Every year thousands of Örms are engaged in research joint ventures (RJV), where all knowl-edge gained through R&D is shared among members. Most of the empirical literature as-sumes members are non-cooperative in the product market. But many RJV members arerivals leaving open the possibility that Örms may form RJVs to facilitate collusion. Weexploit variation in RJV formation generated by a policy change that a§ects the collusivebeneÖts but not the research synergies associated with an RJV. We estimate an RJV partic-ipation equation and Önd the decision to join is impacted by the policy change. Our resultsare consistent with research joint ventures serving a collusive function
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Auch veröff. als: Robert Day School Working Paper ; 2009-12
Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.
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