mode of the election (elected via party list or in a single seat district). He finds that representatives who consider themselves to have a fair chance of winning and are elected in single member districts are more inclined to consider themselves to represent their district and those who consider it unlikely to win are more likely to be partisans. Zittel operationalises party socialisation on the individual level as years of party membership, party employment in years and for how many years representatives have held a local or regional party office. He finds no support for the effect of party socialisation through these measurements, but finds that younger representatives lean more towards the partisan role, perhaps signalling increasing professionalisation of politics, with young politicians subscribing to the partisan role as the best strategic choice for them to advance their careers.

Years of party membership or holding a party office are not the only means to enhance a political career. Parties' socialisation effect might manifest itself through the support needed when competing for public office at the lower levels of the political system, i.e. the local and/or regional level. Political careers in public office generally take off at those lower levels. It is thus rational for representatives on those levels to gain and maintain the support of party elites within their districts to enhance their political career (Zittel, 2012). For this reason, I argue and test whether the effect of

parties' socialisation on the partisan style manifests itself through a high number of representatives who have been elected on the local and/or regional level:

H2: The higher the proportion of party candidates who have been elected on the local/and or regional level, the higher the proportion of partisans within parties.

Strøm (2012) argues that the more a representative is dependent on his constituents for (re)-election the more likely s/he is to adopt a role that conforms to the expectations of her/his constituents. Which style s/he would adapt to under those circumstances depends on features of the electoral system and party competition. In addition, it could also depend on the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the constituents. The more heterogeneous the policy preferences of the constituents, the harder it is to advocate the delegate style because the constituency is highly diverse. Thus when faced with a group of homogenous voters, the delegate style is more easily advocated as it does not run the danger of alienating a group of voters who have different preferences.

Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012) make the point that parties today are faced with the challenge of competing for and representing two diverse but roughly equally sized groups of voters, independent voters and voters who hold a partisan attachment. This they call the 'strain of representation'. They find that party identifiers are closer to their party on an ideological left-right space and more polarised in their issue positions compared to independent voters. Given that party identifiers are more likely to agree with the issue positions of their party and to take cues from their party for evaluating policy issues (e.g. Dalton, 2008), it can be reasoned that those parties who have a high number of party identifiers among their constituents can more easily promote the delegate style. I do recognise the tentative character of my argument and would like to highlight that my hypothesis below (H3) is explorative:

H3: The higher the proportion of party voters who identify with a party, the higher the proportion of delegates within parties.

Rehfeld (2009) argues that historically the trustee style has three components: aim of decision making; source for decision making; and responsiveness to sanctions, most obviously electoral sanctions. Trustees aim for the greater good in their work, use their own judgement as a source and are less responsive to sanctions compared to delegates, and instead act on some form of civic virtue. If it is true that trustees aim for the greater good, it is plausible to argue that those parties who have a greater experience in working for the greater good promote the trustee style. Parties who are frequently represented in government where they have to implement collectively binding decisions might be more

used to justifying their decisions as being for the greater good. Parties' representation in government can thus encourage a nation-wide focus of representation, a focus that is inherent in the trustee style.

A different but related argument is that government-seeking parties aim to secure enough votes to make them viable candidates for government. For that, they both have to secure the votes of their own partisan voters (party identifiers) and of independent voters. Thus it could be strategically prudent for those parties to downplay the partisan style in order not to alienate independent voters and downplay the delegate style because they want to secure the votes of both groups. Instead, it is strategically advantageous to promote the trustee style to signal that the party and its representatives are competent enough to make informed decisions based on their own judgement, representing both partisan and independent voters. This is not meant to predict how elected representatives will behave once their party is in government. There are many reasons to believe that individual representatives of government parties will stick to their party's positions in their work as legislators, whether that be factors such as the importance of securing their government's majority in parliament (Kristinsson, 2011) or aspirations to hold onto an executive position (Müller, 2000). It is also worth noting that in this paper I make use of candidate data for measures on styles of representation and not only elected representatives, who might reply differently. Instead of limiting my analysis to elected representatives, it is justifiable to incorporate all candidates based on the idea that if parties do systematically promote certain styles of representation that should be found among all candidates including the elected ones.

Whether it is a socialisation effect as a consequence of parties' representation in government or strategically wise for parties to emphasise the trustee style in order to maximise their electoral success is an open question. However, it can be tested whether those two constructs, government-seeking parties and the proportion of trustees within parties, go together:

H4: The more often parties have been represented in government the higher the proportion of trustees within parties.

## Research design

### *Data and selection of countries*

Data on styles of representation, the proportion of candidates nominated by parties' leaderships and the proportion who have backgrounds as elected representatives on the regional/local level comes from the Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS; [www.comparativecandidates.org](http://www.comparativecandidates.org)). The countries and national elections in the CCS data that include the variables of interest are the following 10: Belgium 2007, Estonia 2011, Germany 2009, Greece 2007,

Hungary 2010, Iceland 2009, Ireland 2007, Netherlands 2006, Portugal 2009 and Sweden 2010, covering a total of 62 parties. In countries where legislatures are bicameral, only representatives running for the lower house are included in the CCS and the research is therefore limited to those.<sup>1</sup>

Information about parties' representation in government comes from the Parliament and Government Composition Database (ParlGov; [www.parlgov.org](http://www.parlgov.org)). Four data sources are used for the proportion of party identifiers for each party: the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES; <http://cses.org/datacenter/module3/module3.htm>), the European Social Survey (ESS; [www.europeansocialsurvey.org](http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org)), European Election Studies (EES; [www.ees-homepage.net](http://www.ees-homepage.net)) and the Irish National Election Study (INES; [www.tcd.ie/ines](http://www.tcd.ie/ines)).<sup>2</sup>

### *Response variables: Styles of representation*

In the CCS data there are three items that reflect representatives' styles of representation. Those three are questions about how an MP should vote in parliament if there are different opinions between:

1. The party position and his/her party voters' opinion.
2. The constituency voters' opinion and the MP's opinion.
3. The party position and the MP's opinion.

'Constituency voters' and 'his/her party voters' are both referred to as voters in this paper.<sup>3</sup> To classify representatives' style of representation, I use two out of the three questions for each style. Those who say that the MP should vote according to the party when contrasted with own opinion and voters in items 1 and 3 are partisans, those say that the MP should follow the voters' view in items 1 and 2 are delegates and those who name the MP in items 2 and 3 are trustees. The representatives who cannot be categorised according to this rule are coded as 'non-classifiable'.

Table 1 lists the proportion of representatives classified under each style for the 62 parties. It is notable that in 55 of the parties less than 15% of the candidates are non-classifiable and in 57 of them less than 20% are. The low proportion of non-classifiable candidates indicates that there is a systematic component in their replies that can be used to categorise them as partisans, delegates or trustees. At the bottom of the table, a comparison between Eastern and Western Europe is shown, as well as the total proportions for each style; firstly for the pooled un-weighted data, secondly weighted by country and thirdly by party. In the analysis, representatives' replies are not weighted since the unit of analysis is at the party level.

Even if the focus in this paper is on party and party voters' attributes, it cannot be ignored that there seems to be a partial difference in main emphasis on styles between

countries. The strong emphasis on the trustee style in Iceland and Germany and on the partisan style in Ireland might be due to the decentralisation of candidate selection in the two former countries (e.g. Rahat, 2007) and the strong party discipline in Irish politics (Marsh, 2000). The trustee style is more common in the two Eastern European countries compared to the West. However, in Hungary the delegate role is the one emphasised by most candidates in three out of four parties, most notably by 73.6% of candidates of Jobbik, a right-wing populist party. Analysing differences between countries is beyond the scope of this paper but is a clear avenue for future research.

For party measures on styles of representation, I use the proportion of representatives within parties who are either: 1) partisans, 2) delegates or 3) trustees. Representatives that are non-classifiable are included in the calculation for the proportion of each style within parties, but not analysed any further. An example of party measures for the Socialist Party in Belgium is 37.2 for the proportion of partisans, 14.0 for the proportion of delegates and 34.9 for the proportion of trustees.

### *Explanatory variables: Parties and party voters*

The control of party leadership over who is nominated is operationalised as the proportion of candidates of a given party who are nominated by their party's leadership using the CCS data and party socialisation from the same data is the proportion of the parties' candidates who have been elected for local and/or regional office (parliament and/or government). Data from ParlGov is used to construct a measure on parties' representation in government. This measure is the proportion of days the parties have been represented in government in the past four electoral terms preceding the election under study in each country. Information about the proportion of party identifiers among the voters of each party is from the third wave of the CSES for Estonia, Iceland, Germany, Netherlands and Portugal; from the EES 2009 for Belgium and Greece; from the ESS 2010 for Hungary and Sweden; and from the INES 2007 for Ireland. For this measure, I use the proportion of party identifiers among voters (based on vote-recall) for each party.

### *Control variables*

Previous research has established that representatives of traditional left-wing parties are more likely to emphasise the partisan style and that representatives of parties from the centre to right are more likely to emphasise the trustee style (e.g. Damgaard, 1997; Gauja, 2013). To control for those possible effects, I include two dummies indicating whether the parties are social democratic/communist/left parties capturing the traditional left or conservative/Christian democratic parties who are usually placed from centre to right. The party codes are retrieved from the

**Table 1.** Proportion of partisans, delegates, trustees and non-classifiable within parties.

	Partisans	Delegates	Trustees	Non-classifiable	N
<b>Belgium</b>					
Socialist Party	37.2%	14.0%	34.9%	14.0%	43
Reformist Movement	28.3%	13.0%	32.6%	26.1%	46
Humanist Democratic Center	44.4%	8.3%	33.3%	13.9%	36
Ecolo	47.7%	2.3%	27.3%	22.7%	44
National Front	25.0%	50.0%	20.8%	4.2%	24
Christian Democratic and Flemish	41.7%	14.6%	33.3%	10.4%	48
New-Flemish Alliance	21.4%	35.7%	35.7%	7.1%	14
Socialist Party. Different	57.1%	14.3%	28.6%	0.0%	35
Spirit	62.5%	12.5%	25.0%	0.0%	8
Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats	30.0%	30.0%	30.0%	10.0%	50
Flemish Interest	41.2%	20.6%	29.4%	8.8%	34
Green!	32.1%	12.5%	48.2%	7.1%	56
List-Dedecker	7.5%	52.5%	30.0%	10.0%	40
<b>Estonia</b>					
Estonian Center Party	33.3%	11.1%	44.4%	11.1%	9
Estonian Reform Party	32.4%	24.3%	32.4%	10.8%	37
Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica	25.0%	20.0%	45.0%	10.0%	40
Social Democratic Party	14.3%	26.5%	49.0%	10.2%	49
<b>Germany</b>					
Social Democratic Party	19.9%	9.3%	56.3%	14.6%	151
Christian Democratic Union	11.5%	9.4%	72.7%	6.5%	139
Christian Social Union	0.0%	4.2%	87.5%	8.3%	24
Free Democratic Party	6.3%	5.6%	77.6%	10.5%	143
Alliance 90 / Greens	4.6%	7.9%	79.5%	7.9%	151
Left Party	13.1%	23.4%	51.8%	11.7%	137
<b>Greece</b>					
New Democracy	47.4%	20.5%	23.1%	9.0%	78
Panhellenic Socialist Movement	27.1%	24.3%	40.2%	8.4%	107
<b>Hungary</b>					
Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance	27.2%	40.8%	14.3%	17.7%	147
Hungarian Socialist Party	46.2%	26.9%	15.4%	11.5%	52
Jobbik	9.1%	73.6%	14.5%	2.7%	110
Politics Can be Different	7.5%	41.8%	38.8%	11.9%	67
<b>Iceland</b>					
Social Democratic Alliance	10.8%	16.2%	58.1%	14.9%	74
Progressive Party	16.9%	7.7%	61.5%	13.8%	65
Independence Party	8.9%	7.1%	73.2%	10.7%	56
Left Green Movement	13.2%	17.6%	52.9%	16.2%	68
Civic Movement	6.3%	25.4%	63.5%	4.8%	63
<b>Ireland</b>					
Fianna Fáil	57.1%	7.1%	14.3%	21.4%	42
Fine Gael	44.4%	8.3%	30.6%	16.7%	36
Labour	47.1%	23.5%	17.6%	11.8%	17
Green Party	53.6%	14.3%	28.6%	3.6%	28
Progressive Democrats	44.4%	11.1%	11.1%	33.3%	9
Sinn Féin	66.7%	16.7%	0.0%	16.7%	12
<b>Netherlands</b>					
Christian Democratic Appeal	56.7%	0.0%	30.0%	13.3%	30
Labour Party	33.3%	9.5%	47.6%	9.5%	21
Peoples Party for Freedom and Democracy	30.8%	15.4%	46.2%	7.7%	26
Green Left	27.3%	0.0%	72.7%	0.0%	11
Socialist Party	64.0%	0.0%	28.0%	8.0%	25
Democrats 66	22.2%	0.0%	72.2%	5.6%	18
Christian Union	55.6%	0.0%	33.3%	11.1%	9
Political Reformed Party	63.6%	9.1%	27.3%	0.0%	11
Party for the Animals	36.4%	9.1%	27.3%	27.3%	11

(continued)



**Table 1.** (continued)

	Partisans	Delegates	Trustees	Non-classifiable	N
Portugal					
Left Bloc	12.2%	39.0%	39.0%	9.8%	41
People's Party	18.5%	37.0%	33.3%	11.1%	54
Democratic Unity Coalition	52.0%	28.0%	20.0%	0.0%	25
Social Democratic Party	26.5%	22.4%	42.9%	8.2%	49
Socialist	24.0%	16.0%	52.0%	8.0%	25
Sweden					
Center Party	38.8%	16.3%	37.8%	7.1%	196
Liberal Party	26.5%	21.8%	38.8%	12.9%	147
Christian Democrats	36.5%	15.1%	38.5%	9.9%	192
Green Party	21.8%	27.4%	42.1%	8.6%	197
Moderate party	46.9%	17.6%	24.6%	10.9%	256
Social Democrats	53.1%	12.5%	24.6%	9.8%	256
Sweden Democrats	60.0%	12.0%	24.0%	4.0%	25
Left Party	39.0%	16.6%	34.2%	10.2%	187
Comparison between Eastern and Western Europe, weighted by country*					
East (Estonia and Hungary)	22.4%	31.2%	35.5%	10.9%	
West (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden)	32.0%	40.6%	16.5%	10.8%	
Total	29.3%	19.6%	40.6%	10.5%	4200
Weighted by country*	30.0%	20.6%	38.6%	10.8%	
Weighted by party**	32.7%	18.5%	38.2%	10.6%	

Note: Entries are proportion of candidates assigned to each style of representation. \*In the country weight respondents in each country have equal weight (for example respondents' replies in Estonia 2011 have the same weight as respondents' replies in Ireland 2007). \*\*In the party weight respondents in each party have equal weight (for example respondents' replies for the Social Democratic Party in Germany 2009 have the same weight as respondents' replies for the Left Green Movement in Iceland 2009). Country and party weights are calculated based on the total number of replies to questions on style divided by the number of countries or number of parties in each scenario.

Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP; <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu>).

Earlier research has also shown that candidate-centred politics as opposed to party-centred politics encourage representatives to focus more on their constituency (e.g. Farrell and Scully, 2010; Norris, 2002). This is quite often operationalised as a distinction between the different ballot structures, contrasting an open ballot structure with a closed one. Under a closed ballot structure, voters can only vote one party ticket and that has been shown to provide incentives for parties to promote the partisan style (Norris, 2002). In open ballot structures, voters can either vote directly for a certain candidate or have the opportunity to rank or indicate their preferred candidate, resulting in a greater focus on their constituency (Farrell and Scully, 2010; Norris, 2002). As such, I include ballot structure as a control measure in my models contrasting Iceland and Portugal, which use a party ballot, with the remaining eight countries that make use of various versions of ballots where a candidate preference can be or is expressed.<sup>4</sup> However it is noted that the number of countries in this study is too low to any draw firm conclusions about the effect of the electoral system on styles of representation.

The last control variable introduced here is a dummy for Estonia and Hungary as former members of the Eastern

European communist regime. The modern party systems in these countries are younger compared to the other countries included in this study, and it is still a matter of debate whether they have stabilised (e.g. Birch, 2001; Dahmann, 2005; Enyedi, 2006; Róbert and Papp, 2012). For that reason, it is possible that the party indicators used in this study have a different impact on styles of representation in Estonia and Hungary compared to other countries included here. A table with an overview of all variables used in this study can be found in Appendix I.

## Data analysis

In order to examine how the parties' leaderships' control over nomination, party socialisation, how often the parties have been represented in government and the proportion of party voters who identify with the party, explains styles of representation, I use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions. The response variables are the proportion of representatives within parties who are trustees, partisans or delegates. The three proportions for style of representation are not independent of each other; a higher proportion in one style group is followed by lower proportions in the other two groups. For that reason, I run separate regressions

for each of the three style groups. The regressions are done stepwise adding in the first four steps one explanatory variable at a time. In the fifth step I add the control variables for the type of parties and the ballot structure, and in the sixth I control for the Eastern European countries. For each style, I first enter the variables that relate directly to the subject of my hypotheses, and my discussion focuses on significant parameters. The parties included are not chosen randomly and for that reason the significance levels are only meaningful as indicators about the strength of the relationship between the explanatory variables and the response variables among the 62 parties included.

My first hypothesis (H1), that the higher the proportion of candidates who are nominated by the parties' leadership the higher the proportion of partisans, is supported in the full model (Table 2). It is notable that the effect of party leadership control over nomination is positive for both the proportion of partisans and delegates once all explanatory variables have been entered into the calculation, while it is negative for the proportion of trustees. The relationship between party socialisation and the proportion of partisans is as expected (H2); the higher the proportion of representatives who have a background in local and/or regional politics, the higher the proportion of partisans. Examining this for the other two style groups, the direction is the opposite, but non-significant in the case of the trustee style.

The third hypothesis (H3), that the higher the proportion of party identifiers among party voters, the higher the proportion of delegates, is supported in the full model, but the relation is not very strong. The fourth and final hypothesis (H4) is supported in the full model; the more often a party has been represented in government, the higher the proportion of trustees within parties. Representation in government has an opposite effect on the proportion of delegates; the more often parties have been represented in government the lower the proportion of delegates.


Looking at the other control variables, types of parties and party ballot structure, the type of parties as operationalised here do not have an impact on the proportions of any of the three styles of representation, but the party ballot structure is negatively related with the proportion of partisans. This is contrary to the expectation that a party ballot structure promotes the partisan style. Due to the low number of countries in my models, it is meaningless to draw any firm conclusions here about the effect of the party ballot structure on the partisan style. The control variable for Hungary and Estonia is statistically significant in the delegate model, indicating that parties in at least one of those countries are more likely to contain a high proportion of delegates.

In Figures 1 to 4, I examine graphically the relation between the main explanatory variables with each of the relevant predicted values (unstandardised) for styles of representation calculated from the final models (step 6) in Table 2. This I do both for the total number of parties and

for each country. Figure 1 plots the proportions of candidates who were nominated by the parties' leaderships against the predicted values for the partisan style. The positive but modest relation ( $R^2 = 0.12$ ) for the total number of parties is mainly driven by parties from Belgium, Greece, Iceland and Portugal. Only in two out of those four, Belgium and Portugal, does the proportion for candidates who are nominated by their parties' leadership vary – while in the other two it does not. In five of the countries the parties' leaderships do exercise very little or almost no control over nomination in all or almost all parties (Estonia, Germany, Iceland, Ireland and Sweden) indicating that for parties in those countries there are other factors that explain the partisan style. Parties' socialisation effect has a much stronger relation to the proportion of partisans (Figure 2) compared to parties' leaderships control over nomination. The proportions of candidates who have backgrounds as local and/or regional representatives have a positive relation with predicted values for the partisan style in all countries except Estonia and a strong positive relation among the total number of parties ( $R^2 = 0.47$ ). This effect is weak in Greece, a country that together with Estonia makes use of a strong preferential vote and that could possibly explain the negligent effect found in those two countries. It could be that under a candidate centred ballot structure, candidates are prone to downplay the partisan style in order to distinguish themselves from their competitors. However, the overall positive trends give ground to the claim that this effect is independent of other factors such as the electoral system or different types of parties.

