Structural position and inequality tolerance in international perspective

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List of abbreviations

Abbreviation	Meaning
CLI	Cross-level interaction
EGP	Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero Classification [Indicator]
ESeC	European Socio-Economic Classification [Indicator]
EVS	European Values Survey
FE	Fixed effects
GFT	Goal-Framing Theory
HDI	Human Development Index [Indicator]
HLM	Hierarchical linear modeling
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IN[1-3]	Inequality tolerance, non-logarithmic recoding [Indicator]
ISCO	International Standard Classification of Occupations
ISEI	International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status [Indicator]
ISSP	International Social Survey Programme
IT[1-5]	Inequality tolerance [Indicator]
JGH[1-3]	Justice gap for comparatively low-earning occupations [Indicator]
JGL[1-3]	Justice gap for comparatively high-earning occupations [Indicator]
LEI	Logarithmic household equivalence income [Indicator]
LFI	Logarithmic family income [Indicator]
LPI	Logarithmic personal income [Indicator]
LR	Likelihood ratio
MFS	Model of Frame-Selection
MPS	Magnitude-Prestige Scale [Indicator]
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PWT	Penn World Table
RE	Random Effects
RSF	Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Sans Frontieres)
SBCL	Subjective evaluation of social class [Indicator]
SBTB	Subjective evaluation (top-bottom) of subjective status [Indicator]
SEI	Standardized household equivalence income [Indicator]
SEU	Subjective Expected Utility
SFI	Standardized family income [Indicator]
SIOPS	Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale [Indicator]
SIT	Social Identity Theory
SJT	System Justification Theory
SLEI	Standardized logarithmic household equivalence income [Indicator]
SLFI	Standardized logarithmic family income [Indicator]
SLPI	Standardized logarithmic personal income [Indicator]
SPI	Standardized personal income [Indicator]
SWIID	The Standardized World Income Inequality Database
SZEI	Standardized logarithmic family income including zero values [Indicator]
SZFI	Standardized logarithmic personal income including zero values [Indicator]
SZPI	Standardized personal income including zero values [Indicator]
TI	Transparency International
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WDI	World Development Indicators
WGI	Worldwide Government Indicators
WVS	World Values Survey

Notes: This table describes the meaning of various abbreviations and acronyms used throughout this thesis. Additional abbreviations for context-level indicators and some additional variables used in the empirical section and in the appendix are listed in the methodical section (see Tables 3.3 through 3.7 in Chapter 3.4 and 3.5). Additional abbreviations used only in tables are listed in notes below the respective tables. Some additional abbreviations of international organizations are also shown in brackets to allow for easy access in text searches, but are not listed here if they only appear once in the text.

1 Economic inequality and the hidden moderators of self-interest

In recent years, social inequalities[1] within countries have often been described as an important problem by prominent journalists, politicians and political commentators, not withstanding liberal countries that show strong pro-market support in surveys, such as the USA (see Goldhammer, 2017, 33ff.). Even though potential positive effects of social inequalities on economic dimensions such as growth and development are still debated, a lot of theoretical and empirical studies published in recent years have painted a more negative picture of inequality in terms of economic and social stability[2]. Especially potential negative effects of income inequalities[3] on societal level have received attention, not only in economics and sociology, but also in political science, health science, criminology and psychology (see Chapter 1.1). At the same time, most scientific studies on medium- and long-term developments of income and wealth inequalities show increasing disparities between socio-economic groups at least since the 1980s with little confidence in a high possibility of trend changes in the near future (see for instance Piketty, 2020, 1ff., 20ff., 418ff.). Some of these recent publications on inequality have received a lot of public attention[4]. The most prominent among these might be "Capital in the 21st Century" by french economist Thomas Piketty (2014a), having a significant impact on both scientific and public debates on inequality (see for instance Delong, Boushey & Steinbaum, 2017, 1ff.; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2015, 3ff.; Lazović-Pita, 2015, 290). The focus of attention in these debates is often on specific measured increases in inequalities and potential negative consequences of inequality,

1 I use the term "social inequality" in a broad sense, encompassing all structural differences between individuals within given societies with regard to material resources, market outcomes and opportunities. I discuss the definition of the term further in the theoretical section of this thesis (see especially Chapter 2.1).

2 For instance, Bourguignon (2015, 131ff.) gives a short overview for possible negative economic effects of inequality, whereas Milanovic (2016a, 93ff., 192ff.) and Piketty (2020, 2f., 741ff.) focus on social, political and cultural consequences. I discuss possible negative consequences of high inequality and respective empirical studies in more detail in the following sections (see especially Chapter 1.1).

3 In line with previous works on the topic of inequality (see for instance Cowell, 2011, 2, 5f.), I use the term "income" in the theoretical section of this thesis as a catch-all expression referring to individual personal income (which can include unearned income and capital gains in addition to earnings depending on the specific operationalization used in the respective studies discussed), family income and household equivalence income. Further specification is used when differences in conceptualization or operationalization are substantially relevant for the questions investigated in this thesis. In the empirical section of this thesis, I use various specific measures based on data on personal income, family income and household equivalence income (see Chapter 3.3).

4 Besides studies focused on income inequality and other forms of social inequalities, such as publications by Piketty (2020; 2014a), Bourguignon (2015) and Milanovic (2016a), O'Brien et al. generally note "a reorientation within social science towards social patterns of inequality and the variety of consequences stemming from unequal modes of social organization" and list additional older publications as examples for this trend (2017, 272).

such as higher levels of crime and violence. Many publications additionally present lists of possible remedies against increasing inequalities. The solutions presented are diverse, but mostly include political aspects of varying dimensions, especially tax- and transfer-related laws (Piketty, 2020[5], 966–1034; 2014a, 469–570; Atkinson, 2015; Milanovic, 2016a, 217–222; Bourguignon, 2015, 158–180), directly posing questions of feasibility and of the social and political conditions for the test or realization of such ideas.

One of the main elements to be considered for debating political decisions and institutional changes related to inequality is the public perception and evaluation of inequality-related topics, ideas and policies, as has been repeatedly noted in the context of research on objective inequalities (see for instance Milanovic, 2016a, 192–207; Bourguignon, 2015, 69–73; Hurst, 1992, 349–352). While there is a long tradition of considering majority attitudes of the electorate as central factors for the reduction of inequalities in the context of research on political economy (see for instance Meltzer & Richard, 1981), the assumption that increasing inequalities lead to enforced redistribution by increasing the potential gains and decreasing the losses of majorities of voters has been empirically and theoretically contested (see for instance Kelley & Enns, 2010). But still, the idea of an endogenous mechanism relating inequalities to political outcomes via public opinion has some appeal if one allows for three assumptions: political responsiveness of the political system, economic rationality in the behavior of voters and realistic subjective perceptions of voters concerning circumstances on macro-level. In recent years, doubts have been cast on all three of these assumptions and multiple moderating influences including economic, political, institutional and cultural factors have been proposed. While some possible moderating and counteracting influences such as the differential responsiveness of the political system to specific income groups are easy to grasp in terms of rational choice arguments, for example with regard to the role of highly affluent individuals and special interest groups in keeping redistributive efforts limited (see for instance Gilens, 2012, compare also Piketty, 2020, 721ff.), the attitudes and perceptions of the electorate pose a particular puzzle. This is especially the case when highly inequality-tolerant attitudes are voiced by members of low-income, low-wealth or low-status groups. Correspondingly, in this thesis I focus on the relation between objective socio-economic

5 In his recent work "Capital and Ideology", Piketty emphasizes the need to develop "common norms of justice" in response to increasing inequalities (2020, 902ff.), but specific ideas to react to these developments are mostly based on political and institutional measures. He uses the term "participatory socialism" to characterize a bundle of various ideas revolving around progressive taxation on wealth and income, universal endowments, basic income and forms of transnational and economic democracy (ibid., 892–898, 915–918, 966–1034).

differences between individuals (i.e. their structural position) and their attitudes towards economic inequality[6]. Specifically, I investigate possible explanations for variation in this relationship in the form of interaction effects.

In this chapter, the relevance as well as the context of my research questions are briefly outlined with regard to both contemporary sociopolitical issues and the reviewed scientific literature. First, a brief discussion of current developments in Western democracies highlighting the need for analyses on the topics of this thesis is followed by a short overview of specific gaps in the reviewed scientific literature. On this basis, I define my research topic as well as the specific questions to be answered and outline the main methods to be used in the search for answers in a second step.

1.1 The stability of democracy and structural effects on attitudes

Current accounts of global inequality generally point to two trends in the last three decades: While some accounts describe inequalities between countries as being on the decline, inequalities within countries have been increasing in most of the Global North and, with some exceptions, in the Global South[7] (see for instance Milanovic, 2016a; Bourguignon, 2015; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2015; 2011; 2008). This rise in economic disparities within countries, which has often been described as long-term and only interrupted by infrequent violent shocks, has lead scholars of economic inequality to postulate self-reinforcing economic and political-

6 With the term “economic inequality” I refer to structural differences between individuals within given societies in terms of material resources and outcomes, specifically with regard to wealth and income, disregarding specific measures (see Chapter 2.1 and compare Chapter 3.3).

7 In this thesis, the term "Global North" refers to countries in Europe and Northern America and to Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, whereas the term "Global South" refers to other countries, which are not exclusively located in the southern hemisphere. The terminology differentiating between "Global North" and "Global South" is used for two main reasons in this thesis. First, the term minimizes normative connotations as compared to more common and potentially alternative broad categorizations such as "Third World" or "developing countries". Second, countries in the "Global South" are becoming increasingly dissimilar with regard to economic aspects, leading to conceptual problems for definitions based on development and related economic aspects (see Khokhar & Serajuddin, 2015). In general, many authors note that terms and concepts such as "developing nations" are problematic, but there is no clearly defined and established alternative in terms of a very broad differentiation (compare Orbie, 2021, 602ff., 607ff.; Wolvers et al., 2015; Dados & Connell, 2012; Nielsen, 2011). The "Global South/North" terminology also has connotations, but these are related to historical developments and less suggestive of normative judgments of current trajectories (compare for instance Dados & Connell, 2012, 13). It should be noted that the term "developing countries" and modifications such as "low-income developing countries" are still used by many international organizations (see for instance IMF, 2021a; United Nations Statistics Division [UNSD], 2021; World Trade Organization [WTO], 2021; but compare Nielsen, 2011, 7–19).

economic processes (see Milanovic, 2016a; Piketty, 2014a). Contrary to ideas of inequality-stimulated redistribution (compare Chapter 1.2), some recent works in the context of inequality, such as Piketty[8] (2014a), Milanovic (2016a) and Scheidel (2017) stress the role of endogenous economic processes and exogenous violent shocks in the historical development of inequality. Even when policy measures to combat inequality are discussed or presented, the studies in inequality mentioned above do not find strong empirical evidence that effective redistribution has been implemented without preceding exogenous shocks such as state collapses, revolutions, wars and massive epidemics triggering wealth destruction and the expansion of redistributive politics.

These lines of research have been accompanied by an increasing stream of economic and social studies relating inequality to outcomes such as higher levels of crime and violence (Enamoradoa et al., 2016; Pabayp et al., 2014; Rufrancos et al., 2013; Scorzafave & Soares, 2009; Kennedy et al., 1998), decreased social cohesion (Vergolini, 2011; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009), support for democracy, trust in institutions (Schäfer, 2010; Wu & Chu, 2007) and public health (Santelli et al., 2017; van Deurzen, van Ingen & van Oorschot, 2015; Lochner et al., 2001), increased carbon emissions and environmental pollution (Uzar & Eyuboglu, 2019; Knight, Schor & Jorgenson, 2017; Torras & Boyce, 1998; but compare Chen, Xian & Zhou, 2020; McGee & Greiner, 2018) and challenges for economic growth and stability[9] (Morelli, 2017; Zandi, 2017; van Treeck, 2014; Osberg, 2013; Stockhammer, 2013; Yian, 2012; compare also Horn et al., 2009; Angeles-Castro, 2006). In line with this evidence, Milanovic (2016a) proposed an endogenous political-economic mechanism relating rising inequality to wars and revolutions, including possible problems in the foreseeable future. Other scholars argue that the

8 It is noteworthy that Piketty stresses the role of ideology and seems to put forward the idea that a general transnational movement towards democratic socialism has been interrupted by a "conservative revolution" (2020, 1336ff.). Even though assumed causal pathways of effects of and on ideology are not completely clear, in his recent work he describes an "autonomous" influence of ideas (ibid., 7) and postulates that the "history of societies is the history of the struggle of ideologies and the quest for justice" (ibid., 1035). This could be interpreted as a move back to Hegelian dialectic idealism, or as turning Marx from his feet on his head. Since the specific causal relations and directions are not obvious, I interpret this quote primarily as a call to action in terms of research as opposed to the conclusion of a completed project at this stage.

9 Political instability in countries of the Middle East has also been partly attributed to the high level of inequality (Piketty, 2020, 655). When comparing selected world regions and specific countries in different regions (specifically comparing the Middle East to Europe, China, Russia, United States, India, Brazil and South Africa), the Middle East shows high levels of inequality in terms of income inequality as measured by ratios of income shares differentiating between the top 10 percent versus the bottom 50 percent, surpassed only by the inequality levels in South Africa (Piketty, 2020, 649–659). When using the ratio between the top one percent and the bottom 50 percent, the Middle East leads the ranking (Piketty, 2020, 656–659).

combination of increasing productivity since the 1970s and stagnating labor incomes are resulting in political radicalization (Muñiz et al., 2017) and declining rates of support for democracy in the USA and Great Britain (Foa & Mounk, 2016) as well as in other democratic countries (Andersen, 2012; but compare Whitefield & Loveless, 2013). In contrast to linear extrapolations of current processes, some researchers of cultural and political developments expect the emergence of broad political pro-redistributive coalitions in Western democracies:

"The reaction against rapid cultural change and immigration has brought a surge of support for xenophobic populist parties among the less secure strata. But rising inequality has also produced an insurgency on the Left by politicians like Bernie Sanders and intellectuals like Joseph Stiglitz and Thomas Piketty who stress the need for redistributive policies. […] So far, emotionally-charged cultural issues cutting across economic lines have hindered the emergence of a new coalition. But both the rise of populist movements and the growing concern for inequality, reflect widespread dissatisfaction with existing political alignments. In the long run, a coalition based on the 99 percent is likely to emerge." (Inglehart & Norris, 2017, 452)

This idea resonates with the line of reasoning evident in some conceptions of political economy that propose positive effects of inequality on redistribution and might underestimate the influence of moderating and counteracting influences that neutralize direct economic self-interest (compare for instance Lübker, 2014; Lupu & Pontusson, 2011; Kenworthy & McCall, 2008). Even though majorities of electorates could benefit from redistribution, especially in the given context of increasing inequality, and socio-economic disparities in inequality-related attitudes seem to be increasing over time in at least some countries such as the USA (Pittau, Farccomeni & Zelli, 2015), this did obviously not translate into a political rush for redistribution. Long-term political developments do not show any trend of this kind. In sharp contrast, European election data over time shows a shift to the right of the political spectrum, generally associated with less redistribution, accompanying the increase in inequality, especially in most industrialized societies, since the 1980s (Milanovic, 2016a, 204ff.; Han, 2016; Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Norris, 2005; compare also Frankel, 2015). Piketty partly ascribes the accompanying increasing influence of social categories and identitarian nationalist politics (2020, 720, 733, 774–799, 849–857, 871–880, 944–948, 958–961) to challenges posed by rising inequality (ibid., 2) and identifies increasing social nativism as a "new identitarian threat" (ibid., 720), increased by the change of left-wing parties from the political home of

workers to that of the highly educated (ibid., 721–727, 744–764, 807–815, 831–834, 841–844, 863–868, 954f.), and only potentially to be avoided by bringing issues of redistribution back into public debate (ibid., 2, 831).

A policy brief by the Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali [LUISS] School of European Political Economy published 2017 explicitly suggests that in light of globalization processes and related economic pressures on middle classes, supranational organizations such as the EU might present an easy target for nationalist or populist political forces trying to appeal to the middle classes (Buti & Pichelmann, 2017; see also Burgoon, 2013). Accordingly, similar arguments have been presented in the context of anti-globalization and isolationist attitudes and forces (Popov, 2016), and a recent publication by the International Monetary Fund [IMF] notes that „amid weak growth and rising inequality, support for international trade and immigration has eroded" (IMF, 2017, 29) and that „popular support for trade and investment flows may wane further" (ibid., 35). Recent studies illustrate substantial and partly increasing polarization in attitudes between different socio-economic groups in the USA (Pittau, Farccomeni & Zelli, 2015) as well as between popular opinions and attitudes of individuals in positions of influence with regard to supranational political projects such as European integration (Raines, Goodwin & Cutts, 2017), with diminishing support for the EU shown by individuals with comparatively low income (Piketty, 2020, 549ff., 799–802, 852–861, 880–884). Additionally, research shows increasing differences in health and life-expectancy between different socio-economic groups in the USA and many Western European countries (Bosworth, Burtless & Zhang, 2016). Wright (2015b, 250) concludes a recent publication on social class with an in-depth discussion of class compromise as a form of "political-economic equilibrium" that he sees endangered under the contemporary circumstances of stagnation and crisis. Milanovic (2016a, 192ff.) explicitly suggests that electorates in the European Union increasingly turn to right-wing parties since growing inequalities and the absence of political solutions in terms of redistribution make isolationist policies attractive. In this conception[10], electorates in high inequality situations might chose less redistributive but protective nationalist parties over pro-redistributive parties in a situation of increasing economic pressures.

10 This idea contrasts with simple models of redistributive politics such as the median-voter thesis in the redistributive context (Meltzer & Richard, 1981), postulating that democracies tend to redistribute more if inequalities grow, but does not necessarily rely on the assumption that people do not express self-interest with regard to redistributive politics, since there might be other priorities for voters when it comes to deciding to vote for a single party.

Such extrapolations of macro-economic or socio-political processes can easily be criticized or ignored altogether, but the year 2016 seems to have lend some early support to the arguments made by Piketty and Milanovic. Two democratic decisions took place, both with major consequences for the respective countries and both were hardly anticipated by political commentators and scientists alike: the so-called "Brexit" decision of Great Britain to leave the European Union and the election of the businessman and television personality Donald Trump as the 45th President of the USA. In the aftermath of this, several comments have appeared explaining the decisions partly by widening economic gaps in society and a technology-driven deindustrialization of the workforce and resulting anger against establishment politics, media and immigrants[11] (Jackson, 2017; Kennedy, 2017; McCloskey, 2017; O'Rourke, 2017; Rapkin, Smith & Tucker, 2017; see also al Gharbi, 2018; Bor, 2017; Donovan & Bowler, 2018). In the introduction to a volume on Piketty's "Capital in the 21st Century" (2014a) and the reactions to it in the scientific community, Delong, Boushey and Steinbaum (2017) illustrate this view with regard to the election of Donald Trump, and discuss it in the context of Piketty's analysis of inequality reproduction:

"It is important to note that Donald Trump won the 2016 presidential election thanks to the electoral college and not because he got more votes. But he got a lot of votes, and he got them in some places that have historically voted Democratic but faced extreme economic dislocation in the recent past. Moreover, Hillary Clinton failed to achieve the margins among young voters and racial minorities that Barack Obama did, plagued as they are with historically low employment rates, despite the record-high student debt they were promised would lead to security in the labour market. And so Piketty's analytical political-economic case looks to us to have been greatly strengthened by Trump's presidential victory." (Delong, Boushey & Steinbaum, 2017, 2)

11 In the case of the 2016 presidential elections in the USA, it could be argued that, by electing a politician planning to reduce high-income taxes and minimize distributive politics, some of those individuals being located at the low end of the income distribution acted against economic self-interest as assumed by simple political economy conceptions relating increasing inequality to declining inequality tolerance and increasing redistribution. There are various possible reasons to explain counterintuitive behavior in this fashion, including perceived personality of candidates, stereotypes about female politicians or the plausible assumption that other topics such as immigration and foreign policy played a more important role for voters as compared to redistribution. For instance, it was demonstrated for the 2016 US Presidential Elections that the amount of American combat casualties per state predicts the percentage of Trump voters, even when controlling for some alternative explanations (Kriner & Shen, 2020). Other causes for votes contradicting economic self-interest might include direct influences on the evaluation of inequality as investigated in this thesis.

The fact that electoral decisions such as the US Presidential Elections 2016 and the "Brexit" vote in Great Britain also caught many survey analysts[12] as well as the financial markets by surprise (see for instance Wagner, Zeckhauser & Ziegler, 2018; IMF 2016) additionally illustrates the need to adequately understand and explain contextual influences on public opinion and inequality-related attitudes in terms of developments. Piketty notes a surge in "meritocratic extremism" in recent decades, i.e. „a set of strong statements about the fact the losers deserve to lose, so to speak" (Piketty, 2014b, 742–743), which he fears might contribute to the emergence of "extreme forms of domination based simultaneously on property and culture" in the future (ibid.). Heitmeyer and Mansel (2008) refer to increasing economy-focused values and attitudes in Germany and add the long-term unemployed as a category of analysis in one of the last waves of their study on stigmatization of various social categories. If, as many scholars of inequality argue (Milanovic, 2016a; Piketty; 2014a), political inequality reduction is the only way to avert social instability, isolationism and war, it seems beneficial to be able to understand and anticipate perceptions, evaluations and reactions to contemporary developments and political options presented to the electorate in the context of inequality and redistribution. Apart from political questions such as power-based influences and differential political responsiveness resulting in a diminished influence of the political wishes of lower income groups, the scientific problem of explaining relations between inequality-related perceptions and attitudes and economic self-interest seems to be at the core of this subject.

1.2 Boundary conditions of structural effects on attitudes as a research priority

Generally, the role of attitudes as well as cultural aspects in the process of inequality reproduction and reduction remains widely unclear. While some prominent scholars of inequality seem to ignore influences on and effects of public opinion in the reproduction of inequalities in works on the topic (see for instance Bourguignon, 2015), others note the importance of the topic in passing, but focus on economic and political aspects. In his work on effects of violent shocks in the long-term history of inequality, Scheidel (2017) briefly discusses problems of the implementation of redistributive policies and political mobilization. He criticizes limits of a purely policy-oriented approach in that "serious consideration of the means required to mobilize political majorities for implementing any of this

12 At least with regard to the decisive state-level polls, whereas the predictions of popular votes were mostly close to the actual results (see Lusinchi, 2017).

advocacy is conspicuous by its absence" (2017, 434; see also Piketty, 2020, 155, 902ff.). Milanovic discusses potential influences of the creation of false consciousness about inequality as well as immigration on political outcomes and in summation notes the expected influence of "anti-egalitarian headwinds of globalization" endangering any attempt at political redistribution (2016a, 222). Piketty only briefly discusses the issue of influences of attitudes, public opinion and cultural aspects in "Capital in the 21st Century" (2014a)[13] but addresses it in more depth in a reaction to reviews. He explicitly argues against reducing the history of inequality to economic forces alone and instead underlines the importance of perceptions and representations of inequality, including public debates and media productions. Piketty states that "it is the central interactions between belief systems and inequality regimes that should be studied more extensively in future research" (2017, 545).

In line with these statements of contemporary scholars of inequality, classical theoretical conceptions of the reproduction of social inequalities and the chances for redistribution often include assumptions about attitudes, public opinion, values and norms as important explaining or mechanistically relevant factors for the reproduction of social inequalities and the neutralization of possible counteracting influences (compare Chapter 2). Even in materialistically oriented Marxist and post-Marxist traditions, changes in attitudes, often in the sense of a development of class consciousness, are a fundamental, even though materialistically determined, precondition for social change and sometimes optimistically expected (see Chapter 2.1.1). Another typical, and by its assumptions concerning the expression of economic self-interest closely related, example for the political importance attributed to attitudes is the often studied median-voter thesis, i.e. the assumption that democratic systems tend to redistribute more when inequality is high and a certain threshold is reached, since more voters would profit from redistribution as compared to a more equal distribution (see Meltzer & Richard, 1981). This idea can be interpreted as postulating a very basic mechanism relating inequality with attitudes: If people act according to economic self-interest, higher inequality should lead to higher redistribution by election of pro-redistribution parties. However compelling this notion of a direct articulation and representation of economic self-interest might be in democratic

13 Piketty comments on the potential influence of social norms on CEO pay (2014a, 512) and the possible impact of debates on pushing the political process "in a direction more favorable to the general interest" (2014, 514) and expresses doubts about the idea that the US political process has been captured by the 1 percent. Apart from some brief general comments attributing importance to possible relationships, the interplay of economic laws, opinions of different income groups and political outcomes remains widely unclear in Piketty's work, in both theoretical as well as empirical terms.

societies, it has been repeatedly theoretically and empirically challenged. As Runciman has already noted in 1966 in his work on relative deprivation:

"People's attitudes to social inequalities seldom correlate strictly with the facts of their own position. It might be thought plausible to assume that a person's feelings about the structure of his society should vary with his own location; whatever the system of stratification, should we not expect those at the top to be pleased with it and those at the bottom dissatisfied? But it is not what happens." (Runciman, 1972, 3)

The evidence against the median-voter thesis and related conceptions of political economy (see for instance Lübker, 2014; Kenworthy & McCall, 2008; Lübker, 2007; but compare Lupu & Pontusson, 2011; Milanovic, 2000) could in theory be explained by various possible interacting and moderating effects. First of all, as has been illustrated for the USA (Gilens & Page, 2014; Gilens, 2012), Germany (Elsässer, Hense & Schäfer, 2017) and other European countries (Schakel, 2021; Rosset & Stecker, 2019), it can be argued that political systems are much more responsive to affluent or high-income voters and interest groups as compared to non-affluent or low-income voters. This could explain why parties or governments reach certain decisions. But it does not account for non-affluent individuals voting against their economic self-interest without some additional assumptions, such as a potential tendency of voters to penalize politicians or parties that are perceived as breaking campaign promises, even if the alternative leads to worse economic outcomes in terms of individual self-interest. Even though the data presented by Gilens (2012) and others (Schakel, 2021; Rosset & Stecker, 2019; Elsässer, Hense & Schäfer, 2017; Gilens & Page, 2014) is compelling, differential responsiveness can only explain political outcomes, but not deviations from self-interest found in research on attitudes.

Therefore, it seems necessary to give attention to alternative or complementary ideas that focus on the step before political representation, the factors that determine the attitudes of potential voters, especially high inequality tolerance of people with low-status positions in a given society. In line with the thought that economic self-interest might not always be a decisive influence on attitudes as well as behavior, criticism of strict assumptions of subjective rational choice reasoning has been widespread in recent decades and received empirical support in many instances (see for instance Kroneberg, 2010, 47–65). These findings resulted in significant theoretical modifications such as the inclusion of subjective evaluations, nonlinearities and reference points (see for instance Kahneman, 2011, 283;

Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) or norm-based non-rational activity (Nagayoshi & Sato, 2014; Mehlkop & Neumann, 2012; Kroneberg, 2010; 2007; 2005; see also Esser, 2000). Apart from these general modifications in the interpretation of the role self-interest plays in the determination of behavior, some studies in recent years have specifically investigated possible moderating influences on the expression of material interests in certain contexts (see Chapters 2.3.4), proposing various mechanisms responsible for attitudes diverging from simple economic self-interest. In the field of inequality-related attitudes and behavior, two different groups of specific effects have been discussed in recent years by scholars of various disciplines in the social sciences.

First, several authors have put forward ideas concerning the *non-articulation of economic self-interest* in the context of high- as well as low-status individuals. Mechanisms proposed include psychological processes such as differential utility from accepting the status quo as well as effects of ideologies and cultural norms such as the belief in a just world or high levels of meritocracy and culturally determined conceptions of interrelated happiness (see Chapter 2.3.4.4). A second group of explanations instead focuses on *biased evaluations of economic self-interest*. Mechanisms discussed in this line of research are based on potentially distorted perceptions of individuals regarding the absolute income levels of high and low income groups and subjective reference points related to their own position in the income distribution (see Chapter 2.3.1). Despite a respectable amount of research on inequality-related attitudes in general, the specific effects and interplay of these two groups of influences still remains widely unclear. This is also the case for the role of context-level factors in moderating the influences of these mechanisms.

1.3 General research questions and aim of the thesis

One of the main aims of this thesis is to provide some insight into the variability of the effects of income and other status- and class-related attributes that are usually thought of as determining economic self-interest in modern market societies. To illustrate the general idea, a simple assumption would be that high inequality increases the level of polarization in societies and therefore contributes to a strong effect of individual income level on individual attitudes. Similar arguments can be made for various additional economic, political, social and cultural factors on country- and regional-level. Some of these possible country-level moderators of the income effect on inequality attitudes have already been tested (see Chapter 2.3.4), but rarely in a comparative way.

My research question, in the most general terms, is under which circumstances people follow simple predictions based on economic self-interest with regard to inequality and redistribution and how economic, political, social and cultural context factors influence the strength of economic self-interest in explaining attitudes towards inequality. More specifically: Do contextual influences, such as the objective and perceived level of inequality in a society, the amount of redistribution, objective and perceived mobility opportunities, and cultural aspects, such as the mean support for individualist values or meritocratic beliefs in a society, moderate the effect of income and other measures of structural position on attitudes towards inequality? In other words, it is the aim of this thesis to analyze context-level characteristics that potentially influence the expression of economic self-interest as seen in the degree to which the position of an individual in the income distribution relates to the respective subjective evaluations and perceptions of income inequality.

In order to investigate both inequality-related attitudes in general and possible boundary conditions of economic self-interest in this context, a systematic analysis of the moderating effects of inequality and other context factors on structural effects in inequality attitudes is required. This has been done before for some specific relationships (see Chapter 2.3.4), but not in a comprehensive and comparative way. In order to achieve this, I combine multiple possible explanations on the foundation of a single theoretical model based on the Subjective Expected Utility [SEU] framework (see for instance Yee, 1997; Savage, 1954), Goal-Framing Theory [GFT] (Lindenberg, 2015) and the Model of Frame Selection [MFS] (Kroneberg, 2010) as well as socio-psychological ideas such as cognitive dissonance reduction (Festinger, 1957) and system justification (Jost et al., 2003). Since some of the context-level factors to be analyzed as potential moderators of the effects of income on attitudes towards inequalities in general vary between countries and larger regional units, the empirical analysis focuses on large-n secondary data collected from the International Social Survey Programme [ISSP], and various additional sources for constructs on country level. Using this pooled data enables me to run multilevel and fixed-effects regression models in order to estimate cross-level interaction effects between variables measuring income or socio-economic status on individual level and variables on country levels related to various economic, political, social and cultural factors.

In this thesis I add to the respective literature in multiple ways. First, since some research points to the possible influence of culture-related factors such as dominant ideologies and cultural values on the determination of attitudes towards inequalities by income- and status-related variables, I

include cultural differences on country-level as well as economic and institutional factors in the analysis, testing and comparing different theoretical approaches to the problem of moderation of structural effects. To my knowledge, this has not been done yet in a systematic way. This approach also has the potential to add some insights to the understanding of cultural influences on attitudes in general.

Second, I use data of an international large-n survey including countries in the Global South and in the Global North and in doing so I can compare effects of multiple country-level moderators based on an economically, culturally and politically diverse data set. Previous research on the topic has often been limited to very selective sets of countries. By analyzing data from the ISSP, including highly specific items on the perception and evaluation of income inequality, I utilize data allowing for the differentiation between evaluation and perception on the basis of quantitative income estimates for various occupational groups, allowing me to conduct a cautious and thorough test of specific theoretical assumptions.

Third, I consider the perception of context factors as a mechanism relating objective circumstances to attitudes, but also, in line with research on distorted and biased perceptions, as a separate influence. Therefore, I use multiple measures of inequality-related attitudes, differentiating between perceptions and evaluations whenever empirically possible. Analyzing differences in effects and response patterns between different measures provides new insights into attitude patterns. The inclusion of perception specifically allows for testing a possible influence that might explain the deviations from self-interest found in studies on attitudes towards inequality and redistribution. Furthermore, it generally opens up the possibility to differentiate between dimensions of biased perception and normative evaluation, which are often mingled together in analyses of attitudes towards inequality in questions such as asking respondents if they think that social inequality is “too big”, making a specific interpretation of data and estimated effects impossible. Since my general aim is to provide a comparative analysis of moderating influences on the effect of income on inequality-related attitudes, my hope is to also contribute to the understanding of contemporary socio-cultural and socio-political processes mentioned above, specifically the missing strength of support for redistributive policies among individuals of lower income and status groups in the context of rising inequalities.

I start by first discussing concepts and selected classical as well as contemporary theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of structural differentiation and inequality-related attitudes,

with a focus on the effect of structural position on attitudes and contextual moderating factors of this relationship. Following the discussion of specific contextual factors, I describe a basic general theoretical model for the explanation of structural effects and moderating influences on inequality tolerance and integrate middle-range theories related to potentially moderating influences on structural effects in the determination of inequality tolerance (Chapter 2). I then present the methods and indicators used (Chapter 3) and the results of the statistical analyses conducted (Chapter 4). Finally, I discuss the results of all analyses as they relate to current research, the theoretical discussion and the general sociopolitical issues addressed in this introduction (Chapter 5).

2 Social inequality, structural effects and the explanation of inequality tolerance

Social inequality and structural differentiation are important concepts for the research question of this thesis, both as objects of perception and evaluation and as factors influencing societal circumstances and, potentially, individual attitudes. The various forms, causes and effects of social inequalities and of differentiation with regard to structurally determined positions of individuals have often been at the center of social studies and sociological theory, resulting in an expansive and growing corpus of literature from various disciplines over the years, including contributions from diverse fields such as sociology, economics, political science, psychology, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, ethnology and various archaeological, anthropological and historical areas of research. Since there is no clearly established framework for the explanation of the research question of this thesis, I consider contributions from different approaches to the investigation of questions related to social inequalities and discuss multiple areas of research of varying scope in my literature review. At the same time, I focus on specific theories and ideas that contribute to the explanation of variation in the structural determination of inequality attitudes[14]. Due to varying implications of different conceptualizations and measures, it is difficult to completely disentangle theoretical and empirical aspects in the context of inequality, and theories, substantial approaches, data and methods often have to be considered at the same time (Förster & Toth, 2015, 1735; Atkinson & Brandolini, 2009).

I begin my review of previous research[15] on structural effects on inequality tolerance by first introducing concepts and ideas with importance for the review and my own research and briefly discuss classical theoretical views on structural differentiation, the multidimensionality of social inequalities and the relevance of income and occupation in meritocratic societies. Second, I turn to research into the explanation of individual attitudes towards inequality and focus on the potential influence of individual structural position on attitudes and its moderating influences on individual level. Third, I discuss previous research on moderators of the influences of individual structural position, including individual-level processes and interacting effects of context factors such as institutional, economic, social and cultural aspects. Fourth, I propose an integrative theoretical model

14 This review can not give justice to the complexity of thought and research in the various research traditions mentioned above and focuses on aspects that contribute to the research question of my thesis, i.e. the connection between social, and specifically economic inequalities on the one hand and attitudes towards inequalities on the other, especially with regard to causes and effects of differences in attitudes between people in lower versus higher income- or status groups.

15 The literature review in this thesis is limited to works available in English or German.

of structural effects on inequality tolerance, combining middle-range theories from different fields in a complementary way on the foundation of framing models and the SEU framework. Fifth, I generate specific hypotheses based on this model to be tested in the empirical section of this thesis. Sixth, I briefly illustrate the theoretical assumptions proposed using varying degrees of abstraction.

2.1 General perspectives on social inequalities and structural position

Directly related to the amount of research contributing to the study of inequality, definitions of social inequality are numerous and diverse. In many empirical studies on the topic, the term is not explicitly defined in a general way and instead operationalized for a given context, often in terms of income inequality or related, empirically accessible dimensions. In reviews of the theoretical literature on social inequality, authors note this diversity in definitions (see for instance Burzan, 2011, 7ff.; Grabb, 2002, 2ff., see also Flemmen, 2013, 336ff.; Hurst, 1992, 10ff.), but also identify similarities of most conceptions of social inequality. Specifically, Grabb (2002, 2) argues that common to all conceptions is the focus on consequential differences between people with regard to rights, opportunities, rewards and privileges[16]. Burzan (2011, 7f.) views social inequality as a context-dependent social construction and uses the unequal distribution of life chances as a general reference point.

In line with these commonalities, I use the term *social inequality* in a very general form as a catch-all concept for the purpose of this thesis, as describing structural differences between ranked or grouped individuals within societies in terms of resources and opportunities of various kinds (compare Binelli, Loveless & Whitefield, 2015, 239; Charles-Coll, 2011, 17; Grabb, 2002, 2). At the same time, the empirical focus of this thesis[17] is on *economic inequality*[18], interpreted as structural differences in material resources, including inequalities in wealth and income. I understand differences between

16 Grabb sees variation in the identifications of key consequential dimensions of differences between people as the main source of conceptual disagreement. He explicitly notes disagreement over the relevance of "individual differences" with regard to abilities and motivation, which can be understood as objective differences, versus "socially defined characteristics" in the context of success and opportunities, variation in the objective importance of key factors over time as well as space and ideological differences between different schools of thought such as Marxist and feminist theory as conceptual discrepancies (Grabb, 2002, 2).

17 In the empirical section of this thesis, I analyze attitudes towards a form of economic inequality, specifically occupational income inequality. In this context, I use variations of the term "inequality" in the sense of an abbreviation for the constructs analyzed related to specific forms of "occupational income inequality".

18 Other concepts such as status inequality and political inequality denote specific structural differences in other dimensions such as social status and prestige and political power, respectively (see for instance Hurst, 1992, 10ff.; Runciman, 1972, 42ff.).

individuals as being systematically structured if the outcomes of interactions and distributions differ consistently, or, in statistical terms, if a significant correlation between social ranking or grouping on the one hand and outcome variables on the other is empirically evident. Individuals are therefore associated with individual *structural positions*. I understand this structural position to be an abstract construct, empirically accessible with various different indicators[19]. Accordingly, I use multiple indicators of individual structural position on individual level in the empirical section. With regard to specific forms of differentiation between different structural positions in general, I understand *social classes* in a broad sense as categorical groupings of individuals that systematically differ with regard to material resources, life chances and social mobility based on their occupation[20] (compare Toubøl & Larsen, 2017, 1257ff.; Sosnaud, Brady & Frenk, 2013, 81f.), without taking into account the subjective evaluation of class by individuals or ideas such as class consciousness[21] at this point (but compare Chapter 3.3 for the operationalization of objective and subjective class in the empirical section). In contrast, the terms *social strata* and *social status* refer to continuous hierarchies, including distributions of wealth and income or rankings of prestige and socio-economic status, but ignoring

19 This broad conceptualization is partly similar to the approach used by Piketty (2020), utilizing both the term "social position" and a very broad and open definition of classes, in that multiple dimensions can be theoretically and empirically differentiated, but the central concept is both multidimensional and open for various pars-pro-toto indicators in the form of a latent construct. In contrast to the conceptually mixed approach by Piketty (compare for instance ibid., 719f., 741–744), I only use the term "structural position" in a broad and multidimensional interpretation, whereas other terms, specifically social or socio-economic class, are restricted to more specific meanings in line with the reviewed sociological literature on the topic of structural differentiation.

20 In theoretical terms, I assume that the class concept has its clearest and most distinctive form in the Marxist focus on the means of production (see for instance Burris, 1987, 78ff.), but the applicability of this conceptualization to highly differentiated modern societies, and especially to research on survey data, is limited. A strictly Marxist conceptualization of class puts strict limits on empirical research into the topic, since survey data is usually very scarce for the highest class in this conception. Therefore, I use a broad conceptualization that is more in line with Weberian approaches (see Sosnaud, Brady & Frenk, 2013, 81f.), which might be called less abstract (Burris, 1987, 69) and usually focus on occupation-based differences in the market and work situations of individuals instead of ownership with regard to the means of production. At the same time, the broad definition used is related to Marxist conceptualizations in my view (compare Burris, 1987), since I assume that differences with regard to the means of production generally result in distinct differences in material resources, life chances and social mobility.

21 Subjective aspects of class are sometimes included in class conceptualizations (compare Ricci, 2016, 1ff.; Marx, 1892, 162). In this thesis, I differentiate between objective and subjective social class and use the term "social class" in the sense of an objective conceptualization.

specific groupings of social classes and other forms of categorical differentiation[22] (Grabb, 2002, 3ff.; 106ff.; see also Tittenbrun, 2014; Chan, 2010b; Goldthorpe, 2009; Chan & Goldthorpe, 2005, 196).

In the following sections, I briefly discuss selected options of differentiation and classification with regard to differences in the structural position of individuals. Specifically, the focus of this review is on the conceptualization of differences in structural positions in their potential relevance for a systematic variation in structural influences on attitudes and possibly related moderating factors. This step allows me to identify differences in systematic approaches to the categorization and measurement of structural position and the respective potential implications for structural differences, before turning to the explanation of attitudes towards inequalities.

2.1.1 Class, exploitation and false consciousness

As a historically influential traditional approach to inequality analysis, a clear focus on asymmetric and bipolar relations of exploitation, power and conflict is visible in publications in the tradition of Karl Marx and various forms of Marxism and Post-Marxism (see Grabb, 2002, 9–35, 146–174, 223–226; Elster, 1982; Poulantzas, 1975) and, to some degree, also in various more recent theoretical works such as Social Reproduction Theory (Bourdieu, 1984; 1977) and System Justification Theory [SJT] (Jost et al., 2003; see Chapter 2.3.2). In these traditions, inequality is often thought of as being disruptive and harmful, upheld by the application of power or influence in terms of political, economic and cultural activities and, in last defense of unequally distributed resources, physical violence embedded in private organizations and state institutions. Socio-economic differences are often described and understood in terms of categorical discrepancies between economic or socio-economic classes, with sharp differences between classes with regard to access to resources and opportunities.

In the writing of Marx, the fundamental cleavage rupturing societies is defined by relations of production and exists between the class of property owners, i.e. individuals that possess property in an amount that enables them to exploit the work of other, and the class of individuals without significant property, who have to offer their work to owners of the respective topical means of production to survive (Marx, 1867, 721ff.). The alienation of workers from the work process by automation,

22 It should be noted that there are numerous conceptualizations of class based on single attributes such as income and education (compare Keefer, Goode & Van Berkel, 2015, 254, Sosnaud, Brady & Fleck, 2013, 82) or combinations of measures (see for instance Kraus, Park & Tan, 2017, 423). These types of class conceptualization are closely related to my interpretation of strata and are maybe best characterized by the term "class-as-strata" (see Flemmen, 2013, 337f.).

separation and individualization of work processes (see Marx, 1867, 331ff., 344ff., 424ff.) and the importance of centralized private property (see Marx, 1867, 742ff.) fragment potential group interests of workers into individual self-centered particularities (Grabb, 2002, 17ff.). According to traditional Marxist reasoning, this situation will only eventually change when workers realize common interests under conditions of increasing social and spatial closeness and deteriorating social conditions, leading to a growing working class without property and the emergence of class consciousness, ultimately resulting in revolution and further developments to an egalitarian communist society (Grabb, 2002, 26–32; compare Marx, 1892, 154–164). Marx seems to have expected worsening conditions for workers in terms of absolute deprivation and poverty under capitalism (Marx, 1867, 645f.), but interpretations in terms of increasing relative deprivation in times of rising general living standards and class polarization (Grabb, 2002, 28f.; see also Hurst, 1992, 184) may also be in line with the general argument (compare also Elster, 1982). In any case, a strict materialism in this context seems to be hard to defend[23] if the assumption is both that the superstructure enforces social inequalities by spreading values conforming to a capitalist society[24] (Grabb, 2002, 31), and that rising inequalities eventually lead to revolution (Hurst, 1992, 184). For a revolution to happen, an ideological superstructure maintained to reproduce class relations (compare Hurst, 1992, 178) has to lose control over the revolutionaries. In that case, it might be more appropriate to consider the existence of competing ideological structures, such as primary and secondary societal norms (see Chapters 2.3.4.4 and 2.4.3.4) instead of a superstructure and diverging class consciousness[25].

23 If Marx is defended in this context, modern commentators sometimes refer to a supposed middle-ground position of Marx between materialist and idealist views, his strong reaction to the Hegelian tradition and the influence of Marx ideas on historical social change, leaving the text-immanent context (Grabb, 2002, 30f.), or explain the absence of awareness and revolution by the successful maintenance of false consciousness (Hurst, 1992, 184), again stressing the importance of ideologies. Another view of Marxist thought in this context is that simple interpretations of his work fall short of its inherent complexities (Elster, 1982, 146f.). For instance, Elster notes that ideas of causal connections between beliefs and social structures such as “structural homologies” are arbitrary interpretations of similarities (ibid., 123f.) and that ideas shaped by interests do not have to serve these interests (ibid., 143–148). He attempts to reconcile Marxist thought with methodological individualism and causal explanation and specifically argues against functionalist and simple, one-dimensional interpretations of Marxist ideas (ibid., 146f.).

24 Elster (1982) argues against simple interpretations of Marxist thought such as an ideological hegemony of specific structural interests or a homology between superstructure and objective structures. In his view, ideas shaped by specific structural interests do not have to serve the respective interests (ibid., 130ff.) and ideas can be deliberately supported for stabilizing effects with regard to unequal societal structures, but can also have destabilizing character (ibid., 144).

25 The idea of increasing egalitarian attitudes under conditions of increasing economic pressures and inequalities is also visible in theoretical approaches related to the political economy of attitudes towards inequality, proposing positive effects of inequality on egalitarian attitudes (see Chapter 2.5).

Later writers in the Marxist tradition tried to incorporate theoretical ideas and empirical insights from various other fields of research into the Marxist framework of relational class analysis (see for instance Elster, 1982; Wright, 1976; Poulantzas, 1975). They often tried to retain the focus on two basic, economically determined classes, "defined in their mutual opposition" (Poulantzas, 1975, 14) while using concepts such as additional sub-classes and ideologically differing fractions or strata within classes (Poulantzas, 1975, 15ff.), mirroring to varying degree non-dichotomous and non-relational conceptions of the class structure in the tradition of more pluralistic approaches to social stratification without accepting the concept of distinct middle classes (Poulantzas, 1975, 210ff.; Grabb, 2002, 150ff.). In contrast to the choice of closely adhering to the dichotomous class categorization by Marx, Wright explicitly terms the petty bourgeoisie a "class" and introduces several distinct additional "contradictory locations within class relations" such as small to medium capitalists, top managers, technicians and semi-autonomous employees, located in between the three main classes of the tripartite class system composed of bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie and proletariat (Wright, 1976, 26ff.). In another publication, he explicitly argues against the traditional Marxist idea of distinct class borders and for the concept of positions with multiple class character (Wright, 1985, 42ff.), and in later works he relies on the inclusion of skills and organizational assets to classify the socio-economic position of employees[26] (Wright, 1989a, 17–23; 1989b, 308–317). This understanding of the class structure comes close to socio-economic categorizations of employment relations, especially the often-used typology by Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarrero [EGP] and its adaptations such as the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification used for the UK census and the European Socio-economic Classification [ESeC], which classify occupations based on theoretical criteria mostly not related to ownership, specifically autonomy and authority in the workplace, economic security and opportunities of advancement with regard to their market situation[27] (Goldthorpe, 1980; Rose & Pevalin, 2003; Rose & Harrison, 2006; Rose, Harrison & Pevalin, 2007).

26 Reviews of classifications of socio-economic differentiation usually distinguish between two or three different approaches to classification systems by Wright (see for instance Bergman & Joye, 2005, 14–18; Christoph, 2005, 82).

27 These multidimensional categorizations relying on aggregation of aspects of occupational positions are sometimes termed Neo-Weberian classifications and contrasted with Neo-Marxist ideas focused on exploitative relations (Grusky & Galescu, 2005), but it could be argued that both approaches deviated from traditional Marxist class analysis in different but roughly similar ways by mostly dividing the petty bourgeoisie and the working class into multiple subcategories based on specific information about occupations and sometimes additional parameters such as education or income. As one of the most noticeable differences, Neo-Marxist approaches lead to a more precise definition of the bourgeoisie and small capitalist elite as opposed to the Neo-Weberian classifications that usually show the upper service class or the professional managerial class with experts, specialists and managers at the top.

Empirically, some studies show a decline in the influence of individual position in broad class categorizations on the determination of attitudes and voting behavior (see for instance Weeden & Grusky, 2012), but other research reports significant and partly stable differences between broad classes[28] (see for instance Barone, Lucchini & Sarti, 2007; Hout, 2007). The decline in the influence of classes in some studies and outcomes might be explained by cross-cutting cultural voting patterns and changes in party platforms and class structures as opposed to the importance of social classes in general (van der Waal, Achterberg & Houtman, 2007; Andersen, Yang & Heath, 2006).

In current research, EGP and ESeC are often used in contemporary empirical studies on specific questions concerning labor market mobility, determinants of labor market success and international comparisons of the structure and fluidity of working populations. Class categorizations such as EGP and ESeC are not based on a strictly dichotomous conceptualization of class relations, not strictly relational in a Marxist sense[29] and not completely hierarchical, even though often presented in a ranking order using groups of classes. Some authors criticize this use of the term "class" for multidimensional constructs[30] mixing original Marxist criteria of ownership with additional attributes such as occupational status, supervising authority or educational requirements and skills (Hurst, 1992, 18). In a recent publication combining various separate perspectives on class analysis, Wright states advantages of both "fine-grained differentiated" typologies and "a much more abstract, simplified class concept, revolving around the central polarized class relation of capitalism" for different areas of research, but clearly locates the relevance of the completely dichotomous polarized class typologies in the realm of abstract theoretical analysis (Wright, 2015a, 189ff.).

28 Additionally, class framing still proves to be the most influential frame as opposed to other social categorizations for attempts to increase support for progressive politics (English & Kalla, 2021).

29 Classifications like EGP and ESeC disregard traditional lines of ownership- and exploitation-based class analysis and instead group self-employed individuals with many employees together with managers and professionals in the upper service class, while self-employed with no or just a few employees constitute a class of their own. Generally, classes in EGP and ESeC are mostly constructed based on information about occupations, potential employees and number of supervised colleagues, indicating degree of control, training requirements and difficulty of workplace monitoring.

30 In some areas of inequality research, the term class is used as an even broader theoretical term, combining multiple dimensions of social inequalities and structural position without strict categorization (see for instance Piketty, 2020, 720f., 741ff.; compare also Kraus, Park & Tan, 2017, 423).

2.1.2 The relativity of evaluative reference groups

Marxist approaches, and, more generally, most perspectives on inequality based on conflict, domination or exploitation, have to explain the obvious lack of revolutionary enthusiasm among employees, especially among the traditional parts of the working class comprised of manual workers. Contributing to the understanding of both attitudes and identities contrary to objective class locations[31], Runciman uses the concept of relative deprivation to describe effects of class misidentification among members of both working and middle classes in his analysis of attitudes to social inequality in England (1972). Disregarding the question of which form of class-based or classless consciousness would be adequate or false, it is a separate and simpler question to ask if individual class belonging, or more generally socio-economic position, is even perceived according to objective conditions and structural position. Runciman's study of relative deprivation starts from noting that people's attitudes seldom correlate strictly with their objective position in structures of inequality (Runciman, 1972, 3). He describes the interaction of objective and subjective class allocations by comparing attitudes of people that identify with different classes within an objective classification based on manual versus non-manual occupations (Runciman, 1972, 179ff.).

Runciman's concept of relative deprivation stresses the effect of subjective points of comparison on feelings of deprivation and acceptance of conditions, but necessarily in contrast to effects of some form of objective or absolute aspects of conditions[32]. On a theoretical level, Runciman proposes two dimensions of reference: normative reference or ideological and moral congruence with the reference group versus comparative reference, understood as evaluation of individual socio-

31 Even though his work on relative deprivation is informative for Marxist perspectives on class, Runciman is not closely related to Marxist thought in normative terms, but instead argues for a combination of equality of opportunity with some redistribution according to need and generally offers a pluralist understanding of justice in the sense of acknowledging multiple ways to accomplish the reciprocity of social contracts. He states accordingly that a perfectly just distribution of wealth might be possible without communist nationalization of industries (Runciman, 1972, 341ff.) and that the test of inequalities according to the contractual model is if they "can be justified to the losers" (ibid., 322).

32 Runciman explicitly argues against taking it as a conceptual contrast to absolute deprivation in the sense of absolute minimum need or subsistence levels. He states that "there is no necessary reason why a sense of need deriving from an external reference group should be less 'absolute' or less valid" and that education might not be any less valid a need than needs considered more basic (Runciman, 1972, 295f.). This argument of general relativity of deprivation in a normative sense is of no real consequence if absolute deprivation or absolute inequality is only used as a concept of conceptual differentiation, for instance between basic biological and psychological needs and additional needs resulting from social and cultural influences as well as fairness considerations, instead of a focus of normative evaluation. Runciman concedes this point by noting that "a feeling of hunger is not, as a rule, a relative deprivation", but sees this as a completely different matter from his use of relative deprivation, since his main concern is on fairness based on contractualist principles and any form of deprivation relevant for his analysis is relative by definition.

economic conditions by reference to specific reference classes. The interplay of these dimensions of reference leads to two specific forms of relative deprivation (Runciman, 1972, 388ff.): On the one hand, class consciousness in the Marxist sense, closely related to the concept of "fraternalistic relative deprivation", results when individuals in the working class identify with equals of their own class as a normative reference group, but use higher classes as comparative reference groups. In the data analyzed by Runciman, this form of deprivation[33] leads to increased support for left-of-center politicians (Runciman, 1972, 388ff.) and he argues that the general acceptance of unequal structures among this, less conservative, subgroup of workers likely stems from an acquiescence out of tradition, habit and limited concern (Runciman, 1972, 220). On the other hand, deference or "egoistic relative deprivation" occurs when individuals take superior classes as normative reference groups, but their own class as a comparative reference. In this subgroup, workers take their aspirations and priorities from the middle class and compare themselves to other workers in the sense of individual selfish advantages with no relation to questions of class struggle and wider structural inequalities (Runciman, 1972, 388ff.). Runciman notes that the choice of reference groups depends significantly on context and personal or collective socio-economic histories[34] (Runciman, 1972, 25ff.). This idea opens the door for expectations of nonlinear and moderated effects[35] between the level of socio-economic inequalities and the level of relative deprivation, specifically that inequalities can decrease or increase while relative deprivation increases or decreases, depending on context factors (Runciman, 1972, 276).

33 The measurement of deprivation is based on questions asking if both the middle and manual classes have higher income as compared to the individual. If individuals identify as working class and state that working class people are not making more than they themselves and at the same time state the opposite about the middle class, they are classified as fraternalists. This poses problems especially with regard to assuming a normative reference group based on the statement that the their class is not making more money than the individuals themselves.

34 The interactions between self-assigned class and objective socio-economic position get further complicated when analyzing actual definitions of the classes by respondents, illustrating once again discrepancies between subjective understandings of inequality structures and scientific classifications. Most notably, among workers describing themselves as "middle class", those defining middle class as composed of "non-manual workers" show a much stronger preference for conservative parties as compared to those defining middle class as a grouping of "manual occupations" (Runciman, 1972, 207ff.). Comparing these subgroups of misidentification with the correctly self-identified working class, workers identifying as middle class but defining middle class as a grouping of "manual occupations", show no less support for progressive parties than workers identifying with the working class (ibid., 208f.). Additionally, the relative income position within classes seems to matter, since self-rated class produces weaker effects among low-income respondents as opposed to high- and middle-income individuals (ibid., 203ff.).

35 Runciman further adds to the analytical complexity by proposing that the relation between social inequality and relative deprivation might be different in the three general dimensions of inequality, identified as (economic) class, (social) status and (political) power (Runciman, 1972, 287), which can all be related to specific occupations in different ways, again depending on national context (ibid.).

In empirical research, the relative deprivation model has often been and is still frequently used[36] to explain individual satisfaction with personal or household income and effects of income on general well-being, health and criminal behavior (see Neckerman & Torche, 2007, 342–349). Research using direct measures of subjectively reported relative deprivation show evidence that relative deprivation mediates structural effects on psychological constructs such as interpersonal trust (Yu et al., 2020). On a basic level of analysis, some recent empirical studies have echoed the ideas and findings of Runciman regarding the existence of interactions between subjective and objective socio-economic classifications, specifically the effects of upward classification bias in the working class for various countries with different conditions, such as China (Chen & Fan, 2015) and the USA (Sosnaud, Brady & Frenk, 2013). Additionally, Runciman's focus on social-psychological processes of biased comparisons with selective reference groups partly resembles contemporary insights into the biased perception of income inequality (see Chapters 2.3.1.and 2.3.2). Evidence generally shows that differences between objective and subjective categorizations have to be taken into account in research relating structural position with attitudes or behavior. This is relevant for potential forms of perceptional bias stemming from the misidentification of individual structural position, especially when conceptualizations only allow for broad categories, reducing the available information, as is the case for broad class categorizations.

2.1.3 Rankings of prestige and status as reflections of social hierarchies

In contrast to class categorizations, another influential tradition in inequality research is based on finer-grained and hierarchical rankings of status and prestige. The general tendencies of individuals in different countries and socio-economic groups to allocate occupations to roughly similar prestige rankings is sometimes taken as evidence for broad consensus and the functionality of the occupational hierarchy, since it is reflected in both income and subjective attributed prestige[37] (Grabb, 2002, 114f.).

36 A formulation of roughly related mechanisms based on individual utility estimates and reference-dependent preferences in the line of Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) has been proposed in the context of Reference-Utility Theory (Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006; see also Sen, 1997). In contemporary empirical applications, relative deprivation or reference utility can stem from reference to various comparative groups, such as reference groups based on human capital, measured by educational categories (Lubrano & Xun, 2012), or reference to past experience and expectations in addition to an existing current reference group (Castilla, 2012, compare also Binzel & Carvalho 2013).

37 A general problem to any empirical investigation of the scope of functionalist ideas in this context is posed by the conceptual differences between subjectively evaluated and perceived prestige on the one hand and objective functional

Prestige rankings do not differentiate between different dimensions of perception and evaluation and therefore are not necessarily reliable indicators of attitudes, perceptions or opinions towards hierarchies and distributions. As Grabb notes, the averaging out of individual differences in country-specific measures of prestige suggests a consensus that does not exist between individuals in societies (2002, 113ff.), but mean differences between aggregates in this context still relay some useful information about structural differences, in this context specifically between occupation-based groups.

In empirical terms, occupational prestige is often measured according to the Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale [SIOPS], which is based on averaging the prestige ratings for occupational groups given in surveys within and across societies (Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996; Treiman, 1977). Prestige scores as indicators of socio-economic status are still used by many researchers, partly because the idea of prestige hierarchies is often the main theoretical element connecting occupations to functionalist theoretical conceptions of objective or at least consensually agreed upon functional importance (see Grabb, 2002, 108). There is convincing evidence that average subjective hierarchies of occupational prestige are broadly comparable between societies in terms of the generally high correlations of prestige rankings derived from different populations and cultures (Grabb, 2002, 114), but Ganzeboom and Treiman point out measurement problems stemming from changes in time and especially from different reliability and comparability of national classifications (1996). Empirical evidence also strongly suggests that there are discrepancies between different socio-economic groups with regard to the perception and evaluation of specific occupations (van Praag, 2011, Grabb, 2002, 114; Hurst, 1992, 208ff.) and subgroups within occupational groups (see

importance on the other, since the measuring of objective functional importance is arguably impossible and any attempt would depend on subjective priorities and premises. Even if ideal and perceived prestige values would be measured for occupations as given by respondents, it would still be questionable to take these measures as evidence for any objective functionality and even economic or material relevance of the prestige hierarchy in question. Grabb criticizes the "implicit assumption of consensus" also in other contexts of functionalist reasoning, such as the perceived justice of unequal rewards (Grabb, 2002, 115; see also 130f.; 139ff.). In this view, functionalism presents an easy explanation for the main topic of this thesis, i.e. the moderation of structural effects on inequality tolerance, especially with regard to the acceptance of inequality by individuals in low structural positions: regardless of structural position and personal status, individuals have common perceptions of prestige and functional importance of various occupations and therefore generally accept unequal distribution that are roughly in line with the objective and commonly shared prestige hierarchy. This reading of functionalism, taken to its most extreme form, would lead to the expectation of zero-effects for variables related to socio-economic status, class or income and therefore present an, even though very generalist, explanation of deviations from structural self-interest with regard to attitudes towards inequality (compare Chapters 2.3.4.4 and 2.5).

Hargreaves 2009, 221) that get overlooked when averaging opinions within countries[38]. Also, contextual influences on the status and prestige of specific occupations, possibly explaining changes in prestige as noted by Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996) have been discussed in the literature, often including determinants such as historical and economic influences, salaries and qualifications, but also public image (for a brief overview, see Hargreaves, 2009, 222ff.). The complications listed render the use of prestige data for the generation of objective stratification categories problematic.

Other influential attempts to generate occupational hierarchies based on a single gradual distribution different from subjectively evaluated occupational prestige are socio-economic indices such as the International Socio-Economic index [ISEI], based on a weighting scheme for average income and educational qualifications of specific occupations (Ganzeboom, De Graaf & Treiman, 1992), and scales relying on data of actual social interactions between groups in terms of friendship, marriage and cohabitation (Prandy, 1999; Chan, 2010a) such as the International Cambridge Scale (Meraviglia, Ganzeboom De Lucca, 2016). Additional hierarchical measures of occupational stratification rely on information about the average income of occupations, career prospects or ratings of job quality (Gayle, Connelly & Lambert, 2015, 14f.). Many of these different occupation-based scales show high intercorrelation in international comparative analyses and often lead to roughly similar results with regard to correlations with other variables such as education and income, but both average values as well as correlations show some variation between countries, while interaction-based scales have some advantage in predicting cultural consumption and education-and income-based scales, especially ISEI, in predicting economic outcomes and mobility (Meraviglia, Ganzeboom & De Lucca, 2016; Chan, 2010a; 2010b). Taken together, ranking measures related to occupational aspects such as status and prestige are conceptually contested, but often used and well-researched indicators of structural differences between individuals and are based on finer-grained categorizations presenting more information as compared to measures based on broad classes.

38 For example, Hargreaves reports that, as analyzed for England, teachers working "with children with behavioral or learning difficulties, substitute teachers, and, a matter of consternation, minority ethnic teachers experience a status deficit" and also notes multiple “status anomalies” for teachers in the US and Britain: Neither their occupational prestige nor their subjective status is reflected in their high level of occupational esteem and a majority of surveyed British teachers felt unappreciated by the public while another study a few years later showed that 96 percent of respondents were satisfied with how teachers did their job, while increasing numbers of US survey respondents attribute a “very great prestige” to teachers (Hargreaves, 2009, 221f.; see also Verhoeven et al., 2006).

2.1.4 Unifying approaches to the multidimensionality of inequalities

Research into inequalities between various social categories has been conducted in a variety of contexts and methodological designs. This research[39] has illustrated the existence of inequalities of varying, but often significant degree in multiple socio-economic, political and cultural dimensions between the different social categories analyzed, and prompted the search for a generalizing unitary theory (see for instance Diewald & Faist, 2011). Additionally to the multitude of potentially relevant or salient social categories, changes in the relevance of specific social categories for certain inequalities complicate any unifying analysis of inequalities even further. A general unifying approach to inequality also has to take into account the multidimensionality of social inequality in the form of different overlapping social hierarchies with regard to the different, even though connected, power systems in the economic, political and cultural spheres of society, a fundamental insight often associated with the Weberian pluralistic approach to inequality (see for instance Grabb, 2002, 37–70; Hurst, 1992, 184–191).

In an attempt to advance the unification of the various fields of research related to the study of inequality, Diewald and Faist (2011) follow an explicitly multidimensional approach and conceptually differentiate between heterogeneities, as a general term for differences between people that do not necessarily lead to inequalities on the one hand and social inequalities that are produced by differential access to resources and opportunities on the other[40]. They argue for systematically addressing the question of how heterogeneities lead to inequalities in different contexts (Diewald & Faist, 2011, 92ff.). This general view on social inequality is capable of including various forms of heterogeneities resulting in social and economic differences in access to material goods, privileges and opportunities. In a similar integrating approach attempting to bring sociological and psychological perspectives on social categories and inequality closer to each other, North and Fiske (2014) discuss the way in which social categories such as gender, race, sexuality, disability, social class[41] and weight create and reflect

39 A lot of this research, especially in the USA, has been focused on categories such as race and gender (for a brief overview see Leicht, 2008; Grabb, 2002, 204–215; Hurst, 1992, 228–255), but many other categorizations, including social background, attractiveness, physical strength, personality-related characteristics such as self-confidence, age, disabilities and culture- and attitude-related attributes such as religious affiliation have been discussed and analyzed as potential sources of inequalities (see for instance Friedman, O'Brien & Laurison, 2017; Laurison & Friedman, 2016; Newman et al., 2014; Erk, 2017; Judge, Hurst & Simon, 2009; Grabb, 2002, 228f.; Hurst, 1992, 43–61).

40 See also McGuire (1983) for a similar use of terminology in a review of anthropological and archaeological research on cultural complexity.

41 North and Fiske (2014, 248) list social class among the "less-studied" social categories, illustrating the departure of current scientific research on inequality from strictly socio-economic categorizations such as social class or income

inequality and promote researchers to incorporate insights from other subject-related fields into their research, especially with regard to the combination of structural perspectives and "individual-level social inquiry" into intergroup biases and similar psychological areas of research (2014, 258f.). In the closely related field of status attribution[42] Mattan, Kubota and Cloutier follow similar ideas in their proposition of a "social neuroscience perspective" on social status perception[43] (2017, 470ff.). In their conclusion, they criticize one-dimensional conceptions of status and state that "evidence highlights that we readily infer the social status of others based on various social dimensions from a number of perceptual and knowledge-based cues" (Mattan, Kubota & Cloutier, 2017, 498).

The main problem for any research into a general unifying approach is the sheer complexity of dimensions and interactions on multiple levels of theory and analysis to consider. First, as has long been noted with regard to discrimination based on gender and race (Crenshaw, 1991; 1989; compare also Hurst, 1992, 229–255), the intersection of social categories can lead to consequential interactions and the focus on "mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis" tends to ignore interactions – as well as the people suffering from these multiplied forms of discrimination or inequality (Crenshaw, 1989, 139ff.). Including a number of different social categories such as age, gender, nationality and migration history, physical strength and attractiveness, religion, education or salient aspects of life and work history – mostly constructs with a multitude of possible values – as well as interactions would result in very ambitious research projects, even on a purely theoretical level. Second, apart from social categories, multiple dimensions of actual indicators of inequality also have to be taken into account, additionally increasing the amount of relationships to be represented in a

groups to other heterogeneities (or social categories in the terms of North and Fiske), especially race and gender (see also Grabb, 2002, 204ff.; Hurst, 1992, 228ff.), but also a difference between socio-psychological approaches, mostly concerned with discrimination and psychological processes of stereotyping and sociological and economic approaches to inequality that often still focus on income and wealth inequalities. At the same time, economic inequalities, distributional differences and mean gaps in material resources between social categories are frequently used to illustrate discrepancies between non-economic social categories by scholars of inequalities related to specific social categories.

42 While the focus of my thesis is on objective differences in the structural position of individuals in modern societies, work on general status perception or attribution is closely related and might be regarded as the more general concept, with the main difference that social status, as a more general concept as compared to socio-economic status or structural position, does not necessarily lead to differences in material resources, life chances and opportunities, as is the case for the specific dimension socio-economic status.

43 The authors state that "a single and general measure of social status is difficult to formulate because social hierarchies can be based on various social dimensions, and the relative importance of these dimensions may depend on characteristics of individual and context" (Mattan, Kubota & Cloutier, 2017, 471) and list financial, physical, intellectual and moral attributes as examples for potential sources of status attribution.

theoretical or statistical model (compare Chapters 3.7 and 4). Third, a network or structural model of potential interactions between social categories and relations to various dimensions of inequality could become especially complicated with the inclusion of dimensions such as socio-economic class or income groups that are often thought of to be indicators for proposed mechanisms as well as outcomes determined by other dimensions. Fourth, in part related to the problems of intersectionality noted above, the unit of analysis in inequality studies is not necessarily limited to the individual[44].

Empirically, as is to be expected based on intersectional ideas, numerous studies report interaction effects between various social categories. For instance, a study on inequality and mortality in US metropolitan areas found inequality positively correlated with mortality for black, but negative for white individuals (Nuru-Jeter, Williams & LaVeist, 2014), research on migrants shows complex patterns of welfare state spending support with regard to different groups and domains (Lubbers et al., 2018) and effects of income on inequality tolerance seem to be partly moderated by physical strength (Price et al., 2017; see also Petersen et al. 2013) and ethnic identity (Beckman & Zheng, 2007). Generally, interactions with social categories can enhance but also dampen and counteract extreme socio-economic effects, seemingly on both ends of the income distribution (Brannon, Higginbotham & Henderson, 2017). A recent review of the literature notes that including main effects of social categories as a form of controlling additional influences without considering interactions can increase biases in estimated effects and generally recommends the inclusion of moderating effects (Nuru-Jeter et al., 2018, 173f.). Taken together, whereas social inequalities have to be understood as a multidimensional construct, any empirical approach has to make some compromises in light of the potential complexity of influences. Especially when focusing on interaction effects of structural position in a comparative analysis, as is the case for this thesis, a strict reduction of dimensions considered is necessary (compare Chapters 3 and 4).

2.1.5 Economic inequality as an essential element in the analysis of market societies

The following discussion of previous research into attitudes towards inequality focuses on economic inequalities between individuals in national contexts, especially inequalities in income, but also considers other dimensions and context levels for measuring inequality between individuals and

44 Alternative or complementary units that have been analyzed in inequality studies include families of varying numbers of generations, households, groups defined by various social categories, regions of varying sizes, countries and supranational zones – including all of these levels of analysis would obviously significantly add to the complexity of any respective research endeavor.

inequalities between different groups defined by social categories in cases that are closely related to the main theoretical focus of this thesis. This focus on economic inequalities[45] between individuals has significant advantages for the statistical analyses that are at the core of this thesis, since the problem of measurement has to be considered in any empirical research[46]. First, focusing on economic inequalities between individuals, specifically income inequality, allows for the use of very specific information-rich measurements. The gradual nature of income variables opens up ways of analysis not necessarily applicable in other dimensions of inequality such as categorical class analysis. Second, income variables allow for the measurement of both objective facts and subjective evaluations in similar dimensions. For instance, the income of individuals can be used as an indicator of structural position with regard to the income distribution, while income inequality between individuals can often be measured on various regional levels additional to country level. Attitudes towards inequality between individuals can ideally be measured by asking for specific perceptions and evaluations of occupation-specific incomes. Keeping theoretical constructs and measurable variables on various levels in line with each other is a rare advantage in this thematic context[47]. Third, whereas categorizations of social class are usually not completely hierarchical (see Chapter 2.1.1), income as a proxy for social position regardless of specific class position or occupation has the advantage of being a universal, linear and monotonic indicator of structural position. The concept of income is comparatively clear[48], and can

45 It has been argued that not only classical research on inequalities, but also classical sociology itself is based largely on discussion of socio-economic differences between individuals, especially in terms of the concept of socio-economic class in the tradition of or in dispute with the work of Karl Marx (Grabb, 2002, 3ff.). Research explicitly directed at specific social categories often relies on statistics about mean differences in occupations and material resources between different social categories (see for instance Tomaskovic-Devey, Hallstein & Avent-Holt, 2015) and it can be argued in a general way that social categories identified in social research or theory as relevant for societies are usually at least correlated with distributions of material resources. At the same time, the range and variance of material resources within the specific social categories is often considerable (Hussey & Jetter, 2017; Leicht, 2008), generally rendering the use of social categories for inequality research without considering interactions with indicators of material resources problematic. Even within socio-economic classes mainly identified by occupations and related to the distribution of material resources, studies report a wide range of different income levels for most categories and increasing differences within classes in recent decades (Neckerman & Torché, 2007, 349; see also Grotti & Scherer, 2016). It should also be noted that for many contexts, the study of long-term trends in inequality often relies on material inequalities as documented or reconstructed based on archeological data or estimations based on wheat distribution (see Scheidel 2017; Mulder et al., 2009; Scheidel & Friesen, 2009).

46 Additionally, research shows that income is a central dimensions for individuals' subjective perception of social inequalities (Poppitz, 2019).

47 This is also at least theoretically possible for many other measurable unequal distributions, such as wealth, capital income or specific ownership distributions, but data availability is comparatively limited for respective measures.

48 Besides the problems already discussed concerning the definition of social classes and the use of cross-national prestige values (see Chapters 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and 2.1.3), other measures of socio-economic position are even more

easily be used in survey questions to respondents as a direct concept without any problems, including information about personal income levels as well as perceived and ideal occupational income levels. Fourth, income is directly related to the meritocratic aspects of modern market-based societies, since income from work is at least partly earned based on current behavior[49] (compare Wright, 2015a, 35–47; Gijsberts, 2002, 269f.) and, in terms of functionalist reasoning, a reflection of the functional importance associated with a given occupation. In this sense, the use of income with regard to the operationalization of structural position can contribute to theoretical clarity and consistency[50]. Fifth, other potential information-rich conceptualizations of structural position such as wealth inequality are only rarely included in surveys. The use of individual income shows some clear advantages especially in terms of data availability for respondents, but also with regard to international comparability. Sixth, individual income data could be deemed more reliable, as information about occupation is often available for internal cross-validation, generally not possible for information on wealth.

Taken together, especially in multi-cultural and international contexts, rendering the use of many other indicators of socio-economic position problematic for reasons of data availability and comparability, income seems to be a relatively clear and reliable indicator of general socio-economic position. Even though income variables are widely used by economic and social researchers alike in accordance with the advantages noted above, many authors see problems in the sole use of income as an indicator of socio-economic position and argue for multidimensional, multi-typological and interdisciplinary approaches to the research on social inequalities. For instance, Goldthorpe (2009; see also Piketty, 2020, 1039f.) explicitly criticizes economist and epidemiologist approaches to social

problematic in terms of clarity. For instance, Runciman notes ambivalence in self-classifications when comparing self-assigned class with questions about "people like you" (Runciman, 1972, 194). With regard to ranking-based occupational measures, as has been noted, many empirical researchers find that the theoretical differences between various occupation-based concepts and measures of socio-economic position are often overestimated in that empirical estimates of effects are often comparable between measures based on very different theoretical assumptions and more dependent on level of differentiation than theoretical foundation of typology used, rendering theoretical implications unclear and ambivalent (Lambert & Bihagen, 2014). Some scholars of inequality such as Runciman note that monetary comparisons are generally more accurate than even ordinal comparisons of prestige (Runciman, 1972, 113).

49 As Pellicer argues with regard to socio-economic status, in contrast to "other social ranking dimensions such as gender or race, SES is more easily changeable and thus can be attributed to one's fault" (2018, 5), highlighting the relevance of status and, in my reading, also of income for processes of legitimacy of inequality in societies with market structures and dominant meritocratic justification of inequalities.

50 For instance, whereas wealth can be inherited and has at least been earned previously, income from work and other occupation-related measures are directly based on recent individual behavior and might therefore be important predictors of current attitudes towards inequality and redistribution.

inequality, widely focused on income, as problematic, since they ignore class relations and differences between income and status hierarchies.

In empirical terms, multiple articles in recent decades illustrate the high relevance of income for other dimensions of stratification, individual opportunities, lifestyles and attitudes. When compared to other occupation-related variables as a determining influence, income often shows stronger or more consistent influences on outcome variables such as self-rated health (see for instance Xie et al., 2015) or attitudes towards the welfare state (see for instance Kevins et al., 2018) and, additionally, income inequality seems to have been rising mostly within socio-economic classes as compared to inequalities between classes, at least with regard to rises in inequality in recent decades in the USA (Neckerman & Torché, 2007, 349). In sum, while income-based measures are widely used and associated with substantial methodical and theoretical advantages, using various indicators of individual structural position in a comparative way in serial models as opposed to the test of parallel and interactive multi-dimensional influences seems to be promising if one is interested in the overall influence of moderating factors. This approach allows for the identification of commonalities that affect influences of multiple indicators of structural position in different dimensions while keeping statistical models accessible.

2.2 Attitudes towards inequality and redistribution

The discussion of approaches to social stratification and inequality research in the previous chapters has shown that public opinion and attitudes towards inequality and other aspects of social, political and economic contexts are often regarded as important constructs for the explanation of inequality trends and patterns. Especially with regard to the frequent discussions of options of reducing possibly harmful high levels of inequality in contemporary contexts (see for instance Piketty, 2020; 2014a; Scheidel, 2017; Milanovic, 2016a), constructs such as public opinion, commonly held attitudes and cultural and group-specific norms are often referred to as possible mechanisms of inequality reduction in democratic, but also non-democratic societies, since the reduction of possible sources of conflict can also be attractive for authoritarian rulers (see Hradil, 2004, 246). Even though this attribution of importance to the level of subjective evaluations for objective inequality has not yet led to the systematic integration of research, studies on inequality-related attitudes are already a vast field of research protruding into various scientific areas of theoretical and empirical analysis.

With the research on stratification as well as causes and effects of inequality discussed in previous chapters in mind, I now turn to this area of research and the explanation of inequality-related attitudes in preparation for the generation of hypotheses with regard to socio-economically differentiated attitudes towards inequality for the empirical analyses of this thesis. First, I discuss basic conceptualizations of attitudes towards inequality and related topics (see Chapter 2.2.1). Second, I review general approaches explaining individual attitudes by referring to material self-interest and modifications such as subjective perception and reference points (see Chapter 2.2.2). Third, I review possible counteracting and moderating influences on individual level (see Chapter 2.2.3) before turning to contextual influences (see Chapter 2.3).

2.2.1 Conceptualizing attitudes towards inequality

Since the evaluation of unequal outcomes and distributions is, as any evaluation not solely referring to objective parameters, based on subjective ideas leading to the preference of some distributions over others, the research into attitudes towards inequality has some overlaps with theories of justice, fairness or equity. Theories and, more generally, ideas of justice[51] can focus on summed-up or minimum individual utilities, general requirements of equality in certain dimensions or adherence to rights and liberties such as human or citizen rights or rules related to state intervention, free markets or property rights[52]. In this sense, ideas of fairness or justice have to be understood as not only determining inequality-related attitudes or contributing to the rationalization of attitudes held, but also influencing the conceptual framework of inequality analysis[53]. In the following, I apply a widely distribution-focused perspective, using mostly distributional measures for the evaluation of inequalities by respondents. I include further aspects such as normative influences, especially, but not

51 Generally, the terms fairness, justice and equity are often used interchangeably and, as Konow notes (2001, 137), despite frequent usage of the concepts in both public and scientific discourse, there is no consensus on definitions. I will interpret these terms as denoting individual ideas adhering to cognitive associative systems of loosely interrelated and partly contradictory normative rules of varying salience and level of internalization to judge outcomes.

52 For two different systematic approaches reviewing theories of justice in the context of inequality, see the articles by Sen (2000) and Wegener (1992).

53 For instance, if the theoretical framework is focused on the evaluation of specific absolute or relative metrics of distributional outcomes, questions asked might concentrate on quantitative aspects. In contrast, if the framework is based on absolute maximum or minimum values, the adherence to general rules of liberty, freedom or equality in general terms or between specific groups, questions might be framed very differently and aspects such as specific multiple interactions between categories might be the focus, for instance in the context of intersectional research.

exclusively, in the context of possible mechanisms and interaction effects possibly mediating and regulating the effect of structural position on attitudes towards inequality.

I start by briefly discussing process- versus outcome-related attitudes as a specific general contrast of conceptualization. Consecutively, I briefly review general paradigms in the explanation of attitudes towards inequality. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the conceptualization and measurement of attitudes towards inequality.

2.2.1.1 Process- versus outcome-related attitudes

Any distributional result in form of a quantifiable resource can be interpreted as stemming from some combination of inequality-generating processes and causal factors. Therefore, ideas of justice or fairness in any given distributional context and specific attitudes towards inequality can be *procedure- and order-related*, directed at processes, systems, rules and generating factors in general (see Vermunt & Steensma, 2016), or *distribution- and outcome-related*[54], directed at specific, ideally quantifiable, outcomes (see Jasso, Törnblom & Sabbagh, 2016). This categorization can in principle be applied to various topics and is commonly used in research into attitudes towards social inequalities (see for instance Liebig & Verwiebe, 2000, 6f.; Wegener, 1992).

Attitudes towards outcomes can relate to some general construct of overall inequality or the structure of inequality (see for instance Sachweh & Olafsdottir, 2012) in a given society, but also to specific parts of the population, such as specific social groups, classes or upper and lower income strata. On the other side, attitudes can also relate to one's own outcomes and relative position in the distribution (see for instance Liebig & Verwiebe, 2000, 10–11), but I do not consider such attitudes to

54 Liebig and Sauer (2016, 50–54) distinguish between procedural and order-related attitudes towards justice additionally to outcome-related attitudes, discussing the influence of decision-making processes on group level in the context of procedural justice and listing transparency, comprehensibility and revisability of the decision-making process as determinants of attitudes towards procedural justice in addition to principles of fairness or justice such as equality in treatment. On a more specific level, attitudes towards procedures, inequality-generating and -reinforcing structures and rules can be further differentiated into various specific aspects, dimensions and institutional rules, such as attitudes towards meritocracy, specific taxes and policies and the division between functionalist versus etatist attitudes. Besides distributional and procedural justice, two additional forms especially relevant in contexts of crime, conflict, betrayal and punishment are retributive and restorative justice (see for instance Wenzel & Okimoto, 2016 and Cohen, 2016). These concepts might be relevant for the analyses of social inequalities between social categories involving historical aspects of subjugation, occupation and discrimination. This obviously includes social inequalities relating to attributes such as ethnic background, nationality and gender, but could, in principle, also prove useful in analyzing attitudes towards socio-structural, class-based or occupational inequalities.

be attitudes towards social inequality in a narrow sense. On a more specific level, attitudes can relate to various quantifiable dimensions of resources and other attributes, such as income, specific goods, wealth, income from capital or even subjective attributes such as happiness.

