Competition between two-sided platforms is shaped by the possibility of multihoming. If
users on both sides singlehome, each platform provides users on either side exclusive access
to its users on the other side. In contrast, if users on one side can multihome, platforms exert
monopoly power on that side and compete on the singlehoming side. This paper explores
the allocative effects of such a change from single- to multihoming. Our results challenge the
conventional wisdom, according to which the possibility of multihoming hurts the side that
can multihome, while benefiting the other side. This is not always true: the opposite may happen or both sides may benefit.
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