When plotting the proportions of party identifiers against the predicted values for the delegate style, the results for each country are mixed, and the explained variance among the total number of parties is almost non-existent ( $R^2 = 0.04$ ) (Figure 3). Only Belgium and Estonia show a positive trend, while in the other countries it is either negative or there is no trend. This indicates that party identification is neither a strong mover of the delegate style nor a universal trend. Going back to the regression model in Table 2, this does not come as a surprise as the proportion of party identifiers in the parties' electorates has a weak relation with the proportion of delegates within parties.

The proportions of parties' representation in government have a positive relation with the predicted values for the trustee style in all 10 countries, and a modest positive trend among the total number of parties ( $R^2 = 0.12$ ) (Figure 4). This gives reason to believe that the effect of parties' representation in government on whether the trustee style is emphasised within parties is independent of other factors of the political system. It can also be gleaned from Figure 4 that among those parties who have never been represented in government there is a high variance in their predicted values for the trustee style and this deflates the explained variance among the total number of parties. This shows that parties' representation in government is clearly



**Figure 1.** Predicted values for the partisan style and parties' leaderships' control over nomination.

not the only factor that encourages the trustee style, but it is indeed important.

## Discussion


In this paper, I have established that the context of political parties, and to some extent the attributes of party voters, does indeed matter for the styles of representation emphasised within parties. I show that there are partly different incentives for the emphasis within parties on each of the three styles – partisans, delegates and trustees. The wider control parties' leaderships have over nomination and the greater the party socialisation, the more the partisan style is promoted in parties, with party socialisation weighing more heavily than party leadership control over nomination. This means that the success of the highly debated model for representation, the Responsible Party Model, depends on the parties' control over their candidates' career paths.

A high proportion of party identifiers in the parties' electorates is modestly but positively correlated to the proportion of delegates within parties. This could be so because party identifiers of a given party are more homogeneous and in greater agreement with the parties' policies compared to independent voters. In those cases, parties could promote the delegate style because it is 'easier' to advocate the idea that the party voters' opinions should


prevail when party voters are homogeneous. This may even apply more to parties who run on a single-issue platform or a populist right-wing platform. In the case of single-issue parties the 'will of the voters' is more clearly signalled compared to in parties who run on a wider platform. Populist parties might be more prone to emphasise the delegate style because the message of that style, that decisions should be based on the 'will of voters,' fits the populist platform; referring to the will of the people and justifying their actions by appealing to and identifying with the people (e.g. Jagers and Walgrave, 2007).

The trustee style is more common among government-seeking parties. This may be because representatives of those parties have been socialised into the trustee style as through their work they should aim for the greater good. It is also possible that government-seeking parties promote the trustee style as a response to the 'strain of representation' outlined by Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012). Parties that are faced with the challenge of representing both independent voters and those who identify with the party might be more prone to emphasise the trustee style as a strategy to maximise their electoral success. On a related note, party leadership control over nomination reduces the likelihood of the trustee style. It can be argued that a decentralised nomination process, where candidates' nominations are dependent on selectors other than their parties' leaderships, not only creates greater flexibility to






**Figure 2.** Predicted values for the partisan style and party socialisation.



**Figure 3.** Predicted values for the delegate style and the proportion of party identifiers in the parties' electorates.



**Figure 4.** Predicted values for trustee style and the proportion of parties' representation in government.

adopt the trustee style but also encourages it. Under such a process, a strategic way for competitors to secure their nomination is to signal that they are more competent than their competitors to represent their party and can be trusted to make informed decisions and are thus socialised into the trustee style. This could of course depend on the electoral system, with candidate-centred systems more likely to encourage the trustee style.

It is clear from my results that the way representatives of different parties think about how MPs should treat their mandate is related to and conditioned by their parties' attributes and to some extent the attributes of their voters. My results have several implications for the understanding of how representation works in modern democracies. Considering that parties offer different policies and that voters have heterogeneous policy preferences, I have shown that it is reasonable to frame the representational link as the link between parties and their voters. What criterion parties' representatives claim to use to make decisions once in office revolves around their understanding of how they should treat their mandate; whether they are elected to carry out their party's policy, follow the will of their voters or use their own judgement when making decisions. There is, however, more to this story. Given that a politician's ultimate goal is either to be a representative or to contribute to their

party's electoral success, specific contextual factors that condition their or their party's election can encourage different styles of representation. This can be the case whether these are their parties' or party voters' attributes as established here, or the setting of the electoral system.

To conclude, my results show that the context of political parties and party voters is important for the promotion of styles of representation within parties. A country comparison shows that the effects of party identifiers and party leadership control over nomination is different between countries, while the effects of party socialisation and party representation in government are more consistent. The mixed results found between countries underlines the importance of a more detailed theorising and analysis of how those factors differ both between political systems and different types of parties, taking into account for example the different degrees of an open ballot structure, decentralisation of the nomination process, competition within parties and party types. One of the contributions of this paper is that it provides the groundwork for such a detailed analysis. It also shows how the different characteristics of the representatives and of those they represent explain the difference in emphasis between parties on representational styles. Those styles are about how to represent which is a crucial element of representation.

**Table 2.** Determinants of styles of representation.

Step:	% of partisans within parties						% of delegates within parties						% of trustees within parties					
	Standardised betas						Standardised betas						Standardised betas					
	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6
<b>% of party representatives who:</b>																		
Are nominated by the party's leadership	0.20	0.27*	0.28*	0.30*	0.26*	0.22+		0.16	0.08	0.11	0.11	0.24*		-0.33**	-0.37**	-0.36**	-0.34*	-0.37**
Have been represented in local and/or regional politics		0.44***	0.47***	0.49***	0.39***	0.38**			-0.39***	-0.32*	-0.28+	-0.29*			-0.19	-0.19	-0.12	-0.12
<b>Parties and party voters:</b>																		
Representation in government		-0.12		-0.12	-0.14	-0.12				-0.23	-0.20	-0.26+		0.16	0.18	0.22+	0.21	0.23+
Proportion of party identifiers among party voters				-0.08	-0.09	-0.08		0.14	0.11	0.21+	0.20	0.17+			-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00
<b>Control variables</b>																		
Socialist democratic / socialist / communist parties					0.16	0.13					-0.20	-0.03					-0.05	-0.02
Conservative / christian democratic parties					0.11	0.10					-0.06	-0.09					0.04	-0.04
Party ballot					-0.24+	-0.27+					0.06	0.15					0.19	0.16
Hungary/Estonia						-0.17						0.54***					-0.15	
Intercept, p-value	0.000	0.112	0.096	0.082	0.028	0.018	0.008	0.015	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.22	0.24	0.24	0.30	0.32	0.02	0.04	0.18	0.23	0.26	0.52	0.03	0.14	0.17	0.17	0.21	0.22
Change in R <sup>2</sup> significant, p value:	0.123	0.000	0.329	0.516	0.224	0.164	0.289	0.209	0.003	0.061	0.499	0.000	0.201	0.008	0.134	0.907	0.504	0.264

Note: Response variables are three; the proportion of candidates within each party who are 1) partisans, 2) delegates and 3) trustees. Significance levels: +p < 0.1; \*p < 0.05; \*\*p < 0.01; \*\*\*p < 0.001. N = 62 parties. Variance inflation factor (VIF) in the full model (step 6) is in all cases lower than 1.4 and tolerance from 0.73 (% have been represented in local and/or regional politics) to 0.90 (% nominated by the party's leadership).

## Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my two supervisors, Hermann Schmitt and Ólafur Þ Harðarson, for substantial comments on the work in process, as well as Åsa Bengtsson, Michael Marsh, my colleagues in the CDSS program at Mannheim University and many others.

## Author note

Drafts of this work have been presented in the panel 'Roles of representation – a comparative approach' at the 7th ECPR General Conference in Bordeaux and at the CDSS workshop for doctoral students at Mannheim University in Spring 2013.

## Funding

This paper is part of my PhD project, paper track. In my PhD I have been funded by the CDSS and MZES at the University of Mannheim and by the Icelandic Research Fund.

## Notes

1. This applies to Belgium 2007.
2. Preferably all measures for party identification should have been retrieved from election study data where voters are asked as close as possible to the same election as covered in the CCS data. That data was not available for Belgium 2007, Greece 2007, Hungary 2010 and Sweden 2010 when this paper was written. For Belgium and Greece I use the EES data from 2009 which was two years after the general elections covered in the CCS for those countries. For Hungary and Sweden I use the ESS 2010 data that covers the same election as in CCS data from the same year for those two countries. Data on party voters for other countries are retrieved from the CSES and INES covering the same election as the CCS data and carried out immediately after the election under study.
3. Even if there is a difference in terminology about voters between questions 1 and 2, the former asking about "his/her party voters" and the latter about "constituency voters", both are contrasted with either the party position or the MP's own opinion. For that reason it is meaningful to apply the delegate role to those who name voters in questions 1 and 2 and contrast them with partisans and trustees.
4. Information about the electoral systems is retrieved from the Ace Project ([www.aceproject.org](http://www.aceproject.org)) and the Inter-Parliamentary Union ([www.ipu.org](http://www.ipu.org)).

## Supplementary material

Appendix I contains a table for all variables used in this paper.

## References

- American Political Science Association (1950) Toward a more responsible two-party system: A report of the Committee on Political Parties. *APSR* 44(3): Part 2, Supplement 44(3).
- Andeweg RB (1997) Role specialisation or role switching? Dutch MPs between electorate and executive. *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 3(1): 110–127.
- Andeweg RB (2012) The consequences of representatives' role orientations: Attitudes, behaviour, perceptions. In: Blomgren

- M and Rozenberg O (eds) *Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 66–84.
- Bengtsson Å and Wass H (2011) The representative roles of MPs: A citizen perspective. *Scandinavian Political Studies* 34: 143–167.
- Birch S (2001) Electoral systems and party system stability in post-Communist Europe. 97th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, USA, 30 August – 2 September.
- Blomgren M and Rozenberg O (2012a) Introduction. In: Blomgren M and Rozenberg O (eds) *Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 1–7.
- Blomgren M and Rozenberg O (2012b) *Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Castiglione D and Warren ME (2006) Rethinking democratic representation: Eight theoretical issues. Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions, University of British Columbia, USA, 18–19 May.
- Converse PE and Pierce R (1986) *Political Representation in France*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University.
- Costa O, Freire A and Pilet J-B (2012) Political representation in Belgium, France and Portugal: MPs and their constituents in very different political systems. *Representation* 48: 351–358.
- Dahlmann O (2005) *Government stability in Estonia: Wishful thinking or reality?* Potsdam University, Germany. Available at: [http://www.uni-potsdam.de/prof\\_franzke/moe/moe\\_paper\\_03.pdf](http://www.uni-potsdam.de/prof_franzke/moe/moe_paper_03.pdf) (accessed 15 February).
- Dalton RJ (2008) *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (5th edn). Washington DC: CQ Press.
- Damgaard E (1997) The political roles of Danish MPs. *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 3(1): 79–90.
- Enyedi Z (2006) *Stability in the shadow of chaos: The Hungarian party system in 2006*. Parliamentary Elections and Party Landscape in the Visegrád Group Countries, 27 October, Masaryk University, Czech Republic.
- Eulau H, Wahlke JC, Buchanan W, et al. (1959) The role of the representative: Some empirical observations on the theory of Edmund Burke. *American Political Science Review* 53: 742–756.
- Farrell D and Scully R (2010) The European parliament: One parliament, several modes of political representation on the ground. *Journal of European Public Policy* 17: 36–54.
- Gauja A (2013) *The Politics of Party Policy: From Members to Legislators*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Golder M and Stramski J (2010) Ideological congruence and electoral institutions. *American Journal of Political Science* 54: 90–106.
- Ilonski G (2012) Role stability in the context of institutional and positional change. In: Blomgren M and Rozenberg O (eds) *Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 162–183.
- Jagers J and Walgrave S (2007) Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium. *European Journal of Political Research* 46: 319–345.
- Kristinsson GH (2011) Party cohesion in the Icelandic Althingi. *Icelandic Review of Politics & Administration* 7: 229–251.

- Kuklinski JH and Elling RC (1977) Representational role, constituency opinion, and legislative roll-call behaviour. *American Journal of Political Science* 21: 135–147.
- Marsh M (2000) Candidate centred but party wrapped: Campaigning in Ireland under STV. In: Bowler S and Grofman B (eds) *Elections Australia, Ireland and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote*. Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press, pp. 114–130.
- Müller WC (2000) Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work. *European Journal of Political Research* 37: 309–333.
- Norris P (2002) Ballot structure & legislative behavior. *Exporting Congress? The influence of the U.S. Congress on world legislatures*. Jack D Gordon Institute for Public Policy and Citizenship Studies, Florida, USA, 6–7 December.
- Önnudóttir EH (2014) Policy congruence and style of representation: Party voters and political parties. *West European Politics* 37(3): 538–563.
- Rahat G (2007) Candidate selection: The choice before the choice. *Journal of Democracy* 18(1): 157–170.
- Rehfeld A (2009) Representation rethought: On trustees, delegates, and gyroscopes in the study of political representation and democracy. *American Political Science Review* 103: 214–230.
- Róbert P and Papp Z (2012) *Party identification and party preference at the 2010 Hungarian general elections*. Elections, Public Opinion and Parties conference, University of Oxford, UK, 7 to 9 September.
- Rohrschneider R and Whitefield S (2012) *The Strain of Representation: How Parties Represent Diverse Voters in Western and Eastern Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rozenberg O and Blomgren M (2012) Bringing parliamentary roles back in. In: Blomgren M and Rozenberg O (eds) *Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 211–230.
- Saalfeld T (2007) Professionalisation of parliamentary roles in Germany: An aggregate-level analysis, 1949–94. *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 3(1): 32–54.
- Searing DD (1994) *Westminster's World: Understanding Political Roles*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Strøm K (2012) Roles as strategies: Towards a logic of legislative behavior. In: Blomgren M and Rozenberg O (eds) *Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 85–100.
- Thomassen J and Esaiasson P (2006) Role orientations of members of parliament. *Acta Politica* 41: 217–231.
- Valen H and Narud HM (2007) The conditional party mandate: A model for the study of mass and elite opinion patterns. *European Journal of Political Research* 46: 296–216.
- Wahlke JC, Eulau H, Buchanan W, et al. (1962) *The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Wessels B (1999) Whom to represent? Role-orientation of legislators in Europe. In: Schmitt H and Thomassen J (eds) *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 209–234.
- Wessels B and Giebler H (2011) Choosing a style of representation: The role of institutional and organizational incentives. The 6th ECPR General Conference, 25–27 August, University of Iceland.
- Zittel T (2012) Legislators and their representational roles. In: Blomgren M and Rozenberg O (eds) *Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures*. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 101–120.

## Appendix

	Partisans	Delegates	Trustees	Candidates who are nominated by the party leadership	Candidates who have background as elected local and/or regional representatives	Days in government in the last four electoral terms	Party identifiers among the party's voters	Party types: SD/C = Social democratic/ soc./ Communist, C/CH = Conservative/ Christian democratic
<b>Belgium</b>								
Socialist Party	37.2%	14.0%	34.9%	54.5%	79.5%	100.0%	55.0%	SD/C
Reformist Movement	28.3%	13.0%	32.6%	83.3%	81.3%	40.0%	62.0%	Other
Humanist Democratic Center	44.4%	8.3%	33.3%	69.2%	74.4%	65.0%	45.0%	C/CH
Ecolo	47.7%	2.3%	27.3%	14.0%	50.0%	20.0%	68.0%	Other

(continued)

## Appendix. (continued)

	Partisans	Delegates	Trustees	Candidates who are nominated by the party leadership	Candidates who have background as elected local and/or regional representatives	Days in government in the last four electoral terms	Party identifiers among the party's voters	Party types: SD/C = Social democratic/ soc./ Communist, C/CH = Conservative/ Christian democratic
National Front	25.0%	50.0%	20.8%	66.7%	19.2%	0.0%	67.0%	Other
Christian Democratic and Flemish	41.7%	14.6%	33.3%	70.0%	47.1%	65.0%	64.0%	C/CH
New-Flemish Alliance	21.4%	35.7%	35.7%	40.0%	33.3%	0.0%	69.0%	Other
Socialist Party. Different	57.1%	14.3%	28.6%	91.9%	73.0%	100.0%	68.0%	SD/C
Spirit	62.5%	12.5%	25.0%	70.0%	40.0%	0.0%	80.0%	SD/C
Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats	30.0%	30.0%	30.0%	64.7%	57.7%	40.0%	41.0%	Other
Flemist Interest	41.2%	20.6%	29.4%	80.0%	77.1%	0.0%	63.0%	Other
Green!	32.1%	12.5%	48.2%	44.3%	47.5%	20.0%	59.0%	Other
List-Dedecker	7.5%	52.5%	30.0%	61.0%	14.6%	0.0%	33.0%	Other
Estonia								
Estonian Center Party	33.3%	11.1%	44.4%	0.0%	100.0%	23.0%	69.0%	Other
Estonian Reform Party	32.4%	24.3%	32.4%	0.0%	83.8%	82.0%	35.0%	Other
Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica	25.0%	20.0%	45.0%	0.0%	90.0%	55.0%	40.0%	C/CH
Social Democratic Party	14.3%	26.5%	49.0%	0.0%	77.6%	31.0%	26.0%	SD/C
Germany								
Social Democratic Party	19.9%	9.3%	56.3%	0.0%	71.7%	57.0%	56.0%	SD/C
Christian Democratic Union	11.5%	9.4%	72.7%	0.0%	68.8%	42.0%	56.0%	C/CH
Christian Social Union	0.0%	4.2%	87.5%	0.0%	45.5%	42.0%	53.0%	C/CH
Free Democratic Party	6.3%	5.6%	77.6%	0.0%	53.5%	21.0%	30.0%	Other
Alliance 90 / Greens	4.6%	7.9%	79.5%	0.0%	61.5%	36.0%	40.0%	Other
Left Party	13.1%	23.4%	51.8%	0.0%	36.2%	0.0%	48.0%	SD/C
Greece								
New Democracy	47.4%	20.5%	23.1%	87.5%	53.8%	15.0%	54.0%	C/CH
Panhellenic Socialist Movement	27.1%	24.3%	40.2%	89.6%	49.7%	78.0%	70.0%	SD/C
Hungary								
Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance	27.2%	40.8%	14.3%	22.9%	82.5%	27.0%	70.7%	Other
Hungarian Socialist Party	46.2%	26.9%	15.4%	3.8%	67.3%	76.0%	70.1%	SD/C
Jobbik	9.1%	73.6%	14.5%	41.5%	14.7%	0.0%	66.3%	Other
Politics Can be Different	7.5%	41.8%	38.8%	17.4%	7.2%	0.0%	45.5%	Other
Iceland								
Social Democratic Alliance	10.8%	16.2%	58.1%	6.3%	32.0%	15.0%	49.0%	SD/C
Progressive Party	16.9%	7.7%	61.5%	8.3%	30.3%	93.0%	46.0%	Other
Independence Party	8.9%	7.1%	73.2%	6.0%	37.0%	98.0%	73.0%	C/CH
Left Green Movement	13.2%	17.6%	52.9%	1.7%	29.6%	9.0%	48.0%	Other
Civic Movement	6.3%	25.4%	63.5%	0.0%	1.3%	0.0%	13.0%	Other
Ireland								
Fianna Fáil	57.1%	7.1%	14.3%	0.0%	69.2%	85.0%	52.0%	C/CH
Fine Gael	44.4%	8.3%	30.6%	0.0%	84.2%	21.0%	35.0%	C/CH

(continued)