With regard to implications of conceptual differences between order- and outcome-related attitudes, Liebig and Verwiebe (2000) argue in the context of differences between the eastern and western parts of Germany that distribution- and order-related attitudes are determined in different ways by societal structures and conditions since ideas of order-related justice are dependent on norms that can not be easily measured or quantified, whereas distribution-related attitudes are based on universally shared quantifiable measures of actual known distributions of resources (ibid., 7). The authors expect a faster convergence of distribution-related values after reunification. As expected, they find less evidence for differences between the eastern and western parts of Germany with regard to distribution-related attitudes as compared to order-related attitudes (ibid., 15–20).

To deal with cognitive biases on evaluations in the context of quantitative measures of outcome-related attitudes, the explicit separation between perception and evaluation can be used (see Chapter 2.3.1). Since perception does not necessarily mirror reality, both evaluation and perception of inequalities can be treated as separate and possibly interrelated cognitive phenomena possibly affected by influences such as structural effects in different ways. This problem of conceptual and empirical separation between perception- and evaluation-related aspects pertains to all forms of attitudes, both outcome-and procedure-related. Fine-grained quantitative data on both perceived and legitimate outcomes generally allows for more differentiated analyses as compared to general evaluative items.

2.2.1.2 General paradigms of explaining attitudes towards inequality

In terms of explanatory theoretical models, Wegener (1992, 271–276) contrasts macro- and microsociological approaches to justice evaluation. Macrosociological approaches to inequality evaluation are focused on differences between regional units, especially countries, and often aim at explaining mean attitudinal differences by various context factors. In theoretical terms, these approaches generally focus on cultural norms assumed to be shared among members of specific societies and are often based on very broad assumptions and arguments (see for instance Liebig & Verwiebe, 2000, 4–7; Wegener, 1992, 272–277). Empirical research in this context has increasingly

adopted microsociological perspectives and often tries to ground macrosociological assumptions referring to differences between societies on better-developed microsociological theories.

With regard to theories aiming at the explanation of inequality-related attitudes, especially with regard to outcome-related attitudes, the theories presented and applied in the literature reviewed can be broadly summarized and grouped by considering the influences and mechanisms regarded as relevant in the respective approaches. First, theories can refer to influences of the direct economic self-interest of respondents on individual attitudes. On the most basic level, it can be assumed that, ceteri paribus, if individual A profits from a distribution more than individual B, individual A should show a higher level of preference for the current distribution and a higher tolerance towards existing inequalities than individual B. Theories assuming influences of distribution-related self-interest on distribution-related attitudes can either refer to the direct objective self-interest of individuals as determined by contextual factors or to some conceptualization of biased perceived interest or specific relative comparisons (see Chapter 2.3.1). As already discussed in the context of social class conceptualizations (see Chapter 2.1.2), the theory of relative deprivation specifically proposes influences of social comparisons by referring to the effect of outcomes relative to specific reference groups on attitudes (compare Liebig & Sauer, 2016, 48; Wegener, 1992, 271f.).

Second, influences of specific internalized norms and values have been assumed in various works of the literature reviewed (see for instance Liebig & Sauer, 2016). Biological research has pointed to specific evolutionary and genetic factors presumably affecting general norms and cognitive mechanisms of perception and evaluation (see for instance Clark, 2014, 126–140, 264–274). Theoretical accounts such as the MFS postulate norm-related processes overriding aspects of self-interest under certain circumstances (Kroneberg, 2010; 2007; 2005; see Chapter 2.3.3). Additionally, research into effects of political institutions, welfare regimes and cultures on attitudes has long shown that contextual factors can affect individual attitudes (see Chapter 2.3.4.5). Theoretical ideas about the influences of beliefs in meritocracy or religion postulate that the degree of fairness perceived or assumed in the world determines attitudes towards actual distributions by increasing tolerance towards inequality (see for instance Trump, 2013; Jost et al., 2003). Specifically, the psychological mechanism of believing in a just world might improve both individual success for higher structural positions and coping with lower structural positions (see for instance Pellicer, 2018; Trump, 2013). Additionally, believing in a just and ordered world might even be considered to be necessary for any planning for

the future, since some stability is necessary for any expectation of outcomes (Trump, 2013; Lerner & Miller 1978, 1030f.).

Third, the traditional dichotomy of egoism versus norms has increasingly been complemented by the inclusion of social, psychological and cognitive processes such as biases in recent decades. Lines of research such as behavioral economics (see for instance Mathis & Steffen, 2015; see also Sen, 1977) and cognitive psychology (see for instance Kahneman, 2011) have contributed to this development. Theories focusing on the influences of constructs such as the bias towards the perceived status quo, group-based social identity, social dominance orientation, in-group projection or the psychological utility of system justification assume specific, partly comparatively complicated, psychological mechanisms affecting attitudes (see Chapter 2.3.2). The three mentioned groups of factors can not only be seen as commensurable, but as potentially subject to interaction effects between different constructs (compare Chapter 2.3.4).

Fourth, theories can specifically refer to the influence of perceived relative input, investment or effort of individuals as compared to other individuals or groups to evaluate outcomes in the sense of direct input/output proportionality. Whereas assumptions in this context could be summed up under cognitive processes, the influence of these factors has long been the central topic of theories explaining attitudes towards inequality, especially in market contexts, and have recently regained importance in various contexts such as research into meritocracy evaluations (see for instance Roex, Huijts & Sieben, 2019) and system justification (see Chapter 2.3.2). As one of the most basic theories in this area of research, equity theory was originally developed in the context of direct social exchange situations and considers the individual effort of individuals in dyadic interactions. The theory implies that individuals prefer different levels of input or effort to be reflected in proportional outputs (see Adams & Freedman, 1976; see also Liebig & Sauer, 2016, 48; Wegener, 1992, 272), but does not include the influence of reference groups on higher levels of analysis. Status value theory refers to a generalized order based on social status instead of a dyadic relationship based on direct effort and inputs. It explains evaluations of outcomes such as earnings with individual comparisons of actual rewards as received and just rewards, originally thought to be determined by the outcomes of individuals with similar status in the same occupational group (see Liebig & Sauer, 2016, 53; Wegener, 1992, 272).

Justice evaluation theory further generalized and sophisticated this approach by modeling an actual justice evaluation function, determined by the logarithmic ratio of actual and just outcomes, a versatile approach which is often used for comparing justice evaluations of different occupational groups over varying contexts. The method can be applied to different specific groups or even individuals and societies in the form of justice indices which can be compared over different contexts and levels (Jasso, 1999; Jasso & Wegener, 1997). At the same time, the concept of justice evaluation functions in itself does not provide causal assumptions with regard to the determination of perceptions and ideals of evaluated distributions. Instead, the approach provides a consistent framework for the integration of influences from various complementary perspectives such as the two groups of explanatory approaches listed above, and for the conceptualization and measurement of attitudes (see Chapter 3.4).

2.2.1.3 Conceptualizing and measuring outcome-related attitudes towards inequality

As is the case for both socio-economic position and social inequality, the conceptualization and measurement of individual evaluations of inequality is subject to certain value judgments with theoretical and methodical implications. Resulting complications and problems have not been solved conclusively in the sense of a unifying framework integrating various measurements developed in the course of scientific analysis of inequality attitudes and explaining differences in determinants, effects and interactions. Before turning to the theoretical and empirical investigation of structural effects on inequality evaluation, some of these general conceptual issues have to be addressed briefly.

A general problem in the study of attitudes towards social inequality is the mix of multiple normative and descriptive dimensions in general questions concerning social inequality. This problem is obvious in some survey items covering topics of social inequality, for example in questions asking if "social inequality is too high" (see for instance ISSP Research Group, 2017; 2014). Besides mingling different dimensions of social inequality, questions in this tradition are not specific regarding the perceived level of inequality and the ideal levels and structures people may have in mind. Concurrently, these items often do not show much variation empirically (see for instance Sauer et al., 2009). One possibility to increase the specificity of questions is the use of item batteries that allow for the empirical differentiation of inequality-related dimensions of evaluation by analyzing answer patterns (see for instance Breznau, 2010). This facilitates the possible identification of item groups and

the generation of index-based measures. For instance, researchers can distinguish between questions related to general preferences for equalization versus specific state intervention politics, or between universal equalization versus moderate reduction with a focus on basic needs. At the same time, simple general item batteries based on scales with limited categories impede the differentiation between specific levels of perception and evaluation. This general problem of possibly intermingling different aspects, levels and dimensions of social inequality in questions and answers is relevant for any analysis of differences in attitudes, since differences in attitudes might be either accentuated or concealed by systematic differences in the interpretation of questions or answer behavior of individuals, related to socio-economic, educational, cultural or cognitive attributes. Differences in answer behavior and question interpretation have specifically been found with regard to international and intercultural comparisons, including effects of social desirability and acquiescence (see for instance He & van de Vijver 2012; Harzing, 2006; Johnson et al., 2005; Javeline, 1999), rendering any analysis in this context that relies on simple rating-based item batteries problematic.

The subject of income inequality in principle enables researchers to quantify very specific aspects of both perception and evaluation, facilitating the generation of various measures of perceived and legitimate income inequality, ranging from simple occupational earnings to ratios between high- and low-paid occupations or the Gini index. An important step into the direction of differentiating between perception and evaluation of inequality is the inclusion of “do earn” and “should earn” measures for multiple occupational groups in some surveys, for example in the International Social Survey Project, which enables respondents to list specific perceived and legitimate earnings for multiple occupational groups (see for instance ISSP Research Group, 2017). This allows researchers to generate various measures of perceived and legitimate income inequality (ranging from simple occupational earnings to ratios between high- and low-paid occupations or the Gini index). Most important for the analysis of influences of perception on evaluation, income estimates for perceived and ideal incomes or earnings can be set into relation to each other, by generating indicators for “justice gaps”, “justice evaluations” or the “demand for redistribution” (see for instance Osberg & Smeeding, 2006; Verwiebe & Wegener, 2000; Jasso, 1999; Lippl, 1999), or by statistically modeling the influence between some of these measures, for instance in the course of an Ordinary Least Squares [OLS] regression of legitimate inequality on income, controlling for perceived inequality (see for instance Gijsberts, 2002). Generally, a separation of perception and evaluation of specific inequality-

related aspects is possible using any quantifiable resource or attribute. For instance, respective questions could focus on perceptions and evaluations of specific forms of wealth or income such as land ownership, capital income, inheritance or on aspects of state intervention such as tax progressivity (see for instance Beramendi & Rehm, 2016; 2011). Empirically, for many constructs apart from income, fine-grained quantitative data is scarce or, in most cases, simply non-available.

2.2.2 Assumptions of self-interest in the explanation of attitudes towards inequality

As Diewald and Faist note (2011, 92) in the context of discussing various areas and disciplines connected to inequality research, a grand theory of inequality is still missing and the same is even more apparent for the explanation of attitudes related to inequality. At the same time, despite various fields of research and theoretical ideas in the context of attitudes towards inequality, one basic assumption could be described as the most common pattern of explanation in the literature reviewed. Serving as a basic assumption present in many scientific studies on the topic is the influence of direct economic self-interest, often used in a simple linear or dichotomous form. With regard to income inequality, the higher the income, the higher is the expected loss from potential redistribution, leading to higher tolerance for inequality and less support for redistribution[55]. A broad range of theoretical arguments as well as empirical evidence for this general idea has been put forward in the literature reviewed and will be briefly discussed in the following paragraphs, complemented by a focus on evident limitations and possible modifications of the explanatory approaches discussed.

Since the explanation of attitudes by reference to self-interest poses some specific problems, I start the review of the respective literature by discussing the role of self-interest for the explanation of attitudes in general (see Chapter 2.2.2.1). Second, I turn to the role of economic interests in the explanation of inequality-related attitudes (see Chapter 2.2.2.2), specifically with regard to assumed

55 I review research on various dependent variables related to inequality tolerance, such as support for redistribution. It has to be noted that some of the respective constructs show different determinants. Specifically, support for redistribution and other measures related to political decisions have to be separated from inequality tolerance and other measures related to the evaluation of distributions and structures. For instance, there is some evidence that higher inequality correlates with higher legitimate inequality as well as higher support for redistribution (Kerr, 2013). Since my research is focused not on main effects but specifically on the contextual moderation of structural effects on inequality tolerance, I use research on the moderation of structural effects on support for redistribution to inform my integration of theoretical ideas on the general topic, but do not specifically differentiate between expectations for moderating effects on structural effects on inequality tolerance versus support for redistribution with regard to the generation of theoretical assumptions and the generation of hypotheses.

mechanisms, multiple determinants of economic self-interest and the subjectivity of expectations and reference points. Consecutively, I briefly review research on inequality-related attitudes showing evidence for various aspects of nonlinearity, such as special groups, saturation effects and possible cubic functions in structural effects and related areas of research (see Chapter 2.2.2.3).

2.2.2.1 Attitudes and economic self-interest

The explanation of attitudes has been a topic of frequent theorizing and empirical analysis in the context of sociological, psychological, economic and, more recently, neurobiological research. Accordingly, there is a multitude of theoretical ideas, but most studies reviewed do not apply a consistent theoretical framework and instead rely on the combination of specific ideas, in more recent studies often taken from slightly different research traditions. This is at least partly due to the fact that general theoretical models aiming at explaining attitudes in contrast to models explaining behavior generally have to deal with multiple constructs on psychological level. The overt explication of attitudes in the form of responses to surveys or experiments has some specific qualities complicating any analysis. Attitudes per se are no form of behavior and therefore plausibly might be subject to very different explanations from various forms of behavior. Research into correlations between attitudes and relevant behavior shows only moderate concordance and strong variation (see for instance Liebig & Sauer, 2016, 49). Theories aimed at behavior have at least to be adapted to be used, if at all applicable, in the context of attitudes. The explanation of attitudes as indicated by respondent behavior in interview settings seems to be especially problematic since, generally, there is no clearly defined outcome or reaction to the explication of attitudes in the context of scientific interview settings[56], whereas effects of behavior can often be clearly ranked by specific dimensions of outcomes, such as incidence or frequency of specific phenomena or measures such as income. Therefore, instrumental reasoning can relate outcomes to behavior and include knowledge or expectations about outcomes, whereas for attitudes, in an instrumental reading, possible effects have to be based on indirect assumptions in the sense of "what would people choose if they assume that their choice influences possible policy measures?" or be directly based on some idea of psychological utility (see Chapter 2.4). Whereas rational choice theory and related frameworks are influential paradigms often applied in

56 Generally, stated attitudes might be influenced by biases on the level of measurement (related to aspects such as question wording and the presentation of categories in a specific way and ranking), psychological mechanisms such as biases in response behavior or social desirability and influences such as context, framing or interviewer effects.

the research of behavior of various kinds, the application of rational choice reasoning in the context of attitudes is often implicit and not based on a clear, definite and consistent theoretical framework[57].

There are multiple options for integrating self-interest assumptions in attitude research with more general theories. First, in the case of policies, especially in democratic countries, a simple expectation relating self-interest to attitudes is that support is higher for specific policies among individuals that actually profit or would profit from these policies, since opinions expressed in scientific interviews might influence policies and actually lead to real-world effects in terms of changed policies and, for instance, distributions of resources more profitable for specific individuals supporting these policies. This option would leave a direct way open for applying rational choice theory. Second, modifications of rational choice theory such as the SEU framework can be used as a framework to include various additional aspects not considered to be relevant in simple, narrow formulations of rational choice theory. For instance, the holding and expression of attitudes can be interpreted as resulting in subjective psychological utilities determined by objective factors related to material self-interests. Generally, interpretations of rationality seem to have been increasingly questioned and widened in recent decades[58]. As psychological research has shown, both self-interested and altruistic behavior has costs and benefits, including influences on self-esteem, self-efficacy, subjective evaluations of the individual life and feelings of connectivity and isolation (Crocker, Canevello & Brown, 2017). Even if individuals do not assume any effect of their attitudes on political conditions and policies, they might keep their attitudes in line with objective self-interest because of subjective advantages on psychological level[59]. Third, general theories routinely applied to attitudes

57 In some cases, only a vague reference to influences of self-interest is given instead of explicitly rationalizing the use of this paradigm in the context of attitudes (see for instance Hadler, 2005, 132; Mau, 1997, 49). In other cases, rational choice theory or related models are explicitly applied mostly in the form of simple linear effects expected for specific attributes or resources with some relevance for the respective attributes, partly related to specific policies such as family support or general income redistribution (see for instance Mehlkop & Neumann, 2012).

58 See Becker and Mulligan (2017) for a discussion of problematic assumptions and interpretations of instrumental rationality in voting behavior. Specifically, Becker and Mulligan argue that a rational approach to voting would focus on the influences of interest groups on voting and not on underlying preferences, since the distribution of preferences can possibly be substantially affected by external aspects. In this context, political outcomes would not be explained by preferences of voters, but mainly by preferences and spending levels of influential interest groups. In line with the research on differential responsiveness (Gilens, 2012), this framework casts doubt on the relevance of preferences for political outcomes, but leaves open many questions with regard to individual preferences and priorities as possibly determined by structural effects and moderated by external influences (compare Chapter 2.3).

59 The MFS can be applied in a conceptually different, but effectively roughly similar way to rational-choice-based arguments in this context (compare Nagayoshi & Sato, 2014; Mehlkop & Neumann 2012).

such as additive multi-attribute theories of attitude explanation (see for instance Bettman, Capon & Lutz, 1975) or two-way models of judgment and decision-making (see for instance Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; see also Kahneman, 2011) would provide some access points for integration, but per se do not provide very precise mechanisms and integration options with regard to the weighting of particular influences and main and interaction effects. As a general mechanism to be considered, cognitive dissonance theory might provide a suitable framework[60] for the inclusion of effects thought of as being determined by structural positions, leading to the expectation of dissonance resulting from attitudes not in line with direct objective material self-interest related to objective attributes such as structural position (see for instance Hadjar, 2008, 75f.). Whereas for specific topics and questions, these options of explanation or integration can lead to different hypotheses, general assumptions related to self-interest based on these different theoretical frameworks are usually in line with each other.

Empirically, research into general attitudinal effects of objective self-interests is far from being conclusive, but studies in various areas have demonstrated significant effects in line with expectation concerning self-interest, especially in terms of material, economic and specifically monetary interests, apart from topics of inequality and redistribution that are discussed in more detail in the following chapters. More generally, self-interest motives with regard to socio-demographic determinants of interests, such as education and skills, unemployment history or homeownership are used frequently. Empirical studies generally show significant effects of indicators for objective self-interests on attitudes in expected directions, at least when the indicators are considered as single indicators for the respective motives in question, for instance for the explanation of government approval and support for the EU (Aksoy, Guriev & Treisman, 2018; Baute et al., 2018; Hobolt, 2014), support for trade openness and globalization (van der Waal & de Koster, 2015; Feasel & Muzumder, 2012), attitudes towards immigrants (Gerber et al., 2017), meritocratic beliefs (Smith & Mateju, 2012), preferred levels of solidarity, preferences for specific justice principles, especially need and equality (Arts & Gelissen, 2001, 294f.), political orientation (Davidsson, 2018; Emmenegger, Marx & Schraff, 2015; Knoke, 1979), preferences regarding government support for rural areas (Sørensen & Svendsen, 2016), support for social security and unemployment benefits (Fossati, 2018; Ansell, 2014) and support for changing voting rules (Bowler & Donovan, 2018). Generally, research suggests that self-

60 Notably, cognitive dissonance reduction has recently been suggested as a general mechanism of rationalization in the context of neurophysiological research (Jarcho, Berkman & Lieberman, 2011) and for the explanation of preferences resulting from behavior (Acharya, Blackwell & Sen, 2018).

interest is an important determinant of attitudes and behavior and that even in the case of prosocial behavior, individual self-interest can be a determining incentive (Vaish, Liao & Bellotti, 2018).

2.2.2.2 Assumed economic interests and the explanation of inequality-related attitudes

The possible impact of individuals' structurally determined differences in economic interests on their specific attitudes towards economic inequality has been a topic in many studies and is still frequently analyzed by researchers (see for instance Smith & Mateju, 2012; Kuhn, 2011; Hadler, 2005; Corneo & Grüner, 2002). A basic assumption is that the structural position of individuals with regard to economic inequalities, often in form of the income distribution or some general conception of the socio-economic structure in a given society, leads to specific attitudes with regard to inequality. At first sight, it seems plausible to assume that the evaluation of existing structures depends on the position of individuals in these structures, with individuals receiving more tending to prefer the current structures and outcomes to a higher degree as compared to individuals receiving less. In other words, the connection of inequality preferences to advantages and disadvantages resulting from the current situation as well as potential redistribution is supposed to be close[61] (Andreß & Heien, 1999, 4ff.; Gijsberts, 2002, 271f.; see also Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; but compare Elster, 1982, 141). This idea of equivalence between individuals' socio-economic situation and their attitudes towards inequality and redistribution has been called the "structural position thesis" (see for instance Roex, Huijts & Sieben, 2019; Vergolini, 2011; Hadler, 2005; Mau 1997) and the "general inequality regression formulation" (Förster & Toth, 2015, 1734).

61 The structural position thesis is generally in line with a paradigm of broader scope: the median-voter thesis, aiming at explaining inequality reduction by reference to majorities of self-interested voters electing redistributing parties when inequality levels increase (Meltzer & Richard, 1981). Driving forces of persisting and increasing inequalities possibly include long-term social processes and structures that are difficult to change, such as intergenerational capital transmission, class-specific marriage norms, the regional clustering of opportunities and differential responsiveness of the political system to different social groups. At the same time, welfare state institutions actively redistribute wealth and are to some extent influenced by voter decisions in democratic countries, giving some credibility to the expectation of some responsiveness of political decisions to voter preferences, or at least interest groups (see for instance Gilens, 2012). At this point, the median-voter thesis overlaps with, or even includes, the structural position thesis: If the effect of structural position on attitudes or the effect of objective inequality on attitudes has to be modified by the inclusion of relevant interaction effects, the median-voter thesis would have to be adapted accordingly. For instance, Condon & Wichowski (2020) stress the role of the extent of social comparisons as a moderating mechanism, whereas Macdonald (2019) highlights low levels of political trust as an influence counteracting effects of inequality on the demand for redistribution.

In order to address the question of possible moderating influences on context level on the determination of attitudes by individual structural position in a consistent way, mechanisms on individual level susceptible to the influence of contextual moderating forces have to be specified. In so far as specific theoretical explanations of the structural effect are presented in the literature, some authors explicitly refer to rational choice mechanisms (Mehlkop & Neumann, 2012; Andreß & Heien, 1999, see also Kunovich & Slomczynski, 2007), and others to broader concepts such as rational orientations or rational interests (see for instance Liebig & Sauer, 2016). Explanations based on rational self-interest often focus on potential gains through redistribution, since individuals with low income would directly benefit from traditional redistributive measures, while those with high income would loose (see for instance Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003). Since redistribution is assumed to reduce inequality and various levels of redistribution are at least theoretically possible alternatives to a given unequal structure, a similar logic can be applied to the explanation of attitudes towards current inequalities: higher income implies a higher tolerance for current distributions, at least as compared to more redistributive possibilities. A more specific explanation of structural effects in the given context includes the mechanism of cognitive dissonance reduction. In this interpretation of cognitive dissonance reasoning, conflicting or contradictory cognitions, attitudes and behaviors can lead to cognitive dissonance if they contradict objective self-interests. Individuals try to reduce this cognitive dissonance, and one way of achieving this aim is the adaptation of respective attitudes to conflicting routine behaviors, objective or perceived interests or internalized norms (see Hadjar, 2008, 75f.). In the context of attitudes towards inequality and redistribution, egalitarian attitudes or redistributive preferences may constitute a cognitive opposite to objective aspects of individual structural position and respective self-interests. Adjusting attitudes towards the objectively materially determined self-interests might be an option to reduce cognitive dissonance in this context[62] (see Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003, 18). This explanation circumvents the link to objective material outcomes that is implied in rational choice arguments that are focused on economic gain.

Another theoretical way of conceptualizing self-interest assumptions as a determining factor for individual attitudes is the inclusion of class- and position-specific norms (Wegener, 1992), which

62 Dissonance can also be reduced by adjusting wants, beliefs and values to be more consistent with realities such as societal structures that can not be changed easily (compare Manstead, 2018, 275; Jost, 2017, 73f.; Elster, 1982, 126–130). In my view, this openness to interpretation is not limited to reasoning on cognitive dissonance (compare Chapter 2.4) but instead is a problem for most, if not all, general theories that aim to explain complex social phenomena.

might channel group-specific self-interest without leading to individual rational considerations[63]. This option lends itself better to categorical typologies such as socio-economic class as possible determining factors than to measures such as gradual income indicators. The different theoretical paradigms such as rational choice, cognitive dissonance and group norms consistently[64] lead to the expectation of a positive main effect of individual structural position on inequality tolerance if additional interacting influences are not considered. But when interactions or specific mechanisms are included, the theoretical ideas can lead to different assumptions. For instance, group norms do not necessarily have to be affected by cognitive biases in the same way as perceived individual self-interest, and increased cognitive dissonance may result in attempts of dissonance reduction different from adapting individual attitudes to objective self-interests. In general, how "individuals translate position-related interests into justice attitudes" has not yet been conclusively or even systematically explained (Liebig & Sauer, 2016, 52). This is especially the case for potentially moderating influences.

Many studies estimating effects of individual structural position on inequality preferences rely on indicators related to occupations or income. Research usually shows significant main effects of structural position on various inequality- and redistribution-related attitudes (see for instance Liebig & Sauer, 2016, 52; Smith & Mateju, 2012; Kuhn, 2011; Dallinger, 2010; Wong, Wan & Law, 2009; Hadler, 2005; Gijsberts, 2002; Kelley & Evans, 1993; Headey, 1991; compare also Kunovich &

63 In a related formulation, the argument can rest on the advantages and disadvantages for individuals as determined by structural position, resulting from the more general application of justice related principles such as equality (Liebig & Sauer, 2016). In my understanding, the application of justice-related principles in this context can also be relevant and parallel to influences of direct rational considerations and does not have to be directly based on rational self-interest.

64 In contrast to the explanations discussed above that concentrate on the direct effects of self-interest on attitudes, it is possible that both factors might be determined by some causally preceding influence. For instance, a strong belief in meritocracy might increase the motivation to work hard or invest in education or other forms of cultural capital. Additionally, some evidence can be interpreted as pointing into the direction of biological influences on inequality-related attitudes (see for instance Clark, 2014, 126–140, 264–274). Seen from a causal-analytical perspective, this possibility substantially complicates any analysis because it might constitute a classical example of omitted-variable bias. But experimental studies find no evidence for links between attractiveness and generosity (Bhogal, Galbraith & Manktelow, 2017), and survey analyses do not show significant links between egalitarianism and attractiveness ratings (Price et al., 2011). Additionally, it can be argued that the determination of structural outcomes such as income by the relevant attributes justifies the conceptual inclusion of respective indirect effects in the proxy indicator for structural position on the theoretical foundation that this determination might be known to individuals. Therefore, influences of some attributes on attitudes could be understood as being mediated by effects of these attributes on outcomes such as the structural position of individuals. For example, if structural position with regard to economic resources in a fictitious society is completely determined by age, the variable age would be a perfect indicator for structural position and any empirical effects of age might reasonably be explained by either structural position or related constructs such as expected or subjective structural position.

Slomczynski, 2007, 657ff.; Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003, 17f.). Results are mostly in line with the structural position thesis for most indicators such as absolute and relative income, education, broad socio-economic classes and more specific employment- or occupation-related aspects (see for instance Munro, 2017; Thewissen & Rueda, 2019; Backus & Esteller-Moré, 2013; Naumann, Buss & Bähr, 2016; Jaeger, 2013; Hjerm & Schnabel, 2012; Burgoon & Decker, 2010; Kuhn, 2011; 2010; Valdimarsdóttir, 2010; Dallinger, 2008; Linos & West, 2003; Arts & Gelissen, 2001). But effects are not always present and not always robust against changes in control variables (see for instance Wong, Wan & Law, 2009; Corneo & Fong, 2008; Guillaud, 2008; Isaksson & Lindskog, 2007; Corneo & Grüner, 2002; see also Kuhn, 2013; 2011, 633; Knijn & van Oorschot, 2008). Some studies report substantial variation in specific structural effects between countries or regions[65] (see for instance Kim et al., 2018; Wendt et al., 2010; Massari, Pittau & Zelli 2009; Guillaud, 2008; Isaksson & Lindskog, 2007; Linos & West, 2003; Corneo & Grüner, 2001). A related study using a pseudo-panel approach, analyzing fixed effects on attitudes for changes in socio-demographic groups finds no fixed effect of income change (Jaeger, 2013). Whereas some differences between studies might be explained by the selection of control variables and moderators on individual and context level (compare for instance Kuhn, 2011; Stegmueller et al., 2012; Tóth & Keller, 2011), various studies indicate that inequality- and redistribution-related attitudes do not necessarily correspond with direct economic self-interest, especially among individuals in lower structural positions (see Trump 2013; Scervini, 2012; Dallinger, 2008; Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004). Generally, the correlation between structural position and inequality-related attitudes has been described as “far from perfect” (Förster & Tóth, 2015, 1782).

A possible explanation for these inconsistencies might be the influence of moderators on individual or context level, affecting the individual perception and evaluation of distribution structures and alternatives with regard to costs, benefits and normative ideas, as to be discussed in the next chapters. Additionally, the relative influence of aspects of self-interest related to current personal situation versus personal history, subjective evaluations of personal history and expectations, has to be regarded to be widely unclear. A general problem with regard to dimensions of material resources, also affecting the realistic identification of very rich individuals, is that not all resources that determine self-interest are surveyed in questionnaires. Even if a broader coverage of material and financial

65 A comparison of simultaneous effects of multiple structural indicators on multiple inequality-related attitudes shows inconsistent effects in Chinese data, with relatively strong influences of education, age, mobility experiences and geographical aspects such as rurality or distance to cities as compared to individual income (Whyte & Im, 2014).

resources is an aim in the construction of questionnaires, the respective researchers and survey institutes have to deal with the dangers of increasing item non-response, producing fatigue effects and compromising data quality. Possible differences in and differential effects of the various variables measuring structural position have rarely been addressed thoroughly and systematically in the literature reviewed[66]. Studies utilizing multiple structural variables find inconsistent effects, partly more robust for education and subjective measures of status and class as compared to occupational and income measures (Smith & Mateju, 2012; Wong, Wan & Law, 2009). At the same time, country-specific models demonstrate that in some countries, indicators of education show significant effects on attitudes whereas indicators of self-assigned class show smaller effects in contrast to countries revealing strong effects of subjective status but no significant effects of education (Kim et al., 2018).

2.2.2.3 Subjective evaluations and structural interest groups

If subjective evaluations are considered besides objective material interests, the reconstruction of rational considerations by individuals gets substantially complicated[67]. As an illustration, one might consider the computation of expected utilities from different alternatives of selecting responses in a questionnaire. In a simple rational choice framework, a researcher might see a straight equivalence of potential gains stemming from redistribution to the explication of respective attitudes, resulting in high expected utilities for the explication of very unequal preferences for individuals in high income

66 Another influence with regard to structural effects may stem from factors related to family background and mobility experiences or expectations. These aspects might influence the knowledge about other income groups or occupations as well as processes of identification with different groups and might act as parallel influences. Studies generally show influences of mobility prospects in line with expectations stemming from self-interest assumptions, in some studies limited to upward mobility (Guillaud, 2013; Neustadt & Zweifel, 2009; Guillad, 2008; Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005), and the main effect of parents' status on inequality tolerance is generally positive (see for instance Andersen & Yaish, 2012). But possible interactions remain unclear – as is the case for most of the possible interactions in this context. Based on ISSP data, an analysis of influences of various structural indicators related to mobility experiences and class origin on desired inequality levels shows effects of respondents' social class and of class origin measures, but zero effects of upward and downward mobility experiences (Andersen & Yaish, 2012, 24). I tested some factors related to mobility experiences and mobility prospects in preliminary analyses but did not find consistent results in terms of interactions. I focus on current position in the final analyses for this thesis.

67 The theoretical consideration of subjective aspects of perception has a long tradition in the social sciences (compare for instance Elster, 1982; Runciman, 1972) and has in recent decades even influenced psychological and economic conceptions of rational choice. This aspect is perhaps illustrated best by the formulation of prospect theory, a variation of rational choice reasoning that includes functional distinctive features such as nonlinearities and saturation effects and is fundamentally grounded on the concept of a subjective point of reference determining utility functions (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).

positions and low expected utilities for similar preferences stated by individuals on the lower end of the income distribution. If a broader theoretical framework is applied, a researcher might consider the influence of reference points, experiences and differential expectations (see for instance Hadler, 2005, 133f.; Bénabou & Ok, 2001; compare Sugden, 2003) complementary or in contrast to the idea of objective material interest. Methodically, the use of interaction effects to control for expected or measured influences on expectations and evaluations might contribute to the understanding of these differences, but the inclusion of interaction effects is rarely done in a systematic way.

Empirical results with regard to the influence of subjective measures such as relative income are plentiful, yet inconclusive and rarely comparative in a methodological sense. Even though there is evidence for the influence of both objective income and relative social comparisons, as measured by relative income in comparison to some reference group, on attitudes (Hadler, 2005; Lippl, 1999; see also Liebig & Sauer, 2016, 53–54), the specific influences, boundary conditions and respective mechanisms remain widely unclear (see for instance Clark & D'Ambrosio, 2015). In some studies relative income measures seem to have no significant effect (see for instance Dion & Birchfield, 2010; Lippl, 1999), whereas others show an influence of relative income and subjective evaluations compared to one or multiple reference groups (see Hadler, 2005, 133f.). A study analyzing the influence of informing people about their misconceptions with regard to their own relative position in the income distribution demonstrates that support for redistribution increases when people are informed about their misconceptions with regard to their own relative position (Cruces, Perez-Truglia & Tetaz, 2011). In general, while effects of social comparisons are increasingly considered by various scientific traditions in economic, psychological and sociological fields, most research shows moderate or weak effects in the expected direction. These effects vary in strength and moderation, and apart from some general influence, results are plentiful, but overall inconclusive with regard to any specifics. Some researchers such as Clark and D'Ambrosio (2015) note the missing integration of research between different fields and recommend developing consolidating syntheses of existing approaches and evidence.

Additionally, the expected utility stemming from the explication of attitudes that are consistent with internalized norms and values such as group-specific secondary norms as well as with interests resulting from structural position could also be integrated into theoretical approaches without leaving the theoretical framework of rationality. Concepts of expected utility can include anticipated

psychological effects, such as increased cognitive dissonance or negative effects on self-perception for attitudes that are expected to diverge from either objective self-interest or internalized or perceived cultural norms, possibly leading to effects counteracting the expected effects of direct material self-interest[68]. Whereas self-interest in the sense of rational considerations can have a direct influence on decisions in the sense of influencing the utility of possible alternatives and decision parameters, another possible mechanism of structural effects is the possible mediation and moderation of effects of structural determinants by internalized norms. Norms of relevance in this context are often thought to be shared on the group level of similar interest and organized interest. Wegener refers to this form of normative influence bounded by specific objective interests and group identities as secondary ideologies in contrast to primary or dominant norms that are shared among all members of societies (1992, 274; see also Grabb, 2002, 140–144). Especially occupation-based socio-economic groups[69] have a long tradition as a candidate both for objectively determined self-interest and for the expected sharing of attitudes[70]. Empirically, as has been discussed in the context of class analysis, results on

68 A related problem of subjectivity stems from reference group selection with regard to self-interested attitudes. The problem of reference group selection has been noted by Runciman (1972) in the form of upward bias among members of lower-status groups. Runciman identifies this factor as a possibly substantial influence on group-specific attitudes and discusses its potential for contributing to the explanation of attitudes diverging from objective self-interest as reconstructed by researchers, a topic picked up again by recent scientific contributions in the line of research into effects of cognitive biases on attitudes. Empirically, Runciman shows that there is some evidence for a general upward bias with regard to self-classification as well as a seemingly contradictory general expansion of wants, in the sense that most people overestimate their structural position but still want "more" on any income level (Runciman, 1972, 239ff.).

69 Besides class categorizations, institutionalized class- and occupation-based interest groups such as worker associations and unions might be relevant in this context. In contrast, income levels, strata or gradual indicators of income are not ideal indicators in this context, since the boundaries of categories are less clear-cut as in the case of occupation-based socio-economic classes or union membership, and the existence of an element of organization is doubtful in many cases, or at least only roughly captured by the specific income levels alone. Some authors note the possibility that organized groups based on shared structural interests can affect the perception or expression of self-interest negatively. Grabb (2002) discusses the possibility that forms of secondary elites exist in groups on the lower end of the societal structure. These secondary elites have some influence on aims and norms of organizations and do not necessarily share the same self-interests as other members of the respective socio-economic groups. Additionally, these elites can in turn be influenced by other factors such as groups related to high political power and vast economic resources. The position of relative power over individuals in lower structural positions who other societal institutions do not necessarily reach in a similar way makes them both attractive and easy targets (Grabb, 2002, 150f.; Hurst, 1992, 139).

70 The difference between objective socio-economic classes as defined by researchers and classes as self-conscious action groups has long been noted (see for instance Hurst, 1992, 11f.; Runciman 1972, 48). The topic of objective versus subjective structural groups and their influence on attitudes is the topic of later sociological studies such as the work by Runciman (1972) on relative deprivation, in which manual versus non-manual work is one of the main distinctions used to compare potential differences in opinion.

Tab. 2.1: Comparing general explanations of positive structural effects on attitudes

Explanation	Theoretical foundation	Associated structural variables	Expected functional form	Specific implications
Prospects of potential redistribution	Rational choice	Income, wealth	Linear (based on general population)	Determination of attitudes by self-interested as-if calculations
Positive psychological effects of aligning attitudes with interest	Subjective expected utility	Income, wealth	Linear (based on general population)	Negative effects on well-being of attitudes and interests are not aligned
Cognitive dissonance stemming from non-self-interested attitudes	Self-perception	Income, wealth	Linear (based on general population)	Negative effects on well-being of attitudes and interests are not aligned
Relative deprivation	Social comparison	Income, wealth	Linear (based on reference groups)	Processes related to reference group selection determine range of perceived inequality and attitudes
Internalization of secondary ideologies related to structural interest groups	Secondary ideologies	Classes	Categorical	Categorical effects expected in line with social classes and other typologies of structural interest groups

the effects of socio-economic class on attitudes are inconclusive, with some studies reporting effects whereas others do not (see Chapter 2.1.1; see also Grabb, 2002, 171). With regard to the influence of collective organization, unionization rates have been shown to correlate with redistribution (Pontusson, 2013), but rising inequality and income polarization might negatively affect unionization and redistribution by reducing the number of people both interested in and economically capable of union membership (Checchi, Visser & van de Werfhorst, 2010, 101). Effects of interest groups of other socio-economic groups and income strata, such as organizations of employers and other groups of economic or political influence, might plausibly be expected, too, but have not been systematically studied with regard to influences on attitudes in the reviewed literature.

A general methodical problem in this context of differentiation between the direct influence of objective economic self-interests and related but potentially biasing influences is the fact that moderating factors have to be considered for all variables related to both objective and subjective position, and a separate consideration of these effects might introduce additional bias since causal relations between objective and subjective structural variables are not completely clear. The inclusion of respective indicators, especially the use of multiple measures in hierarchical analyses, could contribute to a better understanding of the relationships in question (see Chapters 3.3 and 4.4.1).

2.2.2.4 Linear versus nonlinear structural effects

On the most basic level, all approaches to the explanation of effects of structural position on attitudes towards inequality discussed above can be interpreted as proposing monotonic linear or categorical effects of structural position (see Table 2.1 for an overview of different approaches to the explanation of influences of structural position on attitudes towards inequality as referenced above). But the specific functional form of effects in question might be nonlinear or based on both linear and categorical or threshold effects[71]. Specifically, groups at both the high and low end of the income distribution might differ from each other and from other groups in the middle in a systematic way with regard to the specific form of the effects of income on attitudes[72].

A way to integrate at least one form of nonlinear effect is including a quadratic term in addition to a linear one. This facilitates the modeling of curvilinear effects, often integrated in research on income and sometimes in studies on inequality in the form of saturation effects. Allowing for nonlinear functional forms, in principle, can improve models and enable the identification of threshold effects (see for instance Konow, 2001, 151ff.). If structural effects are systematically stronger (or weaker) in the top and bottom groups as compared to the middle, as might be expected based on relational class theories (see Chapter. 2.1.1), using nonlinear functional forms is a way to approach this problem (see Chapter 4.3). Potential effects of this nature are ignored if a linear functional form is analyzed[73].

71 Possible effects of gradual indicators of structural position, measuring some strictly continuous and hierarchical dimension such as income, might vary in their effect depending on a categorical indicator of structural position, measuring specific qualitatively different sets of resources and opportunities, possibly in the form of structural interest groups with secondary ideologies strongly internalized by a high proportion of members. For instance, in a Marxist definition of the top socio-economic class of capitalists, not only are resources and opportunities systematically different from other classes, with high concentrations of wealth and income from capital resulting in different implications of differences in income, but there are also potential differences in behavioral alternatives, salient political topics and even specific laws of relevance and interest. Whereas in upper classes, topics such as inheritance of corporations, taxation of capital income or other matters of protection of specific forms of wealth and assets might be of relevance and influential with regard to attitudes, in other groups and contexts basic matters of physical existence, social participation or the current taxation of consumable goods might be more relevant, with knowledge on inheritance taxation or capital income plausibly being extremely low. These specific sets of resources, opportunities, structural interests and partly structurally determined information can lead to differences in the relevance of specific indicators of structural position such as income or, possibly, even to different effects of such indicators altogether.

72 For instance, it is possible that there are counteracting mechanisms to the simple direct, linear and positive mechanism of direct economic inequality- and redistribution-related self-interest that are of a quadratic nature, effectively dampening or intensifying structural effects at specific levels.

73 But even when including nonlinear effects, if data on individuals with specific income levels is not available due to income-specific nonresponse biases, as is the case for most studies on attitudes with regard to top income (see for instance Korinek et al., 2006), nonlinear effects relevant for the population might not be visible in the sample.

Empirically, it has been noted repeatedly that social science is in need of data on the attitudes of very wealthy elites[74] (see for instance Jacobs, 2017, 523), with the same being true for attitudes of individuals in extremely low structural positions, such as homeless individuals or asylum seekers, since all groups mentioned are systematically underrepresented in most surveys on attitudes (compare Piketty, 2020, 656–659). A very interesting innovation in this context is the specific surveying of very wealthy individuals, as was done in the US Survey of Economically Successful Americans (Page, Bartels & Seawright, 2013). Whereas research on well-being shows saturation effects for the influence of income on well-being with decreasing marginal utility (see for instance Layard, Mayraz & Nickell, 2008), the analysis of attitudes demonstrates that very wealthy individuals show more conservative attitudes (Page, Bartels & Seawright, 2013, 55–64), specifically a higher tolerance for inequality (ibid., 63f.), and are more active politically as compared to the general public (ibid., 53ff.). Other authors have noted a supposed higher unity of opinion (Hurst, 1992, 111), but even within the group of very wealthy individuals, a higher level of wealth still correlates with more conservative policy preferences (Page, Bartels & Seawright, 2013, 64). Nonlinearities in structural effects on inequality-related attitudes have not been analyzed in a systematic way in the literature reviewed.

2.3 Mechanisms counteracting structural effects

To explain attitudes contrary to direct individual economic interests, multiple attempts have been conducted to integrate both materialist and psychological traditions of explanation as well as socio-psychological insights into perceptional biases, coping strategies[75] and general reactions of individuals

74 The importance of the highest income quantiles for questions of distribution and taxation is also regularly stressed by researchers on objective inequalities (see for instance Piketty 2020, 26f.; 2014a, 508–514; Milanovic, 2016, 36–45) and illustrated by the influence of inequalities at the very top on recent trends in inequality levels.

75 As Pellicer (2018) shows, the different strategies for coping with low structural positions discussed in some recent publications (see for instance Mols & Jetten, 2017; Emmenegger, Marx, and Schraff, 2015; compare also Kreiner, Ashforth & Sluss, 2006) can be summarized in a fourfold typology: First, problem-focused coping strategies result in high demand for redistribution and support for left parties, and therefore are in line with basic assumptions of basic economic self-interest. Second, meaning-focused strategies result in low class consciousness, high system justification and determination of political choices by factors not related to redistribution, therefore representing a shifting of individual focus from redistributive to other priorities such as cultural lifestyles or individual self-enhancement. Third, withdrawal results in low political interest and non-participation in elections, in principle compatible with either slight support of or slight aversion to redistribution. Fourth, aggression results in out-group hostility and support for far-right parties (Pellicer, 2018). In the paradigm presented by Pellicer (2018), coping style depends on personal characteristics such as narcissism and self-esteem stability, situational influences such as perceptions of individual influence, and macro contextual factors such as objective inequality levels.

in lower structural positions to inequality. While economic self-interest as determined by individual structural position and the contextual moderation of structural effects is the main focus of this paper, potential sources of interaction and biasing effects have to be considered as well.

The reviewed literature on inequality-related attitudes generally considers various additional determining influences on the individual level besides economic self-interest, specifically cognitive processes such as perceptional biases and motivational influences (compare Elster, 1982, 128; 125–129) with regard to socio-psychological and normative aspects. In the following sections, I briefly review research on influences on individual level possibly moderating and mediating the effect of structural position on attitudes towards inequality. First, I turn to research on the influence of perception and information on attitudes towards inequality. Second, I discuss the concept of system justification and possible effects of perceived system threat. Third, I review relevant research on potential moderating influences of internalized norms and values.

2.3.1 Perception and information

A certain reading of the constructionist approach leads to the view of society as a double construction generated by individuals subjectively constructing their own realities based on individual interpretations of sensory input (see for instance Berger & Luckmann, 1966). This paradigm of thinking about both social realities and subjectivity is often applied in a theoretical way, but does not always lead to methodological consequences[76]. As a consequence from the insight that individuals subjectively perceive realities, biased perceptions have to be controlled for when analyzing evaluations. Research has to include these subjective aspects to get a complete picture[77] (compare for instance Gimpelson & Treisman, 2018; Brown-Iannuzzi, Lundberg & McKee, 2017).

76 An obvious methodological consequence is the need to include multiple measures for theoretical constructs used, since the interpretation of constructs by researchers might be as subjectively misleading as the perception of individuals. Attributes of a given societal context, for instance with regard to objective inequality levels, have to be differentiated with regard to both measurement and the individual perception of respondents. I follow a similar approach in the empirical section of this thesis (see Chapters 3 and 4).

77 A further problem stems from the need to distinguish between rationalizations of irrational beliefs based on the adjustment of conceptualizations of reality versus biases and illusions resulting from limitations with regard to information availability or time restraints (compare Elster, 1982, 134f.) or, in other words, between self-deception versus biased and wishful thinking (ibid.,140f.). I understand this problem as a complicated issue that has to be investigated by empirical research, but options to deal with this problem are severely limited by data availability, especially with regard to the research question of this thesis.

Some inconsistencies in studies about structural effects on attitudes towards inequality may be due to the use of varying measures that relate to different attitudinal dimensions[78], perhaps most importantly concerning differences between perceived versus legitimate or preferred inequality versus support for various redistribution measures. Several distinct mechanisms may connect the structural position of individuals to these various dimensions of inequality-specific attitudes and lead to varying findings concerning the structural effect. The blending of multiple normative and descriptive dimensions in general questions concerning social inequality that is still evident in some current survey items covering topics of social inequality (as in items like "social inequality is too high") does not allow for the differentiation between the perceived level of inequality and the ideal structure people may have in mind. Additionally, general questions in this fashion often lead to very small variation among respondents (see for instance Sauer et al., 2009). However, the inclusion of "do earn" and "should earn" measures for multiple occupational groups, for example in the ISSP, enables respondents to list specific perceived and legitimate earnings for multiple occupational groups. This allows researchers to generate measures of perceived and legitimate inequality (ranging from single occupational earnings to ratios between occupations and the Gini index) and to set them in relation to each other (see for instance Osberg & Smeeding, 2006; Gijsberts, 2002; Verwiebe & Wegener, 2000).

Even when the differentiation between perception and evaluation is possible, the perception of moderating context factors could possibly mediate the effects of contextual factors and moderate the influence of structural position on attitudes on individual level. Perception can in many respects be understood as a central mechanism for the moderating influence of context variables on the main effect of structural position on inequality tolerance, in as far as rational considerations pertaining to possible losses and gains through redistribution are based on the perceived context individuals find themselves in. Studies on attitudes towards inequality that include measures of perception generally

78 Besides the perception of income inequality, the perceived level of procedural fairness in a society with regard to the production of outcomes is also often utilized to explain variation in inequality preferences (see for instance Grosch & Rau, 2020, 1689ff.; Roex, Huijts & Sieben, 2019, 48ff.; Bischoff, Heinemann & Hennighausen, 2011; compare also Bénabou & Tirole, 2006). The general assumption is that people have a higher tendency to tolerate inequality if they perceive the structure which produces different outcomes as legitimate and fair. The belief in the fairness of income differences is strongly connected to the belief in meritocracy and social mobility, illustrated by questions such as: Do people in higher structural positions actually deserve their advantages because of their achievements? Can I or my children expect similar outcomes if we have the same skills and work as hard? According to SJT (see Chapter 2.3.2), individuals have a general motivation to perceive the world as just and the system as fair and legitimate (Jost & Banaji, 1994) and this fact may contribute to the persistence of inequality by fostering self-doubt or victim-blaming instead of societal factors, even among individuals that do not profit from the current distribution (Jost & Hunyady, 2005).

show a substantial underestimation[79] of existing inequalities in aggregate (Osberg & Smeeding, 2006, 463–465; see also Becker, 2020, showing substantial underestimation of inequalities between social categories) and systematic selectivity of individual perceptions depending on socio-structural attributes such as income (Gijsberts, 2002, 272f.; Hadler, 2005, 133). Since the distribution of income is right-skewed and often right-censored in survey data, it is plausible to expect higher rates of estimation errors, especially underestimation, of high incomes as compared to wrong estimations of low incomes (see Gijsberts, 2002, 278ff.), possibly contributing to or biasing other mechanisms and general effects of income on inequality tolerance.

Research investigating the structural effect on differentiated measures of perception and preferences shows that perception and evaluation of income inequality are heavily correlated, explained by strong status-quo bias of inequality preferences (Pedersen & Mutz, 2019; Kim et al., 2018; Gijsberts, 2002; Headey, 1991; compare also Kudryavtsev & Cohen, 2010), and that the effect of social position on the evaluation of income inequality may be partly explained by differences in the perception of inequality, especially with regard to high incomes[80] (Gijsberts, 2002; see also Runciman, 1972, 199). Additionally, experimental studies show that manipulating the perception of inequality leads to effects on the evaluation of inequality in the same direction (Trump, 2018) and indicate that exposure to inequality can result in increased inequality tolerance (Sands, 2017), an effect in line with the effects of perception corresponding to status-quo bias assumptions[81]. Evaluations of inequality in general seem to be highly manipulable by providing individuals with specific alternatives (Bereby-Meyer & Grosskopf, 2004). Specifically, the presentation of multiple differing levels of actual inequality in different countries can reduce inequality tolerance as compared to the presentation of a

79 Some studies report overestimation of inequalities (see for instance Chesters & Western, 2010), but this seems to be restricted to the overestimation of trends, which is not really surprising considering that the perception of past inequality levels is substantially downward-biased.

80 However, in regional analyses of US data, individuals in lower income strata seem to be more likely to translate high inequality into high inequality perception (Xu & Garand, 2010).

81 The idea that the present state of circumstances influences normative ideas is sometimes called “the normative force (or power) of the factual”. This phrase is often attributed to Jellinek, who explains the concept by referring to the idea that the “already exercised” is easier to reproduce in the sense of both physiological and psychological aspects (1914, 337ff.). This concept is traditionally used in legal, political, historical and epistemological contexts, but the interpretation of the phrase is not always the same, ranging from the influence of empirical evidence and innovative research on ideas and reasoning in the sense of positivist thought (see for instance Borry, Schotsmans & Dierickx, 2004, 48f.) to the influence of traditions on attitudes and law (see for instance Vermeule, 2014, 389–394).

single high-inequality context[82] (Pellicer, Piraino & Wegner, 2019). Furthermore, evidence from qualitative interviews in Germany points to the influence of the perception of extreme poverty and wealth instead of inequality per se (Sachweh, 2012), and quantitative evidence based on US data shows the importance of beliefs about poverty intensity levels for political preferences (Page & Goldstein, 2016). Additionally, in a study on political awareness in European countries, structural effects of income on support for redistribution are not significant when political awareness is low[83] (Jordan, 2018). Taken together, the evidence indicates that the subjective perception of inequality and, if possible, of other contextual factors has to be considered as a possible mediator of effects of inequality and as a moderator of the effect of structural position on attitudes.

2.3.2 System justification and cognitive moderation

Some innovative studies on the topic of interactions between structural position and other attributes were conducted in socio-psychological research traditions[84] surrounding Social Identity Theory [SIT] and SJT. In this line of research, the question often is why people accept inequality and which circumstances lead people to accept unequal outcomes even if they do not benefit from them (see for instance Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Huddy, 2004; Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004; Rubin & Hewston, 2004; compare also Frankel, 2015). SIT stresses the permeability of boundaries and the identification of individuals with different groups as determinants of the evaluation of unequal structures, generally

82 As explained by the authors of the study, this could be explained by beliefs of inevitability (Pellicer, Piraino & Wegner, 2019), i.e. the perceived immutability of the status quo, or by effects of cognitive anchoring (compare Chapter 2.3.2), since providing information about the existence of different inequality levels creates multiple reference points.

83 At the same time, high political awareness in itself does not necessarily imply realistic information and additional aspects such as moral outrage and the assignment of responsibility, blame and credit play a role as well, as is illustrated by studies on self-interest effects in voting behavior and support for social policies (Tilley, Neundorf & Hobolt, 2018; Wakslak et al., 2007), leaving room for additional influences of political, social or economic interest groups.

84 Additional influences of psychological factors and processes on structural effects could be related to constructs in the context of emotions and personality traits. In a related field of research, a study on effects of relative income on perceived justness of individual earnings shows that social comparison orientation moderates the structural effect as measured by relative income (Schneider & Valet, 2013). Psychological processes related to emotions seem to play a role in individual moral judgments and forms of affective priming can influence individuals (Huebner, 2015). Since interview settings can vary in their social and general context, the different provocation of emotions could be relevant for systematic differences between studies and possibly explain some differences in structural effects. Personality traits such as openness and conscientiousness seem to influence inequality-related attitudes, at least partly independently of structural position, and have also been suspected to mediate gender differences (Förster & Toth, 2015, 1782). For both groups of factors, any potential interplay with effects of structural position remains completely unclear. Any serious direct investigation of these questions would rely on complex data with regard to psychometric and ideally neurophysiological and other biological data on reactions of individuals.

leading to the expectation of effects of group identities in line with group-specific self-interests (Kugler, Cooper & Nosek, 2010; Huddy, 2004), but also some limited general acceptance of structures by disadvantaged groups[85] (Jost et al., 2003, 15).

In contrast to SIT, SJT focuses on the concept of systems in the sense of societal structures providing not only sources of group identity but also of security and cognitive certainty, the attraction of belonging to the current system of social order and the psychological benefits people derive from accepting and supporting the system[86] (Jost & Banaji, 1994; compare also Hurst, 1992, 296; Elster, 1982, 124–145), especially if they are disadvantaged (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). A central role in SJT reasoning is played by system-justifying ideas, so-called legitimizing myths, often related to specific normative ideas discussed in more detail in the following chapter. The strength or degree of internalization of these legitimizing myths, for example as visible in attitudes related to protestant work ethic or meritocracy, often shows significant main effects on attitudes (see for instance Kuhn, 2013; 2011; Bénabou & Tirole, 2006) and may have different effects on members of specific structural groups (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). The general idea is that system justification by individuals in lower structural positions is related to the psychological utility, sometimes described as a palliative effect, that individuals gain from the acceptance of both objective conditions and forms of normative legitimization (Vargas-Salfate et al., 2018; Jost, Wakslak & Tyler, 2008; Huddy, 2004). Specifically, SJT posits that the individuals most disadvantaged by the status quo have the greatest need to reduce ideological dissonance and therefore are expected not only to accept but to embrace existing systems[87],

85 For example, in a recent study, the salience of a superordinate group is identified as an interacting variable between the structural position of individuals and the evaluation of inequality (Jaśko & Kossowska, 2013).

86 The SJT stresses concepts such as cognitive and ideological dissonance (see for instance Trump & White, 2017; Jost et al., 2003, 15ff.), the motivation to reduce uncertainty, threat to current conditions and social discord (Jost, 2017) and resulting outgroup favoritism of disadvantaged individuals (Hicks, Jacobs & Matthews, 2016). In research in the context of SJT, various determining factors such as the perceived stability of the system (Blanchar & Eidelman, 2013), the level of dependency or powerlessness, including the hope for mobility (see for instance Day & Fiske, 2017; see also Bénabou & Ok, 2001), and the perceived inevitability of the system (van der Toorn et al., 2015; Costa-Lopes et al., 2013; van der Toorn, Tyler & Jost, 2011) and neurophysiological correlates (Jost, Sapolsky & Nam, 2018; Nam et al., 2018) are analyzed as well as outcomes such as the expected positive psychological effects of system justification (McCoy et al., 2013; Lucas, 2009). Generally, SJT aims not at explaining social change, but focuses on aspects of reproduction of current structures (Rubin & Hewston, 2004; Huddy, 2004).

87 Specifically, with regard to income, studies report negative effects on variables measuring system justification in terms of willingness to limit criticism of the government by press and citizen rights, trust in government officials and the belief that government is run for the benefit of all (Jost et al., 2003, 17–22). Less pronounced effects still in line with SJT expectations have been found for functionalist beliefs with regard to income inequality (ibid., 23f.). Empirical analyses also show that low-income voters in Sweden, Canada and the USA are more responsive to top-income growth

whereas exact motivations and mechanisms of this process are still discussed by researchers in the context of the SJT[88] (see for instance Jost et al., 2003, 15). System justification seems to increase well-being in various contexts. A recent publication argues that positive or palliative effects are more uniform and less heterogeneous than postulated originally by SJT, uniformly increasing acceptance of the status quo across structural groups (Vargas-Salfate et al., 2018). Research on support for suppression of dissent shows effects expected by SJT even for children in poor low-status groups in countries of the Global South such as Bolivia (Henry & Saul, 2006). The authors of a respective study conclude that "system-justifying beliefs are present among low-status group members in even the most extreme cases of poverty, and even among the youngest politically aware members of society" (ibid., 365). Even though SJT leads to interesting expectations with regard to the moderation of structural effects, interaction effects are not frequently utilized. Evidence from studies on SJT illustrate the possible influence of contextual variation in structural effects. For instance, in a study on the limits of self-interest in political attitudes, not testing for interactions and controlling for different forms of attitudes simultaneously, effects of income on economic system justification vary in direction between the Lebanese versus the American respondents (Jost et al., 2017).

2.3.3 Internalized norms, values and attitudes

A frequent focus of recent studies in the context of attitudes towards inequality is the effect of norms, values and political affiliations and ideologies on inequality attitudes[89]. Generally, the influence of normative aspects can be considered on both contextual[90] and individual level. In contrast to attitudes, generally referring to specific evaluations of specific behaviors or circumstances, constructs on

than to economic developments in their own income groups (Hicks, Jacobs & Matthews, 2016) and that the perceived legitimacy of social systems seems to be highest among intermediary structural groups in contrast to groups in highest and lowest positions (Caricati & Sollami, 2017). Negative effects of forms of system justification on support for redistribution seem to be mediated by moral outrage (Wakslak et al., 2007).

88 System justification is expected to be higher for individuals in disadvantaged positions when the salience of structural interests is low, for instance due to low group identification and political mobilization (Jost et al., 2003, 17).

89 Even in economic analyses of inequality, the role of ideologies and justificatory narratives has received increasing attention. Piketty (2020) recently provided a broad historic perspective on the role of ideologies in the development of inequality patterns in different societies.

90 As has been discussed in the context of socio-economic classes and secondary ideologies of structural interest groups (see Chapters 2.1.2 and 2.2.2.3), the influence of normative ideas or ideologies can be conceptualized and analyzed on different levels of social context. Dominant or primary ideologies are usually conceptualized at the level of nation states or even larger cultural or geographic units, whereas secondary ideologies are attributed to specific socio-economic groups determined by structural interests such as socio-economic classes or occupations.

ideological level in line with norms and values are thought of as being more abstract and stable than specific attitudes. Norms and values transcend specific situations, are generated by processes of socialization, especially social pressure (see for instance Goren et al., 2016; Doll & Ajzen, 1992, 755), and influence specific attitudes, behavioral intentions and behaviors[91] (Terry & Hogg, 1996, 778–780). Norms and values have often been noted as possibly counteracting or moderating structural effects in the sense of direct self-interests[92]. At the same time, the level of internalization of even relatively stable norms by individuals is generally understood as being subject to individual variation and determined by aspects of learning, transmission, socialization and also self-interest (see for instance Haack & Siewecke, 2018; Hurst, 1992, 294). Some specific determinants of this variation, including socio-economic class, income, gender, age, personality traits, religion, religiosity and political affiliations have been analyzed in their potential to influence inequality-related attitudes (see for instance Jost et al., 2014), but systematic research utilizing different possible causal pathways and evidence for actual causal influences and processes is still very limited.

In theoretical terms, the MFS (see Kroneberg, 2010; 2007; 2005) postulates that high internalization of norms on individual level can lead to automatic activation of specific frames and scripts as alternative modes of action without including any form of rational consideration. The model presents a coherent and simple way of integrating rational and non-rational influences by considering norms not as sources of possible subjective expected utility, but as a preceding moderating influence, possibly negating rational influences (see Mehlkop & Neumann, 2012; Kroneberg, 2010). In contrast to this conception, models relying on the economy of altruism assume that wealthy or high-income individuals show weaker effects of self-interest as compared to individuals with lower income or wealth (see for instance Rueda, 2014). For both models there is only limited evidence in the context of attitudes (but see Rueda, 2014; Mehlkop & Neumann, 2012). Empirical tests between different models

91 Research in the context of norms and attitudes can often be criticized for unclear causal directions between different constructs of norm-, value- and attitude-related constructs. The reliability, validity and stability of many constructs related to norms as measured by researchers has often been questioned, as is the case on a basic level for the relevance of attitudes and related constructs for the behavior of individuals. At the same time, many researchers on normative aspects argue that there seems to be a continuum between ideas with a very high degree of internalization and stability, generally interpreted as wider systems of norms and values, versus ideas that are subject to high individual instability and variation in terms of time and context, generally interpreted as attitudes and opinions (Terry & Hogg, 1996, 778).

92 Perhaps most prominently, in traditional Marxist thought, religion is regarded as an “opiate to the masses”, a sedative with palliative functions, increasing subjective well-being by devaluing objective reality and switching focus to a transcendent sphere (see for instance Schnabel, 2017). But on the most basic level, it can be argued that even the pursuit of self-interests and respective causal assumptions are products of social norms (see for instance Miller, 1999).

postulating interactions of structural effects with normative constructs have not been conducted in a comprehensive and systematic way in the literature reviewed.

Concerning specific normative ideas, egalitarian or etatist norms could influence individuals in structural positions equivalent to the high end of the income distribution to tolerate less inequality than expected based on simple conceptions of objective economic self-interest. Normative ideas related to the fairness or moral necessity of unequal outcomes or the conservation of current social structures could increase inequality tolerance among people on the low end of the income distribution and the socio-economic structure of a given society. Specific norms and convictions often thought of as influential in the general context of inequality-related attitudes include etatism or state-interventionism versus functionalism or economic liberalism (Liebig & Wegener, 1995; Wegener, 1992), left-right orientation (Jaeger, 2007), religiosity and the belief in a just world (Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; Jost et al., 2014), individualism and collectivism (Lübker, 2004; Delhey, 1998), principles of justice (Liebig & Sauer, 2016) and values related to meritocracy[93]. Substantial correlations with inequality attitudes as expected by basic theoretical accounts have been shown for many norm- and value-related constructs such as political identification, party identification, right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (Carvacho et al., 2013; Jaeger, 2013; Jaeger, 2007; Hadler, 2005; Mau, 1997), individualism and collectivism (Hammar, 2021), egalitarianism (Breznau, 2010) and also for religion and religiosity (Jost et al., 2014; Stegmueller et al., 2012). Various studies[94] find evidence for self-interest in the determination of meritocracy-related attitudes[95] (Suhay, Klasnja & Rivero, 2021;

93 In the most general sense, the idea of meritocracy refers to social structures organized based on individual merit, generally understood as achievement- or performance-based constructs of individual contribution (see for instance Cech, 2017; Mijs, 2016; Tan et al., 2016; compare also Piketty, 2020, 709–713). Support for meritocracy can be interpreted as a key system-justifying ideology in various contexts, but especially in the context of social structures explicitly legitimized by reference to merit-based concepts (Tan et al., 2016). The perception and evaluation of specific groups located at the upper and lower ends of socio-economic structures seem to play important roles in the determination of attitudes towards meritocracy and inequality by influencing the perceived deservingness of outcomes (see for instance McCall, 2013) and perceptions of social conflict (Sachweh, 2012). Notably, an experimental study indicates that highly meritocratic contexts decrease perceived corruption, but at the same time increase the tendency to endorse and participate in corruption, explained by the strengthening of the motivation to uphold hierarchical structures (Tan et al., 2017).

94 Particularly noteworthy is a study that surveyed top income earners in the USA and shows that meritocratic beliefs are substantially influenced by structural position (Suhay, Klasnja & Rivero, 2021).

95 Generally, both individual merit and meritocracy are hard to define and measure, if not operationalized by some form of objective outcome that already might be affected and biased by additional aspects. Individual merit is sometimes measured based on educational attainment, income, status or productivity in certain measurable contexts. All of these indicators are highly problematic as measures of a behavior- and not outcome-based definition of merit. Similarly, the

Kunovich & Slomczynski, 2007) and for effects of meritocracy preferences and perception on inequality attitudes (Gabrieli, 2007; Linos & West, 2003).

With regard to problems of causality and possible mediation effects, hierarchical analyses show that income and other indicators of socio-economic position generally seem to have weaker and sometimes non-significant effects on perception of inequality if controlling for norm- and attitude-related factors that are partly determined by structural interests (see Kuhn, 2011, 633). Additionally, the selection of justice principles seems to depend on social context (see Konow, 2001) and on the individual position in the structure of inequality. In accordance with the idea that individuals prefer justice principles in line with self-interests, low-status individuals seem to prefer the equality principle whereas high-status individuals show stronger preferences for the principles of equity and entitlement (Liebig & Sauer, 2016; Sachweh & Olafsdottir, 2012). Using slightly different definitions of principles, other authors also find differences in preferences for specific principles with regard to both countries and structural groups, with education and authority being valued more in poorer countries and family needs being valued more by individuals in lower structural positions and in poorer countries (Evans, Kelley & Peoples, 2010, 1416), whereas performance and effort seem to be a relatively universal criteria with regard to both differences between and within countries (ibid.).

In terms of the individual-level moderation of structural effects, studies reported in the reviewed literature indicate interactions between structural effects and normative aspects in various fields of research. Political affiliation seems to moderate the influence of structural effects for politicians, with studies showing that status predicts inequality attitudes particularly among left-wing politicians in the USA (Kraus & Callaghan, 2014). A study on support for redistribution in Iceland shows a similar moderation of income effects by political ideology as measured in a left-right dichotomy (Valdimarsdóttir, 2010, 199f.). In a study on preferences for redistribution in the USA, the structural negative effect of individual upward mobility experiences on support for redistribution is moderated by beliefs in equality of opportunity, roughly related to the concept of meritocracy, since limits on equality of opportunity interfere with meritocratic criteria (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005). Research also points to influences of different levels of various forms of trust, possibly related to

measurement of meritocracy is problematic, since objective indicators are generally doubtful even on a mere analytical or theoretical level. Measures such as the equality of educational chances or correlations between measures of structural position between different generations are sometimes utilized (see for instance Ruß, 2012), but can be seen as selective and indirect proxies.

normative conceptions of fairness and distributional justice (Nagayoshi & Sato, 2014) on structural effects. Taken together, evidence is still scarce, but points to the potential influence of norm-related aspects on structural effects on inequality-related attitudes, possibly on multiple levels of analysis, with both mediation and moderation of structural effects as plausible mechanisms.

2.3.4 Moderation of structural effects on context level

Even though the inconsistency and variability of the effect of structural position on inequality attitudes has often been noted by researchers, the analysis of contextual moderators of the effect in question has been very limited. A general variation of structural effects depending on context has been traditionally expected based on discussions by Marxists and other theorists (see for instance Grabb, 2002, 228; compare Elster, 1982), but even the main effects of most context variables are still up to debate, partly because of data limitations and collinearity problems (see Moehring, 2012). In terms of moderation effects, country-level influences[96] have received some attention in the reviewed literature, namely economic conditions, institutional arrangements and various cultural factors. The variability of structural effects between various countries seems to be substantial. Differences between countries are frequently discussed and analyzed with regard to various factors. Therefore, countries are the standard level for contextual effects[97] as discussed in the following, if not explicitly specified otherwise.

Studies analyzing specific effects of income on attitudes towards inequality, redistribution and related constructs such as social equality preferences show substantial differences in effects between different countries, partly indicating different levels and functional forms, including non-monotonic relations (Pittau, Massari & Zelli, 2013), substantial differences in effect strength and zero effects for

96 As calls for the use of transnational scales for the measurement of stratification and structural position (Weiss, 2005) and criticism directed at methodological nationalism in general show, assumptions about nation states as the main units for the reproduction of norms, feelings of identification or security are problematic with regard to both epistemological limitations and normative implications in terms of a reproduction of nationalist frames of reference (Milanovic, 2016a, 235–239; Heidenreich, 2006). At the same time, empirical evidence shows significant variation between countries with regard to both main and interaction effects in many areas of research, rendering it close to impossible to ignore these differences from an epistemological viewpoint.

97 While economic conditions such as inequality and economic growth show substantial variation on the level of small regional units within countries (see for instance Chakravorty, 2006), institutional arrangements generally vary between countries and therefore include various regions of differing economic but similar institutional configurations. In the reviewed literature, spatial inequalities within countries do not receive a lot of attention with regard to main effects on attitudes and, especially, in terms of the moderation of individual-level processes of attitude formation (but see for instance Rueda & Stegmueller, 2014; Bailey et al., 2013; Gannon et al., 2012).

attitudes towards redistribution (Kim et al., 2018) and for related constructs such as attitudes towards social security and meritocratic beliefs (Isaksson & Lindskog, 2007). Recent studies in the context of welfare state regimes and support for redistribution highlight the need for differentiation between specific dimensions both on the level of attitudes and institutional arrangements, especially with regard to the analysis of mechanisms related to self-interest (see for instance Jordan, 2013; Trump, 2013; Beramendi & Rehm, 2016; Larsen, 2008; but see also Brady & Bostic, 2014).

Among the contextual factors considered in studies as possible moderators[98] of the effect of structural position on attitudes towards inequality, economic conditions and institutional arrangements affecting the life conditions and chances of individuals, especially levels of income inequality and redistribution, seem to be the most obvious candidates for influential factors, since these aspects directly structure the economic conditions and alternatives of individuals and possible individual gains and costs of potential redistribution policies. The theoretical arguments presented in previous research often refer to group-specific structuring of individual self-interest by institutional and economic context factors or to the influence of subjective normative considerations, also compatible with the SEU framework as described above. At the same time, as the review of literature on individual-level moderators implies, possible influences of contextual factors related to norms and culture have to be considered as well.

2.3.4.1 Inequality as a moderator

In recent years, there have been some attempts to theoretically and empirically explain international variation in structural effects with ideas related to effects of differences in inequality levels (see for instance Dion & Birchfield, 2010, 317ff.; Tóth & Keller, 2011, 9ff.). In terms of inequality dimensions, income inequality[99] is by far the most used dimension in the context of research into

98 Additional contextual moderators in the broader sense not explicitly considered in this discussion include potential effects of the interview situation and setting as well as the questionnaire and language-specific formulations (see also Konow, 2001, 157–161).

99 The computation of measures of income inequality is usually based on administrative data such as tax records or survey data. Both of these sources are problematic, since tax data does not cover income below tax thresholds, can be biased by under-reporting and often can not be adjusted for household size, whereas survey data is subject to bias stemming from sampling errors, selective under-reporting and survey as well as item nonresponse (Morelli, Smeeding & Thompson, 2015). Especially data on the lower and upper tails of the income distribution is often not reliable to varying degrees. In many studies based on survey data, net household inequality is used as the main measure, but inequality in personal income and inequality in consumption are also regularly analyzed. In international studies, data from different sources using varying measures is sometimes merged and even if only a single source is used, data

attitudes towards inequality and structural effects in particular, often based on post-tax and -transfer household equivalence income. With regard to specific measures, the two most frequently used measures in the reviewed literature are the Gini index, used as an indicator for the deviation of the income distribution from complete income equality, and the ratio between high and low earners as an indicator for the income gap between people on the high and low ends of the distribution. These two indicators only constitute a small fraction of measures for inequality proposed in the literature on inequalities. No systematic comparison of general and differentiated relative or absolute measures is obvious in the literature reviewed on the topic of structural effect on inequality-related attitudes.

In terms of theoretical explanations, a basic mechanical effect has to be considered first. Higher levels of inequality imply a stronger polarization of objective economic self-interests in higher versus lower structural positions. If the level of inequality is perceived adequately, the differences in objective interests are also to be expected to influence individual considerations of self-interests and ultimately individual choices of attitudes and behavior, increasing structural effects in contexts of higher inequality. Specifically, higher levels of objective economic inequality generally imply a more pronounced differentiation of objective economic self-interests.

In contrast to this basic mechanical idea, some researchers propose subjectively expected direct and indirect effects of high inequality on the success of extremist parties, the intensity of social conflicts or the probability of revolutions, possibly reducing structural effects since a higher structural position implies that there is a higher potential for losses (see Alesina & Rodrik, 1994). Increases in inequality might lead to increased inequality aversion of high-status individuals, overall diminishing structural differences in attitudes towards inequality, while possibly moderately reducing inequality tolerance for the complete population on average. In this line of thought, a fear of crime or conflicts and the self-interested aversion against extreme inequality and poverty have been investigated as possible moderating influences on the structural effect (Rueda & Stegmueller, 2016; 2014; Pittau, Massari & Zelli, 2013; Dion & Birchfield, 2010, 319; Alesina & Rodrik, 1994). This explanation of variation in structural effects is generally in line with considerations of economic self-interest[100],

collection often differs between countries. In order to minimize problems related to specific data sources and conceptualizations, I analyze various forms of income and inequality in the empirical section, including different source for the estimation of inequality (see Chapters 3 and 4).

100 Generally, the research conducted and discussed by Scheidel (2017) concerning violent leveling as the main driving force of prehistoric and historic inequality levels lends some plausibility to the idea that the fear of conflict and forms of violent leveling might decrease inequality tolerance among wealthy individuals who have a lot to lose.

possibly reducing structural effects in contexts of high inequality by reducing the inequality tolerance of individuals in higher structural positions[101]. Additionally, SJT includes a possible different mechanism explaining variation in structural effects depending on inequality levels. SJT proposes that contexts of high inequality increase system justification and inequality tolerance by increasing cognitive dissonance and additionally possibly influencing perceived system risk (Jost et al., 2003; see also Braun & Fatke, 2019). This mechanism is presumably especially effective for disadvantaged individuals (Trump & White, 2017), possibly reducing structural effects in contexts of high inequality by increasing the inequality tolerance of individuals in lower structural positions (but compare Sands & de Kadt, 2019, showing that direct exposure to inequality can increase support for progressive taxation among individuals in lower structural positions).

When considering multiple possible pathways and potentially counteracting effects, the influence of country-level inequality on structural effects on inequality-related attitudes can be understood as a multitude of, potentially parallel, direct and indirect moderation effects. First of all, besides effects of inequality on the individual economic outcomes of individuals, the actually perceived levels of inequality[102] also affects economic expectations of individuals[103]. The mediating

101 An alternative explanation of moderating influences of inequality on the effect of social position on attitudes is possible with reference to social norms. High levels of inequality and a widespread lack of vital necessities may lead people in the upper part of the income distribution to approve higher redistribution levels out of normative considerations and therefore diminish social differences with regard to preferred inequality and redistribution. Since this reasoning focuses on basic needs, it seems to be non-intuitive to assume a direct effect of inequality in this regard. High inequalities do not necessarily result in poverty and poor living conditions for people on the low end of the income distribution, since factors such as development and governmental activity (especially when when considering market inequality levels) also play a role. Therefore, the argument may be more relevant for possible moderating effects of societal wealth or poverty or a combination of wealth, poverty, inequality and redistribution. Instead of need satisfaction, chances and opportunities may be the focus of normative considerations related to inequalities, especially incentivizing individuals on the upper end of the income distribution to favor some higher level of redistribution as a measure to promote the realization of meritocratic ideals, and in turn leading to a dampening of social disparities with regard to attitudes. Expected general moderating influences on structural effects for the related possible mechanisms are in line with ideas related to fear of conflict and crime (see for instance Rueda & Stegmueller, 2019a;, 2016).

102 The perception of inequality has received increasing attention in recent years, with scholars on objective inequality noting that perceptions of inequality "shape the political economy of economic reforms" (Bourguignon, 2015, 72).

103 Both direct effects of objective inequality on attitudes and the moderating influence of objective inequality on structural effects could generally be mediated by two different processes: First, inequality could influence other objective contextual factors in turn affecting attitudes of individuals. For instance, high crime rates, high inequality of opportunities or low levels of solidarity could be determined by inequality and in turn influence attitudes. Second, inequality could influence attitudes by affecting inequality perception if inequality perception affects attitudes in turn, for instance by subjective expectations in the way described above as possible mechanisms relating inequality to attitudes. By analyzing the interrelationship between objective inequality, perceived inequality and structural effects on attitudes, it could also be possible to separate between the two general processes of inequality effects empirically.

mechanisms for the moderation of the effect for structural position on attitudes by inequality levels described above (such as the fear of conflicts) could be understood as indirect effects when additional factors (such as the fear of conflicts on aggregate level) are conceptually included. Additionally, research into correlations of inequality with other country-level factors shows various influences on constructs on political, economic, socio-demographic, institutional and normative level, and for some of these additional factors, moderating influences on structural effects are plausible. Therefore, separating effects of inequality and their potential mediating factors from potential additional influences is a difficult task both theoretically and empirically, since causal relations are not necessarily clear, especially when considering multiple plausible ideas.

The empirical evidence on influences of inequality on attitudes towards inequality is not conclusive, even with regard to main effects on attitudes[104]. Some studies find evidence in line with reduced structural effects in contexts of higher inequality, partly specifically for higher structural groups (Rueda & Stegmueller, 2019a; 2016; Pittau, Massari & Zelli, 2013; 319; Alesina & Rodrik, 1994). In contrast to the aforementioned results, in two studies on support for redistribution that explicitly test for moderators of structural effects, no interaction between individual income and national-level inequality is found[105] (Dion & Birchfield, 2010 ; Dallinger, 2008). In a study using 300

104 In terms of main effects of inequality on attitudes towards inequality, a basic and often used theoretical assumption with regard to main effects of objective inequality in the context of inequality attitudes is that higher inequality levels correlate with higher levels of average inequality aversion, since more individuals would profit from redistribution in contexts in which more resources are in the hands of less individuals. Some studies, specifically on European data, find a positive main effect of income inequality on support for redistribution (Olivera, 2015; Finseraas, 2009; see also Förster & Tóth, 2015, 1782–1783). A study using fixed effects models within a pseudo-panel approach reports a significant positive effect of income inequality on demand for redistribution in European data (Jaeger, 2013). Regional inequality in the sense of high segregation between neighborhoods seems to negatively influence support for redistribution in US data (see for instance Bailey et al., 2013; Gannon et al., 2012). A study using lagged effects indicate that earlier inequality levels positively influence later tolerance for inequality as measured after three to four years, but not vice versa (Schröder, 2016). Another study points to the possibility of a nonlinear threshold effect with regard to the influence of inequality on support for redistribution, with structurally interested preferences slightly increasing under conditions of very high top inequality (Hicks, Jacobs & Matthews, 2016). Experimental evidence indicates that high perceived inequality increases the perceived gap in merit between individuals in low versus high structural positions (Heiserman & Simpson, 2017) and other studies report negative effects on solidarity (Paskov & Dewilde, 2012), possibly contributing to inequality acceptance and positive feedback in inequality reproduction. Possibly explained by the existence of counteracting, and potentially context-dependent effects, some studies report no main effect of inequality or inequality changes on attitudes (see for instance Evans & Kelley, 2017; Whyte & Im, 2014; Tay, 2013; Kenworthy & McCall, 2008) and research on US data shows similar findings for effects on trust (Fairbrother & Martin, 2013).

