On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: From discrete to continuous time

DOI:	https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2017001
URL:	https://www.aimsciences.org/article/doi/10.3934/jd...
Additional URL:	https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263039331...
Document Type:	Article
Year of publication:	2017
The title of a journal, publication series:	Journal of Dynamics and Games : JDG
Volume:	4
Issue number:	1
Page range:	1-23
Place of publication:	Springfield, MO
Publishing house:	AIMS
ISSN:	2164-6066 , 2164-6074
Publication language:	English
Institution:	School of Business Informatics and Mathematics > Mathematical Optimization (Staudigl 2023-)
Subject:	510 Mathematics
Classification:	MSC: 91A25 , 91A15 , 60G57,
Keywords (English):	continuous-time game theory , perfect-public equilibrium , weak convergence

Dieser Datensatz wurde nicht während einer Tätigkeit an der Universität Mannheim veröffentlicht, dies ist eine Externe Publikation.

BASE: Staudigl, Mathias ; Steg, Jan-Henrik

Google Scholar: Staudigl, Mathias ; Steg, Jan-Henrik

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