## Appendix. (continued)

	Partisans	Delegates	Trustees	Candidates who are nominated by the party leadership	Candidates who have background as elected local and/or regional representatives	Days in government in the last four electoral terms	Party identifiers among the party's voters	Party types: SD/C = Social democratic/ soc./ Communist, C/CH = Conservative/ Christian democratic
Labour	47.1%	23.5%	17.6%	0.0%	50.0%	32.0%	28.0%	SD/C
Green Party	53.6%	14.3%	28.6%	0.0%	85.7%	0.0%	17.0%	Other
Progressive Democrats	44.4%	11.1%	11.1%	0.0%	66.7%	74.0%	9.0%	Other
Sinn Féin	66.7%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	41.7%	0.0%	26.0%	Other
Netherlands								
Christian Democratic Appeal	56.7%	0.0%	30.0%	64.5%	61.3%	48.0%	33.0%	C/CH
Labour Party	33.3%	9.5%	47.6%	15.8%	50.0%	51.0%	36.0%	SD/C
Peoples Party for Freedom and Democracy	30.8%	15.4%	46.2%	32.0%	65.4%	100.0%	34.0%	Other
Green Left	27.3%	0.0%	72.7%	9.1%	66.7%	0.0%	36.0%	Other
Socialist Party	64.0%	0.0%	28.0%	12.5%	88.0%	0.0%	12.0%	SD/C
Democrats 66	22.2%	0.0%	72.2%	0.0%	44.4%	69.0%	31.0%	SD/C
Christian Union	55.6%	0.0%	33.3%	16.7%	55.6%	0.0%	42.0%	C/CH
Political Reformed Party	63.6%	9.1%	27.3%	61.5%	69.2%	0.0%	62.0%	Other
Party for the Animals	36.4%	9.1%	27.3%	84.6%	0.0%	0.0%	6.0%	Other
Portugal								
Left Bloc	12.2%	39.0%	39.0%	25.0%	42.9%	0.0%	35.0%	SD/C
People's Party	18.5%	37.0%	33.3%	44.9%	55.4%	0.0%	36.0%	C/CH
Democratic Unity Coalition	52.0%	28.0%	20.0%	8.3%	36.0%	0.0%	46.0%	SD/C
Social Democratic Party	26.5%	22.4%	42.9%	57.4%	80.0%	23.0%	52.0%	SD/C
Socialist	24.0%	16.0%	52.0%	34.6%	79.3%	62.0%	53.0%	SD/C
Sweden								
Center Party	38.8%	16.3%	37.8%	1.6%	80.2%	14.0%	85.5%	Other
Liberal Party	26.5%	21.8%	38.8%	3.0%	77.2%	14.0%	72.9%	Other
Christian Democrats	36.5%	15.1%	38.5%	3.4%	80.1%	14.0%	74.4%	C/CH
Green Party	21.8%	27.4%	42.1%	3.1%	76.3%	0.0%	71.2%	Other
Moderate Party	46.9%	17.6%	24.6%	6.1%	86.3%	14.0%	84.9%	C/CH
Social Democrats	53.1%	12.5%	24.6%	5.9%	88.8%	43.0%	78.1%	SD/C
Sweden Democrats	60.0%	12.0%	24.0%	38.5%	56.5%	0.0%	73.1%	Other
Left Party	39.0%	16.6%	34.2%	1.1%	81.4%	0.0%	69.1%	SD/C

## Author biography

**Eva H Önnudóttir** started her PhD at the University of Mannheim, Germany in 2010 under the supervision of Professor Hermann Schmitt at Mannheim University and Professor Ólafur Þ Harðarson at the University of Iceland. This publication is one of her three PhD

papers. She has been the director of the Icelandic Candidate Survey since 2009 and is a member of various research networks such as the True European Voter (TEV), the Comparative Candidate Surveys (CCS) and the Icelandic National Election Study (ICENES).





# Policy Congruence and Style of Representation: Party Voters and Political Parties

EVA H. ÖNNUDÓTTIR

*This article focuses on whether styles of representation influence policy congruence. Style of representation is defined at the party level as the proportion of representatives within parties who are partisans, delegates or trustees. Policy congruence refers to how close on the left–right scale the mean position of a party as placed by its candidates is compared to that of party voters. The article concludes that where there are higher proportions of trustees within parties, there is a greater degree of policy congruence, whereas a higher proportion of partisans results in less policy congruence. The proportion of delegates has no significant impact on congruence after taking account of other party and country measures. This indicates that party constraints on representatives are applied at the cost of congruence with voters, and that when representatives enjoy more flexibility to follow their own opinions, the party displays greater congruence with its own voters.*

It is common for the nature of political representation to be analysed separately from its outcomes (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005). In this article, I combine these strands. Studies on the outcome of representation have frequently focused on whether the opinions and voting behaviour of MPs in a given parliament reflect the policy preferences of their voters on the left–right spectrum, referred to as policy congruence. The nature of representation refers to the role of the representative, in particular whether a representative can be classified as a delegate, a trustee or a partisan. A delegate takes instructions from voters regardless of his own opinion, a trustee makes his own decisions based on deliberation of the issues under question and a partisan follows the party's lead when making decisions.

Earlier studies, such as Andeweg's (2012), using the trustee versus delegate typology to assess whether representatives' roles determine their behaviour once elected, have shown a weak impact. Andeweg establishes that Esaiasson

and Holmberg's (1996) typology of bottom-up representation (the will of the voters should be decisive) versus top-down representation (the will of the political elite should be decisive), explains representatives' behaviour only slightly better. However, as Andeweg points out, the results are, in some cases, quite contentious. The expectation that representatives who favour bottom-up representation should be more inclined to have faith in voters' ability to take decisions is not confirmed. On the contrary, those representatives tend towards greater cynicism about citizens compared to those who favour top-down representation. Andeweg points out that limited empirical support and controversial results indicate that there is still considerable need for further theoretical and empirical research about the consequences of representational roles.

Earlier studies on congruence have, more often than not, been suggestive of a causal connection between representatives and the represented (Dalton 1985; Leimgruber *et al.* 2010; Schmitt and Thomassen 2000; Valen and Narud 2007). However, they have often been confined to single countries or single elections, relying on different measures for representation, different explanatory factors and/or diverse analytical levels (Achen 1977; Bengtsson and Wass 2011; Leimgruber *et al.* 2010; Schmitt 2010; Wessels and Giebler 2011). The question as to whether or not proportional electoral systems facilitate more congruence as against majoritarian systems has recently been shown to be less relevant than it has been historically (Powell 2009). This indicates one or both of the following: that the motivations for policy congruence between parties and voters have changed, and/or that the effect of the electoral system on policy congruence is intermingled with the attributes of voters and parties. It is the latter notion that is under study here; that is to say, whether the proportion of representatives within parties who are delegates, trustees or partisans explains policy congruence. Other party attributes included as explanatory factors for policy congruence are party size, party age and the frequency of a party's representation in government.

In the literature on policy congruence, it is generally assumed that voters will be better represented when they are closer to their representatives (Converse and Pierce 1986; Rosema *et al.* 2011). Wessels and Schmitt (2008) make the point that the wider and more numerous the policy options are from which voters can choose, and the closer the fit between the electorate and their voting options, the more meaningful their vote. The literature on policy congruence implicitly supports the idea that it is delegates that are most likely to be congruent with voters, because they follow instructions from voters in their work as representatives. However, this does not have to be the case. Strøm (2012) points out the importance of distinguishing between roles and preferences, where roles are not necessarily identical to, or determined by, preferences. Another distinction is policy choice, meaning the decisions made on policy. In the literature on styles of representation, it is not of major concern whether the policy preferences of representatives are close to those of voters. Even if the role of the delegate assumes that representatives should follow voters' instructions in their policy choice, it is not necessarily the case

that their policy preferences are close to those of voters. The same argument applies to the partisan role; under this, it is assumed that policy choice should be guided by the position of the party and not the policy preferences of voters or individual representatives. It is only for trustees that policy preferences and policy choices come from the same source, where individual representatives claim to follow their own policy preferences in their policy choices.

The suggestion that delegates are not necessarily closest to voters on policy preferences, as against trustees and partisans, allows for the possibility that either of the latter two may be. Fox and Shotts (2009) discuss how voters prioritise competence and congruence, and theorise that when voters prefer competence, they provide electoral incentives for representatives to take on the role of a trustee. They also theorise that when congruence is high, the trustee role is encouraged, because representatives will then have to compete on skill rather than congruence. However, the causal mechanism could be the inverse; when trustees are successful in signalling their competence to voters, that success engenders trust, and trust produces congruence. In either case, higher proportions of trustees within parties should lead to more congruence between the parties and their voters.

Strøm (2012) argues that representatives' roles are the ones they believe to be most suited to allow them to achieve their goals, whether that is to secure nomination on the party list, to secure their own or their party's election, secure a party office or secure a legislative office. Representatives whose goals are constrained, regulated or mediated by their party are more likely to take on a partisan role. It can thus be expected that partisans are more dependent on their party to reach their goals, and are thus more congruent with their own party compared to trustees and delegates. If voters are generally closer to the centre on policy preferences when compared to parties, it is expected that a higher proportion of partisans within parties spawns less congruence between parties and their voters.

Assuming that a closer fit between voters and their options indicates a more meaningful democracy, it is worth examining how style of representation affects congruence between parties and party voters. The causal direction could also be the reverse – that high or low congruence produces different incentives for representatives to take on certain roles. However, I assume that policy congruence, defined as how close parties are to the policy preferences of voters, is a common denominator between voters and parties regardless of different political incentives and motivations. In this sense, policy congruence as the outcome of representation reflects the extent to which parties represent their voters.

### **Outcome of Representation**

A common factor in examinations of policy congruence from a country-comparative perspective is the left–right orientation of parties and voters. The left–right position of parties and voters is the most widespread cross-sectional indicator available, although it may not be as powerful a determinant of the

vote as it has been (Hellwig 2008). With increasing de-alignment, performance voting, and particularly increasing ideological depolarisation (Green 2007; van der Eijk *et al.* 2005), it is quite plausible that the left–right position is not as significant as it has been historically in reflecting congruence between parties and their voters.

Notwithstanding these considerations, the left–right position is still meaningful as it symbolically unites representatives and the represented (Belchior 2011). Van der Eijk and Schmitt (2010) illustrate that voters' perceptions of the left–right position of parties are associated with the policy content of electoral manifestos. They also find that this compatibility between perceptions and manifestos continues even if the salient issues change over time within and between countries. This indicates that left–right position is still meaningful as a measure of policy congruence.

Golder and Stramski (2010) demonstrate how different measures of policy congruence yield different results, emphasising the well-known dictum that the measure should be guided by the goal of the research. They also point out the importance of how congruence is conceptualised – for example whether the focus is on congruence between all voters and the government (many to one), or whether it is on congruence between all members of the parliament and all voters (many to many). They find that majoritarian systems produce higher policy congruence between citizens and the government, and proportional systems a higher congruence between citizens and the parliament. Golder and Stramski focus on the link between all citizens and either the parliament or the government. An alternative approach is the partisan-constituency model, which emphasises the link between the party and its supporters (Ezrow 2010). Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012) use the latter approach to examine how attributes of the electorate relate to policy congruence. They establish the importance of accounting for the number of de-aligned voters in the examination of policy congruence, and the extent to which that interacts with the institutional setting of the electoral system. Irrespective of the electoral system, they find that the higher the proportion of independent voters in parties' constituencies, the less congruence it has with its voters compared to parties who have a high proportion of partisan voters.

The research presented here falls within the partisan-constituency model, as in Rohrschneider and Whitefield's study. The main difference is that party attributes are examined, i.e. the styles of representation, as explanatory factors for policy congruence, as opposed to voters' attributes.

### **Nature of Representation**

Earlier studies on the nature of representation focused on individual MPs and their voters, not on political parties or all candidates running for a particular election (Eulau and Karps 1977; Eulau *et al.* 1959; Miller and Stokes 1963). The focus on individual MPs is in part explained by the historical development of political theory, originating from Burke's classification of individual legislators

as either trustees or delegates, and in part by the fact that many earlier studies on representation originated in the US, where political parties are weaker than in Europe (Dalton 1985). Dalton (1985) points out that in modern party systems, the focus should be more on the bond between political parties and voters than on individual MPs and voters. In line with this, Converse and Pierce (1986) add the partisan role to those of trustee and delegate in their study of political representation in France. Representatives in modern party systems have to take into consideration not only their own and their voters' opinion, but also the position of the party they are representing.

The responsible party model (RPM) (APSA 1950) is an attempt to capture the three-way bond between representatives, voters and parties. The main idea is that representatives are partisans who take cues and instructions from their parties about how to decide on issues. For political representation to be effective, voters must have a choice between two or more parties where at least two parties offer different policy programmes. RPM assumes that voters have policy preferences, that they are aware of the policy preferences of the parties and that they vote according to their own policy preferences. For representation to work, parties should have sufficient discipline to be able to implement their respective policy programmes. In this way, RPM is very demanding for both voters and representatives (Wessels and Giebler 2011) and it has not been successful in explaining why political representatives do not always follow the position of their party (Esaiasson and Holmberg 1996; Valen and Narud 2007).

In their study on parties running for the European Parliament Wessels and Giebler (2011) find that party control over the nomination of candidates does not produce congruence between candidates and their party, as the full implementation of RPM demands. However, they do establish that the role orientations of candidates are relevant to representation since they relate to policy congruence within parties in a systematic way. They find that partisans<sup>1</sup> are closer to their own party on the left–right scale as compared to non-partisans,<sup>2</sup> confirming that RPM is at least partly relevant in explaining party politics.

Observed deviations from RPM indicate that it is less of a formal theoretical framework and more of a practice of representation (Aldrich 1995; Wessels and Giebler 2011). Aldrich (1995) discusses political parties as endogenous institutions created, maintained and altered by politicians. Parties are a means for politicians to realise their own goals, whether that is to get elected, stay in office or to indirectly implement their policy preferences as party members. At the same time, parties constrain politicians in their actions, as they have to follow the party's rules and traditions.

The expectation is that partisan representatives are office-seekers, as defined by Aldrich (1995). Strøm (2012) adds that representatives aiming for an office or a status determined by their party are more likely to be partisans. Because of their ambition, they stick to the position of their party, as it is the fastest route to a political career, and maintain it within and for the party. Representatives aiming for an office that is not determined by their party will take on roles other than the partisan one, if they believe it may help them to



reach their goal. In line with this, it can be assumed that representatives who want to signal their own competence to the party and voters take on the role of a trustee when they consider that role to be the best one for them as a strategy to reach their goal. The same strategy should also motivate delegates, who emphasise that voters' opinions should prevail over their own or their parties' opinions.

### **Policy Congruence and Style of Representation**

In this section I first discuss what to expect of delegates, trustees or partisans regarding how congruent they are as individuals with their own party before discussing styles of representation as party attributes and their consequences for policy congruence between parties and their voters.

The main concern in the debate on representational roles is about how different roles are linked to tasks, functions and behaviour, and what factors motivate representatives (Strøm 2012). The focus is on the mechanisms representatives use to arrive at decisions, and whether their role choice has any consequences for their behaviour as elected representatives (Andeweg 2012).

Fox and Shotts (2009) treat congruence as the fit between the policy choices of elected representatives and the policy preferences of their voters, which is consistent with much of the literature. Of key importance here is how representatives make choices. Their own policy preferences are either of secondary importance, as in the delegate or the partisan role, or the representatives' policy choice and policy preference come from the same source as in the trustee role. If congruence is measured as behavioural rather than attitudinal, as is done here, then it should be expected that delegates' policy choices are closer to voters' preferences compared to trustees and partisans. However, as the delegate role assumes only that their policy choice is in line with voters, and not necessarily the delegates' policy preferences, there is no apparent reason why they should be more congruent on policy preferences (attitudinal) with voters as compared to trustees or partisans. On this basis, I hypothesise that the proportion of delegates within parties has no effect on congruence between parties and party voters, as outlined and measured in this article:

H1: The proportion of delegates within parties has no effect on the congruence of policy preferences between parties and party voters.

It can be assumed that representatives aiming for positions that are controlled or mediated by their party function as partisans, and assign importance to the party position over their own or voters' opinions. Taking on the partisan role is an effective strategy to secure a seat high enough on the party list to have a chance of getting elected, and of staying in office. Partisans are therefore expected to be the ones who are closest to their own party on policy. It can be assumed that

parties with a high proportion of partisans also have strong party discipline. Given that party discipline is strong, the party leadership should have greater flexibility to position the party on ideology as the leadership prefers. Assuming that the policy preferences of voters are in general more centrist than those of politicians and parties, I expect that the higher the proportion of partisans within parties the less congruent they are with their voters:

H2: The higher the proportion of partisans there are within parties the less congruence of policy preferences there is between parties and party voters.

Andeweg (2011) suggests that voters today prefer their MPs to act as trustees who follow their own instincts as long as they are able to solve the problems they are faced with in their political work. Parties with a high proportion of trustees should have weaker party discipline than parties with a high number of partisans. Thus, the leadership in parties with a high proportion of trustees do not have the same flexibility to place their party on the left–right scale and have to compromise with other party members. That should result in the party positions being closer to the centre and therefore closer to its voters (assuming that voters are more centrist). According to Fox and Shotts (2009), the electoral success of representatives who signal that they are competent enough to use their own judgement for policy-making is dependent on voters preferring competence over congruence. The more importance voters place on competence, the greater incentive there is for representatives to adopt the trustee role. They establish that the role of a trustee is most likely to be encouraged when representatives are highly congruent with voters because then representatives have to compete on skill instead of congruence. Fox and Shotts imply that the main causal mechanism comes from the voters' side; that it is the preferences of voters that determine whether the trustee or delegate role is encouraged. However, this causality could be the inverse, or be mutually reinforcing. Trustees, who are successful in signalling their competence by their past work as politicians, provide incentives for the electorate to trust them. That trust can engender congruence between representatives and the represented. In this two-way relationship between style of representation and congruence, I expect that parties' initiatives to weigh more heavily than the voters', because in general it is parties who lead and voters who follow (Holmberg 2011). Thus, I hypothesise that policy congruence between parties and voters should be greater when the party has a high proportion of trustees:

H3: The higher the proportion of trustees there are within parties the more policy congruence there is between parties and party voters.

## Research Design

As I am using individual-level data as aggregates for party attributes, I first look at descriptive data for representatives' style of representation before moving to an analysis at the party level. However, I start out by describing the data, selection of countries and measurements. Classifications of all party variables used in this article are covered in Appendix I.

### *Data and Selection of Countries*

In this article, I combine parties and party voters in pairs referred to as party dyads. Using party dyads as the unit of analysis is based on the fact that political parties are major players in modern democracies, particularly in political systems where people vote for parties and not individual representatives (Dalton 1985; Holmberg 1997; Valen and Narud 2007). The main data sources used in this article are the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS) for candidates, and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and European Election Study (EES) for voters. Measures on style of representation retrieved from the CCS data cover nine countries and 56 parties at the national level. The nine countries and election years are: Australia 2007, Belgium 2007, Germany 2009, Greece 2007, Iceland 2009, Ireland 2007, Netherlands 2006, Portugal 2009 and Switzerland 2007.

For policy congruence, I use the left–right position of parties as placed by candidates in the CCS data and the self-placement of voters on the left–right scale from the CSES and EES data. Voters' left–right self-placement is available for seven out of nine countries in the CSES data, covering the same elections as the CCS data for those countries.<sup>3</sup> The policy position of voters from the two remaining countries, Belgium and Greece, is retrieved from the EES study that was carried out in 2009, two years after a general election in both countries. Candidates' data and voters' data are linked to the political party the voter cast his vote for and to the political party the candidate represents in the election under study.<sup>4</sup> Throughout the study, I use the term 'representatives' interchangeably with 'candidates', when referring to actual or potential representatives for their respective party.