105 More specifically, inequality levels do not seem to interact with income, but instead with education in a study using both interaction effects simultaneously (Dion & Birchfield, 2010) and the interaction of inequality and structural

country surveys in 50 countries between 1985 and 2008, investigating multiple interactions of context factors with income, an interaction of income with inequality is found, but only in two out of three decades analyzed (Dion, 2010). A study of the preferences for redistribution of specific income groups in European countries indicates that inequality seems to be especially relevant for the preferences of middle income groups as opposed to more stable preferences at the top and bottom ends of the income distribution[106] (Kevins et al., 2018). Two studies specifically analyzing the variation of structural effects report a moderation of negative effects of income on support for redistribution by levels of income inequality. The effects shown for indicators of structural position and interest-group related aspects of identity such as income and union membership are moderated by inequality, with stronger effects in contexts of higher inequality (Rueda & Pontusson, 2010; Massari, Pittau & Zelli, 2009). Another study reports a curvilinear relationship between inequality and the structural effect, with highest effects of income in contexts of moderate inequality and lowest in contexts of high inequality (Tóth & Keller, 2011, 38ff.). Evidence on changes in inequality and structural effects on inequality attitudes over time is limited, but a study on Chinese data shows a significant effect of income on the preference of equality in a more recent wave characterized by substantially higher inequality (Whyte & Im, 2014, 71). Longitudinal research using US data similarly shows increasing gaps between rich and poor individuals in recent decades with regard to both income inequality and differences in attitudes towards redistribution (Pittau, Farcomeni & Zelli, 2015). Comparative research testing ideas regarding the fear of conflict and differential altruism as moderating influences shows that especially rich individuals in more unequal contexts are more supportive of redistribution as compared to more equal contexts[107] (see for instance Dimick, Rueda & Stegmueller, 2018; 2016). Seemingly in contrast to these results, experimental studies show differences in attitudes between contexts of different inequality levels mainly for individuals in lower structural positions (Grimalda, Farina & Schmidt, 2018).

position is not significant in another study when controlling for additional interactions, for instance between structural position and economic prosperity on country-level (Dion & Birchfield, 2010).

106 The authors of this particular study argue that the effects of differences in distances between the middle and the top, but not of differences in distances between the middle and the bottom is evidence against hypotheses assuming effects of social rivalry, insurance motives and social affinity and instead interpret the moderation effects as indicating effects of social envy, since the effects seem to be strongest for middle income groups being affected by inequality between middle and upper middle income groups (Kevins et al., 2018).

107 In a closely related context, higher aggregate perception of inequality of opportunity correlates with weaker structural polarization, but contrary to assumptions based on both SJT and the status quo thesis and in line with assumptions of differential altruism, the general overall support for redistribution seems to be higher (Kim & Lee, 2018).

In related fields of research, a general polarization associated with high inequality levels is also visible in the context of subjective class identifications in contexts of comparatively high inequality, as indicated by a negative effect of inequality on middle class identification regardless of structural position (Curtis, 2016) and stronger general effects of income on class identity in high-inequality contexts (Andersen & Curtis, 2012). A study on differences in meritocratic beliefs shows that high inequality in US counties increases polarization between high and low income individuals (Newman, Johnston & Lown, 2015) and therefore increases structural effects. Research on religiosity additionally indicates that high inequality correlates with low support for secularization, showing greater respective effects for poorer individuals (Karakoc & Baskan, 2012). In general, the selection and inclusion of additional cross-level moderation effects might explain some inconsistencies in results, but evidence is still scarce and selective.

With regard to the perception of inequality, studies in various areas of research show effects in line with status-quo bias (Trump, 2018) and generally seem to indicate that the subjective perception of inequality might matter at least as much for individual attitudes and public opinion as objective inequalities, as seems to be the case empirically in a study on social protests (Justino & Martorano, 2016). The perception of inequality seems to be biased by systematic underestimations and higher differences to actual levels for individuals with low income, which has been interpreted as a result of biased perception, information[108] and social networks (see for instance Yanai, 2017; Gijsberts, 2002) and as a form of social buffer effect protecting against extreme negative comparisons (Schneider, 2012, 434). At the same time, perceived inequality is substantially influenced by objective inequality levels in research on time-series data (Franko, 2017). With regard to the moderation of structural effects, studies show that the influence of perception on attitudes is evident in both experimental (see Trump, 2018) and survey-based studies (Kim et al., 2018, 36). In a study on the topic analyzing influences of system justification using information as a treatment to increase inequality perception, the expected effects are not visible (Trump & White, 2017). Biases in the perception of both inequality levels and structural position as indicated by the income distribution seem to be substantial, partly explained by reference group selection, and confronting individuals with information about their actual

108 Remarkably, even high political interest does not necessarily lead to accurate information and perceptions of real conditions. A study on misperceptions in the American public shows that "political interest" is the strongest individual-level predictor of confident misperceptions (Flynn, 2016) and even explicit corrections fail frequently in the reduction of misperceptions (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; but see Rogers & Nickerson, 2013).

individual structural position increases their support for redistribution (Cruces, Perez-Truglia & Tetaz, 2011). In the following sections, I turn to other factors discussed as being potentially related to inequality levels as well as structural effects on attitudes in the reviewed literature, including possible mediators of effects of inequality.

2.3.4.2 Redistribution and welfare-state institutions

Various influences on context level related to redistribution that have been studied as possibly affecting attitudes and interacting with structural effects[109] include institutional variations between countries, for example with regard to welfare state regimes[110] (Dallinger 2010; 2008), policy feedback (McCarty & Pontusson, 2011, 687f.), tax progressivity (Beramendi & Rehm, 2016; 2011) and specific aspects of social security systems such as universalism (Jordan, 2013). In the context of the evaluation of income inequality and redistribution, institutional arrangements are often operationalized as welfare regime types or the amount of welfare expenditure (see for instance Dallinger, 2010; Dion 2010; see also Jaeger, 2009). An exemption is the use of the progressivity of the tax system (Beramendi & Rehm, 2016), which is a plausible choice for a possible moderator of the effect of structural position, since more progressive systems lead to a direct accentuation of the interest conflicts between different structural positions. However, the evidence for an interaction between structural position and institutional aspects such as general redistribution or the progressivity of the tax system is limited, since the problem of confounding cross-level interactions [CLIs] in this context is not easily solved.

109 On a general level, institutions can potentially structure resources and opportunities of individuals and influence various aspects of social reality possibly relevant for inequality attitudes. Supposed effects of institutions, especially with regard to aspects of welfare state regimes, also include influences on possibilities for the forming of coalitions, incentives for redistribution in terms of available resources and dangers of corruption and mismanagement, differences in the mobilization of structural groups such as low- or high-income voters, the average belief in luck versus effort as determinants of success and trust in government (McCarty & Pontusson, 2011, 687f.).

110 The rich literature concerning attitudes in different welfare state regimes often follows the typological approach by Esping-Anderson (1990), originally based on a limited set of highly industrialized capitalist countries in the Global North, and ideas regarding institutionalized conceptions of social justice, embedded in and reproduced by both institutions and culture (see for instance Sachweh, 2016; Dallinger, 2008, 140ff.; Svallfors, 1997, 284ff.). Research in this area has made progress in recent years in terms of the inclusion of additional regime types on the one hand and the investigation of multidimensionality and specific dimensions of welfare policies on the other (see for instance Sachweh, 2016; Dallinger, 2015; Koçer & van de Werfhorst, 2012; Jordan, 2010; Arts & Gelissen, 2002). Additionally, since political systems have a substantial status quo bias especially with regard to issues of social security (see for instance Gilens, 2012, 72–75, 97–99), limited influence of opposition and high stability of systems can hinder the introduction or expansion of welfare, but also save established policies (McCarty & Pontusson, 2011, 687–688).

Additionally, most analyses to date only include developed countries with certain similarities in terms of institutions due to data limitations or theoretical scope.

In this line of research, two main basic hypotheses have been put forward with regard to the effect of government intervention on attitudes. First, government intervention produces its own clientele by promoting dependent social groups as well as normative conformity in line with status-quo bias (see for instance Dallinger, 2008, 141; Svallfors, 1997, 296; compare also Trump, 2013, 49ff.). This last-mentioned aspect seems to be theoretically relevant for a possible moderating influence, since the normative conformity may especially be affecting net-payers of redistributive systems, while beneficiaries may be less affected because of possible ceiling effects. However, a second, and in part antithetic, assumption can be derived from considering the purely economic effects of redistribution (see for instance Dion, 2010, 5; Dallinger, 2008, 141; Svallfors, 1997, 295; compare also Meltzer & Richard, 1981). Net payers experience their net losses as a direct effect of government measures and may judge them to be unfair without being affected by the assimilating normative influences of the status quo[111]. Although often being considered as a source of main effects on attitudes, redistribution has received less attention in previous studies about inequality-related attitudes as a possible moderator of structural effects as compared to inequality. In this context, if included at all, institutional arrangements are often operationalized as welfare regime types or the general amount of welfare expenditure or governmental consumption of GDP (see for instance Dallinger, 2010; 2008; Dion, 2010; Dion & Birchfield, 2010).

A group of factors related to the quality and effectiveness of redistribution could plausibly act as a parallel influence on the relationship between structural interests and attitudes towards redistribution and inequality. If people do not trust the government to use the money gained through taxation to really support those less well-off for reasons of perceptions of widespread corruption, limitations with regard to the quality or effectiveness of government or the rule of law, even individuals in low structural positions might doubt that increased redistribution will positively affect the individual situation or societal conditions at large. As a more abstract construct, generalized trust or specific trust in institutions could also be considered as moderators of structural effects for the same

111 This assumption seems to be especially plausible with regard to the progressivity of taxation as compared to the overall level of taxation, since the perception of progressivity may violate meritocratic values, impeding any positive impact the status quo may have on the acceptance of redistribution.

reasons (see for instance Nagayoshi & Sato, 2014). Additionally, the frequency or perception of corruption and transparency could possibly affect structural effects in a similar way (see Smith, 2010).

Studies about main effects of institutional arrangements on attitudes towards inequality are manifold, but empirical analyses using various indicators of redistribution report inconclusive results for both main effects on inequality tolerance and interaction with structural effects[112]. Differences between studies with regard to the specific parameters and categorizations used lead to an inconclusive picture with multiple and partly contrasting points of evidence for various specific effects[113], whereas

112 Analyses into differences between different types of welfare state regimes show significantly higher levels of solidarity in social-democratic and Mediterranean regimes versus liberal regimes, but inconsistent results for influences on preferences for specific justice principles such as need, equity and equality (Arts & Gelissen, 2001, 294). Perceived injustice of inequalities seems to be comparatively low in social-democratic regimes (Lippl, 2000). A recent study reports higher support for redistribution in social-democratic and Mediterranean regimes versus conservative regimes (Dallinger, 2010). An analysis of differences in mean levels of support and variance shows that, whereas the support for redistribution is highest in conservative and lowest in liberal regimes, with social-democratic regimes in between, the variance of attitudes is highest in social-democratic regimes and lowest in liberal regimes (Jaeger, 2009), indicating high structural determination of attitudes in regimes of high universal redistribution. Svallfors (1997, 293) shows that the variance explained by structural determinants in support for redistribution is highest (12.4 percent) in social-democratic Norway, but also high (9.3 percent) in the liberal USA and lower in liberal Australia (3.8 percent) and conservative Germany (5.7 percent). Preferences towards legitimate income differences show variable influences of different structural indicators, but overall similar effect directions and levels of explained variance (ibid.), in sum indicating that country differences are not dominated by welfare regime type.

113 Studies using multidimensional measures of welfare state attitudes show different relations between various dimensions in specific countries (Roosma, Gelissen & van Oorschot, 2013), substantial proportions of respondents not corresponding to expected welfare regime patterns (Roosma, van Oorschot & Gelissen, 2014) and strong influences of ideology and spending levels on evaluations in both positive and negative dimensions (van Oorschot, Reeskens & Meuleman, 2012).Specific aspects such as universalism, centralization and inclusiveness of specific programs, which are supposed to appease political discussion and strengthen acceptance, seem in tendency to increase support in the sense of positive policy feedback (Koçer & van de Werfhorst, 2012; Jordan, 2013; Jordan 2010; Larsen, 2008). Another study reports that redistribution preferences are negatively associated with low-income targeting but not related to transfer share or universalism (Brady & Bostic, 2014). Redistribution preferences seem also to be contingent on perceived costs of taxation (Durante, Putterman & Van der Weele, 2014). Some studies using specific differentiated surveying of attitudes and specific policy measures find that individuals in countries with higher social security contributions are less likely to support further increases in contributions (Fernández & Jaime-Castillo, 2013). A study on attitudes towards pension reforms does not find any effects of policy feedback (Lynch & Myrskylä, 2009). A high correlation of economic conditions and job insecurity leads to a smaller pool of individuals potentially benefiting from various forms of redistribution, therefore in tendency reducing aggregate support for redistribution (Rehm, Hacker & Schlesinger, 2012). With regard to the efficiency and related indicators possibly determining the possibility of translating attitudes into policies and the generation of policy measures benefiting the poor, perceived system inefficiency seems to negatively influence support for redistribution, as evidenced by laboratory experiments on tax rate preferences (Tepe et al., 2017). A seemingly important and often ignored dimension, especially for countries in the Global South, is the general truncation of welfare states, concentrating tax and transfer policies on the middle class instead of universal system or benefits for the poor. Holland (2016) demonstrates that income matters less for attitudes in countries and areas where lower income groups benefit less from redistribution and Jordan (2010) shows in the

systematic comparative studies are rare. The moderation of structural effects is less often analyzed. Specifically testing differences in structural effects of household equivalent income and unemployment on support for governmental intervention, a study on four countries representing different welfare regime types shows zero effects for Eastern Germany after the transition to democracy (Andreß & Heien, 2001), but the statistical model also controls for various value-related constructs and indicators for evaluation of present and future economic situation. A more specific analysis using tax progressivity[114] as an indicator of redistribution also shows a significant positive effect on structural effects of income (Beramendi & Rehm, 2016; 2011), also indicating struggles over redistribution and high polarization in contexts of highly progressive redistribution.

2.3.4.3 Prosperity and mobility chances

Apart from the differences between certain structural positions as related to concepts of social inequality and redistribution, general economic conditions of given societal contexts determine the relevance of objective structural positions and respective actual outcomes and opportunities. Theoretical approaches in the tradition of political economy models of attitudes, behavior and political outcomes, can assume a moderation of structural conditions and structural effects by aspects of economic conditions such as prosperity and mobility chances (see Bossi & Gumus, 2011). Societal prosperity and economic growth in particular are often expected to moderate structural effects (see for instance Dallinger, 2008), especially by affecting upward mobility prospects and the acceptance of inequality among lower structural groups (see Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005). In this context, comparably low growth, prosperity and mobility chances might increase social conflict and lead

context of healthcare that centralized systems correlate with weaker structural effects.

114 Tax progressivity (Beramendi & Rehm, 2016) is a plausible choice, since more progressive systems lead to an amplification of interest conflict between net-payers and beneficiaries. However, the progressivity of tax systems is not always identifiable in a straightforward manner, since tax systems often differ in multiple ways, including different types and amounts of taxation, leading to multiple options of constructing indexes of tax progressivity (see for instance Peter, Buttrick & Duncan, 2009), many of which do not give a complete picture of the multiple and often dissimilar redistribution programs of different countries (and additionally they often cannot be generated because of the lack of necessary data). Additionally, tax progressivity does not have to be related to the amount of redistribution at all, since the general level of taxation is often more important for the effect of taxes. Because of these complications and the huge variety of possible measures for redistribution that often only capture some specific aspects of redistribution systems, theoretical arguments sometimes have to be tailored to the specific measures chosen, or vice versa, especially with regard to indicators for specific welfare state programs or aspects of tax systems. A relatively direct measure for redistribution is the Gini-based index for tax-based reduction of inequality, generated by comparing the Gini indexes for market (pre-transfer) and disposable (post-transfer) income distributions (Beramendi & Rehm, 2016).

individuals on the upper end of the income distribution to favor some form of redistribution to reduce social conflicts and potential sources of danger to individual property and income (Dallinger, 2008; Dion & Birchfield, 2010). In contrast, a counteracting effect might be expected with regard to high prosperity, growth or mobility and resulting opportunities, since these factors might neutralize structural effects by contributing to higher expected upward mobility (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005).

Furthermore, apart from objective levels of prosperity and growth, the possible influence of both objective and subjective mobility chances has long been noted by researchers on attitudes towards inequality (see for instance Grabb, 2002, 202; Hurst, 1992, 259; Runciman, 1972). Accordingly, recent studies point to the importance of specific aspects related to individual opportunities, such as individual mobility experiences (Kim & Lee, 2019; Lü, 2014), feelings of control and autonomy (see for instance Budria, Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Ramos, 2012), the perception of societal fairness or meritocracy (Trump, 2013) and diversity and fractionalization (Dion, 2010), for the determination of attitudes related to inequality and possible respective structural effects. Ideas in this context imply the possible importance of mobility chances and expectations in societies for attitudes and structural effects. But nevertheless, to this date, the level of social mobility in societies and related constructs such as meritocracy and corruption have often been neglected as factors in the determination of inequality preferences in general (but see for instance Koster, 2014; Pittau, Massari & Zelli, 2013). This holds in particular for the possible moderation of structural effects, even though it can be argued that the factors mentioned play an important role for the perception of mobility chances and societal fairness. Additional related contextual factors possibly influencing opportunities and chances include the educational system (see for instance Koçer & van de Werfhorst, 2012; Ruß, 2012; Breznau, 2010).

Empirically, studies including interaction effects between prosperity and structural position report negative effects of prosperity or economic growth on demand for redistribution, especially strong in fixed-effects models (see for instance Jaeger, 2013; see also Blekesaune, 2007). Some studies testing influences of both inequality and prosperity on structural effects found no interaction with inequality, but an interaction with economic development instead[115]. Specifically, the structural effect

115 With regard to the intercorrelation of contextual measures related to inequality and opportunities, an internationally comparative study reports a strong correlation of inequality in economic opportunity with income inequality, but weaker correlations of inequality with measures of intergenerational mobility and the intergenerational transmission of education (Brunori, Ferreira & Peragine, 2013). In his analysis of the influence of social class mobility on subjective class identification in 33 societies, comparing effects on micro- and macro-level, Curtis shows that class identification

as measured by income gets stronger in contexts of high economic development (Dallinger, 2008, 150), partly only after correcting for auto-correlation and survey effects (Dion & Birchfield, 2010). A recent study on European data does report main effects of prosperity on attitudes, but no significant interactions with structural effects (Filetti, 2017). Additionally, individuals growing up in times of macroeconomic shocks in aggregate are more skeptical against meritocratic beliefs, support more redistribution and show less trust in institutions, as indicated by research on both US and international survey data (Giuliano & Spilimbergo, 2009). In an analysis of data from Latin American countries, personal economic evaluations do not significantly affect preferences for state intervention and do not show an interaction with general prosperity in the respective countries, but instead, individual evaluations of the economic situation of the country in general show a negative main effect on support for redistribution, moderated by prosperity (Morgan & Kelley, 2010).

With regard to mobility chances, the objective level of general mobility chances or objective equality of opportunity is hard to measure in a convincing and reliable way, and variations in measurements can lead to substantially different results (see for instance Breen & Luijks, 2004). Differences between methods such as class- or status-based family associations on the one hand (see for instance Ballerino & Bernardi, 2016; Breen & Luijks, 2004) and name-based analyses of high-status groups on the other hand are evident[116] (see Clark, 2014, 9; Clark & Cummins, 2014; Clark, 2010; but compare Torche & Corvalan, 2018; Torche, 2015), with substantial country-level variation in mobility found based on family associations and high, stable and uniform levels of social reproduction found with regard to family names in high-status occupations, educational categories and high income and wealth groups. This is the case in all countries analyzed, including European

is influenced by both objective individual class and objective individual class origin, whereas mobility indicators on country-level do not contribute to the explanation of class identification in a meaningful way (Curtis, 2016). At the same time, the missing effect on macro-level could be explained by either referring to the lack of relevance of country-level mobility on individual identifications or by biased perceptions of both position and context (Curtis, 2016, 10).

116 Additionally, using three or, as is more common in empirical research, two generations can also lead to differing results (see for instance Knigge, 2015; Celhay & Gallegos, 2015), with research on three generations showing long-term effects of family background through multiple generations, not completely explained by the intermediary generation or the frequency of direct contacts.

countries that are often characterized as comparatively egalitarian and mobile[117], such as Sweden (2014, 9, 21, 40, 57, 62, 86, 95, 151, 159, 177, 179, 186, 194, 207, 221, see especially 9 and 19–44).

With regard to other economic context factors, after controlling for potentially inequality-increasing factors, economic openness shows significant negative effects on demand for redistribution (Dallinger, 2013) and demand for government intervention as well as positive effects on preferences for economic individualism (Koster, 2014). Using ISSP data, a study on effects of subjective status indicates that the structural effect on support for redistribution in this context is moderated by perceived inequality of opportunity (Kim & Lee, 2018). Another study on ISSP data, controlling for prosperity and inequality of opportunity, only finds significant main effects of income inequality, but not of other contextual factors (Andersen & Yaish, 2012, 28). Taken together, the evidence on the influence of factors related to prosperity and mobility chances is mixed.

2.3.4.4 Culture

A fourth group of factors on context level possibly influencing structural effects on attitudes towards inequality consists of culture-related context attributes. Concepts in this regard are often used to analyze the socialist ideological legacy of former communist countries (Smith & Mateju, 2012; Kunovich & Slomczynski, 2007; Corneo & Grüner, 2002; Liebig & Verwiebe, 2000), the influence of national contexts on migrants (see for instance Luttmer & Singhal, 2011) or directs effects of religiosity and specific ideological factors (Stegmueller et al., 2012; Alesina and Giuliano 2009; Scheve & Stasavage, 2006; see also Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004). On a general level, the relevance of internalized norms for attitudes and behavior has been demonstrated repeatedly in recent decades, including recent studies showing that internalized norms can even play a role in shaping physical

117 Specifically, the idea of general increasing mobility in Western democracies has been questioned by recent research, and problems regarding contradictions between different estimates are evident (Bourguignon, 2015, 67ff.). For instance, lower mobility for children born after 1980 has been found in the USA as compared to those born in 1940 (Chetty et al., 2016) and for the UK, the Social Mobility Commission has argued that individuals "born in the 1980s are the first postwar cohort not to start their working years with higher incomes than their immediate predecessors" (Social Mobility Commission, 2016; see also Friedman, Laurison & Miles, 2015). As Piketty notes with regard to the inequality of opportunities in the contemporary USA, "[t]he gap with the official meritocratic discourse and values is particularly abysmal" (2017, 558; see also Chetty et al., 2016). Other studies show that classical analyses reporting increasing mobility are biased by the omission of structural changes (see for instance Yastrebov, 2016). Additionally, recent research has found that estimates of class-based intergenerational association underestimate transmission effects since class and income seem to interact (Mood, 2017). At the same time, name- or group-based analyses probably overestimate individual transmission effects (see Torche & Corvalan 2018; Neidhöfer & Stockhausen, 2016).

reactions such as blood pressure changes to specific circumstances and phenomena (Hicks & Leonard, 2014, 30; see also Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan, 2010). In historical and anthropological research, important concepts such as cultural identity are often assumed to be related to substantial normative dimensions with binding character, structuring perspectives, priorities, knowledge and symbolic systems, influencing societies by general socialization and constant managing of specific behavior[118] (see for instance Assmann, 1988, 14f.). At the same time, the possible influence of cultural and normative factors has to be considered to be a controversial topic and all evidence reviewed has to be understood on this foundation of skepticism[119].

In terms of specific mechanisms of influence, it is often assumed that norms legitimizing unequal structures, often especially the current status quo, are reproduced and reinforced[120] in both private contexts such as family interactions and public and professional contexts such as educational or religious institutions (Hurst, 1992, 301f., 350; see also Liebig & Sauer, 2016, 43–48). At the same time, influences of cultural aspects are not well understood and partly highly controversial[121]. Whereas

118 In various traditions of social research, concepts such as the superstructure of societies seen in contrast to material structures, dominant or primary ideologies and general cultural values affecting ideas of legitimacy have often been regarded as important by authors on social inequalities (see for instance Piketty, 2020, 7, 28f., 155, 51–412, 719f., 1035; Grabb, 2002, 29ff., 53, 100, 104, 113, 152, 192f., 211; Liebig & Wegener, 1995; Hurst, 1992, 6, 298–302; Wegener, 1992). Additionally, culture-related concepts such as secularization and norms of distribution, inheritance and property relations are often referred to in historical analyses as important explanatory factors influencing inequalities and social structures, leading to self-reinforcing path dependencies, sometimes only to be disrupted by external shocks (see for instance Scheidel, 2017).

119 As is the case with attitude-related constructs on individual level, the inclusion of norms and values as predictors of other attitudes in statistical models can be a risky endeavor, since causal directions are often unclear, but with regard to the moderation of structural effects in terms of CLIs, questions of inverse causality seem to be less problematic for models in which structural position on individual level is interacting with aggregate measures of values and norms.

120 Supposed specific mechanisms of reproduction include increasing internalization by enforcing various forms of social sanctioning, peer pressure and preference falsification, but also by details such as the choice of terms and definitions (Hurst, 1992, 299). In recent years, research in line with SJT has proposed additional mechanism of value internalization especially by low-privileged individuals in given contexts (see for instance Jost et al., 2003).

121 Especially, but not exclusively, in the context of growth, development and prosperity, the influence of culture is a topic of controversial and partly politicized debate, since causal relations are doubtful in the absence of any form of non-quasi experiment and explaining differences in prosperity between nations by reference to cultural aspects is often reasonably criticized as ignoring aspects such as effects of colonialism and continuing asymmetric economic relations (see for instance Sachs, 2000; Shweder, 2000). In the debate related to the explanation of national differences in prosperity, wealth, quality of institutions or development, Marxist (see for instance Poulantzas, 1975) and institutionalist approaches (see for instance Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Morris, 2010) in tendency regard culture as a mechanism of institutional, economic and material conditions and necessities with moderating functions at most, and not as a causally relevant determinant of outcomes. In contrast, culturalist approaches refer to national differences in cultural values as explanatory factors, such as the relevance of private personal relationships in the economy, levels of social capital, the acceptance of corruption and specific forms of work ethic (see for instance Grondona, 2000; Lipset

the general correspondence of dominant ideologies or the superstructure with institutional setups is a common assumption (see for instance Piketty, 2020, 28f., 719f.) and supported by some empirical evidence (Gijsberts, 2002; Grabb, 2002, 101; Wegener, 1992), different theoretical schools attribute this possible correlation to different causal factors. Most approaches aiming at understanding social inequalities including Marxist, institutionalist and functionalist theories as well as research following the influential typology of welfare state regimes by Esping-Andersen (1990) or the dominant ideology thesis (see for instance Wegener, 1992) usually understand objective factors, historical processes and necessities as causally preceding[122].

In terms of theoretical mechanisms affecting structural effects, in contrast to the moderating factors on context level discussed in previous chapters which mostly refer to the influence of subjective interest in both material and subjective terms as structured by economic and institutional conditions, for the inclusion of cultural factors into theoretical models explaining inequality-related attitudes, economic self-interest seems to be less relevant. The MFS (Kroneberg, 2010) provides an additional alternative option of theoretical inclusion. If internalized norms differ by cultures, it is plausible to assume that these norms lead to differences in the selection of modes and frames by individuals in specific structural positions[123]. Effects in this manner could also possibly be explained by cultural differences affecting the utilities of certain alternatives without considering non-rational modes of frame and script selection[124]. Generally, even without adhering to a strict formulation of influences as specified in the MFS (see Kroneberg, 2010; 2007; 2005), it seems plausible to assume that some cultural norms may moderate the expression of self-interest under certain conditions. A basic expectation based on both subjective utility, cognitive dissonance or frame selection approaches as understood in this thesis (see Chapter 2.2.2.) is that the higher the aggregate internalization of

& Lenz, 2000), whereas other approaches to the understanding of differences in development aim to integrate multiple complex and interwoven effects (see for instance Schech, 2018). Since the focus of this thesis is on the moderation of structural effects, the question of a possible relevance of cultural aspects for prosperity can be ignored, but potential influences of culture on structural effects have to be considered (see Chapters 2.3.4.4 and 2.4.3.4).

122 Both cultural and economic outcomes are often viewed as being produced by institutional settings and structured interests, in turn reinforcing institutional path-dependencies (see for instance Acemoglu & Robinson, 2015; 2012).

123 For instance, a high level of egalitarianism, etatism or collectivism might reduce structural effects by increasing the proportion of individuals who do not consider rational interests in the respective context because of strong internalized norms or by affecting scripts associated with certain norm-based frames.

124 A test of these theoretical models against each other is not easy to conduct, since normative aspects might influence subjective expectations and therefore interact with parameters attributed to the rational mode of choice selection even without leading to norm-induced frame and script selection.

norms related to egalitarian constructs such as equality in outcomes and basic need satisfaction, the less strong the expected structural effect is on individual level (see for instance Mehlkop & Neumann, 2012). Specifically, it is plausible that individual income has a less visible effect on attitudes towards inequality in societies in which there is a high general conviction that everybody should receive the same, since it follows directly, if one assumes equal distribution of differences, from the higher level of norm internalization that more people are affected by normative influences on utility considerations, the level of cognitive dissonance and processes of frame selection. But high redistribution in contexts of strong egalitarian convictions might strengthen structural effects by highlighting and increasing material conflicts of interests (see Jaeger, 2009). On the other hand, norms and ideologies related to non-egalitarian ideas of individualism, the importance of work and effort for outcomes and the fairness of existing structures might increase structural effects by amplifying the relevance of rational considerations or reduce said effects by reinforcing non-rational considerations and the acceptance of structures and outcomes by less privileged individuals (see for instance Jost et al., 2003; compare also Nikolaev, Salahodjaev & Boudreaux, 2017).

Even though research in this area with regard to the moderation of structural effects is scarce, there is a large number of possible candidates for interaction effects with objective determinants of structural or other direct objective interests that are discussed in terms of main effects on attitudes[125]. Some values deserve special attention because of their conceptual relation to the idea of inequality. One of these constructs is individualism, associated with general aspects of self-definition, self-construction and the relation of individuals to others and their environment (Chiao & Blizinsky, 2010, 529). Specifically, individualist values[126] have been interpreted as directly reinforcing attitudes conflicting with structural interests, by increasing the personal focus on individual achievement and shifting priorities to the improvement of the individual position at the cost of attempts to criticize, subvert or change objective conditions (Hurst, 1992, 298). Individualist cultures are described as

125 In terms of specific norms and ideologies possibly influencing attitudes towards inequality, the list of factors considered as possibly influential for the context of inequality attitudes includes conceptions of justice (Liebig & Sauer, 2016, 43–48), functionalism and etatism (Liebig & Wegener, 1995; Wegener, 1992), individualism and collectivism (see for instance Schimmack, Oishi & Diener, 2005), meritocratic values and perceptions (see for instance Oddsson & Bernburg, 2017; Wu, 2009), attitudes towards the rich and poor and towards social groups associated with specific income levels in given societal contexts (see for instance Wu, Bai & Fiske, 2018) and political ideologies, religions and religiosity (Jost et al.; 2014; Jaeger, 2007; Scheve & Stasavage, 2006; see Chapter 2.3.4.5).

126 Even though measurement varies between studies and results vary with different measures, some researchers in this area argue that, despite problems with measurement, individualism is a valid construct for cross-cultural comparisons and specifically shows a positive correlation with development (Schimmack, Oishi & Diener, 2005).

focusing on “self-expression and pursuit of individuality over group goals”, whereas collectivist cultures instead emphasize “maintenance of social harmony over assertion of individuality” (Chiao & Blizinsky, 2010, 529). The idea of individualism as a source of fragmentation of collective interests is an idea that has often been discussed in the context of a supposed decrease of class identification and is also evident in some Marxist writings with regard to the individualism of the petty bourgeoisie as a factor negatively affecting chances of changing economic conditions (see for instance Poulantzas, 1975, 292ff.). The concept of meritocracy and the belief in the existence of meritocracy[127] can be understood as being closely related to both individualist values and specific attitudes towards inequality and redistribution[128]. But collectivism, which might at first sight be understood as the opposite to individualism[129] (see for instance Yang et al., 2012; Hofstede, 1980), has also been associated with an acceptance of existing structures, since strong collective identities and harmony oriented social values, sometimes identified with Asian societies, might on the one hand increase general trust and solidarity (Ikeda, 2012), but also contribute to the acceptance[130] of inequalities and undermine the organization of structural interests in line with emancipatory and liberal-democratic values (see for instance Welzel, 2011), possibly due to saturation effects specifically on the low end of the income spectrum.

127 In the context of meritocratic conceptions, attitudes towards specific social groups have been identified as potential influences on attitudes towards inequality. It has been argued that positive attitudes of poor individuals towards groups perceived as very rich and successful could increase the acceptance of inequalities (McCall, 2013). In contrast, the stigmatization of rich people as undeserving is possible (see for instance van Doesum, Tybur & van Lange, 2017) and should increase structural effects if more common in lower structural positions.

128 As scientific explanations, conceptions of determinants of distributive outcomes can focus on either functional and meritocratic determinants of success such as productivity and education or on dysfunctional and non-meritocratic aspects such as discrimination based on gender, ethnicity or nationality (Reynolds & Xian, 2014). If individuals understand social inequalities as resulting from broadly meritocratic factors in contrast to factors not related to aspects of merit, individual effort or productivity, a higher acceptance of inequality is to be expected. As Runciman notes, “where all entrants are in an open contest, there is a greater disgrace attached to an inferior position” (1972, 229).

129 Research into cultural values sometimes assumes and uses sets of nine (Javidan et al., 2006) or five (Hofstede, 1980) unipolar dimensions on country level, whereas isomorphism with individual value patterns seems to be limited (see for instance Fischer et al., 2010; Fischer, 2009, 25f.; Hofstede, 1980). Research in this area found more substantial contributions of individual-level values for predicting behavior (Ralston et al., 2014). At the same time, the conceptual boundaries, reliability and validity of these sets of values is highly contested (see for instance Sun et al., 2014; Minkov & Blagoev, 2012), especially for research on individual level (Venaik & Brewer, 2013).

130 As an extreme possible form of collective influence on individual behavior, in research on terrorism, “identity fusion”, i.e. “a sense of oneness with the group resulting from intense collective experiences” has been proposed as a concept explaining the disregard of self-interest among individuals sacrificing their lives (Whitehouse, 2018). Even though causal relations are not clear in this context, some research indicates that individualistic societies on average show lower levels of inequality (Nikolaev, Salahodjaev & Boudreaux, 2017).

As another closely related concept, functionalist convictions are generally interpreted similarly to meritocratic convictions, the difference being the focus of meritocracy on the fairness and legitimacy of outcomes whereas functionalism is based on the concept of functional necessity, which does not have to be fair in any kind of definition. Other value dimensions and related factors that might plausibly affect structural effects include constructs such as softness and harshness (Stankov, Lee & van de Vijver, 2014) materialism versus post-materialism (Inglehart & Abramson, 1999), or traditional versus secular-rational values (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). In recent years, research into attitudes and political conditions in Eastern Asian countries has shown some results not in line with simple expectations of structural self-interest (see for instance Zhang, Brym & Andersen, 2017; Hitokoto, 2014; Whyte & Im, 2014; Kim, 2010; Vinken, 2006). Some research seems to indicate the possibility of an influence of values dominant in specific regions[131], even though there are substantial differences between respective countries with regard to economic, institutional and cultural aspects (see for instance Welzel, 2011, 25–29). These potential value differences might be roughly captured or explained by constructs related to individualism and post-materialism or traditionalism.

Empirically, studies on global increases in individualism show that cultural differences remain substantial (Santos, Varnum & Grossmann, 2017). With regard to the fragmentation of collective interests, differences in individualism and collectivism have been explained as cultural reactions against high prevalence of pathogens and infectious diseases since high collectivism might limit contacts outside the group and increase conformist behavior, decreasing chances of contact with

131 Specific sets of "Asian values" have repeatedly been discussed in the literature but have to be regarded as controversial (compare for instance Kim, 2010 and Welzel, 2011) and direct comparative research on a moderation of structural effects is not evident in the literature reviewed. Among sets of values described as "Asian values" are more specific value-related constructs such as authority orientations, loyalty and respect towards authority or even preference for one-party authoritarian government, work ethic, familism and social harmony, concern with collective well-being of the community, collectivism and communalism, generally in sum explained by the influence of Confucianism, which leading values include the foregoing of personal freedom and a strong work ethic in loyalty to family, community and nation, and related ideological, religious and philosophical traditions of thought (Kim, 2010; but compare Piketty, 2020, 390; Welzel, 2011). Especially a strong preference for "social harmony" (Kim, 2010) has often been associated with Eastern Asian cultures and seems to be of possible relevance for the moderation of structural effects on attitudes. This concept is prominently featured in most conceptualizations of Asian values and is closely related to similar concepts such as "interdependent happiness", illustrated by negative effects of inequality on well-being in experimental studies in Japan (Hitokoto, 2014), the maintenance of "smooth interpersonal relations" (see for instance Lasquety-Reyes & Alvarez, 2015, 76f.; Tsusaka et al., 2015), possibly leading to stressing the importance of social processes over social outcomes, and the influence of perceived social closeness, assumed to be used sometimes in a targeted way by politicians to appease the poor in the context of patronage relationships additionally to the effects of broad kinship and personal ties (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005, 239–243; see also Kerkvliet, 2013, 232–249).

pathogens (see for instance Fincher et al., 2008; Hofstede, 2001). More recent evidence seems to indicate parallel influences of both pathogen prevalence and economic development, but not of economic inequality (Santos, Varnum & Grossmann, 2017; but see Chiao & Blizinsky, 2010). A study based on data from the World Values Survey [WVS] shows that life satisfaction is affected by the congruence between individual and dominant societal values, interpreted as the endorsement of cultural values, only in collectivist but not in individualist societies (Li & Hamamura, 2010), indicating that specific values might also play a different role in their influence on structural effects in individualist versus collectivist contexts. Additionally, research on democratization indicates that countries with higher individualist values are more likely to transition to a democratic system and less likely to transition to autocratic rule (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2021). Meritocratic beliefs and related conceptions such as factors of success seem to substantially influence support for redistribution on country level (Förster & Tóth, 2015, 39–42) and high meritocratic ideology is correlated with stronger structural effects of income on attitudes towards inequality (Roex, Huijts & Sieben, 2019). Vice versa, Hadler (2005, 144) additionally shows that higher homogeneity of functionalist ideology is correlated with higher income inequality acceptance on country level. In the reviewed literature, additional influences of constructs such as post-materialism on solidarity and attitudes are discussed (see for instance Taylor-Gooby & Martin, 2010), but no systematic analysis of these possible additional cultural influences on structural effects has been found. Similarly, no comprehensive comparison of different conceptualizations and dimensions with regard to influences of values and norms on structural effects or even main effects is evident in the literature.

2.3.4.5 Politics, organized interests and information

With regard to political affiliations and organizations, it is usually assumed for historical and ideological reasons of consistency that sympathy for left-wing parties and specific ideologies typical for left-wing politics such as left-wing social liberalism, socialism and social-democracy correlate with high inequality aversion, whereas preferences for right-wing parties and ideologies such as conservatism, and free-market liberalism are usually expected to be associated with high acceptance of inequality. However, with regard to the relevance for attitudes, it is possible that political ideologies and party affiliations on both country and individual level are not necessarily in line with specific

preferences towards inequality, since the individual priorities determining affiliations[132] may not be in line with specific questions of economic self-interest[133]. Culture-related factors possibly shifting attitudes of low-income individuals away from objective structural self-interests are often thought of to be purposefully influenced by the campaigning and spending power of organized interest groups[134], channeling perceptions and priorities of individuals in specific directions compatible with organized interests, in general away from plans of redistribution, as Becker and Mulligan (2017; see also Milanovic, 2016a, 192–211) have discussed in the context of influences on voting decisions. For low-income and low-education individuals with relatively bad opportunities and prospects, the internalization of ideological ideas in contrast to objective structural interest might even serve as a point of differentiation and source of identity[135]. Regarding other forms of organized ideologies, the influence of religion as a source or sign of belief in a just world and acceptance of the status quo has been considered. This idea is partly in line with traditional Marxist conceptions of religion as a general ideological sedative reducing the explication of self-interests of the working class, possibly interfering

132 Operationalization of political ideologies on country level is sometimes done with scales of left-right positioning or socialization into assumed societal political value systems. Both approaches are based on many implicit assumptions. As Piketty notes, left-right orientations have no “fixed eternal meaning” (2020, 738). At the same time, left-right orientation can be understood as a dimension close to commonplace self-identifications due to its frequent use in everyday political discourse and is often accessible in survey data based on direct explicit questions.

133 Empirically, according to a recent study on voting behavior, higher inequality in Western Europe coincides with increased support for right-wing parties among individuals in lower structural positions, but decreased support for right-wing parties among the rich (Han, 2016).

134 With regard to supposed influences of manipulation, if the internalization of inegalitarian political ideologies by disadvantaged individuals is accompanied by the identification or open association with a political party or specific politicians opposed to individual structural interests, individuals generally expect some form of reciprocation or advantage such as the perception of increased problem-solving competence, social closeness as a form of status adjustment or direct material benefits (Petersen, 2015; Price & Van Vugt, 2014). At the same time, the promotion of acceptance and conforming ideas and ideologies by privileged individuals is often described as being affected by increasingly vast sums of money, especially in the USA (see for instance Gilens, 2012, 241–250), and as a general relevant influence for public opinion and individual attitudes (Grabb, 2002, 61f.). In multidimensional theoretical conceptions of social structures and inequalities in societies in the tradition of Weber, generally identifying three different dimensions of power or influence, the dimension of ideological power can be understood as being a third important and partly independent social sphere of inequality beside the economic and political spheres (Grabb, 2002, 3, 215; Runciman, 1972, 42–61). Many authors from both Marxist and functionalist traditions have attributed an important role to forms of acceptance in systems of domination. This includes the possible influence of organized ideology or value and information distribution influenced by interest groups in the economic and political spheres (see for instance Grabb, 2002, 60ff.; 87; 130; 160ff.; Hurst, 1992, 295; Elster, 1982, 134f.). In a related field of research, studies on coalition forming and collective action highlight the importance of informational warfare for the emergence of dominating coalitions and specifically list negative campaigning as a strategy (Petersen, 2015).

135 Runciman notes about middle-class self-rating of working-class individuals that often “it represents some sort of quite self-conscious differentiation from the 'traditional' working class and its perceived standards and norms” (1972, 397).

with the pursuit of economic self-interest among individuals in lower structural positions[136] (see for instance Trump, 2018; Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004). On the other side, it can be argued that organized progressive and revolutionary movements, often seen as separate influences on public discourses and possibly cultural values (see for instance Gaby & Caren, 2016) also emerge from specific normative ideas embedded in broader cultural circumstances (Hurst, 1992, 295, 336f.). In general, for the influence of ideology-based organizations, mobilization efforts and information availability can be hard to separate from direct influences of ideology, but cultural and institutional aspects possibly affecting structural effects and political mobilization include factors related to systems of media organization and information dispersion. Concepts such as the freedom of press or the use of traditional and social media could be analyzed in their influence on structural effects, but no systematic studies with regard to the moderation of structural effects are evident in the literature[137].

Additionally, it has been argued that high polarization or fractionalization in terms of social and ethnic differences might influence preferences and structural effects. Polarization and fractionalization with regard to ethnic and national categories are proposed to be associated with integration problems and segregation (Koopmanns, 2008), racism and discrimination (Runst, 2017), distrust (Finseraas, 2012a, 66f.) and labor market competition (see for instance Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012; Finseraas, 2012a; Mau & Burkhardt, 2009). Some authors investigating effects of ethnic conflict, fractionalization and polarization on attitudes towards inequality and redistribution as well as on objective measures of redistribution levels[138] (compare also Scheidel, 2017, 427, 428;

136 Not only in this context, influences of organized interests and endogenously evolved ideas is hard to distinguish from each other, especially when unclear and potentially biased expectations and perceptions are considered. For instance, Elster discusses both the possibility of endogenous acceptance in lower structural positions (1982, 124) and the possibility of influences of the expectation of violent oppression in the absence of endogenous mechanisms, resulting in the induced acceptance of structures without enforced indoctrination or direct threats (ibid., 145f.).

137 The segmentation of media markets is included in a study on attitudes, with higher levels of segmentation seemingly related to higher variation in attitudes (Brügger et al., 2011), but causal directions in this context are unclear. Research on main effects indicates that media consumption is negatively related to support for equality (Di Gioacchino & Verashchagina, 2020; see also De Benedictis, Allen & Jensen, 2017).

138 It has specifically been noted that effects of this kind could be reinforced by systematic political campaigning, contributing to increasing nationalism and social nativism and cleavages based on identity and religion (Piketty, 2020, 36f., 265ff., 720, 733, 774–799, 849–857, 871–880, 944–948, 958–961). For instance, in a recent commentary on the framework of identity politics and its negative effects on the success prospects of egalitarian activism for the interests of individuals in lower structural positions, Haider (2018) repeatedly notes the influence of a systematic separation of the interests of black and white workers to reduce the possibility of collective interest organization (compare also Abbott, 2021; English & Kalla, 2021; Milanovic, 2016a, 204–211; Hurst, 1992, 225f.). Piketty notes that cleavages related to identity are becoming more relevant on both sides of the Atlantic (Piketty, 2020, 825–828), whereas the

Grabb, 2002, 213; Hurst, 1992, 215, 225f.). Structural effects on attitudes towards inequality and redistribution could be affected by a reduction of effects of income on inequality aversion in contexts with high levels of ethnic conflicts and polarization.

Empirically, correlations of political party preferences and left-right positioning with inequality preferences and related attitudinal dimensions are not always consistent with expectations based on the traditional view of left parties as being generally in favor of redistribution in contrast to right parties (see for instance Kuhn, 2011; but compare Jaeger, 2007). On context level, there is no systematic study on influences of aggregate political orientations on structural effects in the literature reviewed, but a substantial amount of research has been conducted into long-term effects of socialization into political ideologies on attitudes after regime changes, especially with regard to transitions from communist to democratic systems. Studies on countries transitioning to democratic systems in Eastern Europe demonstrate continuing differences between long-term democracies in Western Europe and transitioning countries, showing higher egalitarianism, seemingly as a form of long-term legacy from socialization experiences under communism (Suhrcke, 2001). Communist rule in tendency seems to coincide with pro-government and pro-redistribution attitudes after transition to a liberal democratic system as compared to other liberal democracies in line with status-quo bias. Cohort differences can get stronger over time after transition, indicating different reactions of cohorts to newer economic or ideological trends (see for instance Saar & Trumm, 2017; Saar, 2008; Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; compare Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2012) and illustrating the potential long-term influence of state-driven ideologies supported by institutional arrangements[139].

With regard to religiosity, Scheve and Stasavage (2006) argue that high levels of religiosity can coincide with high levels of inequality and demonstrate substantial co-variation of religiosity with various dimensions of non-insurance social spending in international comparisons. A study using data from multiple surveys suggests that aggregate religiosity levels are correlated with inequality and

debate about redistribution has largely been "obliterated (ibid., 744), and states that bringing questions of distribution back into public debate might avoid a potential future reduction of politics to issues of identity.

139 With regard to post-Soviet transitional countries, as compared to Western countries, higher inequality and less effective redistribution seems to coincide with higher support for redistribution and more active welfare-state intervention (Habibov, 2013; Gijsberts, 2002). Value-based change seems to occur slowly (Smith & Mateju, 2012; Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Kunovich & Slomczynski, 2007), even though faster for outcome- as compared to process-related attitudes (Liebig & Verwiebe, 2000; see also Goerres & Tepe, 2012). With regard to structural effects, research on data from the Czech Republic shows both an increasing polarization of meritocratic and egalitarian value sets and an increasing stratification of normative beliefs by objective structural position in the decades after the transition to democratic system in Eastern Europe (Smith & Mateju, 2012; see also Verwiebe & Wegener, 2000).

development and proposes aggregate deference to authority as a possible mediator (Fairbrother, 2013). Additionally, with regard to possible mechanisms, Stegmueller (2013; see also Stegmueller et al., 2012) shows that, whereas the structural effects of income on attitudes are mediated by economic instead of moral issues, the effects of religiosity (in contrast to religious affiliation) are markedly related to moral issues. In contrast to these results, some studies on Eastern religiosity find different effects for Eastern religions as compared to Western religions, including low religious and ethnic prejudices and high prosociality among individuals of high religiosity identifying with Eastern religions in three Asian countries (see for instance Clobert et al., 2014). Other studies on East Asia report decreasing support for redistribution with increasing frequency of attendance of religious meetings (Chang, 2010). Research conducted in Muslim countries illustrates effects generally in line with both SJT and the political economy of religions, showing high acceptance of inequality among religious individuals (Pepinsky & Welborne, 2011). At this point it has to be noted that instruments developed to measure religiosity are generally problematic. Whereas direct self-reports of religiosity might be influenced by social desirability or similar effects, questions about behavior have also been criticized in their function as indicators of general religiosity. Especially with regard to cultural differences, for instance in the context of Asian cultures, it has been noted that forms of religiosity differ substantially between Western and Eastern cultures (Clobert et al., 2014; see also Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan, 2010) and in Eastern cultures, religiosity is not adequately captured by instruments developed for measuring religiosity in Western contexts[140].

In the context of mobilization efforts, research on moderating influences on structural effects is not evident in the literature reviewed. In a related study investigating inequality effects on programs of left-wing parties in the OECD, it is shown that left-wing parties only react to rising inequality with higher demand for redistribution in contexts of high mobilization of low-income voters (Pontusson & Rueda, 2010). Connections between low unionization and high inequality are discussed by researchers on welfare states (Checchi, Visser & van de Werfhorst, 2010; see also Alesina, Glaeser & Sacerdote, 2005), and correlations on individual level between union membership and attitudes are present in

140 Specifically, the importance attributed to regular passive indulgence of religion in separate places of worship, as illustrated by the use of questions about the frequency of service attendance, the emphasis on transcendence instead of social aspects and even the idea of choosing between different religious concepts have been criticized as being characteristic of specific Western forms of religiosity and data on these patterns might not be directly informative for actual forms of religiosity in Eastern Asian cultures (Vinkens, 2006).

many studies (Checchi, Visser & van de Werfhorst, 2010; Kelley & Evans, 1995), but partly seem to be limited to areas such as unemployment insurance and pensions (Matthews & Erickson, 2004).

With regard to potential influences of media activity and campaigning by organized interests, attitudes of individuals seem to be substantially reactive to the influence of situation-specific frames such as wording choices, selective presentation of positive versus negative aspects of topics and even completely unrelated effects of information or emotions made more salient by the presentation of specific stimuli[141] (see for instance Kangas, 1997). Generally, the influence of framing effects seems to be subject to interaction with ideological beliefs, as measured by political orientation in a study on support for premiums for having children (Kuehnhanss & Heyndels, 2018). This influence could also result in interactions with structural effects, if these are mediated by value-related aspects such as political orientation. More specifically, research on Chinese data shows different reactions of middle and low income groups to government propaganda, with middle class reactions seemingly immune to propaganda effects, in tendency showing increased critical evaluations of inequality in contrast to increased acceptance among low and high income groups (Jin, 2017).

In the context of socio-demographic heterogeneity and polarization, studies report negative effects of various measures of ethnic, religious or linguistic fragmentation, fractionalization and polarization as well as migration on inequality aversion and, especially, on support for redistribution and specific forms of social spending[142] (see for instance Dahlberg, Edmark & Lundqvist, 2012; Dion, 2010; Mau & Burkhardt, 2009; but compare Nekby, Pettersson-Lidbom, 2017; Kearns et al., 2014). With regard to the moderation of structural effects, a study by Dion (2010) reports significant

141 For instance, in an experiment on welfare evaluations, the manipulation of presented news stories with regard to the framing of welfare recipients as deserving or undeserving of benefits influenced both perception of deservingness of recipients and support for welfare retrenchment (Slothuus, 2007). According to research on Swiss democratic politics, by focusing public debate on business and growth frames, organized business interest prevented the public from increasing taxes for the small group of super-rich individuals in a popular vote that resulted in a large majority against the selective tax increase (Emmenegger & Marx, 2019). Other research shows expected effects of reporting on defense spending on both perceived defense spending and preferences in line with status-quo bias assumptions (Neuner, Soroka & Wlezien, 2016). At the same time, research shows that attempts of influencing public opinion are subject to effects of differential media consumption patterns (Mummolo & Peterson, 2017), with consumption behavior additionally resulting in high opinion stability and the reinforcement of early adopted frames and attitudes (Druckman, Fein & Leeper, 2012).

142 At the same time, Spies and Schmidt-Catran (2016) show that migration only seems to have a negative effects on support for welfare spending when perceived integration of migrants is low and there is additional evidence pointing to short-term effects expected to decrease over time due to temporarily destabilized expectations of residents and local elites (Jacobs, 2017, 535f.).

interaction effects of income with religious fractionalization as well as migrant rates on support for redistribution, with negative effect of income being stronger in contexts of high fractionalization and migration rates[143]. Other studies report specific effects of ethnic heterogeneity on attitudes of rich individuals (Naumann & Stötzer, 2017; Finseraas, 2012a; Rueda & Pontusson, 2010; but compare Burgoon, Koster & Van Egmond, 2012). In a test of various mechanisms, the influence of ethnic heterogeneity on the selective fear of rich individuals of downward income mobility seems to be the most plausible explanation, in contrast to explanations based on specific animosity, identities, social trust or social capital (Finseraas, 2012a).

Overall, studies with explicit inclusion of cross-level interaction effects lead to some interesting but partially incoherent results in need of systematic evaluation. Even though research is inconclusive with regard to specific patterns and determinants, comparing immigrant and native attitudes towards the welfare state shows high similarity within countries and strong influences of national context (Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2015), possibly to be explained by institutional conditions and forms of cultural integration. Despite evidence for significant interaction effects in many studies, the findings are inconclusive, since the various potential country-level moderators of structural effects are often correlated and no detailed empirical comparison of the explanatory power of these multiple theoretical alternatives has been conducted (but see Dion, 2010). Therefore, the country-level moderators of the effects of structural position on inequality attitudes remain unclear to a large extent and are in need of systematic analysis and evaluation. The possibility of multiple, possibly nonlinear interaction effects with regard to moderators of structural effects makes estimation difficult, and the topic has to be regarded as unresolved as of yet.

2.4 Integrating approaches to the explanation of attitudes towards inequalities

The literature discussed in previous and following chapters does not include an exhaustive comparative or integrative theoretical discussion of the effect of structural position on inequality

143 Duch and Rueda (2014) show additional evidence that high individual altruism increases support for redistribution, but only for poor individuals and on average, and not for rich individuals, and that the positive effect of altruism on support for redistribution is additionally moderated by ethnic heterogeneity, possibly capturing aspects of social fractionalization and polarization. Comparing moderation of structural effects with both ethnic fractionalization, taken as an indicator for processes of social distance, and labor market segmentation, fractionalization does not seem to make a difference for income effects, but instead high labor market segmentation seems to coincides with a stronger polarization of attitudes between rich and poor individuals, i.e. a stronger structural effect (Alt & Iversen, 2016).

tolerance, even though research in different areas includes the specification of certain interaction effects and corresponding mechanisms. To fill this apparent gap in a provisional way for the purpose of this thesis, the remaining part of this section focuses on providing a brief theoretical framework integrating various theoretical mechanisms, including moderators on contextual level. The integration of various existing theoretical approaches, varying results and ad-hoc explanations related to attitudes towards inequality often gets more complicated with additional studies being published and is still an ongoing project. Recent reviews of the literature in corresponding fields have noted omissions in the literature not only in terms of theoretical integration, but also in terms of empirical tests including all possibly relevant cognitive factors and their interrelations (Pellicer, 2018; Han et al., 2012).

In related areas, the reviewed theoretical models coming close to integration are either broad and open or focused on very specific aspects. For instance, one project aims to integrate justice theories by modularization based on differentiating between various modules or parts of evaluation processes (Markovsky et al., 2008). This modular approach has the advantage of high usability and of providing a high level of structure and giving an overview of the location of theoretical ideas in the context of related decision processes, but does not lead to a clear and distinct unitary model. In contrast, the approach proposed by Pellicer (2018) focuses on political coping styles and provides some ideas for the differentiation between various expected outcomes, but is mostly tailored towards explaining different forms of coping, such as withdrawal, engagement and aggression, in low structural positions. Additionally, many studies use more general theories as a foundation for the integration of specific middle-range assumptions (see for instance Mehlkop & Neumann, 2012).

It has to be emphasized that, in this thesis, I do not outline a formal mathematical model and do not conduct tests of specific assumptions based on my broad reading of the SEU framework or of specific assumptions related to the applicability of the SEU framework versus alternative theories of choice or preferences (compare for instance Maffioletti & Santoni, 2005). Instead, the SEU framework is only used to provide a consistent foundation for the theoretical integration and empirical test of middle-range theories related to the specific issue of potentially moderating influences of contextual factors on structural effects. More specifically, I combine the general approach of reasoning related to the SEU framework with groups of motivational factors (economic self-interest, hedonic motives and normative motives) corresponding to the goal-frames in GFT to allow for a consistent integration of middle-range theories that relate to the research question. In this sense, the proposed model is an

application of a consistent but open framework to facilitate and simplify the handling of more specific assumptions related to the research question, i.e. the moderation of structural effects. In the following, I discuss selected general theoretical models used in the context of explaining attitudes towards inequality to prepare for the integration of theoretical ideas related to the moderation of structural effects.

2.4.1 Cognitive dissonance and objective interests

With regard to a unifying theory explaining attitudes towards inequality, even though many theoretical accounts of the determination of attitudes towards social inequalities or state interventions rely on rational choice considerations in one form or another, this form of explanation has some disadvantages. Since it is not plausible to assume that people always expect their opinion to influence real-world politics, the statement of attitudes has to be regarded as a very specific form of behavior with no direct linkage to objective material outcomes. Therefore, the use of rational choice considerations relying directly on economic outcomes as mechanisms is in need of justification. Additionally, whereas effects of structural position on inequality attitudes are often roughly based on reasoning in line with rational choice theory and potential benefits and costs related to potential forms of redistribution, some studies explicitly refer to specific additional mechanisms. One approach is based on ideas related to cognitive dissonance reduction (see for instance Festinger, 1957), assuming that individuals have the tendency to uphold a consistent self-image of themselves and to reduce any dissonance stemming from differences between actions and the self-perceived values and norms. This paradigm is used to explain why individuals hold attitudes towards inequality that are roughly in alignment with their perceived interests (Hadjar, 2008; Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003, 18), and also to their objective interests in as far as these are perceived correctly. At the same time, similar reasoning has been used to explain the opposite effect for individuals in lower structural positions, by additionally assuming that individuals in these positions have a higher need for justifying their structural position and any dissonance stemming from objective interests on the one hand and conforming and system-reproducing behavior on the other (Jost, 2017, 73f.). Since multiple possible

mechanisms resolving cognitive dissonance with different outcomes exist[144], the direction of effects to be expected is dependent on multiple additional assumptions.

In the following, I regard cognitive dissonance as a phenomenon resulting in motivation to keep perceived interests, perceived primary and secondary ideologies, individual attitudes and individual behavior roughly aligned[145]. At the same time, and in agreement with traditional reasoning on cognitive dissonance (see for instance Festinger, 1957), I assume that dissonance between various elements can be endured in the sense of split-consciousness (see for instance Mau, 1997, 45) on the individual level or promote different reactions such as exit from a potentially dissonance-inducing context and attitude change, possibly contrary to individual economic interests[146] (Trump & White, 2017, Kay & Jost, 2003). I assume that the expected reduction of cognitive dissonance, resulting from keeping perceived interests, norms and attitudes in line with each other, generally positively affects well-being, but which factors are decisive is dependent on additional influences. To account for these influences in a systematic way, I use a modified version of the SEU framework (Yee, 1997; Savage, 1954) as a theoretical foundation, combining ideas on cognitive dissonance reduction with utility considerations as well as influences in line with framing ideas taken from the MFS (Kroneberg, 2010; Kroneberg, Heintze & Mehlkop, 2008) and GFT (Lindenberg, 2008).

2.4.2 Expected utility and frame selection

Theoretical approaches based on SEU as a general framework are aimed at explaining action and decision-making by reference to not only objective self-interests, but also perception and other psychological factors (see for instance Pivato & Vergopoulus, 2020; Yee, 1997). A broad interpretation

144 Reducing dissonance is possible by mechanisms such as attitude change, reinterpretation of context or exit from a situation. Neurophysiological studies seem to indicate that related processes happen very fast without extended deliberation (Jarcho, Berkman & Lieberman 2011), indicating that they follow a pathway different from a more deliberative decision. This might be seen as an argument for dissonance reduction playing a more pronounced role in non-deliberative processes related to a non-rational frame, but one has to keep in mind that cognitive dissonance reasoning has also been applied to the explanation of direct structural effects of objective self-interests.

145 In general, research into attitudes towards inequalities often takes a roughly dichotomous approach by contrasting effects of objective economic self-interests with those of social, cultural or psychological factors related to normative influences in both theoretical and empirical terms (see for instance Mehlkop & Neumann, 2012; Dallinger, 2010).

146 Therefore, cognitive dissonance in itself, stemming from differences between cognitive aspects such as perceived objective interests related to structural position on the one hand and perceived social norms on the other, in my application of the term, is not an explanatory mechanism, but instead a black-box description for the motivation to reduce any perceived misalignment of motivational influences.

of the SEU framework allows for the integration of effects of counteracting motivational influences. In this framework, the costs and potential benefits of decisions can be included for economic influences, but also potentially for any form of non-economic influence such as adherence to primary or group-specific norms. Since subjective perception can be explicitly included in the model, it provides a straight-forward foundation for the theoretical integration of diverse aspects such as individual or mean aggregate perceptions, and in the broadest reading even normative influences. In this context, cognitive dissonance can be regarded in terms of costs or disutility, resulting from any perceived misalignment of motivational influences. But a broad and open application of the SEU framework[147] in this context has to be complemented by clearly defined auxiliary assumptions. The influence of psychological factors possibly working in various different and counteracting directions poses a substantial problem to any comprehensive model on this foundation[148].

Alternative theoretical paradigms proposed in recent years include multiple pathways for decision processes. Two specific models that have been applied in the explanation of attitudes towards inequality and redistribution in recent years differentiate between multiple pathways of decision and evaluation processes. These models are the MFS proposed by Kroneberg (2010; 2007; 2005) and GFT developed by Lindenberg (2015; 2009; 2008; 2006; Lindenberg & Steg, 2007). Both framing models refer to the importance of differences between frames. The MFS proposes a distinct process of frame selection with normative versus rational modes of decision selection (Kroneberg, 2010). A normative frame is selected and rational consideration disregarded when norm internalization is high[149] (ibid.; see

147 A broad interpretation of the SEU framework as applied in this thesis contrasts substantially with a narrow interpretation (see for instance Maffioletti & Santoni, 2005; Savage, 1972). It is specifically relevant for the context of this thesis, i.e. for contextual influences moderating effects of structural position, that I assume that expected utilities are unstable and depend on situational influences such as symbolic or contextual influences (see for instance Pivato & Vergopoulus, 2020; but compare Stanovich, 2013) and on additional cognitive and psychological aspects such as imperfect perceptions as well as hedonic and normative influences (see Chapters 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6). I distinguish my broad reading of the SEU framework from narrow interpretations of SEU Theory, which are common in discussion of behavioral decision theories (see for instance Takemura, 2014; Stanovich, 2013).

148 In general, utility functions can be constructed to account for diverse forms of social and cultural preferences, incorporating various psychological motives such as shame, jealousy or an aversion against disadvantageous inequality (see for instance Fehr & Schmidt, 2006; 1999). At the same time, in an applied model, all these potential outcomes, including psychological or norm-related aspects, have to be quantified in terms of expected costs, benefits and probabilities. This leaves room for introducing theoretical models based on ambiguous assumptions on the one hand and for increasing model over-specification and measurement bias on the other (compare Kroneberg, 2010, 57).

149 Therefore, the theory can integrate influences related to self-interest in the form of rational utility considerations in the context of the rational frame, and normative influences as possible moderators. Additionally, a strict reading of MFS leads to relatively clear hypotheses, assuming that high internalization of norms, as visible in high subjective

also Mehlkop & Neumann, 2012). Therefore, the MFS can be used to explain the interplay of rational and normative influences. Applications of the model include the analysis of attitudes towards inequality and redistribution (Nagayoshi & Sato, 2014; Mehlkop & Neumann, 2012).

In contrast, GFT relies on goal frames that can be switched in-between when decisions are unclear based on the initially dominating goal frame (Lindenberg, 2015; 2009). As is the case for a very broad reading of the SEU framework, theoretical implications are dependent on additional assumptions[150], since the influence of diverse aspects such as psychological processes and norms could take diverse shapes and forms in the context of all three goal frames[151]. Whereas the MFS proposes normative influences that determine the frame selection by having the capability of activating norm-induced scripts and blocking rational considerations, Lindenberg (2015) argues in the context of GFT that various contextual and individual aspects influence goal-frame activation in terms of the salience of various goal-frames. A specific role is played by the social environment, especially but not exclusively in the context of normative influences in line with the norm goal. This leads to a filtering of information, knowledge and scripts that are considered to be relevant. In contrast to the MFS, even though goal-frames are thought of as being specifically shaped selection processes, activated goal-frames in the context of GFT are open to the influence of background goals and mixed motives (Lindenberg, 2009). The hedonic goal is seen as the most basic and also strongest goal per se, related to primary needs as well as feelings, and is supposed to be least sensitive to variation in context. The gain goal is viewed as based on the inclusion of overarching personal goals and, a priori, a weaker influence in need of social or institutional support[152] (Lindenberg, 2015). The normative goal a priori is the weakest frame and in need of social or institutional support[153] to dominate decisions in a way that counteracts influences in line with other goal frames (ibid.).

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agreement with respective values and ideas, goes along with norm-conforming attitudes and behavior and also with the irrelevance of rational considerations stemming from objective aspects of self-interests such as personal income.

150 GFT might be considered the more general approach, allowing for more complex forms of interrelations.

151 In line with this interpretation, Kroneberg notes that by focusing on goal frames, GFT generally connects closely to the SEU framework with its focus on maximizing utility (2010, 86–89).

152 Even though often viewed as the dominating influence in microeconomic conceptions of behavior in line with a strict economic interpretation of rational choice reasoning, Lindenberg (2015) stresses that the potential prevalence of this goal is based on institutional support and not a natural state.

153 This idea is of potential importance for the moderation of structural effects on inequality attitudes, since it implicates that a given context influences the salience of frames.

In terms of empirical studies, research testing framing models in the explanation of attitudes is still relatively rare[154], especially with regard to influences on structural effects. In general, psychological utility stemming from fairness or inequality aversion has been used in the context of inequality-related attitudes as a relevant explanatory concept by many researchers in recent years (see for instance Le Garrec, 2018; Horváth & Janky, 2014; Alesina & Angeletos, 2005). For instance, authors argue that subjective sensitivity to fairness (Alesina & Angeletos, 2005) and experiences with or the observation of poorer fellow citizens (Horváth & Janky, 2014) can increase utility related to support for redistribution and inequality aversion[155]. Influences in this regard in turn might be dependent on structural position, as Scheve and Stasavage (2006) argue with regard to the greater psychological benefits of religion for poorer individuals. A recent study indicates that the sensitivity to fairness might have different effects depending on structural position of individuals. For people with high income, high fairness orientation increases support for redistribution, but for individuals with low income, the opposite is the case, explained by fairness considerations with regard to individuals with higher income (Sabatini et al., 2020; compare Dimick, Rueda & Stegmueller, 2019a, 135–141; 2019b; 2016). These effects indicate that economic influences might affect the impact of normative aspects.

In the following, while using the SEU framework as the general foundation, I take the differentiation of economic, hedonic and normative goal frames from Lindenberg (2008; 2006), to theoretically structure the influence of different aspects of utility considerations. I keep open the possibility that economic, hedonic and normative factors can work together in parallel as utility-affecting parameters in a rational SEU framework without need for the dominance of any single factor, if hedonic and normative impulses are at low or medium levels. I integrate the possibility that decisions are dominated by either hedonic or normative aspects simply by affecting situative utility considerations interactively. Since, in contrast to perceived economic outcomes, psychological outcomes are hard to measure or even subjectively quantify, it is plausible to assume that their associated expected absolute relative utility is depending on the salience and evaluation of associated feelings and norms, influenced by individual and situational factors. Contextual and individual

154 Generally, expectations based on GFT are in line with research on the influence of interviewer effects (Liebig et al., 2015) and two studies reviewed demonstrate effects in line with MFS expectations, showing moderative effects of normative convictions and different forms of trust on the impact of self-interest on support for redistribution (Nagayoshi & Sato, 2014; Mehlkop & Neumann, 2012).

155 Research by Fong (2001) shows that beliefs about causes of income and poverty can affect support for redistribution when controlling for instrumental self-interest related to structural effects.

influences can increase the perceived expected utility in terms of immediate and long-term social and psychological outcomes, changing the utility considerations of individuals. Specifically, if the hedonic or normative goal-frame is activated, it receives a higher importance for the general evaluation without completely prohibiting the influence of other frames. If nothing changes with regard to economic rational considerations, the relative influence of very high (low) expected utility stemming from hedonic or normative goals can discount (or accentuate) these self-interest influences completely if evaluated as high (low) enough. This can lead to the dominance of a frame without substantial changes in process and without the discounting of utility considerations.

This form of decision selection can lead to expectations in line with the normative frame selection in Kroneberg's model (2010), if high norm internalization is accompanied by high psychological utility empirically overshadowing rational impulses. In both conceptions, high norm internalization reduces effects of parameters related to rational considerations. In contrast to the MFS, I do not assume that high norm internalization can completely override rational considerations for two reasons: First, different normative influences can possibly negate each other or interact with each other (see for instance Osberg & Smeeding, 2006, 470; Kluegel et al., 1995, 205–211). Second, there is evidence that the interpretations and effects of norms can vary depending on individual and contextual factors[156]. I assume that, in principle, both normative and economic aspects can also be reduced in relative influence by strong hedonic influences and vice versa[157].

Instead of assuming goal-frames that affect the process of decision-making, I propose a simple weighting model, depending on the relative strength and direction of multiple economic, hedonic and normative motives as well as additional contextual factors. Specifically, I assume in line with the discriminatory interpretation of Lindenberg's GFT (see for instance Kroneberg, 2010) that if all influences belonging to the economic, hedonic or normative motivational groups, respectively, line up in the same direction, this group of influences receives a greater weight as compared to the other two motivational groups, ceteris paribus, resulting in a de-facto discounting of the other influences without changing the general process of decision-making. In my application of the term, a clear dominance of

156 Studies indicate that normative impulses can also be affected by aspects of self-interest. For instance, low individual income might increase effects of religiosity on attitudes or well-being (see for instance Scheve & Stasavage, 2006) and high income might amplify effects of altruism (Dimick, Rueda & Stegmueller, 2016).

157 In this view, it is possible that high norm internalization diminishes the relative utility of rational considerations, whereas strong influences in line with economic self-interest can affect the influence of normative aspects.

Tab. 2.2: The three groups of motives in broad SEU Theory, GFT, MFS and integrated model

Theoretical model	Economic self-interest	Hedonic self-interest	Normative influences
Broad reading of Subjective Expected Utility [SEU] framework	Expected economic utility	Expected psychological utility	
Goal-Framing Theory [GFT]	Gain frame (long-term economic interest)	Hedonic frame (basic needs and feelings)	Normative frame (normative and social factors)
Model of Frame Selection [MFS]	Rational utility considerations including economic and psychological aspects		Normative frame and script activation
Integration	Variable utility based on strength and salience of all three motive groups		

one of the three motivational factor groups can be interpreted as a dominant frame among the three goal-frames in the context of GFT. With regard to the moderation of structural effects, contextual influences to be considered are all factors that increase the strength or salience of economic, hedonic or normative motives – not necessarily in direct relation to the topic of inequality. Which motivational group is dominant, or, in GFT terms, which goal-frame is selected, can only be extrapolated when considering all relevant factors and interactions potentially moderating the relative influence of the three factor groups. See Table 2.2 for a rough overview of how the three motivation groups are interpreted in my integrated model and in my broad reading of the SEU framework, GFT and the MFS. On the foundation of this general model that is roughly sketched as a combination of the theoretical approaches discussed, I integrate recent research into mechanisms of the contextual moderation of self-interest while allowing for specific assumptions based on the interrelations between influences of three groups of motives, corresponding to the goal frames in GFT (Lindenberg, 2009).

2.4.3 Integrating effects of structural position on inequality-related attitudes

To briefly recapitulate the state of empirical research with regard to the influence of structural position on attitudes related to inequality and redistribution, in broad and general terms, the structural position of individuals seems to have an overall impact on attitudes in most, if not all, contexts analyzed in past research. At the same time, this effect is often very surprisingly small considering the prevalence of theoretical arguments about self-interest in this context and in social and specifically economic research in general (see for instance Kim et al., 2018; Wendt et al., 2010; Massari, Pittau & Zelli 2009; Guillaud, 2008; Isaksson & Lindskog, 2007; Linos & West, 2003; Corneo & Grüner, 2002). Past research, especially in the tradition of SJT (see Jost, 2017; Jost & Hunyady, 2002), class and income inequality research (see Braun & Fatke, 2019; Andersen & Yaish, 2012; Osberg & Smeeding, 2006) as

well as general progress in theories of action and decision-making (Mehlkop & Neumann, 2012; Kroneberg, 2010; Lindenberg, 2008; 2006) shows some moderators of structural effects, but despite a lot of studies pointing into the direction of possible interactions between structural position and other factors in the determination of attitudes towards income inequality and redistribution, no systematic analyses of interactions are evident. Therefore, the knowledge of moderators and boundary conditions of structural effects still has to be regarded as being very limited.

In an attempt to synthesize the current state of research, I combine various ideas from research in the context of specific middle-range theories related to the moderation of structural influences on inequality attitudes. This specifically includes ideas related to certain concepts that emerged in the literature review as potentially relevant for the understanding of structural effects on attitudes, specifically system justification (Jost, 2017), dominant primary and group-specific secondary ideologies (Liebig & Wegener, 1995; Wegener, 1992), status-quo bias (see for instance Trump, 2013), the intersection of multiple determinants of inequalities (see for instance Justino & Moore, 2015, 17; Haller, Edler & Stolz, 2016, 122f.; Crenshaw, 1989), relative deprivation (Cojocaru, 2016; Runciman, 1972) and the relevance of mobility expectations and meritocracy perception for the legitimacy of inequalities (Tan et al., 2016; Chen & Fan, 2015; Bjørnskov et al., 2013). In the following, I use the integration of utility and framing models on the basis of the SEU framework and GFT sketched above as a foundation for the explanation of structurally influenced attitudes towards inequality with a special focus on the moderation of structural effects on attitudes.

2.4.3.1 Specific motives and forms of structural effects

In order to explain the moderation of structural effects by contextual factors, the specific pathways of effects of structural position on inequality-related attitudes have to be specifically discussed to prepare for the integration of interaction effects on a comprehensive and clear foundation. With regard to overall effects of income on attitudes in general, I focus the discussion mostly on monotonic effects, either linear or nonlinear with some form of saturation at the high or low end. I expect that both dichotomous group differences between rich and poor income groups and linear effects of income are visible in the analysis when considered separately. To reduce complexity, I focus on ideal-type effects for rich and poor income groups in the following discussion, since I am interested in the moderation of general differences and monotonic effects between upper and lower structural groups.

As a first step, I take the differentiation between economic, hedonic and normative motivational groups in line with GFT and allow for specific motives associated with structural groups. Since structural position influences various aspects of life, especially social and normative factors such as the potential influence of peer groups, socio-economic classes and structural interest groups, the inclusion of these aspects, as far as they are relevant for effects on inequality-related attitudes, seems necessary for a comprehensive theoretical account of structural effects. Based on reasoning related to differences between primary ideologies that are dominant in societies in the sense of a high percentage of internalization in aggregate, and secondary ideologies that are internalized to a much higher degree by specific structural groups with fitting interests (Liebig & Wegener, 1995; Wegener, 1992), I assume that besides utility related to direct economic motives, internalized normative ideas in line with secondary ideologies can also differ in aggregate between different structural groups and can play a separate, additional role that can interfere with direct individual economic considerations. In my model, motives affect decisions by traditional parameters associated with a broad reading of SEU reasoning including utility considerations and the salience of motives and motive groups[158]. In general, I expect the salience of motive groups to be affected by the overall strength of utility expectations in the three motivational groups and the salience of specific motives, including non-related motives. In the following, I first differentiate between two simplified pathways of effects for economic motivations related to income to account for some of these problems and then briefly sketch the basic pathways of effects I assume for all three motivational groups related to economic, hedonic and normative influences. After that, I finally turn to the inclusion of moderating contextual factors.

2.4.3.2 Motives in the group of economic motivational factors

In terms of economic motivational factors, research shows various biases of perception with regard to actual income distributions (Franko, 2017; Yanai, 2017; Trump, 2013; Schneider, 2012, 434; Osberg & Smeeding, 2006; Gijsberts, 2002) and individual structural position (Cruces, Perez-Truglia & Tetaz, 2011), partly affecting attitudes. On this foundation, I assume that any form of economic consideration in the context of inequality and redistribution is based on perceived inequality, perceived individual

158 In contrast to a narrow reading of MFS, the pathways in my model do not represent specific cognitive processes but instead parallel groups of motivational factors. These groups are moderated in their influence by additional factors such as the salience of economic, hedonic and normative ideas in a given context, potentially resulting in effects similar to frame selection, but based on weighted multipolar utility considerations.

structural position and perceived interests instead of actual objective interests. If individuals perceive their position incorrectly or expect individual mobility, economic considerations can be affected. In line with SEU reasoning (Yee, 1997; Savage, 1972), it is plausible to assume that any form of expected economic utility is based on cognition instead of objective interests. Even though influences of bias can take multiple forms, I use a simple differentiation between two summarizing economic motives to account for basic differences in expected effects. First, individual structural position, in broad tendency, determines the immediate benefits individuals receive in societal distributional systems and therefore the utility associated with inequality and redistribution. The higher the individual structural position, the higher the expected utility associated with maintaining or increasing inequality levels. The lower the structural position, the higher the expected utility associated with redistribution[159] in the sense of inequality reduction[160]. Second, expected utility with regard to the relation of values, attitudes and economic self-interest not only relates to the perceived current structural position, but also to the perceived mobility perspectives on the one hand and the perceived level of opportunities, effectively limiting the influence of objective and perceived structural position (see Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005). I propose that the positive effect of income on inequality tolerance is not to be expected in general, but instead a special case, even though empirically prevalent in the sense of significant results usually found in studies on the topic. It is a special case since it depends on cognitive and contextual aspects such as a roughly unbiased perception of societal structures and individual structural position, the salience of individual mobility and other alternatives, the salience of the concept that actively changing societal circumstances is a realistic way of improving one's situation and the expected possibility of change favoring one's interests in the societal systems determining distributions[161].

159 Redistribution can take various forms and specifically in the context of tax systems, various forms of progressive and regressive taxation exist and are used in various countries, often in varying forms of combination. One way to deal with the complexity of redistribution in this context is to focus on specific aspects such as specific welfare-state measures or the progressivity of the income tax (see for instance Beramendi & Rehm, 2016; Mehlkop & Nuemann, 2012). For this thesis I focus on inequality tolerance and regard redistribution only in the general form of inequality reduction.

160 This basic idea relates closely to the expected utility associated with inequality aversion for lower structural positions and inequality tolerance for higher positions in traditional political economy view on inequality attitudes as reflected in the original median-voter thesis (Meltzer & Richard, 1981) and to the traditional assumption in analyses of inequality attitudes of a linear or at least monotonic positive effect of income on attitudes (see for instance Dion & Birchfield, 2010) as expected based on the consideration of immediate advantages stemming from redistribution levels.

161 As Elster notes in the context of a discussion of Marxist ideas related to class interests and ideology, the interests of class members are not necessarily in line with the interests of the respective class as a whole (see Elster, 1982, 123f.).

Fig. 2.1: Specific motives related to structural effects in the economic motivational group



For individuals in lower structural position, if the potential upward mobility associated with changing individual structural position is salient, the expected economic utility associated with accepting inequality levels and improving one's own position in the system is increased. Additionally, if the influence of political action and public opinion on the societal distributional systems resulting in specific inequality and redistribution levels is judged as being very weak or nonexistent, the expected economic utility related to ideas of system improvement is decreased. In this context, the association with structural interests common with other individuals that are, currently or long-term, in similar structural positions, might seem like a completely fruitless endeavor in wasting time and energy. The possibility of upward mobility could be unrealistically overestimated, resulting in a relatively high utility associated with inequality tolerance for low structural positions. For individuals in high structural positions, the salience of downward mobility might decrease any expected utility associated with increasing inequalities. The salience of the general idea and specific forms of downward mobility is potentially increased by a high percentage of individuals in similar social categories such as ethnic, religious or age groups (see for instance Finseraas, 2012b) and the fear of crime and social conflicts due to high inequality levels, possibly leading to revolutions or other forms of violent disruptions of inequality reproduction (Rueda & Stegmueller, 2016; Alesina & Rodrik, 1994). The second economic motive is therefore based on the expectation of upward mobility. The utility associated with inequality tolerance because of expected upward mobility could explain inequality tolerance for lower structural groups even within an economic goal-frame. At the same time, fear of downward mobility decreases the utility associated with high inequality tolerance for individuals in higher structural positions. The differentiation resulting overall is a dichotomy between economic motives focused on the group versus individual[162] mobility or system improvement versus position improvement (see Figure 2.1).

162 Similar effects could also be assumed for the salience of negative versus positive societal macro-level effects of inequality. I assume these possible effects of affected self-interest to be marginal when controlling for individual self-interest on the one hand and potential aggregate normative and cognitive effects related to the evaluation of

2.4.3.3 Hedonic motives

With regard to hedonic motivation, in the context of GFT (Lindenberg, 2008; 2006), the influence of basic needs is considered as well as the effects of emotions. For the context of attitudes towards inequality, I do not further consider basic needs as direct hedonic motives, since I assume that strong basic need influences would lead to the disengagement with questions of societal inequality at the time of data collection[163]. I focus on emotions as hedonic influences and integrate research in the context of SJT, showing that the agreement or conformity with a given societal system[164] increases psychological utility, even and in some contexts especially for individuals in lower structural positions who would benefit from some forms of change such as specifically increased redistribution[165] (see for instance Jost, 2017; Jost & Hunyady, 2005). Related processes[166] increase the utility of individuals in low structural positions to hold and explicate attitudes preferring higher levels of inequality as compared to objective material interests (see Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; but compare Sands & de Kadt, 2019).

