Vote buying in the US Congress


Matter, Ulrich ; Roberti, Paolo ; Slotwinski, Michaela


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URL: https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/53652
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-536527
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2019
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 19-052
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: D72 , D78,
Keywords (English): Legislative voting , campaign finance , special interest groups , lobbying , forensic economics
Abstract: We assess the influence of moneyed interests on legislative decisions. Our theory predicts that the vote outcome distribution and donation flows in a legislature feature a discontinuity at the approval threshold of bills if special interest groups are involved in vote buying. Testing the theoretical predictions based on two decades of roll-call voting in the U.S. House, we identify the link between narrowly passed bills and well-timed campaign contributions. Several pieces of evidence substantiate our main finding, suggesting that moneyed interests exert remarkably effective control over the passage of contested bills

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.




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Matter, Ulrich ; Roberti, Paolo ; Slotwinski, Michaela (2019) Vote buying in the US Congress. Open Access ZEW Discussion Papers Mannheim 19-052 [Working paper]
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