My analysis only includes parties that were elected to parliament, for three reasons. First, the focus of the study is on the representational bond that becomes active once a party is elected. By excluding non-represented parties, I still include an overwhelming majority of voters, as the 56 parties cover around 80 per cent of the national vote, with the lowest vote share (79.9 per cent) being for the two Greek parties (New Democracy and Panhellenic Socialist Movement) (see Appendix I). Second, indicators of interest are not available for all non-represented parties<sup>5</sup> and non-represented parties are excluded from the candidate studies in some countries.<sup>6</sup> Third, in the voter data there is in most cases a small-*n* problem for parties that did not get elected, thereby making the indicator for voters' left–right self-placement in those cases



unreliable. In countries where parliaments are bicameral (upper and lower house) only parties that were running for the lower house are included in the CCS and the research is therefore limited to those.<sup>7</sup>

### *Policy Congruence*

For policy congruence between parties and party voters, I calculate the absolute distance between the mean of the party representatives' placement of their party on the left–right scale and the mean self-placement of party voters.<sup>8</sup> Low figures reflect closer links between parties and voters, and therefore high policy congruence. High figures reflect parties and voters that are further apart and therefore low policy congruence. Using two different data sources (one for voters and one for representatives) prevents the danger of assimilation or contrast effects found in studies using the same data source, such as voters' self-placement and voters' placement of parties. Assimilation is when respondents pull their preferred party closer towards them on the left–right spectrum, while a contrast effect is when they push non-preferred parties further away from their own position (Drummond 2010). A more serious bias caused by endogeneity is theoretical; that it is congruence itself that promotes certain styles of representation but not the inverse, as is argued here. As I am using discrete data (one time-point for each country) I cannot test the direction of causality empirically. I have addressed this issue theoretically earlier in this article and return to it in the discussion at the end.

Van der Eijk (2001) argues that using the mean to determine policy position could cause error, as it does not capture the different dispersions around the mean within each group that is compared, and instead the interpolated median is a more appropriate measure for congruence.<sup>9</sup> Another option for a measure of policy congruence that captures dispersion on the left–right scale is to use Andeweg's (2011) measure, which is similar to Golder and Stramski's (2010) measure. Both use a measure for policy congruence which compares the number of agreements on each point of the scale.<sup>10</sup> The higher the number of agreements between voters and parties on the left–right scale, the more policy congruence there is. For the purposes of this article, the absolute difference between the means is used for congruence measures. However, I do run the regression analysis presented later in this article, using each of the alternative measures of congruence discussed here and list the results in Appendix II. All nine models, except one, yield similar results as when using the difference between the absolute means.<sup>11</sup>

### *Style of Representation*

In the CCS data there are three questions that reflect style of representation. The questions concern how an MP should vote in parliament if there are different opinions between:

- (1) Party position and his/her party voters' opinion.
- (2) Constituency voters' opinion and MP's opinion.
- (3) Party position and MP's opinion.

For simplicity, I refer to both 'constituency voters' and 'his/her party voters' as 'voters'.<sup>12</sup> I assume that representatives' style of representation is that which they believe to be optimal for them to achieve their goal. In this sense, I assume that their replies to the three questions above are sincere and reflect their role orientation. However, I do not assume that their replies reflect how they would actually behave when faced with conflicting opinions, because there are numerous factors other than representational roles that affect the actual policy choices of representatives. Those factors include party discipline (Kristinsson 2011) and the limited number of issues in which one representative can effectively invest sufficient time to become master (Andeweg 2012).

For the categorisation of representatives' style into partisans, delegates and trustees, I use two out of three questions for each style group. Those representatives who say that the MP should follow the party position when in conflict with voters or the MP's opinion are classified as partisans. Those who say that the MP should follow his own opinion when in conflict with the party position or the voters' opinion are considered trustees. Delegates are those who say that the MP should follow the voters' opinion when in conflict with the party position or the MP's opinion.

Table 1 lists the proportion of representatives in each of the three style categories and those that are non-classifiable for each party in the candidate data. It is notable that in 40 out of the 56 parties less than 15 per cent of the candidates are non-classifiable, and in 46 of them less than 20 per cent are non-classifiable. The low proportion of non-classifiable candidates indicates that there is, in general, a systematic component that allows for the classification of trustees, partisans and delegates according to candidates' replies to the three questions about how an MP should decide. At the bottom of the table, the total proportions for each style are shown firstly for the pooled un-weighted data, secondly weighted by country and thirdly by party.<sup>13</sup>

For the purpose of this article, representatives' replies are not weighted since the unit of analysis is the party level. For party measures on style of representation, I use the percentage of representatives within parties who are (1) delegates, (2) partisans or (3) trustees. Representatives that are non-classifiable are included in the calculation for the proportion of each style group within parties, but not analysed any further. To take an example of party measures for the Liberal Party of Australia, it is 19.0 for the proportion of delegates, 39.7 for the proportion of partisans and 27.0 for the proportion of trustees.

TABLE 1  
PROPORTION OF PARTISANS, DELEGATES, TRUSTEES AND NON-CLASSIFIABLE  
WITHIN PARTIES

	Delegate (%)	Partisan (%)	Trustee (%)	Non-classifiable (%)	N
<i>Australia 2007</i>					
Liberal Party of Australia	19.0	39.7	27.0	14.3	63
Australian Labor Party	16.9	60.2	14.5	8.4	83
National Party of Australia	70.0	0	30.0	0	10
<i>Belgium 2007</i>					
Socialist Party	14.0	37.2	34.9	14.0	43
Reformist Movement	13.0	28.3	32.6	26.1	46
Humanist Democratic Center	8.3	44.4	33.3	13.9	36
Ecolo	2.3	47.7	27.3	22.7	44
National Front	50.0	25.0	20.8	4.2	24
Christian Democratic and Flemish	14.6	41.7	33.3	10.4	48
New-Flemish Alliance	35.7	21.4	35.7	7.1	14
Socialist Party. Different	14.3	57.1	28.6	0	35
Spirit	12.5	62.5	25.0	0	8
Open VLD	30.0	30.0	30.0	10.0	50
Flemish Interest	20.6	41.2	29.4	8.8	34
Green!	12.5	32.1	48.2	7.1	56
List Dedecker	52.5	7.5	30.0	10.0	40
<i>Germany 2009</i>					
Social Democratic Party	9.3	19.9	56.3	14.6	151
Christian Democratic Union	9.4	11.5	72.7	6.5	139
Christian Social Union	4.2	0	87.5	8.3	24
Free Democratic Party	5.6	6.3	77.6	10.5	143
Alliance 90 / Greens	7.9	4.6	79.5	7.9	151
Left Party	23.4	13.1	51.8	11.7	137
<i>Greece 2007</i>					
New Democracy	20.5	47.4	23.1	9.0	78
Panhellenic Socialist Movement	24.3	27.1	40.2	8.4	107
<i>Iceland 2009</i>					
Social Democratic Alliance	16.2	10.8	58.1	14.9	74
Progressive Party	7.7	16.9	61.5	13.8	65
Independence Party	7.1	8.9	73.2	10.7	56
Left Green Movement	17.6	13.2	52.9	16.2	68
Civic Movement	25.4	6.3	63.5	4.8	63
<i>Ireland 2007</i>					
Fianna Fáil	7.1	57.1	14.3	21.4	42
Fine Gael	8.3	44.4	30.6	16.7	36
Labour Party	23.5	47.1	17.6	11.8	17
Green Party	14.3	53.6	28.6	3.6	28
Progressive Democrats	11.1	44.4	11.1	33.3	9
Sinn Féin	16.7	66.7	0	16.7	12
<i>Netherlands 2006</i>					
Christian Democratic Appeal	0	56.7	30.0	13.3	30
PvdA Labour Party	9.5	33.3	47.6	9.5	21
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	15.4	30.8	46.2	7.7	26
Green Left	0	27.3	72.7	0	11
Socialist Party	0	64.0	28.0	8.0	25
Democrats 66	0	22.2	72.2	5.6	18

(Continued)

TABLE 1 (Continued)

	Delegate (%)	Partisan (%)	Trustee (%)	Non-classifiable (%)	N
Christian Union	0	55.6	33.3	11.1	9
SGP Political Reformed Party	9.1	63.6	27.3	0	11
Party for the Animals	9.1	36.4	27.3	27.3	11
<i>Portugal 2009</i>					
Left Bloc	39.0	12.2	39.0	9.8	41
People's Party	37.0	18.5	33.3	11.1	54
Democratic Unity Coalition	28.0	52.0	20.0	0	25
Social Democratic	22.4	26.5	42.9	8.2	49
Socialist	16.0	24.0	52.0	8.0	25
<i>Switzerland 2007</i>					
Christian Democratic People's Party	19.2	8.4	49.3	23.2	203
Radical – Democratic Party	13.3	12.4	56.4	17.9	218
(Swiss) People's Party	16.3	18.3	42.8	22.6	208
Social Democratic Party	7.5	16.5	57.1	18.8	266
(Swiss) Green Party	7.6	4.2	65.3	22.9	262
Liberal Party	14.3	0	38.1	47.6	21
(Protestant) Evangelical People's Party	9.2	4.6	63.8	22.4	152
Total – pooled data	14.6	20.5	50.2	14.7	3725
Total – weighted by country*	16.3	30.3	41.2	12.2	
Total – weighted by party**	16.1	29.7	41.1	13.1	

*Note:* Entries are proportion of candidates assigned to each style of representation. \*In the country weight respondents in each country have equal weight (for example respondents' replies in Switzerland 2007 have the same weight as respondents' replies in Ireland 2007). \*\*In the party weight respondents in each party have equal weight (for example respondents' replies for the Social Democratic Party in Germany 2009 have the same weight as respondents for the Left Green Movement in Iceland 2009). Country weight and party weight are calculated based on the total number of replies to questions on style divided by the number of countries or number of parties in each scenario.

### *Other Party Characteristics (Age, Size and Representation in Government)*

Other party attributes, aside from style of representation, that are considered in relation to policy congruence between parties and party voters are party size, party age and the frequency of parties' representation in government.

Dahlberg (2009) suggests that voters' agreement on party policy should be lower for catch-all parties than cadre parties, due to a higher variance of their policy positions. Attributes of catch-all parties, according to Kirchheimer (1990), are their large size and vague ideological profile. Based on this, party size is included, and thus testing for whether policy congruence between bigger parties and voters is lower compared to smaller parties. Party size is measured as the parties' share of MPs in the parliament after the election under study.<sup>14</sup>

Party age can be expected to influence policy congruence as older parties could have a clearer policy position than younger and less established parties (Dahlberg 2009). Older parties have had a longer time to establish themselves and mobilise voters. The variable on party age<sup>15</sup> included is the number of years since the party was first elected to parliament.<sup>16</sup> A similar logic can be applied to the representation of parties in government as for party age. Since

governing parties generally secure a greater amount of media coverage, they could have a clearer policy position as perceived by voters, compared to opposition parties. Governing parties can also be expected to be closer to their voters on policy, as their electoral success may be influenced by the possibility that they are actually closer to their voters than parties with less electoral success. As a measure of parties' representation in government, I use the proportion of days the parties have been represented in government in the four electoral terms preceding the election under study in each country.<sup>17</sup>

## Data Analysis

Next, I examine how style of representation affects policy congruence between parties and party voters on the level of parties, taking into account party size, party age and parties' representation in government, using bivariate correlation matrix and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. When examining the effect of the styles of representation on policy congruence, positive correlations and Beta coefficients indicate that the higher the proportion of the style in question, the higher is the figure for policy congruence; indicating that parties and party voters move further apart (distance grows). Negative correlations and Beta coefficients indicate that a higher proportion of the style is followed by lower figures on policy congruence; parties and their voters move closer together (distance shrinks).

Initial analysis is performed using Pearson *R* correlations to establish whether there is a difference in policy congruence between parties and party voters depending on style of representation and other party attributes (Table 2). In order to determine the robustness of the results, I perform this analysis twice; first with all 56 parties and then dropping parties with fewer than 30 responses from candidates (18 parties have fewer than 30 respondents, with the lowest number of respondents being nine for a single party). The correlations are robust in all cases, with the exception of the correlation between the proportion of partisans and policy congruence, which is not significant when the analysis is limited to parties with a minimum of 30 responses. Nevertheless, the direction of the correlation is the same in both instances, which justifies the use of all 56 party dyads in the remaining analysis in this article.

The bivariate correlations in Table 2 indicate that style of representation is correlated to policy congruence between parties and party voters. Contrary to hypothesis H1, which stated that the proportion of delegates within parties has no impact on policy congruence, the bivariate correlation indicates that it does indeed have an impact. The higher the proportion of representatives within parties who are delegates, the lower the congruence between parties and party voters. The bivariate correlations support my other two hypotheses regarding the impact of the proportion of partisans (H2) and trustees (H3) on policy congruence. The higher the proportion of partisans within parties, the lower is policy congruence. The relationship is the inverse for trustees; the higher the proportion of trustees within parties, the higher the congruence between parties and

TABLE 2  
CORRELATIONS OF STYLE OF REPRESENTATION, PARTY SIZE, PARTY AGE AND HOW OFTEN THE PARTIES HAVE BEEN REPRESENTED IN GOVERNMENT WITH POLICY CONGRUENCE

	Policy congruence; all parties:			Policy congruence; parties with 30 respondents or more:		
	<i>R</i>	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	<i>N</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	<i>N</i>
<i>Style of representation:</i>						
Partisanship	<b>0.35**</b>	<b>0.12**</b>	56	0.23	0.05	38
Delegation	<b>0.21<sup>+</sup></b>	<b>0.04<sup>+</sup></b>	56	<b>0.39*</b>	<b>0.15*</b>	38
Trusteeship	<b>-0.43**</b>	<b>0.18**</b>	56	<b>-0.39*</b>	<b>0.15*</b>	38
<i>Background:</i>						
Party size	0.06	0.00	56	0.10	0.01	38
Age of party	<b>-0.49**</b>	<b>0.24**</b>	56	<b>-0.52**</b>	<b>0.27**</b>	38
Representation in government	<b>-0.41*</b>	<b>0.17*</b>	56	<b>-0.29<sup>+</sup></b>	<b>0.08<sup>+</sup></b>	38

Information about incumbency is not available in the candidate data from Germany 2009 and Ireland 2007.

*Note:* Correlations are with the distance between parties and party voters on the left-right scale (policy congruence). The distance is calculated as the absolute distance between the mean self-placement of party voters, and the mean placement of the parties by their candidates. Significant coefficients are in bold figures. Significance levels: <sup>+</sup>p < 0.1; \*p < 0.05; \*\*p < 0.01; \*\*\*p < 0.001. Program: SPSS 20.



party voters. Of the other party attributes, party size does not correlate with policy congruence, but party age and the frequency of parties' representation in government do show correlations. The greater the age of the party, and the more often it has been represented in government, the higher is the policy congruence between parties and party voters.

Next, I test my three hypotheses in a full OLS regression model, including measures on style of representation, other party measures and control measures for institutional settings of the political systems. Obviously, there is a small-*n* problem, with only 56 party dyads. Moreover, the three proportions for style of representation are not independent of each other. A higher proportion in one style group is followed by lower proportions in the other two groups. For that reason, I run three OLS regressions, one for each of the three style groups. I drop party size from the analysis as it does not correlate with policy congruence (Table 2), but keep party age and frequency of parties' representation in government in the model. Here, there is a potential central tendency among voters that needs to be controlled for. This would show higher congruence between parties and party voters in the middle of the left–right spectrum. To control for this, I include polarisation on the left–right scale between the mean party voters and the mean country voter.<sup>17</sup>

An interaction coefficient between party age and frequency of parties' representation in government is added to the model, as parties that first enter parliament in one of the four electoral terms before the current election have not had the same opportunity to be represented in government as older parties. The effect of parties' representation in government could therefore be dependent on the age of the party.

Two country-level variables are included in the OLS regression as control measures: the number of effective parliamentary parties and polarisation of the party system. The number of effective parliamentary parties can affect parties' policy placement if it is assumed that the more numerous parties are, the more likely they are to spread out across the ideological spectrum. As a measure of the number of effective parties, I use relative seat share of parties in the parliament.<sup>18</sup> On a related note, polarisation of the party system can affect congruence between parties and party voters to a similar degree as the number of effective parties. The difference is that polarisation of the party system captures the dispersion of the party system on the left–right scale – not only the number and relative weight of parties.<sup>19</sup> Each regression analysis is done stepwise, including first only the party measures on style of representation and, in the second step, adding the other explanatory variables.

Table 3 presents the results of the regressions. With references to my three hypotheses, they are all supported in the full model. The proportion of delegates does not explain variance in policy congruence when controlling for other party and country measures (H1). The proportion of partisans does explain variance in policy congruence: the higher the proportion of partisans, the less policy congruence there is (H2). The relationship is the opposite for trustees, with a higher proportion associated with more policy congruence

TABLE 3  
OLS REGRESSION, DETERMINANTS OF POLICY CONGRUENCE BETWEEN PARTIES  
AND PARTY VOTERS ( $N = 56$  PARTY DYADS)

	Standardized Beta Coefficients	Standardized Beta Coefficients	Standardized Beta Coefficients
<i>Party variables:</i>			
% of partisans	<b>0.35**</b>		
% of delegates		0.21	
% of trustees			<b>-0.43**</b>
$R^2$	0.12	0.04	0.18
<i>Party variables:</i>			
% of partisans	<b>0.31*</b>		
% of delegates		-0.02	
% of trustees			<b>-0.35*</b>
Party age	<b>-0.53**</b>	<b>-0.53**</b>	<b>-0.55**</b>
Representation in government (%*100)	<b>-0.50<sup>+</sup></b>	<b>-0.64*</b>	-0.43
Polarisation, voters (mean party voter – the mean country voter)	<b>0.28*</b>	<b>0.29*</b>	<b>0.21<sup>+</sup></b>
Interaction; party age*representation in government	0.54	<b>0.68<sup>+</sup></b>	0.48
<i>Country variables:</i>			
Effective number of parliamentary parties	-0.08	-0.01	-0.04
Polarisation of the party system	-0.07	<b>-0.27*</b>	-0.04
$R^2$	0.49	0.42	0.50
Change in $R^2$ significant	0.000	0.000	0.000

*Note:* Dependent variable is policy congruence between parties and party voters, measured as the absolute distance on the left-right scale between the mean placement of party by its candidates and the mean self-placement of voters. Significant coefficients are in bold figures. Significance levels: <sup>+</sup>p < 0.1; \*p < 0.05; \*\*p < 0.01; \*\*\*p < 0.001. Program: SPSS 20. N=56 party dyads.

between parties and party voters (H3). The bivariate correlations from Table 2, between other party attributes and policy congruence between parties and party voters, are also confirmed by the regression analysis. Party age explains variance in policy congruence to the extent that congruence is higher in older parties across all three models. The frequency of parties' representation in government is associated with higher policy congruence only when the party has a high proportion of either trustees or delegates.

### Concluding Remarks

The research presented here contributes to the existing body of knowledge by combining the nature and outcome of representation in a single study analysing these factors in a country-wide comparative perspective. I establish that style of representation and the proportion of partisans and trustees relates to policy congruence between parties and party voters, at least for the 56 parties included in this study. The lack of impact of the proportion of delegates and the effect of the proportion of partisans and trustees with policy congruence is as expected. When a party has a high proportion of partisans, congruence as measured here is lower between parties and party voters. When a party has a



high proportion of trustees, it has more congruence with its voters. Party age also explains policy congruence; older parties show higher congruence between parties and party voters.

Even if the delegate role assumes that representatives' policy choices should be close to voters, it does not assume that their policy preferences should be close. Treating policy congruence as attitudinal – that is to say, how close parties are to voters on policy preferences – results in no impact of the proportion of delegates on congruence after taking account of other party attributes and characteristics of the party system. This underlines the importance of separating policy preferences from policy choice, when examining the impact of style of representation on the outcome of representation, measured as congruence between policy preferences. It is surprising that when looking at a bivariate correlation between the proportion of delegates and congruence the relationship is both positive and significant, indicating that a higher proportion of delegates are followed by lower policy congruence. This relationship disappears in the full model after controlling for other party- and country-level variables. Whether this holds true if the number of units (party dyads) is increased is beyond the scope of this article, but is a clear avenue of future research to build upon.