In this line of reasoning, conformity with a given system, in the sense of economic and political institutions relevant for inequality and redistribution, is assumed to coincide with high acceptance of inequality and low support for increases in redistribution. Since perceived and actual inequality levels are routinely higher on aggregate than levels reported as justified by respondents, I

distributional systems and inequality levels on the other.

163 At the same time, basic needs can play a role for either economic motivation in the sense of self-interest and for normative motivation in the sense of altruistic convictions, but these influences are not related to direct hedonic motives in my understanding and application of the terms.

164 A system in this context can be broadly understood as a structure of rules, institutions and ordered structural positions that are occupied by individuals and related to specific outcomes.

165 Research on SJT mostly focuses on current industrialized market societies and pro-capitalist ideas as legitimizing myths, but the theoretical framework can be understood as an open research program based on psychological insights into positive effects of acceptance of circumstances, research on religiosity and the belief in a just world and a skeptical view on legitimizing myths that justify existing inequalities with ideas that are not necessarily reflected in actual circumstances (compare Jost, 2017; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004).

166 More specifically, in the view of SJT, income inequality is rationalized and legitimized by meritocratic conceptions of fair chances and rewards and equal opportunities, with meritocratic principles in theory constituting the main mechanism of legitimate and fair distribution of income for a market society (Jost, 2017; Jost & Hunyady, 2005). At the same time, non-meritocratic aspects play a substantial (see for instance Reynolds & Xian, 2014) but varying role in societies, ranging from inequality in opportunities stemming from cultural and social capital to open forms of nepotism, exclusion and extreme forms of exploitation and division such as slavery, feudalism and forced labor. The level of meritocratic beliefs and perceptions such as believing in the possibility of upward mobility and in the existence of meritocracy not only affect perceived mobility chances and fairness conceptions, but also psychological aspects such as increased well-being, increased perception of control and higher satisfaction with the current situation in line with SJT (Jost, 2017; Jost & Hunyady, 2005).

assume that strong individual system justification goes along with strong support for current inequality levels, as opposed to lower inequality, for all structural groups or income levels. Additionally, I assume that inequality acceptance also reduces cognitive stress stemming from evaluating positive and negative effects of inequality levels and therefore increases utility. With regard to specific interview settings and questions, answer patterns in line with satisficing behavior, usually associated with low cognitive effort (see for instance Grauenhorst, Blohm & Koch, 2016), are expected to be increased for all structural groups if hedonic motives are dominant (i.e. if other motives are not salient).

For individuals with high hedonic motivation, I assume a high dependency of decisions on immediate emotions, resulting in contextual influences affecting emotional activity when hedonic motivation is over-weighted, such as cues and social desirability. At the same time, as a general trend, ceteris paribus, I assume that a focus on hedonic motives goes along with an increased general acceptance of inequality resulting from strong system justification. This effect is to be expected for all groups, but possibly stronger for low structural income groups (Jost, 2017; Jost & Hunyady, 2005) for two reasons. First, the possible nonlinearity of utility functions for income might lead to a saturation of increases for higher structural groups, since economic self-interest and secondary ideologies related to structural interest groups are simultaneously increasing the utility of inequality tolerance. Second, SJT assumes stronger effects for low structural positions since the general options to derive utility from any decision are more restricted. In my conception, this can be integrated by a higher salience of hedonic motives and a resulting high weight associated with hedonic utility considerations for individuals in lower structural positions, possibly moderated by additional contextual factors.

2.4.3.4 Normative motives

Factors related to norms such as ideological and cultural influences are possibly relevant at multiple points at individual and contextual levels in my theoretical framework, both with regard to contextual influences on the selection of goal frames and directly on the parameters of utility considerations. First, the adherence to internalized norms reduces or minimizes cognitive dissonance between internalized norms, explicit attitudes and overt behavior leads to gains in subjective utility and the possible discounting of other motivational factor groups. These norms can be specific to smaller groups or represent norms prevalent in either the complete society or contextual unit or in the specific structural group. I expect main positive effects of internalized norms on expressed attitudes. Second,

normative ideas could possibly affect the salience of all three motivational factor groups and therefore affect their weights in any utility consideration. This influence could be roughly analogous to the influence of strong internalized norms in MFS reasoning, discounting the influence of economic influences.

For normative influences as the third group of motivational factors, I again use a differentiation between two specific motives based on the theoretical dichotomy between dominant primary and structurally determined secondary ideologies (see Liebig & Wegener, 1995; Wegener, 1992). First, primary ideologies are prevalent among all structural groups in a society, ideally without differences between income levels, class or other forms of groups and categories. Due to the complexity of societal differences between prevalent norms, I take an abstract and indirect approach and only consider the influence of primary ideologies on individual level in an indirect way[167]. Regardless of the multitude of specific and partly counteracting normative ideas shared by majorities in specific societies, I consider the overall influence on decisions as an indirect construct. My assumption is simply that, since normative ideas cover various ideas, primary normative ideas in this context and in tendency are mostly relevant in as far as they go against economic self-interests stemming from structural position. Therefore, if primary norms prevalent in a given society overall promote a level of inequality in line with perceived self-interests, there is no effect on a to be expected[168].

Second, as normative concepts prevalent in specific social groups, secondary norms are directly related to individual structural interest groups, promoting the internalization of norms related to individual self-interest with potential advantages for the whole group. It is plausible to assume that these normative ideas are on average in line with economic self-interests related to social group mobility and system improvement. At the same time, they are increased in weight when the normative motivational group is focused on and therefore constitute a very different and indirect form of influence of self-interests that might plausibly be subject to different contextual moderating factors. In

167 This simple conception of normative influence on individual level is situated on a high level of abstraction. It could be replaced by more specific normative ideas, but focusing on the overall influence of multiple normative ideas and restricting the normative aspects on individual level to the difference between primary and secondary ideologies, resulting in tendency in opposing effects for ideal-type groups, is an economic choice at this point.

168 Specifically, if primary norms promote high inequality tolerance, individuals in high structural positions do not have any need to adjust their individual levels of inequality tolerance, but for individuals in lower structural positions, these norms potentially increase the utility related to upward adjustment of inequality tolerance.

Fig. 2.2: Specific motives related to structural effects in all motivational groups



line with GFT, I assume that normative factors are highly subjective to contextual factors affecting social situational setting, anticipated expectations and perceived rules (Lindenberg & Steg, 2007).

2.4.3.5 Basic assumptions of the theoretical model

Recapitulating, I assume that effects on inequality attitudes can be separated into three main motivational groups and present a simple model including five specific motives as a foundation for the integration of moderating contextual factors. See Figure 2.2 for an illustration of effects in all three motivational groups[169] (corresponding to goal-frames in GFT terminology) and for all five specific

169 The differentiation between gain (economic), hedonic and normative motivation is in line with the goal frames in GFT and partly in line with a categorization by Pellicer (2018) in which coping strategies for shame resulting from low structural positions are mapped to political choices. In this categorization, the coping with the specific perceived self-esteem threat can be problem-focused, resulting in demand for redistribution, or it can be emotion-focused and inequality-tolerant, further differentiated by meaning-focused coping, resulting in non-class ideology and system

motives[170] (or subframes). The vertical arrows in Figure 2.2 illustrate the reciprocal relations between different groups of motives. In contrast to the MFS, I do not assume that processes with regard to normative and economic influences are separated from each other, but instead assume that motive- and utility-related influences based on different kinds of motive groups are not only affected by exogenous and psychological aspects such as basic needs, physiological condition and cognitive load, but can indirectly affect each other. Highly salient motives, high expected utilities related to specificmotives and a strong internalization of relevant norms can increase the weight put on specific motivational groups, increasing their influence (compare Chapter 2.4.3.6).

This uniform but open and multipolar conceptualization includes various points for potential CLIs on individual level: the perceived individual structural position, the perception of societal context structuring resources, opportunities, reference groups and norms, and the weighting processes affecting the influences of different motivational groups (corresponding to processes of frame selection in GFT and MFS) and of specific motives. I assume that most moderating influences on individual level and those crossing multiple levels discussed above can be integrated into this simple conceptualization. For instance, a high weighting of hedonic utility is assumed to result in high inequality tolerance for all income strata, based on the findings that actual inequality levels are, on average and when judged based on quantified income levels, in all countries reviewed higher than perceived, but still also higher than levels evaluated as justified by individuals (see for instance Gimpelson & Treisman, 2018; Yanai, 2017a; 2017b; Engelhardt & Wagener, 2014; Osberg & Smeeding, 2006; Gijsberts, 2002). This effect could possibly be reduced or even changed in direction by social contexts, cues or information that shows alternative inequality levels, promotes social inequality or sheds a negative light on effects of inequality (see for instance Kuziemko et al., 2015;

justification, or internalized, resulting in withdrawal and aggression. The problem-focused form of coping corresponds to group-based economic motivation and system improvement as a sub-motive in my conception. Additionally, emotion-focused coping corresponds to psychological utility and hedonic motivation in my conception, with withdrawal and aggression both resulting in inequality tolerance in both models. A difference exists with regard to meaning focused coping which is also understood as leading to the same conclusions in the form of inequality tolerance, but for different reasons. Pellicer categorizes it as an emotional form of coping with non-class identity resulting from a focus on meaning. In my conception, the pathway leading to non-class identity can be in line with an individualist and optimistically biased individual perception of economic motives. The meaning-focused interpretation proposed by Pellicer (2018) is broader and includes different societal aspects not related to inequality since it is focused on broad political choices and not specifically on inequality-related attitudes.

170 These five motives include group-based versus individual-based motives related to economic motivation, hedonic motivation without further differentiation, and primary versus secondary norms in the group of normative motivation.

McCall & Chin, 2013; Cruzes, Perez-Truglia & Tetaz, 2011). In sum, all the specific expectations regarding the five pathways and ten hypothetical outcomes defined by income groups are highly dependent on specific contextual bridge assumptions. Changes related to contextual factors can change the influence of all four pathways and in sum moderate any form of structural effect.

I make a number of general assumptions[171] for my sketched integration of theoretical ideas that partly directly relate to the contextuality of inequality-related evaluations and to the measurement of attitudes towards inequality. As a foundation for the integration of various structural and moderation effects, I use an extended version of the SEU framework focusing on the utility that individuals gain from holding and explicating specific attitudes towards inequality and redistribution. In the context of this framework, utility gains can stem from multiple expected outcomes. Based on general assumptions of economic self-interest in the context of inequality and redistribution in line with the structural position thesis[172] (see Roex, Huijts & Sieben, 2019; Wong, Wan & Law, 2009; Hadler, 2005), the individual structural position with regard to the systematic distribution of economic resources determines the individual stakes with regard to any change in the distribution. Besides immediate economic interest related to inequality and potential redistribution, individuals are subject to additional influences resulting from expectations, perception biases and normative influences on the level of social groups and broader cultural contexts. Cognitive dissonance may be expected from the internalization or expression of attitudes contrary to individual economic interests, but also of ideas contrary to individual ideology and even to perceived circumstance in general[173]. In terms of possibly counteracting effects and cognitive dissonance stemming from differences between economic,

171 On the most basic level, with regard to inequality tolerance as a construct, In line with research on quantitative justice evaluations (Gijsberts, 2002; Jasso, 1999) levels of societal inequality are perceived and subjectively evaluated by individuals with regard to both outcomes and processes resulting in specific outcomes. Objective economic and institutional contextual conditions influences and determine objective and perceived structural self-interests in line with assumptions based on SEU regarding utility expectations. Additionally, various culturally transmitted normative and value-related ideas are shared and internalized by individuals to varying degree and influence decisions and attitudes as well as provide a context for judgments (see for instance Graham et al., 2016; Liebig & Sauer, 2016; Mehlkop & Neumann, 2012; Bourdieu, 1984). Therefore, it seems plausible to assume that individuals have some perception of distributions, inequality levels and societal norms and actively evaluate current distributional systems.

172 Whereas the progressivity of taxes and the benefits from transfers are not necessarily linear distributed as determined by a negative reading of the structural position, perhaps the most common assumption in the reviewed literature is that the lower the income, the higher the potential benefit and the lower the potential loss from redistribution.

173 If these influences line up in direction, decisions and attitudes are plausibly easy to explain in theory. However, this should be a nearly non-existent ideal-type case, since in any given societal context, multiple partly counteracting values and ideas are available and even on economic level, individuals regularly have multiple aspects of costs and benefits as outlined in traditional research on rational choice and expected utility paradigms.

normative and hedonic motives, in line with the idea of variability in expected utility for hedonic and normative goal-frames, external influences affect which groups of motivational factors are discounted and which are weighted higher (or which goal-frame is dominant). With regard to perceived self-interests, utility gains stemming from self-interest are directly moderated by both objective and perceived economic conditions and the influence of internalized norms and ideologies. These influences can lead to a reduction of perceived utility gains connected to the adherence to structural interests and to increases in salience and expected utility connected to normative motives [174] (see Nagayoshi & Sato, 2014; Mehlkop & Neumann, 2012; Kroneberg, 2010).

With regard to moderation effects, I assume that both perceived economic self-interests and contradicting influences are subject to individual and context-level variation in multiple ways. First, objective contextual factors can affect attitudes towards inequality in line with SEU-based explanations by structuring objective and perceived opportunities, benefits and costs of the status quo and potential alternative circumstances. Second, objective contextual factors can affect the influence or weighting of specific motivational groups and motives in the form of the salience of motives and associated ideas. Third, the perception of contextual factors, especially inequality levels, has to be considered as a mediating and biasing influence[175]. In general, my integration of macro-level factors is based on a strict micro-foundation, as illustrated by the fact that context-level factors are only

174 I assume that subjective utility for norm-according behavior is very high when norms are strongly internalized, diminishing the utility of rational influences of self-interests even though not neutralizing their influence or consideration. At this point, I differ from the interpretation given by Kroneberg (2010; 2007; 2005) who understands the existence of interaction effects between rational-choice parameters and certain internalized norms as indication for the selection of non-rational frames by individuals showing high internalized norms and only weak correlation between material self-interests and respective attitudes. This interpretation is specifically plausible for narrow readings of subjective utility theory, but in a wider interpretation of this framework, interactions between parameters are possible that could explain effects similar to framing models. At the same time, this broader interpretation of the SEU framework has the disadvantage of depending on various additional assumptions to specify expectations. For this reason, I use various additional middle-range theories in my approach to fill the theoretical gap between model and specific assumptions..

175 Specifically, perception is needed as a central mechanism linking context factors to the determination of individual attitudes and the moderation of individual-level effects. But the perception of contextual circumstances also determines the general reference frame for the perception of individual structural position. Additionally, differential knowledge and beliefs about societal circumstances, such as a relatively high underestimation of the degree of income inequality by individuals in lower structural positions (Gijsberts, 2002) or an overestimation of the degree of meritocracy and mobility chances as suggested by SJT (see Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004; Jost & Hunyady, 2005), may systematically affect the contextual moderation of the effect of structural position on attitudes.

considered in as far as they could contribute to or bias the explanation of variation in structural effects on attitudes towards inequality, therefore being relevant by affecting parameters on individual level[176].

2.4.3.6 Motive salience on individual level

In my conception, economic motivation can focus on perceived or expected mobility chances in addition to immediate individual structural interests (compare for instance Guillaud, 2008). Therefore, in contrast to many accounts of inequality-related attitudes contrasting norm-related effects with influences of rational economic self-interest (see for instance Mau, 1997) and framing models, especially MFS (Mehlkop & Neumann, 2012; Kroneberg, 2010), my main focus in this thesis is not on differences between economic versus hedonic and normative mechanisms[177], but instead on the consistency of motives with current objective structural interests with regard to redistribution and inequality. For instance, in my conception, a strong individual focus on normative motives can increase the consistency of attitudes with objective self-interests, if the individual focus in terms of rational economic motives is on individual mobility. The main dichotomy is based on differentiating between structurally consistent motives or sources of expected utility, generally expected to increase structural effects on inequality tolerance when salient, versus structurally inconsistent motives. To allow for specific assumptions with regard to influences of contextual moderating factors, I use the further differentiated level of five specific motives as a foundation for the discussion of influences on the salience of specific motives and for the consecutive integration of cross-level mechanisms.

In general, the salience of motives can be affected by the relative strength of specific motives and motive groups in terms of possible costs and gains with regard to utility expectations. Additionally, external influences can increase the salience of motive groups without relation to specific topic, such as immediate physiological needs or high cognitive load decreasing the influence of economic motives relative to hedonic motives or the mere existence of monetary incentives

176 While this assumption seems plausible, the relevant individual-level parameters, for instance specific normative constructs, do not necessarily have to be similar to the relevant factors on macro-level, since intermediary mechanisms on various levels could be overlooked.

177 The strict dichotomy between rational versus normative frames determining different modes of action as found in the MFS (Kroneberg, 2010), and also visible in GFT (Lindenberg, 2009) as the basic separation between frames, can be understood as being based on the development of more inclusive and realistic action theories in opposition to narrow rational choice frameworks. In my conception, I include the possibility of both normative effects in line with structural interests and rational effects contrary to structural interests, rendering any strict differentiation between rational versus normative motives, frames or pathways effectively irrelevant for the expectation of effects in this context.

potentially increasing the salience of economic motives. To prepare for the inclusion of cross-level moderation effects to be discussed in the next chapter, I make a number of propositions relating different types of contextual influences to the salience of motive groups. First, with regard to the salience of economic motives, in line with research on coping with low structural positions (Pellicer, 2018), one might expect that the salience of rational economic motives in general is increased by the perception of power and control. The perception of powerlessness is associated with depression and general withdrawal (Pellicer, 2018, 15f.), specifically increasing the salience of hedonic but potentially also of normative motives as alternative sources of expected utility. Similar arguments have been made for status anxiety, stress and low self-esteem (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2017; see also Pellicer, 2018, 15f.). Concerning the differentiation between economic motives that relate to current structural interests or structural group interests versus economic motives that relate to individual mobility expectations, I assume that the salience of mobility motives for attitudes towards inequality is especially dependent on contextual and individual factors determining the perception of general and group-specific mobility chances.

Second, for the salience of hedonic motives, I assume in line with Lindenberg (2008, 675) that hedonic motivation is directly related to need satisfaction and therefore other motivational groups have to be associated with high levels of utility and salience to decrease the influence of hedonic motives. I assume a strong relation of hedonic motives to concepts associated with SJT (Jost et al., 2017; Jost & Hunyady, 2005), especially the idea that people are motivated to justify the societal status quo since system justification fulfills a form of palliative function. Specifically, system justification provides "hedonic benefits minimizing unpredictable, unjust, and oppressive aspects of social reality" (Jost & Hunyady, 2005, 261) and is associated with increased positive and decreased negative emotions (Jost et al., 2017). I take this as a baseline of hedonic motivation[178] with regard to inequality that can only be overridden if other motives, specifically economic or normative motives, are salient. Antecedents of system justification such as the perception of a dangerous world and perceived system instability and threat might increase the salience of hedonic motives and provide a link to contextual factors such as social conflicts or inequality levels, but also homicides or poverty.

178 In my conception and in line with general SJT assumptions, based on the routinely lower reported justified inequality levels as compared to perceived inequality (Gijsberts, 2002) hedonic motivation with regard to inequality attitudes results in a general indifference and a strong reliance on cues, but also in higher inequality tolerance in line with a general acceptance of current circumstances.

Third, I assume in line with MFS and GFT that normative aspects are especially relevant in as far as the specific normative ideas are internalized by individuals. In my conception, the level of internalization of norms affects both the expected utility associated with norm-consistent attitudes and behavior and the salience of normative motives. A simple general assumption is that a strong internalization of inequality-averting norms decreases the influence of other motives. However, specific normative ideas could also increase the salience of other motives, specifically with regard to individualist norms and the salience of individualist economic motives related to mobility expectations[179]. With regard to secondary ideologies, even though I expect similar effects to group-based economic interests, the specific moderation of salience is different from the direct economic motive in my conception. The influence of secondary ideologies depends less on perceived interests and more on actual and perceived reference groups as well as the perception and internalization of norms held by those groups[180]. Contextual factors related to information and mobilization efforts might affect reference group selection and the salience of secondary norms in specific groups. In this short characterization of the theoretical foundation, effects on motive salience versus parameters related to utility expectations are not in all cases clearly distinguished from each other. But since both types of influences result in similar expectations with regard to the moderation of structural effects, this level of specificity seems adequate for the research question of this thesis.

2.5 Specific hypotheses for the moderation of structural effects and additional assumptions

In the following, I briefly outline the integration of specific mechanisms proposed or implicated in the reviewed literature (see Table 2.3 for an overview including general theoretical ideas, authors cited, moderating factors and expected overall interaction effects) as potentially moderating influences of

179 Additionally, ideas such as communism or workers' rights might increase the salience of both structural interests and secondary ideologies in lower and higher structural positions. In general, I assume that the same specific normative ideas that are relevant on individual level also might affect individuals in the sense of CLIs. As discussed before, the complexity on context level can be reduced by considering the overall influence of aggregate norms in the form of aggregate inequality tolerance. I assume for this thesis that some tendencies of aggregate normative ideas relevant for inequality evaluation are reflected in the overall level of inequality tolerance. In this view, high aggregate inequality tolerance is a catch-all reflection of inequality-tolerant normative ideas in a given context, potentially increasing the salience of related ideas and additionally the utility associated with inequality tolerance.

180 Additional factors not further considered in this thesis are related to reference group attributes, such as the perceived interdependence in groups and the identification with groups (Markovsky et al., 2008).

Tab. 2.3: Selected potential mechanisms counteracting self-interests in inequality preferences

Mechanism	General theoretical idea	Related authors cited	Moderating factors	Influence on structural effects
Accentuation	High inequality and redistribution (and high inequality) increases structural stakes and polarization (see H1 and H1a)	Jaeger (2009)	Inequality and redistribution	Positive/ reinforcing
Expected upward mobility	Focus on mobility prospects increases acceptance of inequality among low-status groups (see H2 and H2a)	Alesina & La Ferrara (2005)	Prosperity and perceived chances	Negative/ attenuating
Expected downward mobility	Group-based identities associated with inequalities reducing perceived risks (see H3 and H3a)	Finseraas (2012b)	Inequality; polarization between social categories	Positive/ reinforcing
Distraction	Social conflicts and polarization decreasing self-interested political participation in lower structural groups (see H3b)	Finseraas (2012a)	Inequality; polarization between social categories	Negative/ attenuating
Distrust in politics	High levels of distrust and perception of corruption decrease political activity and interest among the poor (see H4 and H4a)	Abinales & Amoroso (2005)	Distrust and corruption	Negative/ attenuating
Mobilization and information	Influences of mobilization by organized interests such as worker organizations; information accessibility (see H5 and H5a)	Checchi, Visser & van de Werfhorst (2010)	Mobilization efforts, freedom of and access to information	Positive/ reinforcing
Fear of conflict	Redistribution as reduction of sources of conflict and loss (see H6 and H6a)	Alesina & Rodrik (1994)	Inequality; conflict	Negative/ attenuating
System threat	Disadvantaged individuals derive utility from supporting a given system (see H6 and H6b)	Jost et al. (2003)	Inequality; instability of system	Negative/ attenuating
Primary ideologies	Dominant and secondary ideologies lead to differential influences due to saturation effects (see H7 and H7a)	Liebig & Wegener (1995); Wegener (1992)	Prevalence of specific inequality-reinforcing primary ideologies	Negative/ attenuating
Differential bias	Structurally biased perception of context and position (see H1b, H8 and H8b)	Gijsberts (2002); Runciman (1972)	Individual subjective positioning	Negative/ attenuating
Hedonic motivation	Withdrawal from rational discussion and expression of economic self-interests in low structural positions (see H9 and H9a)	Pellicer (2018)	Hedonic motivation	Negative/ attenuating
Normative motivation	Moderating influence of internalized inequality-reinforcing norms on individual level (see H10 and H10a)	Mehlkop & Neumann (2012)	Individual-level norms	Negative/ attenuating

Notes: Related authors cited do not necessarily explicitly identify the mechanisms specified here.

structural position on attitudes in the form of cross-level and individual-level moderation into the proposed theoretical model. Consecutively, I present hypotheses related to the influence of specific moderating contextual factors on structural effects in the explanation of inequality tolerance to be tested in the empirical section of this thesis. The selection of these middle-range mechanisms is based on the review of literature on individual- and context-level influences, with mechanisms taken from various fields and traditions, only sharing the potential of explaining variation in structural effects.

Tab. 2.4: List of general hypotheses

Hypothesis	Relevant constructs	Expected moderating influence
H1 Economic accentuation	Actual and perceived inequality, redistribution	Positive/reinforcing
H2 Prosperity and mobility chances	Prosperity and perceived mobility chances	Negative/attenuating
H3 Fractionalization	Fractionalization of social or ethnic groups	Negative/attenuating
H4 System distrust	Distrust in political system and institutions	Negative/attenuating
H5 Mobilization and information	Political mobilization and information availability	Positive/reinforcing
H6 System threat	System threat (expected conflicts or instability)	Negative/attenuating
H7 Primary norms	Normative legitimization of inequality	Negative/attenuating

I specifically consider the following mechanisms possibly moderating structural effects on inequality attitudes (see Tables 2.4 through 2.6): First, partly in line with the median-voter thesis, one can argue that higher inequality mechanically determines an accentuation of specific conflicts over inequality, since individuals in lower structural positions have, in tendency, more to win from redistribution and those on the other side of the income spectrum have more to lose (see for instance Beramendi & Rehm, 2016; Jaeger, 2009; 2007). Similar assumptions can be made for the amount of redistribution, since the actual and possible amount of state-driven redistribution of income is, at the most basic level, another important source of political conflicts related to inequality besides inequality per se. This accentuation mechanism captures potential country-level influences on structurally consistent motives in terms of CLIs affecting current structurally determined economic interests. The motive[181] presumably mostly affected on individual level is the economic motive of group-based economic system improvement[182]. Taken together, high levels of inequality and of redistribution are expected to positively correlate with structural effects (H1), especially for lower income groups because of saturation effects of the utility of income and gains from redistribution (H1a).

Second, high prosperity and perceptions of mobility increase actual and expected chances for individual upward mobility, specifically for individuals in lower structural positions. These mobility prospects contribute to the acceptance of inequality among low-status groups, by increasing expected utility associated with economic motives related to individual position improvement (compare Alesina & La Ferrara; 2005). Concerning the difference between system and position improvement, I expect influences of prosperity and mobility and also of meritocratic aspects of a given social context[183]

181 In terms of the contextual moderation of salience, it is plausible to assume direct and indirect positive influences of interest polarization in terms of inequality and redistribution on the salience of economic interests.

182 The motive of secondary ideologies is also affected if reference groups are located in structurally similar positions.

183 If individuals in low structural positions perceive the context as potentially fluid, the salience of mobility expectations might increase since mobility prospects might be considered a more realistic option, encouraging the investigation and reflection of options. The level of segregation between different socio-economic or demographic groups could also

(compare Jost, 2017, 75ff.). All aspects might increase the salience of upward mobility and associated individualist economic motives. Taken together, I expect high levels of prosperity[184] and perceived mobility to correlate with reduced structural effects (H2), especially in lower structural positions (H2a). Third, expectations of possible downward mobility among individuals in higher structural positions might influence attitudes towards redistribution. As Finseraas (2012b) argues, social polarization such as discrepancies between ethnic groups might reduce the probability of individuals in high structural positions identifying with majorities to fear downward mobility when the respective classes are mostly comprised of minorities. In terms of motivational considerations, the fear of downward mobility can be understood as being directly related to the utility associated with economic group-based interests and the salience of the mobility motive for high structural positions in my conception. Therefore, strong economic polarization between social categories or forms of ethnic animosity in contexts of high segregated inequality (Alesina, Glaeser & Sacerdote, 2001) increases inequality tolerance among individuals in higher structural positions (H3a), increasing structural effects (H3).

Fourth, an alternative mechanism related to ethnic and migration-related polarization is that political agitation in line with ethnic or migration-related conflicts might distract social groups from voting according to structural interests (see for instance Finseraas, 2012a; 2012b; see also Milanovic, 2016a, 204–210; Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012; but compare Piketty, 2020, 741–754, 801f.). Even though distracted voters can still share inequality-averse opinions without voting accordingly, this influence might directly or indirectly affect inequality tolerance. This distraction mechanism might generally decrease structural effects in contexts of high social or ethnic fractionalization (H3[185]), specifically for lower structural positions (H3b).

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affect the salience of mobility motives by influencing group-specific perceptions of fluidity in a similar way.

184 A study by Evans and Kelley (2007) shows that population size influences a measure of legitimate inequality based on occupational incomes and also moderates the influence of structural position on the level of earnings thought legitimate for the occupation of individual respondents. I included main and moderating effects of population size in preliminary and additional analyses not reported in this thesis, but I did not find any evidence for consistent effects on structural effects on inequality tolerance.

185 I expect the influence of distraction (H3b) to be dominant for overall effects since I assume that more people are affected by distraction, which can be understood as a politically amplified influence (compare for instance Piketty, 2020, 753–759, 774–806, 828–831; Milanovic, 2016a, 204–211), as compared to influences of fractionalization on expected downward mobility (H3a), but this is of course an empirical question.

Tab. 2.5: List of group-specific hypotheses

Hypothesis	Relevant constructs	Expected moderating influence
H1a Differential impact of redistribution	Redistribution	+ (Lower structural position)
H1b Differential inequality perception	Perceived inequality	+ (Higher structural position)
H2a Expected upward mobility	Perceived upward mobility chances	- (Lower structural position)
H3a Expected downward mobility	Fractionalization of social and ethnic groups	+ (Higher structural position)
H3b Distraction	Fractionalization of social and ethnic groups	- (Lower structural position)
H4a Differential power	Distrust in political system and institutions	- (Lower structural position)
H5a Differential information deficit	Mobilization and information	+ (Lower structural position)
H6a Fear of conflict	System threat (expected social conflicts)	- (Higher structural position)
H6b System justification	System threat (perceived instability)	- (Lower structural position)
H7a Saturation	Normative legitimization of inequality	- (Lower structural position)

Notes: + (-) indicates positive (negative) influences of contextual moderators on structural effects.

Fifth, high distrust in political institutions as well as perceptions of corruption might decrease structural effects, since individuals in lower structural positions might be influenced by this factor stronger than individuals in higher structural positions[186]. The chances for dependency on welfare state institutions and, alternatively, the influence of patronage relationships is naturally higher for lower structural positions (compare Kerkvliet, 2013, 227–249, 267–273; Abinales & Amoroso, 2005, 189f., 240–243, 284f.). Whereas individuals in higher structural positions might also be skeptical with regard to the efficiency of state intervention, the more extensive resources possibly allow for better use of institutional opportunities and conditions in general and specifically result in a higher potential to influence redistribution outcomes[187] by non-electoral means. Therefore, high distrust in politicians and institutions would specifically decrease the salience and possible gains attributed to redistribution for individuals in low structural positions, possibly leading to disengagement or withdrawal[188] (see Pellicer, 2018) and contributing to negative views of both redistribution and politically enforced equality[189]. This might also result in a lower salience of economic motives with regard to the

186 For a description of respective sentiments in the Philippines, a country with weak structural effects in all ISSP waves as visible in preliminary country-specific analyses, see the work by Abinales and Amoroso (2005, 190, 240–243, 285).

187 Individuals with high income by definition have nothing to gain but instead losses to expect from efficient redistribution, at least with regard to direct material outcomes, leading to inverse utility expectations with regard to redistribution for individuals located at opposite tails of the income distribution.

188 A contrasting idea proposed for individual level is that high levels of trust attenuate structural effects by generally increasing the perceived fairness and effectiveness of a given allocation of resources and the support for existing welfare-state redistribution in higher structural positions (Nagayoshi & Sato, 2014, 318). Context factors possibly associated with political distrust are direct measures of subjective trust in institutions (see for instance Nagayoshi & Sato, 2014) and proxy measures of institutional quality, transparency or corruption (see for instance Smith, 2010).

189 In a closely related context, Macdonald (2019) describes individual-level political trust as a moderating influence on the relationship between inequality and the demand for redistribution as proposed by the median-voter thesis.

explication of attitudes and less representation of economic interests. In sum, I expect political distrust to decrease structural effects (H4), specifically for lower structural positions (H4a).

Sixth, mobilization efforts by worker organizations or political parties and factors related to the spread of information on inequality and structural conflicts and differences are also potentially relevant (see for instance Checchi, Visser & van de Werfhorst, 2010). Specifically, mobilization efforts and the access to objective information on inequality and structural conflicts might reduce perceptional biases. Since inequality is usually underestimated, especially in lower structural positions (see for instance Osberg & Smeeding, 2006), factors related to information availability and accessibility such as media activity, internet access, freedoms related to media activity and the level of educational expansion might reduce biases related to inequality perception, and specifically differential perceptional biases as affected by structural position. Mobilization efforts also might increase the salience of material conflicts related to differences between higher and lower structural positions, and therefore of economic motives related to current structural position, but especially the salience of secondary norms, i.e. norms related to material interests, based on structural reference groups. I expect this to be specifically the case for individuals in groups targeted by mobilization efforts, for instance, individuals in lower structural positions in the case of activities by unions (compare Alesina, Glaeser & Sacerdote, 2005). Taken together, I expect mobilization and information to increase structural effects (H5), especially for individuals in lower structural positions (H5b).

Seventh, fear of increasing social conflict and crime, sometimes understood in this context as a mechanism of high inequality levels, could possibly, by trend, reduce the high inequality tolerance of individuals in high structural positions because of increasing subjectively expected risks of crime, revolution, the election of extremist parties and social conflict, possibly perceived as threats to privileged structural positions or mid- and long-term benefits from current structures. This focus on the continued reproduction of existing inequalities might promote inequality aversion and some form of support for redistribution aimed at conflict reduction (Rueda & Stegmueller, 2016; 2014; Alesina & Rodrik, 1994). Additionally, and in contrast to a strict reading of conflict reduction as being economically self-interested for reasons of system stabilization, it could also be assumed that individuals in high structural positions are increasingly inequality averse in extremely unequal and poor[190] or contexts, for reasons of limited perceived functionality of the current system. Differential

190 In the context of this mechanism, an interaction between inequality and poverty (see Rambotti, 2015 for an application of this idea in the context of inequality effects on health) seems to be plausible, since low levels of poverty might

effects with regard to structural position might be expected because knowledge of inequalities, bad conditions and limited opportunities as compared to other contexts might be more prevalent among individuals in higher structural positions, decreasing the utility of high inequality acceptance[191] (Dimick, Rueda and Stegmueller, 2018; 2016; Rueda, 2014). I expect that social conflict and system threat correlate with decreased structural effects, specifically for higher structural positions (H6a).

Eighth, SJT specifically assumes that strong perceptions of system threat increase system justification among individuals in low structural position, leading to increased adoption of system-justifying ideas including support for inequality (see for instance Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost et al., 2003). This in turn increases the salience and utility of norm conformity with regard to system-justifying norms for individuals in lower structural positions and also the salience and utility of hedonic motives, since system justification in itself can be considered a form of hedonic motive associated with positive psychological payouts (Jost et al., 2017; Jost & Hunyady, 2005). This possibly increases the salience of hedonic motives[192] and decreases the salience of economic motives. I expect context factors related to system threat[193], such as as poverty, crime and perceived social conflicts, to

counteract some influences of inequality.

191 A specific group of possibly influential normative concepts is related to altruistic principles of distribution and justice such as the ideal of complete equality or the primacy of basic needs of individuals, which generally promotes a limitation of inequalities as long as basic needs of all individuals are not covered, possibly reducing utility of high inequality acceptance. Possible differential influences on structural effects could be assumed based on a possible saturation of inequality aversion in low structural positions. This influence goes against the MFS idea that normative influences reduce economic considerations and instead focus on the dominant aspect of structural position as a determinant of the influence of normative motivations, but could possibly contribute to the explanation of variation in structural effects on attitudes in an effectively very similar way. In line with this idea, in a recent study, Dimick, Rueda and Stegmueller (2018) provide empirical evidence for the idea of income-dependent altruism, i.e. diminishing marginal utility of income resulting in higher priorities given to altruistic considerations or motivations among individuals in higher structural positions leading to the expectation of stronger effects of contextual factors influencing normative considerations for individuals in higher structural positions.

192 Additionally, the subjective experiences of individuals in lower structural positions might be specifically vulnerable to the experience of social distance and exclusion in context of high inequality and limited or highly unequal opportunities (see for instance Delhey & Dragolov, 2014; Layte & Whelan, 2014). As Wilkinson and Pickett (2017) argue, individuals in lower structural positions experience higher levels of stress, status anxiety and depression in highly unequal countries, increasing the possibility of using coping strategies such as withdrawal and aggression instead of problem-focused strategies as suggested by self-interest assumptions (Pellicer, 2018). This potential mechanism would effectively increase the utility of hedonic motivation and reduce structural effects on the side of individuals in lower structural positions. On contextual level, besides inequality, aggregate or group-specific measures of system threat are expected to influence the relative salience of hedonic motives.

193 In my reading of SJT, I additionally assume that the concept of societal system has to be separated from specific aspects of economic distribution. Whereas the societal system in my interpretation of SJT encompasses the economic system, it also includes further economic, social and political aspects, rendering it the wider concept and a different

positively correlate with decreased structural effects in lower structural positions (H6b). With ideas related to fear of conflicts and system justification taken together and broadly connecting concepts of perceived system threat and expected social conflicts, I also assume in terms of a general influence that structural effects are decreased in contexts of high system threat (H6).

Ninth, dominant or primary ideologies prevalent in given societies (see Liebig & Wegener, 1995; Wegener, 1992) could affect individuals in different ways according to their structural position. Whereas position-specific secondary ideologies might act as a mediator of effects of income on attitudes, country-specific primary ideologies seem to show less differentiation as determined by structural position (see Liebig & Wegener, 1995; Wegener, 1992) and could decrease income effects by affecting structural groups whose secondary ideologies are not in line with culturally shared primary ideologies in a stronger way then structural groups whose secondary ideologies do not contrast with dominant norms. There is some evidence that secondary ideologies are especially relevant when they are not in line with primary ideologies in a given context (Liebig, & Wegener, 1995; Wegener, 1992). For structural interest groups whose interests are in line with primary ideologies, it is plausible to assume a saturation effect with regard to effects of primary ideologies, since these norms are in line with structural interests and therefore already captured, in terms of mechanical explanation and statistical modeling, by determinants of structural position such as income or determinants of structural interest groups such as income groups or socio-economic classes. I assume that both the salience and also associated levels of expected utility[194] related to norm conformity are affected by individual internalization, in turn influenced by the general aggregate level of norm internalization[195].

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theoretical construct not reduced to economic distribution. In contrast, the distribution and redistribution of income is a very specific structure within the societal system, affected by wider perceptions of the system, but eventually subordinated to the whole and limited to specific forms of market exchange and respective political corrections.

194 As noted in the context of explanatory models, effects in this context could be explained by either referring to high subjective expected utilities of norm-according attitude expression or to norm-driven frame selection (Mehlkop & Neumann, 2012. The main difference between both mechanisms in my view is the assumption of effects of system acceptance and subjective expected self-interest versus the expectation of a norm-induced suppression of economic self-interest in the form of frame selection.

195 Normative concepts of potential influence in this context include individualism and collectivism (see for instance Lübker, 2004; Delhey, 1998), the belief in meritocracy and authoritarianism (see for instance Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost et al., 2003). Individualist values might accentuate self-interests and increase structural effects on attitudes. At the same time, norms in the context of collectivist ideologies have been associated with the influence of motivations such as modesty, interpersonal happiness and smooth inter-personal relationships (Hitokoto, 2014; Lasquety-Reyes & Alvarez, 2015, 76f.; Tsusaka et al., 2015), possibly also decreasing structural effects.

Tab. 2.6: List of model-specific hypotheses

Hypothesis	Relevant constructs	Expected moderating influence
H8 Subjective economic motivation	Parallel main effects of objective and subjective position	negative/attenuating
H8a CLI of subjective position with prosperity, fractionalization	Cross-level interaction	negative/attenuating
H9 Hedonic motivation	Main effect of hedonic motivation and moderation of structural effects	negative/attenuating
H9a Indirect influence of hedonic motivation	Reduction of cross-level interaction of poverty and structural position	negative/attenuating
H10 Normative motivation	Main effect of normative motivation	positive/reinforcing
H10a Normative moderation of structural effects	Moderation of structural effects on individual level	negative/attenuating

In sum, I expect inequality-promoting norms to negatively correlate with structural effects because of saturation effects (H7). This moderating influence is expected to be specifically visible for lower structural groups, since the saturation is expected to occur in higher structural positions (H7a).

Tenth, measures of inequality tolerance and ideal inequality evaluations are subject to influences of cognitive biases, especially perceptions of objective conditions[196]. Therefore, the influence of information and perception with regard to both national conditions and international comparisons (see for instance Pellicer, Piraino & Wegner, 2019) is a potentially important aspect with multiple implications. First, differential biases influence the perception of conditions and opportunities[197] and might promote a focus on individualist aims in line with motives of mobility and position improvement, especially in lower structural positions. Second, all parameters related to economic interests and motives are potentially affected by the perception of economic conditions[198], directly determining the utility associated with group- and mobility-focused economic motives. Third, the empirically found biases in inequality perception seem to result in low-range comparisons and a

196 Methodically, controlling for interaction of income with both perceived and objective inequality in analyses of structural effects therefore might contribute to the question under which conditions objective inequality affects structural effects on attitudes. In general, comparative research into perception-related and cognitive aspects of inequality evaluation is still scarce (Han et al., 2012).

197 In general, contextual predictors of information distribution might also influence biases in perception. Research on support for welfare state redistribution shows that individual literacy is associated with higher support (Montagnoli et al., 2017). Incomplete information about social structures and social comparisons with selective reference groups can result in differences between objective and subjective structural position in the sense of narrow comparisons and a general regression to the mean (Pahl, Rose & Spencer, 2007; Runciman, 1972).

198 This is specifically the case in as far as these effects of objective inequality are mediated by subjective parameters related to the perception of inequality, such as the cognitive anchor effects or status-quo bias (see for instance Trump, 2018; Yanai, 2017b), in contrast to effects mediated by other objective contextual factors such as increased crime, social conflict and objective inequalities in opportunities. In line with this view, studies show that both information and contextualization can affect attitudes towards inequality (see for instance Cruces, Perez-Truglia & Tetaz; 2011).

substantial underestimation of inequality levels (Osberg & Smeeding, 2006; Gijsberts, 2002). Fourth, effects in this sense specifically influence structural group-based motives in the economic motivational group by affecting perceived opportunities and relative outcomes of distribution and redistribution processes[199]. Taken together, I expect aggregate perceived inequality to correlate positively with structural effects (H1b) in line with accentuation ideas and the influence of actual inequality (see H1). With regard to the perception of individual structural position, I expect positive main effects of subjective position[200] in parallel to effects of objective position (H8), potentially increasing the effects of objective position when controlled for in line with assumptions of differential bias. Additionally, I expect specific CLIs of subjective position. Since subjective position implies subjective mobility expectations, I specifically expect prosperity and fractionalization to moderate structural effects of subjective position (H8a; compare H2 and H3).

Eleventh, even though harder to conceptualize, the influence of *hedonic motivation* in my model is related to the aversion of a cognitively demanding evaluation and expression of self-interests in inequality contexts. This approach directly implies a positive main effect of any measure of hedonic motivation on inequality tolerance and, through the expected higher utility gains for individuals in lower structural positions based on SJT (see H6), a negatively moderating influence on structural effects (H9). Additionally, I expect a reduction of CLIs of system threat and structural position when hedonic motivation is controlled for, rendering respective moderation effects insignificant (H9a), since hedonic motivation is expected to account for some of the SJT-related mechanisms on individual level.

Twelfth, with regard to *normative motivation* on individual level, moderating influences of internalized inequality-related norms on individual level (see Mehlkop & Neumann, 2012), are one of the assumed mechanisms connecting context factors to structural effects (see H7). Since I expect

199 Other structural influences, specifically secondary ideologies, are not directly based on perceived economic interests but instead on the perceived norms of the structural reference groups and are not necessarily subject to the same biases as individual considerations. At the same time, strong aggregate bias in perceived subjective position might coincide with strong bias of the normative ideas of structural interest groups if these are based on aggregate biases in perception, but I expect secondary ideologies to be more grounded in actual structural interests, since organized interests including the collection of information can play an important role for interest groups and additional influences of reference groups in the form of actual occupational micro-classes (see Weeden & Grusky, 2002) are to be expected.

200 The influence of subjective position is in general expected to be positive, but depending on measure, if not controlling for perceived inequality, perceptional bias in both dimensions can increase structural effects on measures such as subjectively reported ideal inequality levels. For general rating items and quantitative evaluation measures that control for perceived inequality, the effect of bias is in general expected to be negative, decreasing structural effects.

Fig. 2.3: Cross-level interactions expected for effects of structural position, basic model



Notes: Inequality refers to both actual and aggregate perceived inequality in this figure.

normative influences to constitute a third group of motives besides goal-oriented self-interest and hedonic motivation, effectively in line with GFT, stronger normative motives reduce the influence of motives in the two other groups. Specifically, I expect two influences of inequality-related norms on individual level, a positive (negative) main influence on inequality tolerance and a negative (positive) moderating influence on structural effects for inequality-promoting (-averting) norms.

All discussed specific hypotheses are listed in Tables 2.4 through 2.6 (compare also Figures 2.3 through 2.5). In general, since some of the context-level moderators included might be mediators[201] of other context-level factors, such as negative moderating effects of inequality on structural effects, I expect substantial differences between statistical models within hierarchical series. Among the six additional aggregate construct groups apart from inequality, especially system instability, distrust in politics and inequality tolerance have been argued to be directly affected by inequality levels and to partly mediate effects of inequality (see for instance Trump, 2018; Delhey & Dragolov, 2014; Jost & Hunyady, 2005), but plausible arguments can be made for influences of inequality on all six groups of factors. By controlling for these factors, the direct accentuation effect of inequality is expected to become more pronounced in empirical models. Specifically, I assume that models that only include inequality as a moderator of structural effects show, in tendency, a negative moderating influence of inequality on structural effects. When adding more contextual variables that control for potentially mediating factors to models, I expect the influence to change direction and, in tendency, show a positive moderating influence, in line with basic accentuation assumptions (see H1).

201 As is visible in the reviewed literature, reasoning on the moderation of structural effects on attitudes towards inequality in general has traditionally focused on inequality, as a dimension conceptually closely related to structural position and structurally determined interests, on the one hand and on the evaluation of inequalities on the other. It follows naturally that most mechanisms proposed for contextual moderating influences on structural effects are associated with inequality. In the empirical section of this thesis, I compare models within hierarchical series and between different model configurations, but I do not specifically focus on identifying mediation effects in this thesis.

Fig. 2.4:Cross-level interactions expected for effects of structural position, motivational groups



Notes: Inequality refers to both actual and aggregate perceived inequality in this figure.

2.6 Expected contextual influences and individual motives

Taking together the specific cross-level mechanism and the differentiation between different motives on individual level, the various proposed ideas regarding the moderation of and variation in structural effects on attitudes towards inequality can be assessed in terms of differences and commonalities with regard to two important dimensions: First, the specific contextual factors possibly moderating structural effects usually relate to other constructs in terms of theoretical ideas, empirical patterns and possibilities of operationalization, especially with regard to the construct inequality and its relation to other constructs on contextual level (see Table 2.5). Second, the individual-level effects implied by proposed CLIs can also be associated with corresponding motives as discussed above. The accentuation of interests implied by inequality and redistribution levels directly affects the perception of structurally determined interests. This influence is based on effects related to economic motives on individual level and is supposed to increase structural effects in contexts of high inequality as well as in contexts of high redistribution. It constitutes the most direct influence of inequality on structural effects in my view, only mediated by the perception of the objective contextual factors, i.e. by perceived inequality and perceived redistribution. Other mechanisms related to contextual factors are of a more indirect nature and possibly constitute partial effects of inequality mediated by different contextual constructs that are supposedly affected by inequality.

Showing varying levels of abstraction with regard to individual motives, Figures 2.3 through 2.5 illustrate the expected moderation effects with increasing levels of complexity. Figure 2.3 shows

the effects for the most abstract and simplified model only considering effects of structural position on inequality tolerance in general. In this illustration, positive moderating influences on structural effects are shown for *inequality* (encompassing both actual and perceived inequality in Figures 2.3 through 2.5), *redistribution*, *ethnic and social fractionalization* and *mobilization and information*. Negative moderating influences are visible for *prosperity and mobility chances*, *system threat*, *political distrust* and *inequality-promoting norms*. This illustration also corresponds to the expectations tested in the basic statistical model used in the main analyses of the empirical section. The following two figures illustrate the theoretical ideas in more detail.

Increasing the complexity to include different motives on individual level as discussed in previous chapters, Figure 2.4 shows effects differentiated for the three main motivational groups. In this illustration, specific assumptions about pathways relating moderating contextual influences are visualized separately for economic, hedonic and normative motives. As discussed in the previous section, I expect influences of system threat to moderate effects based on hedonic motivation, influences of mobilization, information and norms to moderate effects based on normative motives, and the other four groups of contextual factors to moderate influences related to economic motives.

Figure 2.5 illustrates the expected moderating influences on structural effects further differentiated by specific motives as discussed in the previous chapter. Even though most assumptions on this level of detail are not thoroughly tested in the empirical sections of this thesis, the results of a number of models provide some direct and indirect evidence for these proposed mechanisms (compare especially Chapter 4.5). More precisely, the results on cross-level interactions (see Chapters 4.1 through 4.4) and various extensions of the main statistical model for individual-level effects (see Chapter 4.5) provide some evidence related to these assumptions. In the following sections, (see Chapter 3), I describe the methods used to test these various hypotheses derived from the theoretical model.

Fig. 2.5 Specific motives and cross-level interactions expected for structural effects



Notes: Inequality refers to both actual and aggregate perceived inequality in this figure.

3 Research strategy and methods

The missing clarity about effects of inequality with regard to structural influences on attitudes towards inequality described above is partly due to multiple differences between and specific assumptions set in previous studies as well as general data restrictions, limiting research widely to either using preferred variables or bigger data sets. This often resulted in very limited sets of included cross-level interaction effects, accompanied by the use of single selective computations of income and inequality and of general evaluative ranking items for attitudes. In contrast to these approaches, the integration of theoretical ideas in this thesis is generally broad and theoretical expectations are unclear and partly contradictory due to the openness of specific bridging hypothesis linking context-level moderators to individual-level processes and preferences.

With regard to possible problems of endogeneity, I propose that by using structural position as the main independent construct, country-level contextual factors as moderators and individual-level inequality tolerance as dependent construct, endogeneity related to the influence of moderators on structural effects is to be expected to be comparatively small, but cannot be ruled out. The strength of structural effects could in theory affect political outcomes and especially redistribution, and attitudes on individual level could in principle affect individual structural position. But in terms of possibilities of analysis, the potential forms of biases proposed are related to structural position, possibly deeply interwoven with individual identity, making it difficult to imagine how these possible sources of bias could be ruled out experimentally with compelling validity[202]. Since experimental strategies for the identification of causal effects are of no particular help for the given topic, the proposed hypotheses are tested by statistical modeling of international and national survey and process data, mainly in the context of multilevel models of varying size and complexity.

A difficulty for the inclusion of moderating effects in this context arises from the low case number on country-level of most international surveys. One option to deal with this problem is the merging of different datasets, although this comes at the expense of information, since only a few

202 It is plausible to assume that evidence for effects of experimentally manipulated status on attitudes or behavior would have only limited relevance for this context, since the experimental treatment is not equivalent to differences in structural position as experienced in the everyday lives of individuals embedded in societal structures. For example, even though an artificial form of fear of conflict might be induced by experimental settings, is is difficult to argue that such an effect would be comparable with a potential real-life fear of revolution. Since both structural position and contextual factors cannot easily be manipulated as treatment conditions in an experimental setting without compromising the external validity of results or the ethical integrity of the research, the clear identification of causal treatment effects with experimental research poses serious problems in the given context.

variables are included in and comparable between relevant datasets, usually general rating items. A recent study merged an impressive number of datasets in this way[203], but relied on general rating items and included a limited number of interactions of structural position with contextual factors (Dion, 2010). In this context, the additional cases gained by this method come at the price of information loss, since researchers have to work with relatively common but broad and ambiguous rating items and a limited number of control variables. In contrast, the estimates of perceived and legitimate occupational earnings provide a lot of information about possible mechanisms. Additional problems related to dealing with unobserved heterogeneity stem from the non-existence of international panel data for the estimation of individual fixed effects and respective interaction effects. The only available datasets including internationally comparative data with differentiated data on inequality tolerance are based on repeated cross-sectional surveys, which pose serious problems for the estimation of unbiased effects of individual-level variables and, concurrently, cross-level interactions CLIs as well. To make use of the information inherent in data based on occupational estimates and in order to maximize the differentiation between actual interests and perceived interests, I use various different ways of dealing with the problems related to multicollinearity and unobserved heterogeneity, such as country-level fixed effects, testing differences between clustering methods in the statistical modeling, between alternative indicators of theoretical constructs and between different forms of controlling for additional regional and temporal influences.

In order to use the most information about perceptions and evaluations possible, I conduct a differentiated analysis of perceived and legitimate inequality, justice gaps for lower and higher income groups and related measures, available only in a limited set of studies. In its periodic modules on social inequality, the ISSP offers a broad range of measures for the perception of inequality and meritocracy, the evaluation of inequality and attitudes towards redistribution. Therefore, in order to rely on actual differences with regard to both contextual and individual factors, the estimation of

203 Specifically, the study included region-specific survey data from sources such as the European Social Survey, the Eurobarometer, Latinobarometer, Afrobarometer, Arab Barometer and Asiabarometer studies, and other national and internal surveys to generate a large enough pool of different groups of individuals nested in countries to analyze multiple main and interaction effects in one statistical model (see Dion, 2010). While being an important contribution, this method has to rely on classical, relatively broad and ambiguous variables with regard to attitudes towards inequality and, due to the merging of data taken from very different sources, a very limited set of control variables on the individual level with questionable comparability between countries and studies.

proposed effects in this study is conducted based on large-n survey data[204]. With regard to possible additional time-constant biasing factors, at the time of collecting data for this study, internationally comparable data with relevant variables[205] based on a panel structure is not available for individual level[206]. I utilize simple hierarchical models using cross-sectional data with random effects and additional models using fixed and random effects on country level.

My research strategy is to specifically analyze how individual income tends to correlate with individually reported ideal inequality levels as moderated by multiple economic and institutional factors on country level, related to the mechanisms and moderating factors described above. For this purpose, I use hierarchical linear modeling [HLM] with cross-level effects between possibly moderating influences on country level and structural position to predict attitudes on individual level. Comparative testing using alternative indicators and model configurations is applied in multiple ways, including the use of changing model composition, alternative indicators for the main theoretical constructs, the test of possible additional biasing factors on individual and contextual level, the variation in data sources and variable computations and the restriction of data sets. I use forms of comparative testing for all analytical steps and finally evaluate hypotheses based on the consistency of effects found. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I give a brief overview of my general research strategy, the methods applied in the empirical section and the main variables used as indicators for the various theoretical constructs on both context and individual level. I first outline the estimation strategies applied, then describe the data sources and various forms of operationalization used for theoretical constructs, and conclude the chapter with a brief overview for the specific groups of models to be analyzed.

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204 The respective data sources have mostly already been analyzed repeatedly, but the proposed research project, as described, will improve upon the existing research in multiple ways, both theoretically, by using a consistent theoretical framework for the moderation of structural effects and a consistent, even though partly ambivalent, and interrelated set of testable assumptions based on specific results about moderators of structural effects on attitudes found in various different research traditions discussed in the previous chapters and methodically, by using extensive comparative testing including various alternative indicators, nonlinear interaction effects and the differentiation between aspects such as actual inequality versus perceived inequality versus inequality evaluated as legitimate, to identify interaction effects in the context of moderating influences on structural effects.

205 This is especially the case for survey data including quantitative quantitative information related to perceived and legitimate inequality estimates as used in this study. Large-scale internationally comparative studies including occupation-specific subjective income estimates follow a repeated cross-sectional design.

206 I ran additional non-reported models with fixed effects for country-level moderators, but results weer inconclusive due to substantial differences in case numbers and model structure due to non-converging models.

3.1 General estimation methods

In order to estimate structural effects and the moderating influence of contextual moderators on structural effects, i.e. effects of variables related to socio-economic position, I apply HLM with individual structural effects interacting with moderators on country-level (with regard to the general approach, see Langer, 2010) in their influence on attitudes towards inequality on individual level in the form of CLIs. In addition to these basic HLM models testing CLIs based on random variation between countries and country years, I build models including fixed effects [FE] on country level for more specific analyses in which within-variation of moderating variables is used in parallel to moderation effects using country-level random effects[207] [RE]. In all other analyses, the estimation of moderation effects is based on country-level random effects of contextual factors interacting with effects of individual structural position, i.e. structural effects in line with the structural position thesis, in their influence on individual-level inequality tolerance.

In all analyses reported, I use Stata 16 for all estimations (StataCorp, 2019). I also make use of various ado-files for Stata to compute measures of structural position based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations [ISCO] (see Jann, 2019; Weiss & Bauer, 2007; Hendrickx, 2002), inequality measures based on income data (Jenkins 1999) and regression diagnostics for multilevel analyses (Moehring & Schmidt, 2013). I additionally use regression diagnostics for OLS regressions on country level and estimate effects of structural position on inequality tolerance in all single country years and then regress the extracted coefficients on context-level factors (see Chapter 4.4.4). I use variance inflation factors and estimates of tolerance, DFBETA and Cook's D (see StataCorp, 2021; Azubuike & Nosike, 2020; Fox, 2020; Ohr, 2010; Belsley, Kuh & Welsch, 2004; Cohen et al., 2003) to identify potentially influential and problematic variables and context units.

With some exceptions for specific tests and robustness checks, the general data structure is modeled so that moderating influences vary between countries, and, in some but not all cases, also between country years within countries. Generally, both forms of variation are considered together in the form of country-year variation and individuals are nested in country-years instead of a structure of individuals nested in country-years and country-years nested in countries[208]. I tested twofold nested

207 Models using both within and between variance to estimate fixed and random effects have many advantages (see for instance Bell, Fairbrother & Jones, 2019; Fairbrother, 2014), but to reduce the complexity of the main analyses and results, I only use these models in a limited number of dedicated analyses (see Chapter 4.2).

208 This approach has some disadvantages with regard to the modeling of temporal variation, but I aim at maximizing the number of groups, since a low number of groups has significant disadvantages (see Bryan & Jenkins, 2016). I also

models but these could often not be estimated with the results not converging with the software used (Stata 16). In contrast to the more complex models that were often not converging in tests in which they were applied, this simpler structure allows for the test of more interaction effects. Results in basic cases where the models with a more complex nesting structure converged did not substantially diverge from results in the simpler country-year models.

By using series of models with differing context variables, I can include various indicators with data available for varying country selections and test assumptions based on a wide set of indicators. Since some indicators on country and individual level result in drastic changes in case numbers, using a single unified sample for all analyses and indicators is impractical for the comparative analyses. Therefore, models cannot be compared directly because of changing samples and I concentrate on identifying commonalities in terms of consistencies between the various indicators in direction and significance of effects to establish a first broad overview of interest-, perception-, information- and mobilization-related influences on structural effects on inequality tolerance. Case numbers are held constant within hierarchical series of models and for some specific comparisons with theoretical and methodological implication within specific groups of models. Apart from questions related to specific model series and the specific comparisons mentioned, the focus of analyses is set on consistencies in terms of effect significance and effect direction of structural effects and moderation effects.

Since the main analyses of this thesis are comparative and extensive while my focus is on the consistency and of significant CLIs, I generally present Z values of effects for all models[209] (but see Table A.3 in the appendix for an exemplary table of regression coefficients, standard errors and p-values of the full main models presented in Chapter 4.1) and summary tables with regard to consistent significant and theoretically relevant effects at the end of the empirical section (see Chapter 4.6) for easy access to the main results[210]. Some additional tests such as the use of additional alternative indicators not reported in the main text are only briefly discussed in footnotes if substantially relevant.

tested for differences between various model configurations with regard to the inclusion of country years without finding substantial differences.

209 To allow for a simple and intuitive interpretation of substantial results, I provide graphical illustrations for ideal-type combinations of structural position and contextual factors with regard to differences in structural effects and predicted legitimate income ratios based on consistent results found in empirical section as well as exemplary concrete interpretation of estimated effects in a dedicated section of the empirical part of this thesis (see Chapter 4.4.5).

210 Even though this constitutes an established form of reporting results especially for the report of results from models using propensity score matching (see for instance Weiss, Klein & Grauenhorst, 2014), I provide a more traditional presentation of main results in the form of p- values and regression coefficients for selected exemplary models in the appendix (see Table A.3 in the appendix).

In the following, I describe the data and various indicators for the two series of regression models used in the empirical analyses and finally present and discuss the results in the following sections[211].

3.2 Data sources and sample sizes

For individual-level data, I rely on the ISSP, which provides extensive information on perception and evaluation for occupational estimates and on actual and perceived structural position of individuals (ISSP Research Group 2017; 2014a; 2014b; 1999). As an additional advantage, the ISSP is conducted in various countries with different combinations of contextual factors, including countries in the Global South and in the Global North. Even though the number of participating countries is limited, the respective data enables me to use various factors on individual level as indicators for proposed mechanisms of CLIs. This implies that the results are potentially biased due to the cross-sectional nature of the data and the selective group of countries included in the ISSP, but based on very specific information provided by respondents differentiating between perception and evaluation of various occupational groups and of respondents' own structural position.

In all analyses, all variables related to individual-level information such as socio-demographic attributes and attitudes are based on the Social Inequality modules of the ISSP (Social Inequality I-IV), whereas country-level indicators for context-level factors are taken from both the ISSP and additional sources (see below). The ISSP data used covers four waves (1987, 1992, 1999, 2009) and partly includes additional country years not available in the original longitudinal data set. I include all country years[212], in which there is all relevant data available in at least one of the relevant ISSP waves. For context-level indicators, I use individual-level data from the ISSP and generate mean aggregate

211 For further information regarding the statistical methods used with regard to hierarchical modeling, see Langer (2010), and for an applied example see Steenbergen (2012).

212 When working with ISSP data and similar international survey data, some non-OECD countries, such as the Philippines, are often excluded from analyses, since they differ from OECD countries in a substantial way on multiple country-level factors, especially with regard to some development- and wealth-related constructs. However, analyses using ISSP data for all countries available are also restricted: First, the number of countries in the ISSP data is very small in general. Second, and probably more importantly, the group of countries is already very selective. For instance, most countries in Africa have a substantially lower GDP per capita as compared to all ISSP member countries, including Bulgaria and the Philippines. Therefore, to exclude even more countries from the data seems problematic to me since I am interested in general contextual influences on structural effects. I conduct regression analyses to investigate influential country years and exclude those from analyses in separate steps (see Chapter 4.4.4).

Tab. 3.1: List of specific data sources used

Data source	Information used
Bagchi & Svejnar (2013)	Wealth inequality
Davies et al., (2007)	Wealth inequality
European Values Study [EVS] (2020)	Political distrust, rationalism
Fearon (2003)	Fractionalization
Fuentes-Ramirez (2014)	Human development
Hofstede (2015)	Individualism
Human Development Report Office (2020)	Human development
International Labour Organization [ILO] (2020; 2015)	Poverty, union density and accessibility
International Social Survey Programme [ISSP] (ISSP Research Group 2017; 2014a; 2014b; 1999)	Individual-level data on structural position, inequality perception, inequality tolerance, socio-demographic attributes and attitudes; aggregated data on inequality perception, inequality tolerance, perceived mobility, meritocracy perception, conflict perception and income equality
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] (2021)	Union density and accessibility
Penn World Tables [PWT]; Zeileis (2019); Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2015); Groningen Growth and Development Centre (2015)	Economic development
Reporters Without Borders [RSF] (2010)	Press freedom
Selway (2011; 2010)	Fractionalization, polarization, ethno-income cross-fractionalization
Standardized World Income Inequality Database [SWIID]; Solt (2019)	Inequality, redistribution
Transparency International [TI] (2009; 1999)	Corruption perception
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] (2021)	Currency exchange rate
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs [UNDESA] (2013)	Migration
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC] (2021)	Homicides
World Bank Development Indicators [WDI] (World Bank, 2017)	Inequality, redistribution, economic development, poverty, education, internet use, employment in areas of science, research and development, tax revenue
World Bank Government Indicators [WGI] (World Bank, 2021)	Government reliability and effectiveness
World Economic Outlook Database (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2021)	Unemployment
World Values Survey [WVS] (Inglehart et al., 2020)	Political distrust, rationalism

values as well as additional measures such as standard deviation in some cases[213]. Additional macro-level data is merged from various sources such as the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Solt, 2016), the World Bank Development Indicators, the World Values Survey and individual publications (see Table 3.1 for a complete list).

213 Descriptive statistics for both individual- and context-level variables used are presented in the appendix for the full data set (see Tables A.2.1 and A.2.2 in the appendix).

Models include varying numbers of cases due to data availability. In the main analyses, the number of countries is 42[214] and the number of country years is 67 for the models using income-based indicators of structural position. Lists of available country data and case numbers based on country and country year for three different sample selections used in the analyses (see Tables A.1.1 and A.1.2) are provided in the appendix. The number of individual cases in the main analyses ranges between 52713 for personal income and 60397 for household equivalence income. For robustness checks, I use various alternative indicators for all main constructs on contextual and individual level to increase the reliability of results. Due to problems with data availability, the number of cases on individual and country level varies between different series of models and specific models in some parts of the analyses[215]. The specific case number is provided for all models in the tables presenting respective results. Case numbers on both individual and country level are held constant within hierarchical series of models as well as within specific groups of models for comparisons[216]. In the following, I describe the operationalization of theoretical constructs and the generation of variables. Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in the appendix (see Tables A.2.1 and A.2.2).

3.3 Operationalization of structural position

To estimate the effect of a concept such as the structural position of an individual, researchers usually decide between multiple possible forms of operationalization that are more or less plausible for a given theoretical and substantial context. In some cases, the decision may even seem like a trivial matter of definition, but the possibility has to be kept in mind that results may differ substantially based on to the exact dimension chosen. Using a broad definition encompassing different conceptualizations allows for the use of multiple indicators and the empirical identification of differences and commonalities between results.

214 The main analyses (see Tables 4.1 through 4.7) specifically include the following countries (in alphabetical order): Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechia, Chile, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, USA and Venezuela.

215 This is unfortunate and has to be kept in mind for the interpretation and discussion of results, but it is necessary for some of the additional constructs to be included at all without substantially lowering case numbers on contextual level. Additional models with adjusted case numbers are presented for direct comparison when possible and practical.

216 Apart from questions related to model series and specific comparisons, the focus of the analyses is set on consistencies in terms of the significance and direction of structural effects and corresponding moderation effects.

When considering expected effects of varying structural indicators, there are some obvious implications for comparisons and the importance of indicator choice in this context has to be stressed for multiple reasons. First, the different indicators have different theoretical implications as discussed with regard to potential differences between measures, such as class categorizations and subjective ratings in relation to secondary norms versus other objective measures of position in relation to self-interests based on current position. With regard to income-based measures, personal income is directly to occupations and workplace-generated inequality, whereas family income as well as equivalence household income directly affects the consumption level of individuals and family-specific economic interests.

Second, even when ignoring conceptual differences between different approaches, the use of categorical versus continuous variables may in general lead to different results[217] (see for instance Hagenaars, 2015; Braveman et al., 2001; Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 1994; compare also Ballerino & Bernardi, 2016, 272ff.), especially if nonlinear or group-specific effects are relevant in a given context. Third, with regard to contextual moderation effects, potential differences and commonalities between different indicators are not known. Specific dimensions of structural position related to single indicators might be more susceptible to moderating and interacting influences on contextual level as compared to others. For example, as discussed in the theoretical section, moderation of immediate self-interest, i.e. a linear correlation between income and inequality acceptance, may be more obvious to discover when using the position of individuals in the income distribution, whereas the moderation of influences of secondary norms as related to structural interest groups may be more obvious when using class- or other group-based categories. For these reasons, I use multiple indicators of structural position in additional models to investigate if effects are consistent between indicators[218]. This

217 In terms of general main effects on attitudes, if effects of structural position on inequality tolerance are determined by objective income levels and follow a linear functional form, one would expect the right-skewed but gradual distribution of income to fit structural effects better than class typologies or subjective self-ratings. If, on the other hand, qualitative categorical differences, subjective evaluations of structural position play a key role, the linear effects of income might be drastically reduced. This might also be the case if effects counteracting direct economic self-interests such as expected by theoretical ideas related to system justification or fear of conflict are an important aspect reducing linear effects within groups of individuals in lower structural positions.

218 Studies often have analyzed the impact of occupational attributes (Pittau, Massari & Zelli, 2013; Dion & Birchfield, 2010; Wong, Wan & Law, 2009); objective class or subjective status (Andersen & Yaish, 2012; Wong, Wan & Law, 2009; Hadler, 2005), education (Dion & Birchfield, 2010; Wong, Wan & Law, 2009; Hadler, 2005), mobility experiences (Kuhn, 2013) and, foremost, absolute income (Jaeger, 2013; Kuhn, 2013; Dion & Birchfield, 2010) as well as relative income in comparison to reference groups (Hadler, 2005; Lippl, 1999). The results have generally been in line with the structural position thesis for all indicators tested if considered without additional structural controls. This

comparative strategy is based on an overall multi-typological approach and corresponds with a broad and multi-dimensional identification and interpretation of structural position[219], with materialistic aspects in the form of income and wealth at the center.

Even though indicators of structural position are regularly used in empirical studies, possible differences in effects of the various structural variables have not been addressed thoroughly in previous research[220]. With regard to material resources, a general problem for the realistic evaluation of individuals in high structural positions is that high positions, such as indicated by high personal income, are a comparatively small group and rarely present in surveys in high numbers. The analysis of super-rich individuals demonstrated that this group shows a very strong tolerance for inequality as compared to other social groups (Page, Bartels & Seawright, 2013). This result may be underestimated if a mere linear effect of income over the whole population is analyzed[221]. Additionally, not all resources and sources of money that may play a role in determining self-interest are included in surveys[222]. In the absence of information on individual wealth, as is the case in most surveys, income

is not the case for all indicators in all studies when included as parallel main effects in single statistical models (see for instance Wong, Wan & Law, 2009).

219 Generally, a fully integrated multidimensional and gradual perspective on inequality, including different sources of income, power and assets, based on property ownership, skills, networks and institutionalized educational certificates is hard to measure in surveys that aim to include additional items apart from structural identifiers. Additionally, the validity of individual reports of non-certified skills, networks, cultural codes or even owned property would be questionable with questions leading to possibly higher rates of missing values than traditional questions related to income.

220 There are some recent exception with regard to general rating items. Smith and Mateju (2012) provide an interesting comparison of the effects of multiple structural variables on meritocratic and egalitarian values, but do not include measures of income and objective socio-economic status. They find mostly inconsistent effects between different survey waves analyzed, with higher education being the most consistent influence resulting in less egalitarian and more meritocratic attitudes in line with the structural position thesis. Wong, Wan and Law (2009) conduct an analysis based on general rating items related to the seriousness and justness of inequality and report effects of income on seriousness and of subjective class on justness, but no effects of education or occupation.

221 The high tolerance for inequality found for individuals earning top incomes as compared to other social groups (Page, Bartels & Seawright, 2013) might not be evident in surveys with limited case numbers, since these selective groups of individuals are rarely a part of samples and at least underrepresented, since participation in surveys decreases with higher income (see for instance Korinek et al., 2006), additionally to mechanical effects of their smaller group size. The identification would therefore focus on the next group of individuals in comparatively lower structural positions as the highest structural group available in the data.

222 The missing knowledge of various forms of economic resources apart from income leads to potential reliability problems with regard to the identification of actual objective interests. The individual-level correlation between wealth and disposable income is usually high throughout history, even though lower in foraging societies (see for instance Scheidel, 2017) and some Nordic and other European countries, with some authors noting increasing association of incomes from labor and capital at the top in recent decades (Atkinson & Lakner, 2017), but the relationship is far from perfect (Fochesato & Bowles, 2015; see also Piketty, 2020, 38f., 730).

data is the most direct accessible indicator of self interests related to economic inequalities and therefore, in my interpretation, the most direct proxy for structural position in the given context. Compared to other possible and available indicators of structural position, such as class, status or occupation, personal income has the advantage of being located in the same specific dimension, i.e. income, that is used for the computation of measures for income inequality and inequality tolerance. It directly determines objective economic self-interests in the context of income inequality and can be assumed to be closely related to various constructs of relevance on country and individual level, especially inequality, redistribution and related attitudes.

Therefore, as the two main indicators for structural position to be used in the majorities of models, including those investigating variations of other constructs, I utilize survey data based on reported personal income and household equivalence income. To investigate possible commonalities and differences as well as more specific hypotheses and bridge assumptions, I additionally draw evidence from models using other subjective and objective indicators of structural position in dedicated analyses and in various combinations including parallel and combined influences of objective and subjective measures of structural position. For the main model configuration using the main indicators of other constructs, I analyze parallel models for various computations of income-related variables as well as for additional measures based on categorizations of social class and on socio-economic status and prestige, complemented by measures of subjective evaluation of structural position in the form of subjective top-bottom ranking position and subjective class position (see Table 3.2). In most analyses, I rely on a single indicator of structural position in any one model, but in additional analyses focused on differences between objective and subjective position, I also use objective and subjective indicators of structural position with all respective interaction effects for both constructs in parallel. Additionally, I construct combined measures allowing for the differentiation between groups with consistent and inconsistent evaluations as compared to actual position. In the following sections, I describe the various indicators used for structural position in more detail.

With regard to indicators based on income, I analyze a set of recodings of personal and family income, since every variant brings its own conceptual implications[223]. For instance, a logarithmic

223 The definition of income is difficult even in ideal circumstances disregarding problems such as data availability (see for instance Brooks, 2018, 253ff.). For the purpose of the empirical section of this thesis I differentiate between three main conceptualizations based on available ISSP data. Even for these three measures, clear comprehensive definitions are difficult to provide, since the exact wording of respective questions in national questionnaires varies. For instance, what I refer to as “personal income” is polled with expressions such as “annual income from your occupation”,

transformation of income variables can make the interpretation of effects less intuitive, but it substantially reduces the impact of outliers on the upper end of the income distribution, artificially reducing distances with increasing income level, while enlarging fine differences between individuals in lower structural positions (compare Eichfelder, Jacob & Schneider, 2020, 12; Cowell, 2011, 22; Jasso, 2001, 42). While this can make sense for improving fit when modeling respective functional relations, it effectively enforces a form of saturation effect which does not necessarily improve the fit or the theoretical applicability of models, for instance when expecting strong effects for individuals with top incomes. In terms of differences between income concepts, personal income before taxation is closely related to individual occupation and market-based earnings, whereas family income after taxation factors in possible household-level aspects and effects of taxation, resulting in a closer connection to differences in disposable household resources (compare Murray et al., 2017, 28f.). Household equivalence income after taxation additionally accounts for household size, but is less closely related to differences between individuals stemming from their direct market situation. Government redistribution in this context can substantially alter income distributions and even the choice of equivalence scales can affect results (compare Dastrup, Hartshorn & McDonald, 2005, 6f.; Buhmann et al., 1988). In this thesis, I try to maximize the range of indicators of structural position to look for consistent effects and do not use strict theoretical arguments that require or favor a specific measure of income. For this reason and to facilitate general checks of the robustness of results, I use multiple computations of income based on responses to survey items asking for personal and family income[224].

Generally, the data contained in income variables in the ISSP can vary in terms of information value between years and countries[225], and often only includes income categories transformed into mid-

"personal average net income per month in total", "total annual income – gross – i.e., before taxes", "personal monthly wage (before taxes)", "average monthly income before taxes", "professional monthly income" or "gross or total earnings, before deduction of income tax and national insurance" in different questionnaires (compare ISSP, 2017).

224 The measurement options are reduced, but still substantial for income as an indicator, especially for international contexts when data on both personal and household income is available and both are only available in national currency, implying some form of control such as monetary conversion or variable standardization. Since income items available in the ISSP (and many other international projects) are surveyed with substantial international differences, especially regarding the use of categories, the resulting variables are not ideal and for many country years only transcribed from categories of income strata. The use of these variables as linear predictors is problematic for these reasons, but still seems promising for comparative analyses with a focus on general trends in results.

225 Exemplary distributions for selected country years are presented in the appendix (see Figure A.1).

Tab. 3.2: Measures of objective and subjective structural position (without combined measures)

Concept	Variable	Code
Individual income	**Standardized logarithmic personal income**	SLPI
	Standardized logarithmic household equivalence income	SLEI
	Standardized logarithmic family income	SLFI
	Standardized personal income	SPI
	Standardized household equivalence income	SEI
	Standardized family income	SFI
	Logarithmic personal income	LPI
	Logarithmic household equivalence income	LEI
	Logarithmic family income	LFI
	Standardized personal income including zero values	SZPI
	Standardized household equivalence income including zero values	SZEI
	Standardized family income including zero values	SZFI
Socio-economic status and prestige	International Socio-Economic Index	ISEI
	Socio-economic Index of Occupational Prestige and Status	SIOPS
	Magnitude Prestige Scale	MPS
Socio-economic class	European Socio-economic Classification, dichotomized	ESeC
	Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarrero class categorization, dichotomized	EGP
Subjective status	Subjective evaluation of subjective status in a ten-point scale	SBTB
Subjective class	Subjective evaluation of social class in six categories, dichotomized	SBCL

Notes: This table shows the indicators used for different concepts related to the measurement of structural position with the corresponding codes or abbreviations. Main indicators used in the main analyses and most additional analyses are set in bold. Source for all measures used is the ISSP.

point pseudo-linear measures as routinely used in this context. Using household equivalence income in combination with standardization on country-year level directly relates to some of these problems by artificially increasing variance in the income measure and limiting currency and survey differences by context-specific standardization. In general, all single-model estimates of the analyses conducted for this thesis have to be interpreted with some caution since the information in the available data is limited and the focus of this thesis is on the broad consistency of results instead of single models. Comparing effects in different model configurations using different variants of income-based measures and other indicators allows for the identification of trends across these models. To at least approximately control for currency-related differences between countries and reduce the impact of outliers in single country years, I apply standardization of income data on country-year level in the majority of models and use a logarithmic transformation of the data.

Personal, household equivalence and family income are the three sources for the computation of variations for each income measure. To compute household equivalence income, I use a common approximation based merely on home population and income by dividing the family income by the square root of the home population. Based on these three variables I introduce four transformed

variants for each variable to reduce potential biases stemming from data collection and currencies used. First, the income variables are standardized based on their country-year-specific distributions. Second, I take the natural logarithm of the income variables. Third, the natural logarithms of the income variables are standardized based on their country-year specific distributions. Fourth, I also test standardized income variants that include values of zero that are set to missing in all other models. Of the 12 resulting measures, I use two for the main analyses and a majority of additional models, specifically standardized logarithmic personal and household equivalence income. The other 10 measures based on income are only used in a more limited number of additional analyses for alternative indicators.

The ISSP also provides additional data related to structural position based on occupations. I use this data to generate measures of socio-economic status and prestige as alternative indicators of structural position closely related to income-based measures. I assume that these indicators are also based on very differentiated information, but are not as affected by outliers as is the case for income-based variables. Specifically, I generate the International Socio-Economic Index [ISEI] (see Ganzeboom De Graaf & Treiman, 1992), the Socio-economic Index of Occupational Prestige and Status [SIOPS] (see Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996) and the Magnitude Prestige Scale[226] [MPS] (see Christoph, 2005; Wegener, 1985).

Based on ISSP data on occupations and employment relations, I generate indicators of objective structural position based on two broad categorizations of socio-economic class[227]. I specifically use the European Socio-economic Classification [ESeC] (see Harrison & Rose, 2006; Rose, Harrison & Pevalin, 2007) and the widely-applied class categorization based on the work by Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarrero [EGP] (1979). Both classifications used combine large parts of the population with a broad definition of the highest class in contrast to the much smaller group of capitalist individuals as seen in the writings of Wright and other Post- and Neo-Marxist authors[228]

226 The MPS is intended for use in national research, but I include it here to maximize the scope of measures used.

227 Approximations to the two class categorization by Wright (1985; 1976) were used in preliminary tests, but resulted in drastically reduced case numbers for the highest class in many country years.

228 In my empirical use of the class concept, I focus on two aspects that I consider central in the conception of social class as a complementary concept to income differences when using both as indicators of structural position. First, the definition of the highest class is an important factor when considering class typologies, since a clear definition of a distinguished economically privileged top class is more closely related to concepts of relational exploitation originally central to class conceptions in the Marxist sense (see Chapter 2.1.1), whereas broad definitions of the service class, as the more common method, might be expected to show different effects. Due to data limitations, I use the service class as the top category in the analyses. Second, with regard to other classes, I simply focus on the difference between

(compare Chapter 2.1.1). In both ESeC and EGP classifications, the upper class of the full categorization can be separated from both a combined working class and a combined middle class. I analyze effects between working class and other classes for both classification systems. All measures for socio-economic status and prestige and socio-economic class are generated based on ISCO88 using ado-files for Stata (Jann, 2019; Weiss & Bauer, 2007; Hendrickx, 2002).

