Cross-border tax evasion after the common reporting standard : game over?

Casi-Eberhard, Elisa ; Spengel, Christoph ; Stage, Barbara

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URL:	https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/46754
URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-467540
Dokumenttyp:	Arbeitspapier
Erscheinungsjahr:	2018
Titel einer Zeitschrift oder einer Reihe:	ZEW Discussion Papers
Band/Volume:	18-036
Ort der Veröffentlichung:	Mannheim
Sprache der Veröffentlichung:	Englisch
Einrichtung:	Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > GESS - CDSB (BWL) Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Fakultät für Betriebswirtschaftslehre > ABWL u. Betriebswirtschaftliche Steuerlehre II (Spengel 2006-)
MADOC-Schriftenreihe:	Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Fachgebiet:	330 Wirtschaft
Fachklassifikation:	JEL: F42 , G21 , H26 , H31,
Freie Schlagwörter (Englisch):	Tax evasion , automatic exchange of information , offshore locations , cross-border deposits
Abstract:	Back in 2013, the Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) was endorsed as the prevailing universal solution to fight cross-border tax evasion. In this regard, the OECD launched a global standard for the AEOI, the Common Reporting Standard (CRS). Currently, around 100 jurisdictions have committed to implement it into respective national laws by 2018. In this study, we analyze the impact of the CRS on cross-border tax evasion using a difference-in-difference research design. By considering a period of four years (2014-2017), results suggest that the CRS induced a reduction of 14% in cross-border deposits parked in offshore locations for tax evasion purposes. Moreover, such wealth and related income has not been repatriated but rather a new location to avoid domestic tax obligations has emerged. More specifically, upon the CRS implementation at domestic level, the United States (U.S.), i.e. the only major economy in the world, which so far did not commit to the CRS, seems to emerge as a potentially attractive location for cross-border tax evasion.