Parties with a high proportion of partisans seem to be pulled away from their voters. Representatives choose the partisan role when they state they would follow the party's policy, even when and if it deviates from the representatives' own opinion or the voters' views. My results contradict the responsible party model, which assumes that sticking to the party position is the best way to represent voters who have voted for the party's policy; a policy that should be closest to the voters' own preferences, according to RPM. Even more controversial for RPM is that parties with a high proportion of trustees are actually closer to voters compared to parties with a high proportion of partisans.

In line with Andeweg's (2011) suggestion, if voters today prefer their representatives to act as trustees – i.e. as long as they are competent enough to deal with the policy problems they are faced with – parties that have a high proportion of competent trustees should encourage voters to trust them, and this trust could engender congruence between parties and their voters. It is also possible that there is a systemic component influencing where representatives place their respective parties, depending on party discipline. Strong party discipline encourages representatives to take on the partisan role if they want to maintain a political career within their party. Strong party discipline should also result in more flexibility for the party leadership to place their party closer towards the ends of the left–right spectrum, away from the bulk of voters who place them closer to the centre, resulting in lower congruence between the party and its voters. Trustees could have a tendency to place their party closer to the centre of the left–right spectrum because they do not have the same constraints as partisans to follow party policy and for that reason parties with a high proportion of trustees are more congruent with their voters.

My argument is that style of representation impacts on policy congruence between parties and party voters. However, I cannot exclude the possibility that high or low congruence produces different incentives for representatives to take on certain roles. If that is indeed the case, I argue that the relation is bi-directional, and that parties' incentives, such as style of representation, weigh more heavily compared to voters' incentives. It is possible that low congruence with voters encourages representatives to take on the partisan role. If the gap between the party and voters is perceived to be wide, its representatives cannot argue that they are following the will of voters and they shift over to the policy of the party as a justification of policy choices. If congruence is perceived to be high, representatives could be encouraged to promote the trustee role, since they are already close to voters on policy, and they have to establish that they are sufficiently skilled in order to solve the policy problems with which they are faced. However, in this mutually reinforcing relationship, I argue that the style of representation weighs more heavily, assuming that parties are the leading actor in the partnership between parties and voters.

A research lead to take from here would be to examine congruence on more specific issues, including the salience of those issues in the voters' minds and how competent they consider the available parties are to deal with those issues. The effect of style of representation might be different if the focus is on single issues such as environmental protection or nationalistic issues. Another possible avenue of research would be to consider Rohrschneider and Whitefield's (2012) study on how congruence is higher when a party has a higher number of partisan voters as opposed to independent voters, and examine to what extent parties' style of representation interacts with such voters' attributes.

The focus in this study has been on attitudinal factors as reflected in styles of representation and congruence between the policy preferences of parties and their voters. I do acknowledge that MPs might (and probably will) behave differently when they are faced with an actual choice between conflicting opinions. However, establishing that there is a link between styles of representation and congruence between policy preferences of parties and voters, as has been demonstrated here, indicates that style of representation is meaningful for the outcome of representation.

### **Acknowledgements**

Drafts of this article have been presented at the 2nd CCS Plenary Conference Mannheim, 27–29 January 2012, ECPR joint sessions in Antwerp, 10–15 April, in the panel 'Perceptions of Representation: A Cross Analysis of Citizens' and MPs' Views', CDSS workshop for doctoral students at Mannheim University, spring 2012 and 22nd ECPR Standing Group Summer School 'Political Parties in Modern Democracies', Brussels, 10–22 September 2012.

Many people have offered substantial comments on the work in process. These include my supervisors, Hermann Schmitt and Olafur Th. Hardarson, as

well as Indridi Indridason, Robert Rohrschneider, Daniele Caramani, Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson, Thorunn Palina Jonsdottir, Thorbergur Thorsson, Stephanie Cox, my co-students in the CDSS programme at Mannheim University and many more.

## Notes

1. Wessels and Giebler label them as 'party delegates'.
2. Wessels and Giebler group trustees and delegates together and contrast them with partisans.
3. CSES module 3 covers Australia 2007, Ireland 2007, Netherlands 2006, Germany 2009, Iceland 2009, Portugal 2009 and Switzerland 2007.
4. In the EES study, voters were asked about what party they voted for in the previous election. In both countries, Greece and Belgium, the previous election was the 2007 election also covered in the CCS data.
5. This applies to the candidate data from Portugal 2009, Germany 2009 and Ireland 2007.
6. This applies to the candidate data from Greece 2007, Iceland 2009 and the Netherlands 2006.
7. This applies to the candidate data from Australia 2007, Belgium 2007 and Switzerland 2007.
8. The formula for policy congruence using the means is:  $LRDP_m = |V_m - P_m|$ .  $LRDP_m$  is the absolute left-right distance between the mean placement of party by its candidates and the mean self-placement of party voters,  $V_m$  is the mean left-right placement of party voters and  $P_m$  is the mean left-right placement of the party as placed by its candidates. The scales for left-right are on an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right).
9. The interpolated median takes account of the number of respondents that choose each layer on the congruence measure, in our case the left-right position. The interpolated median is computed as follows:  $IM = M + (ng - nl) / (2ne)$ ,  $IM$  is the interpolated median,  $M$  is the standard median,  $nl$  is the number of responses less than  $M$ ,  $ng$  the number of responses that are greater than  $M$  and  $ne$  is the number of responses equal to  $M$ . The distance measure is calculated using the same formula as computing the distance between the means (see note 8); <AQ4> replacing the mean with the interpolated median.
10. Andeweg uses a non-cumulative function, while Golder and Stramski use a cumulative function. See discussion on this in Andeweg (2011: 43).
11. The one exception is that the coefficient for the proportion of partisans is non-significant when policy congruence is measured as the absolute difference between the interpolated medians; in all other models it is significant and positive.
12. There is a semantic difference between questions 1 and 2, when asking voters' opinions. The response category to the first question refers to the MP's own party voters, and the second to constituency voters. However both are contrasted with either the party position or the MP's own opinion. I assume that the responses reflect a difference between a bottom-up process as the role of delegate assumes, and a top-down process inherent in the role of partisans and trustees. Based on that I take those together who choose voters in question 1 and 2 as delegates and contrast them with partisans and trustees.
13. Weighing the data by country or by party results in an increase in partisans, a slight increase in delegates and a drop in trustees. The difference between the un-weighted and weighted replies, and the harmonisation between the replies when weighted by country or by party, could indicate that there is a country difference in representatives' replies to the questions about the role of the MPs.
14. Information on the size of the parties in parliament is from the macro-data codebooks in the CSES study for all elections except the Greek and Belgian elections in 2007. Information on the size of Belgian and Greek parties is retrieved from Patrikios and Karyotis (2008) for Greece and from Pilet and van Haute (2008) for Belgium.
15. Various sources for party age are used, such as party websites, Wikipedia.org and macro-data codebooks from the CCS project. National experts have, in all cases, been asked to confirm

the coding for party age. National experts are: Rachel Gibson and Ian McAllister (Australia), Lieven de Winter and Pierre Baudewyns (Belgium), Hermann Schmitt (Germany), Theodore Chadjipadelis (Greece), Eva Heida Önnudóttir and Olafur Th. Hardarson (Iceland), Michael Marsh (Ireland), Dorien van Rheenen (Netherlands), André Freire (Portugal) and Georg Lutz (Switzerland).

16. Another possibility would be to use the number of years since the party was founded. However, there can be problems in pin-pointing the exact year for when the parties were founded, as well as mergers and splits of parties before they first enter the parliament. Whilst these problems can also occur when using the year the party first enters the parliament, I believe this is a more reliable measure. Most importantly, it should be found that party age is related to policy congruence; older parties should have higher policy congruence with their voters compared to younger parties.
17. Information on the number of days parties have been represented in government is from the Parliament and Government Composition Database (2011).
18. The absolute difference between the mean party voter and the mean country voter.
19. Formula used is: Number of effective parliamentary parties =  $1/\sum((\text{proportion of seats in the parliament})^2)$ .
20. Polarisation of the party system is calculated using the following formula from Dalton (2008):  $\text{SQRT} \{ \sum (\text{party vote share}_i) * ([\text{party L-R score}_i - \text{party system average L-R score}] / 5^2) \}$ , where  $i$  represents individual parties and L–R stands for left–right. For the parties' L–R means, I use the candidates' placement of their own party from the CCS data.

## References

- Achen, Christopher H. (1977). 'Measuring Representation: Perils of the Correlation Coefficient', *American Journal of Political Science*, 21:4, 805–15.
- Aldrich, John H. (1995). *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- American Political Science Association (APSA) (1950). 'Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties', *American Political Science Review*, 44:3, Part 2, Supplement.
- Andeweg, Rudy B. (2011). 'Approaching Perfect Policy Congruence: Measurement, Development and Relevance for Political Representation', in Martin Rosema, Bas Deters and Kees Aarts (eds.), *How Democracy Works: Political Representation and Policy Congruence in Modern Societies*. Amsterdam: Pallas Publication, 39–52.
- Andeweg, Rudy B. (2012). 'Consequences of Representatives' Role Orientations: Attitudes, Behaviour, Perceptions', in Magnus Blomgren and Olivier Rozenberg (eds.), *Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 66–84.
- Andeweg, Rudy B., and Jacques J.A. Thomassen (2005). 'Modes of Political Representation: Toward a New Typology', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 4, 507–27.
- Belchior, Ana M. (2011). 'Explaining Left–Right Party Congruence across European Party Systems: A Test of Micro, Meso and Macro Level Models'. 1st European Conference on Comparative Electoral Research, University of National and World Economy, Sofia.
- Bengtsson, Åsa, and Hanna Wass (2011). 'The Representatives Roles of MPs: A Citizen Perspective', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 34:2, 143–67.
- Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS) (n.d.). Available at <http://www.comparativecandidates.org/> (accessed 28 April 2011).
- Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) (n.d.). Available at <http://www.cses.org/plancom/plancom.htm> (accessed 23 March 2010).
- Converse, Philip E., and Roy Pierce (1986). *Political Representation in France*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University.

- Dahlberg, Stefan (2009). 'Political Parties and Perceptual Agreement: The Influence of Party Related Factors on Voters' Perceptions in Proportional Electoral Systems', *Electoral Studies*, 28:2, 270–78.
- Dalton, Russell J. (1985). 'Political Parties and Political Representation: Party Supporters and Party Elites in Nine Nations', *Comparative Political Studies*, 18:3, 267–99.
- Dalton, Russell J. (2008). 'The Quantity and Quality of Party Systems: Party Systems Polarization, its Measurement, and its Consequences', *Comparative Political Studies*, 41:7, 899–920.
- Drummond, Andrew J. (2010). 'Assimilation, Contrast and Voter Projections of Parties in Left–Right Space: Does the Electoral System Matter?', *Party Politics*, 17:6, 711–43.
- Esaiasson, Peter, and Sören Holmberg (1996). *Representation From Above: Members of Parliament and Representative Democracy in Sweden*. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
- Eulau, Heinz, and Paul D. Karps (1977). 'The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying the Components of Responsiveness', *Comparative Legislative Research Center*, 2:3, 233–54.
- Eulau, Heinz, John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson (1959). 'The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke', *American Political Science Review*, 53:3, 742–56.
- European Election Study (EES) (n.d.). Available at <http://www.ees-homepage.net/> (accessed 15 March 2012).
- Ezrow, Lawrence (2010). *Linking Citizens and Parties*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fox, Justin, and Kenneth W. Shotts (2009). 'Delegates or Trustees? A Theory of Political Accountability', *The Journal of Politics*, 71:4, 1225–37.
- Golder, Matt, and Jacek Stramski (2010). 'Ideological Congruence and Electoral Institutions', *American Journal of Political Science*, 54:1, 90–106.
- Green, Jane (2007). 'When Voters and Parties Agree: Valence Issues and Party Competition', *Political Studies*, 55, 629–55.
- Hellwig, Timothy (2008). 'Explaining the Salience of Left–Right Ideology in Post Industrial Democracies: The Role of Structural Economic Change', *European Journal of Political Research*, 47, 687–709.
- Holmberg, Sören (1997). 'Dynamic Opinion Representation', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 20:3, 265–83.
- Holmberg, Sören (2011). 'Dynamic Representation from Above', in Martin Rosema, Bas Denters and Kees Aarts (eds.), *How Democracy Works: Political Representation and Policy Congruence in Modern Societies*. Amsterdam: Pallas Publications, 53–76.
- Kirchheimer, Otto (1990). 'The Catch-All Party', in Peter Mair (ed.), *The West European Party System*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 50–60.
- Kristinsson, Gunnar Helgi (2011). 'Party Cohesion in the Icelandic Althingi', *Stjórnmal og stjórnsýsla*, 7:2, 229–51.
- Leimgruber, Philipp, Dominik Hangartner, and Lucas Leeman (2010). 'Comparing Candidates and Citizens in the Ideological Space', *Swiss Political Science Review*, 16:3, 499–531.
- Miller, Warren E., and Donald E. Stokes (1963). 'Constituency Influence in Congress', *American Political Science Review*, 57:1, 45–56.
- Parliament and Government Composition Database (2011). Available at <http://www.parlgov.org> (accessed 1 March 2012).
- Patrikios, Stratos, and Georgios Karyotis (2008). 'The Greek Parliamentary Election of 2007', *Electoral Studies*, 27:2, 356–90.
- Pilet, Jean-Benoit, and Emilie van Haute (2008). 'The Federal Elections in Belgium, June 2007', *Electoral Studies*, 27:3, 547–77.
- Powell, G. Bingham Jr. (2009) 'The Ideological Congruence Controversy: The Impact of Alternative Measures, Data, and Time Periods on the Effects of Election Rules', *Comparative Political Studies*, 42:12, 1475–97.
- Rohrschneider, Robert, and Stephen Whitefield (2012). *The Strain of Representation: How Parties Represent Diverse Voters in Western and Eastern Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.



- Rosema, Martin, Kees Aarts, and Bas Denters (2011). 'How Democracy Works: An Introduction', in Martin Rosema, Bas Denters and Kees Aarts (eds.), *How Democracy Works: Political Representation and Policy Congruence in Modern Societies*. Amsterdam: Pallas Publications, 9–17.
- Schmitt, Hermann (2010). 'Better Than it Used to Be? New Evidence on the Congruence of Voters and Their National MPs Regarding the Issue of European Integration'. The 106th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, the Omni Shoreham and the Hilton Washington, Washington, DC.
- Schmitt, Hermann, and Jacques J.A. Thomassen (2000). 'Dynamic Representation: The Case of European Integration', *European Union Politics*, 1, 318–39.
- Strøm, Kaare (2012). 'Roles as Strategies: Towards a Logic of Legislative Behaviour', in Magnus Blomgren and Olivier Rozenberg (eds.), *Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures*. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 85–100.
- Valen, Henry, and Hanne Marthe Narud (2007). 'The Conditional Party Mandate: A Model for the Study of Mass and Elite Opinion Patterns', *European Journal of Political Research*, 46, 296–318.
- Van der Eijk, Cees (2001). 'Measuring Agreement in Ordered Rating Scales', *Quality and Quantity*, 35, 325–41.
- Van der Eijk, Cees, and Hermann Schmitt (2010). 'Party Manifestos as a Basis of Citizens' Left–Right Perceptions'. The 106th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, the Omni Shoreham and the Hilton Washington, Washington, DC.
- Van der Eijk, Cees, Hermann Schmitt, and Tanja Binder (2005). 'Left–Right Orientation and Party Choice', in Jacques J.A. Thomassen (ed.), *The European Voter: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 167–91.
- Wessels, Bernhard, and Heiko Giebler (2011). 'Choosing a Style of Representation: The Role of Institutional and Organizational Incentives'. The 6th ECPR General, Reykjavik.
- Wessels, Bernhard, and Hermann Schmitt (2008). 'Meaningful Choices, Political Supply and Institutional Effectiveness', *Electoral Studies*, 27, 19–30.

## APPENDIX I

	Vote share in the election (%)	Policy congruence between parties and voters	Party size; share of MPs in the parliament (%)	Party age; years since the party first entered the parliament	Proportion of days the party has been represented in government in the four former electoral terms (%)	Polarisation, voters - the distance between the mean party voter from the mean country voter	Effective number of parliamentary parties	Polarisation of the party system
<i>Australia 2007</i>								
Liberal Party of Australia	36.28	0.84	36.7	58	72	2.5	2.2	2.6
Australian Labor Party	43.38	0.56	55.3	106	0	0.3	2.2	2.6
National Party of Australia	5.49	0.40	6.7	87	72	2.2	2.2	2.6
<i>Belgium 2007</i>								
Socialist Party	10.86	0.51	13.3	113	65	1.2	7.9	3.9
Reformist Movement	12.52	0.96	15.3	160	0	2.6	7.9	3.9
Humanist Democratic Center	6.06	0.70	6.7	137	100	0.1	7.9	3.9
Ecolo	5.10	0.72	5.3	26	0	1.7	7.9	3.9
National Front	1.97	1.99	0.7	16	40	3.6	7.9	3.9
Christian Democratic and Flemish in alliance with	18.50	0.31	20.0	137	0	0.9	7.9	3.9
<i>Germany 2009</i>								
New-Flemish Alliance*		1.33		4	20	1.8	7.9	3.9
Socialist Party, Different in alliance with Spirit*	10.26	0.66	9.3	113	0	1.3	7.9	3.9
Open VLD	11.83	0.22	12.0	160	15	2.2	7.9	3.9
Flemish Interest	11.99	2.39	11.3	29	78	1.0	7.9	3.9
Green!	3.98	2.43	2.7	26	78	3.9	7.9	3.9
List Dedeker	4.03	1.57	3.3	0	0	2.8	7.9	3.9
<i>Germany 2009</i>								
Social Democratic Party	23.00	0.85	23.5	56	57	1.9	4.8	3.7
Christian Democratic Union	27.30	0.41	31.2	56	42	1.3	4.8	3.7
Christian Social Union	6.50	0.13	7.2	56	42	1.8	4.8	3.7
Free Democratic Party	14.60	0.13	15.0	56	21	0.5	4.8	3.7
Alliance 90 / Greens	10.70	0.37	10.9	12	36	1.8	4.8	3.7
Left Party	11.90	1.27	12.2	15	0	3.7	4.8	3.7
<i>Greece 2007</i>								
New Democracy	41.84	2.72	50.7	33	78	0.6	2.6	2.5
Panhellenic Socialist Movement	38.10	2.10	34.0	33	78	1.3	2.6	2.5

(Continued)

APPENDIX I (Continued)

	Vote share in the election (%)	Policy congruence between parties and voters	Party size; share of MPs in the parliament (%)	Party age; years since the party first entered the parliament	Proportion of days the party has been represented in government in the four former electoral terms (%)	Polarisation, voters - the distance between the mean party voter from the mean country voter	Effective number of parliamentary parties	Polarisation of the party system
<i>Iceland 2009</i>								
Social Democratic Alliance	29.80	0.74	31.7	86	15	1.0	4.2	3.9
Progressive Party	14.80	0.53	14.3	93	93	0.3	4.2	3.9
Independence Party	23.70	0.25	25.4	80	98	2.8	4.2	3.9
Left Green Movement	21.70	1.38	22.2	53	9	2.8	4.2	3.9
Civic Movement	7.20	0.42	6.3	0	0	0.3	4.2	3.9
<i>Ireland 2007</i>								
Fianna Fáil	41.60	1.68	47.0	81	85	0.8	3.1	2.2
Fine Gael	27.30	0.45	30.7	84	21	1.4	3.1	2.2
Labour Party	10.10	1.10	12.0	85	32	2.3	3.1	2.2
Green Party	4.70	1.90	3.6	18	0	1.4	3.1	2.2
Progressive Democrats	2.70	0.24	1.2	22	74	2.7	3.1	2.2
Sinn Féin	6.90	2.51	2.4	10	0	1.1	3.1	2.2
<i>Netherlands 2006</i>								
Christian Democratic Appeal	26.51	0.73	29.1	127	48	1.1	5.5	3.9
PvdA Labour Party	21.19	0.24	23.4	60	51	1.2	5.5	3.9
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	14.67	0.17	15.6	58	100	2.3	5.5	3.9
Green Left	4.60	0.83	5.0	17	0	2.4	5.5	3.9
Socialist Party	16.58	2.45	17.7	12	0	3.5	5.5	3.9
Democrats 66	1.90	0.48	2.1	39	69	0.1	5.5	3.9
Christian Union	3.97	1.88	4.3	43	0	0.4	5.5	3.9
SGP Political Reformed Party	1.56	0.23	1.4	84	0	3.0	5.5	3.9
Party for the Animals	1.83	0.65	1.4	0	0	0.9	5.5	3.9
<i>Portugal 2009</i>								
Left Bloc	9.81	1.84	7.0	10	0	3.7	3.1	4.2
People's Party	10.43	1.83	9.1	33	0	3.4	3.1	4.2
Democratic Unity Coalition	7.86	1.22	6.5	33	23	3.9	3.1	4.2
Social Democratic	29.11	1.23	35.2	33	62	1.1	3.1	4.2
Socialist	36.56	1.12	42.2	33	100	1.1	3.1	4.2

(Continued)



APPENDIX I (Continued)

	Vote share in the election (%)	Policy congruence between parties and voters	Party size; share of MPs in the parliament (%)	Party age; years since the party first entered the parliament	Proportion of days the party has been represented in government in the four former electoral terms (%)	Polarisation, voters - the distance between the mean party voter from the mean country voter	Effective number of parliamentary parties	Polarisation of the party system
<i>Switzerland 2007</i>								
Christian Democratic People's Party	14.50	0.41	15.5	95	80	0.4	5.0	5.2
Radical - Democratic Party	15.80	0.47	15.5	113	80	1.8	5.0	5.2
(Swiss) People's Party	28.90	1.38	31.0	71	80	3.8	5.0	5.2
Social Democratic Party	19.50	1.12	21.5	119	80	2.8	5.0	5.2
(Swiss) Green Party	9.60	1.00	10.0	24	0	2.7	5.0	5.2
Liberal Party	1.90	0.59	2.0	94	0	2.6	5.0	5.2
(Protestant) Evangelical People's Party	2.40	0.42	1.0	88	0	0.4	5.0	5.2

\*The vote share and the share of MPs for coalition parties are reported jointly for both coalition partners.