With regard to subjective structural position or perceived structural position, I use two measures, one focused on linear hierarchies and one based on a broad hierarchical class categorization. Subjective top-bottom ranking is used as a measure of subjective structural position in a subjective social hierarchy as indicated by the individual response to a question asking for a self-placement in the social structure of society in 10 categories ranging from bottom to top [SBTB]. This subjective rating of individual position in society is treated as a gradual linear measure. Additionally, a measure of subjective class [SBCL] is used that allows people to directly give their perception of individual class position in a simplified class categorization separating between six comparatively neutrally named classes ranging from "lower class" to "upper class".

In additional models, combined categorizations of both objective indicators of position and subjective evaluations are used in which individuals with inconsistency in objective and subjective rankings are separated from those with consistent self-ranking. Specifically, I test for differences between lower structural groups with consistent (low) subjective evaluations, lower structural groups with inconsistent (higher) subjective evaluations, middle structural groups, higher structural groups with inconsistent (lower) subjective evaluations and higher structural groups with consistent (high) subjective evaluations. For two measures based on personal income or household equivalence income in combination with subjective top-bottom ranking, the lowest quarter of the income distribution is separated from the two middle quarters and from the upper quarter of distribution to determine objective position in three categories. To determine the subjective evaluation of position, the grouping relies on similar groups based on actual responses on the ten-point scale measuring subjective top-bottom ranking. Objective position and subjective evaluation are then combined into five categories as described above to generate the first combined measure. With regard to the third and forth measures

working and middle classes, not solving the problem of the definition of specific categories of working and middle classes, which has to be regarded to be one of the central sources of differences between class typologies. This reduces the consideration of different effects to two broad categories that are expected to be clearly ranked in the sense that the working class is structurally located below the middle class, whereas both are structurally located below the service class.

which are based on class, a clear hierarchical recoding of class categorizations into three groups is needed. By reducing class numbers of both ESeC and EGP to three, I separate three broad groups[229] of individuals identified as working or lower classes, middle or intermediate classes or upper classes in either one of the two class categorizations. The generated four combined measures differentiating between consistent and inconsistent evaluations of position for higher and lower structural groups are used only in a limited number of dedicated analyses to investigate the interrelation of objective and subjective aspects of individual structural position.

Taken together, the indicators used for structural position include 19 single measures[230], 12 indicators based on income data, three indicators based on socio-economic status and prestige, two indicators based on socio-economic class, one indicator based on subjective top-bottom ranking and one indicator based on subjective class. For complementary analyses, four combined indicators using consistent and inconsistent combinations of subjective and objective structural position are tested. As the two main indicators of structural position, I use logarithmic forms of personal and household equivalence income, standardized on country level. I include these two measures of structural position based on income as main indicators in the majority of models across all groups of analyses. All other indicators are only used in additional dedicated models.

3.4 Operationalization of inequality tolerance

With regard to dependent variables, the main construct to be analyzed is inequality tolerance. General evaluative rating questions routinely used in research on attitudes towards inequality and redistribution

229 Among the many class typologies reviewed, class numbers mostly range between 6 and 15 classes for most full typologies. Many classes are not situated in a clear ranking order to each other when using the full classifications (see for instance Hurst, 1992, 12–16), but a broad hierarchical grouping of classes into three broad groups is usually possible by separating between working class versus middle and intermediary classes versus upper classes defined by either ownership over the means of production (in traditional Marxist or Post-Marxist conceptualizations) or some form of service class based on employment.

230 I also analyze the effects of indicators related to education, but report these results only in the appendix (see the last two columns in Tables A.6.1 and A.6.2 in the appendix). Education as a structural indicator shows similar effects to other structural indicators used in this thesis with regard to CLIs, but the influences of redistribution and system threat on structural effects are not consistently significant and mostly only evident for measures of secondary as opposed to tertiary education. Since the main analyses use education as an additional control variable, I also test CLIs with other indicators of structural position when not controlling for main effects of education (see the first nine columns in Tables A.6.1 and A.6.2 in the appendix). The results of these models are similar to the main analyses reported in this thesis with regard to effect directions, but not consistently significant.

Tab. 3.3: Measures of inequality tolerance and related constructs

Concept	Variable	Code
Inequality tolerance, quantitative estimates, logarithmic	**Natural logarithm of the ratio of the occupational income estimates for high- versus low-earning occupations** (“cabinet minister in the national government” and “chairman of a large national corporation” versus “shop assistant” and “unskilled worker in a factory”)	IT1
	Natural logarithm of the ratio of the occupational income estimates for high- versus low-earning occupations (using the maximum range of occupational estimates provided by individual respondents)	IT2
	Natural logarithm of the ratio of the occupational income estimates for high- versus low-earning occupations (“doctor in general practice”, “chairman of a large national corporation”, “cabinet minister in the [national] government”, “lawyer”, “owner manager of a large factory” and “judge in country's highest court” versus “shop assistant”, “unskilled worker in a factory”, “bricklayer”, “farm worker”, “secretary” and “bus driver”)	IT3
Inequality tolerance, quantitative estimates	Ratio of the occupational income estimates for high- versus low-earning occupations (“cabinet minister in the national government” and “chairman of a large national corporation” versus “shop assistant” and “unskilled worker in a factory”)	IN1
	Ratio of the occupational income estimates for high- versus low-earning occupations (using the maximum range of occupational estimates provided by individual respondents)	IN2
	Ratio of the occupational income estimates for high- versus low-earning occupations (“doctor in general practice”, “chairman of a large national corporation”, “cabinet minister in the [national] government”, “lawyer”, “owner manager of a large factory” and “judge in country's highest court” versus “shop assistant”, “unskilled worker in a factory”, “bricklayer”, “farm worker”, “secretary” and “bus driver”)	IN3
Justice gap, low-income occupations	Justice gap for low-earning occupations (“shop assistant” and “unskilled worker in a factory”)	JGL1
	Justice gap for low-earning occupations (using the maximum range of occupational estimates provided by individual respondents)	JGL2
	Justice gap for low-earning occupations (“shop assistant”, “unskilled worker in a factory”, “bricklayer”, “farm worker”, “secretary” and “bus driver”)	JGL3
Justice gap, high-income occupations	Justice gap for high-earning occupations (“cabinet minister in the national government” and “chairman of a large national corporation”)	JGH1
	Justice gap for high-earning occupations (using the maximum range of occupational estimates provided by individual respondents)	JGH2
	Justice gap for high-earning occupations (“doctor in general practice”, “chairman of a large national corporation”, “cabinet minister in the [national] government”, “lawyer”, “owner manager of a large factory” and “judge in country's highest court”)	JGH3
Inequality tolerance, general rating items	Disagreement with the item “Inequality exists because it benefits the rich”, subtracting the mean disagreement with the two items "People study to earn a lot of money” and “Differences in income are necessary”	IT4
	Mean disagreement with the two statements “Differences in income in [respondents country] are too large” and “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce differences in income between people”	IT5

Notes: This table shows the indicators used for different concepts related to the measurement of inequality tolerance with the corresponding codes or abbreviations. Main indicators used in the main analyses and most additional analyses are set in bold. Source for all measures used is the ISSP.

mingle multiple dimensions of inequality evaluation and often additionally combine aspects of perception and evaluation[231]. For instance, items measuring agreement to propositions such as "inequality is too high" mingle perception and evaluation of conditions and rely on respondents to choose among a few categories, which is especially problematic for international and cross-cultural comparisons (see for instance He & van de Vijver 2012; Harzing, 2006). Differences in social interaction routines, translations and interpretations of items with regard to varying denotations and connotations of specific words and concepts in given linguistic and cultural contexts potentially introduce additional forms of measurement bias (see for instance He & van de Vijver 2012; Harzing, 2006; Johnson et al., 2005; Javeline, 1999). Even disregarding international comparisons, research on support for welfare state policies shows the impact of word choice and using different levels of abstraction when general rating items. For instance, altruism tends to decrease with the specificity of questions (see for instance Kangas, 1997).

In contrast to this approach, occupational income estimates provide an opportunity to control for influences of perception (see for instance Osberg & Smeeding, 2006; Gijsberts, 2002; Verwiebe & Wegener, 2000; Jasso, 1999; Lippl, 1999). These numeric occupational estimates pose a cognitive problem to respondents and have been criticized for being subject to strong cognitive anchoring effects non-related to substantial causalities. At the same time, to the best of my knowledge, these estimates are the only clear and precise form to measure both perception and evaluation of inequality as distinct constructs in natural numeric form. While there are different forms of differentiating between perception and evaluation based on these occupational income estimates[232], my analyses rely on the

231 Specifically, survey items such as rated agreement to items such as "income differences in [Respondents country] are too large" are not precise and depend on the individual perception of differences, the subjective evaluations of the level at which differences are large and on how "too large" is interpreted. Even a very specific rating item such as "the government should reduce income differences" is up to interpretation in many ways, since the forms and extent of government interaction are completely open. Questions such as these can be helpful to see basic trends of answering behavior, but specific opinions towards inequality and respective effects are more precisely captured in a quantitative form that is adequate for the complicated subject of inequality and redistribution, such as item batteries of perceived and legitimate occupational income estimates that support the explicit differentiation between perception and evaluation and additional forms of analyses.

232 The occupation-specific subjective perceived and legitimate earnings surveyed in the ISSP modules on "Social Inequality" allow researchers to generate various measures of perceived and legitimate income inequality and set them in relation to each other by generating simple values for "justice gaps", "justice evaluations" or the "demand for redistribution" (see for instance Osberg & Smeeding, 2006; Verwiebe & Wegener, 2000; Jasso, 1999; Lippl, 1999), or by statistically modeling the influence between some of these measures, for instance in the course of an OLS regression of legitimate inequality on income, controlling for perceived inequality (see for instance Gijsberts, 2002). It is also an option to compute Gini ratios for perceived and legitimate incomes, but since these measures would be based

specific quantitative separation of existing and ideal inequality levels. To keep the interpretation of results both simple and precise with regard to dependent variables, I focus on effects on a very specific measure of inequality tolerance and analyze influences on ideal inequality evaluations while controlling for perceived inequality (Gijsberts, 2002).

In order to achieve this, I make use of an item battery composed of various questions on estimated (or perceived) and ideal (or legitimate) occupation-specific income surveyed in the "Social Inequality" modules of the ISSP[233]. I use perceived income ratios[234] between high- and low-income occupations, in the following termed perceived inequality, as a predictor of income ratios between the same occupations judged legitimate by respondents, in the following termed legitimate inequality. The ISSP modules on social inequality allow for the computation of both legitimate and perceived income ratios between occupations in high versus low structural positions. Whereas the specific formulation can vary between countries, the basic English wording of the question, followed by a list of occupations, is simply: „What do you think people in these jobs ought to be paid – how much do you think they should earn each year before taxes regardless of what they actually get?". This form of item battery is an established form of surveying attitudes towards inequality (for earlier studies see for instance Kelly & Evans, 1993; Headey, 1991), but still not used very frequently in research on the topic despite its many advantages. Since the occupations included in the ISSP only constitute a small selective list mostly concentrated on the upper and lower ends of the income distribution, I use ratios between low- and high-income occupations instead of measures routinely used for the measurement of objective inequality such as the Gini index that take into account a complete distribution.

Specifically, for the first main indicator of inequality tolerance to be used in the main models and a majority of analyses in general [IT1], I take the mean of estimated earnings of two high- and two low-earning occupations in the ISSP data for both perceived and ideal occupational income[235]. I then generate the ratios of the occupational income estimates for high- versus low-earning occupations. The

on just a few occupational incomes, reflecting a very incomplete income distribution, I do not apply this procedure. I focus the analyses on legitimate inequality, controlling for perceived inequality, and additionally use position-specific justice gaps and index measures based on general rating items for comparisons.

233 The ISSP modules on "Social Inequality" offer a rare chance to use these occupational income estimates in internationally comparative analyses together with extensive sets of items related to individual structural position.

234 Using ratios between high and low earners instead of actual values also provides a natural means of correcting for differences between the currencies of multiple countries.

235 These occupations also show high commonalities as indicated by factor analyses not reported in this paper. In these analyses, other occupations conceptually related to either low or high income, such as the owner manager of a large factory, show much stronger deviation from these patterns.

result is the legitimate income ratio as reported by respondents, taken as an indicator for inequality (see Gijsberts, 2002). The selection of occupations for the first measure of inequality tolerance is based on mean lowest and highest incomes[236]. The items additionally show broad, but not complete, convergence with regard to international differences[237] in the determination of income estimates. The first main indicator of inequality tolerance is based on the mean estimated income of two occupations associated with high structural positions divided by the mean estimated income of two occupations related to lower structural positions. The two occupations used for higher structural positions or high-income groups are "cabinet minister in the national government" and "chairman of a large national corporation", whereas "shop assistant" and "unskilled worker in a factory" are included for lower structural positions or low-income groups (see Jasso, 2009; Osberg & Smeeding, 2006; Gijsberts, 2002 for closely related approaches).

Additionally, I use different occupational groups for two similar alternative measures. As a second main indicator of inequality tolerance, to be used in the main models and a majority of analyses in general, I generate a simple measure using the maximum range of occupational estimates provided by individual respondents, i.e. not specific occupational groups but instead the maximum and minimum of occupational estimates as provided by respondents [IT2]. As a third indicator of inequality tolerance, only to be used in a limited number of dedicated models, I use broad fixed groups of higher and lower-earning occupations including six occupations for each group that are on aggregate perceived as lowest or highest, respectively [IT3]. Specifically, for the high income group I include the estimates for "doctor in general practice", "chairman of a large national corporation", "cabinet minister in the [national] government", "lawyer", "owner manager of a large factory" and "judge in country's highest court". For the lower income group, I use the estimates for "shop assistant", "unskilled worker in a factory", "bricklayer", "farm worker", "secretary" and "bus driver". All three measures based on occupational estimates are used as logarithmic transformations in the main analyses, but in additional analyses I also check for the consistency of effects using non-logarithmic measures of inequality tolerance based on the same three groupings of occupations [IN1, IN2 and IN3]. In most analyses, I use the natural logarithm of the ratio similar to common practices in income analyses, since the distribution is also right-skewed.

236 Factor analyses show that estimates for these two groups of occupations are associated with the highest similarity.

237 More generally, the ranking of ideal occupational incomes shows high convergence within and between countries (Gijsberts, 2002; Kelley & Evans, 2006, 7).

As complementary analyses to the models using these indicators of inequality tolerance, I run a smaller series of additional models to check for specific effects on justice gaps of the low- and high-income occupations [JGL1, JGL2, JGL3, JGH1, JGH2 and JGH3]. This serves the purpose to potentially identify mechanisms of the forms of general inequality evaluation, based on to the specific evaluation of low- and high-income occupations and potential differences and similarities in effects. For further comparisons with general rating items, I also include analyses of two measures of inequality tolerance based on multiple general rating items.

Specifically, I generate a measure based on the disagreement with the item “Inequality exists because it benefits the rich”, subtracting the mean disagreement with the two items "People study to earn a lot of money” and “Differences in income are necessary” [IT4]. These items measure inequality tolerance in terms of disagreement with broad general inequality-related evaluative statements. Additionally, I use the mean disagreement with the two statements “Differences in income in [respondents country] are too large” and “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce differences in income between people” [IT5]. For all these rating-based items, the response categories include five options ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. The two resulting alternative measures of inequality tolerance are only used in a limited number of dedicated analyses.

3.5 Operationalization of context-level moderators

At the context level, theoretically relevant constructs include actual inequality and redistribution, prosperity and mobility chances, ethnic and social fractionalization, system threat, system distrust, mobilization and information, perceived inequality and mean aggregate inequality-promoting norms. For most of these constructs, multiple alternative indicators are included, partly to account for different theoretical and methodical implications of operationalizations, especially with regard to inequality and redistribution, and partly for additional general checks of the robustness and validity of results. In the following section, I describe main and alternative indicators used for these context-level constructs.

One of the most commonly used indicators for inequality is the Gini index, based on differences in the Lorenz curve of the actual given income distribution to the straight diagonal line indicating complete equality, specifically the ratio of the area between the line for complete equality and the graph for the actual distribution to the area between the line for complete equality and the line for complete inequality. For reasons of availability, reliability and comparability of data, including

multiple different computations based on varying data sources, I use the Gini index as a general measure for inequality. Even for the frequently used Gini index, values for specific contexts are not always completely comparable (Scheidel, 2017, 13, 370ff.; 424), but the amount of research into conception, use, interpretation and comparability of Gini measures is substantial and supports the making of informed decisions. For the main indicator, I use the data from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database [SWIID] (Solt, 2019; 2016; 2009).

General measures of inequality such as the Gini index imply a drastic reduction of information resulting in one single parameter and do only give a rough general mean measure of inequality, disregarding more specific discrepancies within and between specific parts of the distribution (compare also Piketty, 2020, 26, 656–659). For this reason, I also use specific income shares in some analyses alternatively and in addition to the Gini index, especially the income shares of the first and last deciles and the ratio of highest versus lowest decile. Commonly used inequality measures such as the Gini index and income shares have the advantage of being scalable and internationally comparable, but at the same time imply that equal-amount increases in income (i.e., an increase of the same amount for rich and poor individuals) decrease inequality whereas equal-percent increases (i.e. high increases for rich individuals and low increases for poor individuals) keep inequality constant, an assumption that is problematic and not necessarily in line with popular attitudes conceptions of inequality which might be more focused on absolute distances and proximity (Förster & Toth, 2015, 1782). I include standard deviation as a measure for absolute income variance.

When choosing income inequality either as a main or supplementary concept with regard to social inequality, the question of measurement is of substantial importance for both theoretical and methodological reasons. Since empirical distributions of income and similar monetary constructs show substantial differences in multiple dimensions such as range, skewness and concentration in various parts of the distribution, measures reducing the available data to one or two parameter are necessarily limiting and selecting the retained information. Different empirical distributions showing similar values for one measure such as the Gini index can have multiple differences in specific parts of the respective distributions. Additionally, whereas operationalization decisions do no necessarily have not to be grounded in real-world perceptions of respondents, the situation might be different when considering effects on individual attitudes in terms of perceived self-interests. Whereas previous research has applied a wide range of measurements to the study of income inequality, including

various options and variations as well as numerous, partly multi-dimensional modifications, in sum problematic to discuss or analyze in any exhaustive form due to the number of measures, many empirical applications are limited to a very specific and restrictive selections of measures.

The most frequently used measures in the literature reviewed for this thesis are related to relative distances (compare Zheng, 2007, 97), such as the Gini, Theil and Atkinson indices (see for instance Charles-Coll, 2011, 23–26). This practice has many advantages in international contexts, since measures based on relative differences can easily be scaled and can be used without direct conceptual problems, even though they also are potentially affected by differences between countries in data gathering methods and additional aspects potentially influencing data quality, non-response rates and even specific response styles or biases. From a daily-life or respondent perspective, the scientific focus on scalability and relative distances might be less convincing[238] (see for instance Sachweh, 2012; Cowell, 1998, 27). Inequality is not necessarily understood as measured scientifically and if these subjective conceptualizations systematically differ from scientific conceptualizations, objective inequality levels might have effects that get overlooked or misjudged in empirical tests. Defining inequality in absolute terms might seem more intuitive when thinking about inequality as being visible and effective as a set of actual and individually perceived real-world differences. Empirical studies show that respondents indeed seem to favor inequality concepts based on absolute social distances, not very well represented in the scientific measurement of inequality apart from relatively rare exceptions (see for instance Bosmans, Decancq & Decoster, 2014; Zheng, 2011) and basic range- and variance-based measures. Since most readily available measures, and most measures used in empirical studies throughout most research traditions with relevance for this topic, are of a relative nature, even reliable results of inequality research might be based on concepts of inequality substantially different from common everyday interpretations of inequality.

238 A common example to illustrate this problem is a fictitious monetary gift to a complete population. In setting A, everybody gets the same amount of money, independent of the money already owned. In setting B, everybody gets a different amount of money, based on and proportional to the money already owned. Using relative measures, the inequality in setting A gets reduced, whereas it stays unchanged in setting B. In other words, giving rich individuals more money than poor individuals does not increase inequality when measured using relative measures. Instead, giving someone who already earns 10 times the amount of another individual an increase that is 10 times bigger than the increase given to the other individual keeps inequality exactly the same. In absolute terms and measures, inequality is increased in setting B and stable in setting A. These different implications of relative versus absolute measures have to be regarded as normative implications of the choice of inequality measures (compare Zheng, 2007, 97ff.). When using a measure such as the Gini index, it is implied that inequality is described and analyzed as being stable when absolute distances might increase substantially, as long as relative differences stay constant.

Among specific relative measures, various forms of indices reducing the available information in different ways have been used in the literature (see for instance Charles-Coll, 2011; Cowell, 2011). Even though the use of multiple indicators of inequality for empirical analyses is often recommended by researchers (see for instance Piketty, 2014a, 266; Hoeller et al, 2012; Nolan, Marx & Salverda, 2011, 33; Jasso, 2009, 129), comparative tests are still rare. Tests conducted are generally limited to a small selection of measures and often find consistency between measures with regard to trends and international differences or rankings (Caminada, Goudswaard & Wang, 2012; Evans, Hout & Mayer, 2004). Some differences between indicators seem to stem from differences in sensitivity to the lower, middle or upper parts of the distribution (Caminada, Goudswaard & Wang, 2012). Most commonly used single indicators such as the Gini index (as well as the Theil index and the Atkinson index at medium alpha levels) are substantially influenced by the middle parts of the distribution in question, whereas variance-based measures, absolute measures and, to a lesser degree, ratios between top and bottom percentiles are more affected by absolute differences between both tails (Evans, Hout & Mayer, 2004; Leigh, 2007), and specifically by high outlier-type values on the upper end that characterize many current changes in inequality levels (see for instance Belfield et al., 2017, 6).

To deal with some of these problems and with the different implications related to specific measures, I include perception as a separate construct on contextual level in form of mean aggregate perceived inequality as indicated by occupational income estimate ratios and use a broad comparative approach. I consider multiple types of conceptually different relative measures of actual inequality, including Gini- and ratio-based measures[239], income shares, measures related to wealth inequality and indicators of absolute inequality. Specifically, I generate five indicators based on the Gini index, eight indicators based on income shares and percentile ratios, two indicators related to wealth inequality and four indicators of absolute inequality based on standard deviation (see Table 3.4).

239 For the use of inequality measures in general, and especially for the Gini index, the utilization of modifications such as the extraction rate (Milanovic, 2016a) and functional forms based on expected Kuznets wave cycles (Ruß, 2012) are possible. The extraction rate takes into account that maximum inequality is depending on economic development, since specific minimum biological needs have to be satisfied for all individuals. With increasing development, when average income tends to increase substantially over subsistence level, proportionally more income can be accumulated by single individuals, a concept that has been termed the inequality probability frontier. According to estimations by Milanovic (2016a), average income is about 100 times the minimum level of subsistence in modern developed societies, setting the maximum feasible Gini index value close to its general maximum value (ibid., 15f.). For these reasons, it seems appropriate to include specific indicators of prosperity and mobility chances as additional controls instead of using transformed inequality measures.

Tab. 3.4: Measures of actual inequality and redistribution with sources

Concept	Variable	Code	Sources
Actual inequality	**Gini of personal income**, post-tax	GNS	SWIID
	Gini of personal income, pre-tax	GMS	SWIID
	Gini of household equivalence consumption (or income)	GNW	WDI
	Gini of household equivalence income, pre-tax	GIE	ISSP
	Gini of personal income, pre-tax	GIP	ISSP
	Income share of the lowest 20 percent of the income distribution	SH20	WDI
	Income share of the lowest 10 percent of the income distribution	SH10	WDI
	P90/P10 ratio, upper bound of the ninth decile to upper bound of the first decile, personal income	R91P	ISSP
	P90/P10 ratio, upper bound of the ninth decile to upper bound of the first decile, for household equivalence income	R91E	ISSP
	P90/P50 ratio, upper bound of the ninth decile to median income, for personal income	R95P	ISSP
	P90/P50 ratio, upper bound of the ninth decile to median income, for household equivalence income	R95E	ISSP
	P50/P10 ratio, median income to upper bound of the first decile, for personal income	R51P	ISSP
	P50/P10 ratio, median income to upper bound of the first decile, for household equivalence income	R51E	ISSP
	Sum of the wealth of all billionaires in a given country year divided by GDP	WSF	Bagchi & Svejnar (2013)
	Gini for wealth distribution, partly imputed	WGE	Davies et al., (2007)
	Standard deviation of personal income	SDP	ISSP
	Standard deviation of household equivalence income	SDE	ISSP
	Standard deviation of personal income in US$	SXP	ISSP, UNCTAD
	Standard deviation of household equivalence income in US$	SXE	ISSP, UNCTAD
Redistribution	**Relative gini reduction**, ((Gini, pre-transfer) − (Gini, post-transfer)) / (Gini, pre-transfer)*100	RGR	SWIID
	Absolute gini reduction, (Gini, pre-transfer) − (Gini, post-transfer)	RGA	SWIID
	Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP	RTR	WDI

Notes: This table shows the indicators used for the context-level factors actual inequality and redistribution with the corresponding codes or abbreviations and sources. Main indicators used in the main analyses and most additional analyses are set in bold.

In terms of Gini-based measures, I use the Gini index for post-transfer or net income inequality [GNS] based on the SWIID (Solt, 2019; 2016; 2009) as the main indicator of actual inequality and a measure for pre-transfer or market inequality [GMS] based on the same source as an alternative measure[240]. These indicators of actual inequality based on SWIID data have the advantage of allowing for the computation of tax-based redistribution based on the same data[241] and are therefore used in

240 Solt notes that the net-income inequality series is probably best suited conceptually for most needs of researchers and that market inequality should not be considered to be pre-government, since various political measures affect market inequality (Solt, 2016).

241 To compute pre- and post-transfer inequality for a large set of countries in the SWIID, income data from various conceptually different sources is used. Solt uses a procedure based on averaging and standardization to compute

most analyses. As a further alternative measure based on partly different sources[242], I use WDI data for the Gini index of household equivalence income or consumption [GNW]. Additionally, I compute the Gini index for personal income [GIP] and household equivalence income [GIE] based on the individual-level ISSP income data as provided by respondents.

As additional relative measures of inequality, I use two measures of income shares, measuring the proportion of income of the lowest 20 [SH20] and 10 percent [SH10] of the income distribution, respectively. Six additional relative measures are ratio-based indicators of inequality generated from individual-level ISSP data. Specifically, the P90/P10 ratio, i.e. the ratio of the upper bound of the ninth decile to the upper bound of the first decile for personal income [R91P] and for household equivalence income [R91E], the P90/P50 ratio, i.e. the ratio of the upper bound of the ninth decile to the median income, for personal income [R95P] and for household equivalence income [R95E], and the P50/P10 ratio, i.e. the ratio of the median income to the upper bound of the first decile, for personal income [R51P] and for household equivalence income [R51E].

Additionally, I generate two measures related to relative inequalities in wealth based on wealth shares and the Gini index. I use the sum of the wealth of all billionaires in a given country year divided by GDP [WSF] as reported by Bagchi and Svejnar (2013) as a first measure. Additionally, I rely on estimates of the Gini index for the wealth distribution in countries [WGE] as published by Davies, Sandström, Shorrocks and Wolff (2007). This indicator is partly based on imputations and has to be understood as a rough approximation of actual differences in wealth inequality[243].

Besides these more common relative measures, I include two indicators of absolute inequality in the form of the standard deviation of personal income [SDP] and of household equivalence income [SDE] in the ISSP data for respective country years. I also generate an alternative to this indicator using currency exchange rates based on data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] (2021) to make the income data more comparable for both personal income

measures of inequality approximating inequality in household equivalence income (see Solt, 2016, 6–13).

242 Another option is to take estimations based on publications by Wang and Caminada (2011) and Morelli, Smeeding and Thompson (2015), based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study and the OECD. This indicator has the advantage of being available for both pre- and post-tax data. Since this data is only available for some country-years of the ISSP module on Social Inequality, the numbers of countries in preliminary analyses conducted is very low and the results are not reported explicitly due to the low case numbers. The preliminary analyses based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study result in less consistent significant effects, while the effect directions of the constructs associated with consistent effects in the main analyses presented in this study show similar tendencies apart from system threat. This can be explained by the low variance of the poverty-based indicator of system threat in the selective set of countries.

243 As Piketty notes, the availability of data on wealth and wealth inequality is generally very limited (2020, 677–679).

[SXP] and household equivalence income [SXE]. For these four indicators, it has to be kept in mind that information related to income data in the ISSP partly varies between individuals and country years and the indicators again are only rough approximations.

In the context of redistribution (see Table 3.4), data availability is limited with regard to more differentiated measures such as tax progressivity. I rely on data on relative and absolute reduction in the Gini index, relating market inequality to post-transfer inequality in form of subtraction or ratio, corresponding to relative and absolute reduction of inequalities, complemented by data on tax revenue. As the main indicator for redistribution, I use the relative reduction of the Gini index [RGR] through taxation-based governmental redistribution. This measure is based on the pre- and post-transfer Gini values for single country years as visible in the SWIID[244]. As an alternative proxy for state-driven redistribution, I analyze the effect of absolute Gini reduction [RGA], i.e. subtracting post-tax from pre-tax values of Gini index. This indicator is again based on SWIID data. As a third indicator of redistribution, I use national tax revenue as a percentage of GDP [RTR].

With regard to indicators of prosperity and mobility chances[245] (see Table 3.5), this broad category of factors includes measures of GDP per capita, human development, subjective mobility, perceived meritocracy and unemployment. As the main indicator for prosperity and mobility chances, I use GDP per capita in current US$ [GD1] as reported by the World Bank Group in the World Development Indicators [WDI] dataset (World Bank, 2017). I also use an alternative measure of GDP from the Penn World Tables [PWT] as a different source (Zeileis, 2019; Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer, 2015; Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 2015) based on expenditure-side data [GD2] and an index of human development [HDI] as reported by the Human Development Report Office (2020) and additional authors for missing country years.

244 Because of the intuitive interpretation and the comparability with the objective pre-transfer inequality, Gini-based inequality reduction is used as an indicator for redistribution. Using data provided by the Luxembourg Income Study would have some advantages, but leads to a serious limitation of country numbers and high selectivity because of data availability. Instead, I again rely on SWIID data for this indicator.

245 As Milanovic (2013) notes, inequality levels are also limited by prosperity, since lower prosperity puts natural limits on inequality by determining the maximum amount of income or natural goods that can be extracted from individuals without taking from their minimum of existence. Milanovic proposes to use the extraction rate that is based on both inequality and prosperity levels, but the relatively high prosperity levels in most contexts in contemporary times make this practice especially important for historical studies. At the same time, influences of prosperity on attitudes possibly biasing the influence of inequality identified are not implausible to expect.

Tab. 3.5: Measures of prosperity and mobility chances and system threat with sources

Concept	Variable	Code	Sources
Prosperity and mobility chances	**GDP per capita in current US$**	GD1	WDI
	GDP per capita in current US$, expenditure side	GD2	PWT
	Human Development Index	HDI	Human Development Report Office (2020); Fuentes-Ramirez (2014)
	Aggregated subjective status mobility, upward mobility versus downward mobility	MB1	ISSP
	Aggregated subjective status mobility, upward and downward mobility versus no mobility	MB2	ISSP
	Aggregated perception of meritocracy (hard work and having ambition versus coming from a wealthy family and knowing the right people)	MRT	ISSP
	Unemployment, total	UE1	IMF
	Unemployment, long-term (% of total unemployment)	UE2	IMF
	Unemployment, tertiary education (% of total unemployment)	UE3	IMF
System threat	**Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population)**	PV1	ILO
	Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population)	PV2	ILO
	Poverty gap at $1.25 a day, ratio by which the mean income of the poor falls below the poverty line	PV3	WDI
	Poverty gap at $2 a day, ratio by which the mean income of the poor falls below the poverty line	PV4	WDI
	Aggregated perception of conflicts between structural groups (rich versus poor, top versus bottom)	PC1	ISSP
	Aggregated perception of conflicts between various structural and social groups (rich versus poor, top versus bottom, working class versus middle class, unemployed versus employed, management versus workers, farmers versus city people, young people versus older people)	PC2	ISSP
	Homicides per 100,000 people	HMC	UNODC

Notes: This table shows the indicators used for the context-level factors prosperity and mobility chances and system threat with the corresponding codes or abbreviations and sources. Main indicators used in the main analyses and most additional analyses are set in bold.

To generate additional alternative measures for prosperity and mobility chances, I use data on subjective evaluations of intergenerational mobility. In the ISSP, respondents are asked to rate the status of their own job as compared to the job of their father. The answers range from “much lower” to “much higher” in five categories. Based on this item, I generate two measures of aggregate subjective intergenerational mobility. The first measure takes the mean values of all respondents for each country year, indicating aggregated subjective upward mobility [MB1]. The second measure only takes the distance to the middle point of the scale and therefore ranges between zero and two for each individual [MB2]. This second indicator measures both upward and downward mobility.

Additionally, I use an indicator of aggregate meritocracy perception [MRT] based on ISSP data. Based on a battery of items related to the question how people get ahead in society, I take the mean value for responses to the two items listing hard work and having ambition and subtract the mean value for responses to the two items listing coming from a wealthy family and knowing the right people. While the first two aspects can be seen as meritocratic determinants of success, the latter two are more related to paternalism and family-based differences in social and economic capital.

As a final group of indicators for prosperity and mobility chances, I use three unemployment-related measures based on data from the IMF (2021b). The first indicator is the total unemployment rate as percentage of the population [UE1]. The second and third unemployment-related measures have to be understood as specific sub-dimensions of unemployment. I use the percentage of long-term unemployment as a part of total unemployment [UE2] as second measure. The third indicator measures the percentage of individuals with tertiary education among the unemployed [UE3].

In the context of indicators of system threat, the range of measures to be used is again broad and includes multiple indicators related to poverty, perceived conflicts and homicides. Specifically, I use the poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day as a percentage of a population in a given country year [PV1] as the main indicator of system threat. As alternative measures, I use three additional measures based on poverty data as provided by the International Labor Organization [ILO] (2015) and the World Bank Group in the World Development indicators dataset (World Bank, 2017). The measures include the poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day as a percentage of a population in a given country year [PV2], the poverty gap at $1.25 a day, i.e. the ratio by which the mean income of the poor falls below the poverty line [PV3], and the poverty gap at $2 a day, i.e. the ratio by which the mean income of the poor falls below the poverty line [PV4].

Two additional indicators of system threat are based on ISSP item batteries related to conflicts between different groups in society and measure aggregated conflict perception as given by respondents. For these measures, I take the mean value of answers given in a four-point scale ranging between “there are no conflicts” and “very strong conflicts”. The first indicator of conflict perception uses only two items specifically related to structural position, based on items for the cleavages between poor people versus rich people and people at the top of the society versus people at the bottom [PC1]. The second indicator of conflict perception additionally uses items related to conflicts between working class versus middle class, unemployed people versus employed people, management

Tab. 3.6: Measures of fractionalization, system distrust, mobilization and information with sources

Concept	Variable	Code	Sources
Fractionalization	**Ethnic fractionalization based on percentages of ethnic groups**	FR1	Fearon (2003)
	Ethnic fractionalization based on percentages of ethnic groups	FR2	Selway (2011)
	Ethno-income cross-fragmentation, extent to which individuals sharing ethnic groups differ in income groups as a composite measure of subgroup fractionalization and cross-cuttingness	FR3	Selway (2011)
	Ethnic (bi-)polarization, based on the relative size of the two biggest groups in a given society	FR4	Selway (2011)
	Cultural fractionalization based on structural distances between languages of groups in a country	FR5	Fearon (2003)
	International migrants as a percentage of total population	MGR	UNDESA
Political distrust	**Aggregated distrust in political institutions as indicated by the mean value of confidence ratings related to parliament, government and political parties**	PDW	WVS, EVS
	Corruption Perception Index	CPI	TI
	Mean value of indicators based on control of corruption, government effectiveness and rule of law.	GV1	WGI
	Mean value of indicators based on control of corruption, government effectiveness, rule of law, political stability, regulatory quality, and voice and account.	GV2	WGI
Mobilization and information	**Percentage of respondents reporting union membership**	UNI	ISSP
	Trade union density rate	UND	ILO, OECD
	Percentage of employers with the right to bargain	UNA	ILO, OECD
	Percentage of population with complete secondary education	ISE	WDI
	Percentage of population with internet access and usage	IIU	WDI
	Percentage of population employed in occupations related to science, research and development	IRD	WDI
	Press Freedom Index	PFI	RSF

Notes: This table shows the indicators used for the context-level factors fractionalization, political distrust and mobilization and information with the corresponding codes or abbreviations and sources. Main indicators used in the main analyses and most additional analyses are set in bold.

versus workers, farmers versus city people and young people versus older people [PC2]. Finally, I use the number of homicides per 100,000 people in a given country year as reported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC] (2021) as another indicator of system threat [HMC].

As the main indicator of fractionalization, I use multiple measures related to ethnic and cultural fractionalization, polarization and cross-fractionalization between ethnic groups and income groups. The main indicator of fractionalization is based on the percentages of different ethnic groups in a given society (FRI) as reported by Fearon (2003). An alternative indicator is also based on percentages of ethnic groups [FR2] as reported by Selway (2011). Based on the same data, I also use the measure of ethno-income cross-fragmentation [FR3] provided by Selway (2011), a composite measure of subgroup fractionalization and cross-cuttingness taking into account the extent to which individuals of

specific ethnic groups differ in income groups. Additionally, I use a measure of ethnic (bi-)polarization [FR4], based on the relative size of the two biggest groups in a given society (Selway, 2011) and a measure of cultural fractionalization [FR5], based on structural distances between languages of different groups in a given country (Fearon, 2003). As a final approximate measure of fractionalization, I use the percentage of international migrants in a population in a given country year [MGR] as reported by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs [UNDESA] (2013). This measure is less direct compared to the other five measures, but is available for multiple country years and therefore allows for the estimation of fixed effects.

In the context of system distrust, indicators are limited to a subjective measure of confidence in political institutions and external ratings of corruption, government reliability and government effectiveness. As the main indicator, I use an aggregated measure of distrust in political institutions as indicated by the mean value of confidence ratings related to parliament, government and political parties [PDW] as visible in the World Values Survey [WVS] and the European Values Survey [EVS]. All items are Likert-scaled with five categories ranging between “a great deal of confidence” and “no confidence at all”. The Corruption Perception Index [CPI] provided by Transparency International [TI] serves as an alternative indicator (TI, 2009; 1999). Two further indicators are based on data from the Worldwide Government Indicators [WGI] dataset (World Bank, 2021). For both measures, I take the mean value of various conceptually different indicators. All these single measures of sub-dimensions are standardized with similar distributions and additionally show very high loadings on the same factor (between 0.80 and 0.97) in a preliminary factorial analysis. As simple general approximate measures, I use two indicators based on mean values of multiple indicators. The first indicator used is based on three items with factor loadings higher than 0.95, specifically control of corruption, government effectiveness and rule of law [GV1]. The second measure uses all six measures available, adding political stability, regulatory quality and voice and account [GV2].

The indicators for mobilization and information can be divided into two groups. Indicators for mobilization are based on union activity, indicators for information are related to education, research activity and media access and activity. As the main indicator to be used for mobilization and information in most analyses, I rely on the information provided by respondents in the ISSP concerning their individual union membership. I aggregate the information to be used as the

Tab. 3.7: Measures of perceived inequality and inequality-promoting norms with sources

Concept	Variable	Code	Sources
Perceived inequality	**Logarithmic ratio between perceived income estimates for high and low income groups based on IT1 grouping**	IP1	ISSP
	Ratio between perceived income estimates for high and low income groups based on IT1 grouping	IPN	ISSP
	Logarithmic ratio between perceived income estimates for high and low income groups based on IT2 grouping	IP2	ISSP
	Logarithmic ratio between perceived income estimates for high and low income groups based on IT3 grouping	IP3	ISSP
Inequality-promoting norms	**Aggregate mean of index of inequality tolerance used as alternative dependent variable (IT4)**	NGN	ISSP
	Logarithmic ratio between legitimate income estimates for high and low income groups based on IT1 grouping	NR1	ISSP
	Logarithmic ratio between legitimate income estimates for high and low income groups based on IT2 grouping	NR2	ISSP
	Logarithmic ratio between legitimate income estimates for high and low income groups based on IT3 grouping	NR3	ISSP
	Aggregated individual-level individualism as indicated by multiple items related to the importance of employment security, sufficiency of time for your personal or home life, respect of family and friends for the job and the evaluation of work as interesting or not	IDV	Hofstede (2015)
	Aggregated individual-level rationalism (versus traditionalism) as indicated by multiple items related to happiness, trust, respect for authority, political action, importance of god, justifiability of homosexuality and abortion, national pride, materialism and autonomy.	RTN	WVS, EVS

Notes: This table shows the indicators used for the context-level factors perceived inequality and inequality-promoting norms with the corresponding codes or abbreviations and sources. Main indicators used in the main analyses and most additional analyses are set in bold.

percentage of respondents reporting union membership [UNI]. Among alternative indicators, I use two additional measures focused on mobilization as indicated by union activity. These two measures are using data from both ILO and OECD to decrease the amount of missing values (OECD, 2021; ILO, 2020). I use the ILO data as a preferred source and the OECD data to fill in gaps if available for the country years missing in the ILO data set. As the first of these two indicators, I use the density rate of trade unions [UND], i.e. the ratio of trade union members to the total number of potential members in the economy. For the second measure, I rely on the collective bargaining coverage rate, i.e. the percentage of employees with the right to bargain [UNA].

With regard to information-based measures of the construct mobilization and information, I use four measures covering multiple possible influences on the spread of accessible accurate information in given societies. First, I use the percentage of people who have completed secondary education [ISE] to approximately capture differences in education. Second, I use the percentage of the population with access to the internet [IIU]. Third, I include the percentage of people employed in occupations related

to areas of science, research and development [IRD]. Finally, I use an index of press freedom [PFI] as provided by Reporters Without Borders [RSF] (2010).

All indicators for perceived inequality are based on the individual-level occupational income estimates available in the ISSP. As the main indicator of perceived inequality, I use the natural logarithm of the ratio between perceived income estimates for high and low income groups based on the same categorization of high- and low-income occupational groups as for the main indicator of legitimate and perceived inequality on individual level, i.e. “a cabinet minister in the national government” and “a chairman of a large national corporation” versus “a shop assistant” and “an unskilled worker in a factory”. As an alternative indicator, I use a non-logarithmic measure based on the same data [IPN]. Additionally, I use the natural logarithm of the ratio between the perceived highest and lowest occupational estimate given by individuals respondents [IP2], corresponding to the grouping used for the second indicator of inequality tolerance on individual level, and between two broader occupational groups for lower and higher values [IP3], corresponding to the grouping used for the third indicator of inequality tolerance on individual level. For this fourth measure, I specifically include “doctor in general practice”, “chairman of a large national corporation”, “cabinet minister in the [national] government”, “lawyer”, “owner manager of a large factory” and “judge in country's highest court” in the high-income group and “shop assistant”, “unskilled worker in a factory”, “bricklayer”, “farm worker”, “secretary” and “bus driver” in the low-income group.

Inequality-promoting norms are measured with four conceptually different types of measures, one aggregated rating measure, three aggregated ratios of occupational estimates and single indicators for context-level individualism (see Hofstede, 2001) and rationalism (see Inglehart, 2000). As the main indicator used in a majority of analyses, I use the aggregated mean of the index of inequality tolerance [NGN] used as alternative dependent variable on individual level [IT4]. This measure is based on general evaluative responses, not occupational income estimations for two reasons. First, I do not use an inequality tolerance measure based on occupational income estimates as the main indicator for aggregate inequality tolerance on country level because of the close relation to the dependent variable. Second, for the aggregated measure, I assume that the combination of perception and evaluation in the general questions related to inequality tolerance is less problematic than on individual level, since the potential structural differences in perception and evaluation are not necessarily relevant on this level. By controlling for aggregate perceived inequality and individual-

level inequality perception, I hope to minimize any potential source of bias related to influences of perception. I additionally analyze the influence of other normative factors on country level (see Chapter 4.4) and on both country and individual level (see Chapter 4.6) to compare potential commonalities and differences in effects.

In terms of alternative indicators, I analyze three measures of legitimate inequality based on the occupational income estimates (aggregated versions of IT1, IT2 and IT3). To generate three alternative indicators, I again refer to the occupational income estimates in the ISSP and generate measures based on the three groupings used for inequality perception on aggregate level and for individual-level indicators of inequality perception and inequality tolerance. Specifically, I use the natural logarithm of the ratio between legitimate income estimates for high and low income groups based on the occupations "a cabinet minister in the national government" and "a chairman of a large national corporation" versus "a shop assistant" and "an unskilled worker in a factory" [NR1]. As another alternative indicator, I use the natural logarithm of the ratio between the perceived highest and lowest occupational estimate given by respondents [INR]. The third measure [NR3] based on occupational estimates uses "doctor in general practice", "chairman of a large national corporation", "cabinet minister in the [national] government", "lawyer", "owner manager of a large factory" and "judge in country's highest court" for high-income occupations and "shop assistant", "unskilled worker in a factory", "bricklayer", "farm worker", "secretary" and "bus driver" for low-income occupations.

As another indicator of inequality-promoting norms, I use aggregated individual-level individualism [IDV] as published by Hofstede (2015), indicated by multiple items related to the importance of employment security, sufficiency of time for your personal or home life, respect of family and friends for the job and the evaluation of work as interesting or not[246] (Hofstede, 2015; 2001; Hofstede & Minkov, 2013). Finally, I use a measure of rationalism, specifically rationalism-secularism as opposed to traditionalism, based on data from the WVS (Inglehart et al., 2020) and the EVS (2020), computed according to the approach by Inglehart (2000). It is generated based on multiple value-related items, specifically happiness, trust, respect for authority, political action, importance of god, justifiability of homosexuality and abortion, national pride, materialism and autonomy (Hofstede & Minkov, 2013).

246 The prevalence of work-related items in this operationalization is notable. The indicator can also be interpreted as measuring self-orientation versus work-orientation, following Brewer and Venaik (2011).

3.6 Operationalization of additional motives and potentially biasing factors on individual level

With regard to the test of potential individual-level mechanisms and related bridge assumptions, I include indicators for hedonic motivation and for normative motivation. For hedonic motivation, I rely on measures of satisficing (see for instance Grauenhorst, Blohm & Koch, 2016) based on the individual-level ISSP data. I use three crude and approximate measures of satisficing, based on the amount of extreme and middle values[247] across 10 Likert-scaled items[248]. These items are selected since they are not included in the operationalization of any other construct used in the models including this variable and they are available for most country years used in the analyses across survey waves.[249] The first indicator uses the amount of extreme and middle values as a linear variable [HEDL], whereas the second indicator uses a dichotomous recoding of the same data based on the mean values of given country years, resulting in a dummy variable differentiating between comparatively low and high numbers of middle and extreme values [HEDD]. The third indicator is based on the same variables, but divides the distribution of the linear measure [HEDL] into four quartiles, resulting in four categories of increasing satisficing [HEDC].

For the test of assumptions related to influences of normative motivation[250], I include measures of left-wing political orientation and religiosity on individual level and country-year level. Left-wing

247 I also tested single indicators based on extreme values, middle values and missing values in preliminary analyses with results substantially similar to those reported in the empirical chapter, specifically finding no consistent interaction effects between the various indicators of satisficing and structural position. Preliminary factorial analyses showed that extreme and middle values are related to a single factor, while there was a much weaker relation to missing values. Therefore, I only report results for the combined indicator based on extreme and middle values. Comparing occupational estimates of individuals based on accordance of provided data with Benford's Law would be another option to generate an indicator of satisficing (compare for instance Menold & Kemper, 2013), but in the case of occupational estimates, the values given by respondents are not random but instead part of an explicit evaluation of a system of quantitative relations.

248 Specifically, I use the complete item battery related to questions asking respondents how important different factors are for getting ahead in life. Some of these items are used for the measure of aggregate meritocracy perception, but this variable is not included in any model testing influences of hedonic motivation.

249 Alternative indicators based on more extensive item sets used in preliminary analyses did not result in systematic differences in substantial results reported in the empirical section. In substantial terms, the results did not show a consistent moderation of structural effects by hedonic motivation as indicated for any measure used.

250 The selection in this context is very much open to debate. Attitude-related dimensions that are analyzed in combination with inequality preferences and support for redistribution include various constructs, such as values related to justice principles (Kuhn, 2011; 2010), left-right orientation (Jaeger, 2007) and religion as well as religiosity (Stegmueller et al., 2012; Scheve & Stasavage, 2006). As already discussed in the theoretical section, the causal direction is often unclear in these cases. I concentrate on left-wing orientation and religiosity since both factors can be interpreted as having direct implications for inequality evaluation but are clearly different in both conceptual and methodological regards.

orientation is measured by self-reported party affiliation recoded into a one-dimensional scale with five categories ranging from far right to far left. For religiosity, I use the reported attendance of religious services in eight categories ranging from “never” to “several times a week or more often”.

In addition to these main independent variables, I use a small set of individual-level independent variables that potentially affect both individual income and individual attitudes towards inequality, specifically age, age squared, gender, marital status in five categories (differentiating between “married”, “widowed”, “divorced”, “separated” and “never married”) and, in most models apart from those specifically testing the influence of education[251], a measure of education in five categories (differentiating between “no degree” “lowest formal degree” “above lowest formal degree” “higher secondary degree” “university degree”). As already noted, individual perception of the respective concept which evaluation serves as dependent variable is also included in each model. This variable is always coded in correspondence to the dependent variable used, including the same occupational groups for the estimation of the natural logarithm of the ratio between high- and low-income occupations and only in included in the models using indicators of inequality tolerance based on occupational income estimates. I also use three methods of controlling for potential differences between geographical or cultural regions not captured in the contextual factors used. If not further specified, I control for survey wave and four very broad geographical regions[252] (Australasia and Northern America versus Western Europe, Northern Europe and Southern Europe versus Eastern Europe versus Asia, South and Central America, Middle East and Africa). In a small number of other models, I additionally use either main effects of geographical region and interactions between region and structural position or country year controls (i.e. dummy-variables for context-level units). I

251 Research on political preferences indicates that education should be considered as a separate dimension, since interests stemming from education are partly different from those stemming from income and wealth. The research of Piketty on the “reversal of the educational cleavage” illustrates this point by showing that left-wing parties, traditionally preferred by individuals with both lower income and lower education, have increasingly become the parties of the highly educated in recent decades in various industrialized countries (2020, 720–727, 744–764, 807–815, 831–834, 841–844, 863–868, 954f.). Piketty describes a "dual elite system", with educated versus monetary elites reflected by left- versus right-wing parties (ibid., 744, 773). At the same time, whereas a reversal for individuals with higher income took longer, it might become a newer trend, already being visible in the 2016 national elections in the USA (ibid., 37).

252 I also tested a less broad grouping of geographical regions with nine categories (separating between Australasia, Northern America, South America, Western Europe, Northern Europe, Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, South and Central America, and Middle East and Africa), but the low number of countries in some categories makes this indicator problematic. Effects of geographical regions were similarly inconsistent as seen in the analyses presented in the empirical section.

generally report the Z-values for effects of individual structural position and for CLIs with theoretically relevant context-level factors in all models. In Chapter 4.1 and in additional models that include additional context-level factors not included in models presented in Chapter 4.1, I also report main effects of theoretically relevant context-level factors. In tables showing full hierarchical series of models (see Chapter 4.1), I additionally list results of likelihood-ratio [LR] tests of specific models against preceding models. For these models and other models presented in Chapter 4.1, I also report the variance of errors for level one (for individuals, i.e. the residual variance) and level two (for country-level units).

3.7 Analysis overview

In the following analyses, inequality tolerance as dependent construct is predicted by various measures of structural position, income inequality and other context-level factors, and cross-level interaction effects between structural position and context-level factors. I test the proposed hypotheses by modeling interaction effects between structural position and country-level factors while using multi-level analysis, fixed effects regression and controlling for possible confounding influences on all levels. To test for consistent effects across model configurations, i.e. commonalities in substantial relations between different measures of individual income and societal income inequality as well as other context-level factors, I run multiple series of hierarchical linear regression models. As outlined above, I include multiple indicators for both individual structural position, inequality tolerance and context-level factors to deal with various problems related to measurement and data selectivity. For cases of systematically inconsistent results, I also compare how indicator choice and combination affects substantial results in this context and to provide a broad comparison of potential differences and commonalities between indicators focused in the specific context of structural polarization in inequality tolerance. While controlling for perceived inequality as measured by ratios of perceived occupational incomes, all effects on legitimate inequality are interpreted as influences on inequality tolerance while controlling for possible anchoring and perception-related biases.

In a majority of models, I test for moderating effects of inequality and other contextual factors on effects of structural position as indicated by standardized and logarithmic recodings of personal and household equivalence income. As a first analysis, three series of basic hierarchical linear models with one level for country years and individuals each are conducted in multiple hierarchical steps. In each

step, I introduce more restrictions to the respective models, starting with a basic empty model, then only controlling for main effects on individual level, in a third step including main control effects on country-year level and an indicator for income inequality as a main effect. Consecutively, I introduce cross-level interaction effects, starting with the interaction between inequality and individual income, and then continue to add additional CLIs between individual income and factors on contextual level as suggested by the set of hypotheses to be tested. Specifically, I include indicators for actual inequality, redistribution, prosperity and mobility chances, fractionalization, system threat, mobilization and information, distrust, aggregate inequality perception and aggregate inequality-promoting norms. All effects of CLIs reported are based on interactions between context-level factors and the individual-level indicator of structural position, if not explicitly specified otherwise. If multiple indicators of structural position are used in models, the CLIs are labeled more precisely in the respective tables.

First, I test the main hypotheses related to the general moderating influence of contextual factors on structural effects in multiple hierarchical model series (see Chapter 4.1). I use both household equivalence and personal income as indicators of structural position and report effects on the first two indicators of inequality tolerance. For these four main models, I test hierarchical series consecutively including interaction effects of structural position with contextual factors. I present Z-values for effects in hierarchical series for all these combinations and results of likelihood ratio tests for model improvement related to the consecutive inclusion of contextual factors. Whereas these four series of models are controlling for main effects of survey wave and geographical region, I then introduce the four full models for alternative model configurations controlling for main effects of year and single countries, while not controlling for the main effects of context-level factors but only for moderation effects. Following these tests, I also present the full models for another approach of controlling for influences of geographical regions by adding CLIs between geographical regions and individual structural position additionally to the CLIs including contextual factors. Consecutively, all 12 full models of the hierarchical series tested so far are estimated using cluster-robust standard errors as another way to deal with biases stemming from similarities between different waves, i.e. adjusting standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within countries. In these analyses, LR tests are not supported and I only compare the consistently significant influences on the basis of Z-values of moderation effects.

Second, I investigate models differentiating between time-variant and time-invariant effects on context level (see Chapter 4.2). Even though the individual-level data used is cross-sectional, CLIs include a context-level that provides the opportunity to use a panel of countries for tests. For these tests, I use fixed[253] and random effects of contextual factors with regard to both main effects and CLIs. In these analyses, I test the main hypotheses again for fixed and random effects and investigate if consistent CLIs found in the main models are consistently related to random or fixed context-level effects.

Third, I further analyze more specific theoretical assumptions with regard to moderation effects for lower and higher structural groups (see Chapter 4.3). In order to test hypotheses related to group-specific moderation effects, I use segmented split regression models as a first approach by differentiating between effects within the upper half of the income distribution, effects within the lower half and effects related to group differences. As an alternative approach, I also test models using squared terms for indicators of structural position to investigate potential nonlinearities of effects as implied in theoretical assumptions.

Fourth, I repeat the hierarchical analyses for multiple indicators of structural position and of contextual factors and with various other modifications to the baseline model (see Chapter 4.4). I keep the individual-level and contextual factors constant on the level of constructs, corresponding to potential contextual influences on the effect of structural position on inequality tolerance as outlined in previous chapters, but introduce alternative indicators for all indicators related to theoretically relevant constructs, partly extended by additional control variables. This includes a set of alternative indicators of structural position and inequality tolerance on individual level and all context-level factors related to expected moderation effects based on theoretical assumptions. Since potentially biasing influences are discussed in the literature for nonlinear effects of inequality and interactions between inequality and poverty [254], I test both ideas in additional models. Consecutively, I test the influence of sample restrictions informed by regression diagnostics and present exemplary predictions of structural effects

253 Analyzing only fixed effects in this context has the advantage of not sacrificing degrees of freedom for the estimation of variance and random effects and therefore is able to incorporate a higher number of interaction effects without model overspecification (see Moehring, 2012). In the analyses conducted for this study, the number of tested CLIs is limited, allowing for the estimation of interactions with both fixed and random effects on contextual level.

254 The possible existence of optimal levels of inequality with regard to economic and social outcomes is discussed in the literature (see for instance Varshavsky, 2010) and research in the context of health inequality shows that the interplay of poverty and inequality might be more important than inequality in itself in terms of main effects (Rambotti, 2015).

and inequality tolerance as well as a reduced model based on variables that show consistent significant effects in preceding analyses.

Fifth, I test additional mechanistic assumptions by introducing variables related to specific motives on individual level as implied in the theoretical model, specifically hedonic and normative motives and influences of subjective structural position (see Chapter 4.5). The control of additional individual-level factors, specifically in the context of attitudes, may introduce the risk of an overestimation of associated effects and an underestimation of other effects related to interests and hedonic factors because of possible collinearity and reverse causality between different normative and attitudinal dimensions. I assume that these problems are more prevalent for the estimation of main effects in contrast to interaction effects, but also use multiple conceptually different indicators to minimize these risks. Attitude-related independent variables on individual level are only controlled for in these additional tests designed to test the postulated mechanisms on individual level with regard to normative influences.

4 Results

Since all indicators can be regarded as rough approximations of theoretical constructs and no measure is ideal, my focus in all analyses is, as described above, the consistency of CLIs across different model configurations and indicators. It was not the aim of this study to build an optimal model of the explanation of inequality tolerance, but instead to test multiple indicators of the same group of theoretically relevant constructs in varying models and specifications and only accept hypotheses that show consistent and significant effects in most models in every series of models, ideally in at least nine out of 10 cases in all model series.

Additionally, I use at least two different computations of structural position (SLEI and SLPI), of the main dependent variable inequality tolerance (IT1 and IT2) and of the corresponding control variable inequality perception (IP1 and IP2) if not further specified. On individual level, all models if not further specified additionally control for age in linear and quadratic form, gender, marital status and educational categories. On contextual level, survey wave and geographical region are included as control variables beside the main effects of all variables used for CLIs with indicators of individual structural position, such as computations of personal and household equivalence income.

Regarding main effects of control variables, although not of theoretical interest in this study, it should be noted that on individual level, in terms of control variables there are highly consistent effects for most variables. Perceived inequality shows consistent positive effects on inequality tolerance, which has to at least partly be explained by the measurement of the variables as described in the previous sections. The highest education category shows consistent positive effects, gender shows a consistent negative effect for females and age is associated with a negative linear and a positive quadratic effect in all models of the first four series. In terms of main effects of contextual variables, in the models of the first four series, differences between geographic regions and survey waves are not consistently significant, but political mobilization as indicated by unionization rates often shows significant negative effects, whereas aggregate perceived inequality and aggregate inequality tolerance show consistent positive effects in most models[255]. In the following, only effects of individual structural position[256] and its CLIs with contextual factors will be discussed in terms of consistency of

255 Since these control variables are of no theoretical interest to this study, the full models including control variables on individual level are only presented for selected model series in the appendix (see Table A.3 in the appendix).

256 To provide some information about range and extreme cases, Table A.2.3 in the appendix shows the 10 country years with the strongest and the 10 country years with the weakest structural effects.

effects, apart from later chapters testing for more specific hypotheses related to theoretical mechanisms. I generally use an alpha level of 0.05 to identify effects that are significant, but additionally take note of effects that are significant using an alpha level of 0.10 when tendencies in terms of consistency are notable on this level. In these cases, I always explicitly describe which alpha level is used. If no alpha level is noted, the alpha level used to identify significant effects is 0.05.

4.1 Main hierarchical model series for standardized logarithmic income measures

The first series of regression models use standardized logarithmic forms of household equivalence and personal income as indicators of structural position with respective CLIs and additional controls to explain variation in two different indicators of inequality tolerance (IT1 and IT2). The combination of different independent and dependent variables used in these baseline models including the 14 hierarchical steps conducted are termed the main model series in the following and are used for most analyses in this chapter. The model including all CLIs with actual inequality, redistribution, prosperity, system threat, fractionalization, political mobilization, political distrust, perceived inequality and aggregate inequality tolerance (corresponding to M. 14 in Tables 4.1 through 4.4) is termed the full model. To evaluate hypotheses, I consider the consistency of significance and direction of CLIs as well as simple likelihood ratio tests against previous hierarchical models when possible. The number of individual cases included in all analyses in this chapter is 60397 in 67 country years for series using household equivalence income and 52713 in 67 country years for series using personal income.

In the following I present results for complete hierarchical steps for the main models series using main effects of geographical regions. As a next step, I only present the final model for each of the four main model series (corresponding to M. 14 in Tables 4.1 through 4.4) using five different model configurations[257]. Whereas the first four model series use only main effects for geographical regions as additional controls, in the second step, the four main model series are first repeated with two alternative forms of inclusion of geographic differences (main effects of country-year dummies and CLIs between structural position and region). The 12 resulting combinations of income measure, dependent variable and model configuration are then repeated controlling for cluster-robust standard errors, since the previous series of models allow for additional likelihood ratio tests, but are potentially biased by the use of simple standard errors.

257 Full hierarchical steps for the model series that are not fully reported in the following two chapters are presented in the appendix (see Tables A.4.1 through A.4.20 in the appendix).

Tab. 4.1: Main model for IT1 controlling for region and year using SLEI

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9	M. 10	M. 11	M. 12	M. 13	M. 14
Model type	RI	RI	RI	RSRI	RSRI	RI	RI	RI	RI	RI	RI	RI	RI	RI
Structural position		20.44	20.45	9.62	10.49	21.12	20.18	20.29	20.77	20.76	19.41	19.32	18.10	17.76
Context-level main effects:														
Actual inequality			0.55	0.66	1.03	0.56	1.08	1.23	0.90	0.96	0.65	0.71	-0.51	-0.17
Redistribution							1.11	0.87	0.74	0.75	1.45	1.56	1.59	1.23
Prosperity								0.70	0.81	0.85	1.34	1.25	0.77	-0.06
System threat									0.94	0.91	1.04	0.67	1.21	-0.27
Fractionalization										-0.34	-0.53	-0.52	0.02	0.56
Mobilization											-2.70	-2.82	-2.63	-2.65
Political distrust												-0.77	-1.76	-1.83
Perceived inequality													2.74	3.37
Inequality tolerance														2.00
CLI:														
Actual inequality					*-3.31*	*-8.08*	*-1.78*	*-1.86*	*2.04*	*1.84*	*1.72*	*1.75*	*-0.91*	*-0.96*
Redistribution							*3.00*	*3.48*	*3.88*	*3.82*	*4.58*	*4.24*	*2.85*	*2.68*
Prosperity								*-2.15*	*-3.59*	*-3.59*	*-2.31*	*-2.05*	*-2.15*	*-0.54*
System threat									*-7.64*	*-7.45*	*-6.95*	*-5.83*	*-4.36*	*-3.75*
Fractionalization										*0.00*	*0.00*	*-1.04*	*-0.64*	*-0.41*
Mobilization											*-3.69*	*-2.79*	*-1.44*	*-1.40*
Political distrust												*0.01*	*0.00*	*-0.73*
Perceived inequality													*5.13*	*3.90*
Inequality tolerance														*-2.30*
Constant	35.10	10.71	5.97	5.90	5.87	5.79	5.96	4.66	4.75	4.76	4.49	4.56	4.86	3.45
Variance (level two)	0.11	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Residual variance	0.60	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42
Chi² value of LR test		20830	26	183	10	128	10	5	59	0	21	4	33	9
LR Test against M. 3						65								

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors and Chi² values of LR tests are displayed in the last four rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. LR tests are conducted against the previous model (vice versa for the test of M. 6 against M. 5) if not further specified (compare the last row). Model type differentiates between random-intercept [RI] and random-slope-random-intercept [RSRI] models.

4.1.1 Main model series controlling for main effects of geographic regions

The respective tables show the main model of explaining inequality tolerance in hierarchical steps, including more independent variables with each step. In the first series of regression models (see Table 4.1), all models are based on IT1, controlling for IP1 using SLEI. In the second series (see Table 4.2), I present data for similar models using SLPI and again IT1 as dependent variable, controlling for IP1. In the third series (see Table 4.3), SLEI is used as indicator for structural position and IT2 as indicator for inequality tolerance. In the forth series (see Table 4.4), SLPI is used in combination with IT2. After

that, these four models are used with the alternative model configurations using other forms of control for geographic influences.

Before turning to the effect of structural position and its CLIs, I briefly consider some basic tests to see if the use of multi-level models and CLIs is sound in this case. I first estimate how much variance in the dependent variable is located at country level and second if likelihood ratio tests comparing both models with random spline estimation for effects of structural position and models with specific additional CLIs show significant advantages over random intercept models in general and, respectively, against random intercept models with more limited sets of CLIs. With regard to the variance in the independent variable to be explained as related to country-year level, the first model series, using SLEI and IT1, shows that most of the unexplained variance is located on personal level, while 15.5[258] percent of unexplained variance is located at country level for standardized logarithmic household equivalence income as can be seen for the zero model in the first data column. For the other three model series using different indicators for structural position and inequality tolerance, the variance located at country level varies between 12.5 percent and 19 percent (see Tables 4.1 through 4.4). Controlling for additional variables including CLIs, the unexplained variance located at country level decreases with additional dependent variables and CLIs included, but stays over 3.5 percent in all models[259].

In terms of cross-level interaction effects, the consistently positive main effect of structural position as indicated by the two different income-based measures used is universally affected by redistribution in form of a positive cross-level interaction, describing a stronger positive effect of income in contexts of higher redistribution, and by system threat (as indicated by poverty), showing a negative interaction effect with income in all models. For these two variables, all models in all four series show consistent and significant CLIs with individual income. Additionally, perceived income inequality shows a consistent positive cross-level interaction with income in all models for household

258 Computed by dividing the variance on contextual level by the sum of the variance on contextual level added to the residual variance 0.11/(0.60*0.11)=0.155.

259 It should be kept in mind that the effects of interest are CLIs and not main effects on country level and these tests therefore are limited in implications. Additionally, the estimates for conditional intra-class coefficients might be biased by inclusion or exclusion of control variables. Conditional intra-class coefficients for some models such as series controlling for country-level fixed effects are much lower because of extensive country-level control variables.

Tab. 4.2: Main hierarchical model series for IT1 controlling for region and year using SLPI

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9	M. 10	M. 11	M. 12	M. 13	M. 14
Model type	RI	RI	RI	RSRI	RSRI	RI	RI	RI	RI	RI	RI	RI	RI	RI
Structural position		16.35	16.35	8.34	8.75	16.60	15.65	15.67	15.93	15.96	15.30	15.16	14.70	14.10
Context-level main effects:														
Actual inequality			0.98	1.31	1.66	0.99	1.58	1.82	1.38	1.39	1.06	1.10	-0.01	0.24
Redistribution							1.39	1.05	0.88	0.89	1.61	1.74	1.74	1.30
Prosperity								1.01	1.15	1.19	1.62	1.51	1.09	0.27
System threat									1.26	1.22	1.36	-0.52	1.41	-0.31
Fractionalization										-0.34	-0.53	-2.74	-0.05	0.79
Mobilization											-2.60	0.95	-2.60	-2.68
Political distrust												-0.81	-1.64	-1.69
Perceived inequality													2.30	2.93
Inequality tolerance														1.98
CLI:														
Actual inequality					*-2.35*	*-5.69*	*1.17*	*1.15*	*4.95*	*5.38*	*5.14*	*5.08*	*3.40*	*3.51*
Redistribution							*5.19*	*5.22*	*5.88*	*6.19*	*6.57*	*6.05*	*5.27*	*5.05*
Prosperity								*-0.88*	*-2.24*	*-2.50*	*-1.64*	*-1.38*	*-1.48*	*0.13*
System threat									*-7.50*	*-7.77*	*-7.25*	*-6.09*	*-5.46*	*-4.98*
Fractionalization										*-2.14*	*-2.53*	*-2.68*	*-2.55*	*-2.26*
Mobilization											*-2.42*	*-1.62*	*-0.93*	*-0.69*
Political distrust												*1.31*	*0.21*	*0.57*
Perceived inequality													*2.20*	*1.10*
Inequality tolerance														*-2.39*
Constant	34.68	9.58	5.54	5.58	5.56	5.42	5.73	4.38	4.53	4.52	4.25	4.33	4.54	3.22
Variance (level two)	0.08	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Residual variance	0.56	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40
Chi² value of LR test		18186	26	133	5	106	29	2	58	5	12	2	10	10
LR Test against M. 3						32								

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors and Chi² values of LR tests are displayed in the last four rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. LR tests are conducted against the previous model (vice versa for the test of M. 6 against M. 5) if not further specified (compare the last row). Model type differentiates between random-intercept [RI] and random-slope-random-intercept [RSRI] models.

equivalence income (see Tables 4.1 and 4.3), whereas actual income inequality shows a consistent significant positive interaction and ethnic fractionalization as well as aggregated inequality tolerance show consistent significant negative CLIs with income in all series for personal income (see Tables 4.2 and 4.4). Even though the inclusion of aggregate inequality tolerance leads to significant likelihood ratio tests against the previous hierarchical models, the indicator used only shows consistent significant interaction effects in three of the four series, not including standardized logarithmic household equivalence income (see Table 4.3).

Tab. 4.3: Main hierarchical model series for IT2 controlling for region and year using SLEI

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9	M. 10	M. 11	M. 12	M. 13	M. 14
Model type	RI	RI	RI	RSRI	RSRI	RI	RI	RI	RI	RI	RI	RI	RI	RI
Structural position		17.01	17.04	8.72	9.60	17.71	16.92	17.13	17.67	17.64	16.39	16.38	15.50	15.39
Context-level main effects:														
Actual inequality			0.83	0.95	1.58	0.83	1.67	1.73	1.00	0.96	0.70	0.75	-0.27	0.09
Redistribution							1.74	1.55	1.27	1.27	1.83	1.90	1.91	1.54
Prosperity								0.44	0.74	0.76	1.14	1.07	0.67	-0.22
System threat									2.55	2.53	2.68	-0.30	0.15	-0.16
Fractionalization										-0.16	-0.31	2.26	2.72	2.00
Mobilization											-2.18	-2.26	-2.06	-2.08
Political distrust												-0.56	-1.37	-1.44
Perceived inequality													2.24	2.97
Inequality tolerance														2.16
CLI:														
Actual inequality					*-3.50*	*-7.95*	*-2.11*	*-2.23*	*1.97*	*2.05*	*1.92*	*1.92*	*0.01*	*0.00*
Redistribution							*2.52*	*3.30*	*3.73*	*3.79*	*4.53*	*4.51*	*3.51*	*3.49*
Prosperity								*-3.14*	*-4.66*	*-4.70*	*-3.39*	*-3.39*	*-3.45*	*-2.78*
System threat									*-8.17*	*-8.09*	*-7.60*	*-7.16*	*-6.06*	*-5.87*
Fractionalization										*-0.67*	*-1.25*	*-1.19*	*-0.92*	*-0.89*
Mobilization											*-3.60*	*-3.42*	*-2.46*	*-2.46*
Political distrust												*-0.18*	*-1.85*	*-1.83*
Perceived inequality													*3.50*	*3.18*
Inequality tolerance														*-0.20*
Constant	36.44	14.22	8.53	8.47	8.43	8.35	8.68	7.11	7.63	7.63	7.42	7.45	7.74	6.05
Variance (level two)	0.19	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Residual variance	0.81	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55
Chi² value of LR test		22781	45	150	11	98	9	10	73	0	18	0	17	5
LR Test against M. 3						63								

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors and Chi² values of LR tests are displayed in the last four rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. LR tests are conducted against the previous model (vice versa for the test of M. 6 against M. 5) if not further specified (compare the last row). Model type differentiates between random-intercept [RI] and random-slope-random-intercept [RSRI] models.

Noteworthy is that the inclusion of political mobilization shows a significant negative interaction effect with income in three of the four series of models when it is initially included, but the effect loses significance in all but one model series (standardized household equivalence income). Actual inequality also initially shows significant negative cross-level interaction effects when added, but the significance is lost in the following models of all series using household equivalence income, whereas the effect turns into a significant positive effect in the following models of the series for personal income. Specifically, the inclusion of redistribution seems to substantially weaken the cross-

Tab. 4.4: Main hierarchical model series for IT2 controlling for region and year using SLPI

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9	M. 10	M. 11	M. 12	M. 13	M. 14
Model type	RI	RI	RI	RSRI	RSRI	RI	RI	RI	RI	RI	RI	RI	RI	RI
Structural position		13.95	13.97	7.23	7.76	14.24	13.30	13.40	13.66	13.70	13.18	13.20	13.01	12.50
Context-level main effects:														
Actual inequality			1.06	1.29	1.65	1.07	2.00	2.09	1.31	1.29	1.01	1.04	0.04	0.35
Redistribution							2.01	1.76	1.48	1.48	2.06	2.16	2.16	1.66
Prosperity								0.59	0.90	0.93	1.27	1.18	0.80	-0.17
System threat									2.68	2.65	2.80	2.33	2.74	2.01
Fractionalization										-0.26	-0.41	-0.41	0.01	-0.30
Mobilization											-2.14	-2.25	-2.11	-2.20
Political distrust												-0.70	-1.42	-1.50
Perceived inequality													2.04	2.88
Inequality tolerance														2.42
CLI:														
Actual inequality					*-2.88*	*-6.13*	*1.08*	*1.05*	*4.80*	*5.46*	*5.27*	*5.29*	*4.45*	*4.53*
Redistribution							*5.38*	*5.63*	*6.27*	*6.68*	*6.91*	*6.88*	*6.54*	*6.35*
Prosperity								*-1.67*	*-2.99*	*-3.31*	*-2.60*	*-2.69*	*-2.70*	*-1.09*
System threat									*-7.38*	*-7.75*	*-7.33*	*-6.99*	*-6.73*	*-6.29*
Fractionalization										*-2.62*	*-2.90*	*-2.78*	*-2.75*	*-2.50*
Mobilization											*-1.80*	*-1.93*	*-1.74*	*-1.53*
Political distrust												*-0.72*	*-0.83*	*-0.52*
Perceived inequality													*0.42*	*-0.40*
Inequality tolerance														*-2.02*
Constant	36.04	13.55	8.48	8.29	8.28	8.35	8.84	7.26	7.81	7.79	7.59	7.65	7.89	6.20
Variance (level two)	0.14	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Residual variance	0.76	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53
Chi² value of LR test		19674	44	110	8	80	33	3	61	7	8	1	4	10
LR Test against M. 3						38								

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors and Chi² values of LR tests are displayed in the last four rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. LR tests are conducted against the previous model (vice versa for the test of M. 6 against M. 5) if not further specified (compare the last row). Model type differentiates between random-intercept [RI] and random-slope-random-intercept [RSRI] models.

level interaction of inequality and the inclusion of system threat two hierarchical steps later turns the interaction effect of inequality around, with system threat showing a consistently negative effect whereas inequality in contrast shows a positive (for series using personal income) or zero effect (for series using household equivalence income) in the models controlling for system threat.

In terms of comparing model quality, Chi² values of likelihood ratio tests are presented for the first four series of models. In the last four rows in the tables of the first four series, the residual

Tab. 4.5: Separate results of LR tests for inclusion of main effects versus cross-level interactions of contextual factors

	IT1				IT2			
	SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI	
	Main effect	CLI	Main effect	CLI	Main effect	CLI	Main effect	CLI
Actual inequality	26.42	65.25	25.53	32.42	44.72	63.14	44.14	37.55
Redistribution	1.22	8.98	1.90	26.95	2.96	6.36	3.92	28.92
Prosperity	0.50	4.64	1.02	0.78	0.19	9.85	0.35	2.79
System threat	0.89	58.32	1.56	56.22	6.18	66.69	6.82	54.41
Fractionalization	0.11	0.02	0.11	4.57	0.02	0.44	0.07	6.86
Mobilization	6.94	13.60	6.46	5.87	4.60	12.95	4.43	3.24
Political distrust	0.59	3.32	0.66	1.72	0.32	0.03	0.48	0.52
Perceived inequality	7.13	26.28	5.09	4.86	4.84	12.28	4.03	0.17
Inequality tolerance	3.87	5.31	3.80	5.73	4.50	0.04	5.58	4.06

Notes: Displayed are Chi² values of LR tests against preceding models (corresponding to the hierarchical series in Tables 4.1 through 4.4, but consecutively adding main effects and cross-level interactions separately). The degree of freedom for the LR tests in these models is only 1 instead of 2 for the other two model configurations with regard to the treatment of geographical region, since main and interaction effects are added consecutively in single steps. Therefore, the Chi²-based threshold for significant effects in these models using an alpha-level of 0.05 is 3.84 instead of 5.99. Only the results for LR tests against preceding models for the models adding the listed variables with regard to main effects (first data column) and cross-level interactions with structural position (second data column) for context-level factors related to hypotheses are displayed.

variance for errors on contextual and individual level is shown as well as the result of a likelihood ratio test against the previous model where applicable. The last row additionally shows the result of a likelihood ratio test against the third model (M. 6 against M.3) in each of the four tables, to analyze the difference of the sixth model to the preceding random-intercept model. The Chi² test with 2 degrees of freedom for an alpha level of 0.05 is based on a critical value of 5.99, showing Chi² values higher or equal to 6 as significant for the likelihood ratio tests. Based on this procedure, the inclusion of inequality shows a consistently better model fit as compared to the model not using random splines for the income variable, but not consistently better when adding it to the random spline model variation (see M. 3 in Tables 4.1 through 4.4). The inclusion of additional interaction effects consistently improves model fit significantly for four additional contextual variables. Specifically, including interaction effects of individual income with redistribution, system threat and aggregate inequality tolerance significantly improves the models tested in all four series in accordance with their consistent significant interaction effects with individual income[260]. For aggregate perceived inequality, the inclusion improves the model in three of the four series (for the exception see Table 4.4). In the case of

260 Additionally, political mobilization also improves the model in all series in accordance with its consistent main effect whereas its interaction effect is not significant in most models.

prosperity (specifically in the series for personal income), ethnic fractionalization (in all series) and political distrust (in all series), most likelihood ratio tests are not significant. Among the factors tested, only the inclusion of inequality, redistribution, political mobilization and aggregate inequality tolerance consistently improves the general model of explaining individual inequality tolerance.

Considering the likelihood ratio tests for the inclusion of contextual variables separately for main versus interaction effects (see Table 4.5), it is evident that the inclusion of interaction effects[261] significantly improves the model for actual inequality, redistribution and system threat. For political mobilization, perceived inequality and inequality tolerance, the model is improved in three of the four series, respectively. For fractionalization, the model is improved in both series using personal income. For prosperity, the model is improved in both model series using household equivalence income. No model improvement is visible for political distrust in terms of either main or interaction effects.

4.1.2 Alternative controls for geographic influences

As the next step, the same series of models are conducted again, first including additional cross-level interactions between geographical region and structural position (in the first four data columns of Table 4.6) and second using models that control for country-year differences with dummies for each country year (in the last four data columns of Table 4.6) instead of using the broader indicators for survey wave[262] and geographical region. For the Z-values of effects, only the last model in each series is presented[263], corresponding to M. 14 in the specification in Tables 4.1 through 4.4.

Controlling for main effects of country years (see Table 4.6) does not change the results substantially from those presented in the previous tables (see Tables 4.1 through 4.4). Redistribution shows a positive and system threat a negative interaction with structural position in all four models, whereas actual inequality and perceived inequality have positive interaction effects associated with

261 The inclusion of main effects makes a consistent significant difference for actual inequality, mobilization and perceived inequality. Inequality tolerance significantly improves the model in three out of four series and in four series when using an alpha level of 0.10. These results are roughly in line with the main effects discussed for contextual factors in the beginning of chapter 4, excepting actual inequality which generally only shows main effects in a small number of models.

262 Additional tests show that there are no consistent interaction effects between survey wave and structural effects visible in the data (see Table A.12 in the appendix).

263 The full models are reported with all hierarchical steps in the appendix (see Tables A.4.1 through A.4.20 in the appendix).

