Linear voting rules


Grüner, Hans Peter ; Tröger, Thomas


[img]
Preview
PDF
18-01_Grüner, Tröger.pdf - Published

Download (687kB)

URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/43628
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-436284
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2018
The title of a journal, publication series: Working Paper Series
Volume: 18-01
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > VWL, Wirtschaftspolitik (Grüner)
MADOC publication series: Department of Economics > Working Paper Series
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: D71 , D72 , D82,
Keywords (English): Mechanisms design , optimal voting rules , costly voting , compulsory voting , quorum rules
Abstract: How should a society choose between two social alternatives if participation in the decision process is voluntary and costly and monetary transfers are not feasible? Considering symmetric voters with private valuations, we show that it is utilitarian-optimal to use a linear voting rule: votes get alternativedependent weights, and a default obtains if the weighted sum of votes stays below some threshold. Standard quorum rules are not optimal. We develop a perturbation method to characterize equilibria in the case of small participation costs and show that leaving participation voluntary increases welfare for linear rules that are optimal under compulsory participation.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




+ Citation Example and Export

Grüner, Hans Peter ; Tröger, Thomas (2018) Linear voting rules. Open Access Working Paper Series Mannheim 18-01 [Working paper]
[img]
Preview


+ Search Authors in

+ Download Statistics

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics



You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail


Actions (login required)

Show item Show item