APPENDIX II

	Interpolated median. Higher figures indicate less congruence.	Number of agreements. Higher figures indicate more congruence.	Cumulative distribution function of the number of agreements. Higher figures indicate less congruence.
Standardized Beta Coefficients			
<i>Party variables:</i>			
Partisanship	0.17	-0.42**	0.42**
Delegation			
Trusteeship		-0.35**	0.51***
R <sup>2</sup>			0.23 <sup>+</sup>
<i>Party variables:</i>			
Partisanship			
Delegation	0.03	0.17	0.17
Trusteeship	0.13	-0.39**	0.39**
Party age			0.02
Representation in government	-0.45*	-0.29*	0.46***
Polarisation, voters (mean party voter – the mean country voter)	-0.53*	-0.47**	0.52**
Interaction; party age*representation in government	0.43***	0.37**	-0.51*
	0.49	0.39	-0.72*
		-0.75*	0.33*
		-0.89*	0.75*
<i>Country variables:</i>			
Effective number of parliamentary parties	-0.07	0.02	-0.02
Polarisation of the party system	0.06	-0.09	0.09
R <sup>2</sup>	0.54	0.51	0.51
Change in R <sup>2</sup> significant	0.000	0.000	0.000

*Note:* Dependent variables are policy congruence between parties and party voters, measured as 1) the absolute distance on the left-right scale between the interpolated median placement of party by its candidates and the interpolated median self-placement of voters (van der Eijk 2001), 2) the number of agreements (Andrews's 2011) and 3) the cumulative distribution function of agreements (Golder and Stramski 2010). Significance levels: <sup>+</sup> p < 0.1; \*p < 0.05; \*\*p < 0.01; \*\*\*p < 0.001. Program: SPSS 20. N=56 party dyads.

**Title:** Styles of representation and voters' evaluations of democratic performance: Parties and party voters

**Author:** Eva H. Önnudóttir  
Post-doctoral researcher  
Political science, University of Iceland  
Email: eho@hi.is

*Manuscript submitted to Representation for review on 15 March 2015*

*Manuscript accepted on 29 September 2016 for publication in Representation*

Word count (excluding abstract, title page, appendices, tables and figures): 7467

**Author biography:**

Eva H. Önnudóttir is a post-doctoral researcher in political science at the University of Iceland. She defended her PhD at the CDSS / University of Mannheim in 2015. Her PhD project constituted of papers and the one presented here is part of that project. Önnudóttir is the director of the Icelandic Candidate Survey since 2009 and she is a member of various research networks such as the True European Voter (TEV) the Comparative Candidate Surveys (CCS) and the Icelandic National Election Study (ICENES).

**Acknowledgements:**

I would like to thank my two PhD supervisors, Hermann Schmitt and Ólafur Þ. Harðarson, for substantial comments on the work in process, as well as those who commented on an earlier draft of this paper when it was presented at the 'The True European Voter: A strategy for analysing the prospects of electoral democracy that includes the West, the South and the East of the continent' and 'The 3<sup>rd</sup> European Conference on Comparative Electoral Research' 24-27 April 2014, Thessaloniki, Greece.

The author's PhD projects was funded by CDSS and MZES and the University of Mannheim, and by The Icelandic Research Fund for Students

## **Abstract**

This paper combines the nature and outcome of representation by analysing how different styles of representation emphasised within parties explain party voters' evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy in their country, using for parties the Comparative Candidates Survey and for voters the European Social Survey 2012. Styles of representation are defined at the party level as the proportions of representatives within parties who are partisans, delegates or trustees. The results show that the more the trustee style is emphasised within parties, the more positively the performance of liberal democracy is evaluated. The relation for the delegate style is inverse; the more that style is emphasised, the more negatively democratic performance is rated, while the effect for the partisan style is negligible. It is argued that trustee parties are those who gain from the current political system, and are able to mobilise voters who evaluate liberal democracy positively, as opposed to voters of delegate parties which are less satisfied and evaluate democratic performance more negatively.

Keywords: Styles of representation, political parties, party voters, party dyads and performance of democracy.

## Introduction

---

One of the distinguishing features of representative democracy is the electoral linkage where voters on the demand side of democracy choose their representatives on the supply side of democracy (Castiglione and Warren 2006: 6). This paper combines those two sides by analysing how party characteristics in modern democracies explain party voters' evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy in their countries. Political parties are key actors in the intermediation of interests and policy preferences in modern democracies (Mair 2006: 12), and thus it is meaningful to examine whether there is a link between the structure and make-up of parties and their voters' evaluations of liberal democracy.

Furthermore, this paper combines two main concepts which are generally theorised about and analysed separately in studies of representation, and those are the nature and outcome of representation (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005: 507). The nature of representation concerns the relationship between representatives and the represented, while outcome is about how representation manifests. Nature of representation as how to represent, using here styles of representation, divided into partisan, trustee and delegate styles, is linked both to normative and practical debate about democracy (Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012: 4-5). These styles are about, *inter alia*, what criteria elected representatives should use for decision making—whether they should use their own judgement as trustees, whether they should follow their respective party's policy as partisans or whether they should follow the will of voters as delegates.

Complicating this debate is that democratic representation is, by its nature, a collective representing a collective (Castiglione and Warren 2006: 12-13). The individual-level focus is limited when it comes to understanding and analysing the demand and the supply sides of representation together, the dyadic link between the represented and those who represent (Schmitt and Thomassen 2000: 321). The content and the form of this link is

disputed, both due to different ideas about how representation ought to work, as the three styles of representation, trustee, partisan and delegate styles reflect, and due to differences in expectations of democratic representation. Considering the outcome of representation, it is debated whether parties do represent their voters on policies and/or issues (e.g. Hooghe et al. 2002: 973-976), which can be labelled as objective outcome of representation. Party voters' evaluations of the performance of their political regime can be considered as a subjective outcome of representation, reflecting how content they are with the state of affairs in their political system. Different expectations about democracy is of importance when it comes to understanding how supportive people are of their political system. Those who prioritize means of democracy (such a free and fair election) over its ends (such as policy responsiveness) have been found to be more likely to support the incumbent government compared to those who prioritise the ends of democracy over its means (e.g. Baviskar and Malone [2004: 14-15]; Fuchs [1999: 142-45]). This highlights that those who expect more of democracy in terms of what it delivers seem to hold the political authorities to a higher standard and underlines the importance of taking into account the differences in expectations about democracy.

As pointed out by Easton (1975b: 436), evaluations of democratic performance are one of the foundations for support for the political system. The question asked here is whether differences in evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy manifests in the electoral linkage between parties and their voters. More specifically the question is whether party voters evaluate the performance of their democracy differently depending on the extent to which the trustee, partisan or delegate styles are emphasised within the party they voted for, and if so, why? Implicit in these questions is whether the nature of representation has consequences for its outcome; and this is a largely unexplored field in studies about representation. The main findings are that when the trustee style is prevalent within parties,

voters of those parties evaluate the performance of liberal democracy more positively, voters of delegate parties evaluate it negatively and the relation is negligent for partisan parties.

These findings could reflect that trustee parties are those who gain the most from the current political system and thus manage to attract voters who have a favorable view of the performance of the system, while it is the other way around for delegate parties. By combining the demand and supply side together in one study, I follow Easton's (1973; 7-8) notion, which assumes that each part of the larger political whole is related to one another or as in his words: "...the operation of no one part can be fully understood without reference to the way which the whole itself operates" (7-8).

For my case, I use 72 party dyads, constituting of party voters and political parties who gained representation in 11 elections in Europe in the 2000s (Belgium 2007, Denmark 2011, Germany 2009, Finland 2011, Hungary 2010, Iceland 2009, Ireland 2007, the Netherlands 2006, Portugal 2009, Sweden 2010 and Switzerland 2011). In the following sections I first discuss the theoretical background of my study, both in what mobilises voters' evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy in their country, and what mobilises different styles within parties. The next section after that discusses the dyadic link between parties and their voters and the hypotheses tested in this paper. After that I move on to the description of the research design, data and measurements, followed by analysis of the data and a discussion.

## **Evaluations of liberal democratic performance**

---

The term 'political support' was introduced by Easton (1973: 14-15) as an important concept for the legitimacy of the political regime, the political community and the political authorities. Easton argued that political support is on a continuum from diffuse support for the political regime to specific support for the authorities. Building on Easton's framework,

Norris (1999b: 9-13) argues that it ranges from support for the political regime to support for political actors, with three levels in between—regime principles, regime performance and regime institutions. Support for the political regime is about attachment to the nation as a community. Regimes' principles concern the values of the political system, or in the case of modern democracies, support for democracy as the legitimate system of governance. Support for regime performance is about the performance of the political system. On the level of regime institutions, support concerns the authorities, such as the government and the legislative bodies, and support for political actors refers to support for the politicians themselves.

The distinction between the different levels of support indicates that people can express high support for one or some levels and low for others (e.g. Dalton 1999: 74-77). However, as pointed out by Easton (1975a: 16), the distinction between different levels of support does not mean that they are fully independent of one another. It is generally found in modern democracies that support for the political regime and principle is high, while support for its performance or incumbent authorities varies (e.g. van Ham and Thomassen 2014: 10-13). The widespread diffuse support is usually interpreted as a support for the democratic system—and an indicator of its legitimacy being in good shape. At the same time fluctuations or changes in support with how it is implemented, its performance and political actors, are interpreted as 'support for' and not as indicators about how legitimate the political system is or is perceived to be. However, it has repeatedly been suggested (e.g. Magalhães [2014a: 92]; Norris [1999a: 264-68]) that a long-term dissatisfaction and low support towards the end of specific support might consequently undermine support towards the diffuse end of the continuum of political support.

Voters' evaluations of the performance of their democracy can be considered as important foundations for their support on the level of regime performance (Gómez and



Palacios [2016: 157-158]; Easton [1975b: 436]). Different explanations for what mobilises support on this level have been, for example, the cognitive mobilisation of citizens (Dalton 2006: 262-64), perceptions and/or levels of corruption (Kubbe [2013: 117]; Stokemer and Sundstrøm [2013: 137]), and institutional effectiveness of the political system (Norris 2011: 116). An analysis of data from the European Social Survey 2012 shows that while Europeans widely share a liberal view of democracy, most notably emphasising the rule of law and free and fair elections as indispensable for democracy (Hernández 2016: 63). However, there are differences in how demanding they are of democracy, as for example democracy in terms of social justice and the use of elements of direct democracy (Kriesi et al. 2016: 86-87). Using the same data, Ceka and Magalhães (2016: 109-110) establish that those who are privileged are more likely to defend the status quo of their current political and institutional system, while the underprivileged are more likely to endorse a change. In both new and old democracies, high social status citizens (in terms of education) are less supportive of social justice in the sense of redistributive policies, compared to low social status individuals. In new democracies, where liberal democracy is weaker compared to older ones, and in countries that do not make use of direct democracy, high social status individuals are less supportive of both liberal and direct democracy. Ceka and Magalhães argue that these differences are due to that low social status individuals have more to gain to from changes in the system, while high status individuals are content with it as it is. Torcal and Trechsel (2016: 217-224), using the same data, establish that those who place higher importance on liberal democracy are also more likely to evaluate it positively, and that this effect is more pronounced among those who voted for an incumbent government party in the last election. In their analysis, party identifiers, are also more likely to evaluate liberal democracy more positively compared to those who do not identify with a party, and this they say confirms the importance of party supply and its proximity to citizens' preferences. This could also mean

that supporters of the status quo, including party identifiers, are those who evaluate the performance of liberal democracy more positively and are more likely to vote for political parties that represent and gain from the current political system. Using almost an identical scale for evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy (explained in more details in the section ‘Research design’), I test whether party voters’ evaluate the performance in their countries differently depending on the extent of which different styles of representation are emphasised within their parties.

## **Styles of representation**

---

Since the early days of representative studies, two dominant models of representation have been widely disputed, the trustee versus delegate model and the political parties model (Thomassen 1994: 237). The former refers to the mandate-independence controversy, whether elected representatives should behave as trustees and follow their own judgement when making decisions or act as delegates following the will of voters (e.g. Eulau and Karps 1977: 242-43). The political party model, also referred to as the Responsible Party Model (RPM) (e.g. Thomassen 1994: 251-52), adds the role of the partisan, which are those who emphasise that their party’s policy should be decisive in decision making. Both those models have been criticised for being both unrealistic and outdated. However, the fact that those are still quite dominant in studies on representation (e.g. Andeweg [2012: 65-69]; Fox and Shotts [2009: 1225]) reflects that, even if not without flaws, they touch upon core elements of democratic representation—about whom and how to represent. Converse and Pierce (1986) argue that a threefold distinction, adding the partisan style to the trustee and delegate styles, is closer to capturing the political reality, specifically in party centered systems.

In the discussion about styles of representation it is of importance what criterion representatives should use for decision making. For the delegate and partisan styles, the

criterion is in both cases a ‘will of a collective’, the voters for delegates and their party’s policy for the partisans. Önnudóttir (2014a: 2-3) makes the point that in both cases representatives’ own policy preferences can deviate from the preferences of the relevant collective, and that the emphasis is on that representatives’ policy choices and decision making reflecting the preference of the ‘collective’. Only in the case of the trustee style, the criterion for decision making coincides with the policy preferences of the representatives’ themselves because they are expected to use their own judgement when making decisions.

Why representatives take on certain roles has been explained, under the rational choice approach, to be determined by the utility of different strategies to help representatives to reach their goals (Strøm 2012: 86-89). This approach assumes that representatives’ role-choice is conditioned by the means they have to realise their preferences for a certain outcome, such as an election or selection as candidates. How they reach those goals is most notably conditioned by the rules of the electoral system and the control their parties have over their representatives’ career paths. Supporting this are the findings that the greater power the parties’ leaderships have over the selection of candidates, the more likely they are to contain a high number of partisan candidates and less of trustees, party socialisation encourages the partisan style and discourages the delegate style, and parties that are frequently represented in the government are more likely to contain a high number of trustees and less likely to contain a high number of delegates (Önnudóttir 2014b: 8-9). It has also been established that parties that contain a high proportion of trustee candidates have more congruence on the left-right continuum with its voters, compared to parties where the partisan style is widely emphasised (Önnudóttir 2014a: 15-16). These findings suggest that trustee parties can be regarded as those who gain the most from the status quo of the current political system, as they are both more often part of the government and are closer to their voters on the left-right continuum.

## The dyadic link between parties and party voters

---

As already mentioned, the partisan style is in line with RPM, which is as an ideal model for how representation should work (e.g. Thomassen 1994: 237). RPM assumes that political parties are the uniting link between the policy preferences of voters and representatives. The parties offer different policy packages, voters choose the policy package of a party that is closest to their own policy preferences and the parties' representatives carry out the policy of their parties. RPM has been criticised because it does not give room for voters to choose parties based on other factors than their own or the parties' policy preferences, for being too strict in assuming that voters know their own and/or the parties' policy preferences, and because it does not offer flexibility for individual MPs to deviate from their party's policies (e.g. Thomassen [1994]; Valen and Narud [2007: 294]).

There are some aspects of RPM that have been shown to be more relevant than others, and those are about the link between representatives and parties. Parties do constrain politicians in their actions (Aldrich 2011: 297), and it has been established that partisan representatives are closer to their own party on policy compared to non-partisans (Wessels and Giebler 2011: 19). Given that party socialisation and the more control the parties' leaderships have over nomination, the more likely parties are to contain a high proportion of partisans (Önnudóttir 2014b: 8-9), the part of RPM about whether this constraint translates into more positive evaluations of liberal democracy among the voters of those parties is tested here. Furthermore, if RPM is a successful model for representation, in the sense that those constraints lead to that the parties' policies are implemented, voters of those parties should be happier with democratic performance when the representatives' of their party stick to the party line or:

H1: The higher the proportion of partisans within parties, the more positively party voters evaluate the performance of liberal democracy.

The delegate style assumes that voters' opinion should be followed regardless of representatives own opinions or their party's policy. This style has been criticized for being over-demanding, assuming that voters have stable and exogenous policy preferences (Thomassen 1994: 242-43), and it is unclear how those demands should be made known to representatives. It can be reasoned that the delegate style has a populist element to it, meaning that the will of voters should be decisive in policy making and actions are justified by appealing to the people (Jagers and Walgrave 2007: 322). Implicit in the delegate style is the assumption that voters are a united group, with 'one single will' that can be translated into decisions taken on their behalf. Parties that emphasise the delegate style are less often represented in government (Önnudóttir 2014b: 8-9) and for that reason they could be more likely to advocate a change from the status quo of the political system as they are not gaining from it as it is in terms of holding a government position. Furthermore, if the delegate style fits the populist platform of right-wing and/or anti-establishment parties, which have been shown to both mobilise on and fuel voters' discontent (e.g. van der Brug [2003: 89]; Rydgren [2005: 419]), voters of delegate parties should express more negative evaluations of the performance of their democracies, including liberal the liberal aspect of their democracies. Thus, I hypothesise that:

H2: The higher the proportion of delegates within parties the more negatively party voters evaluate the performance of liberal democracy.

The trustee style assumes that representatives use their own judgement when making policy decisions. Inherent in it is that representatives get a mandate from voters to make informed decisions based on their own deliberation. The trustee style has been shown to be more common among government-seeking parties, and it has been suggested that could be due to a socialisation effect, where representatives of those parties are more used to thinking about decision making for the greater good, a focus of representation which is closely linked to the trustee style (Önnudóttir 2014b: 9). A different line of argument is that the utility of the trustee style could be greater under Rohrschneider and Whitefield's (2012: 23-26) 'strain of representation', which is the challenge parties in modern democracies face competing for and representing increasingly diverse voters. Under this strain the trustee style might be a useful strategy to secure as many votes as possible to maximise the parties' chance of entering the government. Trustee parties have been shown to be more congruent with their voters on the left-right continuum, compared to partisan and delegate parties (Önnudóttir 2014a: 15-16). That could indicate that trustee parties are more successful in capturing both the votes of independent and partisan median voters, assuming that they maximise their share of votes close to the centre of the left-right spectrum, where the bulk of voters are placed. This could also mean that trustee parties are those who gain the most from the current political system, as they are both more often represented in government (Önnudóttir 2014b: 8-9) and closer to the median voter on policy. Trustee parties could thus be perceived as the defenders of the status quo of the political and institutional system and as such an attractive option for voters that evaluate the performance of liberal democracy as good and have less need for a change in the system compared to voters that evaluate it more negatively.

