Strategic delegation and international permit markets : why linking may fail

Habla, Wolfgang ; Winkler, Ralph

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URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-433663
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2017
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 17-025
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: D72 , H23 , H41 , Q54 , Q58,
Keywords (English): Non-cooperative climate policy , political economy , emissions trading , linking of permit markets , strategic delegation
Abstract: We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select agents caring less for environmental damages than they do themselves in case of an international market regime, while they opt for self-representation in case of domestic markets. This strategic delegation incentive renders the linking of permit markets less attractive and constitutes a novel explanation for the reluctance to establish non-cooperative international permit markets.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.

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