information aggregation , committee decision making , cognitive biases , informational lobbying
Abstract:
Information about the impact of policies is indispensable for political decision making. In politics, exchange of information in committees or the knowledge of experts from stakeholders are ways to aggregate enough evidence to make an informed decision. Research in economics and political science shows that truthful information transmission in committees or from a better informed sender to a decision maker is not always rational due to differences in preferences. However, individuals also differ in the way they process information and face institutional constraints when making decisions. In this dissertation I analyze how differences in information processing between individuals affect information aggregation and decision making in groups. Across two articles, I show that individuals strategically deviate from full information sharing behavior as a reaction to different cognitive biases of others. In a third article I examine the effect of institutional constraints on strategies of stakeholders in the consultation procedure of the European Commission.
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