Executive compensation tied to ESG performance: International evidence

Cohen, Shira ; Kadach, Igor ; Ormazabal, Gaizka ; Reichelstein, Stefan

[img] PDF
ESGPay.pdf - Accepted
Restricted to Staff of the repository only until 1 April 2025.

Download (885kB)

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12481
URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/14...
Additional URL: https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/zewdip/22051.html
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-642074
Document Type: Article
Year of publication: 2023
The title of a journal, publication series: Journal of Accounting Research
Volume: tba
Issue number: tba
Page range: 1-63
Place of publication: Oxford [u.a.]
Publishing house: Wiley-Blackwell
ISSN: 0021-8456 , 1475-679X
Publication language: English
Institution: Business School > Stiftungsprofessur für ABWL (Reichelstein 2018-)
Subject: 330 Economics
Classification: JEL: M12 , M41 , Q54,
Keywords (English): ESG metrics , executive compensation , institutional ownership
Abstract: Using a wide sample of international publicly traded firms, this paper studies the rapidly increasing practice of incorporating ESG metrics in executive compensation contracts. Our evidence suggests that this compensation practice varies at the country, industry, and firm level in ways that are consistent with efficient incentive contracting. We also observe that reliance on ESG metrics in executive compensation arrangements is associated with engagement, voting, and trading by institutional investors, which suggests that firms could be adopting this practice to align their management’s objectives with the preferences of certain shareholder groups. Finally, we find that the adoption of ESG Pay is accompanied by improvements in key ESG outcomes, but not by improvements in financial performance.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.

Metadata export


+ Search Authors in

+ Download Statistics

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics

You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail

Actions (login required)

Show item Show item