Regardless of whether the trustee style is emphasised because of strain of representation, due to a socialisation effect from being a part of a government-seeking party, or because those parties are the ones who gain the most from the current political system, all

reflect that the trustee style is promoted under certain conditions within the political system. The socialisation effect as such should not necessarily have consequences for party voters' evaluations of their democratic system, but if the trustee style is a successful strategy to deal with the complexity of the issue space and diverse electorate, and are perceived as the defenders of the current political system, they should be an attractive option for voters that evaluate democratic performance more positively, or:

H3: The higher the proportion of trustees within parties the more positively do party voters evaluate the performance of liberal democracy.

## Research design

---

The main data-sources used in this paper are the Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS) and the European Social Survey (ESS) round six. Together CCS and ESS cover in total 72 parties from 11 countries: Belgium 2007, Denmark 2011, Germany 2009, Finland 2011, Hungary 2010, Iceland 2009, Ireland 2007, the Netherlands 2006, Portugal 2009, Sweden 2010 and Switzerland 2011. Parties and party voters are paired into party dyads, linking the candidates' party from the CCS data to voters of the same party in the ESS. In 3 of the countries, Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands, the question about vote-recall in the ESS data does not cover the same election as in the CCS data. Thus, I include a dummy for these in the models to control for a possible bias arising from the time lag between the CCS and ESS data.

### *Party voters' evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy*

In ESS round six from 2012 there is a battery of ten question pairs (all together 20 questions) that do tap into respondents' evaluations of the performance of different aspects of liberal

democracy and the importance of those same factors in their respective countries. The questions are regarding the evaluation of the performance and importance of:<sup>1</sup>


- a. Free and fair elections (national)
- b. Voters discussing politics with people they know before deciding how to vote
- c. Different political parties offering clear alternatives to one another
- d. Opposition parties' freedom to criticise the government
- e. The government explaining its decisions to voters
- f. The punishment of governing parties in elections when they have done a bad job
- g. The media's freedom to criticise the government
- h. The media providing citizens with reliable information to judge the government
- i. The protection of the rights of minority groups
- j. The courts treating everyone the same

Kriesi et al. (2016: 69-77) and Gómez and Palacios (2016: 161) treat those ten items as part of a liberal democracy scale<sup>2</sup> which includes two subscales, electoral democracy (items a to f) and liberalism (items g to j). Kriesi et al. (2016: 69-77) show that the two subscales are highly correlated, meaning that if one is liberal democrat one is also an electoral democrat and the other way around. In this paper I use the ten items that evaluate the performance of liberal democracy, using the half of the question pairs that ask about how well each item applies to the respondents' country. A mean score is calculated for each respondent's evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy. Given that there might be a difference in the importance respondents place on each item, such as that some might say that it is extremely important for democracy that the government explains its decisions to voters while others rate it as only modestly important, each item on the evaluation scale is weighted by



how important respondents deem that item to be for democracy. In Appendix I, the procedure of the calculation of this scale and weighting is explained in more detail. In the final step, arriving at the party level and the response variable in my models, the means of the evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy are calculated for each group of party voters where higher values indicate more positive evaluations. A table showing the means for each group of party voters as well as values, and their sources, for all other variables used in this study is in Appendix II.

Figure 1 shows the mean values on the scale for the evaluations of liberal democracy for each country, and the dots around the country means show the distribution of the party means within each country. There is a country variation in the evaluation ratings, where those are lowest in Portugal and Hungary and highest in Sweden and Denmark. It is also noted that three of the eleven countries in this dataset, Portugal, Ireland and Iceland, were seriously affected by the global credit crunch in 2008 (Magalhães 2014b), which could lead to more negative evaluations for the performance of liberal democracy in those countries compared to times when their economies are in better shape. As a control variable, I calculate for each group of party voters the absolute distance between their means on evaluations of liberal democracy and the country mean. I include this measure in my models to control for a possible bias due to the country variation in voters' evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy, thereby controlling for a possible bias due to differences in the countries' economic performance.



**Figure 1. Evaluation of liberal democratic performance, country and party means**

### *Styles of representation*

For styles of representation emphasised within parties I make use of three questions from the CCS project. Those are about how an MP should vote in parliament if there are different opinions between:

1. The party position and his/her party voters' opinion.
2. Constituency voters' opinion and MP's opinion.
3. Party position and MP's opinion.

For each of the three styles I use two out of the three questions. Those who name the party in items 1 and 3 are partisans, those who say that the MP's opinion when contrasted with voters and party in items 2 and 3 are trustees, and those who say that the MP should follow the voters'<sup>3</sup> views in items 1 and 2 are delegates. Those who cannot be categorised according to this rule are coded as 'non-classifiable'.

Party measures on styles of representation are done by calculating the proportions of representatives within parties who are: 1) partisans, 2) delegates or 3) trustees. Table 1 shows an example of the distribution of styles within the Belgian parties. The party measure used in my models for the Socialist Party in Belgium is 39.0 for the proportion of partisans, 34.2 for trustees and 12.2 for delegates.

**Table 1. Styles of representation within parties, an example from Belgium**

	% of partisans	% of trustees	% of delegates	% of non-classifiables	N
<i>Belgium</i>					
Socialist Party	39.0%	34.2%	12.2%	14.6%	41
Reformist Movement	28.3%	32.6%	13.0%	26.1%	46
Humanist Democratic Center	44.4%	33.3%	8.3%	13.9%	36
Ecolo	47.7%	27.3%	2.3%	22.7%	44
Christian Democratic and Flemish	41.7%	31.3%	16.7%	10.4%	48
New-Flemish Alliance	20.0%	33.3%	40.0%	6.7%	15
Soicalist Party. Different - SP.A	57.1%	28.6%	14.3%	0%	35
Open VLD (Flemish Liberals and Democrats)	32.0%	30.0%	28.0%	10.0%	50
Flemist Interest	38.2%	29.4%	23.5%	8.8%	34
Green!	32.1%	48.2%	12.5%	7.2%	56

Note: See a list for all parties in Appendix II

### *Control variables*

Given that the number of observations are 72 party dyads from eleven elections, there is limited flexibility for a great number of control variables. By including the aforementioned control, the absolute distance between the parties' and countries' mean on evaluations of the

performance of liberal democracy should, to some extent, control for a possible bias due to a differences in perceptions of the performance between countries. Other control variables are discussed shortly below.

Given that right-wing voters and voters of government parties are more likely to evaluate liberal democracy more positively (Torcal and Trechsel 2016: 218-220), I include control variables for both of those factors. Older parties might be perceived as having a clearer policy position as perceived by voters (Dahlberg 2009: 272), a greater likelihood of having governing experience and to be part of the established political system. Because of this, voters of older parties might evaluate the performance of liberal democracy more positively, and thus I control for the parties' age, using the number of years since the party was first elected to parliament. The effect of parties' representation in government could be dependent on the age of the party, and for that reason an interaction term between those two variables is added to the models. Finally I control for the number of effective parties because a variety in policy options could bring about more positive evaluations of liberal democracy. The reasoning is that the more parties voters can choose from, the more likely it is that they find a fit between their own preferences and the preferences of the party they vote for (Wessels and Schmitt 2008: 20-21) and thus feel better represented and evaluate the performance of liberal democracy more positively.

## **Party characteristics and party voters' evaluations of democratic performance**

---

To test my hypotheses about the link between styles of representation emphasised within parties and party voters' evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy, I use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions. The proportions for styles of representation within parties are dependent on each other; a higher proportion in one group is followed by lower

proportions in the other two groups. Thus the regressions are done separately for each style group in three steps. In the first step, I include only the proportion for the extent to which the partisan, delegate or trustee styles are emphasised within parties. The second step adds other party characteristics, and the third one adds the control variables for the countries.

The first hypothesis (H1), that the higher proportion of partisans within parties there is, the more positively party voters evaluate liberal democracy in their country is not supported (Table 2). Explained variance is almost non-existent ( $R^2$ : .01) with only the proportion of partisans in the first step, and the direction of the effect is only as hypothesised in the third step. In the delegate model, hypothesis two (H2) is supported; a higher proportion of delegates within parties goes together with more negative evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy. The third hypothesis (H3) is supported as well. The more prevalent the trustee style is within parties the more positively do its voters rate liberal democracy in their country.

In Figures 2 and 3 the unstandardized predicted values for party voters' evaluation of liberal democratic performance are plotted for the two styles of representation that contribute to perceived democratic performance, both for the total number of parties and for each country<sup>4</sup>. Figure 2 shows a clear trend of a negative relation between the delegate style and evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy for almost all of the countries and the total number of parties. Dropping the outlier in the lower right corner (the Hungarian party *Jobbik*) lowers the explained variance from .33 to .28. In two countries, Denmark and Sweden, the relation is almost non-existent. In those two countries the range of the extent to which the delegate style is emphasised within parties is very narrow, and that is a possible explanation for the negligent effect there.


**Table 2. Party attributes and party voters' evaluations of liberal democratic performance**

Step:	Partisan			Delegate			Trustee		
	Standardized Betas			Standardized Betas			Standardized Betas		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
% of party representatives who are:									
Partisans	-.12	-.16	.17						
Delegates				-.39**	-.37**	-.45***			
Trustees							.45***	.50***	.35*
<i>Party variables</i>									
Socialist/communist party/social democratic party		-.20	-.24*		-.23*	-.22*		-.16	-.17+
Representation in government		.15	.27		.06	-.04		-.03	.03
Party age		.52*	.41*		.31	.31+		.53**	.52**
Representation in government*party age		-.48	-.55		-.30	-.24		-.40	-.44
Distance between party voters' mean on democratic performance and the country means		.02	.04		-.03	.04		.06	.08
<i>Country variables</i>									
Number of effective parties			.33*			.14			.12
Dummy variable for Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands			-.58***			-.53***			-.27+
Intercept, p-value	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
R <sup>2</sup> :	.01	.12	.33	.16	.23	.47	.20	.32	.38
Change in R2 significant, p value:	.318	.059	.000	.001	.102	.000	.000	.014	.145

Note: Response variable is party voters' evaluations of democratic performance on ten items. Cronbach's alpha for the ten items is .89. Higher values indicate better (perceived) performance. Significance levels: +p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001. N=72 party dyads.

In Figures 2 and 3 the unstandardized predicted values for party voters' evaluation of liberal democratic performance are plotted for the two styles of representation that contribute to perceived democratic performance, both for the total number of parties and for each country<sup>4</sup>. Figure 2 shows a clear trend of a negative relation between the delegate style and evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy for almost all of the countries and the total number of parties. Dropping the outlier in the lower right corner (the Hungarian party *Jobbik*) lowers the explained variance from .33 to .28. In two countries, Denmark and Sweden, the relation is


almost non-existent. In those two countries the range of the extent to which the delegate style is emphasised within parties is very narrow, and that is a possible explanation for the negligent effect there.



**Figure 2. Predicted values for party voters' evaluations of liberal democratic performance and the proportion of delegates within parties**

Examining the relation between the proportion of trustees within parties and the predicted values for party voters' evaluation of the performance of liberal democracy, there is a strong, almost universal, positive trend (Figure 3). The total variance explained is quite high, .56, and in all countries except Iceland, there is a positive linear trend, indicating that the more the trustee style is emphasised the happier party voters are about the performance of liberal democracy. In Iceland, there seems to be no relation, or even a slight negative trend, indicating that in that country there are other factors than the extent to which the trustee style

is emphasised that explains voters' perceptions of the performance liberal democracy. In Belgium the trend is positive, but it is driven by one party, the *Green Party*. But in general, the trustee style seems to be a strong mover of party voters' perceived performance of liberal democracy in their countries.



**Figure 3. Predicted values for party voters' evaluations of liberal democratic performance and the proportion of trustees within parties**

## Conclusion

The extent to which the delegate and trustee styles are emphasised within parties are clearly linked to party voters' evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy in their countries. For both the partisan and the trustee style, party voters' evaluations of liberal



democratic performance are more positive the higher the proportion of each style within parties, but only in the case of the trustee style is this effect strong enough to gain statistical significance. The negligible effect of the partisan style indicates that RPM might not be a successful model to mobilise and attract voters that evaluate the performance of liberal democracy positively. However, whether this holds true if the number of units is increased is beyond the scope of this paper, but is a clear avenue of future research to build upon.

Finding that the more the delegate style is prevalent within parties the worse party voters evaluate the performance of liberal democracy goes against the popular belief that the ‘will of the voters’ is a successful decision making style in politics. It is also quite possible that protest parties, such as extreme right-wing parties and/or anti-establishment parties, are more likely to emphasise the delegate style because that style fits their populist message referring to ‘the will of the people’ against the political establishment. Given that such parties are prone to both mobilise on and fuel the discontent of voters (e.g. van der Brug [2003: 89]; Rydgren [2005: 419]), the delegate style could both be a useful strategy to capture the votes of discontent voters as well as contribute to their discontent. Furthermore, delegate parties are less often represented in government (Önnudóttir 2014b: 8-9) and are as such underprivileged in terms of government status and more likely to support a change in the current political system. Delegate parties can be regarded as parties that are not happy with the state of affairs in their political systems, and attract to voters that evaluate liberal democracy more negatively compared to voters of other kinds of parties.

The fact that an increasing proportion of trustees within parties goes together with more positive evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy could reflect that the trustee style is a successful strategy to mobilise heterogeneous voters on a diverse issue space. Under Rohrschneider and Whitefield’s (2012: 23-26) ‘representational strain’, parties might promote the trustee style as a strategy to maximise votes. ‘New’ issues on the political

agenda, such as the protection of the environment or immigration (Hooghe et al.2002: 976-77), are an add-on to ‘older’ traditional issues such as privatisation and social-security. Given that parties cannot mobilise only partisan voters on all of those issues, they have to convince as many voters as possible that they are competent enough to deal with all of them. Under those conditions, the trustee style might work better, than both the partisan and the delegate style, as a useful strategy to capture as many votes as possible. The success of the trustee style for party voters’ evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy in their country could also indicate that trustee parties, which have been shown to be more often represented in government (Önnudóttir 2014b: 8-9), and are closer to their voters on the left-right space (Önnudóttir 2014a: 15-16), are parties that gain from the current political and institutional system. Those parties can therefore be considered to be defenders of the status quo and to feel low or no need for a change in the system, and to be able to mobilise voters that feel the same and evaluate the performance of liberal democracy positively. If this is the case, it has implications for an understanding of why the different styles are promoted, and that one of the incentives for parties to emphasise certain styles is how much they gain from their current political system and they are able to translate this gain or loss into mobilising the votes of voters’ that share their need for either protecting the status quo or their need for a change.

The results in this paper give a valuable insight into how different workings of parties are linked with different levels of evaluations of liberal democratic performance between groups of party voters. This does not mean that party voters are aware of the prevalent styles of representation within parties nor the extent to which each style is emphasised. Even if party voters are not aware of the extent to which the different styles of representation are emphasised within parties, they are presented with other things, such as how the parties convey their message, most notably through political campaigns. Whether there is a difference in how parties campaign or inform voters by other means about their policy

preferences, depending on which style of representation is emphasised within parties, could be considered for future research. The importance of party characteristics in explaining evaluations of liberal democratic performance on the level of political parties has implications for research on the individual level for performance evaluations. Both the different attributes of parties, such as their emphasis in how to represent and the difference between party voters' in their perceptions about what is considered important for democracy, should be taken into account when analysing evaluations of democratic performance.

## **Endnotes**

1. See Appendix I for the full question text and response scales.
2. In Gómez and Palacios' (2016: 161) construction of the scale for respondents' evaluations of the performance of liberal democracy they use one additional item about whether politicians take into account the views of other European government before making decisions. This item ranks the lowest in Kriesi et al's (2016; 73) analysis of the importance placed on liberal democracy, and for that reason, as well as that it could be linked to how integrated the countries are in European affairs, I exclude the item from the calculation of the scale for evaluation of liberal democratic performance.
3. There is a difference in terminology about voters between questions 1 and 2, the former asking about 'his/her party voters' and the latter about 'constituency voters'. However, both are contrasted with either the party position or the MP's own opinion. For that reason it is meaningful to apply the delegate role to those who name voters in question 1 and 2 and contrast them with partisans and trustees.

4. The predicted values are calculated from full models (step 3) of the three regression models presented in Table 2. The dummy variables for social democratic/left wing parties and Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands are held constant at 1. Other variables are held constant at their means.

## Bibliography

---

- ALDRICH, JOHN H. 2011. *Why Parties?: A Second Look*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- ANDEWEG, RUDY B. 2012. The consequences of representatives' role orientations: attitudes behaviour perceptions. In *Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures*, edited by Magnus Blomgren and Olivier Rozenberg. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 66-84.
- ANDEWEG, RUDY B. and JACQUES J.A. THOMASSEN. 2005. Modes of political representation: Towards a new typology. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 30 (4): 507-28.
- BAVISKAR, SIDDHARTHA and MARY FRANT MALONE. 2004. What democracy means to citizens - and why it matters. *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, 76 (April): 3-23.
- BLOMGREN, MAGNUS and OLIVIER ROZENBERG. 2012. Introduction. In *Parliamentary roles in modern legislatures*, edited by Magnus Blomgren and Olivier Rozenberg. Oxon: Routledge, pp. 1-7
- CASTIGLIONE, DARIO and MARK E WARREN. 2006. Rethinking democratic representation: Eight theoretical issues. Prepared for 'Rethinking Democratic Representation' hosted by the Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. 18-19 May.

- CEKA, BESIR and PEDRO MAGALHÃES. 2016. How people understand democracy: A social dominance approach. . In *How European View and Evaluate Democracy*, edited by Mónica Ferrín and Hanspeter Kriesi. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 90-110.
- CONVERSE PHILIP E. and ROY PIERCE. 1986. *Political representation in France*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University.
- DAHLBERG, STEFAN. 2009. Political Parties and Perceptual Agreement: The Influence of Party Related Factors on Voters' Perceptions in Proportional Electoral Systems. *Electoral Studies*, 28 (2): 270-78.
- DALTON, RUSSELL J. 1999. Political support in advanced industrial democracies. In *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic governance*, edited by Pippa Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 57-77
- DALTON, RUSSELL J. 2006. *Citizen politics: Public opinion and political parties in advanced industrial democracies*. 4<sup>th</sup> edition. Washington DC: CQ Press.
- EASTON, DAVID. 1965. *A framework for political analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- EASTON, DAVID. 1975a. An approach to the analysis of political systems. In *Politiske Systemer*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, pp.8-23.
- EASTON, DAVID. 1975b. A re-assessment of the concept of political support. *British Journal of Political Science*, 5 (4): 435-57.
- EULAU, HEINZ and PAUL D KARPS. 1977. The puzzle of representation: Specifying the components of responsiveness. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 2 (3): 233-54.
- FOX, JUSTIN and KENNETH W. SHOTTS. 2009. Delegates or trustees? A theory of political accountability. *The Journal of Politics*, 71 (4): 1225-1237.