Tab. 4.6: Main hierarchical models for inequality tolerance using dummy variables for context-level units

	IT1				IT2			
	SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI	
	Z	Chi² (LR)	Z	Chi² (LR)	Z	Chi² (LR)	Z	Chi² (LR)
Structural position	17.74		14.08		15.37		12.49	
CLI:								
Actual inequality	*-0.97*	*65.49*	*3.51*	*32.56*	*0.00*	*63.30*	*4.54*	*37.66*
Redistribution	*2.68*	*9.01*	*5.05*	*27.00*	*3.49*	*6.38*	*6.35*	*29.01*
Prosperity	*-0.54*	*4.64*	*0.13*	*0.78*	*-2.78*	*9.84*	*-1.09*	*2.79*
System threat	*-3.75*	*58.38*	*-4.98*	*56.34*	*-5.87*	*66.79*	*-6.30*	*54.57*
Fractionalization	*-0.42*	*0.02*	*-2.26*	*4.56*	*-0.89*	*0.44*	*-2.50*	*6.86*
Mobilization	*-1.39*	*13.59*	*-0.69*	*5.85*	*-2.45*	*12.94*	*-1.53*	*3.23*
Political distrust	*-0.72*	*3.36*	*0.58*	*1.74*	*-1.83*	*0.03*	*-0.51*	*0.52*
Perceived inequality	*3.90*	*26.27*	*1.10*	*4.84*	*3.18*	*12.28*	*-0.40*	*0.17*
Inequality tolerance	*-2.30*	*5.31*	*-2.39*	*5.73*	*-0.20*	*0.04*	*-2.02*	*4.07*
Constant	4.93		4.23		11.82		11.97	
Variance (level two)	0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00	
Residual variance	0.42		0.40		0.55		0.53	
N (individuals)	60397		52712		60397		52712	
N (groups)	67		67		67		67	

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients and Chi² values of LR tests against the preceding model in the hierarchical setup (compare Tables 4.1 through 4.4). Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors and numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last four rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for country year controls and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. The degrees of freedom for the LR tests in these models is only 1 instead of 2 for the other two model configurations with regard to the treatment of geographical region, since no main effects of contextual variables are included and only one variable is added to the nested model. Therefore, the Chi²-based threshold for significant effects in these models using an alpha-level of 0.05 is 3.84 instead of 5.99.

personal and household equivalence income, respectively. Additionally, aggregate inequality tolerance shows a negative interaction with structural position in three models, but not in the model using household equivalence income and IT2. In all four models, the unexplained variance on country level is minimal, since most variation in terms of main effects is controlled for by the use of country-year dummy variables. The likelihood ratio tests show that the inclusion of variables significantly improves the model for actual inequality, redistribution and system threat in all models. With regard to effects specific to income type, the inclusion of prosperity, mobilization and perceived inequality leads to improved models for series using household equivalence income whereas the inclusion of fractionalization and inequality tolerance significantly improves models using personal income.

The control of cross-level interaction effects between individual structural position and geographical region in the next four series in the same table (see Table 4.7) shows no consistent

Tab. 4.7: Main hierarchical model series for inequality tolerance using geographical interactions

	IT1				IT2			
	SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI	
	Z	Chi² (LR)	Z	Chi² (LR)	Z	Chi² (LR)	Z	Chi² (LR)
Structural position	6.26		4.64		3.39		2.13	
Context-level main effects:								
Region: Europe	0.56		0.57		-0.34		-0.25	
Region: East. Europe	-0.34		-0.05		-0.76		-0.50	
Region: Other	2.53		2.32		2.37		2.40	
Actual inequality	-0.18		0.24		0.79		0.35	
Redistribution	1.23		1.30		0.94		1.66	
Prosperity	-0.06		0.27		-1.88		-0.17	
System threat	-0.27		-0.31		0.09		-0.30	
Fractionalization	0.56		0.80		1.54		2.01	
Mobilization	-2.66		-2.68		-2.08		-2.20	
Political distrust	-1.83		-1.69		-1.44		-1.50	
Perceived inequality	3.37		2.94		2.97		2.88	
Inequality tolerance	1.99		1.97		2.15		2.41	
CLI:								
Region: Europe	*-0.85*		*0.13*		*0.79*		*1.54*	
Region: East. Europe	*-1.28*		*-1.25*		*0.94*		*1.19*	
Region: Other	*-4.48*		*-2.45*		*-1.88*		*-0.73*	
Actual inequality	*0.17*	*151.85*	*3.03*	*82.01*	*1.21*	*127.05*	*4.62*	*80.46*
Redistribution	*1.91*	*1.77*	*4.28*	*11.54*	*2.23*	*3.83*	*4.73*	*15.65*
Prosperity	*-1.18*	*1.08*	*-1.45*	*3.44*	*-2.06*	*1.02*	*-1.27*	*1.25*
System threat	*-1.92*	*20.42*	*-3.72*	*36.48*	*-4.89*	*39.43*	*-5.68*	*46.60*
Fractionalization	*-0.63*	*1.70*	*-1.82*	*5.01*	*-1.40*	*2.60*	*-2.71*	*8.14*
Mobilization	*-1.02*	*13.55*	*-0.73*	*11.34*	*-2.10*	*11.93*	*-1.33*	*6.36*
Political distrust	*-0.60*	*3.77*	*0.56*	*3.45*	*-1.54*	*0.39*	*-0.32*	*0.58*
Perceived inequality	*3.03*	*25.32*	*1.17*	*10.08*	*2.76*	*12.47*	*-0.03*	*4.06*
Inequality tolerance	*-2.31*	*9.20*	*-1.92*	*7.46*	*0.54*	*4.77*	*-0.31*	*5.67*
Constant	3.42		3.21		6.02		6.17	
Variance (level two)	0.02		0.02		0.02		0.02	
Residual variance	0.42		0.40		0.55		0.53	
N (individuals)	60397		52712		60397		52712	
N (groups)	67		67		67		67	

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients and Chi² values of LR tests against the preceding model in the hierarchical setup (compare Tables 4.1 through 4.4). Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors and numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last four rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed.

significant effects, but reduces the Z-values of other CLIs. The positive effects of redistribution and the negative effects of system threat fall below the threshold using an alpha of 0.05 in the model for standardized logarithmic household equivalence income, but continue to be significant in all other models. Aggregate perceived inequality shows a positive cross-level interaction with structural

position for all models using household equivalence income, whereas actual inequality shows a positive interaction with personal income. Other effects are not consistent. Prosperity, fractionalization, political mobilization and aggregate inequality tolerance only show significant interaction effects with structural position in some of the models. With regard to likelihood ratio tests, only the inclusion of actual inequality, system threat and mobilization results in model improvement for all series. The inclusion of perceived inequality improves models using household equivalence income, the inclusion of redistribution improves models using personal income.

In sum, using the two alternative model configurations based on country-year controls and geographic interactions, highly similar effects can be seen in terms of consistency in effect direction in most of the eight additional series, but the inclusion of interactions with geographical regions changes the significance of some effects. Specifically, for the model series using standardized logarithmic household equivalence income with geographic CLIs and IT1 as dependent variable, the cross level interactions of income with redistribution and system threat do not reach significance in the last hierarchical model when using an alpha value of 0.05[264] (even though it could still be regarded as significant using a slightly higher alpha value such as 0.10). In all other series, the substantial results are highly similar to the results presented above using only main effects of geographical region, even though Z-values are partly smaller as compared to the first four series of models. Since the inclusion of interactions between region and structural position does not lead to consistent effects[265] and substantially reduces the Z-values for most other CLIs in all models, I consider the inclusion of geographical interaction effects to be a likely unnecessary source of bias and limit their inclusion to additional comparisons for specific forms of models such as the test of random versus fixed context-level effects (see Chapter 4.2.1).

In the next step of analyses, I repeat the full models from the previous 12 series using cluster-corrected standard errors, again presenting the Z-values for interaction effects for the full model from each of the 12 hierarchical model series[266] (see Table 4.8). The results for all 12 models using

264 Additionally, likelihood ratio tests comparing these models with the previous hierarchical step are not significant for models using household equivalence income.

265 Even the inconsistent significant cross-level interaction effects between region and structural position (see Table 4.5) only reach significance in the final model (corresponding to M. 14 in Tables 4.1 through 4.4) that introduces the control for inequality tolerance.

266 For these configurations, the software used (Stata 16) does not show results for the likelihood ratio tests.

Tab. 4.8: Full models from previous series using cluster-corrected standard errors

	Regional main effects				Country-year controls				Regional CLIs			
	SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	10.08	10.04	8.09	7.94	10.06	10.01	8.07	7.91	5.38	3.31	3.16	1.36
Context-level main effects:												
Region: Europe	0.67	-0.30	0.67	-0.23					0.66	-0.30	0.66	-0.23
Region: East. Europe	-0.39	-0.69	-0.05	-0.46					-0.39	-0.70	-0.06	-0.47
Region: Other	2.34	2.20	2.35	2.44					2.34	2.20	2.35	2.44
Actual inequality	-0.13	0.08	0.20	0.34					-0.13	0.07	0.20	0.34
Redistribution	0.95	1.07	1.08	1.22					0.95	1.07	1.08	1.22
Prosperity	-0.05	-0.19	0.20	-0.14					-0.05	-0.19	0.21	-0.14
System threat	-0.24	-0.16	-0.29	-0.31					-0.25	-0.16	-0.29	-0.31
Fractionalization	0.61	2.34	0.84	2.24					0.61	2.34	0.84	2.24
Mobilization	-2.43	-1.60	-2.48	-1.70					-2.43	-1.61	-2.48	-1.70
Political distrust	-1.66	-1.25	-1.54	-1.31					-1.66	-1.25	-1.54	-1.31
Perceived inequality	2.37	1.98	2.21	2.04					2.37	1.98	2.21	2.05
Inequality tolerance	1.92	1.82	1.86	2.03					1.91	1.82	1.85	2.02
CLI:												
Region: Europe									*-0.61*	*0.71*	*0.08*	*1.05*
Region: East. Europe									*-0.97*	*0.80*	*-0.82*	*0.75*
Region: Other									*-4.13*	*-1.30*	*-1.56*	*-0.36*
Actual inequality	*-0.60*	*0.00*	*2.63*	*3.26*	*-0.61*	*0.00*	*2.63*	*3.26*	*0.11*	*0.78*	*2.05*	*2.88*
Redistribution	*2.01*	*2.50*	*3.47*	*4.49*	*2.01*	*2.50*	*3.47*	*4.50*	*1.48*	*1.95*	*2.96*	*3.56*
Prosperity	*-0.42*	*-2.16*	*0.12*	*-1.12*	*-0.42*	*-2.15*	*0.11*	*-1.12*	*-0.87*	*-1.84*	*-1.13*	*-1.11*
System threat	*-2.69*	*-5.25*	*-5.08*	*-5.62*	*-2.69*	*-5.25*	*-5.08*	*-5.62*	*-1.83*	*-4.36*	*-3.62*	*-4.12*
Fractionalization	*-0.31*	*-0.60*	*-1.52*	*-1.56*	*-0.31*	*-0.60*	*-1.52*	*-1.56*	*-0.48*	*-0.97*	*-1.13*	*-1.64*
Mobilization	*-0.75*	*-1.35*	*-0.55*	*-1.18*	*-0.74*	*-1.35*	*-0.55*	*-1.18*	*-0.64*	*-1.29*	*-0.65*	*-1.13*
Political distrust	*-0.44*	*-1.24*	*0.36*	*-0.37*	*-0.43*	*-1.23*	*0.37*	*-0.37*	*-0.39*	*-1.14*	*0.36*	*-0.24*
Perceived inequality	*2.26*	*2.01*	*0.69*	*-0.29*	*2.26*	*2.01*	*0.68*	*-0.30*	*1.74*	*1.96*	*0.73*	*-0.02*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.36*	*-0.15*	*-1.42*	*-1.32*	*-1.35*	*-0.15*	*-1.42*	*-1.32*	*-1.39*	*0.37*	*-1.14*	*-0.19*
Constant	3.21	5.12	2.94	5.65	3.38	7.49	2.74	7.99	3.18	5.10	2.92	5.64
Variance (level two)	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Residual variance	0.42	0.55	0.40	0.53	0.42	0.55	0.40	0.53	0.42	0.55	0.40	0.53
N (individuals)	60397	60397	52712	52712	60397	60397	52712	52712	60397	60397	52712	52712
N (groups)	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors and numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last four rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for country-year controls, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed.

corrected standard errors are highly similar to the previous models additionally using likelihood ratio tests in terms of direction and also in terms of significance. The exception are slightly lower Z-values leading to non-significant interactions of otherwise consistent effects (at least on an alpha level of 0.10 in the model series using geographic interactions) in one model series (using SLEI, IT1 and

geographical interactions). This is substantially consistent with the results from previous series that show lower Z-values for all interactions in all model series using geographical interactions. Again, the geographical CLIs are not consistent and this time only significant in one model series, the same series that leads to zero effects of most other CLIs (using SLEI, IT1 and geographic interactions).

In sum, 11 of the 12 series using corrected standard errors show significant effects for redistribution and system threat in line with previous models, but one of the 12 model series falsifies all hypothetical assumptions regarding CLIs. This specific model again belongs to a set of models using geographical CLIs that show no consistently significant effects. For household equivalence income, perceived inequality shows nearly consistent positive CLIs with structural position (consistent in terms of direction, but like all CLIs not significant in the model series using SLEI, IT1 and geographic CLIs), for personal income, actual inequality shows a similar effect. The substantial results are highly similar, but reduced in terms of Z-values and lead to the falsification of all hypotheses in at least one model (using SLEI, IT1 and geographic CLIs, see Table 4.8).

4.2 Models using fixed and random effects on context level

As a next step, the final models of the main model series (substantially corresponding to M. 14 in Tables 4.1 through 4.4) are used with fixed and random parts for main and cross-level interaction effects of all contextual factors to check for potential systematic differences in the nature of the interaction effects considered. In all analyses presented in this chapter, I use country-level fixed effects to differentiate between random and fixed CLIs of contextual factors with individual structural position. For each model, I present CLIs of structural position with the mean of the respective country as well as with the deviation of each country year from the country-specific mean for each contextual factor of theoretical relevance.

To be able to use a fixed-effects estimation of time-variant contextual variables, I modify the main models used in two ways[267]. First, the indicator for fractionalization is changed to a different indicator that includes multiple points of measurement in my data set. Specifically, instead of a direct measure of ethnic fractionalization, I use the percentage of migrants in a given country year as a proxy

267 The differences in the main models when controlling for the two different fractionalization measures as well as for including or not including political distrust are substantially minimal. I present the results of comparative tests in this context in the appendix (see Tables A.5.1 and A.5.2 in the appendix).

Tab. 4.9: Selected hierarchical steps of the modified main model with fixed and random effects for country level using geographic main effects and IT1 for SLEI and SLPI

	SLEI	SLPI	SLEI	SLPI	SLEI	SLPI	SLEI	SLPI	SLEI	SLPI	SLEI	SLPI
Structural position	7.73	7.03	7.74	6.88	7.71	6.78	9.87	8.06	9.95	7.82	10.25	9.06
Main Effects, fixed:												
Actual inequality	-0.47	-0.86	-0.07	-0.58	-0.23	-0.68	-0.34	-0.80	-0.44	-0.94	-0.81	-1.26
Redistribution			0.45	0.08	0.44	0.08	0.39	0.03	0.43	0.08	0.28	0.00
Prosperity					0.62	0.74	0.48	0.54	0.67	0.78	1.03	1.32
System threat							0.43	0.66	0.45	0.67	0.70	0.72
Fractionalization									-0.12	-0.10	-0.71	-0.54
Mobilization									-0.99	-0.93	-0.78	-0.84
Perceived inequality											-1.04	-0.75
Inequality tolerance											-1.53	-1.27
Main Effects, random:												
Actual inequality	0.79	1.21	0.86	1.45	0.82	1.33	0.55	0.91	0.40	0.76	0.00	0.42
Redistribution			0.76	1.14	0.72	1.07	0.62	0.93	0.74	1.08	1.03	1.31
Prosperity					0.09	0.09	0.24	0.25	0.96	0.90	-0.21	-0.03
System threat							1.72	2.29	1.83	2.33	1.36	1.52
Fractionalization									-0.02	-0.06	-0.54	-0.57
Mobilization									-2.44	-2.17	-1.59	-1.54
Perceived inequality											2.31	2.13
Inequality tolerance											2.57	2.35
CLI, fixed:												
Actual inequality	*0.86*	*0.82*	*2.41*	*1.76*	*2.42*	*1.70*	*1.80*	*1.42*	*0.65*	*0.71*	*0.81*	*0.85*
Redistribution			*2.87*	*3.42*	*2.85*	*3.48*	*3.09*	*3.92*	*2.53*	*3.08*	*2.57*	*3.30*
Prosperity					*-0.86*	*-0.70*	*-0.65*	*-0.59*	*-1.49*	*-1.02*	*-1.58*	*-0.89*
System threat							*1.73*	*0.74*	*2.01*	*0.98*	*1.62*	*0.52*
Fractionalization									*0.05*	*-0.06*	*0.39*	*0.09*
Mobilization									*-3.03*	*-1.67*	*-1.50*	*-0.73*
Perceived inequality											*0.86*	*0.35*
Inequality tolerance											*-0.37*	*-0.31*
CLI, random:												
Actual inequality	*-3.80*	*-3.30*	*-1.83*	*0.04*	*-1.92*	*-0.01*	*0.38*	*2.50*	*0.15*	*2.50*	*-1.41*	*1.63*
Redistribution			*0.91*	*1.95*	*1.32*	*2.17*	*1.89*	*3.17*	*2.23*	*3.21*	*1.48*	*3.00*
Prosperity					*-0.79*	*-0.51*	*-1.59*	*-1.25*	*-0.98*	*-0.44*	*-0.29*	*0.33*
System threat							*-4.70*	*-5.79*	*-4.98*	*-5.65*	*-2.71*	*-3.56*
Fractionalization									*0.98*	*0.70*	*1.23*	*0.95*
Mobilization									*-1.33*	*-1.06*	*-0.84*	*-0.89*
Perceived inequality											*2.42*	*0.64*
Inequality tolerance											*-0.67*	*-1.27*
N (individuals)	64570	58123	64570	58123	64570	58123	64570	58123	64570	58123	64570	58123
N (groups)	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for survey wave, regional controls, controls on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed.

for fractionalization. Second, I also exclude political distrust, as a construct that shows no consistent effects in any of the previous model series of the analyses in this chapter, since the data is imputed for some country years and shows very limited variation in time. As a first step, I use the same indicator for actual inequality as in the main model series. In a further step, I use various aggregated measures of actual inequality derived from the given ISSP data on individual-level. This has some disadvantages in terms of data quality and reliability, but ensures that the inequality data used comes from the same source for consecutive years. The number of units analyzed on individual level varies even within income types in this chapter, so comparisons apart from the direction and consistency of effects are in many cases not reliable in this chapter.

4.2.1 Modified main models

To compare changes over hierarchical steps as seen in previous chapters for the main model series, specifically with regard to the Gini index, I first present selected steps from the hierarchical model series for standardized logarithmic household equivalence and personal income using the main indicator of inequality tolerance (IT1, see Table 4.9). The initial inclusion of actual inequality shows a negative random cross-level interaction with structural position for both types of income, but no fixed effect. When additionally controlling for redistribution and prosperity, the random effect is not significant anymore and one model now shows a significant positive fixed effect of actual inequality. With the inclusion of additional control variables, the random effect of actual inequality is inconsistent and mostly not significant, whereas the fixed effect is not significant in any following model. The inclusion of redistribution leads to a significant positive interaction of the fixed effect with structural position, whereas the interaction with the random effect is positive, but not significant in the full model for equivalence income. Other contextual factors do not show consistent significant interactions of the fixed effect with structural position. In terms of random effects, the negative interaction of the random effect of system threat with structural position is significant in all respective models for both income types. Additionally, the random effect of perceived inequality shows a positive interaction with structural position for household equivalence income.

Using the second indicator of inequality tolerance (IT2), the hierarchical series (see Table 4.10) show similar effects to the previous hierarchical series for the first indicator of inequality

Tab. 4.10: Selected hierarchical steps of the modified main model with fixed and random effects for country level using geographic main effects and IT2 for SLEI and SLPI

	SLEI	SLPI	SLEI	SLPI	SLEI	SLPI	SLEI	SLPI	SLEI	SLPI	SLEI	SLPI
Structural position	7.34	6.51	7.30	6.25	7.26	6.24	9.95	7.58	10.53	6.95	10.85	7.96
Main Effects, fixed:												
Actual inequality	-0.68	-1.05	-0.26	-0.70	-0.43	-0.77	-0.95	-1.27	-1.14	-1.42	-1.20	-1.38
Redistribution			0.63	0.27	0.63	0.27	0.43	0.06	0.47	0.13	0.40	0.16
Prosperity					0.68	0.59	0.21	-0.10	0.43	0.24	0.50	0.19
System threat							1.29	1.61	1.58	1.85	1.52	1.52
Fractionalization									-1.45	-1.29	-1.29	-0.79
Mobilization									-1.35	-1.26	-1.40	-1.34
Perceived inequality											-0.38	0.21
Inequality tolerance											-0.90	-0.57
Main Effects, random:												
Actual inequality	1.38	1.69	1.48	2.04	1.18	1.59	0.49	0.71	0.40	0.60	0.04	0.40
Redistribution			1.14	1.49	1.29	1.66	1.21	1.52	1.37	1.72	1.41	1.61
Prosperity					-0.81	-0.86	-0.66	-0.70	-0.04	-0.14	-1.24	-1.13
System threat							3.72	4.01	4.02	4.35	3.02	3.01
Fractionalization									-0.28	-0.16	-0.66	-0.51
Mobilization									-1.70	-1.63	-1.21	-1.31
Perceived inequality											2.27	2.34
Inequality tolerance											2.27	2.29
CLI, fixed:												
Actual inequality	*1.43*	*1.32*	*2.58*	*2.48*	*2.41*	*2.67*	*2.08*	*2.34*	*1.45*	*1.62*	*1.06*	*1.57*
Redistribution			*2.72*	*2.90*	*2.89*	*3.25*	*3.09*	*3.57*	*2.35*	*2.90*	*2.13*	*3.12*
Prosperity					*-1.12*	*-1.44*	*-1.23*	*-1.41*	*-1.96*	*-1.46*	*-2.69*	*-1.38*
System threat							*-0.15*	*-0.51*	*0.11*	*-0.34*	*-0.39*	*-0.90*
Fractionalization									*0.14*	*0.47*	*0.87*	*0.57*
Mobilization									*-1.52*	*-0.92*	*-0.40*	*-0.38*
Perceived inequality											*2.05*	*0.43*
Inequality tolerance											*0.18*	*-0.50*
CLI, random:												
Actual inequality	*-3.69*	*-2.82*	*-2.28*	*0.13*	*-2.48*	*0.07*	*0.76*	*2.34*	*0.33*	*2.17*	*-0.34*	*2.47*
Redistribution			*0.98*	*2.37*	*1.66*	*2.73*	*2.22*	*3.83*	*2.63*	*3.89*	*2.18*	*4.27*
Prosperity					*-1.41*	*-0.89*	*-2.40*	*-1.77*	*-1.73*	*-0.94*	*-1.09*	*-0.15*
System threat							*-6.44*	*-5.16*	*-5.63*	*-4.95*	*-4.49*	*-4.39*
Fractionalization									*1.16*	*0.59*	*1.47*	*0.77*
Mobilization									*-1.57*	*-0.85*	*-1.47*	*-1.30*
Perceived inequality											*0.90*	*-0.75*
Inequality tolerance											*-0.54*	*-1.44*
N (individuals)	64570	56651	64570	56651	64570	56651	64570	56651	64570	56651	64570	56651
N (groups)	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for survey wave, regional controls, controls on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed.

tolerance (IT1). Actual inequality shows a positive interaction of its random effect with structural position, but the effect loses significance and partly changes direction in consecutive models. Specifically, after adding the cross-level interaction for redistribution the random cross-level effect of actual inequality is no longer significant when using personal income as indicator for structural position. For household equivalence income, the negative interaction of the random effect of actual inequality stays significant until system threat is added. Additionally, actual inequality also shows a negative interaction of its random effect, changing effect direction in the final three models for personal income. The interaction of the fixed effect of actual inequality is significant and positive in three of the six steps, but loses significance in the final two models for both measures of structural position. Only the positive interaction of redistribution with structural position is consistently significant throughout all steps that include the variable. Redistribution additionally shows a significant positive interaction of its random effect with structural position in eight of the 10 models presented including the final models for both measures of structural position. System threat shows a consistent negative interaction of its random effect, but no significant influences of its fixed effect.

Considering the full models for the second indicator of inequality tolerance as well as for alternative model configuration with regard to the inclusion of geographic influences (see Table 4.11), I again compare the 12 main model configurations already used for most other analyses in previous chapters. Taken together, the interactions between random contextual effects and structural position are substantially mostly similar to the general CLIs found in previous model series and mostly substantially consistent between the two measures of inequality tolerance and between different model specifications. The random effect of system threat shows a negative interaction with structural position but fails to reach significance in one of the 12 models (using household equivalence income and geographical CLIs). The random effect of redistribution shows the same direction as the consistent fixed effect of redistribution, but the random effect is only consistently significant for personal income. The random effect of perceived inequality shows a significant positive interaction with structural position for models using household equivalence income and IT1, but for models using IT2, the fixed effects of perceived inequality instead is significant. As a notable difference to previous series, actual inequality does not reach significance in most models as a random or fixed interaction with structural position, including half of the models using personal income, and also changes direction as a random effect depending on income type.

Tab. 4.11: Full models for estimations of cross-level interactions with fixed and random effects for country level using IT1 and IT2 for SLEI and SLPI

	Regional main effects				Country-year controls				Regional CLIs			
	IT1		IT2		IT1		IT2		IT1		IT2	
	SLEI	SLPI	SLEI	SLPI	SLEI	SLPI	SLEI	SLPI	SLEI	SLPI	SLEI	SLPI
Structural position	10.25	9.06	10.85	7.96	10.22	8.89	10.83	7.84	6.63	3.62	3.10	1.74
Main Effects, fixed:												
Actual inequality	-0.81	-1.26	-1.19	-1.38					-0.81	-1.25	-1.20	-1.38
Redistribution	0.28	0.00	0.40	0.16					0.28	0.00	0.40	0.16
Prosperity	1.04	1.32	0.50	0.20					1.03	1.32	0.49	0.19
System threat	0.70	0.72	1.51	1.50					0.70	0.72	1.53	1.52
Fractionalization	-0.71	-0.54	-1.28	-0.78					-0.71	-0.54	-1.29	-0.78
Mobilization	-0.78	-0.84	-1.39	-1.34					-0.79	-0.84	-1.40	-1.34
Perceived inequality	-1.04	-0.74	-0.38	0.22					-1.04	-0.74	-0.38	0.21
Inequality tolerance	-1.52	-1.27	-0.88	-0.56					-1.53	-1.27	-0.90	-0.56
Main Effects, random:												
Actual inequality	0.08	0.52	0.36	0.72					0.00	0.42	0.04	0.40
Redistribution	0.90	1.19	1.10	1.36					1.03	1.31	1.41	1.61
Prosperity	-0.12	0.04	-0.91	-0.86					-0.21	-0.03	-1.25	-1.13
System threat	1.36	1.58	2.92	3.00					1.36	1.52	3.02	3.01
Fractionalization	-0.50	-0.54	-0.46	-0.32					-0.55	-0.56	-0.66	-0.50
Mobilization	-1.59	-1.56	-1.16	-1.29					-1.59	-1.54	-1.21	-1.31
Perceived inequality	2.31	2.12	2.27	2.33					2.31	2.13	2.27	2.34
Inequality tolerance	3.14	2.79	3.53	3.45					2.56	2.35	2.26	2.29
CLI, fixed:												
Actual inequality	*0.81*	*0.85*	*1.06*	*1.57*	*0.87*	*0.87*	*1.11*	*1.58*	*0.61*	*0.47*	*1.23*	*1.51*
Redistribution	*2.57*	*3.30*	*2.13*	*3.12*	*2.63*	*3.32*	*2.19*	*3.16*	*2.87*	*3.53*	*2.29*	*3.44*
Prosperity	*-1.58*	*-0.89*	*-2.69*	*-1.38*	*-1.53*	*-0.87*	*-2.60*	*-1.35*	*-1.50*	*-0.79*	*-2.81*	*-1.50*
System threat	*1.61*	*0.52*	*-0.39*	*-0.90*	*1.52*	*0.47*	*-0.49*	*-0.99*	*1.32*	*0.62*	*-0.70*	*-0.90*
Fractionalization	*0.39*	*0.09*	*0.87*	*0.57*	*0.40*	*0.09*	*0.87*	*0.57*	*0.18*	*-0.05*	*0.80*	*0.57*
Mobilization	*-1.50*	*-0.73*	*-0.40*	*-0.38*	*-1.47*	*-0.71*	*-0.39*	*-0.37*	*-1.23*	*-0.76*	*0.02*	*-0.12*
Perceived inequality	*0.86*	*0.35*	*2.05*	*0.43*	*0.83*	*0.32*	*2.01*	*0.39*	*0.48*	*0.15*	*2.04*	*0.47*
Inequality tolerance	*-0.37*	*-0.31*	*0.18*	*-0.50*	*-0.41*	*-0.35*	*0.15*	*-0.56*	*-0.54*	*-0.56*	*0.27*	*-0.40*
CLI, random:												
Actual inequality	*-1.41*	*1.63*	*-0.34*	*2.47*	*-1.39*	*1.66*	*-0.27*	*2.51*	*-0.34*	*1.36*	*0.62*	*2.34*
Redistribution	*1.48*	*3.00*	*2.18*	*4.27*	*1.48*	*2.99*	*2.16*	*4.23*	*1.42*	*3.23*	*1.38*	*3.38*
Prosperity	*-0.29*	*0.33*	*-1.09*	*-0.15*	*-0.22*	*0.37*	*-0.96*	*-0.08*	*-0.01*	*-0.42*	*-0.18*	*-0.44*
System threat	*-2.71*	*-3.56*	*-4.49*	*-4.39*	*-2.69*	*-3.59*	*-4.43*	*-4.41*	*-1.37*	*-2.30*	*-3.58*	*-3.18*
Fractionalization	*1.23*	*0.95*	*1.47*	*0.77*	*1.24*	*0.95*	*1.48*	*0.78*	*1.23*	*0.57*	*1.67*	*0.68*
Mobilization	*-0.84*	*-0.89*	*-1.47*	*-1.30*	*-0.82*	*-0.88*	*-1.45*	*-1.29*	*-0.70*	*-0.89*	*-1.33*	*-1.29*
Perceived inequality	*2.42*	*0.64*	*0.90*	*-0.75*	*2.43*	*0.65*	*0.89*	*-0.76*	*2.04*	*0.51*	*0.88*	*-0.60*
Inequality tolerance	*-0.67*	*-1.27*	*-0.54*	*-1.44*	*-0.72*	*-1.28*	*-0.65*	*-1.48*	*-1.31*	*-1.30*	*-0.06*	*-0.40*
N (individuals)	64570	56651	64570	56651	64570	56651	64570	56651	64570	56651	64570	56651
N (groups)	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, regional CLIs, country-year controls, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed. The first four data columns are taken from the last two columns of Tables 4.9 and 4.10 and are only displayed for easier comparison of consistency.

In sum, the models using geographic CLIs again show comparatively small Z-values, with the interaction effects of structural position with redistribution and system threat falling under the threshold of significance in the respective model using household equivalence income. But there again is one notable exception. Redistribution, as the only factor consistently significant in all models as a fixed effect, shows even higher Z-values in the models additionally using geographic interactions. Effects are very similar between the three model configurations controlling for geographic region in different ways. In general, the lack of fixed effects for both main effects[268] and all interactions apart from interactions related to redistribution is notable in all steps for all models. Taken together, the results are roughly in line with most previous tests regarding redistribution and system threat, but additionally show that the effect of redistribution seems to be an effect related to temporal short-term changes in redistribution levels within countries, whereas the effect of system threat seems to be connected to long-term differences between countries, potentially influenced by additional variables related to economic, institutional or cultural influences not measured in the models presented here.

4.2.2 Using alternative inequality measures based on ISSP data

In the following, the final models of the main model series using 12 combinations of model configuration and indicators used in previous chapters are presented using four alternative measures of actual inequality. These measures are based on the individual-level data available directly in the ISSP. For both household equivalence income and personal income, I use the Gini index and the ratio of the 9th to the 1st decile of each income measure. This procedure is problematic since the available income data is not very consistent over countries and includes some categorical data in varying quantity, but I briefly compare the CLIs present in the data for consistency with previous results.

When using the Gini index for household equivalence income (see Table 4.12), actual inequality shows no consistent effect. The effects for redistribution and system threat are roughly in line with previous models differentiating between random and fixed effects on country-level. For redistribution, there is a significant interaction of the fixed effect with structural position in 11 out of 12 models, again excluding a model using geographic CLIs in combination with household

268 No consistent fixed effects are found related to main influences of contextual factors and only perceived inequality and aggregate inequality tolerance show significant random main effects in the full model, positive for both contextual factors and both income types used (see Table 4.9).

Tab. 4.12: Full models for estimations of cross-level interactions with fixed and random effects for country level using ISSP-based Gini index of household equivalence income

	Regional main effects				Country-year controls				Regional CLIs			
	IT1 SLEI	IT2 SLEI	IT1 SLPI	IT2 SLPI	IT1 SLEI	IT2 SLEI	IT1 SLPI	IT2 SLPI	IT1 SLEI	IT2 SLEI	IT1 SLPI	IT2 SLPI
Structural position	9.57	10.31	8.59	7.46	9.49	10.15	8.44	7.40	7.38	3.95	4.01	2.49
CLI, fixed:												
Actual inequality	*-0.97*	*-0.92*	*0.51*	*0.40*	*-0.96*	*-0.89*	*0.53*	*0.45*	*-1.03*	*-0.90*	*0.46*	*0.37*
Redistribution	*3.12*	*2.24*	*3.25*	*2.76*	*3.16*	*2.25*	*3.27*	*2.75*	*2.98*	*1.79*	*3.59*	*2.89*
Prosperity	*-1.44*	*-2.34*	*-0.49*	*-0.85*	*-1.39*	*-2.25*	*-0.46*	*-0.80*	*-1.27*	*-2.19*	*-0.55*	*-0.93*
System threat	*2.24*	*0.12*	*1.05*	*0.22*	*2.16*	*0.04*	*1.02*	*0.16*	*2.27*	*0.08*	*1.13*	*0.25*
Fractionalization	*0.30*	*0.85*	*0.10*	*0.60*	*0.31*	*0.84*	*0.10*	*0.60*	*0.18*	*0.84*	*-0.02*	*0.58*
Mobilization	*-2.03*	*-0.54*	*-1.08*	*-0.74*	*-1.99*	*-0.53*	*-1.05*	*-0.72*	*-1.66*	*-0.27*	*-1.22*	*-0.91*
Perceived inequality	*0.98*	*2.10*	*0.46*	*0.64*	*0.96*	*2.08*	*0.44*	*0.61*	*0.60*	*2.00*	*0.19*	*0.55*
Inequality tolerance	*-0.52*	*0.07*	*-0.35*	*-0.58*	*-0.57*	*0.03*	*-0.39*	*-0.64*	*-0.67*	*0.09*	*-0.66*	*-0.70*
CLI, random:												
Actual inequality	*-1.36*	*-1.55*	*-0.35*	*-0.76*	*-1.40*	*-1.58*	*-0.37*	*-0.78*	*-1.07*	*-1.42*	*0.27*	*-0.42*
Redistribution	*2.74*	*2.83*	*2.43*	*2.28*	*2.71*	*2.75*	*2.41*	*2.25*	*2.17*	*1.65*	*2.93*	*2.82*
Prosperity	*-0.75*	*-1.57*	*0.07*	*-0.55*	*-0.70*	*-1.47*	*0.08*	*-0.52*	*-0.03*	*-0.38*	*-0.60*	*-0.87*
System threat	*-2.42*	*-3.24*	*-2.11*	*-2.15*	*-2.39*	*-3.18*	*-2.10*	*-2.12*	*-0.57*	*-1.90*	*-1.76*	*-1.92*
Fractionalization	*1.29*	*1.51*	*1.16*	*1.04*	*1.30*	*1.52*	*1.17*	*1.05*	*1.32*	*1.72*	*0.57*	*0.74*
Mobilization	*-0.58*	*-1.13*	*-0.54*	*-0.76*	*-0.57*	*-1.12*	*-0.53*	*-0.75*	*-0.42*	*-0.96*	*-0.84*	*-1.06*
Perceived inequality	*2.11*	*1.16*	*1.31*	*0.19*	*2.16*	*1.17*	*1.34*	*0.20*	*2.30*	*1.25*	*0.95*	*0.06*
Inequality tolerance	*-0.35*	*-0.10*	*-1.03*	*-0.92*	*-0.40*	*-0.19*	*-1.03*	*-0.94*	*-1.42*	*-0.26*	*-1.40*	*-0.56*
N (individuals)	64570	64570	56651	56651	64570	64570	56651	56651	64570	64570	56651	56651
N (groups)	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, country-year controls, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

equivalence income. The interaction of system threat with structural position again is only evident for the random effect, but is completely consistent over all models. As notable differences to previous models, redistribution shows a consistent interaction of its random effect with structural position in all models. As in the previous models differentiating between random and fixed effects on country level, neither actual nor perceived inequality shows consistent interactions with structural position, but perceived inequality shows either positive random or positive fixed interactions with structural position in all models using household equivalence income as indicator for structural position. Notably, prosperity shows a negative interaction with structural position for its fixed effect, but the effects is only significant for four models using individual personal income as indicator for structural position.

Tab. 4.13: Full models for estimations of cross-level interactions with fixed and random effects for country level using ISSP-based ratio of 9th to 1st income decile of household equivalence income

	Regional main effects				Country-year controls				Regional CLIs			
	IT1 SLEI	IT2 SLEI	IT1 SLPI	IT2 SLPI	IT1 SLEI	IT2 SLEI	IT1 SLPI	IT2 SLPI	IT1 SLEI	IT2 SLEI	IT1 SLPI	IT2 SLPI
Structural position	6.59	6.19	4.35	4.57	6.60	6.23	4.30	4.51	6.66	3.31	4.28	2.48
CLI, fixed:												
Actual inequality	*0.89*	*0.58*	*0.71*	*0.99*	*0.87*	*0.57*	*0.70*	*0.99*	*1.23*	*1.00*	*0.72*	*1.35*
Redistribution	*2.83*	*2.07*	*3.46*	*2.73*	*2.87*	*2.09*	*3.48*	*2.74*	*2.72*	*1.67*	*3.75*	*2.79*
Prosperity	*-1.49*	*-2.35*	*-0.67*	*-0.99*	*-1.43*	*-2.27*	*-0.64*	*-0.96*	*-1.43*	*-2.35*	*-0.80*	*-1.19*
System threat	*-0.62*	*-0.08*	*-0.15*	*0.19*	*-0.62*	*-0.09*	*-0.15*	*0.19*	*-0.67*	*-0.10*	*-0.28*	*0.09*
Fractionalization	*1.59*	*-0.08*	*0.83*	*-0.12*	*1.53*	*-0.13*	*0.80*	*-0.19*	*1.72*	*-0.17*	*1.00*	*-0.09*
Mobilization	*-2.51*	*-0.97*	*-1.21*	*-0.99*	*-2.49*	*-0.97*	*-1.19*	*-0.98*	*-2.21*	*-0.67*	*-1.37*	*-1.28*
Perceived inequality	*0.41*	*1.63*	*0.34*	*0.41*	*0.39*	*1.60*	*0.31*	*0.38*	*0.22*	*1.66*	*0.14*	*0.39*
Inequality tolerance	*-0.54*	*0.06*	*-0.35*	*-0.57*	*-0.58*	*0.02*	*-0.40*	*-0.63*	*-0.64*	*0.10*	*-0.60*	*-0.62*
CLI, random:												
Actual inequality	*-0.03*	*-0.14*	*0.44*	*0.66*	*-0.04*	*-0.16*	*0.43*	*0.66*	*0.43*	*0.38*	*0.44*	*0.91*
Redistribution	*4.33*	*4.35*	*2.67*	*2.71*	*4.32*	*4.27*	*2.66*	*2.68*	*3.25*	*2.51*	*3.17*	*3.40*
Prosperity	*-0.78*	*-1.46*	*0.15*	*-0.59*	*-0.72*	*-1.36*	*0.17*	*-0.54*	*-0.57*	*-0.78*	*-0.86*	*-1.34*
System threat	*-3.39*	*-5.52*	*-2.74*	*-3.71*	*-3.38*	*-5.40*	*-2.74*	*-3.68*	*-1.93*	*-3.55*	*-2.05*	*-3.00*
Fractionalization	*4.62*	*2.81*	*0.98*	*1.24*	*4.65*	*2.80*	*0.98*	*1.25*	*4.08*	*2.64*	*0.93*	*1.52*
Mobilization	*-1.08*	*-1.67*	*-0.91*	*-1.21*	*-1.07*	*-1.66*	*-0.91*	*-1.21*	*-0.95*	*-1.65*	*-1.05*	*-1.71*
Perceived inequality	*1.70*	*0.59*	*1.10*	*-0.11*	*1.73*	*0.59*	*1.12*	*-0.10*	*1.92*	*0.81*	*0.89*	*-0.14*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.19*	*-0.92*	*-1.33*	*-1.34*	*-1.23*	*-1.02*	*-1.33*	*-1.37*	*-1.46*	*-0.23*	*-1.30*	*-0.46*
N (individuals)	64570	64570	56651	56651	64570	64570	56651	56651	64570	64570	56651	56651
N (groups)	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, country-year controls, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

In the models using the ratio of the 9th to the 1st income decile as indicator for actual inequality (see Table 4.13), actual inequality again is not associated with interaction effects, but redistribution shows a consistent positive interaction with structural position for both its random and its fixed effect apart from one of the four models controlling for geographic CLIs. The interaction of structural position with system threat is again only evident for its random effect and in one model shows a Z-value slightly below the threshold used. Effects of actual and perceived inequality are notably not significant in any of the final models of the current set. As a difference to previous models, fractionalization shows a consistent positive interaction of its random with structural position in all models using household equivalence income as a measure for structural position.

Turning to individual personal income from the ISSP as a source of inequality data, the

Tab. 4.14: Full models for estimations of cross-level interactions with fixed and random effects for country level using ISSP-based Gini index of personal income

	Regional main effects				Country-year controls				Regional CLIs			
	IT1 SLEI	IT2 SLEI	IT1 SLPI	IT2 SLPI	IT1 SLEI	IT2 SLEI	IT1 SLPI	IT2 SLPI	IT1 SLEI	IT2 SLEI	IT1 SLPI	IT2 SLPI
Structural position	9.58	10.11	8.72	7.58	9.49	9.91	8.55	7.52	7.11	3.85	4.00	2.45
CLI, fixed:												
Actual inequality	*-0.90*	*-1.28*	*0.55*	*0.51*	*-0.95*	*-1.26*	*0.52*	*0.55*	*-0.62*	*-1.04*	*0.48*	*0.42*
Redistribution	*2.98*	*2.23*	*3.30*	*2.76*	*3.02*	*2.23*	*3.33*	*2.76*	*2.69*	*1.63*	*3.71*	*2.94*
Prosperity	*-1.41*	*-2.45*	*-0.41*	*-0.73*	*-1.38*	*-2.39*	*-0.40*	*-0.69*	*-1.06*	*-2.11*	*-0.53*	*-0.86*
System threat	*2.14*	*0.20*	*0.98*	*0.25*	*2.09*	*0.15*	*0.97*	*0.20*	*2.28*	*0.19*	*1.09*	*0.27*
Fractionalization	*0.27*	*0.82*	*0.07*	*0.55*	*0.29*	*0.81*	*0.08*	*0.55*	*0.06*	*0.72*	*-0.03*	*0.54*
Mobilization	*-1.93*	*-0.39*	*-1.09*	*-0.70*	*-1.90*	*-0.38*	*-1.08*	*-0.69*	*-1.53*	*-0.10*	*-1.23*	*-0.86*
Perceived inequality	*1.06*	*2.30*	*0.35*	*0.52*	*1.05*	*2.28*	*0.34*	*0.49*	*0.61*	*2.11*	*0.13*	*0.47*
Inequality tolerance	*-0.46*	*0.16*	*-0.34*	*-0.51*	*-0.50*	*0.12*	*-0.37*	*-0.55*	*-0.56*	*0.21*	*-0.65*	*-0.66*
CLI, random:												
Actual inequality	*-0.96*	*-1.12*	*-0.26*	*-0.78*	*-0.95*	*-1.13*	*-0.26*	*-0.79*	*-1.37*	*-1.37*	*0.00*	*-0.54*
Redistribution	*2.37*	*2.34*	*2.29*	*2.15*	*2.36*	*2.28*	*2.28*	*2.13*	*1.59*	*1.18*	*2.93*	*2.71*
Prosperity	*-0.61*	*-1.41*	*0.15*	*-0.53*	*-0.56*	*-1.33*	*0.17*	*-0.49*	*0.03*	*-0.32*	*-0.62*	*-0.86*
System threat	*-2.72*	*-3.42*	*-2.28*	*-2.15*	*-2.70*	*-3.35*	*-2.28*	*-2.12*	*-0.50*	*-1.82*	*-1.60*	*-1.64*
Fractionalization	*1.24*	*1.37*	*1.19*	*1.12*	*1.24*	*1.38*	*1.19*	*1.13*	*1.45*	*1.65*	*0.66*	*0.81*
Mobilization	*-0.69*	*-1.19*	*-0.58*	*-0.77*	*-0.69*	*-1.18*	*-0.58*	*-0.77*	*-0.30*	*-0.97*	*-0.77*	*-1.05*
Perceived inequality	*2.06*	*1.05*	*1.34*	*0.29*	*2.07*	*1.05*	*1.35*	*0.31*	*2.37*	*1.20*	*1.02*	*0.15*
Inequality tolerance	*-0.37*	*-0.17*	*-0.93*	*-0.74*	*-0.40*	*-0.24*	*-0.93*	*-0.76*	*-1.37*	*-0.34*	*-1.32*	*-0.51*
N (individuals)	63136	63136	56651	56651	63136	63136	56651	56651	63136	63136	56651	56651
N (groups)	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, country-year controls, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

models using the Gini index of personal income (see Table 4.14) again show no significant interaction effects of structural position with actual inequality. Redistribution shows a positive interaction with structural position for both fixed and random effects, this time excluding two models using geographical CLIs. System threat again exhibits negative interactions with structural position for its random effect, but not in four models using geographical CLIs. Interactions with perceived inequality are positive for either its random or its fixed effect when using household equivalence income, but not when using personal income.

Finally, the models using the ratio of the 9th to the 1st income decile of personal income as indicator of actual inequality (see Table 4.15) again are highly similar to the results using the other three ISSP-based indicators of actual inequality. Again, no significant interaction of the random or

Tab. 4.15: Full models for estimations of cross-level interactions with fixed and random effects for country level using ISSP-based ratio of 9th to 1st income decile of personal income

	Regional main effects				Country-year controls				Regional CLIs			
	IT1 SLEI	IT2 SLEI	IT1 SLPI	IT2 SLPI	IT1 SLEI	IT2 SLEI	IT1 SLPI	IT2 SLPI	IT1 SLEI	IT2 SLEI	IT1 SLPI	IT2 SLPI
Structural position	1.53	1.37	1.98	1.98	1.49	1.31	1.97	1.96	3.09	1.85	3.22	2.06
CLI, fixed:												
Actual inequality	*-0.71*	*-0.62*	*-0.13*	*0.21*	*-0.74*	*-0.66*	*-0.15*	*0.19*	*-0.44*	*-0.36*	*-0.17*	*0.15*
Redistribution	*2.78*	*1.99*	*3.55*	*2.86*	*2.82*	*2.02*	*3.58*	*2.89*	*2.63*	*1.43*	*4.11*	*2.98*
Prosperity	*-1.26*	*-2.22*	*-0.73*	*-1.01*	*-1.20*	*-2.15*	*-0.68*	*-0.95*	*-1.07*	*-2.00*	*-0.64*	*-1.00*
System threat	*2.01*	*-0.02*	*0.90*	*-0.04*	*1.94*	*-0.09*	*0.86*	*-0.11*	*1.95*	*-0.13*	*0.96*	*0.02*
Fractionalization	*0.21*	*0.74*	*0.35*	*0.79*	*0.22*	*0.73*	*0.36*	*0.79*	*0.09*	*0.74*	*0.23*	*0.74*
Mobilization	*-2.07*	*-0.64*	*-0.79*	*-0.47*	*-2.03*	*-0.61*	*-0.73*	*-0.42*	*-1.64*	*-0.25*	*-0.78*	*-0.51*
Perceived inequality	*0.80*	*2.09*	*0.87*	*0.90*	*0.78*	*2.07*	*0.84*	*0.88*	*0.52*	*2.08*	*0.55*	*0.78*
Inequality tolerance	*-0.48*	*0.10*	*-0.33*	*-0.58*	*-0.53*	*0.06*	*-0.37*	*-0.65*	*-0.60*	*0.12*	*-0.54*	*-0.66*
CLI, random:												
Actual inequality	*-0.68*	*-0.65*	*-0.33*	*0.05*	*-0.71*	*-0.70*	*-0.36*	*0.03*	*-0.46*	*-0.44*	*-0.38*	*0.01*
Redistribution	*3.25*	*3.22*	*2.42*	*2.49*	*3.21*	*3.12*	*2.40*	*2.45*	*1.99*	*1.34*	*2.75*	*2.47*
Prosperity	*-0.39*	*-1.23*	*0.40*	*-0.15*	*-0.35*	*-1.13*	*0.42*	*-0.11*	*0.05*	*-0.02*	*0.01*	*-0.32*
System threat	*-3.13*	*-4.46*	*-3.84*	*-3.44*	*-3.10*	*-4.33*	*-3.84*	*-3.38*	*-1.20*	*-2.71*	*-1.71*	*-2.08*
Fractionalization	*0.97*	*1.35*	*1.42*	*1.21*	*0.98*	*1.35*	*1.42*	*1.22*	*1.10*	*1.60*	*1.26*	*1.06*
Mobilization	*-0.82*	*-1.53*	*-1.37*	*-1.54*	*-0.81*	*-1.52*	*-1.37*	*-1.54*	*-0.68*	*-1.42*	*-1.27*	*-1.61*
Perceived inequality	*1.66*	*1.03*	*1.88*	*0.39*	*1.69*	*1.05*	*1.93*	*0.42*	*2.01*	*1.30*	*1.72*	*0.32*
Inequality tolerance	*-0.66*	*-0.14*	*-0.29*	*-0.38*	*-0.69*	*-0.22*	*-0.28*	*-0.39*	*-1.39*	*-0.17*	*-1.22*	*-0.38*
N (individuals)	63136	63136	56651	56651	63136	63136	56651	56651	63136	63136	56651	56651
N (groups)	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44	44

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, country-year controls, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

fixed effects of actual inequality is evident in the final models of the 12 hierarchical series. Redistribution again is consistently positively interacting with structural position in 11 of the 12 models, but again shows no interaction for its fixed and for its random effect in one of the four models using geographical CLIs. For system threat, there is no significant interaction for its random effect in two of the 12 models, both using geographical CLIs. Perceived inequality is associated with positive interactions for either its random or fixed effect in all models using household equivalence income as an indicator for structural position.

Taken together, the tests using interactions of structural position with fixed and random effects on country level lead to results partly in line with previous evidence regarding the effects of redistribution and system threat. Redistribution shows consistent positive interactions for either random or fixed effects in all models and for both types of interaction effects in most models. System

threat shows negative interactions of its random effects with structural position in most models, but the effect does not reach significance in about half of the models using geographic CLIs in combination with alternative ISSP-based indicators of actual inequality. System threat also rarely shows interactions of its fixed effect. The positive interaction of perceived inequality is evident in most models using household equivalence income either as an interaction with the random or with the fixed effect of perceived inequality. Actual inequality shows no consistent interaction in any model series. Taken together, the influence of redistribution seems to be comparatively consistent including fixed and random effects, but one of 12 full models does not show a significant interaction, specifically the model controlling for geographical interactions and using IT2 in combination with SLEI. System threat and actual inequality show a less consistent influence when differentiating between random and fixed effects, especially in all models using alternative ISSP-based measures of actual inequality.

4.3 Separating between influences of lower versus higher structural positions

Turning to the test of hypotheses postulating differentiated interaction effects determined by individual structural position itself, I use two forms of differentiating between effects in different income strata in the following analyses. First, I differentiate between income below and above the median of each country year and use separate CLIs for both terms, differentiating between both groups using a form of dummy-variable adjustment and adding additional CLIs for the new dummy variable generated. Second, I use a squared income term additionally to the linear term, allowing for nonlinear effects such as saturation.

Since income data is split up in the first step, I use non-logarithmic income data[269] for all models in this chapter to minimize bias for effect comparisons stemming from different functional forms methodically introduced into different parts of the distribution. Specifically, I apply standardization on country-year level to both household equivalence and personal income, but do not use the logarithm of the data in contrast to the main analyses. In the models controlling for effects within and between higher versus lower income groups, the number of countries and cases is slightly lower, since I exclude country years that show less than 10 distinct values for individual income data.

269 In a later chapter, I evaluate potential differences between logarithmic and non-logarithmic income measures as well as various other forms of measuring structural position in a wider sense (see Chapter 4.4.1).

Tab. 4.16: Selected models from hierarchical series for split income effects with dummy variable adjustment using SEI and regional main effects

	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position:												
High vs. low	4.84	4.47	4.63	4.59	4.36	4.40	5.25	5.23	5.89	5.57	5.83	5.68
Within group (high)	7.09	5.94	7.19	5.89	7.20	5.95	8.23	6.80	7.79	6.77	8.63	6.89
Within group (low)	4.76	3.07	4.77	3.00	6.53	4.67	4.98	3.01	3.91	2.44	3.96	2.46
CLI, high vs. low:												
Actual inequality	*-1.11*	*-1.31*	*0.35*	*-0.55*	*0.38*	*-0.53*	*1.85*	*0.75*	*1.85*	*0.94*	*1.40*	*0.53*
Redistribution			*1.09*	*0.40*	*0.95*	*0.20*	*1.34*	*0.31*	*0.98*	*0.05*	*0.78*	*-0.14*
Prosperity					*0.33*	*0.61*	*-0.48*	*0.07*	*-0.95*	*-0.47*	*0.63*	*0.31*
System threat							*-2.41*	*-1.82*	*-2.29*	*-2.19*	*-1.55*	*-1.50*
Fractionalization									*0.49*	*-0.08*	*0.50*	*0.04*
Mobilization									*1.27*	*0.23*	*0.63*	*-0.04*
Political distrust									*2.04*	*1.36*	*1.85*	*1.40*
Perceived inequality											*-0.26*	*-0.09*
Inequality tolerance											*-2.25*	*-1.33*
CLI, within group (high):												
Actual inequality	*-2.61*	*-1.64*	*-1.79*	*-0.67*	*-1.82*	*-0.65*	*-0.72*	*0.31*	*-0.95*	*0.08*	*-1.93*	*-0.81*
Redistribution			*-0.08*	*0.30*	*-0.64*	*0.15*	*-0.62*	*0.20*	*-0.03*	*0.47*	*-0.66*	*0.07*
Prosperity					*2.00*	*0.46*	*1.58*	*0.07*	*2.49*	*1.00*	*1.91*	*0.89*
System threat							*-2.36*	*-2.81*	*-2.63*	*-1.82*	*-1.25*	*-0.99*
Fractionalization									*0.33*	*-0.13*	*0.45*	*-0.04*
Mobilization									*-0.41*	*0.67*	*-1.53*	*-0.55*
Political distrust									*-1.55*	*-1.48*	*-1.39*	*-1.39*
Perceived inequality											*2.00*	*1.29*
Inequality tolerance											*0.05*	*-0.18*
CLI, within group (low):												
Actual inequality	*-1.41*	*-1.20*	*-0.10*	*0.13*	*-0.20*	*0.05*	*0.08*	*1.01*	*-0.81*	*0.42*	*-1.09*	*0.16*
Redistribution			*0.90*	*1.23*	*1.83*	*1.92*	*2.32*	*2.81*	*2.12*	*3.28*	*2.02*	*3.31*
Prosperity					*-3.24*	*-3.01*	*-3.23*	*-3.22*	*-2.21*	*-2.72*	*-2.74*	*-2.74*
System threat							*-1.09*	*-2.81*	*0.21*	*-1.72*	*0.17*	*-1.78*
Fractionalization									*-0.89*	*-0.10*	*-0.48*	*-0.04*
Mobilization									*1.81*	*-0.04*	*1.19*	*-0.43*
Political distrust									*-2.07*	*-2.17*	*-1.34*	*-1.60*
Perceived inequality											*1.40*	*1.12*
Inequality tolerance											*0.74*	*0.91*
N (individuals)	63247	63247	63247	63247	63247	63247	63247	63247	63247	63247	63247	63247
N (groups)	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

4.3.1 Cross-level interactions with median-split income variables

Using separate variables for the upper and lower halves of the distribution first of all shows positive main effects of all three income related variables throughout all models in the first series (see Table

4.16). Specifically, linear income effects are both visible in the upper and lower halves of the income distribution and recipients in the upper half also show higher inequality tolerance compared to the recipients in the lower half of the distribution. With regard to CLIs with income, actual inequality shows negative effect direction for all three income variables in the first step of the hierarchical model series for both measures of inequality tolerance, but only reaches significance in one of the two models (using IT1). The effect becomes inconsistent and loses significance in subsequent models. In contrast to previous hierarchical series, the effect of redistribution shows no interaction with structural position for any of the three income variables when initially included. Only when controlling for prosperity and system threat, the positive interaction with redistribution reaches significance for the linear income measure for the lower half of the income distribution. This interaction stays significant throughout subsequent models for both measures of inequality tolerance, but the interaction of redistribution with both the linear income measure for the upper half of the income distribution and with the dummy variable differentiating between both halves loses significance in later models. For prosperity, again only the interaction with the lower half of the income distribution is consistent. This interaction is significant and negative for all models. It is noteworthy that, even though not significant, the interaction of prosperity with both other income variables in these models is positive in the first model that includes prosperity. Prosperity seems to have a differentiated moderating effect depending on the position in the income distribution of units compared. The effect of system threat is significant and in line with previous models for all income variables in the first model that includes system threat, but loses significance in consecutive models for all three income variables. I take this as evidence that the system threat effect is uniform over the whole distribution or at least can not be successfully isolated by using the differentiated income measure applied in the analyses presented here. Additional variables do not show consistent interactions.

Turning to the hierarchical series using standardized personal income (see Table 4.17), both the dummy indicator separating between the two halves of the income distribution and the linear income variable for the upper half of the distribution show consistent and significant positive main effects on inequality tolerance, but the linear income variable for the lower half of the income distribution is only associated with a significant positive main effect in one of the models. In terms of interaction effects, actual inequality shows no consistent CLI with any of the three income variables. As in the previous

Tab. 4.17: Selected models from hierarchical series for split income effects with dummy variable adjustment using SPI and regional main effects

	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position:												
High vs. low	2.57	2.33	2.14	2.10	1.90	1.89	2.39	2.63	3.02	3.42	2.93	3.48
Within group (high)	8.17	6.63	8.20	6.92	8.28	6.97	10.02	7.78	10.54	8.26	12.46	9.24
Within group (low)	1.45	0.46	1.81	0.55	2.81	1.23	1.78	0.17	1.46	-0.07	1.47	-0.05
CLI, high vs. low:												
Actual inequality	*-1.50*	*-1.37*	*-0.46*	*-0.78*	*-0.40*	*-0.73*	*0.51*	*0.08*	*1.40*	*1.03*	*1.27*	*1.48*
Redistribution			*1.07*	*0.80*	*0.75*	*0.68*	*0.91*	*0.71*	*0.83*	*0.72*	*0.77*	*0.80*
Prosperity					*1.32*	*0.51*	*1.03*	*0.09*	*-0.36*	*-1.35*	*-0.10*	*-0.77*
System threat							*-0.82*	*-0.62*	*-2.63*	*-2.00*	*-2.74*	*-2.31*
Fractionalization									*0.21*	*-0.87*	*0.14*	*-0.94*
Mobilization									*-1.05*	*-1.15*	*-0.92*	*-0.27*
Political distrust									*1.77*	*1.99*	*1.77*	*1.69*
Perceived inequality											*0.04*	*-1.17*
Inequality tolerance											*-0.14*	*-0.41*
CLI, within group (high):												
Actual inequality	*-1.83*	*-1.35*	*0.29*	*0.18*	*0.30*	*0.18*	*2.19*	*1.31*	*1.75*	*0.88*	*-0.46*	*-0.61*
Redistribution			*1.65*	*1.23*	*1.29*	*0.88*	*1.63*	*1.02*	*1.48*	*1.23*	*0.59*	*0.35*
Prosperity					*1.69*	*1.79*	*1.07*	*1.33*	*1.40*	*1.82*	*1.61*	*1.70*
System threat							*-4.15*	*-3.47*	*-4.39*	*-3.60*	*-2.75*	*-1.87*
Fractionalization									*0.44*	*0.35*	*0.74*	*0.51*
Mobilization									*0.44*	*0.12*	*-1.26*	*-1.19*
Political distrust									*-1.05*	*-1.31*	*-0.18*	*-0.81*
Perceived inequality											*2.86*	*2.56*
Inequality tolerance											*-0.65*	*-0.22*
CLI, within group (low):												
Actual inequality	*0.50*	*0.12*	*1.49*	*1.08*	*1.37*	*1.01*	*1.62*	*1.39*	*0.63*	*0.80*	*1.06*	*1.00*
Redistribution			*1.24*	*1.69*	*1.93*	*2.14*	*2.25*	*2.72*	*2.09*	*2.93*	*2.41*	*2.90*
Prosperity					*-3.16*	*-2.17*	*-3.06*	*-2.10*	*-0.98*	*-0.98*	*-0.38*	*-0.60*
System threat							*-1.13*	*-1.48*	*0.32*	*-0.79*	*0.28*	*-0.79*
Fractionalization									*-1.23*	*-0.26*	*-1.05*	*-0.22*
Mobilization									*3.14*	*1.89*	*2.99*	*1.62*
Political distrust									*-1.79*	*-1.55*	*-1.80*	*-1.54*
Perceived inequality											*-1.02*	*-0.36*
Inequality tolerance											*-0.76*	*-0.50*
N (individuals)	53753	53753	53753	53753	53753	53753	53753	53753	53753	53753	53753	53753
N (groups)	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

series of models, redistribution shows no consistent effect for all three variables, but does show a positive interaction with the income variable controlling for effects in the lower half of the distribution in all models additionally controlling for system threat, including the full model. Prosperity in tendency shows a differentiated interaction effect similar to the effect found in the previous models,

but neither the positive interaction with the effect for the upper half of the income distribution nor the negative interaction with the effect for the lower half is consistent or reaches significance in the full model. For system threat, the results are different from previous models with split income measures but more in line with the main results using single income variables, since the interaction with the difference between the halves of the income distribution are significant in the full models for both indicators of inequality tolerance used, corresponding to a decreased discrepancy between individuals in upper and lower structural positions according to their personal income. Additionally, the effects within the upper half of the income distribution have the same direction, but only reach significance for one of the indicators of inequality tolerance (IT1) in the final model. Interactions of fractionalization, distrust and mobilization do not show consistent significant effects, but distrust is associated with increased structural effects within the lower half of the income distribution for one indicator of inequality tolerance (IT1) in both models that includes the variable. Perceived inequality is consistently associated with positive interactions with income in the upper half of the income distribution, whereas effects within the lower half of the distribution and effects of the difference between both halves are not affected by perceived inequality. Aggregate inequality tolerance does not seem to have any moderating influence for both indicators of inequality tolerance used.

In the remaining eight models using alternative geographic controls (see Table 4.18), results do not show notable systematic effects. It can be seen that linear effects in the lower half of the income distribution are not significant as main effects in any of the models for personal income. In contrast, the effect for the upper half of the income distribution and the effect for differences between the two groups stay significant for both income measures and both indicators of inequality tolerance tested.

In terms of interactions, the evidence for differential effects is inconsistent[270]. With regard to mostly consistent effects that are clustered in one half of the distribution, in 11 of the 12 full models (excepting one model using country-year controls with household equivalence income), redistribution is positively correlated with structural effects in the lower half of the income distribution. Significant moderation effects are visible for prosperity within lower income groups, but are only significant in the full models when using household equivalence income as an indicator of structural position. In contrast, when using personal income, prosperity only shows significant interactions with structural

270 This is not completely surprising, since the combination of three income-related effects with eight CLIs each is demanding and this approach also cuts the income distribution in arbitrary halves.

Tab. 4.18: Full models for split income effects with dummy variable adjustment and alternative regional controls

	Country-year controls SLEI		Regional CLIs		Country-year controls SLPI		Regional CLIs	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position:								
High vs. low	5.71	5.67	5.87	5.79	2.61	3.30	3.79	3.79
Within group (high)	8.68	6.98	9.64	7.75	11.77	9.31	9.55	13.43
Within group (low)	4.52	2.79	3.93	2.27	1.90	0.17	-0.04	1.36
CLI, high vs. low:								
Actual inequality	*2.01*	*1.44*	*2.22*	*1.20*	*1.62*	*2.12*	*2.89*	*2.90*
Redistribution	*1.71*	*1.24*	*-0.10*	*-1.02*	*1.31*	*2.13*	*-0.06*	*-0.37*
Prosperity	*0.71*	*0.46*	*0.41*	*0.47*	*-0.20*	*-1.21*	*0.83*	*0.70*
System threat	*-1.59*	*-1.67*	*-1.42*	*-1.05*	*-2.24*	*-1.95*	*-1.57*	*-1.45*
Fractionalization	*0.35*	*0.06*	*0.09*	*-0.40*	*0.12*	*-0.82*	*-1.89*	*-0.63*
Mobilization	*0.74*	*-0.06*	*0.34*	*0.16*	*-0.33*	*0.41*	*-0.03*	*-0.84*
Political distrust	*1.35*	*0.76*	*1.16*	*1.64*	*1.88*	*1.49*	*2.76*	*2.77*
Perceived inequality	*-0.44*	*-0.66*	*-0.43*	*-0.29*	*0.02*	*-1.51*	*-1.78*	*-0.44*
Inequality tolerance	*-2.79*	*-2.02*	*-0.83*	*-0.34*	*0.13*	*0.04*	*-0.42*	*-0.50*
CLI, within group (high):								
Actual inequality	*-1.91*	*-0.85*	*-0.98*	*-0.29*	*-0.22*	*-0.60*	*-0.12*	*-0.04*
Redistribution	*-0.67*	*0.04*	*-0.75*	*0.18*	*0.74*	*0.35*	*0.14*	*0.67*
Prosperity	*1.91*	*0.89*	*1.78*	*1.43*	*1.65*	*1.83*	*0.35*	*-0.03*
System threat	*-1.24*	*-1.04*	*0.03*	*0.00*	*-2.69*	*-1.77*	*-0.78*	*-1.91*
Fractionalization	*0.52*	*0.16*	*0.16*	*-0.28*	*0.30*	*0.21*	*0.39*	*0.69*
Mobilization	*-1.39*	*-0.52*	*-1.43*	*-0.56*	*-1.19*	*-1.16*	*-1.07*	*-1.11*
Political distrust	*-1.29*	*-1.27*	*-1.15*	*-1.41*	*-0.24*	*-0.77*	*-1.00*	*-0.47*
Perceived inequality	*1.96*	*1.22*	*1.31*	*0.87*	*2.94*	*2.77*	*2.33*	*2.76*
Inequality tolerance	*0.05*	*-0.20*	*-1.07*	*-0.79*	*-0.46*	*-0.13*	*-0.21*	*-0.75*
CLI, within group (low):								
Actual inequality	*-1.42*	*-0.42*	*-0.47*	*0.04*	*0.91*	*0.64*	*0.86*	*0.15*
Redistribution	*1.26*	*2.23*	*2.00*	*2.80*	*2.27*	*2.52*	*2.96*	*3.37*
Prosperity	*-2.79*	*-2.80*	*-2.78*	*-2.56*	*-0.38*	*-0.46*	*-1.29*	*-1.05*
System threat	*0.11*	*-2.05*	*-0.05*	*-1.44*	*-0.11*	*-1.05*	*-1.26*	*-0.40*
Fractionalization	*-0.39*	*-0.34*	*-0.69*	*-0.04*	*-0.86*	*-0.08*	*0.00*	*-0.23*
Mobilization	*1.03*	*-0.43*	*0.33*	*-0.44*	*2.25*	*0.94*	*1.40*	*3.34*
Political distrust	*-0.97*	*-1.20*	*-0.95*	*-1.52*	*-1.81*	*-1.35*	*-2.10*	*-2.66*
Perceived inequality	*1.67*	*1.82*	*1.54*	*1.29*	*-1.05*	*-0.17*	*-0.09*	*-0.81*
Inequality tolerance	*1.04*	*1.30*	*0.39*	*0.65*	*-1.09*	*-1.01*	*0.21*	*-0.53*
N (individuals)	63247	63247	63247	63247	54337	54337	54337	54337
N (groups)	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions are printed in cursive. Data columns one, two, seven and eight are taken from the last two columns of Tables 4.16 and 4.17 for easier comparison. Effects for region, country-year controls, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

position in early hierarchical steps before including fractionalization, mobilization and political distrust, while none of these additional factors consistently reaches significance in the full models. It is notable that mobilization is associated with a positive interaction with structural position, increasing structural effects, but this effect is only in the model using personal income in combination with IT1. Moderation effects of other factors and all interactions in the upper half of the income distribution are even less consistent.

4.3.2 Nonlinear cross-level interactions

As a second method of analyzing nonlinear differentiated effects, I use a simple quadratic term and corresponding CLIs added to the linear income variable and its interactions in the following analyses. I follow the same procedure as in previous analyses and first present two hierarchical series for household equivalence income using two indicators of inequality tolerance, followed by the same hierarchical analyses for personal income and finally a comparison of the full models including the corresponding eight full models from additional series using alternative controls for geographical influences. The main effects of the linear and squared income variables are significant in all models for household equivalence income (see Table 4.19), with squared income in form of a negative effect counteracting the positive effect of linear income increasingly with higher income levels.

With regard to CLIs, the first model using both indicators of inequality tolerance shows significant effects of actual inequality, counteracting the main effects of both income variables. Therefore, both the linear positive effect and the quadratic negative effect of income are smaller in contexts of higher inequality, indicating a weaker general effect with less saturation in higher income strata. Adding redistribution to the model changes this relationship completely, even though redistribution does not consistently show significant effects in the initial model using an alpha level of 0.05. The effect of actual inequality loses significance for both linear and squared income and both indicators of inequality tolerance and changes direction for the interaction with the squared income term, becoming significant in this opposite direction in later models. Adding prosperity to the model does not lead to significant effects of prosperity, but the interaction of redistribution with the linear income term is now significant in a positive direction. Adding system threat to the model leads to consistent moderating influences of actual inequality, increasing negative effects of the quadratic

Tab. 4.19: Selected models from hierarchical series with squared income effects using SEI

	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position:												
Linear income	9.79	9.24	9.74	9.47	9.83	9.45	11.09	10.84	9.57	9.70	9.62	9.56
Squared income	-6.93	-5.83	-6.60	-5.37	-6.00	-4.92	-6.07	-4.81	-4.83	-3.48	-4.07	-3.85
CLI, linear income:												
Actual inequality	*-3.57*	*-3.30*	*-0.71*	*-0.17*	*-0.83*	*-0.33*	*1.52*	*2.40*	*1.09*	*1.99*	*-0.01*	*0.86*
Redistribution			*1.92*	*2.28*	*2.29*	*2.65*	*3.50*	*3.61*	*3.47*	*3.71*	*2.74*	*3.24*
Prosperity					*-1.37*	*-1.70*	*-2.39*	*-2.59*	*-1.84*	*-2.35*	*-0.88*	*-2.34*
System threat							*-3.58*	*-4.69*	*-2.56*	*-3.52*	*-1.99*	*-3.13*
Fractionalization									*-0.07*	*-0.21*	*0.35*	*-0.02*
Mobilization									*-1.24*	*-1.56*	*-0.62*	*-0.99*
Political distrust									*0.87*	*0.04*	*0.07*	*-0.78*
Perceived inequality											*1.95*	*2.00*
Inequality tolerance											*-1.27*	*0.49*
CLI, squared income:												
Actual inequality	*3.57*	*3.23*	*-1.49*	*-1.22*	*-1.46*	*-1.15*	*-2.65*	*-2.20*	*-2.58*	*-2.04*	*-2.56*	*-2.75*
Redistribution			*-2.43*	*-1.77*	*-2.56*	*-1.94*	*-2.81*	*-2.23*	*-3.03*	*-2.50*	*-3.52*	*-2.91*
Prosperity					*1.20*	*1.10*	*1.53*	*1.29*	*1.64*	*1.73*	*1.32*	*2.85*
System threat							*3.06*	*3.71*	*2.12*	*2.80*	*1.58*	*2.98*
Fractionalization									*-0.33*	*-0.38*	*-0.41*	*-0.42*
Mobilization									*-0.41*	*-0.37*	*-0.87*	*-1.35*
Political distrust									*-0.17*	*0.71*	*-0.92*	*0.60*
Perceived inequality											*0.63*	*-1.15*
Inequality tolerance											*0.15*	*-2.05*
N (individuals)	60397	60397	60397	60397	60397	60397	60397	60397	60397	60397	60397	60397
N (groups)	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

income variable and therefore effects of saturation in the general positive association between income and inequality tolerance in contexts of higher inequality. The influence of prosperity is also changed, now significantly reducing linear effects of income in contexts of higher levels of prosperity. This latter effect is not consistent in consecutive models. Redistribution is now associated with an increased general positive effect of income with increased saturation on the high end of the income distribution, since the positive linear effect is increased by a positive interaction with redistribution whereas the negative quadratic effects is also enhanced by an additional negative effect dependent on redistribution. These effects of redistribution stay consistent throughout consecutive models. For system threat itself, the effects are opposite in that high system threat correlates with weaker linear effects and weaker quadratic effects of income in contexts of higher system threat. Further adding

Tab. 4.20: Selected models from hierarchical series with squared income effects using SPI

	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position:												
Linear income	8.05	7.24	8.41	8.22	7.90	7.84	8.70	8.88	8.33	8.43	7.60	7.64
Squared income	-3.62	-1.72	-3.71	-2.16	-3.01	-1.70	-2.35	-1.26	-1.92	-0.73	-0.60	0.06
CLI, linear income:												
Actual inequality	*-2.49*	*-2.08*	*1.15*	*1.57*	*1.07*	*1.46*	*3.34*	*4.37*	*3.25*	*4.87*	*2.67*	*4.41*
Redistribution			*2.84*	*3.51*	*2.94*	*3.59*	*4.32*	*5.22*	*4.33*	*5.15*	*3.89*	*5.11*
Prosperity					*-1.22*	*-1.55*	*-2.22*	*-2.49*	*-1.85*	*-2.59*	*-0.90*	*-1.73*
System threat							*-4.83*	*-3.88*	*-3.80*	*-4.68*	*-3.70*	*-4.92*
Fractionalization									*-0.38*	*-0.50*	*-0.16*	*-0.37*
Mobilization									*0.04*	*0.19*	*0.51*	*0.30*
Political distrust									*1.00*	*0.08*	*0.81*	*0.33*
Perceived inequality											*0.37*	*-0.60*
Inequality tolerance											*-1.23*	*-1.05*
CLI, squared income:												
Actual inequality	*1.40*	*0.35*	*-0.58*	*-1.76*	*-0.59*	*-1.63*	*-1.11*	*-2.23*	*-1.89*	*-2.89*	*-2.90*	*-3.94*
Redistribution			*-1.28*	*-2.40*	*-1.58*	*-2.57*	*-2.31*	*-2.96*	*-2.39*	*-2.51*	*-3.48*	*-3.24*
Prosperity					*1.87*	*1.51*	*2.10*	*1.61*	*2.59*	*2.61*	*2.27*	*2.67*
System threat							*0.09*	*0.36*	*0.61*	*1.57*	*0.91*	*1.76*
Fractionalization									*-0.04*	*-0.17*	*-0.12*	*-0.18*
Mobilization									*-1.46*	*-2.30*	*-1.04*	*-2.00*
Political distrust									*0.30*	*0.60*	*-1.11*	*-0.87*
Perceived inequality											*2.50*	*2.26*
Inequality tolerance											*0.79*	*0.42*
N (individuals)	52712	52712	52712	52712	52712	52712	52712	52712	52712	52712	52712	52712
N (groups)	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

fractionalization, mobilization and distrust to the model series in the next step does not lead to additional effects, whereas perceived inequality as added in the next step shows a positive interaction with the linear effect of income, but only significant in one of the two models using an alpha level of 0.05. In the full model, actual inequality shows a negative interaction with squared income for both inequality indicators, corresponding with increased saturation effects in higher strata of the income distribution. The differential effects of redistribution and system threat stay significant for both indicators of inequality tolerance. No effects of aggregate inequality tolerance are visible.

Turning to the results for personal income using linear and squared terms (see Table 4.20), in contrast to household equivalence income, the squared income variable is not significant in most models for personal income, including the full models for both indicators of inequality tolerance (see the final two columns in Table 4.20), but designates either a negative or zero effect in all models.

Actual inequality shows a negative interaction with linear income in the first model it is included in. In subsequent models, this interaction turns positive and stays positive and significant in the final model, corresponding to an increased main positive effects of income in contexts of high inequality. The interaction between actual inequality and the quadratic income variable is negative and significant in the final model for both indicators of inequality tolerance used, describing an increased saturation of the effect of income in contexts of higher inequality. As is the case for inequality, the effect of redistribution is negative for the squared income term, but positive for the linear income term, in tendency describing stronger effects in the lower parts of the income distribution in combination with increased saturation in the upper parts. The influence of system threat is negative on the linear income effect in all models that include system threat, describing decreased general effects of structural position on inequality tolerance in contexts of higher system threat. The inclusion of fractionalization, mobilization and distrust does not lead to additional consistent effects and does no substantially change the results. Mobilization in tendency shows a negative interaction with the squared income term, but this is only significant in the models using the second indicator for inequality tolerance (IT2). Perceived inequality shows a positive interaction with the squared income term whereas aggregate inequality tolerance shows no effect.

Comparing the series for the two different income measures used and for the three different model configurations in terms of geographic controls (see Table 4.21), there are three substantial differences between the series for household equivalence and personal income in the final models. First, actual inequality shows consistent and significant positive influences on the linear effect of income for personal income, but not for household equivalence income. Second, differential effects are also visible for system threat, which does not show a consistent interaction with squared income for the personal income measure. Third, perceived inequality shows a positive interaction with the linear term for household equivalence income, suggesting overall increased structural polarization, but a positive interaction with the squared income term when using personal income, indicating increased structural polarization in contexts of higher perceived inequality through less saturation of positive income effects. The differentiated influence of perceived and actual inequality on structural effects for household equivalence income versus personal income has been indicated by some results in previous analyses of this thesis, but it is not in line with most discussed theoretical assumptions at this point,

Tab. 4.21: Full models with squared income effects using alternative regional controls

	Country-year controls SLEI		Regional CLIs		Country-year controls SLPI		Regional CLIs	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position:								
Linear income	9.61	9.53	5.06	2.84	7.59	7.62	3.87	2.16
Squared income	-4.05	-3.83	1.18	1.24	-0.59	0.06	-0.03	0.75
CLI, linear income:								
Actual inequality	*-0.01*	*0.86*	*0.91*	*1.37*	*2.66*	*4.40*	*2.26*	*3.43*
Redistribution	*2.74*	*3.24*	*3.00*	*3.54*	*3.89*	*5.11*	*4.16*	*5.17*
Prosperity	*-0.88*	*-2.34*	*-0.71*	*-1.99*	*-0.90*	*-1.73*	*-1.01*	*-1.16*
System threat	*-1.99*	*-3.13*	*-1.17*	*-2.62*	*-3.70*	*-4.93*	*-2.32*	*-3.77*
Fractionalization	*0.35*	*-0.02*	*-0.11*	*-0.51*	*-0.16*	*-0.37*	*-0.12*	*-0.70*
Mobilization	*-0.62*	*-0.98*	*-0.40*	*-0.80*	*0.52*	*0.30*	*0.78*	*0.26*
Political distrust	*0.07*	*-0.78*	*0.00*	*-0.89*	*0.82*	*0.34*	*0.77*	*0.13*
Perceived inequality	*1.94*	*2.00*	*1.37*	*1.99*	*0.37*	*-0.61*	*0.07*	*-0.71*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.27*	*0.49*	*-1.38*	*0.49*	*-1.23*	*-1.05*	*-1.31*	*-0.59*
CLI, squared income:								
Actual inequality	*-2.56*	*-2.75*	*-2.70*	*-2.64*	*-2.90*	*-3.95*	*-2.11*	*-3.21*
Redistribution	*-3.53*	*-2.91*	*-3.34*	*-3.31*	*-3.48*	*-3.24*	*-3.56*	*-4.01*
Prosperity	*1.32*	*2.85*	*0.04*	*0.75*	*2.27*	*2.67*	*1.07*	*1.78*
System threat	*1.58*	*2.98*	*1.16*	*3.01*	*0.91*	*1.77*	*0.20*	*1.93*
Fractionalization	*-0.42*	*-0.42*	*0.24*	*0.13*	*-0.12*	*-0.18*	*-0.18*	*-0.13*
Mobilization	*-0.88*	*-1.35*	*-0.67*	*-1.13*	*-1.04*	*-1.99*	*-0.90*	*-1.01*
Political distrust	*-0.92*	*0.61*	*-0.86*	*0.52*	*-1.11*	*-0.88*	*-0.96*	*-0.42*
Perceived inequality	*0.63*	*-1.15*	*0.68*	*-1.33*	*2.51*	*2.27*	*2.43*	*2.36*
Inequality tolerance	*0.16*	*-2.05*	*-0.03*	*-2.69*	*0.80*	*0.42*	*1.07*	*0.44*
N (individuals)	60397	60397	60397	60397	52712	52712	52712	52712
N (groups)	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions are printed in cursive. Effects for region, country-year controls, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

specifically assumptions regarding information deficit, since those would imply stronger overall positive effects for personal income. Apart from this, there are slight differences in significance, specifically the interactions for prosperity and system threat partly not reaching significance in the model using household equivalence income and IT1.

In terms of alternative model configurations, in these series using CLIs with linear and squared income terms, the different controls for geographic influences do not make much substantial difference. The effects for prosperity are consistently not significant in contrast to the other models for personal income, but the CLIs for redistribution, actual inequality and system threat are highly consistent with the four previous model series using linear and squared income, with the exception of

one model using geographic CLIs in combination with the first indicator of inequality tolerance (IT1) that does not result in a significant cross-level interaction for system threat.

