Holding individual representatives accountable : the role of electoral systems

Rudolph, Lukas ; Däubler, Thomas

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/685378
URL: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/68537...
Document Type: Article
Year of publication: 2016
The title of a journal, publication series: The Journal of Politics : JOP
Volume: 78
Issue number: 3
Page range: 746-762
Place of publication: Chicago, IL
Publishing house: University of Chicago Press
ISSN: 0022-3816 , 1468-2508
Publication language: English
Institution: Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > Mannheim Centre for European Social Research - Research Department B
Subject: 320 Political science
Abstract: Voters are reluctant to sanction representatives for individual misconduct if they have to balance candidate-level and party-level factors in their choice, but this trade-off is affected by the electoral system. Our general theoretical model explains why individual accountability can empirically occur in single-member district (SMD) systems but is expected under less restrictive conditions using open-list proportional representation (OLPR). The latter not only decouples party and candidate choice but also makes seat allocation more vote elastic. For a thorough empirical test of our argument, we draw on real-world evidence from state-level elections in Bavaria, Germany, which are held under an unusual mixed-member system. Exploiting a recent public scandal involving one-third of representatives, we examine how electoral punishment of the same candidates by the same voters differs across electoral rules. Drawing on difference-in-differences as well as matching/regression estimators, we show that electoral punishment is substantially larger under OLPR than under SMD systems.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

Metadata export


+ Search Authors in

+ Page Views

Hits per month over past year

Detailed information

You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail

Actions (login required)

Show item Show item