- GÓMEZ, BRAULIO and IRENE PALACIOS. 2016. Citizens' evaluations of democracy: A microscope with quality seal. In *How European View and Evaluate Democracy*, edited by Mónica Ferrín and Hanspeter Kriesi. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.155-77.
- FUCHS, DIETER. 1999. The democratic culture of unified Germany. In *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic governance*, edited by Pippa Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.123-45.
- HERNÁNDEZ, ENRIQUE. 2016. Europeans' views of democracy: The core elements of democracy. In *How European View and Evaluate Democracy*, edited by Mónica Ferrín and Hanspeter Kriesi. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 43-63.
- HOLMBERG, SÖREN. 1999. Down and down we go: Political trust in Sweden. In *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic governance*, edited by Pippa Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.103-22.
- HOOGHE, LIESBET and GARY MARKS, CAROLE J. WILSON. 2002. Does left/right structure party positions on European integration? *Comparative Political Studies*, 35 (8): 965-89.
- INGLEHART, RONALD and JACQUES-RENÉ RABIER. 1986. Political realignment in advanced industrial society: From class-based politics to quality-of-life politics. *Government and Opposition*, 21 (4): 456-79.
- JAGERS, JAN and STEEFAN WALGRAVE. 2007. Populism as Political Communication style: An Empirical Study of Political Parties' Discourse in Belgium, *European Journal of Political Research*, 46 (3): 319-45.
- KLINGEMAN, HANS-DIETER. 1999. Mapping political support in the 1990s: A global analysis. In *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic governance*, edited by Pippa Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.31-56.

- KRIESI, HANSPETER, WILLEM SARIS and PAOLO MONCAGATTA. 2016. The structure of Europeans' views of democracy: Citizens' models of democracy. . In *How European View and Evaluate Democracy*, edited by Mónica Ferrín and Hanspeter Kriesi. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 64-89.
- KUBBE, INA. 2013. Corruption and trust: a model design. In *(Dys)-functionalities of corruption: Comparative perspectives and methodological pluralism*, edited by Tobias Debiel and Andrea Gawrich. Wiesbaden: Springer VS., pp.117-36.
- LAASKO, MAARKU and REIN TAAGEPERA. 1979. "Effective" number of parties: A measure with application to West Europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 12 (1): 3-27.
- MAGALHÃES, PEDRO C. 2014a. Government effectiveness and support for democracy. *European Journal of Political Research*, 53: 77-97.
- MAGALHÃES, PEDRO C. 2014b. Introduction – Financial crisis, austerity, and electoral politics. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 24 (2): 125-33.
- MAIR, PETER. 2006. *Polity-scepticism, party failings and the challenge to European Democracy*. Wassenar: NIAS, Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- NORRIS, PIPPA. 1999a. Conclusions: The growth of critical citizens and its consequences. In *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic governance*, edited by Pippa Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 257-72.
- NORRIS, PIPPA. 1999b. Introduction: The growth of critical citizens. In *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic governance*, edited by Pippa Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-27.
- NORRIS, PIPPA. 2011. Does democratic satisfaction reflect regime performance? In *Political representation and policy congruence in modern societies*, edited by Martin

- Rosema, Bas Denters and Kees Aarts. Amsterdam: Pallas Publications - Amsterdam University Press, pp.115-35.
- ÖNNUDÓTTIR, EVA H. 2014a. Policy congruence and style of representation: Party voters and political parties. *West European Politics*, 37 (3): 538-63.
- ÖNNUDÓTTIR, EVA H. 2014b. Political parties and styles of representation. *Party Politics*, published online before print December 8, 2014.
- ROHRSCHEIDER, ROBERT and STEPHEN WHITEFIELD. 2012. *The strain of representation: How parties represent diverse voters in Western and Eastern Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- RYDGREN, JENS. 2005. Is extreme right-wing populism contagious?: Explaining the emergence of a new party family. *European Journal of Political Research*, 44(3-4): 413-37.
- SCHMITT, HERMANN and JACQUES J.A THOMASSEN. 2000. Dynamic representation: The case of European integration. *European Union Politics*, 1 (3): 318-39.
- STRØM, KAARE. 2012. Roles as strategies: Towards a logic of legislative behavior. In *Parliamentary roles in modern legislatures*, edited by Magnus Blomgren and Olivier Rozenberg. Oxon: Routledge, pp.85-100.
- STOKEMER, DANIEL and SUNDSTRØM, AKSEL. 2013. Corruption and citizens' satisfaction with democracy in Europe: what is the empirical linkage? In *(Dys-)functionalities of corruption: Comparative perspectives and methodological pluralism*, edited by Tobia Debiał and Andrea Gawrich. Wiesbaden: Springer VS., pp.137-58.
- THOMASSEN, JACQUES. 1994. Empirical research into representation: Failing democracy or failing models. In M. Kent Jennings and Thomas E. Mann, *Elections at home and*



- abroad: Essays in honor of Warren E. Miller*, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, pp. 237-64.
- THOMASSEN, JACQUES and CAROLIEN VAN HAM. 2014. Failing representation or a change in kind? Models of representation and empirical trends in Europe. *West European Politics*, 37 (2): 400-19.
- TORCAL, MARIANO and ALEXANDER H. TRECHSEL. 2016. Explaining citizens' evaluations of democracy. . In *How European View and Evaluate Democracy*, edited by Mónica Ferrín and Hanspeter Kriesi. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 206-34.
- VALEN, HENRY and HANNE MARTHE NARUD. 2007. The conditional party mandate: A model for the study of mass and elite opinion patterns. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46 (3): 296-316.
- VAN DER BRUG, WOUTER. 2003. How LPF fuelled discontent: Empirical tests of explanations of LPF support. *Acta Politica*, 38 (1): 89-106.
- WESSELS, BERNHARD and HEIKO GIEBLER. 2011. Choosing a style of representation: The role of institutional and organizational incentives. Prepared for '6<sup>th</sup> General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research' in Reykjavik, Iceland, 25-27 August 2011.
- WESSELS, BERNHARD and HERMANN SCHMITT. 2008. Meaningful Choices, Political Supply and Institutional Effectiveness. *Electoral Studies*, 27 (1): 19-30.

## Appendix I -

---

*Questions in the European Social Survey round six, about different aspects of democracy.*

*Questions about importance:*

Using this card, please tell me how important you think it is for democracy in general...

- ...that national elections are free and fair?
- ...that voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote?
- ...that different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another?
- ...that opposition parties are free to criticise the government?
- ...that the media are free to criticise the government?
- ...that the media provide citizens with reliable information to judge the government?
- ...that the rights of minority groups are protected?
- ...that the courts treat everyone the same?
- ...that governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job?
- ...that the government explains its decisions to voters?

Response scales are on 11 point scales from 0 (not at all important for democracy) to 10 (extremely important for democracy).

*Questions about performance:*

Using this card, please tell me to what extent you think each of the following statements applies in [country]. 0 means that you think the statement does not apply at all and 10 means you think it applies completely.

- National elections in [country] are free and fair.

- Voters in [country] discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote.
- Different political parties in [country] offer clear alternatives to one another.
- Opposition parties in [country] are free to criticise the government.
- The media in [country] are free to criticise the government.
- The media in [country] provide citizens with reliable information to judge the government.
- The rights of minority groups in [country] are protected.
- The courts in [country] treat everyone the same.
- Governing parties in [country] are punished in elections when they have done a bad job.
- The government in [country] explains its decisions to voters?

Response scales are on 11 point scales from 0 (does not apply at all) to 10 (applies completely).

*The calculation of a ten-item scale, capturing respondents' evaluations of democratic performance:*

The mean score on the ten items are calculated for each individual respondent. Each item is weighted by the importance the respondent places on that item. In this process the importance ratings are rescaled to an 11 point scale ranging from 0 to 1. For example, if a respondent gives 'a free and fair election' a score of five and 'courts treat ought to treat everyone the same' a score of 8 on the importance ratings, his performance evaluations of 'free and fair elections' is weighted by .5 and by .8 of 'courts treat everyone the same' in the calculation of the respondent's mean on a ten-item scale of for his/her evaluation of democratic performance.

## Appendix II

	Party voters' evaluations of democratic performance <sup>1</sup>	Number of responses in the CCS data (candidates) <sup>2</sup>	Proportion of partisans <sup>2</sup>	Proportion of trustees <sup>2</sup>	Proportion of delegates <sup>2</sup>	Proportion of non-classifiabiles <sup>2</sup>	Socialist/communist/social democratic party <sup>3</sup>	Party age <sup>4</sup>	Proportion of representation in government in the four preceding electoral terms <sup>5</sup>	Country means evaluations of democracy <sup>6</sup>	Number of effective parties <sup>7</sup>
<i>Belgium</i>											
Socialist Party	4.79	41	39.0%	34.2%	12.2%	14.6%	Yes	113	100%	5.2	7.9
Reformist Movement	5.05	46	28.3%	32.6%	13.0%	26.1%	No	160	40%		
Humanist Democratic Center	5.34	36	44.4%	33.3%	8.3%	13.9%	No	137	65%		
Ecolo	5.23	44	47.7%	27.3%	2.3%	22.7%	No	26	20%		
Christian Democratic and Flemish	5.42	48	41.7%	31.3%	16.7%	10.4%	No	137	65%		
New-Flemish Alliance	5.40	15	20.0%	33.3%	40.0%	6.7%	No	4	00%		
Socialist Party, Different - SP.A	5.49	35	57.1%	28.6%	14.3%	0.0%	Yes	113	100%		
Open VLD (Flemish Liberals and Democrats)	5.73	50	32.0%	30.0%	28.0%	10.0%	No	160	40%		
Flemish Interest	4.81	34	38.2%	29.4%	23.5%	8.8%	No	29	00%		
Green!	5.90	56	32.1%	48.2%	12.5%	7.2%	No	26	20%		
<i>Denmark</i>											
Danish Social Democrats	6.82	21	47.6%	42.9%	4.8%	4.7%	Yes	127	24%	6.7	5.9
Danish Social-Liberal Party	7.10	23	26.1%	65.2%	8.7%	0.0%	No	105	24%		
Conservative Party	6.59	25	24.0%	72.0%	4.0%	0.0%	No	93	76%		
Socialist People's Party	6.76	28	35.7%	64.3%	0.0%	0.0%	Yes	51	0%		
Danish Peoples Party	6.34	32	56.3%	40.6%	0.0%	3.1%	No	13	0%		
Venstre	6.99	22	22.7%	77.3%	0.0%	0.0%	No	141	76%		
Liberal Alliance	6.90	27	18.5%	66.7%	7.4%	7.4%	No	4	0%		

	Party voters' evaluations of democratic performance <sup>1</sup>	Number of responses in the CCS data (candidates) <sup>2</sup>	Proportion of partisans <sup>2</sup>	Proportion of trustees <sup>2</sup>	Proportion of delegates <sup>2</sup>	Proportion of non-classifiabiles <sup>2</sup>	Socialist/communist/social democratic party <sup>3</sup>	Party age <sup>4</sup>	Proportion of representation in government in the four preceding electoral terms <sup>5</sup>	Country means evaluations of democracy <sup>6</sup>	Number of effective parties <sup>7</sup>
<i>Finland</i>										6.2	5.8
National Coalition Party	6.38	63	25.8%	50.0%	14.5%	9.7%	No	92	75%		
Social Democratic Party of Finland	6.37	86	20.7%	47.6%	14.6%	17.1%	Yes	104	75%		
The Finns Party	6.20	96	10.8%	52.7%	32.3%	4.3%	No	12	0%		
Center Party of Finland	6.33	86	14.5%	50.6%	24.1%	10.8%	No	104	50%		
The Left Alliance	6.32	103	16.0%	59.0%	16.0%	9.0%	Yes	66	50%		
Green League	6.53	88	9.2%	78.2%	8.1%	4.6%	No	24	70%		
Christian Democrats in Finland	6.56	81	16.3%	53.8%	21.3%	8.8%	No	41	0%		
Swedish People's Party in Finland	6.35	42	14.6%	61.0%	4.9%	19.5%	No	104	100%		
<i>Germany</i>										6.1	4.8
Social Democratic Party	6.33	151	19.9%	56.3%	9.3%	14.6%	No	60	57%		
Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union <sup>8</sup>	6.28	163	9.3%	75.5%	8.4%	6.8%	No	60	42%		
Free Democratic Party	6.46	143	6.3%	77.6%	5.6%	10.5%	No	60	21%		
Alliance 90 / Greens	6.36	151	4.6%	79.5%	8.0%	7.9%	No	16	36%		
Left Party	5.85	137	13.1%	51.8%	23.4%	11.7%	Yes	19	0%		
<i>Hungary</i>										4.9	2.0
Fidesz / Christian Democratic People's Party	5.49	150	27.2%	14.3%	40.8%	17.7%	No	20	27%		
Hungarian Socialist Party	4.44	53	46.2%	15.4%	26.9%	11.6%	Yes	20	76%		
Jobbik	4.87	111	9.1%	14.6%	73.6%	2.7%	No	0	0%		
Politics Can be Different	4.91	70	7.5%	38.8%	41.8%	11.9%	No	0	0%		
<i>Iceland</i>										5.7	4.2
Social Democratic Alliance	5.86	74	10.8%	58.1%	16.2%	14.9%	Yes	86	15%		
Progressive Party	5.97	65	16.9%	61.5%	7.7%	13.9%	No	93	93%		
Independence Party	5.99	56	8.9%	73.2%	7.1%	10.7%	No	80	98%		
Left Green Movement	5.66	68	13.2%	52.9%	17.7%	16.2%	No	53	9%		
Civic Movement	5.54	63	6.3%	63.5%	25.4%	4.8%	No	0	0%		

Proportion of representation in government in the four preceding electoral terms <sup>5</sup>												
	Party voters' evaluations of democratic performance <sup>1</sup>	Number of responses in the CCS data (candidates) <sup>2</sup>	Proportion of partisans <sup>2</sup>	Proportion of trustees <sup>2</sup>	Proportion of delegates <sup>2</sup>	Proportion of non-classifiabiles <sup>2</sup>	Socialist/communist/social democratic party <sup>3</sup>	Party age <sup>4</sup>	Country means		Number of effective parties <sup>7</sup>	
									evaluations of democracy <sup>6</sup>	proceeding electoral terms <sup>5</sup>		
<i>Ireland</i>												
Fianna Fáil	6.27	42	57.1%	14.3%	7.1%	21.4%	No	81	85%	5.8	3.1	
Fine Gael	6.00	36	44.4%	30.6%	8.3%	16.7%	No	84	21%			
Labour Party	5.90	17	47.1%	17.7%	23.5%	11.8%	Yes	85	32%			
Green Party	6.10	28	53.6%	28.6%	14.3%	3.6%	No	18	0%			
Sinn Féin	4.91	12	66.7%	0.0%	16.7%	16.7%	No	10	0%			
<i>Netherlands</i>												
Christian Democratic Appeal	5.85	30	56.7%	30.0%	0.0%	13.3%	No	127	48%	5.9	5.5	
PvdA Labour Party	6.16	21	33.3%	47.6%	9.5%	9.5%	Yes	60	51%			
Peoples Party for Freedom and Democracy	6.09	26	30.8%	46.2%	15.4%	7.7%	No	58	100%			
Green Left	6.10	11	27.3%	72.7%	0.0%	0.0%	No	17	0%			
Socialist Party	5.84	25	64.0%	28.0%	0.0%	8.0%	Yes	12	0%			
Democrats 66	6.41	18	22.2%	72.2%	0.0%	5.6%	Yes	39	69%			
Christian Union	5.72	9	55.6%	33.3%	0.0%	11.1%	No	43	0%			
SGP Political Reformed Party	5.60	11	63.6%	27.3%	9.1%	0.0%	No	84	0%			
Party for the Animals	5.82	11	36.4%	27.3%	9.1%	27.3%	No	0	0%	4.6	3.1	
<i>Portugal</i>												
Left Bloc	4.76	41	12.2%	39.0%	39.0%	9.8%	Yes	10	0%			
Peoples Party	4.99	54	18.5%	33.3%	37.0%	11.1%	No	33	0%			
Democratic Unity Coalition	5.04	25	52.0%	20.0%	28.0%	0.0%	Yes	33	0%			
Social Democratic	4.49	49	26.5%	42.9%	22.5%	8.2%	Yes	33	23%			
Socialist	4.59	25	24.0%	52.0%	16.0%	8.0%	Yes	33	62%			
<i>Sweden</i>												
Center Party	6.87	196	38.8%	37.8%	16.3%	7.1%	No	96	14%	6.9	4.5	
Liberal Party	7.05	147	26.5%	38.8%	21.8%	12.9%	No	99	14%			
Christian Democrats	7.16	192	36.5%	38.5%	15.1%	9.9%	No	25	14%			
Green Party	7.14	197	21.8%	42.1%	27.4%	8.6%	No	22	0%			
Conservatives / Moderate party	7.11	256	46.9%	24.6%	17.6%	10.9%	No	106	14%			
Social Democrats	7.09	256	53.1%	24.6%	12.5%	9.8%	Yes	99	43%			
Sweden Democrats	6.34	25	60.0%	24.0%	12.0%	4.0%	No	0	0%			
Left Party	6.55	187	39.0%	34.2%	16.6%	10.2%	Yes	93	0%			

Party voters' evaluations of democratic performance <sup>1</sup>		Number of responses in the CCS data (candidates) <sup>2</sup>	Proportion of partisans <sup>2</sup>	Proportion of trustees <sup>2</sup>	Proportion of delegates <sup>2</sup>	Proportion of non-classifiabiles <sup>2</sup>	Socialist/communist/social democratic party <sup>3</sup>	Party age <sup>4</sup>	Proportion of representation in government in the four preceding electoral terms <sup>5</sup>	Country means evaluations of democracy <sup>6</sup>	Number of effective parties <sup>7</sup>
<i>Switzerland</i>											
Swiss People's Party		6.1	103	15.5%	54.4%	26.2%	No	75	95%	6.2	5.6
Social Democratic Party		5.9	167	15.0%	67.1%	9.6%	Yes	123	100%		
FDP.The Liberals		6.4	124	12.1%	62.9%	21.8%	No	117	100%		
Christian Democratic People's Party		6.4	131	9.2%	55.0%	31.3%	No	99	100%		
Green Party		6.7	130	9.2%	73.8%	13.8%	No	26	0%		
Green Liberal Party		6.7	72	4.2%	70.8%	20.8%	No	4	0%		

<sup>1</sup> Data available through European Social Survey. Retrieved 1 January 2014 from: [www.europeansocialsurvey.org](http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org). See Appendix I for explanation about how this scale is calculated.

<sup>2</sup> Data available through DARIS - Data and Research Information Services of FORS. Retrieved 1 February 2015 from: <http://www.comparativecandidates.org/data-access>

<sup>3</sup> Based on the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), left-wing parties (socialist/communist and social democratic parties) are contrasted with other party types. Data available through Manifesto Project Database. Retrieved 20 April 2014 from: <https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/>

<sup>4</sup> Information about party age is from party websites, Wikipedia.org and macro-data codebooks from the CCS project. National experts have, in all cases, been asked to confirm the coding for party age. National experts are: Lieven de Winter and Pierre Baudewyns (Belgium), Christian Elmelund-Præsteker (Denmark), Åsa Bengtsson (Finland), Zsolt Enyedi (Hungary), Hermann Schmitt (Germany), Eva H. Önmudóttir and Ólafur P. Harðarson (Iceland), Michael Marsh (Ireland), Dorien van Rheenen (Netherlands), André Freire (Portugal), Henrik Oscarsson (Sweden) and Georg Lutz (Switzerland).

<sup>5</sup> For parties' representation in government, I use information from the Parliament and Government Composition Database6 (ParlGov) to control for the proportion of time each party has been represented in government in the four preceding electoral terms. Data available through Parliament and Government Composition Database. Retrieved 1 March 2012 from: [www.parlgov.org](http://www.parlgov.org)

<sup>6</sup> The absolute distance between the country mean and the party mean on evaluations of democratic performance.

<sup>7</sup> For number of effective parties I use Laasko and Taagepera's (1979) calculation of the relative seat share of parties in the parliament, calculated as such:  $\text{parties} = 1/\sum(\text{proportion of seats in the parliament})^2$ .

<sup>8</sup> CSU and CDU were combined in the ESS data but two separate items in the CCS data. When calculating combined measures for CSU/CDU the data is weighted by the parties size in the parliament after the election covered in the CCS data (the 2009 general election in Germany).