4.4 Results using alternative indicators and model configurations

In this chapter, I introduce additional and alternative indicators for structural position, attitudes towards inequality and for the contextual moderators of the structural effect. I repeat analyses with alternative measures and extended sets of moderators to compare the consistency of interactions and of the main effects for structural position. Analyzing how robust the results from main analyses are to additional changes in operationalization and measurement of variables and model configuration serves as a test to detect potential limitations and boundary conditions of the effects reported so far.

First, I use alternative indicators of structural position. In this part of the analyses, I repeat the main model as presented in the first empirical chapter with different indicators for individual structural position. Second, I use alternative measures for inequality tolerance and attitudes towards inequality. For this part of the analyses, I repeat the main model as presented in the first empirical chapter for all independent variables and use different dependent variables. Third, I use alternative and additional indicators of contextual moderators of the structural effect while keeping the indicators of structural position and inequality tolerance, known from the previous empirical chapters.

4.4.1 Alternative indicators of structural position

Besides the four income-based indicators of individual structural position utilized in the main analyses, I use alternative income-based measures, specifically logarithmic non-standardized variants of both household equivalence and personal income, standardized non-logarithmic variants of household equivalence and personal income including cases with values equal to zero. Extending the analyses further[271], I also use family income without correcting for household size in all four

271 I also test CLIs of contextual moderators with education-related variables to investigate how education compares to more direct indicators of structural position. Specifically, I use tertiary degree and years spent in the education system. These tests show that education works similar to other indicators of structural position if considered and tested without other indicators in the model (see Tables A.6.1 and A.6.2 in the appendix). Preliminary analyses not reported indicate that, if the model includes CLIs for education and for another indicator of structural position, moderation effects are split up between the two indicators, with poverty mostly showing significant interactions with more direct indicators such as income, whereas redistribution seems to mostly show significant interaction effects with education.

Tab. 4.22: Comparing measures using household equivalence income as indicators of structural position

	SEI		SLEI		LEI		SZEI	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	20.16	17.74	19.03	16.03	18.93	15.60	20.14	17.70
CLI:								
Actual inequality	*-1.42*	*-0.41*	*-0.86*	*-0.07*	*-1.40*	*-0.81*	*-1.27*	*-0.45*
Redistribution	*2.33*	*3.16*	*3.08*	*3.69*	*4.09*	*4.39*	*2.28*	*3.08*
Prosperity	*0.91*	*-0.91*	*-0.90*	*-2.72*	*-0.51*	*-2.19*	*0.95*	*-0.94*
System threat	*-2.85*	*-3.97*	*-4.13*	*-5.88*	*-4.12*	*-6.00*	*-2.87*	*-4.09*
Fractionalization	*-0.44*	*-0.74*	*-0.58*	*-0.85*	*-0.94*	*-1.13*	*-0.56*	*-0.82*
Mobilization	*-2.57*	*-3.35*	*-1.66*	*-2.51*	*-3.28*	*-4.04*	*-2.79*	*-3.47*
Political distrust	*-1.00*	*-1.48*	*-0.84*	*-1.85*	*-2.34*	*-3.50*	*-0.80*	*-1.61*
Perceived inequality	*4.01*	*3.40*	*3.88*	*3.38*	*3.71*	*3.80*	*3.97*	*3.49*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.77*	*-0.61*	*-2.19*	*-0.52*	*-3.21*	*-1.29*	*-1.89*	*-0.51*
N (individuals)	63247	63247	63247	63247	63247	63247	63887	63887
N (groups)	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

variants also utilized for household equivalence and personal income (standardized linear, standardized logarithmic, non-standardized logarithmic and standardized linear income including zero values). Additionally, I also estimate effects for three measures based on occupation-specific socio-economic status and prestige, two dichotomous class-based measures separating between the working class and other classes and two measures of subjective position, one based on a subjective ranking in a ten-point scale and a measure of subjective class again separating between working class versus other classes. For all of these measures, I estimate main effects on inequality tolerance and CLIs with contextual factors in line with the models used in the main analyses.

In terms of income-based measures, using the two additional measures based on household equivalence income (see Table 4.22) leads to similar results compared to the main analyses using standardized and standardized logarithmic household equivalence income. Main effects are visible for all indicators of structural position used. It is noteworthy that main effects of contextual factors are not consistent for any of the indicators used. The positive interaction of structural position with redistribution is significant in all models for both measures of inequality tolerance used. Similarly, the negative interaction of structural position with system threat is also consistent and significant. A negative interaction is visible between structural position and mobilization in contrast to theoretical

Tab. 4.23: Comparing measures using personal income as indicators of structural position

	SPI		SLPI		LPI		SZPI	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	18.91	17.09	14.65	12.61	14.41	11.99	16.89	15.51
CLI:								
Actual inequality	*3.29*	*3.65*	*3.48*	*4.44*	*2.76*	*3.44*	*1.93*	*2.33*
Redistribution	*5.16*	*5.76*	*5.04*	*6.32*	*5.49*	*6.25*	*4.02*	*4.45*
Prosperity	*0.74*	*-0.01*	*0.29*	*-0.65*	*0.22*	*-0.27*	*1.21*	*-0.11*
System threat	*-5.04*	*-5.16*	*-5.02*	*-6.09*	*-4.80*	*-6.12*	*-3.34*	*-4.33*
Fractionalization	*-0.77*	*-1.15*	*-2.23*	*-2.36*	*-2.58*	*-2.52*	*-0.94*	*-1.49*
Mobilization	*-0.18*	*-1.30*	*-0.59*	*-1.31*	*-1.86*	*-2.66*	*-0.25*	*-0.99*
Political distrust	*0.43*	*-0.23*	*0.69*	*-0.30*	*0.10*	*-1.42*	*0.30*	*-0.62*
Perceived inequality	*2.71*	*1.28*	*1.18*	*-0.20*	*0.69*	*0.01*	*2.47*	*1.38*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.75*	*-1.68*	*-2.69*	*-2.65*	*-4.01*	*-3.61*	*-1.95*	*-1.75*
N (individuals)	54337	54337	54337	54337	54337	54337	63910	63910
N (groups)	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

assumptions, but only significant in seven of the eight full models. For political distrust, a negative interaction with structural position is visible in all models in tendency, attenuating structural effects, but this moderation effect is only significant in two of the eight models. Perceived inequality shows a consistent positive interaction with structural position in all full models. All other contextual factors do not lead to consistent significant results.

Turning to measures based on personal income (see Table 4.23), main effects are similar but the results for CLIs are different apart from redistribution and system threat. For actual inequality, the indicators using personal income show significant positive interactions in seven of the eight models. Similarly to the models using household equivalence income, redistribution shows significant positive interactions with structural position and system threat shows significant negative interactions in all eight models. Fractionalization shows significant negative interactions in four of the eight models, mobilization in one model. For perceived inequality, positive interactions are significant in only two of the eight models. Aggregate inequality tolerance is related to significant negative interactions in four of the eight models.

With regard to the third group of income-based measures for structural position (see Table 4.24), the analyses using family income lead to similar results as the analyses for the corrected

Tab. 4.24: Comparing measures using family income as indicators of structural position

	SFI		SLFI		LFI		SZFI	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	20.22	17.84	18.35	15.37	18.03	14.78	20.20	17.81
CLI:								
Actual inequality	*-1.49*	*-0.70*	*-1.13*	*-0.65*	*-1.75*	*-1.39*	*-1.32*	*-0.71*
Redistribution	*2.36*	*2.60*	*2.82*	*2.86*	*3.25*	*3.15*	*2.32*	*2.54*
Prosperity	*0.95*	*-1.08*	*-1.05*	*-2.99*	*-0.96*	*-2.53*	*0.98*	*-1.12*
System threat	*-3.04*	*-4.41*	*-3.99*	*-5.93*	*-4.20*	*-6.18*	*-3.04*	*-4.52*
Fractionalization	*-0.26*	*-0.87*	*0.27*	*-0.28*	*-0.11*	*-0.48*	*-0.37*	*-0.94*
Mobilization	*-2.07*	*-2.73*	*-1.20*	*-2.09*	*-2.25*	*-3.22*	*-2.21*	*-2.79*
Political distrust	*-1.65*	*-1.75*	*-1.36*	*-1.99*	*-2.76*	*-3.59*	*-1.42*	*-1.87*
Perceived inequality	*4.30*	*4.45*	*3.75*	*3.95*	*3.82*	*4.31*	*4.23*	*4.49*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.35*	*0.18*	*-1.55*	*0.36*	*-2.11*	*-0.25*	*-1.51*	*0.26*
N (individuals)	63814	63814	63814	63814	63814	63814	64454	64454
N (groups)	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

household equivalence income. Again, interactions with structural position are consistent for the positive influence of redistribution and perceived inequality and for the negative influence of system threat. For mobilization, there is a negative influence on structural effects in seven of eight models and for political distrust, there is evidence for a negative influence on structural effects, which is only significant in four of eight models. Aggregated inequality is associated with a significant negative interaction in only one of the eight models. The other contextual factors do not result in consistent interactions with structural position.

Broadening the spectrum of indicators of structural position (see Table 4.25) leads to some similarities in effects, but noteworthy exceptions. Considering that the results for all class-based indicators have to be read inverted, since the variable controls for the objective or subjective belonging to the working class instead of a linear measure of structural position, main effects for all indicators of structural position are in line with expectations, with the exception of the subjective top-bottom ranking. This measure shows a main effect close to a zero effect and interaction effects that are not in line with the other indicators, and even when not controlling for interaction effects, the main effect of this measure is not significant in most model configurations additionally tested. For this measure, single country year regressions show that in some country years, the effect of this measure on

Tab. 4.25: Comparing additional non-income based measures as indicators of structural position

	ISEI		MPS		SIOPS		SBTB		ESeC		EGP		SBCL	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	15.10	13.41	13.42	12.08	12.73	10.65	0.18	-0.36	-9.90	-8.07	-11.99	-10.43	-19.09	-16.70
CLI:														
Actual inequality	*0.99*	*0.70*	*-0.20*	*-0.07*	*1.99*	*0.71*	*-1.38*	*-0.77*	*0.04*	*-0.48*	*0.50*	*-0.17*	*2.00*	*0.74*
Redistribution	*4.68*	*4.99*	*2.16*	*3.16*	*4.75*	*4.89*	*-1.11*	*-1.12*	*-3.91*	*-4.40*	*-3.53*	*-4.21*	*-0.83*	*-2.44*
Prosperity	*-2.06*	*-2.88*	*-1.96*	*-2.78*	*-1.37*	*-2.37*	*15.45*	*14.72*	*1.80*	*3.36*	*0.86*	*2.19*	*-0.93*	*0.65*
System threat	*-3.32*	*-1.94*	*-3.96*	*-2.15*	*-2.69*	*-0.80*	*4.42*	*3.67*	*1.56*	*1.39*	*0.06*	*0.05*	*1.08*	*0.74*
Fractionalization	*-2.13*	*-3.19*	*-2.83*	*-3.04*	*-2.64*	*-2.84*	*-1.12*	*-1.00*	*-1.46*	*-0.72*	*0.59*	*0.53*	*-1.01*	*-0.44*
Mobilization	*-0.80*	*-2.11*	*-1.16*	*-2.33*	*-1.22*	*-2.30*	*-4.79*	*-4.40*	*0.00*	*1.05*	*0.79*	*1.64*	*-0.57*	*-0.05*
Political distrust	*-1.38*	*-1.42*	*-1.25*	*-1.68*	*-0.55*	*-0.94*	*0.13*	*0.41*	*1.30*	*0.72*	*0.71*	*0.14*	*0.94*	*1.39*
Perceived inequality	*3.90*	*3.11*	*3.63*	*2.78*	*2.23*	*1.67*	*2.56*	*1.26*	*-2.88*	*-2.28*	*-2.07*	*-1.86*	*-3.82*	*-2.30*
Inequality tolerance	*2.91*	*2.20*	*2.65*	*2.26*	*2.65*	*1.94*	*-8.49*	*-8.95*	*-2.18*	*-2.68*	*-2.10*	*-2.65*	*-0.29*	*0.68*
N (individuals)	55539	55539	43972	43972	55539	55539	79491	79491	53780	53780	55539	55539	65973	65973
N (groups)	63	63	62	62	63	63	75	75	69	69	63	63	64	64

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

inequality tolerance is positive, whereas in other country years, it is positive. Further analyses have shown that for the year 2009, most country years show positive main effects of this measures line with expectation, whereas many, but not all, country years before 2009 show negative main effects of the measure. Additionally, correlations with other structural indicators are negative for the waves before 2009, but positive for the 2009 wave[272]. I therefore have to consider the possibility of coding problems in this measure in years before 2009 and present separate analyses for 2009 versus other years for this measure below and focus on other measures in this table[273].

For the three occupational-based measures of socio-economic status and prestige, results are mostly in line with those for household equivalence and family income. The positive interaction effects of redistribution with structural position are significant in all six models. Prosperity shows a negative CLI with structural position, but the effect does not reach significance in one model. In two

272 I report the global pairwise correlations for all indicators of structural position for all years pooled, 2009 and previous years in the appendix (see Tables A.7.1, A.7.2 and A.7.3 in the appendix). Additionally, regressing subjective ranking on income shows a significant positive effect of income, but explains only 0.01 percent of the variance, whereas regressing any of the dependent variables used in the main analyses or other structural variables on income, applying a simple non-hierarchical OLS estimation, results in effects that explain at least 0.1 percent of variance, but usually much more for non-dichotomous variables.

273 For the pooled data, poverty, unionization and GDP show negative effects, whereas the effect of inequality tolerance shows a negative sign. Only perceived inequality also shows a positive effect in line with expectations related to economic accentuation.

of six models, the negative interaction between system threat and structural position does not reach significance, in one case even when using an alpha level of 0.10. In contrast to most income-based models, where the effect is negative but mostly does not reach significance, fractionalization shows a consistently negative interaction with structural position in all six models in contrast to the downward mobility hypothesis. Mobilization and political distrust in tendency show negative interactions with structural position, as is the case in the models using household equivalence and family income, but these effects are not consistently significant. Perceived inequality and aggregate inequality tolerance are associated with significant positive interactions with structural position in five of six models.

For the two measures of objective class[274], the negative effect of redistribution in all four models is again significant and in line with expectations, since it increases the negative effect associated with belonging to the working class. In contrast to previous models, the interaction effects associated with system threat do not reach significance in any of the four models, even when using an alpha level of 0.10. Other contextual factors do not show consistent effects with one exception. Aggregate inequality tolerance shows a negative effect which, in this case, is contrary to expectations since it increases the negative main effect of structural position.

For subjective class, the models for the two indicators of inequality tolerance are highly inconsistent in general. For this indicator, not even redistribution or system threat show consistent significant influences, but instead, only perceived inequality shows a significant negative influence in both models. All other contextual factors are not associated with significant effects for both models using the two different indicators of inequality tolerance.

In sum, results are not consistent over the additional alternative indicators of structural position used, but significant effects for actual and perceived inequality, redistribution and system threat are usually in line with theoretical expectations. More specifically, the analyses using objective measures of socio-economic status and occupational prestige as well as those using objective measures of socio-economic class are consistent with regard to the positive influence of economic accentuation, but structural effects related to class position show no moderation by system threat in contrast to structural effects based on socio-economic status and prestige. Effects of subjective ranking position are completely inconsistent with other results and subjective class, and seem to be consistently influenced only by perceived inequality.

274 For the class-related models, signs have to be reversed in interpretation, since all analyses test working classes against classes that can be interpreted as higher, resulting in negative main effects.

Tab. 4.26: Comparing results for the 2009 wave versus other waves using subjective top-bottom ranking as an indicator for structural position

	2009				Other waves			
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	14.87	13.07	12.61	11.09	-10.25	-8.47	-9.88	-7.50
CLI:								
Actual inequality	*-0.03*	*0.62*	*-0.94*	*-0.17*	*1.31*	*0.55*	*1.97*	*0.89*
Redistribution	*3.11*	*3.72*	*3.10*	*3.54*	*-0.73*	*-1.14*	*-0.52*	*-0.78*
Prosperity	*0.13*	*-0.21*	*-1.02*	*-0.97*	*-1.11*	*-0.40*	*-0.93*	*-0.23*
System threat	*-2.08*	*-2.83*	*-1.63*	*-2.27*	*2.60*	*1.46*	*2.28*	*1.34*
Fractionalization	*-1.04*	*-1.56*	*-1.01*	*-1.48*	*-1.55*	*-1.13*	*-1.54*	*-1.07*
Mobilization	*0.04*	*-1.37*	*-1.08*	*-2.04*	*-2.60*	*-0.63*	*-1.20*	*-0.04*
Political distrust	*0.14*	*-0.64*	*0.58*	*-0.22*	*1.33*	*0.98*	*1.17*	*0.92*
Perceived inequality			*2.85*	*2.13*			*-1.41*	*-0.99*
Inequality tolerance			*1.01*	*0.54*			*-0.59*	*-0.64*
N (individuals)	43957	43957	43957	43957	35534	35534	35534	35534
N (groups)	40	40	40	40	35	35	35	35

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

Separating between the 2009 wave versus other waves of the ISSP for the subjective top-bottom ranking measure leads to more consistent results, at least for 2009 (see Table 4.26). Whereas actual inequality shows no consistent effects, the positive interaction between structural position and redistribution is completely consistent for 2009. System threat shows a significant negative interaction with structural position in three of four models presented for 2009, but the effect fails to reach significance in one of the two full models. It is noteworthy that system threat also is associated with a significant positive effect in the waves before 2009, again increasing structural effects which are inverted in this case, since the main effect for subjective top-bottom ranking is inverted in the waves before 2009 and shows a negative sign. However, this effect is only significant in one of the two full models. In general, the model for the waves before 2009 goes against most expectations, including the direction of the main effect of the indicator for subjective position, whereas the data for the 2009 wave are consistent with previous models and with most objective indicators of structural position used in this study. Perceived inequality is associated with a positive interaction with structural position in both models it is included in for 2009, but not in the years before 2009. Other contextual factors lead to inconsistent results and, in general, no consistent significant interaction effects are visible in the data before 2009.

Tab. 4.27: Model improvement over hierarchical steps for all indicators of structural position used

		AI	RD	PC	ST	FR	MI	DT	PI	IT
SEI	IT1	55.69	9.47	0.51	39.39	0.22	29.65	4.51	34.77	6.89
	IT3	42.35	10.54	2.68	47.47	0.02	28.63	0.84	21.37	5.02
SLEI	IT1	68.66	12.34	4.84	59.82	0.10	21.98	5.27	35.53	8.51
	IT3	66.53	11.61	9.64	73.39	0.28	19.35	0.39	20.88	4.84
LEI	IT1	126.06	15.27	6.23	57.17	1.06	27.26	2.60	28.29	10.40
	IT3	105.39	9.37	9.14	70.54	1.57	26.99	3.75	21.26	1.70
SZEI	IT1	48.60	8.45	0.52	41.41	0.18	32.61	5.63	34.73	7.58
	IT3	41.94	9.67	2.50	48.22	0.04	29.48	0.66	21.60	4.76
SPI	IT1	29.32	46.91	1.19	69.07	0.22	13.30	6.11	19.90	6.85
	IT3	27.51	41.68	0.74	58.64	0.83	11.46	0.97	9.18	8.67
SLPI	IT1	32.47	32.32	1.58	57.86	3.78	13.12	4.03	11.88	10.99
	IT3	37.70	37.27	2.68	61.08	5.78	8.63	0.51	5.30	12.77
LPI	IT1	61.89	20.73	4.10	51.80	5.50	18.15	3.56	7.19	16.33
	IT3	53.98	20.61	4.82	55.01	7.83	14.36	5.17	3.63	14.38
SZPI	IT1	30.43	31.87	1.29	39.15	0.44	11.74	5.74	18.62	8.33
	IT3	32.19	26.20	0.90	42.99	1.92	8.80	0.54	9.61	8.94
SFI	IT1	61.36	11.34	0.71	36.21	0.23	23.16	2.30	36.52	5.39
	IT3	44.36	9.30	1.16	53.67	0.06	25.00	1.16	28.56	4.46
SLFI	IT1	65.15	12.03	3.01	49.40	0.56	15.99	2.29	31.20	5.89
	IT3	61.81	8.58	7.39	73.58	0.04	16.77	0.41	22.68	4.46
LFI	IT1	105.43	11.30	4.72	48.15	0.86	15.74	2.43	25.64	4.48
	IT3	90.98	4.37	7.05	71.13	0.73	19.62	3.76	22.79	0.08
SZFI	IT1	53.94	10.35	0.58	37.79	0.19	25.01	3.10	36.31	6.07
	IT3	44.32	8.67	1.09	54.16	0.10	25.18	0.92	28.52	4.36
ISEI	IT1	53.92	20.36	1.01	20.02	3.86	10.37	0.55	14.41	13.46
	IT3	34.55	16.87	6.12	8.06	8.03	12.89	0.24	10.15	11.39
MPS	IT1	29.36	4.97	1.16	23.94	8.90	14.57	0.34	12.16	13.81
	IT3	14.73	7.34	6.26	5.36	8.50	14.33	0.44	6.75	12.87
SIOPS	IT1	27.27	21.22	1.22	11.29	5.91	10.64	0.50	7.09	11.95
	IT3	22.27	17.05	5.01	2.16	6.19	11.78	0.29	5.19	10.30
SBTB, 2009	IT1	98.07	14.47	0.30	5.56	1.25	2.22	2.40	10.53	10.15
	IT3	76.87	13.15	0.16	5.86	3.37	0.88	3.30	8.68	11.36
ESeC	IT1	24.09	18.25	1.01	4.88	1.87	8.60	0.63	10.09	9.72
	IT3	14.80	17.78	6.88	7.93	0.86	7.96	0.24	6.23	13.21
EGP	IT1	28.30	14.29	1.13	0.55	0.40	9.21	0.36	7.12	9.13
	IT3	15.21	17.27	3.22	1.73	0.06	9.37	0.33	4.98	13.23
SBCL	IT1	34.99	4.47	3.34	8.69	1.47	6.63	1.33	19.73	5.17
	IT3	18.66	9.27	2.28	7.52	0.28	5.17	0.45	10.66	7.30

Notes: Displayed are Chi^2 values for LR tests between hierarchical steps (compare Tables 4.1 through 4.4). The following terms related to context-level factors are abbreviated in this table: “actual inequality” [AI], “redistribution” [RD], “prosperity and mobility chances” [PC], “system threat” [ST], “fractionalization” [FR], “mobilization and information” [MI], distrust [DT], “perceived inequality” [PI] and “inequality tolerance” [IT]. Results for SBTB are based on the 2009 wave of the ISSP.

Finally, taking into account the model improvement as reported by likelihood ratio tests (see Table 4.27), results are not completely consistent, but some tendencies are clear. The addition of actual inequality improves the models for all indicators of structural position and both indicators of inequality tolerance. Including redistribution improves the model for 35 out of the 38 hierarchical series tested. Adding prosperity does not significantly improve the model for 31 out of the 38 series. The results for system threat are split between the specific measures used. System threat significantly improves the model for all income-based measures, in four out of six series using measures based on socio-economic status and occupational prestige and in both series using subjective class as an indicator for structural position, but fails to improve models in the hierarchical series using subjective top-bottom ranking and in three of the four series using measures based on objective socio-economic class. For fractionalization, only five out of 38 series show significant improvements when including the factor, four of those series using measures related to socio-economic status and occupational prestige. Including mobilization leads to significant improvements across the board, only the two series using subjective top-bottom ranking and one series using subjective class do not show significant improvements. The inclusion of political distrust improves the model only in one out of 38 series. Adding aggregate inequality perception improves the model in 34 out of the 38 series, whereas aggregate inequality tolerance leads to improvements in 26 out of the 38 series. With regard to aggregate inequality tolerance, it is noteworthy that in contrast to system threat and fractionalization, most series not showing significant improvements utilize indicators of structural position based on income measures. The results regarding model improvement in general are not completely in line with the significance of respective interaction effects, especially in the context of actual inequality and mobilization, since both variables do not show consistent effects in previous analyses. At the same time, the results illustrate again that redistribution is an important moderating factor across the board and, with some exceptions among the 38 series tested not reaching significance as in previous analyses, and that system threat and aggregate inequality perception are also relevant factors that show nearly consistent patterns across the various indicators used.

In sum, the analyses using 19 different indicators of structural position show some convergences in results with regard to the main effects of structural position and the influences of redistribution, system threat and perceived inequality, but there are some differences between groups of indicators and there is the general exception of subjective top-bottom ranking that shows a counter-

intuitive inverted main structural effect in waves before 2009, but is partly in line with expectations when only analyzing the 2009 wave. For all other contextual moderators, results are either not consistent or consistently in line with zero effects. Considering that redistribution, system threat and perceived inequality are the factors discovered as consistently relevant in most analyses conducted so far, the results for the various additional indicators of structural position, by far and large, further support the main findings, with some visible differences between specific groups of indicators.

4.4.2 Alternative indicators of inequality tolerance

As a further step of testing the boundary conditions of the findings reported so far, I compare the results for the two indicators used for inequality tolerance so far with analyses for additional indicators of inequality tolerance and more specific related constructs. First, I compare the full models for two main indicators of inequality tolerance with models for an additional third indicator with a slightly different computation method and a fourth model that uses the second indicator of inequality tolerance in combination with an individual-level control for perception that is based on the occupations used for the third instead of those used for the second indicator, as is the case in all other models that use the same occupations to compute both indicators of inequality tolerance and inequality perception. Second, I also present results using three additional dependent variables that strongly differ conceptually and computationally from the other indicators of inequality tolerance. Specifically, I use non-logarithmic versions of the indicators of inequality tolerance used in the main analyses of this study and two index-based measures generated from general Likert-scaled rating item batteries related to questions about inequality. Third, I also compute justice gaps based on Jasso (1999) for the occupation groups that are used for the computation of the indicators for inequality tolerance. This results in three indicators each for justice gaps for low- and for high-income occupations, according to the three indicators of inequality tolerance based on occupational incomes. These indicators are not indicators of inequality tolerance, but instead measures that combine perception and evaluation within low- and high-income groups, potentially shining some additional light on the effects on inequality tolerance as reported in this study. This part of the analyses is completely exploratory and only serves to investigate if some moderating effects can be specifically localized in terms of the income estimates provided for low- versus high-income groups. For all analyses in this chapter, as in the main analyses of this study, I use standardized logarithmic measures of household equivalence and personal income.

Tab. 4.28: Comparing alternative computations of the main dependent variable

	SLEI				SLPI			
	IT1	IT2	IT3	IT3*	IT1	IT2	IT3	IT3*
Structural position	10.73	10.77	11.08	9.99	8.54	9.03	8.03	7.58
CLI:								
Actual inequality	*-0.53*	*-0.06*	*-0.02*	*-0.43*	*2.59*	*3.93*	*3.12*	*2.48*
Redistribution	*2.28*	*2.72*	*2.29*	*2.73*	*3.45*	*4.45*	*4.26*	*3.84*
Prosperity	*-0.75*	*-2.23*	*-1.81*	*-2.36*	*0.26*	*-0.70*	*-0.63*	*-0.46*
System threat	*-3.16*	*-5.65*	*-3.75*	*-6.30*	*-5.63*	*-7.17*	*-5.48*	*-4.59*
Fractionalization	*-0.41*	*-0.57*	*-0.44*	*-0.38*	*-1.49*	*-1.39*	*-1.44*	*-1.21*
Mobilization	*-0.87*	*-1.40*	*-0.92*	*-1.17*	*-0.47*	*-0.82*	*-1.00*	*-0.79*
Political distrust	*-0.51*	*-1.22*	*-0.89*	*-1.56*	*0.44*	*0.01*	*-0.20*	*-0.23*
Perceived inequality	*2.18*	*2.17*	*2.40*	*3.50*	*0.73*	*0.78*	*-0.15*	*0.60*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.35*	*-0.37*	*-1.16*	*-0.06*	*-1.63*	*-1.78*	*-1.72*	*-2.06*
N (individuals)	63247	63247	63247	63247	54337	54337	54337	54337
N (groups)	70	70	70	70	69	69	69	69

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed. * In the models corresponding to data columns four and eight, IT3 is used, but the individual-level control for perceived inequality is based on the occupational groups used for IT2.

Comparing the four models using different indicators of inequality tolerance (see Table 4.28), the main effect of structural position is significant and positive for all dependent variables used. Moderation effects are also substantially consistent. In all models, higher redistribution is associated with increased structural effects and system threat with weaker structural effects. Additionally, for all models using personal income, actual inequality shows a significant positive interaction with structural position, whereas in models using household equivalence income, perceived inequality shows a consistent significant positive interaction with structural position. Other contextual factors are not related to significant effects, with the exceptions of prosperity, significantly decreasing structural effects in two of eight models, and inequality tolerance, significantly decreasing structural effects in one of eight models.

For the additional indicators of inequality tolerance that are conceptually different (see Table 4.29), the effects diverge widely from all previous analyses presented and are both partly inconsistent within this group of indicators and partly not in line with the results using any of the logarithmic measures of inequality tolerance based on occupational income estimations. First of all, the main effects of structural position are not significant in any of the models using non-logarithmic measures

Tab. 4.29: Effects on indicators of inequality tolerance based on linear occupational income ratio and general rating items

	SLEI			SLPI			SLEI		SLPI	
	IN1	IN2	IN3	IN1	IN2	IN3	IT4	IT5	IT4	IT5
Structural position	0.81	-0.18	0.74	-1.23	-0.72	-1.22	8.96	5.01	11.87	3.66
CLI:										
Actual inequality	*2.21*	*-1.58*	*2.29*	*2.56*	*-0.80*	*2.54*	*-0.20*	*-2.97*	*-0.49*	*-2.30*
Redistribution	*1.25*	*-2.19*	*1.24*	*1.63*	*-0.71*	*1.64*	*1.80*	*-0.84*	*1.26*	*-0.12*
Prosperity	*0.91*	*1.12*	*0.87*	*0.88*	*0.66*	*0.85*	*-0.15*	*0.18*	*0.39*	*-0.03*
System threat	*-11.10*	*-2.81*	*-12.61*	*-6.58*	*-4.06*	*-6.58*	*-1.63*	*-0.86*	*-0.47*	*-1.57*
Fractionalization	*-0.43*	*-0.48*	*-0.38*	*0.58*	*-1.66*	*0.48*	*-0.57*	*0.50*	*-0.94*	*0.26*
Mobilization	*-0.40*	*-0.69*	*-1.52*	*-0.10*	*0.04*	*-1.62*	*0.13*	*0.39*	*0.93*	*0.68*
Political distrust	*-1.45*	*-0.16*	*-0.27*	*-1.61*	*-1.34*	*-0.08*	*0.33*	*0.25*	*2.02*	*-0.40*
Perceived inequality	*-0.76*	*1.02*	*-0.78*	*-0.98*	*0.42*	*-0.99*	*1.03*	*1.79*	*0.95*	*0.64*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.17*	*0.83*	*-1.22*	*-1.31*	*-0.17*	*-1.32*	*2.96*	*1.36*	*2.54*	*2.18*
N (individuals)	63247	63247	63247	54337	54337	54337	62962	27192	54100	22333
N (groups)	70	70	70	69	69	69	70	31	69	30

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

of inequality tolerance (see the first six data columns in Table 4.29). In terms of interactions, for actual inequality, significant positive moderation effects are visible in four of six models using the non-logarithmic indicators of inequality tolerance. Noteworthy is that these effects are visible for both household equivalence income and personal income, in contrast to analyses using logarithmic measures of inequality tolerance that resulted in effects of actual inequality for personal income and of perceived inequality for household equivalence income. The results for redistribution are inconsistent and not in line with results for other indicators seen in the analyses presented so far. Redistribution is even associated with a significant negative effect in one model, contrary to expectations and all other results presented so far, in one model using the non-logarithmic version of the second indicator of inequality tolerance. Only system threat shows consistent significant negative effects for these non-logarithmic measures of inequality tolerance. Interaction effects of other contextual factors are not significant or not consistent[275].

275 When using non-logarithmic measures of aggregate perceived inequality corresponding to the non-logarithmic measures of inequality tolerance used in the respective models (see Table A.7.4 in the appendix), results are also mostly inconsistent with two notable differences from the results presented in Table 4.30: First, in these models, the interaction between structural position and system threat is in line with expectations but not consistently significant. Second, the non-logarithmic measure of aggregate perceived inequality shows consistent effects, but negative effects which are contrary to theoretical assumptions. Since not even the main effects of structural position (and other main effects of control variables that are consistent throughout all models using logarithmic measures of aggregate

Tab. 4.30: Effects on indicators of income group-specific justice gaps

	SLEI						SLPI					
	JGL1	JGL2	JGL3	JGH1	JGH2	JGH3	JGL1	JGL2	JGL3	JGH1	JGH2	JGH3
Structural position	2.22	3.32	2.21	-7.97	-8.04	-8.29	4.21	3.61	4.14	-7.21	-6.80	-7.16
CLI:												
Actual inequality	*-0.69*	*0.01*	*-0.57*	*0.33*	*0.09*	*0.03*	*1.15*	*1.48*	*1.37*	*-0.81*	*-1.71*	*-1.37*
Redistribution	*0.97*	*2.26*	*1.01*	*-1.12*	*-1.19*	*-1.18*	*2.96*	*2.88*	*3.07*	*-1.10*	*-1.77*	*-1.46*
Prosperity	*-0.44*	*-0.65*	*-0.38*	*0.48*	*1.21*	*0.98*	*0.75*	*0.84*	*0.91*	*0.66*	*1.15*	*1.10*
System threat	*-0.70*	*-1.10*	*-0.78*	*1.08*	*1.51*	*1.72*	*-0.85*	*-0.70*	*-1.05*	*2.09*	*2.67*	*2.50*
Fractionalization	*-0.04*	*-0.52*	*-0.16*	*1.74*	*1.66*	*1.62*	*-0.71*	*-1.32*	*-0.99*	*1.83*	*1.66*	*1.54*
Mobilization	*-1.34*	*-1.80*	*-1.25*	*-1.33*	*-0.74*	*-0.78*	*-0.32*	*-0.77*	*-0.30*	*-1.15*	*-0.81*	*-0.71*
Political distrust	*-0.08*	*-1.70*	*-0.21*	*0.40*	*0.66*	*0.53*	*-1.50*	*-2.42*	*-1.72*	*-0.43*	*-0.43*	*-0.35*
Perceived inequality	*2.95*	*1.54*	*2.76*	*0.90*	*1.06*	*0.74*	*2.44*	*0.17*	*2.33*	*0.87*	*1.05*	*0.65*
Inequality tolerance	*1.35*	*2.70*	*1.39*	*3.08*	*2.68*	*3.00*	*4.12*	*3.46*	*4.26*	*1.77*	*1.52*	*1.89*
N (individuals)	63247	63247	63247	63247	63247	63247	54337	54337	54337	54337	54337	54337
N (groups)	70	70	70	70	70	70	69	69	69	69	69	69

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

For the two measures of inequality tolerance based on general rating items (see the last four columns in Table 4.29), whereas the main effects of structural position are significant and positive, the contextual factors do not lead to any consistent significant effects. Only aggregate inequality tolerance is associated with a positive significant interaction in three of four models, but in one model the effect does not even reach significance when using an alpha level of 0.10. All other contextual factors show no consistency in terms of significant effects at all.

Turning to the last group of alternative dependent measures (see Table 4.30), the justice gaps analyzed separately for low and high income groups as estimated and evaluated by the respondents show mostly insignificant or inconsistent results, but there are some noteworthy tendencies visible. First of all, the main effects of structural position are, as is to be expected, positive for the justice gap of lower income groups but negative for the justice gap of higher income groups[276]. In terms of interaction effects, the picture is much less clear and dependent on specific indicators of structural

perceived inequality such as gender, age and marital status) are significant in these models, I assume that the linear measurement of both inequality tolerance and aggregate perceived inequality is a problematic option, probably due to the stronger influence of outliers and the relative influence of structural effects in lower parts of the income distribution on overall structural effects (compare Chapter 4.4.5).

276 Whereas the justice gap for lower income groups as measured in this study is in line with the concept of inequality tolerance in terms of expected effect directions, since a higher value indicates that the ratio between perceived divided by legitimate income is higher, the justice gap for higher income groups is to be interpreted inverted in terms of direction and could be understood as a measurement of inequality aversion.

position and income groups used. Actual inequality has no significant influence in any model. Redistribution only shows a positive interaction with structural position for the lower justice gap in one of the three models for household equivalence income, but in all three models for personal income. System threat shows a consistent positive interaction effect reducing the negative main effect of structural position on the justice gap for higher income groups in all models using personal income, but not in the models using household equivalence income. Perceived inequality is associated with a positive interaction in four of the six models for the justice gap related to lower income groups.

Noteworthy is that aggregated inequality tolerance seems to have opposing effects in terms of the conceptualization of the dependent variables used here as measures of inequality tolerance. For the justice gaps in both lower and higher income groups, aggregate inequality tolerance shows positive interactions with structural position, but these are only significant for lower income groups using personal income and for higher income groups using household equivalence income. Therefore, aggregate inequality tolerance seems, in tendency, to always be associated with higher justice gaps in higher structural positions, increasing structural effects for the evaluation of lower income groups, but decreasing structural effects for the evaluation of higher income groups. Since these partial effects (when seen through the lens of inequality tolerance measurement) can be different in strength, the net effect on inequality tolerance can be positive or negative, but as seen in most previous models presented, the partial effects routinely negate each other and add up to a zero effect.

In sum, the use of alternative indicators of inequality tolerance leads to inconsistent results. Whereas the effects on alternative logarithmic measures of inequality tolerance based on occupational income estimates are consistent with the main models (compare Chapter 4.1), the non-logarithmic measures only show consistent moderation effects in line with previous models for system threat, but not for inequality-related measures or redistribution. Measures of inequality tolerance based on general rating items are not associated with any consistent moderation effect of context-level factors. Results for measures of justice gaps are mostly inconsistent in terms of significance, but using an alpha-level of 0.10, in a majority of models, system threat seems to increase justice gaps for higher-earning occupations whereas redistribution and perceived inequality have positive influences on structural effects for income gaps of lower-earning occupations. Effect directions indicate that, in tendency, both actual inequality (for SLPI) and redistribution increase justice gaps for lower-earning occupations and decrease justice gaps for higher-earning occupations at the same time. This might partially explain

why effects on the main indicators of inequality tolerance (IT1 and IT2) are much more consistent, since these measures combine estimates for lower- and higher-earning occupations by setting both against each other in the form of a fractional relationship, effectively unifying the opposing moderation effects visible for justice gaps.

4.4.3 Alternative and additional indicators of contextual factors

In order to investigate how robust the results are to the use of alternative indicators[277] for constructs on contextual level, I repeat the main analyses using alternative indicators for all moderating contextual factors in consecutive steps. For actual inequality, I use one additional source for the Gini index for net income (GNW) and one source for the Gini index for market income (GMS), two measures of income shares of the lowest 20 and 10 percent of the income distribution (SH20 and SH10) and eight relative inequality measures based on ISSP data, specifically the Gini index and three ratio-based measures for both household equivalence and personal income (GIP, GIE, R91P, R91E, R51P, R51E, R95P and R95E). Additionally, two measures of wealth inequality (WSF, WGE) and two measures of standard deviation approximating absolute inequality (SDP and SDE). For redistribution, I analyze the effect of absolute Gini reduction (RGA) and of tax revenue (RTR).

For prosperity and mobility chances, I rely on an alternative measure of GDP (GDP2), an index of human development (HDI), two ISSP-based measures of reported intergenerational mobility (MB1 and MB2), an ISSP-based measure of perceived meritocracy (MRT) and three measures of unemployment (UE1, UE2, UE3). For system threat, I use three alternative measures of poverty (PV2, PV3, PV4), two ISSP-based measures of perceived conflict (PC1 and PC2) and one measure based on homicide data (HMC). For fractionalization, four alternative measures of fractionalization (FR2, FR3, FR4, FR5) and the percentage of international migrants (MGR) are utilized. With regard to political distrust, I analyze an index of corruption perception (CPI) and two different measures of government reliability based on factor scores (GV1 and GV2).

For mobilization and information, I use two alternative measures focused on mobilization based on union access and union density (UNA and UND), the percentage of people who have completed secondary education (ISE), a measures of internet usage (IIU), the percentage of people employed in areas related to research and development (IRD), and an index of press freedom (PFI).

277 A detailed description of these indicators is provided in the method section of this thesis (see Chapter 3).

For aggregate perceived inequality, I analyze the influence of the non-logarithmic ratio of estimated occupational incomes (IPN) and two alternative logarithmic ratios (IP2 and IP3) with the occupational groups taken from the two alternative measures of inequality tolerance (IT2 and IT3). For normative influences, I analyze three alternative measures of legitimate inequality (NR1, NR2, NR3) based on occupational income estimates (aggregated versions of IT1, IT2 and IT3) and measures of individualism (IDV) and rationalism (RTN).

In general, the analyses in this chapter have to be interpreted with additional care, since the numbers of cases and country years included varies substantially between models for different indicators resulting from the data sources used. For instance, with regard to alternative indicators of actual inequality (see Tables 4.31 through 4.34), all models based on measures using data from the World Bank and on indicators related to wealth inequality have substantially lower numbers for individuals and country years resulting from the data sources used. This drastic drop in cases and country years analyzed is potentially a relevant source of bias. With regard to the ISSP-based measures, case numbers are minimally reduced in the four models using household equivalence income data for the estimation of actual inequality while using personal income as indicator for structural position, whereas the other four models have the same case numbers of the previous models using personal income including the main models. Even though some samples used for different indicators are similar to each other, the additional problems for model comparisons in this chapter have to be kept in mind. The interpretation of results has to be strictly limited to the consistency of effect direction and significance and the results have to be regarded as approximate and tentative. At the same time, the use of conceptually different indicators with varying sample sizes is expected to, in tendency, lead to an underestimation of the consistency of effects found, reducing the chances of false positive findings if consistency is evaluated across all tests while increasing the chances of false-negative results. The evaluation of consistent effects in this chapter is therefore based on a very conservative form of estimation.

For the test of all alternative indicators of contextual moderators, I present models using standardized personal income as well as the first indicator of inequality tolerance (IT1). Additionally, for models that show significant effects for the respective alternative indicators tested, I also report additional models using standardized logarithmic household equivalence income and the second indicator of inequality tolerance. For some of the measures used as alternative indicators, it could be

argued that they constitute separate dimensions from the main indicator used. Therefore, I also conduct analyses combining interaction effects for these measures with those for the main indicators used in the main analyses. In this context, I specifically test the measures related to income shares, wealth inequality and absolute inequality in the context of actual inequality, the measures based on unemployment, class mobility and the perception of meritocracy in the context of prosperity and mobility chances, the measures based on perceived conflict and homicides in the context of system threat, the measures related to corruption perception and government reliability in the context of political distrust, and information-related measures in the context of mobilization and information. After reporting the models that use alternative indicators, I present results for analyses utilizing threeway CLIs to test for the influence of additional interrelations as proposed in the literature, specifically for the interaction between individual structural position, actual inequality and system threat, and for the interaction between individual structural position and a squared term for actual inequality.

4.4.3.1 Actual inequality and redistribution

With regard to alternative indicators of actual relative inequality, the results are inconsistent even with regard to conceptually similar indicators in terms of significance, but mostly in line with expectations in terms of effect direction. Beginning with Gini- and ratio-based indicators (see Table 4.31), only the indicator based on market inequality shows a significant influence, and only in the two models using personal income as indicator of structural position. Household equivalence income shows no significant interaction with market inequality. In these models using household equivalence income, perceived inequality shows a positive interaction with structural position instead. This is the same pattern visible in most previous model series. With regard to other contextual moderators, the moderating effects of system threat are significant and in line with expectations in all four models, whereas the interaction of redistribution with structural position does not reach significance in the models using personal income. Other contextual factors do not show consistent significant effects.

The Gini index based on World Bank data is not associated with a significant interaction effect. Additionally, the influence of redistribution fails to reach significance in most of the models using this indicator, including the one for personal income using the first indicator of inequality tolerance. Only

Tab. 4.31: Comparing effects for full models using alternative Gini- and ratio-based indicators of actual inequality

	GMS SLPI IT1	SLPI IT2	SLEI IT1	SLEI IT2	GNW SLPI IT1	GIE SLPI IT1	GIP SLPI IT1	R51E SLPI IT1	R51P SLPI IT1	R91E SLPI IT1	R91P SLPI IT1	R95E SLPI IT1	R95P SLPI IT1
Structural position	8.83	8.29	10.57	10.77	6.00	8.59	8.22	8.77	8.36	3.40	1.30	8.69	8.32
CLI:													
Actual inequality, alternative indicator	*2.83*	*3.31*	*-0.14*	*0.25*	*-0.31*	*0.18*	*-0.02*	*-0.04*	*-0.22*	*0.82*	*-0.19*	*1.20*	*-0.44*
Redistribution	*1.51*	*1.71*	*3.22*	*3.93*	*1.28*	*2.24*	*2.34*	*2.10*	*2.71*	*2.33*	*2.30*	*2.37*	*2.20*
Prosperity	*0.10*	*-0.78*	*-0.76*	*-2.26*	*1.69*	*0.36*	*0.34*	*0.31*	*0.40*	*0.42*	*0.39*	*0.64*	*0.36*
System threat	*-5.43*	*-5.46*	*-3.41*	*-6.00*	*-2.97*	*-3.00*	*-2.75*	*-3.82*	*-3.41*	*-3.91*	*-2.78*	*-3.92*	*-2.43*
Fractionalization	*-1.43*	*-1.30*	*-0.65*	*-0.71*	*-0.89*	*-0.63*	*-0.66*	*-0.60*	*-0.71*	*-0.81*	*-0.50*	*-1.00*	*-0.34*
Mobilization	*0.33*	*-0.40*	*-0.42*	*-1.18*	*-1.34*	*-0.09*	*0.00*	*-0.07*	*0.01*	*0.12*	*-0.04*	*0.01*	*-0.09*
Political distrust	*-0.38*	*-0.89*	*-0.89*	*-1.40*	*-0.94*	*-0.33*	*-0.27*	*-0.31*	*-0.35*	*-0.43*	*-0.27*	*-0.53*	*-0.25*
Perceived inequality	*0.67*	*-0.17*	*2.00*	*2.02*	*3.17*	*1.60*	*1.69*	*1.53*	*1.78*	*1.35*	*1.79*	*1.31*	*1.82*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.66*	*-1.71*	*-1.37*	*-0.38*	*0.55*	*-1.70*	*-1.32*	*-1.58*	*-1.42*	*-1.76*	*-1.33*	*-1.77*	*-1.35*
N (individuals)	54337	54337	63247	63247	29052	53637	54337	53637	54337	53637	54337	53637	54337
N (groups)	69	69	70	70	37	68	69	68	69	68	69	68	69

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

perceived inequality and system threat show the consistent expected influences in line with the main model series in the models using this indicator.

Indicators based on ISSP data lead to similar results, even though based on a much larger sample size. All ratio- and Gini-based indicators of actual relative inequality aggregated from ISSP data do not show consistent significant effects. At the same time, the effects of redistribution and system threat remain significant in the models using ISSP-based measures of actual relative inequality. In general, the influence of system threat remains significant throughout models using relative measures of actual inequality. Perceived inequality shows an inconsistent influence, positive in most models and in all models in which it is significant, but only significant when using an alpha level of 0.05 in the models with restricted sample size using the four indicators based on World Bank data. Other indicators do not show consistent effects and are not significant influences in most models. It is noteworthy that in one of the models using ISSP-based relative measures of inequality, the main effect of structural position does not reach significance. This is an exception from the rule set by most other models in this study, but at the same time, the effect direction is positive and the expected interaction effects are visible for a moderation of structural effects by both redistribution and system threat.

Tab. 4.32: Comparing effects for full models using alternative indicators of actual inequality based on income shares

	SH20				SH10			
	SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI	
	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1
Structural position	10.39	7.88	6.89	6.60	11.25	8.08	6.59	6.92
CLI:								
Actual inequality, alternative indicator	*-1.88*	*-2.89*	*-3.87*	*-3.82*	*-2.60*	*-3.76*	*-3.40*	*-4.01*
Redistribution	*2.78*	*3.91*	*3.81*	*4.85*	*3.50*	*4.26*	*3.37*	*5.02*
Prosperity	*-2.69*	*-2.03*	*-1.25*	*-1.19*	*-2.86*	*-2.47*	*-1.34*	*-1.44*
System threat	*-5.26*	*-3.38*	*-3.84*	*-3.57*	*-4.59*	*-2.91*	*-3.44*	*-3.17*
Fractionalization	*-1.28*	*-1.44*	*-0.86*	*-1.91*	*-1.69*	*-2.08*	*-0.85*	*-2.08*
Mobilization	*0.18*	*0.42*	*0.60*	*-0.39*	*-0.24*	*-0.10*	*0.36*	*-0.86*
Political distrust	*0.09*	*0.41*	*1.47*	*1.12*	*0.24*	*0.61*	*1.54*	*1.34*
Perceived inequality	*2.00*	*1.45*	*1.31*	*2.03*	*2.62*	*2.23*	*1.90*	*3.00*
Inequality tolerance	*-0.45*	*-1.88*	*-1.47*	*-1.76*	*-0.48*	*-1.97*	*-1.32*	*-1.75*
N (individuals)	39534	39534	35540	35540	39534	39534	35540	35540
N (groups)	45	45	46	46	45	45	46	46

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

With regard to alternative indicators of actual inequality based on income shares taken from World Bank data (see Table 4.32), these indicators have to be interpreted as negative measures of inequality or measures of equality, since the indicators refer to the percentage of income shared by the lowest (10 or 20 percent) quantiles in the income distribution. For both measures, effects are consistently negative in direction and therefore in line with expectations. The effect of the indicators of actual inequality based on income shares fails to reach significance in one of eight models[278], but in this model, the income share of the lowest 20 percent is associated with a significant effect when using

278 The effects of indicators of actual inequality based on income shares reach significance in a clear majority of models for both share-based measures when used without controlling for the main indicator of inequality (see Table 4.32), but when both measures are used in parallel (see Table A.8.1 in the appendix), results are inconsistent and seem to be divided between the two indicators of inequality, with effects reaching significance for one of the two measures or no measures at all in the models tested. More precisely, interaction effects of income shares reach significance in three of eight models and interaction effects of the main indicator of actual inequality reach significance in two of eight models (see Table A.8.1 in the appendix). This seems to indicate that the effects of both indicators are closely related. Based on this evidence, I assume that income shares and the Gini index as conceptually different indicators of actual inequality do not necessarily correspond to different dimensions of the construct in question with relevance for the moderation of structural effects.

Tab. 4.33: Comparing effects for full models using alternative indicators of actual inequality based on wealth

	WSF									
	SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI		WGE SLPI	
	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1
Structural position	12.42	10.87	10.67	15.06	7.42	9.68	5.68	7.78	6.96	7.34
CLI:										
Actual inequality, alternative indicator	*2.54*	*2.31*	*0.62*	*1.56*	*1.88*	*2.42*	*-0.24*	*1.25*	*1.04*	*0.55*
Actual inequality, main indicator					*1.88*	*-0.78*	*3.86*	*1.67*		*2.44*
Redistribution	*1.88*	*3.22*	*1.25*	*2.43*	*2.26*	*1.58*	*3.34*	*2.28*	*2.56*	*3.14*
Prosperity	*-2.30*	*-3.22*	*-1.19*	*-2.12*	*-2.21*	*-3.55*	*-0.50*	*-1.59*	*-0.20*	*-0.32*
System threat	*-3.92*	*-3.16*	*-1.45*	*-1.99*	*-5.01*	*-3.07*	*-4.57*	*-2.75*	*-3.58*	*-4.94*
Fractionalization	*0.35*	*0.61*	*1.67*	*0.90*	*-0.22*	*0.90*	*0.72*	*0.38*	*-0.67*	*-1.19*
Mobilization	*1.10*	*2.86*	*2.75*	*3.81*	*-0.05*	*2.64*	*-0.08*	*1.53*	*0.94*	*0.45*
Political distrust	*0.11*	*-0.40*	*2.32*	*1.30*	*-0.37*	*-0.20*	*1.26*	*0.41*	*0.19*	*0.40*
Perceived inequality	*1.23*	*0.56*	*-0.19*	*-0.36*	*1.40*	*0.55*	*-0.39*	*-0.47*	*1.80*	*0.57*
Inequality tolerance	*0.52*	*-0.02*	*-1.36*	*-1.39*	*0.48*	*0.00*	*-1.55*	*-1.45*	*-0.96*	*-1.55*
N (individuals)	23615	23615	20437	20437	23615	23615	20437	20437	37450	37450
N (groups)	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	49	49

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

an alpha level of 0.10 instead of 0.05. The influence of income shares therefore is generally in line with expectations. Effects of redistribution and system threat are completely in line with expectations in these models. Significant positive influences of perceived inequality and negative influences of both prosperity and aggregate inequality-promoting norms are visible only in a minority of models, even though effect directions are consistent for these three moderating influences. Other effects of contextual factors are not consistent, including the effects of aggregate perceived inequality, which fail to reach significance in three of eight models. At the same time, in every model at least one interaction associated with inequality is significant, either the interaction of structural position with the alternative indicator of actual inequality, or the interaction with aggregate perceived inequality.

In terms of wealth-related indicators of inequality (see Table 4.33), the share of wealth owned by individuals at the top does not show a consistent influence, but when only controlling for this indicator and not the main indicator of inequality, all models using household equivalence income show a positive moderation effect in line with expectations. When additionally controlling for the moderation effect of the main indicator of actual inequality, only on of the models using household

equivalence income is associated with a significant interaction effect. For the Gini-based measure of wealth inequality, no significant moderation effects are visible, independent of the control of the main indicator of actual inequality.

When comparing effects of other contextual factors in these models, it is evident that effects of both redistribution and system threat are not completely consistent in terms of significance. Redistribution fails to reach significance as a moderator in three of the 10 models presented, and in two models even when using an alpha level of 0.10. The moderation effect of system threat does not reach significance in one model. Effect direction remains consistent in all models for both contextual factors. Additionally, it has to be noted that all models that do not show significant influences of redistribution and system threat are based on a substantially reduced sample size that has to be taken into account when evaluating these results.

In sum, effects of wealth-related indicators of actual inequality are inconsistent in terms of significance, but the moderation effects that are significant are in line with expectations. All significant effects of wealth inequality are again in line with the effects of the main indicator of inequality in terms of direction. Therefore, the effects do not seem to be related to a separate dimension of inequality substantially different from the main indicator of inequality used.

Turning to the four measures of absolute inequality (see Table 4.34), effects are not significant, but in contrast to other alternative indicators of inequality, the effect direction is mostly negative and therefore opposed to effects of the main indicator of inequality, since the measure is a positive indicator of inequality, with higher values indicating higher inequality. Effects of redistribution and system threat are consistent and in line with expectations, apart from two models in which the moderation effect of redistribution only reaches significance when using an alpha level of 0.10. Actual inequality shows a positive influence on structural effects in models using personal income as an indicator of structural position, but is consistently significant only when using an alpha level of 0.10.

Taken together, most alternative indicators of actual inequality used do not lead to significant interaction effects in the full model of the respective series with some exceptions. One measure of market inequality based on the same source as the main indicator of actual inequality used in the main analyses, the measures based on income shares and one of the two measures based on wealth inequality show influences in line with the idea of economic accentuation. Measures of absolute

Tab. 4.34: Comparing effects for full models using alternative indicators of actual inequality based on standard deviation, IT1

	SDE SLEI	SXE SLEI	SDP SLEI	SXP SLEI	SDE SLPI	SXE SLPI	SDP SLPI	SXP SLPI
Structural position	8.61	3.27	8.64	0.18	8.77	3.39	8.81	0.06
CLI:								
Actual inequality, alternative indicator	*-1.22*	*0.23*	*-1.06*	*0.12*	*-1.51*	*0.12*	*-1.34*	*-0.01*
Actual inequality, main indicator					*1.95*	*1.82*	*1.95*	*1.85*
Redistribution	*1.85*	*2.16*	*1.84*	*2.15*	*2.82*	*2.81*	*2.82*	*2.81*
Prosperity	*0.45*	*0.06*	*0.39*	*0.08*	*0.47*	*-0.02*	*0.39*	*-0.01*
System threat	*-3.61*	*-2.99*	*-3.75*	*-2.99*	*-5.31*	*-4.68*	*-5.22*	*-4.66*
Fractionalization	*-0.55*	*-0.44*	*-0.52*	*-0.44*	*-1.30*	*-1.07*	*-1.26*	*-1.09*
Mobilization	*-0.17*	*-0.17*	*-0.17*	*-0.18*	*0.26*	*0.18*	*0.25*	*0.17*
Political distrust	*-0.05*	*-0.30*	*-0.08*	*-0.32*	*-0.16*	*-0.47*	*-0.18*	*-0.50*
Perceived inequality	*1.92*	*1.46*	*1.92*	*1.48*	*0.73*	*0.60*	*0.76*	*0.62*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.79*	*-1.69*	*-1.76*	*-1.57*	*-1.90*	*-1.73*	*-1.86*	*-1.60*
N (individuals)	50123	50123	50123	50123	50123	50123	50123	50123
N (groups)	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

inequality partly are related to negative effects more in line with assumptions based on system justification as opposed to the economic accentuation of interests. For other measures, the effect direction, especially when effects are significant, also is usually in line with expectations based on economic accentuation. In some of the models using drastically reduced case numbers due to reasons of data availability, the interaction of redistribution with structural position does not reach significance, even though the effect direction is in line with other models. Effects of system threat are mostly consistent, but fail to reach significance in one of 39 models presented, specifically one model using a wealth-based measure of inequality (WSF) in combination with SLPI and IT2.

In terms of alternative measures of redistribution (see Table 4.35), the effects are completely in line with previous model series for both income measures and both indicators of inequality tolerance. The interaction of redistribution and structural position is significant and positive in all four models, system threat is consistently significant with a negative interaction, actual inequality shows a positive interaction with personal income and perceived inequality with household equivalence income. Again, no consistent interaction effects of structural position with other contextual factors are visible.

Tab. 4.35: Comparing effects for full models using alternative indicators of redistribution

	RGA				RTR							
	SLPI		SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI		SLEI	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	8.96	8.51	11.04	11.38	7.78	8.48	8.70	7.74	8.49	11.24	9.38	9.40
CLI:												
Actual inequality	*2.10*	*2.36*	*-0.92*	*-0.68*	*1.93*	*1.50*	*-0.21*	*-0.12*	*3.83*	*4.79*	*1.33*	*2.11*
Redistribution, alternative indicator	*3.57*	*4.32*	*2.41*	*2.80*	*3.28*	*2.89*	*3.55*	*2.25*	*2.70*	*2.60*	*3.25*	*1.94*
Redistribution, main indicator									*3.30*	*4.54*	*2.40*	*3.22*
Prosperity	*-0.04*	*-0.87*	*-0.98*	*-2.37*	*-0.42*	*-0.91*	*-1.16*	*-2.49*	*-0.95*	*-1.62*	*-1.46*	*-3.20*
System threat	*-5.68*	*-5.10*	*-3.26*	*-5.54*	*-2.17*	*-2.44*	*-1.98*	*-3.43*	*-3.77*	*-4.55*	*-2.49*	*-4.54*
Fractionalization	*-1.25*	*-1.14*	*-0.30*	*-0.42*	*0.41*	*0.64*	*0.85*	*0.16*	*-0.11*	*0.17*	*0.49*	*-0.33*
Mobilization	*0.17*	*-0.53*	*-0.70*	*-1.45*	*0.57*	*0.95*	*1.39*	*0.54*	*-0.17*	*0.00*	*1.13*	*-0.14*
Political distrust	*-0.42*	*-0.85*	*-0.88*	*-1.40*	*-0.90*	*-0.16*	*-1.77*	*-1.35*	*-1.63*	*-0.75*	*-2.15*	*-1.87*
Perceived inequality	*0.75*	*-0.11*	*2.19*	*2.20*	*1.52*	*0.92*	*1.26*	*1.22*	*0.79*	*0.09*	*0.70*	*0.67*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.61*	*-1.69*	*-1.34*	*-0.35*	*-0.14*	*-0.30*	*0.24*	*0.52*	*-0.25*	*-0.53*	*0.15*	*0.56*
N (individuals)	54337	54337	63247	63247	33116	33116	36916	36916	33116	33116	36916	36916
N (groups)	69	69	70	70	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

With regard to tax revenue as a second alternative indicator of redistribution, effects are consistently positive, even in three of the four models using both tax revenue and the main indicator of redistribution in combination, and in all four of these models when using an alpha level of 0.10. The effects of both redistribution-related variables are always positive in these models. The effect of the main indicator of redistribution is completely consistent and in line with expectations in these models when used as an additional parallel influence and system threat also shows a consistent influence in line with expectations in all models. In sum, redistribution shows a positive interaction with structural position in all models using alternative indicators of redistribution, even when using two measures of sub-dimensions in parallel. Only a single model is an exception to this pattern with one of two parallel indicators not reaching significance. In contrast, measures of actual inequality and perceived inequality do not always show significant influences on effects of structural position in these models. For system threat, all models presented here show significant negative effects, even in the sets with drastically reduced case and country year numbers.

Tab. 4.36: Comparing effects for full models using alternative indicators of prosperity and mobility chances, SLPI and IT1

	GD2	HDI	MRT	MB1		MB2		UE1		UE2		UE3		
Structural position	8.81	8.27	9.73	6.88	7.60	7.35	8.36	7.77	8.45	8.31	8.22	7.68	9.05	7.50
CLI:														
Actual inequality	*3.23*	*2.58*	*5.85*	*4.26*	*3.57*	*2.95*	*2.90*	*2.31*	*2.19*	*2.09*	*2.36*	*2.36*	*1.65*	*1.76*
Redistribution	*5.60*	*2.92*	*5.54*	*2.39*	*6.27*	*3.78*	*5.23*	*3.35*	*3.13*	*2.81*	*3.63*	*3.18*	*2.95*	*2.58*
Prosperity, alternative indicator	*-0.16*	*1.84*	*0.21*	*0.90*	*1.67*	*0.22*	*1.42*	*-0.30*	*0.80*	*0.46*	*0.00*	*0.17*	*-0.41*	*0.62*
Prosperity, main indicator				*0.26*		*1.56*		*1.37*		*0.86*		*0.03*		*-0.48*
System threat	*-6.10*	*-1.82*	*-5.60*	*-3.53*	*-5.54*	*-5.03*	*-4.33*	*-4.12*	*-6.30*	*-5.51*	*-5.24*	*-4.47*	*-3.95*	*-3.22*
Fractionalization	*-1.63*	*-0.94*	*-3.08*	*-2.97*	*-1.36*	*-1.28*	*-1.44*	*-1.35*	*-1.57*	*-1.62*	*-0.44*	*-0.44*	*-0.63*	*-0.63*
Mobilization	*0.17*	*0.32*	*1.87*	*2.36*	*0.91*	*0.92*	*0.87*	*0.86*	*0.38*	*0.45*	*1.10*	*1.08*	*1.53*	*1.52*
Political distrust	*-1.02*	*-0.47*	*0.52*	*0.86*	*-0.90*	*-0.76*	*-0.58*	*-0.30*	*-0.41*	*-0.44*	*0.27*	*0.26*	*0.30*	*0.22*
Perceived inequality	*0.91*	*0.44*	*-0.70*	*-0.38*	*0.00*	*0.13*	*0.61*	*0.86*	*0.76*	*0.68*	*0.88*	*0.78*	*0.87*	*0.63*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.95*	*-2.24*	*-2.26*	*-2.40*	*-1.81*	*-1.62*	*-1.36*	*-0.96*	*-1.11*	*-1.18*	*-1.55*	*-1.52*	*-1.40*	*-1.43*
N (individuals)	54337	54128	31165	31165	52712	52712	52712	52712	52712	52712	47395	47395	46122	46122
N (groups)	69	68	39	39	67	67	67	67	67	67	61	61	61	61

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

4.4.3.2 Other contextual factors

Turning to alternative indicators of prosperity and mobility chances (see Table 4.36), it is evident that none of the alternative measures are significant. Interactions of structural position with measures of class mobility, meritocracy perception, gross domestic production, human development or the three measures of unemployment[279] all fail to reach significance. When using an alpha level of 0.10, only the moderation effect associated with human development shows a significant positive effect.

When controlling for meritocracy perception, class mobility or measures of unemployment additionally to the main indicator used for prosperity and mobility chances, moderation effects of both indicators of prosperity and mobility chances do not reach significance. In sum, all alternative measures used for prosperity and mobility chances do not result in significant interaction effects with

279 Since two measures of unemployment are relative percentages based on total unemployment, I conducted additional analyses to test for influences when using both total unemployment and more specific groups of unemployed individuals in parallel (compare Table 4.36). These additional tests also show that the measures for unemployment based on long-term unemployment and unemployment of people with tertiary education do not reach significance when controlling for total unemployment in addition to the more specific unemployment measures. All analyses indicate that measures of unemployment have no consistent moderating influence on structural effects in this context (see Table A.8.2 in the appendix).

Tab. 4.37: Comparing effects for full models using alternative indicators of system threat based on poverty

	PV2				PV3				PV4			
	SLPI		SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI		SLEI	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	8.59	8.10	10.90	11.00	8.72	8.14	10.95	10.88	8.47	7.68	11.13	10.49
CLI:												
Actual inequality	*2.42*	*3.04*	*-0.58*	*-0.02*	*2.91*	*3.25*	*-0.11*	*0.24*	*2.07*	*2.02*	*-0.29*	*-0.34*
Redistribution	*3.41*	*4.23*	*2.40*	*2.87*	*3.50*	*4.14*	*2.42*	*2.61*	*2.73*	*3.11*	*2.04*	*1.94*
Prosperity	*0.47*	*-0.38*	*-0.62*	*-2.11*	*0.27*	*-0.53*	*-0.89*	*-2.21*	*0.81*	*0.25*	*-0.59*	*-1.58*
System threat, alternative indicator	*-4.52*	*-5.20*	*-3.45*	*-7.30*	*-5.80*	*-5.21*	*-3.19*	*-4.78*	*-4.51*	*-3.00*	*-4.30*	*-2.82*
Fractionalization	*-1.59*	*-1.56*	*-0.53*	*-0.75*	*-1.49*	*-1.41*	*-0.49*	*-0.58*	*-1.42*	*-1.29*	*-0.62*	*-0.55*
Mobilization	*0.68*	*0.08*	*-0.36*	*-1.02*	*0.59*	*0.01*	*-0.47*	*-1.06*	*1.45*	*1.05*	*0.31*	*-0.15*
Political distrust	*-0.57*	*-1.13*	*-0.97*	*-1.57*	*-0.40*	*-0.93*	*-0.86*	*-1.38*	*-0.10*	*-0.59*	*-0.80*	*-1.28*
Perceived inequality	*0.66*	*-0.27*	*2.14*	*2.07*	*0.56*	*-0.37*	*2.03*	*2.01*	*0.41*	*-0.47*	*1.80*	*1.82*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.61*	*-1.71*	*-1.30*	*-0.31*	*-1.76*	*-1.90*	*-1.43*	*-0.49*	*-1.98*	*-2.20*	*-1.67*	*-0.79*
N (individuals)	54337	54337	63247	63247	54337	54337	63247	63247	54337	54337	63247	63247
N (groups)	69	69	70	70	69	69	70	70	69	69	70	70

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

structural position. Additionally, interaction effects of the main indicator of the respective constructs also do not reach significance in these models when controlled for in parallel. Interaction effects containing other contextual factors are consistent with previous models. Redistribution shows consistent positive, system threat consistent negative interactions with structural position. Actual inequality shows a significant positive interaction with structural position in seven of eight models using alternative indicators for prosperity and mobility chances.

With regard to alternative indicators of system threat, the measures based on poverty (see Table 4.37), including the second measure based on ILO data and both measures based on World Bank data, lead to completely consistent negative moderation effects in line with expectations in all models for both measures of income and both indicators of inequality tolerance. Since the main measure of system threat used in most other models is also based on poverty, it is evident that all four poverty-related indicators of system threat show consistent negative influences on structural effects[280].

In these models using alternative poverty-based measures as indicators of system threat, actual

280 This is also noteworthy since poverty is often understood as being closely related to inequality, while relative measures of inequality in these analyses show positive influences on structural effects if the moderating effect is significant.

Tab. 4.38: Comparing effects for full models using alternative indicators of system threat and fractionalization, SLPI and IT1

	PC1		PC2		HMC		MGR	FR2	FR3	FR4	FR5
Structural position	7.43	8.60	7.37	8.57	5.25	5.62	7.86	8.45	7.86	8.47	8.39
CLI:											
Actual inequality	*0.52*	*2.56*	*0.46*	*2.37*	*1.94*	*2.56*	*2.16*	*2.15*	*2.54*	*1.98*	*2.14*
Redistribution	*2.54*	*3.52*	*2.49*	*3.45*	*2.27*	*2.71*	*3.14*	*3.18*	*3.51*	*2.94*	*3.18*
Prosperity	*1.17*	*0.36*	*1.12*	*0.26*	*1.03*	*0.73*	*-0.01*	*0.40*	*0.50*	*0.34*	*0.40*
System threat, alternative indicator	*0.88*	*0.97*	*0.47*	*0.63*	*-0.99*	*0.18*					
System threat, main indicator		*-5.78*		*-5.69*		*-4.16*	*-4.11*	*-3.75*	*-3.91*	*-4.54*	*-5.00*
Fractionalization, alternative indicator							*1.73*	*-0.13*	*0.57*	*0.18*	*-0.01*
Fractionalization, main indicator	*-0.78*	*-1.10*	*-0.87*	*-1.18*	*0.23*	*-0.67*					
Mobilization	*1.00*	*0.29*	*1.05*	*0.36*	*1.95*	*1.27*	*0.31*	*0.24*	*0.18*	*0.24*	*0.23*
Political distrust	*-0.18*	*-0.58*	*-0.13*	*-0.48*	*1.70*	*0.76*	*-0.30*	*-0.31*	*0.02*	*-0.03*	*-0.28*
Perceived inequality	*0.84*	*0.51*	*0.96*	*0.61*	*0.50*	*0.04*	*0.78*	*0.73*	*0.67*	*0.90*	*0.73*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.31*	*-1.22*	*-1.41*	*-1.37*	*-2.30*	*-2.02*	*-1.44*	*-1.64*	*-1.44*	*-1.41*	*-1.66*
N (individuals)	54337	54337	54337	54337	34567	34567	53516	54337	47838	53243	54337
N (groups)	69	69	69	69	45	45	68	69	62	67	69

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

inequality only shows a significant positive interaction effect with structural position in all models using SLPI. The interaction of redistribution with structural position is significant and positive in 11 of the 12 models, or in all 12 models if using an alpha level of 0.10 instead of 0.05. Effects of perceived inequality are only significant in three out of 12 models and, as is the case for the effects of actual inequality in these models, partly show inverted direction in the models in which the effects are not significant. Aggregate inequality tolerance is significant in two models with a negative interaction with structural position, or in six models when using an alpha level of 0.10. Other contextual factors are not associated with consistent significant results.

The results are very different for alternative indicators of system threat based on conceptually divergent measures (see the models for PC1, PC2 and HMC in the first six data columns in Table 4.38). The models using measures of aggregated perceived conflict do not show significant effects of this indicator for system threat on structural effects. Similarly, the measure based on homicide data also does not lead to significant moderating influences. For all three indicators, effects are far from reaching significance, with effect directions mostly opposed to expectations. When additionally

controlling for the main indicator of system threat, effects of the alternative indicators remain substantially unchanged and do not reach significance. The interaction effect of redistribution with structural position is again significant and positive, but other interaction effects are not consistently significant in the two models. Actual inequality is only significant as a moderator in models also controlling for the main indicator of system threat in addition to the alternative indicator.

With regard to results using alternative measures for fractionalization (see the models for MGR, FR2, FR3, FR4 and FR5 in the last five columns in Table 4.38), the alternative measures used do not lead to any significant interaction with structural position, as is the case for the main indicator used in the main model series. Only for the measure based on migrant data, the moderation effect is close to reaching significance using an alpha level of 0.10. Notably, the direction of effects varies between the five indicators used. Despite changing numbers of cases and country years between analyses, the influence of other contextual factors stays substantially the same. The interaction effects of actual inequality, redistribution and system threat are significant and consistent in all models presented[281].

The three alternative measures of political distrust used also do not exhibit any significant interaction with structural position (see the first six data columns in Table 4.39). This is the case for both the measure of corruption perception and the two measures of government reliability. When including both an alternative indicator and the main indicator of political distrust in parallel, moderation effects for both measures are not significant in any case, even though the effect direction is consistently positive. Again, the interaction effects including redistribution and system threat are not affected, but for actual inequality, none of the models lead to significant interaction effects with structural position when the alternative indicator of political distrust is used without controlling for the main indicator. These analyses are substantially consistent with previous groups of models.

With regard to alternative indicators of information and mobilization, results are mixed. For the two measures focused on mobilization (see the last two columns in Table 4.39), neither union density nor access shows a significant effect as a moderating factor. The interaction effects of other contextual factors are consistent with most previous results. Actual inequality and redistribution are associated

281 As is the case for other groups of models, effects of actual inequality are mostly not significant in this group of models when using household equivalence income instead of personal income. In these models not presented here, perceived inequality usually shows a significant influence, again similar to other groups of models.

Tab. 4.39: Comparing effects for full models using alternative indicators of political distrust and mobilization, SLPI and IT1

	CPI		GV1		GV2		UND	UNA
Structural position	9.26	8.76	7.77	7.57	7.83	7.58	6.81	6.10
CLI:								
Actual inequality	*1.45*	*1.88*	*1.73*	*2.17*	*1.52*	*1.98*	*3.43*	*3.53*
Redistribution	*3.19*	*3.14*	*2.81*	*2.78*	*2.82*	*2.71*	*3.12*	*3.53*
Prosperity	*-1.13*	*-0.39*	*-0.23*	*0.37*	*-0.37*	*0.21*	*0.21*	*1.28*
System threat	*-2.71*	*-2.85*	*-3.23*	*-3.35*	*-2.86*	*-2.86*	*-4.20*	*-3.76*
Fractionalization	*-1.19*	*-1.20*	*-1.23*	*-1.26*	*-1.15*	*-1.16*	*-0.82*	*-2.09*
Mobilization, alternative indicator							*1.57*	*2.30*
Mobilization, main indicator	*1.23*	*0.42*	*0.65*	*0.56*	*0.80*	*0.61*		
Political distrust, alternative indicator	*-1.06*	*-0.70*	*-0.89*	*-0.35*	*-0.97*	*-0.36*	*1.38*	*0.09*
Political distrust, main indicator		*1.03*		*0.22*		*0.60*		
Perceived inequality	*1.69*	*0.83*	*1.28*	*0.43*	*1.33*	*0.42*	*-0.22*	*-0.28*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.40*	*-1.77*	*-1.22*	*-1.51*	*-1.28*	*-1.61*	*-0.90*	*-1.89*
N (individuals)	54337	54337	50641	50641	50641	50641	30659	42132
N (groups)	69	69	64	64	64	64	38	54

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

with positive interaction effects and system threat shows a negative moderating influence. For actual and perceived inequality, there again is a differential effect dependent on the income measure used, showing a positive interaction with personal income and household equivalence income, respectively.

Turning to the information-focused measures of information and mobilization, only the eight models using the measure of press freedom as an alternative indicator (see the first eight data columns in Table 4.40) result in consistent significant interaction effects of structural position with the measure used for mobilization and information. Independent of controlling for the main indicator of mobilization and information or not, in both model configurations, the effects are substantially similar. Press freedom is associated with a positive interaction effect in all eight models. In these eight models, effects of actual inequality, redistribution, system threat and perceived inequality are in line with the trend of previous groups of models. Redistribution shows positive influences and actual and perceived inequality show positive differential effects depending on the indicator of structural position used. System threat negatively correlates with structural effects in all eight models.

Tab. 4.40: Comparing effects for full models using alternative indicators of mobilization

	PFI								ISE		IIU		IRD	IRD
	SLPI		SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI		SLPI		SLPI	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT1	IT1	IT1	IT1	IT1
Structural position	8.85	8.43	11.86	11.62	8.85	8.40	11.26	11.40	5.87	5.74	7.61	7.66	7.73	7.73
CLI:														
Actual inequality	*3.08*	*3.57*	*-0.19*	*0.26*	*3.23*	*3.80*	*-0.09*	*0.45*	*1.14*	*1.36*	*2.31*	*2.37*	*3.13*	*3.14*
Redistribution	*4.05*	*5.22*	*2.86*	*3.17*	*4.12*	*5.20*	*3.13*	*3.66*	*1.78*	*2.11*	*3.43*	*3.31*	*3.07*	*3.18*
Prosperity	*0.32*	*-0.51*	*-0.93*	*-2.14*	*0.43*	*-0.36*	*-0.55*	*-1.93*	*0.69*	*1.29*	*-0.98*	*-0.95*	*0.33*	*0.38*
System threat	*-5.29*	*-5.55*	*-4.18*	*-6.76*	*-5.42*	*-5.78*	*-4.47*	*-6.54*	*-4.15*	*-4.21*	*-5.49*	*-5.26*	*-3.86*	*-3.91*
Fractionalization	*-0.92*	*-0.84*	*0.23*	*-0.02*	*-1.00*	*-0.98*	*0.17*	*-0.12*	*-1.73*	*-2.18*	*-1.29*	*-1.35*	*-0.98*	*-0.95*
Mobilization, alternative indicator	*1.36*	*1.01*	*0.50*	*-0.26*	*1.16*	*0.71*	*0.31*	*-0.55*	*-1.08*	*-1.25*	*0.29*	*0.24*	*1.14*	*1.16*
Mobilization, main indicator					*-0.54*	*-1.05*	*-1.11*	*-1.60*		*-1.62*		*-0.12*		*0.36*
Political distrust	*3.13*	*2.75*	*3.19*	*2.02*	*3.26*	*3.06*	*3.33*	*2.51*	*-0.94*	*-0.94*	*1.24*	*1.19*	*0.63*	*0.48*
Perceived inequality	*0.61*	*-0.21*	*2.61*	*2.48*	*0.56*	*-0.45*	*2.21*	*2.06*	*2.10*	*1.96*	*0.80*	*0.81*	*0.11*	*0.17*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.05*	*-1.16*	*-0.57*	*0.36*	*-1.00*	*-1.06*	*-0.59*	*0.39*	*-1.20*	*-1.31*	*-1.41*	*-1.37*	*-2.19*	*-2.20*
N (individuals)	54337	54337	63247	63247	54337	54337	63247	63247	38495	38495	52712	52712	48727	48727
N (groups)	69	69	70	70	69	69	70	70	48	48	67	67	61	61

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

All alternative indicators of information and mobilization based on education, internet usage and the percentage of people employed in research and development (see the last six columns in Table 4.40) do not results in significant results for interaction effects with structural position. In the respective full models, the influences of both actual and perceived inequality are not completely consistent. In the model using the education-related measure, both effects fail to reach significance, which is a rare case among all the analyses conducted so far and possibly partly related to the low number of cases and country years. For system threat, all four models show a consistent significant interaction with structural position as expected. In these models, only moderation effects of system threat are completely consistent, whereas inequality-related measures are associated with inconsistent effects and one model including an education-based indicator for information and mobility (ISE) shows no significant influence of redistribution, at least when using an alpha level of 0.05. In the other three models, the effects of redistribution are consistent and in line with expectations.

Considering alternative indicators of aggregate inequality perception (see Table 4.41), the alternative indicator based on non-logarithmic data shows substantially similar results to the models

Tab. 4.41: Comparing effects for full models using alternative indicators of aggregate perceived inequality

	IPN				IP2				IP3			
	SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	10.83	10.78	8.76	8.04	10.31	10.24	8.09	8.54	11.11	10.80	8.05	8.52
CLI:												
Actual inequality	*-1.04*	*-0.25*	*1.90*	*2.72*	*0.24*	*-0.18*	*3.37*	*3.00*	*-0.16*	*-0.56*	*3.06*	*2.76*
Redistribution	*1.98*	*2.55*	*3.38*	*4.38*	*2.69*	*2.18*	*4.39*	*3.57*	*2.81*	*2.32*	*4.23*	*3.53*
Prosperity	*-1.78*	*-3.00*	*-0.80*	*-1.95*	*-1.96*	*-0.40*	*-0.49*	*0.56*	*-1.80*	*-0.19*	*-0.77*	*0.51*
System threat	*-1.86*	*-4.26*	*-3.78*	*-4.62*	*-5.98*	*-3.43*	*-5.29*	*-5.47*	*-6.52*	*-3.53*	*-5.44*	*-5.50*
Fractionalization	*-0.66*	*-0.64*	*-1.79*	*-1.63*	*-0.58*	*-0.43*	*-1.43*	*-1.47*	*-0.38*	*-0.18*	*-1.43*	*-1.45*
Mobilization	*-0.36*	*-1.17*	*0.46*	*-0.31*	*-0.95*	*-0.21*	*-0.01*	*0.79*	*-1.09*	*-0.24*	*-0.33*	*0.64*
Political distrust	*-0.97*	*-1.43*	*-0.79*	*-1.17*	*-1.48*	*-0.98*	*-1.08*	*-0.65*	*-1.56*	*-1.06*	*-0.97*	*-0.57*
Perceived inequality, alternative indicator	*3.08*	*2.64*	*1.65*	*0.80*	*1.44*	*1.39*	*-0.55*	*0.02*	*2.47*	*2.39*	*0.17*	*0.63*
Inequality tolerance	*-5.36*	*-1.65*	*-5.17*	*-2.37*	*-0.90*	*-1.88*	*-1.97*	*-2.15*	*-0.63*	*-1.78*	*-1.71*	*-1.88*
N (individuals)	63247	63247	54337	54337	63247	63247	54337	54337	63247	63247	54337	54337
N (groups)	70	70	69	69	70	70	69	69	70	70	69	69

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

using the logarithmic measure. The results are only significant for household equivalence income, whereas in the models using personal income, the moderating influence of actual inequality is significant, but in one of the two models only when using an alpha level of 0.10. For the other two measures, only one of the alternative logarithmic indicators of perceived inequality shows significant influences with household equivalence income, whereas the effects do not reach significance in the four models using the other measure.

