This paper examines the use of ESG performance metrics in executive compensation contracts. We first document that a growing fraction of publicly traded companies around the world now incorporate ESG metrics in the compensation schemes of their top executives. Our analysis links the reliance on these metrics to firm fundamentals, the geographic location of firms as well as the influence of institutional shareholders. Our findings also suggest that the adoption of ESG variables in managerial performance measures is accompanied by improvements in ESG performance and meaningful changes in the compensation of executives.
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Executive compensation tied to ESG performance:
International evidence. (deposited 14 Jun 2022 12:39)[currently selected]
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