Judicial independence in illiberal regimes

Olsowski, Felix

[img] PDF
dissertation.pdf - Published

Download (16MB)

URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-642672
Document Type: Doctoral dissertation
Year of publication: 2023
Place of publication: Mannheim
University: Universität Mannheim
Evaluator: Carey, Sabine C.
Date of oral examination: 17 January 2023
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Social Sciences > Political Scinece, International Relations (Carey 2010-)
Subject: 320 Political science
Keywords (English): judicial independence , autocratic politics , state repression , judicial selection , extrajudicial killings , personalism
Abstract: This dissertation advances our understanding of (partly) independent judges in illiberal regimes. I address the question of how the autocratic executive in an illiberal regime balances costs and benefits of an independent judiciary. I argue that greater judicial independence is compatible with autocrats’ aspiration to control society by limiting judicial independence in key areas and by adapting methods of repression. In three empirical chapters I examine the relationship between these two branches of government. Using new fine-grained measurements and original datasets, primarily from the Philippines, I analyze variation in independence between court types, determinants of the judicial selection process, and the effects of independent judges on state repression. My results point to weaknesses in the judicial merit-selection process and identify the use of extrajudicial killings as strategy to avoid accountability resulting from independent judges.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.

Metadata export


+ Search Authors in

+ Download Statistics

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics

You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail

Actions (login required)

Show item Show item