An iterative deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast and fair childcare assignment

Reischmann, Tobias ; Klein, Thilo ; Giegerich, Sven

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URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-613361
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2021
The title of a journal, publication series: ZEW Discussion Papers
Volume: 21-095
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: Sonstige Einrichtungen > ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
MADOC publication series: Veröffentlichungen des ZEW (Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung) > ZEW Discussion Papers
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: C78 , D02 , D47 , D82 , I24,
Keywords (English): childcare assignment , deferred acceptance algorithm
Abstract: We design and implement an iterative, program-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism with ties (IDAT) and apply it to childcare assignment in two German cities. The mechanism can accommodate complementarities in providers' preferences, is fast to terminate even in larger cities, is difficult to manipulate in practice, and produces stable allocations. It can be further sped up by introducing two new features. First, allowing for an arbitrary share of facilities who participate in a centralized manner by submitting a rank- order-list over applicants. Second, by breaking ties in applicants' rankorder-lists on a first-come-first-serve basis, which sets incentives for programs to propose faster.

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