With regard to other contextual factors, the interaction effect of structural position with redistribution is significant in all models. The interaction including system threat only shows a significant influence in 11 of 12 models, but also in the remaining model when using an alpha level of 0.10. Additionally, aggregate inequality tolerance shows significant negative interactions with structural position in three of four models. Other interaction effects are not consistent.

In terms of alternative measures for aggregate normative influences (see Table 4.42), effects vary between the measures based on aggregate legitimate inequality as indicated by occupational income estimates on the one hand and those based on individualism and rationalism on the other. No

Tab. 4.42: Comparing effects for full models using alternative indicators of aggregate inequality-promoting norms

	NR1				NR2				NR3				IDV	RTN
	SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI		SLPI	SLPI
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT	IT1
Structural position	11.27	11.70	8.77	7.69	12.22	12.46	8.32	9.50	11.80	11.28	7.86	8.71	8.20	8.13
CLI:														
Actual inequality	*0.20*	*0.48*	*3.11*	*3.13*	*0.41*	*0.05*	*3.24*	*3.31*	*0.40*	*0.00*	*3.14*	*3.05*	*2.77*	*2.03*
Redistribution	*2.75*	*3.00*	*3.98*	*4.51*	*3.12*	*2.80*	*4.59*	*3.96*	*3.03*	*2.77*	*4.54*	*3.87*	*3.66*	*2.26*
Prosperity	*-1.36*	*-2.72*	*-0.50*	*-1.76*	*-2.23*	*-1.02*	*-1.50*	*-0.27*	*-3.17*	*-2.32*	*-2.17*	*-1.43*	*-1.46*	*-0.50*
System threat	*-2.65*	*-4.88*	*-7.02*	*-5.61*	*-4.40*	*-2.13*	*-4.50*	*-5.50*	*-3.96*	*-1.83*	*-4.39*	*-5.40*	*-6.47*	*-5.38*
Fractionalization	*-0.64*	*-0.66*	*-1.72*	*-1.58*	*-0.53*	*-0.40*	*-1.53*	*-1.59*	*-0.82*	*-0.81*	*-1.68*	*-1.79*	*-0.90*	*-1.87*
Mobilization	*-1.07*	*-1.66*	*-0.11*	*-0.60*	*-1.22*	*-0.46*	*-0.31*	*0.50*	*-1.64*	*-1.02*	*-0.74*	*-0.19*	*-0.33*	*0.36*
Political distrust	*-1.33*	*-1.76*	*-1.07*	*-1.28*	*-1.76*	*-1.27*	*-1.25*	*-0.86*	*-1.53*	*-0.90*	*-1.04*	*-0.38*	*-0.71*	*-0.06*
Perceived inequality	*4.21*	*3.49*	*3.70*	*1.62*	*4.41*	*5.52*	*2.19*	*4.83*	*3.63*	*4.03*	*2.37*	*4.56*	*1.56*	*1.16*
Inequality tolerance, alternative indicator	*-2.75*	*-1.94*	*-2.73*	*-1.31*	*-2.33*	*-3.69*	*-2.23*	*-4.46*	*-1.72*	*-2.33*	*-2.02*	*-3.16*	*0.68*	*0.27*
N (individuals)	63247	63247	54337	54337	63247	63247	54337	54337	63247	63247	54337	54337	50935	38155
N (groups)	70	70	69	69	70	70	69	69	70	70	69	69	66	49

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

interaction effects with structural position are evident in models using individualism and rationalism and effect direction is opposed to the moderation effects visible in the models using measures based on occupational estimates as indicators of aggregate normative influences. In contrast, for the three alternative indicators of context-level inequality tolerance based on the data respondents provided for occupational income estimates, nine out of 12 models show significant interactions in line with expectations[282]. The interaction in one of the other three models does not reach significance even when using an alpha level of 0.10.

Other effects of contextual factors are in line with previous models. Redistribution shows a significant positive interaction with structural position and system threat shows a significant negative interaction in all models. Actual inequality is associated with increased structural effects in models using personal income, perceived inequality in models using household equivalence income.

282 This indicator is basically an aggregated version of the dependent variable (IT1). Since my only interest is in interaction effects, I do not expect the close connection between independent and dependent variable to substantially bias results, but the possibility has to be kept in mind. The results are not consistent for this indicator and for the main indicator used in most other models, but the tendency of a negative, even if usually not significant influence of both, methodically distinct indicators of inequality tolerance on structural effects is noteworthy and should be further analyzed using different and more specific normative measures in future analyses.

Tab. 4.43: Comparing effects for full models using additional threeway interactions

	SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	7.18	6.78	7.15	6.10	5.91	6.99	7.69	7.94
Context-level main effects:								
Actual inequality	-1.34	-1.29	-1.35	-1.68	-1.01	-0.86	-0.70	-0.71
Redistribution	-0.14	0.20	0.01	0.31	-0.66	-0.16	-0.36	0.08
Prosperity	-0.01	-0.15	0.07	-0.29	-0.22	-0.37	-0.05	-0.43
System threat	0.47	2.42	0.64	2.31	-4.82	-2.15	-4.51	-2.19
Fractionalization	-1.24	-1.06	-1.36	-1.36	-1.13	-0.93	-1.13	-1.06
Mobilization	-0.97	-0.59	-0.96	-0.69	-0.58	-0.29	-0.64	-0.47
Political distrust	-3.84	-2.50	-4.35	-3.15	-3.38	-2.26	-3.49	-2.46
Perceived inequality	2.26	2.02	2.31	2.35	2.72	2.40	2.59	2.60
Inequality tolerance	2.30	2.26	2.50	2.77	2.95	2.80	2.87	3.07
Actual inequality * actual inequality	3.41	3.27	3.86	4.16				
Actual inequality * system threat					5.14	3.56	4.89	3.58
CLI, structural position:								
Actual inequality	*0.11*	*0.26*	*2.67*	*2.76*	*-0.83*	*0.22*	*2.42*	*3.52*
Redistribution	*1.90*	*2.15*	*3.43*	*3.96*	*0.88*	*2.22*	*2.92*	*4.16*
Prosperity	*-0.96*	*-2.22*	*-0.14*	*-0.78*	*-0.69*	*-2.25*	*0.24*	*-0.73*
System threat	*-3.08*	*-5.34*	*-6.13*	*-5.14*	*-2.58*	*-1.74*	*-1.54*	*-1.10*
Fractionalization	*-0.08*	*-0.34*	*-0.88*	*-1.20*	*-0.65*	*-0.35*	*-1.16*	*-0.94*
Mobilization	*-0.76*	*-1.41*	*0.03*	*-0.34*	*-0.08*	*-1.48*	*0.13*	*-0.76*
Political distrust	*-0.60*	*-1.18*	*0.24*	*-0.73*	*-0.96*	*-1.33*	*-0.34*	*-0.78*
Perceived inequality	*2.21*	*2.17*	*0.72*	*-0.17*	*2.17*	*2.11*	*0.69*	*-0.29*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.41*	*-0.41*	*-1.82*	*-1.72*	*-1.14*	*-0.45*	*-1.70*	*-1.94*
*Actual inequality * actual inequality*	*-0.69*	*-0.47*	*-1.70*	*-0.57*				
*Actual inequality * system threat*					*0.90*	*-0.50*	*-0.92*	*-1.84*
N (individuals)	63247	63247	54337	54337	63247	63247	54337	54337
N (groups)	70	70	69	69	70	70	69	69

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed.

4.4.3.3 Threeway cross-level interactions related to inequality and system threat

With regard to threeway interactions, the results using an additional interaction of structural position with a squared term for the measure of actual inequality[283] (see the first four data columns in Table 4.43) do not support potential assumptions that the influence of actual inequality might lead to a more consistent significant interaction of structural position with actual inequality by providing the

283 I also report the main effects of the contextual factors for these models, since it is noteworthy that the results are partly consistent and significant, in contrast to most other models tested. The inclusion of threeway interactions leads to consistent significant main effects for multiple contextual factors. The main effect of actual inequality is not significant, but the squared term shows a consistent and significant positive effect. Additionally, mobilization is associated with a significant negative main effect and both aggregate perceived inequality and aggregate inequality tolerance exhibit consistent significant positive main effects on inequality tolerance.

possibility of taking a different functional form described by linear and quadratic effects of actual inequality. In all four models, the threeway interaction does not result in a significant effect. Instead, and essentially in line with previous analyses, the twoway interaction between actual inequality and structural position is significant for all models using personal income, whereas the twoway interaction between structural position and perceived inequality is positive for household equivalence income. Redistribution does not show a significant positive interaction with structural position in one of the four models when using an alpha level of 0.05. The negative moderating influence of system threat is consistent across the four models.

For the threeway interaction between actual inequality, system threat and structural position[284] (see the last four data columns in Table 4.43), results again do not show any significant effect for the threeway interaction. Redistribution does not reach significance as a moderating influence in one of the four models, whereas actual inequality and perceived inequality show the usual differential relation to personal and household equivalence income, respectively. In contrast to nearly all other analyses presented so far, system threat does not show a significant interaction effect with structural position when controlling for the threeway interaction between system threat and actual inequality. Other contextual factors are not relevant as moderators of structural effects. However, the interaction between contextual factors tested here only significantly work as main effects. For the explanation of main effects, the inclusion of these factors seems promising, but for the explanation of the moderation of structural effects, the interactions on contextual level does not seem to contribute to the explanation and instead might work as biasing factors. Especially in the case of system threat, the three models that do not lead to significant moderating influences of system threat include interactions between actual inequality, system threat and structural position that might bias the estimated effects for the interaction of system threat and structural position that shows significant results in most previous analyses.

284 As for the models using threeway interactions including a squared term for actual inequality, I provide main effects of the contextual factors for the models using interaction using threeway interaction effects including the interaction between inequality and poverty. In these models, the inclusion of interactions leads to consistent significant main effects for multiple contextual factors. The main effect of actual inequality is not significant, but poverty shows a negative main effect whereas the interaction between actual inequality and poverty is positive. As is the case in the previous four models, mobilization is associated with a significant negative main effect and both aggregate perceived inequality and aggregate inequality tolerance show consistent significant positive main effects on inequality tolerance.

4.4.4 Sample restrictions based on regression diagnostics

I conduct additional regression diagnostics on country level[285] by estimating structural effects for personal income (SPI and LPI) and household equivalence income (SEI and LEI) on inequality tolerance (IT1), using controls on individual level as seen in the main multilevel models presented in previous chapters (gender, age, age squared, categories of educational degrees and categories of marital situation) for all single country years. I then analyze the extracted coefficients for structural effects on country-year level by regressing the coefficients on the indicators of contextual factors used in previous analyses. For these simple OLS regressions, I apply three forms of regression diagnostics to identify potential collinearity with regard to context-level factors and influential country years that potentially might bias the results reported in this thesis. I specifically investigate variance inflation factors, Cook's D and DFBETA values. Consecutively, I conduct multilevel regressions similar to the final model in the main model series with restricted sets of country years based on the results of the regression diagnostics.

First, I analyze variance inflation factors for all context-level variables. In line with a commonly used rule-of-thumb, I specifically look for values that are larger than 10 to identify problematic context-level factors in terms of collinearity (see StataCorp, 2021, 23ff.; Azubuike & Nosike, 2020, 15). All variance inflation factors for all regressions are smaller than 10[286] in regressions using regional controls and smaller than 5 in regressions without regional controls. I take this as

285 I also used regression diagnostics for multilevel analyses (Moehring & Schmidt, 2013), but for three reasons I rely on diagnostics on country level: First, my interest is specifically in moderation effects, therefore excluding main effects of context-level factors from diagnostics by estimating context-level effects on country-specific coefficients of structural effects seems to be the most appropriate and economical approach. Second, some methods are not supported for multilevel models and prefer conducting all diagnostics based on the same model types (specifically, I use variance inflation factors and tolerance values as well as both sample-adjusted and rule-of-thumb cutoff values with regard to DFBETA and Cook's D). Third, Cook's D and DFBETA values could not be estimated for the full models without additional modifications, which seems to be a common problem (see for instance Carlsson, 2019; Hernandez, 2015).

286 Another value used by some authors as a cutoff value for variance inflation factors is 30 (see StataCorp, 2021, 23ff.), which leads to the same results in the given context as described above. But the identification of meaningful cutoff points for problematic values of variance inflation factors is disputed in general (see for instance Belsley, Kuh & Welsch, 2004, 93; Cohen et al., 2003, 423ff.; compare Ohr, 2010, 661). An alternative but closely related approach to identify sources of collinearity is the use of tolerance values as the reciprocal of variance inflation factors. Using a cutoff value of 0.1 (compare Cohen et al., 2003, 423ff.), no context factors show problematic tolerance values based on the same regressions used for the estimation of variance inflation factors. It should be noted that mean values of variance inflation factors are between 2.40 and 2.41 for regressions without regional controls and between 4.01 and 4.03 for regressions including regional controls. Even the largest values can be considered as being not particularly problematic (see StataCorp, 2021, 23ff.; compare Azubuike & Nosike, 2020, 15).

evidence that there are no substantial problems on country-year level with regard to collinearity between context-level factors, especially with regard to the context-level factors of theoretical interest used in the main analyses without regional CLIs.

Second, I investigate values of Cook's D for OLS regressions using the coefficients of structural effects on inequality tolerance in all country years as dependent variables in country-level regressions including contextual factors as independent variables. The diagnostics show that there are no problematic cases for any of the regressions when using the rule-of-thumb cutoff value of 1.0 found in the literature (see for instance Cohen et al., 2003, 404, 410). In contrast to this result, if a cutoff value based on the number of cases and variables is used instead (4/[n-k-1]; see for instance Fox, 2020, 127f.), three country years show problematic values when analyzing effects of household equivalence income (Bulgaria 2009, Chechnya 1999 and Sweden 1999) and four country years are identified for effects of personal income (Philippines 1999, Poland 1992, South Africa 2009 and South Korea 2009). Among these seven country years identified based on a sample-adjusted threshold, two cases show comparatively high values (Philippines 1999 and South Korea 2009 with values of Cook's D greater than 0.19, whereas the other five country years are associated with values below 0.10).

Third, comparing the DFBETA values for contextual influences, based on the same regression analyses conducted for the previous two steps, again leads to differing identifications of influential country years based on the cutoff values and the indicator of structural position used. Using the rule-of-thumb cutoff value of 1.0 found in the literature (see for instance Cohen et al., 2003, 404ff., 410) in combination with effects of household equivalence income indicates that no country years are problematic. But when analyzing effects of personal income instead, one country year is clearly identified as being over the cutoff value (Philippines 1999) and one additional country year is only slightly below the cutoff value (South Korea 2009) and clearly distinct from other country years in that regard[287]. More country years are identified when a cutoff value correcting for the number of cases is used (2/n^0.5; see Fox, 2020, 127). Specifically, for effects of personal income, 12 country years are associated with values above the threshold (Argentina 2009, Brazil 1999, Bulgaria 2009, Chechnya

287 Additionally, both country years are above the cutoff value when regional controls are included in the regression analyses. Specifically, the DFBETA values are 1.20 (Philippines 1999, for system threat) and 0.96 (South Korea 2009, for actual inequality) without regional controls, but 1.03 (Philippines 1999) and 1.00 (South Korea 2009) when including regional controls.

Tab. 4.44: Full models for IT1 using SLEI and SLPI with sample restrictions based on diagnostics

	CDSA EI Restriction 1 SLEI	DFSA EI Restriction 2 SLEI	DFRT PI Restriction 3 SLPI	DFRT+ PI Restriction 4 SLPI	CDSA PI Restriction 5 SLPI	DFSA PI Restriction 6 SLPI
Structural position	10.27	10.81	7.90	8.00	7.66	8.07
Context-level main effects:						
Region: Europe	0.56	-0.15	0.54	0.44	0.65	2.03
Region: East. Europe	-0.60	-1.26	-0.16	-0.03	0.32	1.72
Region: Other	2.36	0.43	2.24	1.77	2.15	2.66
Actual inequality	-0.30	1.25	0.02	0.60	0.40	-0.70
Redistribution	1.11	2.24	1.08	1.40	1.04	-0.69
Prosperity	-0.19	-0.77	0.33	0.48	0.43	-0.12
System threat	0.06	-0.14	-0.40	-0.37	-1.16	-1.20
Fractionalization	0.58	0.99	1.30	1.56	0.73	-0.23
Mobilization	-2.13	-1.44	-2.72	-2.81	-3.35	-2.17
Political distrust	-2.10	-1.32	-1.41	-1.25	-1.51	-1.38
Perceived inequality	2.79	1.14	2.27	1.56	1.85	2.02
Inequality tolerance	1.86	1.32	1.78	1.64	1.74	2.86
CLI:						
Actual inequality	*-0.22*	*-0.49*	*3.06*	*2.81*	*2.70*	*3.93*
Redistribution	*2.20*	*1.30*	*3.62*	*3.40*	*3.04*	*3.81*
Prosperity	*-0.37*	*-0.74*	*-0.08*	*-0.11*	*0.23*	*0.38*
System threat	*-2.61*	*-3.46*	*-4.91*	*-4.75*	*-3.39*	*-3.30*
Fractionalization	*-0.89*	*-1.58*	*-1.30*	*-1.39*	*-0.83*	*-0.84*
Mobilization	*-1.11*	*-0.80*	*-0.34*	*-0.25*	*0.02*	*0.17*
Political distrust	*-0.11*	*-0.67*	*0.09*	*0.02*	*0.28*	*0.74*
Perceived inequality	*2.14*	*3.19*	*0.67*	*0.91*	*0.78*	*0.15*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.56*	*-0.89*	*-1.54*	*-1.45*	*-1.54*	*-2.01*
N (individuals)	58516	51353	52165	52015	49696	43329
N (groups)	64	55	66	65	63	57

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed.

1999, France 1999 and 2009, Hungary 1999, New Zealand 1999, Philippines 1999, Russia 1999, South Africa 2009 and South Korea 2009), and for household equivalence income, 13 influential country years are identified (Argentina 2009, Belgium 2009, Bulgaria 2009, Chechnya 1999 and 2009, Chile 2009, France 1999, Japan 1999, Latvia 2009, Netherlands 1987 and 2009, South Korea 2009 and Sweden 1999). It is noteworthy that the influential country years identified in this last step are not exclusively or even predominantly located in the Global South but instead are found in all geographical regions included in the analyses[288].

288 When additionally counting the country years identified when using regional effects in regressions, the set of country years identified as influential is increased even more. The complete list of influential countries based on regressions with and without regional controls, listing all factors for which the country shows problematic values in parentheses

Fourth, to further investigate this influence of special cases on the results, I conduct a series of additional multilevel models, restricting the included country years in multiple steps based on the country years identified by the regression diagnostics conducted. As is the case in the main series of models, I again use personal income (SLPI) and household equivalence income (SLEI) as indicators of structural position in separate regressions. I specifically analyze models for both measures of structural position with restrictions based on the regression diagnostics conducted for the specific measure (see Table 4.44). Since the diagnostics using rule-of-thumb thresholds did not extract problematic cases for household equivalence income[289], I present only two models for household equivalence income based on sample restrictions using the sample-adjusted thresholds (see the first two data columns in Table 4.44), but four models for personal income (see the last four data columns in Table 4.44). Specifically, I exclude cases based on effects of household equivalence income as identified by high values for Cook's D when using a sample-adjusted threshold value (Restriction 1) and based on DFBETA values when using a sample-adjusted threshold value (Restriction 2). With regard to effects of personal income, I restrict country years identified by high DFBETA values using a strict rule-of-thumb cutoff

(with factors associated with values over 1.0 shown in italics), is as follows: Argentina (region, distrust), Belgium (prosperity, fractionalization), Brazil (region, inequality tolerance), Bulgaria (redistribution, perceived inequality), Canada (region, actual inequality, inequality tolerance), Chechnya (region, actual inequality, prosperity, fractionalization, inequality tolerance), Chile (system threat), China (actual inequality, prosperity), France (region, redistribution, prosperity, fractionalization, inequality perception, inequality tolerance), Germany (prosperity), Hungary (redistribution, prosperity), Japan (fractionalization), Latvia (region, actual inequality, redistribution, fractionalization), Netherlands (redistribution, prosperity, inequality tolerance), New Zealand (distrust), Philippines (*system threat*), Poland (region, actual inequality, inequality tolerance), Portugal (region, redistribution, inequality tolerance), Russia (mobilization, inequality perception), South Africa (distrust), South Korea (region, *actual inequality*, redistribution, fractionalization, distrust, inequality perception), Sweden (mobilization), Turkey (region).

289 I also conducted analyses for both income variables using the sample restrictions based on the diagnostics for the respective other income measure. Since the sample restrictions are not directly based on measure-specific diagnostics, these analyses are presented only in the appendix to allow for further comparisons (see Table A.13.1 in the appendix). The results show that trends in direction are the same as in the main models for the context factors that show consistent influences (actual inequality for SLPI, perceived inequality for SLEI, redistribution and system threat), but the moderating influences of redistribution, system threat and perceived inequality do not reach significance in some of the models in which the significant effect is expected. In a further step, I also analyze models for two alternative indicators of structural position, specifically for ESeC as a measure of objective class and for ISEI as a measure of socio-economic status (see Table A.13.2 in the appendix). In these models, the moderating effects of redistribution and perceived inequality are nearly consistent and in line with previous models, excluding one model using socio-economic status as an indicator of structural position, but the effects are consistent when using an alpha level of 0.10 for the identification of significant effects. The moderating effect of system threat is not significant in the models for objective class and also fails to reach significance in two of the six models using socio-economic status. Additionally, aggregate inequality tolerance shows a moderating influence accentuating structural effects in a clear majority of models.

value (Restriction 3) and country years based on the same diagnostic, but including one additional country year slightly below the threshold (Restriction 4). Additionally, I restrict the sample to country years below the sample-adjusted threshold as indicated by values for Cook's D (Restriction 5) and to country years below the sample-adjusted threshold as indicated by DFBETA values (Restriction 6).

All analyses lead to results substantially similar to the consistent results found in previous series of models. Redistribution shows significant moderating influences on effects of structural position in line with expectations, i.e. accentuating structural effects, in all but one model (specifically the model excluding country years that are associated with DFBETA values above the sample-adjusted threshold when analyzing effects of household equivalence income). Actual and aggregate perceived inequality show the same pattern as visible in most previous analyses, with high actual inequality accentuating effects of personal income and high aggregate perceived inequality accentuating the influence of household equivalence income. The moderating effect of system threat is significant and in line with expectations in all six models[290]. Additionally, aggregate inequality tolerance shows a negative direction for its moderation effect, in tendency attenuating structural effects, but this moderation effect only reaches significance in one of the six models, even when using an alpha level of 0.10. In sum, the results of analyses based on sample restrictions informed by regression diagnostics are mostly in line with the effects seen in previous models with regard to both the significance and the

290 It should be noted that when restricting the data set to countries of the Global North, specifically excluding Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Philippines, Venezuela and South Africa, the picture changes (see the first four data columns in Table A.13.3 in the appendix), but mostly with regard to the effect of system threat. In these models, only actual and aggregate perceived inequality show the expected patterns, whereas the effect of redistribution does not reach significance for models based on household equivalence income, and system threat as indicated by poverty does not show any significant moderating influence. The results in these models can be explained by the limited variance of poverty and, to a lesser extent, of redistribution when excluding countries of the Global South. Similar results are evident for models based on an even smaller sample restricted to WEIRD (i.e. Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic, see Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan, 2010) countries (see data columns five through eight in Table A.13.3 in the appendix). When using dummy variable adjustment to differentiate between values of system threat equaling zero and values over zero (see the last four data columns in Table A.13.3 in the appendix), moderating effects of system threat are significant for the continuous variable, but not for the dummy variable, and significant for both income measures used (SLPI and SLEI). For the two alternative non-income based measures of structural position, the interaction with system threat does not reach significance, but for the measure based on socio-economic status (ISEI), the interaction is significant when using an alpha level of 0.10. Only for the class-based measure (ESeC), the interaction with the dummy variable is significant instead, with a zero value of system threat showing an attenuating influence on the structural effect. I interpret these results as further evidence for the reliability of the general results reported in this thesis, especially with regard to actual and perceived inequality, whereas the use of poverty as a measure of system threat might be problematic (compare Chapter 5) and limited with regard to applicability when only analyzing countries of the Global North. Additionally, these results further illustrate that the class-based measures used lead to substantially different results with regard to the interaction with system threat.

direction of moderation effects. Even though not the main interest of this thesis, it should also be noted that the negative main effect of mobilization is significant in five of six models when using sample restrictions, in contrast to other context-level factors.

4.4.5 Exemplary predictions of structural effects and inequality tolerance

In this chapter, I provide two types of illustrative examples for the consistent moderation effects found in the empirical analyses of previous chapters. First, I present estimated structural effects for ideal-type values of context-level factors to demonstrate how structural effects differ between specific contexts and interpret this effects with regard to actual changes in inequality tolerance. Second, I briefly illustrate how structural position and context-level factors interact by referring to examples of concrete differences between ideal-type minimum and maximum values for both structural position and context-level moderators in their determination of specific predictions of inequality tolerance.

For this prediction of inequality tolerance and the estimation of structural effects, I rely on logarithmic transformations of income measures, specifically of personal income [LPI] and household equivalence income [LEI] instead of standardized logarithmic transformation. Even though SLPI and SLEI are used as the main measures for structural position throughout this thesis, I focus on the non-standardized income measures LPI and LEI for the report of examples of effects and predicted values, since the standardization of logarithmic values further complicates the interpretation of the specific size or strength of estimated effects[291]. I calculate percentage changes in the dependent variable inequality tolerance [IT1] for changes of 10 percent in the independent variable measuring structural position[292].

The estimated structural effects are reported with standard errors, Z-values, p-values and confidence intervals for each estimation (see Table 4.45). With regard to the influence of actual inequality on predicted structural effects, a very low level of inequality is associated with an increase

291 With regard to the use of standardized logarithmic income measures throughout the empirical section of this thesis, the complicated nature of the respective models poses no problem for the analysis and interpretation of effect directions and consistencies of effects. As has been shown in the models using alternative indicators (see Chapter 4.4.1, but also compare Tables A.14.1 versus A.14.2 and Figures A.2.1 through A.2.4 versus A.2.5 through A.2.8 in the appendix), results for these variants (standardized logarithmic versus logarithmic income measures) are very close to each other.

292 In mathematical terms, I raise 1.10 to the power of the value corresponding to the estimated effect of structural position.

Tab. 4.45: Estimated structural effects on inequality tolerance for ideal-type cases based on marginal effects using logarithmic income measures

	Predicted effect	SE	Z	p	Confidence interval, lower bound	Confidence interval, upper bound
Average marginal effects using LPI						
AME with actual inequality set to 20	0.03	0.02	1.76	0.08	0.00	0.07
AME with actual inequality set to 60	0.14	0.04	3.61	0.00	0.06	0.22
AME with perceived inequality set to 0.7	0.05	0.03	2.18	0.03	0.01	0.10
AME with perceived inequality set to 3.5	0.07	0.02	3.56	0.00	0.03	0.11
AME with redistribution set to 0	-0.02	0.03	-0.83	0.40	-0.07	0.03
AME with redistribution set to 50	0.12	0.02	7.11	0.00	0.08	0.15
AME with system threat set to 0	0.07	0.01	10.15	0.00	0.06	0.09
AME with system threat set to 60	-0.07	0.03	-2.70	0.01	-0.12	-0.02
AME with multiple values set[1]	-0.20	0.05	-3.64	0.00	-0.31	-0.09
AME with multiple values set[2]	0.21	0.05	4.38	0.00	0.12	0.31
Average marginal effects using LEI						
AME with actual inequality set to 20	0.11	0.02	4.45	0.00	0.06	0.15
AME with actual inequality set to 60	0.05	0.05	0.91	0.36	-0.05	0.15
AME with perceived inequality set to 0.7	0.03	0.03	0.98	0.33	-0.03	0.10
AME with perceived inequality set to 3.5	0.13	0.02	5.63	0.00	0.09	0.18
AME with redistribution set to 0	0.02	0.03	0.77	0.44	-0.03	0.07
AME with redistribution set to 50	0.13	0.02	7.93	0.00	0.10	0.16
AME with system threat set to 0	0.10	0.01	13.27	0.00	0.08	0.11
AME with system threat set to 60	-0.02	0.03	-0.49	0.63	-0.08	0.05
AME with multiple values set[1]	-0.12	0.06	-2.15	0.03	-0.23	-0.01
AME with multiple values set[2]	0.14	0.05	2.70	0.01	0.04	0.25

Notes: Displayed are predicted average marginal effects [AME], standard errors [SE], Z-values, p-values and confidence intervals for inequality tolerance (measured based on IT1) based on marginal effects at ideal-type values for structural position (as indicated by standardized logarithmic personal income [SLPI] and standardized logarithmic household equivalence income [SLEI]) and four context-level factors (actual inequality, perceived inequality, redistribution and system threat) using main measures. The models used for the predictions are the full models with all independent variables (compare Chapter 4.1) for LPI and LEI (compare Tables 4.22 and 4.23 in Chapter 4.41). Predictions are estimated using the margins command in Stata 16 with other independent variables set too mean values.

[1] actual inequality set to 20, perceived inequality set to 0.7, redistribution set to 0 and system threat set to 60

[2] actual inequality set to 60, perceived inequality set to 3.5, redistribution set to 50 and system threat set to 0

of 0.3 percent in IT1 for an increase of 10 percent in structural position when using LPI (1.0 percent when using LEI) as a measure of structural position. In contexts of very high levels of inequality, the estimated percentage change in IT1 related to a 10 percent increase in structural position is 1.3 percent for LPI (0.5 percent for LEI). In contexts of very low perceived inequality, IT1 increases by 0.5 percent for a change of 10 percent in LPI (0.3 percent for LEI), whereas the change amounts to 0.7 percent for LPI (1.2 percent for LEI) in contexts of very high perceived inequality. Concerning the influence of redistribution, the change for a 10 percent increase in LPI is a decrease in IT1 of 0.2

percent (an increase of 0.2 percent for LEI) in contexts of very low redistribution and an increase of 1.2 percent (1.2 percent for LEI) in contexts of very high redistribution. In contexts of a very low level of system threat, the increase in IT1 for a 10 percent change in LPI is 0.7 percent (1.0 percent for LEI) and in contexts of a very high level of system threat, the change is -0.7 percent for LPI (-0.2 percent for LEI). When combining all four contextual factors to maximize accentuating versus attenuating effects, the differences in structural effects, as is to be expected, appear to be even more pronounced. Using the attenuating combination of values, IT1 decreases by 1.9 percent for 10 percent changes in LPI (1.1 percent for LEI) in maximally attenuating contexts and increases by 2.0 percent for LPI (1.3 percent for LEI) in contexts of maximal accentuation. Not all predicted effects are significant and the confidence intervals for these estimates of structural effects overlap with regard to the comparison of effects for different values of context factors with regard to actual inequality and perceived inequality, but not with regard to redistribution, system threat and the combinations of maximally accentuating versus maximally attenuating contexts.

Turning to concrete substantial examples for differences between specific structural positions in different contexts, the models estimated in previous chapters allow for the prediction of inequality tolerance as determined by specific combinations of independent variables. For this exercise, I again rely on logarithmic transformations of income measures (LPI and LEI) and predict inequality tolerance for ideal-type combinations of minimum and maximum values[293] of structural position and of the four single context-level factors that show consistent effects in previous analyses (actual inequality, perceived inequality, redistribution and system threat). More specifically, I present selected predicted values for inequality tolerance (IT1) using lowest versus highest empirical values of income measures (LEI and LPI) and four context-level factors (actual inequality, perceived inequality, redistribution and system threat. For this purpose, I transform the logarithmic measure of inequality tolerance into the non-logarithmic measure, i.e. the estimated ideal income ratio as reported by respondents. Since this

293 For the prediction of inequality tolerance (compare Tables A.14.1 and A.14.2 as well as Figures A.2.1 through A.2.8 in the appendix), I use minimum and maximum values directly as ideal-type values in order to keep the selection of all values in line with each other, since the income-based measures of structural position used are transformed, i.e. standardized on country-year level and logarithmic, and there simply are no alternative values that are intuitive to interpret for these measures. Therefore, I recommend to focus on the differences between confidence intervals and the graphical illustrations (see Figures A.2.1 through A.2.8) for these values. The ideal-type values selected for the estimation of structural effects (see Table 4.45) are close to the minimum and maximum values of respective context-level factors, but rounded to make the table easier to interpret.

Tab. 4.46: Predicted legitimate income ratios based on estimated marginal effects using logarithmic income measures

Context factor	Indicator of structural position	Prediction for lowest structural position	Prediction for highest structural position
Actual inequality (minimum)	LPI	4.35	6.05
Actual inequality (maximum)	LPI	0.76	5.75
Perceived inequality (minimum)	LEI	6.36	7.32
Perceived inequality (maximum)	LEI	0.76	7.46
Redistribution (minimum)	LEI	14.30	8.67
Redistribution (maximum)	LEI	0.87	6.75
System threat (minimum)	LEI	1.95	7.32
System threat (maximum)	LEI	20.91	8.76

Notes: Displayed are predicted ideal income ratios (calculated based on marginal effects for IT1) at ideal-type minimum and maximum values for four context-level factors (actual inequality, perceived inequality, redistribution and system threat) using main measures and for structural position (as indicated by logarithmic personal income [LPI] for actual inequality and logarithmic household equivalence income [LEI] for the other three context-level factors). Predictions are estimated using the margins command in Stata 16 with other independent variables set too mean values. For the concrete estimated logarithmic values and additional combinations see Table A.14.1 in the appendix.

procedure only serves the purpose to illustrate the consistent results found in the analyses reported in previous chapters, I limit the presentation to a small number of meaningful examples, but include further examples and graphical illustrations without transformation showing confidence intervals for predictions in the appendix[294].

The predicted income ratios for ideal-type combinations of structural position and context-level factors are displayed in Table 4.46 (see also Figure 4.1 for a graphical illustration and compare Table A.14.1 in the appendix for the corresponding logarithmic predictions). All predictions taken together, ideal income ratios vary between values slightly below one (0.76), indicating that the occupational income for the high-earning occupations are set to a lower level as compared to the low-earning occupations in some extreme predicted cases, and values over 20 (20.91), indicating that high-earning occupations for these ideal-type cases are associated with a 20 times higher occupational income as compared to low-earning groups.

294 Tables A.14.1 and A.14.2 in the appendix provide a complete list of predicted values of inequality tolerance based on ideal-type combinations of income measures and the four context-level variables that show consistent moderating influences on structural effects, using minimum and maximum values. Additionally, Figures A.2.1 through A.2.8 in the appendix illustrate the results for these predicted values graphically to visualize the substantial findings for the most consistent results of the analyses in this thesis. In order to maximize informative value and transparency, I report the predicted values of inequality tolerance for both logarithmic (see Table A.14.1 and Figures A.2.1 through A.2.4 in the appendix) and standardized logarithmic measures (see Table A.14.2 and Figures A.2.5 through A.2.8 in the appendix).

With regard to extreme values of actual inequality, for contexts of minimal actual inequality, predicted legitimate income ratios are 4.35 for the lowest structural position and 6.05 for the highest. A stronger difference is visible for contexts of maximal actual inequality, with legitimate income ratios of 0.76 for the lowest structural position and 5.75 for the highest. Very similar values are evident for the influence of perceived inequality, with predicted legitimate income ratios of 6.36 for the lowest structural position and 7.32 for the highest position in contexts of minimal perceived inequality and 0.76 (for the lowest structural position) versus 7.46 (for the highest structural position) in contexts of maximal perceived inequality. Even stronger differences can be seen in the predictions for extreme values of redistribution and system threat. In contexts of minimal redistribution, the predicted legitimate income ratio for the lowest structural position is 14.30, higher than the predicted ratio for the highest structural position which is 8.67. In contexts of maximal redistribution, the values for lowest versus highest structural position are also very different, but show an inverted relationship, with 0.87 versus 6.75. With regard to the fourth context-level factor, minimal system threat is associated with legitimate income ratios of 1.95 for the lowest and 7.32 for the highest structural position. For contexts of maximal system threat, the predicted legitimate income ratios for lowest versus highest structural position are 20.91 versus 8.76, respectively.

A graphical illustration of these predicted values is provided in Figure 4.1. As is evident in both the illustration and the corresponding table (see Table 4.46), for these ideal-type predictions based on the extreme values used, the differences in legitimate income ratios for the highest structural position are considerably smaller as compared to the differences in legitimate income ratios for the lowest structural position (compare also Table A.14.1 and Figures A.2.1 through A.2.4 in the appendix with regard to significance and confidence intervals associated with specific predictions). More specifically, the predicted legitimate income ratios vary between 6.05 and 8.76 for the highest structural position and between 0.76 and 20.91 for the lowest structural position. Even though this illustration of results allows for an intuitive and simple interpretation of results in line with the substantial consistent results of the main analyses conducted for this thesis, it has to be kept in mind that these predictions are based on extreme values for the independent variables of interest and mean values for all other independent variables and are not significant for all predictions (compare Table A.14.1 in the appendix).

Fig. 4: Predicted legitimate income ratios for ideal-type combinations of values for structural position and four context-level factors



Notes: Plotted are predicted ideal income ratios (calculated based on marginal effects for IT1) at ideal-type minimum [min.] and maximum [max.] values for four context-level factors (actual inequality, perceived inequality, redistribution and system threat) using main measures and for structural position (as indicated by logarithmic personal income [LPI] for actual inequality and logarithmic household equivalence income [LEI] for the other three context-level factors). Predictions are estimated using the margins command in Stata 16 with other independent variables set too mean values. For the concrete estimated logarithmic values and additional combinations see Table A.14.1 in the appendix.

Tab. 4.47: Effects on inequality tolerance (IT1) for the reduced model using the full sample versus the sample restricted to country years and cases used in the main analyses

	Full SLPI	Valid SLPI	Full SLEI	Valid SLEI	Full SLPI	Valid SLPI	Full SLEI	Valid SLEI
Structural position	8.73	8.45	9.93	10.45	8.33	8.34	9.81	10.27
Context-level main effects:								
Actual inequality	-1.06	0.08	-1.25	-0.28	-0.39	0.95		
Redistribution	-0.34	0.96	-0.30	0.71	-0.40	1.09	0.64	1.27
System threat	2.45	2.34	1.92	2.10	1.44	1.76	0.61	1.75
Perceived inequality	2.71	1.89	2.91	2.09			2.62	2.54
CLI:								
Actual inequality	2.25	1.82	0.47	-1.00	3.84	3.39		
Redistribution	4.21	3.47	2.20	1.37	4.85	3.82	3.05	2.61
System threat	-4.73	-5.40	-3.14	-2.51	-5.83	-6.34	-2.30	-5.15
Perceived inequality	2.52	2.08	2.35	3.24			3.34	3.27
N (individuals)	62682	52712	71217	60397	62682	52712	71217	60397
N (groups)	77	67	77	67	77	67	77	67

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Models predict inequality tolerance (IT1) and use two different income-based measures of structural position (SLPI and SLEI, compare Chapter 4.1). The sample is restricted to either all available country years and cases ("Full") or the cases from the main analyses ("Valid"). Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed.

4.4.6 Reduced model including only consistently significant predictors on contextual level

In this chapter, I test if the substantial results reported in previous chapters, specifically with regard to consistent effects, are biased by the inclusion of non-significant context-level factors. In order to investigate this question, I analyze a reduced model that only includes the context-level factors that prove to be consistently significant, i.e. actual inequality, redistribution, system threat and perceived inequality. I estimate this model for the two main income-based indicators of structural position (SLEI and SLPI), each time using the main measure for inequality tolerance (IT1) and the main measures for context-level factors. To maximize the informative value of these tests, I estimate effects for the sample used in the main analyses (compare Chapter 4.1), but also for a larger sample that includes country years that are excluded from the main analyses since some values are missing for context-level factors. Since the reduced models used for the analyses presented in this chapter exclude these context-level factors that show inconsistent effects in the main analyses, I can extend the sample for the analyses of this chapter. The inclusion of both extended sample (labeled "Full" in Table 4.47) and

the sample of the main analyses (labeled “Valid” in Table 4.47) allows for maximizing both the information included for the estimation of effects and the comparability with the main analyses.

The results (see the first four data columns in Table 4.47) are substantially similar to the results reported in the main analyses (compare chapter 4.1), but the effects of actual and perceived inequality are less consistent. Specifically, actual inequality shows significant accentuating moderation effects for measures of structural position based on personal income in one of two models, while perceived inequality shows significant accentuating moderation effects for measures of household equivalence income in both models. Additionally, a significant interaction between perceived inequality and measures of personal income is visible in both models. Redistribution is associated with accentuating moderation effects in three of four models and system threat exhibits an attenuating influence on structural effects for both measures of structural position in all four models.

When further reducing the context-level variables by excluding one of the inequality-related context factors (see the last four data columns in Table 4.47), specifically actual inequality from the models based on household equivalence income, and perceived inequality from the models based on personal income, the results are completely consistent with expectations. All moderation effects are significant. When using personal income, high levels of actual inequality and redistribution increase and high levels of system threat increase structural effects. For household equivalence income, high levels of perceived inequality and redistribution increase and high levels of system threat decrease structural effects. These results for the reduced model using only one indicator of inequality (actual inequality for models based on personal income and perceived inequality for models based on household equivalence income) are completely consistent and in line with the consistent results seen in most previous analyses. I interpret these results as evidence that the consistent substantial effects identified in previous analyses are not produced by the potentially biasing influence of the additional non-significant context-level moderators included in previous analyses.

As a further step, I estimate the reduced models for alternative income-based measures of structural position (compare Chapter 3.3 and 4.4.1) to test if the reduced model leads to substantially similar results when using different transformations of personal income (SPI, LPI and SZPI) and household equivalence income (SEI, LEI and SZEI) and when using measures of structural position based on family income (SLFI, SFI, LFI and SZFI). Using these alternative income-based measures

Tab. 4.48: Effects on inequality tolerance (IT1) for the reduced model using additional income-based measures of structural position

	SPI	LPI	SZPI	SEI	LEI	SZEI	SLFI	SFI	LFI	SZFI	SLPI	SPI	LPI	SZPI
Structural position	10.26	7.08	11.27	10.44	7.81	10.80	9.53	9.39	8.13	9.59	8.20	10.79	7.42	12.05
Context-level main effects:														
Actual inequality	0.95	-0.95	1.02											
Redistribution	1.11	-2.39	1.13	1.28	-2.65	1.27	1.24	1.26	-2.56	1.25	1.26	1.29	-2.79	1.24
System threat	1.80	5.60	1.50	1.74	4.57	1.80	1.81	1.80	5.17	1.86	2.41	2.44	4.51	2.23
Perceived inequality				2.55	-1.34	2.53	2.52	2.52	-1.23	2.51	2.42	2.43	-1.24	2.51
CLI:														
Actual inequality	*4.58*	*2.54*	*3.77*											
Redistribution	*4.42*	*3.29*	*3.88*	*2.26*	*2.29*	*2.12*	*2.56*	*2.26*	*2.14*	*2.12*	*2.82*	*3.22*	*2.78*	*3.43*
System threat	*-6.74*	*-5.54*	*-6.80*	*-3.56*	*-5.12*	*-3.67*	*-4.78*	*-3.84*	*-5.25*	*-3.94*	*-4.07*	*-3.91*	*-4.05*	*-3.68*
Perceived inequality				*3.19*	*2.12*	*3.60*	*2.98*	*2.94*	*2.05*	*3.26*	*3.22*	*4.62*	*2.06*	*4.85*
N (individuals)	52712	52712	62285	60397	60397	61037	60964	60964	60964	61604	52712	52712	52712	62285
N (groups)	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Models predict inequality tolerance (IT1) and use income-based measures of structural position. Results for the main income-based measures SLPI and SLEI are not included (for these measures see Table 4.46). The sample for each model is restricted to country years and cases similar to the previous analyses for main and alternative indicators (see Chapters 4.1 and 4.4.1). Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed. The sample is restricted to country years and cases used in the main analyses.

leads to exclusively significant results completely consistent with expectations as well as trends found in the previous models (see the first 10 data columns in Table 4.48). Positive moderation effects related to actual inequality are significant for the two additional measures based on personal income (SPI, LPI and SZPI), and positive moderation effects related to perceived inequality are significant in models using measures of structural position based on household equivalence (SEI, LEI and SZEI) and family income (SLFI, SFI, LFI and SZFI). For all 10 alternative income-based measures of structural position, redistribution consistently shows a significant positive influence on structural effects and system threat is associated with a consistently significant negative influence on structural effects. Therefore, all income-based measures of structural position show consistent CLIs with the context-level moderators included in these models. It is also noteworthy that main effects of context-level factors show clearer tendencies in these reduced models as compared to previous models, even though not in a completely consistent way. In tendency, all main effects are positive in a majority of models, describing positive influences of all contextual factors on inequality tolerance, but especially system

Tab. 4.49: Effects on inequality tolerance (IT1) for the reduced model using alternative measures of structural position

	ESeC	EGP	SBCL	ISEI	MPS	SIOPS	SBTB
Structural position	-8.02	-8.99	-12.18	11.53	11.18	9.61	11.54
Context-level main effects:							
Redistribution	2.07	1.96	1.55	0.29	0.75	0.26	-0.11
System threat	1.77	1.49	1.26	2.68	1.79	2.26	2.33
Perceived inequality	2.69	2.68	2.67	1.33	1.09	1.56	1.42
CLI:							
Redistribution	*-3.89*	*-4.08*	*-2.57*	*3.44*	*2.78*	*3.91*	*4.37*
System threat	*0.66*	*0.06*	*2.95*	*-1.88*	*-2.41*	*-1.44*	*-2.16*
Perceived inequality	*-1.96*	*-1.17*	*-2.59*	*2.40*	*2.50*	*1.74*	*1.16*
N (individuals)	53780	55539	65973	55539	43972	55539	43957
N (groups)	69	63	64	63	62	63	40

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Models predict inequality tolerance (IT1) and use alternative measures of structural position (compare Chapter 4.4.1). Models for SBTB only include cases from the year 2009 (compare Chapter 4.4.1). The sample for each model is restricted to country years and cases similar to the previous analyses for main and alternative indicators (see Chapters 4.1 and 4.4.1). Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed. The sample is restricted to country years and cases used in the main analyses.

threat is associated with positive main effects on inequality tolerance, significant in seven of 14 models, or 13 of 14 models when using an alpha level of 0.10.

Additionally, I also estimate models for personal income using perceived inequality instead of actual inequality (see the last four data columns in Table 4.48) to test if measures based on personal income are also moderated by perceived inequality in a similar way to the influence of actual inequality (and in a similar way to the moderating influence of perceived inequality seen for measures based on household equivalence income and for most other indicators of structural position). It is evident that in the reduced models, all measures based on personal income also show a significant positive cross-level interaction with perceived inequality as is the case for the interaction with actual inequality, if only one of these two context-level indicators is included in a single model. Therefore, the moderating influence of aggregate perceived inequality is visible for all income-based measures of structural position when using the reduced model.

In order to investigate if the reduced model only leads to significant moderation effects when using income-based measures of structural position, I also conduct the analyses for alternative measures of structural position that are not directly based on income data (compare Chapters 3.3 and 4.41). Using these alternative measures of structural position leads to mixed results (see Table 4.49).

The trends in these models are in line with expectations as well as trends in the models using income-based measures, but not all moderation effects are significant. While all CLIs related to redistribution consistently reach significance, the moderating effect of system threat does not reach significance in both models using indicators of structural position based on objective class (ESeC and EGP) and in two of the three models using indicators of structural position based on socio-economic status and prestige (ISEI and SIOPS). Additionally, the moderating influence of perceived inequality is not significant in one model using a class-based measure of structural position (EGP), one model using a measure based on socio-economic status and prestige (SIOPS) and the model using subjective top-bottom ranking (SBTB). All other moderation effects are significant and in line with the effects found in the models using income-based measures of structural position. All three moderation effects are significant in the models for subjective class (SBCL) and one of the models using socio-economic status and prestige (MPS).

Taken together, while the reduced model leads to completely consistent results for all income-based measures of structural position, only redistribution is associated with consistently significant effects across all alternative measures of structural position that are not directly based on income. More specifically, the moderating effects of system threat and perceived inequality are not consistently significant for measures of objective class and socio-economic status and prestige, and the moderation effect of perceived inequality fails to reach significance in the model using subjective top-bottom ranking as a measure of structural position. At the same time, the effect direction is consistently in line with expectations for all moderation effects and two more moderation effects (out of eight) reach significance when using an alpha level of 0.10 instead of 0.05. In sum, the analyses using the reduced model consistently support the substantial implications of previous analyses specifically for all income-based measures, whereas results are not consistently significant for other alternative measures of structural position.

4.5 Theoretically implied individual-level mechanisms

In the following three steps, I analyze additional models to see if some of the bridge assumption that the proposed theoretical model implies for individual level. First, I include variables controlling for subjective structural position in various combinations with measures of objective position. Specifically, I include main effects of subjective ranking of individual position at the top versus

bottom of society with and without measures of income. As an alternative test, I include measures for objective and subjective class in models with and without a measure of income[295]. I also control for CLIs of the contextual factors analyzed in previous models with all variables controlling for individual structural position[296]. For most contextual factors, I do not expect differences because the theoretical model postulates multiple pathways. I exclude aggregate inequality tolerance from these models since the variable was not relevant in most models with regard to both its effects as well as changes to the model series. Additionally, I test models using two combinations of measures of subjective and objective structural position to see if effects are significant for individuals in tendency displaying discrepancies. One of these measures is based on objective versus subjective class, whereas the second measure uses income and subjective ranking position[297].

Second, I use an indicator for the level of satisficing behavior expressed by individuals in their responses throughout selected parts of the complete survey to analyze if this satisficing behavior, interpreted as a display of retreat from politics or general hedonistic behavior, corresponds to assumptions related to system justification. The idea is that this form of behavior would correlate with increased inequality tolerance in general, and, because of saturation effects at the high end of the income distribution, predominantly so at the lower ends of the income distribution. This would lead to the expectation of a positive main effect of the satisficing measure on inequality tolerance and a negative influence on the effect of structural position (H9). In terms of CLIs, the influence of system threat is expected to moderate the effect of income, decreasing it in contexts of high system threat especially for individuals with high hedonic motivation (H9a).

Third, I use individual-level as well as CLIs between structural position and norm-related variables to test for the potentially negative influence of norm-related factors on structural effects. Specifically, I use left-wing orientation and religiosity, using both norm-related measures as aggregated and individual-level variables for interactions. Additionally, I test for the influence of

295 For both procedures using subjective indicators of structural position, I expect all variables related to structural position to exhibit effects describing a positive relation of structural position and inequality tolerance, corresponding to the assumption that subjective structural position is a separate influence from actual structural position, but associated with effects in the same direction (H8).

296 According to the theoretical ideas regarding the three different motives influencing structural effects, I expect the effects related to economic accentuation and distrust to be significant for objective measures of structural position, whereas I expect prosperity and fractionalization to be relevant for the effects of subjective measures (H8a).

297 In these models, I expect significant CLIs of prosperity with the structural dummy variable for the inconsistent lower structural group and of fractionalization with structural dummy variables for objectively higher groups (H8a).

individualism on aggregate level. Since I use more differentiated measures of norm-related factors, I do not use aggregated inequality tolerance in most of these models. I expect main effects of left-wing orientation to reduce and main effects of religiosity and individualism to increase inequality tolerance (H10) and individual-level interactions as well as CLIs between structural position and any of the normative measures to reduce structural effects (H10a).

4.5.1 Objective versus subjective structural position

As a form of testing assumptions related to the potentially biasing influences of subjective structural position, I analyze models including interactions of contextual factors with both objective and subjective measures of structural position to investigate three questions. First, do subjective measures show similar main effects compared to objective measures when included in the same model? Second, are some CLIs only relevant for subjective or objective measures as implicated by the theoretical model proposed? I additionally observe if additional CLIs of objective measures with contextual factors are evident when controlling for interactions of contextual factors with subjective structural position. I first analyze models using CLIs for income as well as subjective top-bottom ranking, then for socio-economic status and occupational prestige as well as subjective top-bottom ranking, and finally for objective class as well as subjective class. After that, I turn to the models estimating separate effects for consistent and inconsistent combinations of objective and subjective measures to see if interactions of contextual factors with these combined measures are evident for the respective groups. For this question, I analyze combined measures based on personal income and top-bottom ranking and on objective class and subjective class. For these models, I generally exclude aggregate inequality tolerance to reduce the number of context-level factors since CLIs with four different variables related to structural position are included and aggregate inequality tolerance does not show consistent influences in preliminary tests. In separate models, I additionally exclude aggregate perceived inequality and use the reduced model (compare Chapter 4.4.5) to further limit the number of CLIs for these models.

With regard to the models using subjective top-bottom ranking as well as income (see Table 4.50), results for the main effects of both indicators related to structural position are significant in all models in the data for 2009. Interaction effects are partly inconsistent and specifically the effects for

Tab. 4.50: Comparing effects of measures of structural position based on of income versus subjective top-bottom ranking

	SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Objective position	4.49	4.44	6.61	6.22	4.28	4.16	4.65	3.82
Subjective position	7.43	6.70	6.59	6.04	6.95	6.42	6.62	6.19
CLI, objective position:								
Actual inequality	*0.65*	*1.13*	*3.15*	*4.37*	*1.07*	*1.37*	*3.89*	*4.50*
Redistribution	*0.51*	*0.97*	*1.62*	*2.88*	*0.68*	*0.85*	*1.50*	*2.54*
Prosperity	*1.16*	*0.51*	*1.22*	*0.94*	*0.63*	*-0.08*	*1.04*	*0.71*
System threat	*-0.36*	*-0.87*	*-3.04*	*-2.80*	*-0.90*	*-1.79*	*-4.16*	*-4.63*
Fractionalization	*-0.37*	*-0.08*	*-0.99*	*-1.90*	*-1.40*	*-0.93*	*-2.63*	*-2.83*
Mobilization	*1.86*	*1.29*	*2.30*	*2.10*	*1.74*	*0.98*	*2.47*	*1.25*
Political distrust	*0.08*	*-1.11*	*1.35*	*-0.33*	*0.23*	*-0.97*	*0.25*	*-1.26*
Perceived inequality	*0.77*	*0.03*	*0.65*	*-0.57*	*0.63*	*-0.23*	*-1.06*	*-2.28*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.97*	*-0.37*	*-2.86*	*-0.96*	*-2.30*	*-0.44*	*-3.85*	*-2.52*
CLI, subjective position:								
Actual inequality	*-0.06*	*0.09*	*0.10*	*-0.44*	*-0.31*	*0.00*	*0.08*	*-0.37*
Redistribution	*2.70*	*2.91*	*3.13*	*1.85*	*2.43*	*2.70*	*3.08*	*1.93*
Prosperity	*-0.91*	*-0.72*	*-1.01*	*-0.47*	*-0.41*	*-0.15*	*-0.76*	*-0.20*
System threat	*-1.11*	*-1.45*	*-0.67*	*-1.40*	*-0.60*	*-0.88*	*-0.50*	*-1.19*
Fractionalization	*-2.01*	*-2.65*	*-1.18*	*-0.33*	*-1.23*	*-1.78*	*-0.34*	*0.40*
Mobilization	*-1.17*	*-1.72*	*-0.38*	*-1.56*	*-1.21*	*-1.78*	*-0.37*	*-1.51*
Political distrust	*-0.01*	*-0.21*	*0.40*	*-0.27*	*-0.06*	*-0.17*	*0.95*	*0.25*
Perceived inequality	*0.81*	*0.80*	*0.52*	*0.86*	*0.87*	*0.96*	*0.88*	*1.26*
Inequality tolerance	*1.22*	*0.15*	*0.24*	*0.04*	*1.09*	*0.05*	*0.36*	*0.26*
N (individuals)	34702	34702	30903	30903	34702	34702	30903	30903
N (groups)	39	39	39	39	39	39	39	39

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions are printed in cursive. All models use cluster-robust standard errors based on countries. All models are based on data for the 2009 wave only, because of the problems with the SBTB measure in all waves before 2009 in the previous analyses. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

for interactions with indicators of structural position based on income are inconsistent with previous results and partly inconsistent between models. Actual inequality shows the known interaction effect with structural position when using measures based on personal income, and perceived inequality does not exhibit the known interaction with household equivalence income. In contrast to most previous models, the interactions associated with redistribution and with system threat are not significant in most cases. For redistribution, the interactions are not significant in six out of eight models, and for system threat, the interactions are only significant in the four models using measures of objective

Tab. 4.51: Comparing effects of measures of structural position based on socio-economic status and prestige versus subjective top-bottom ranking and objective versus subjective class

	ISEI		SIOPS		MPS		ESeC		EGP	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Objective position	5.37	5.18	4.91	4.50	5.96	6.24	-6.24	-5.59	-7.13	-6.80
Subjective position	7.11	6.95	7.26	6.93	6.70	6.60	-10.94	-9.96	-11.01	-10.46
CLI, objective position:										
Actual inequality	*2.40*	*2.02*	*3.43*	*2.54*	*2.44*	*1.69*	*-0.33*	*-1.24*	*0.00*	*-1.37*
Redistribution	*2.00*	*1.71*	*2.69*	*2.47*	*1.66*	*1.51*	*-3.83*	*-3.27*	*-3.06*	*-3.16*
Prosperity	*-0.09*	*0.05*	*-0.21*	*-0.33*	*-0.34*	*-0.91*	*0.67*	*2.21*	*-0.01*	*1.40*
System threat	*-1.13*	*-0.79*	*-1.09*	*-0.86*	*-1.43*	*-0.92*	*0.42*	*1.66*	*-0.25*	*1.89*
Fractionalization	*-1.78*	*-2.28*	*-2.05*	*-2.05*	*-1.51*	*-1.23*	*-0.62*	*-0.42*	*1.10*	*0.41*
Mobilization	*1.06*	*1.74*	*1.44*	*1.31*	*1.41*	*1.22*	*0.88*	*0.35*	*0.17*	*-0.14*
Political distrust	*0.42*	*-0.96*	*-0.15*	*-1.90*	*0.47*	*-0.62*	*0.51*	*1.11*	*1.17*	*1.48*
Perceived inequality	*1.49*	*1.72*	*0.41*	*0.10*	*1.79*	*1.12*	*-1.84*	*-0.83*	*-0.63*	*-0.33*
Inequality tolerance	*0.56*	*0.49*	*0.87*	*1.19*	*0.96*	*1.39*	*-1.07*	*-1.27*	*-1.18*	*-1.31*
CLI, subjective position:										
Actual inequality	*-1.34*	*-0.84*	*-1.55*	*-0.90*	*-0.94*	*-0.48*	*1.68*	*0.53*	*0.93*	*1.77*
Redistribution	*2.20*	*2.71*	*2.14*	*2.59*	*1.75*	*1.84*	*1.38*	*-0.51*	*1.13*	*0.09*
Prosperity	*-0.23*	*-0.22*	*-0.16*	*-0.08*	*0.24*	*0.65*	*-1.49*	*-0.57*	*-1.06*	*-0.24*
System threat	*0.07*	*-0.37*	*0.08*	*-0.24*	*0.84*	*0.50*	*0.31*	*0.85*	*0.53*	*-1.17*
Fractionalization	*0.44*	*0.25*	*0.56*	*0.12*	*1.59*	*0.87*	*-0.41*	*-0.60*	*-1.25*	*-0.66*
Mobilization	*-0.89*	*-1.46*	*-0.93*	*-1.30*	*-0.64*	*-1.03*	*0.59*	*1.69*	*1.18*	*1.34*
Political distrust	*0.59*	*0.26*	*0.90*	*0.69*	*1.41*	*0.80*	*-1.00*	*-1.35*	*-1.92*	*-1.68*
Perceived inequality	*1.51*	*1.17*	*1.78*	*1.42*	*2.21*	*1.58*	*-3.05*	*-1.57*	*-3.83*	*-1.87*
Inequality tolerance	*-0.21*	*-0.34*	*-0.33*	*-0.52*	*-0.60*	*-0.90*	*0.28*	*1.86*	*0.67*	*1.50*
N (individuals)	37054	37054	37054	37054	28631	28631	47485	47485	48943	48943
N (groups)	40	40	40	40	39	39	42	42	39	39

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions are printed in cursive. All models use cluster-robust standard errors based on countries. The models presented in the first six data columns use objective indicators of structural position based on socio-economic status and occupational prestige (ISEI, SIOPS and MPS) as well as subjective indicators of structural position based on subjective top-bottom ranking position. The models shown in the last four columns use objective indicators of structural position based on objective class position (using categorizations based on ESeC and EGP) and subjective indicators of structural position based on subjective class position. The models shown in the first six data columns are based on data for the 2009 wave of the ISSP. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

structural position based on personal income. Political distrust is actually showing a significant interaction with objective structural position, but this effect is only significant in three of the eight models. With regard to CLIs between contextual factors and subjective structural position, redistribution shows accentuating effects in six out of eight models, and in all models when using an alpha level of 0.10. The interaction of subjective structural position with system threat is not

significant in any of the eight models. Fractionalization is associated with a negative interaction with subjective structural position, but this effect is only significant in two of the eight models.

Turning to measures of socio-economic status and occupational prestige (see the first six data columns in Table 4.51), the six models including respective measures in combination with subjective top-bottom ranking and CLIs for both objective and subjective measures of structural position leads to similar results in terms of effect direction, but to some differences with regard to the significance of interactions. The main effects of both objective and subjective measures of structural position are again significant and positive in all cases in line with expectations. For actual inequality, five of the six models show significant positive interactions with objective structural position as measured by socio-economic status and occupational prestige. The positive interaction of redistribution with objective structural position is positive, but only significant in three of the six models. Three of the six models also show significant negative interaction effects with fractionalization. Other interaction effects with objective structural position are not significant, including effects of system threat. In general, the effects are very similar to those in the models using personal income as an indicator of structural position in combination with subjective top-bottom ranking. With regard to interactions with subjective structural position, actual inequality shows no significant effects, but redistribution is associated with positive interactions with subjective position in five of the six models. Additionally, in tendency, there is a positive interaction of perceived inequality with subjective structural position, but it is only significant in one of the six models. Other interaction effects with subjective structural position are not significant. As is the case for the models using income measures and subjective top-bottom ranking, differential CLIs are not clearly visible, since most interactions are not consistently significant apart from the influence of redistribution.

With regard to models using measures of both objective and subjective class (see the last four columns in Table 4.51), main effects again are significant and in line with expectations for both objective and subjective measures. Both objective and subjective identification with the working class versus other class positions is associated with lower inequality tolerance. The difference between working class and other class positions gets increased by redistribution as expected for objective measures of class in line with expectations. For subjective class, interaction effects are not consistently significant. Perceived inequality shows an accentuating influence on the negative effects of

identification with the working class, but the effect is only significant in two of the four models, three when using an alpha level of 0.10. No other interaction effects are significant.

In sum, main effects of both objective and subjective measures of structural position are visible in all models for all indicators. While reduced case numbers due to the inclusion of subjective ranking and the resulting restriction of the sample to the 2009 wave of the ISSP might be a partial explanation for the results[298], CLIs seem to be split up between objective and subjective measures, rendering both types of moderation effects insignificant in most models. The exception to this pattern is redistribution, which is associated with at least one significant interaction in all models that include income-based measures of structural position and in eight of 10 models using alternative indicators of structural position. All CLIs featuring objective measures are less consistent when additionally controlling for subjective measures. Effects of subjective evaluation of position do not seem to interfere with effects of objective position, but instead, even when weakly associated, effects of objective structural position seem to be, partly and in tendency, in line with effects of subjective position, but effects seem to be split up when CLIs are included for both types of measures of structural position.

With regard to the combined measure of objective and subjective measures in a single categorical variable differentiating between higher, middle and lower as well as consistent and inconsistent combinations, I present additional hierarchical steps excluding effects related to aggregate inequality tolerance and both aggregate inequality tolerance and aggregate inequality perception for all model series, since the number of interaction effects included is comparatively high. The combined categorical indicator of structural position based on income and subjective top-bottom ranking (see the first six data columns in Table 4.52) shows that all four groups are connected to positive main effects, i.e. all groups in tendency show a higher inequality tolerance compared to the consistent group related to low structural position. Interaction effects are not consistent for all differences between the combined structural groups. The interaction between structural group and actual inequality is

298 Further tests using only cases with valid information on subjective top-bottom ranking without controlling for it (see Tables A.9.1 and A.9.2 in the appendix) show that the insignificant effects of CLIs of income and redistribution as well as poverty are partly due to the restricted case numbers, since moderation effects are generally less consistent in these models as compared to the main model series. This result in tendency supports the assumption that subjective aspects of position are effective in parallel to objective aspects, but might partly serve as mechanisms of effects of objective structural position. This potential mechanistic effect does not seem to be a dominant influence for most models, with only two of eight models showing different CLIs for measures of objective structural position when additionally controlling for subjective position.

Tab. 4.52: Effects for combined measures of objective and subjective position based on income versus subjective ranking and socio-economic status versus subjective ranking

	Personal income						ISEI					
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural pos., inconsistent, low	6.42	4.63	6.35	5.61	6.20	4.41	3.60	2.37	3.54	2.23	4.28	2.70
Structural pos., intermediary	5.75	2.40	5.41	2.77	5.58	3.00	3.91	2.86	3.59	2.45	5.72	3.51
Structural pos., inconsistent, high	6.53	5.70	6.39	7.64	6.43	5.79	4.21	2.76	3.95	2.15	6.52	3.35
Structural pos., consistent, high	8.93	6.16	8.30	6.26	8.79	7.04	7.17	5.62	6.27	4.96	9.15	7.35
CLI, inconsistent, low:												
Actual inequality	*0.08*	*-0.82*	*0.43*	*0.95*	*0.33*	*1.85*	*-0.84*	*-0.98*	*-0.63*	*-0.74*	*-1.20*	*-0.59*
Redistribution	*1.84*	*2.10*	*2.00*	*3.04*	*1.51*	*2.01*	*0.87*	*1.91*	*0.89*	*2.03*	*0.41*	*1.44*
Prosperity	*-1.20*	*-0.69*	*-1.18*	*-0.78*			*-0.34*	*0.81*	*-0.33*	*0.82*		
System threat	*-1.35*	*-3.45*	*-1.60*	*-5.34*	*-0.86*	*-2.44*	*0.76*	*0.44*	*0.57*	*0.27*	*1.56*	*0.74*
Fractionalization	*0.28*	*1.68*	*0.28*	*1.72*			*-0.29*	*0.32*	*-0.37*	*0.21*		
Mobilization	*-1.53*	*-3.20*	*-1.14*	*-1.98*			*-0.42*	*-0.78*	*-0.44*	*-0.79*		
Political distrust	*-0.69*	*-1.98*	*-0.84*	*-2.95*			*-0.94*	*-2.26*	*-1.02*	*-2.52*		
Perceived inequality			*-0.76*	*-2.57*	*-0.62*	*-1.79*			*-0.24*	*-0.31*	*0.14*	*0.17*
CLI, intermediary:												
Actual inequality	*2.21*	*1.13*	*2.23*	*1.99*	*0.84*	*1.35*	*-0.90*	*-0.42*	*-1.14*	*-0.55*	*-1.52*	*-0.46*
Redistribution	*1.98*	*2.49*	*2.18*	*3.11*	*0.78*	*1.60*	*1.17*	*1.86*	*1.09*	*1.87*	*1.34*	*1.55*
Prosperity	*-0.15*	*0.01*	*-0.14*	*-0.02*			*0.50*	*1.13*	*0.53*	*1.18*		
System threat	*-2.46*	*-3.54*	*-3.06*	*-4.23*	*-2.39*	*-2.08*	*0.56*	*-0.36*	*0.72*	*-0.23*	*0.82*	*-0.13*
Fractionalization	*-3.11*	*-0.29*	*-2.95*	*-0.29*			*-0.01*	*0.07*	*0.05*	*0.14*		
Mobilization	*0.62*	*-1.74*	*0.94*	*-0.90*			*0.32*	*-0.44*	*0.35*	*-0.40*		
Political distrust	*-1.74*	*-2.63*	*-2.15*	*-3.49*			*-0.77*	*-2.10*	*-0.76*	*-2.23*		
Perceived inequality			*-1.20*	*-1.68*	*0.22*	*-0.44*			*0.20*	*0.23*	*0.56*	*0.61*
CLI, inconsistent. high:												
Actual inequality	*2.83*	*2.40*	*2.48*	*4.11*	*2.15*	*2.91*	*0.64*	*0.69*	*0.47*	*0.29*	*0.63*	*0.43*
Redistribution	*3.27*	*3.21*	*3.06*	*4.25*	*2.32*	*1.79*	*2.24*	*2.31*	*2.18*	*2.30*	*2.95*	*1.92*
Prosperity	*-0.99*	*-1.21*	*-0.93*	*-1.24*			*0.87*	*1.54*	*0.91*	*1.61*		
System threat	*-3.34*	*-5.61*	*-3.55*	*-7.26*	*-3.40*	*-5.54*	*0.02*	*-0.26*	*0.15*	*0.06*	*-0.86*	*-0.17*
Fractionalization	*-1.88*	*-1.32*	*-1.85*	*-1.58*			*-0.17*	*-0.07*	*-0.10*	*0.10*		
Mobilization	*-0.93*	*-2.21*	*-0.51*	*-1.22*			*0.80*	*0.03*	*0.80*	*-0.03*		
Political distrust	*-1.33*	*-3.27*	*-1.50*	*-4.23*			*-1.16*	*-2.52*	*-1.06*	*-2.58*		
Perceived inequality			*-1.19*	*-4.06*	*-0.38*	*-1.51*			*0.41*	*0.75*	*1.16*	*1.39*
CLI, consistent, high:												
Actual inequality	*3.50*	*4.01*	*2.89*	*4.16*	*2.30*	*3.29*	*-0.12*	*0.27*	*-0.99*	*-0.25*	*-2.34*	*-0.65*
Redistribution	*3.37*	*3.67*	*3.00*	*4.13*	*2.78*	*3.19*	*2.09*	*2.43*	*2.19*	*2.52*	*3.07*	*2.70*
Prosperity	*-0.78*	*-0.15*	*-0.79*	*-0.18*			*0.07*	*0.95*	*0.03*	*0.93*		
System threat	*-3.45*	*-6.38*	*-3.39*	*-6.65*	*-3.54*	*-4.76*	*-0.48*	*-0.82*	*0.05*	*-0.32*	*-0.35*	*-0.58*
Fractionalization	*-2.59*	*-1.18*	*-2.57*	*-1.24*			*-0.71*	*-0.55*	*-0.63*	*-0.43*		
Mobilization	*0.51*	*-1.09*	*0.54*	*-0.49*			*0.92*	*0.42*	*0.64*	*0.25*		
Political distrust	*-0.51*	*-1.73*	*-0.60*	*-2.28*			*-0.29*	*-1.77*	*0.04*	*-1.60*		
Perceived inequality			*-0.29*	*-1.73*	*0.47*	*-1.03*			*2.41*	*1.43*	*2.51*	*1.99*

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Results for cross-level interactions are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed. The sample for these analyses is restricted to the 2009 wave of the ISSP (compare Chapter 4.4.1). The numbers of individuals (groups) is 30903 (39) for models using personal income and 37054 (40) for models using ISEI.

significant for both consistent and inconsistent higher structural groups, but only four of six models show significant interactions with the middle structural group and the difference to the inconsistent low structural group is seemingly not affected by actual inequality at all, since the effects are not significant in any model and even change direction. For redistribution, half of the models show significant interactions for all structural groups, and all models for differences between consistent high and consistent low structural groups. For system threat, there is a negative interaction effect for the differences between structural groups, but it fails to reach significance for the difference between the consistent low and the inconsistent low structural group in three of six models. In tendency, there seems to be a negative interaction between fractionalization and variables related to objectively higher structural positions, but the effect is not significant in two for four models.

For the combined measure using socio-economic status and occupational prestige as indicator of objective structural position and top-bottom ranking as an indicator of subjective structural position (see the last six columns in Table 4.52), main effects are again consistent across all categories of structural position. Differences between consistent and inconsistent combinations of objective and subjective measures of structural position in lower objective positions again are not affected by actual inequality, but in these models, this is the case for all differences between categories of structural position tested in these models. At the same time, the difference between consistent lower positions and consistent objectively higher positions seems to be stronger in contexts of higher perceived inequality in tendency, but this effect is not significant in one of four models. The moderating positive influence of redistribution is again evident for the difference between consistent lower and higher structural groups, but only consistently significant for inconsistent and consistent higher structural groups. Notably, interaction effects including system threat are not significant in these six models.

All combined measures using subjective top-bottom ranking taken together, main effects and CLIs do not indicate clear systematic differences in terms of effect directions with the exception of fractionalization showing significant negative effects only for objective differences between lower and higher structural groups. In tendency, CLIs are mostly more consistent for objective differences between the consistent low structural group and higher structural groups. Context-level factors do not affect the differences between consistent and inconsistent lower structural groups in most models. In tendency, redistribution shows consistent positive influences especially for differences between

Tab. 4.53: Effects for combined measures of objective and subjective position based on socio-economic class and subjective class for ESeC and EGP classifications

	ESeC						EGP					
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural pos., incons. low	4.15	5.20	4.56	6.15	4.62	7.16	5.25	6.27	5.77	6.57	5.35	7.55
Structural pos., intermediary	6.42	7.20	7.12	8.02	7.07	8.30	7.23	8.12	7.80	8.55	7.72	9.17
Structural pos., incons. high	10.57	11.60	11.35	11.37	10.84	11.60	10.97	11.75	11.89	11.76	10.47	10.44
Structural pos., cons. high	1.44	1.22	1.61	1.64	3.03	3.71	0.61	0.87	0.41	1.01	0.88	1.83
CLI, inconsistent, low:												
Actual inequality	*0.28*	*0.20*	*-0.19*	*0.11*	*0.32*	*0.53*	*0.37*	*0.05*	*-0.41*	*-0.16*	*-0.14*	*0.10*
Redistribution	*0.51*	*0.17*	*0.37*	*0.06*	*0.61*	*0.48*	*1.01*	*0.53*	*0.86*	*0.48*	*0.94*	*0.54*
Prosperity	*0.78*	*-0.68*	*0.96*	*-0.54*			*0.22*	*-1.22*	*0.25*	*-1.18*		
System threat	*-1.01*	*-1.03*	*-0.84*	*-0.90*	*-0.30*	*-0.48*	*-1.41*	*-0.72*	*-1.13*	*-0.54*	*-0.19*	*0.22*
Fractionalization	*2.48*	*3.33*	*2.34*	*3.38*			*2.09*	*2.33*	*2.15*	*2.40*		
Mobilization	*-1.81*	*-1.51*	*-2.05*	*-0.90*			*-1.68*	*-1.80*	*-2.37*	*-1.54*		
Political distrust	*-0.01*	*1.33*	*0.14*	*1.09*			*0.02*	*0.31*	*0.44*	*0.36*		
Perceived inequality			*0.79*	*-0.40*	*0.07*	*-0.90*			*1.60*	*0.27*	*0.79*	*-0.13*
CLI, intermediary:												
Actual inequality	*0.36*	*1.41*	*-0.17*	*0.87*	*0.30*	*1.26*	*-0.13*	*0.98*	*-0.65*	*0.62*	*-0.46*	*0.88*
Redistribution	*2.87*	*2.57*	*2.51*	*2.19*	*2.90*	*2.36*	*2.74*	*3.15*	*2.40*	*2.87*	*2.74*	*2.69*
Prosperity	*0.64*	*-1.48*	*0.72*	*-1.59*			*0.83*	*-1.18*	*0.94*	*-1.30*		
System threat	*-1.07*	*-2.87*	*-0.90*	*-2.65*	*-0.42*	*-2.37*	*-0.48*	*-1.79*	*-0.26*	*-1.62*	*0.21*	*-1.35*
Fractionalization	*2.38*	*2.69*	*2.49*	*2.70*			*0.71*	*1.36*	*0.83*	*1.39*		
Mobilization	*-1.63*	*-1.51*	*-2.27*	*-1.46*			*-1.50*	*-1.28*	*-2.15*	*-1.22*		
Political distrust	*-0.57*	*-0.01*	*-0.17*	*0.23*			*-0.70*	*-0.60*	*-0.39*	*-0.48*		
Perceived inequality			*1.45*	*0.45*	*1.12*	*0.65*			*1.27*	*0.41*	*0.92*	*0.76*
CLI, inconsistent, high:												
Actual inequality	*0.52*	*0.93*	*-0.26*	*0.42*	*-0.25*	*0.11*	*1.01*	*1.21*	*0.04*	*0.51*	*-0.15*	*0.22*
Redistribution	*2.37*	*2.50*	*2.49*	*2.29*	*3.51*	*2.71*	*1.69*	*2.61*	*2.02*	*2.52*	*2.87*	*2.78*
Prosperity	*1.27*	*-0.60*	*1.23*	*-0.74*			*1.61*	*0.47*	*1.61*	*0.34*		
System threat	*-0.54*	*-0.38*	*-0.41*	*-0.25*	*-0.25*	*0.09*	*-0.90*	*-0.65*	*-0.78*	*-0.62*	*-0.86*	*-0.47*
Fractionalization	*0.29*	*-0.30*	*0.63*	*-0.23*			*-1.11*	*-0.98*	*-0.86*	*-0.77*		
Mobilization	*0.53*	*0.37*	*-0.48*	*-0.04*			*0.78*	*0.47*	*-0.29*	*-0.45*		
Political distrust	*-0.42*	*-0.62*	*0.22*	*-0.30*			*-0.12*	*-0.59*	*0.60*	*-0.06*		
Perceived inequality			*3.53*	*1.20*	*3.24*	*1.62*			*3.85*	*2.20*	*3.04*	*2.08*
CLI, consistent, high:												
Actual inequality	*1.99*	*2.31*	*2.12*	*2.54*	*1.05*	*1.41*	*2.73*	*1.84*	*2.62*	*1.99*	*2.04*	*1.56*
Redistribution	*1.18*	*1.38*	*1.25*	*1.53*	*1.11*	*1.38*	*2.60*	*1.94*	*2.43*	*2.00*	*2.25*	*1.95*
Prosperity	*2.61*	*2.62*	*2.73*	*2.71*			*2.18*	*2.29*	*2.22*	*2.50*		
System threat	*-1.28*	*-2.42*	*-1.36*	*-2.75*	*-1.96*	*-3.46*	*-1.89*	*-1.50*	*-1.78*	*-1.44*	*-2.60*	*-2.62*
Fractionalization	*-0.73*	*-0.79*	*-0.86*	*-1.15*			*-1.11*	*-1.07*	*-1.01*	*-1.34*		
Mobilization	*0.33*	*1.55*	*0.31*	*1.72*			*-0.25*	*0.74*	*-0.32*	*0.84*		
Political distrust	*-0.46*	*-0.09*	*-0.55*	*-0.44*				*-0.81*	*-1.03*	*-0.99*		
Perceived inequality			*-0.16*	*-0.46*	*-0.26*	*-0.42*			*0.51*	*-0.25*	*0.60*	*0.15*

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Results for cross-level interactions are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed. The numbers of individuals (groups) is 47485 (42) for models using ESeC and 48943 (39) for models using EGP.

objectively lower versus higher structural groups, whereas system threat in general only shows significant moderating influences in models using personal income.

Turning to class-based measures (see Table 4.53), main effects in these models are only consistently significant for three of the four categories. Notably, differences between consistent lower and consistent higher structural groups are, even though in tendency in line with expectations, not significant in 10 of the 12 models presented, but differences between consistent lower structural positions and other categories are consistently significant. With regard to CLIs, actual inequality shows a moderation of differences only between consistent lower and consistent higher structural groups, but this effect is only significant in eight of 12 models tested and only in one of the four full models. For redistribution, effects are consistent and significant for the differences between consistent lower structural groups versus the middle structural group in all models. Moderation effects related to higher structural groups are nearly consistently significant in models using EGP-based combined measures, but fail to reach significance when using ESeC-based combined measures. For system threat, interaction effects are mostly negative, but rarely reach significance. Additionally, all models tested show positive influences of fractionalization on the effects of differences between consistent lower positions and inconsistent lower positions. Significant moderation of effects related to the middle structural group are only visible in three of 12 models. Prosperity shows a positive interaction related to the difference between consistent lower and consistent higher structural groups in all models. Perceived inequality is associated with a moderation of effects for differences between consistent lower and inconsistent higher groups in six of eight models.

These results for class-based combined measures are not completely consistent with those for status-and income based combined measures, but in general illustrate that both objective and subjective aspects of structural position are associated with main effects on inequality tolerance. Effects of objective differences and effects within the group of respondents in lower structural positions showing consistent versus inconsistent subjective evaluation for structural position are evident. One category, consisting of individuals reporting higher objective and subjective structural position, does not lead to significant differences to consistent lower structural positions for class-based measures in terms of main effects. Consistent systematic differences for CLIs with regard to the moderation of subjective versus objective structural effects are not evident, but tendencies, especially for status- and class-based measures show that redistribution and both actual and perceived inequality

seem to mostly relevant for objective differences in structural position. Effects of fractionalization might be dependent on the combination of subjective and objective differences, with positive moderation effects for differences of subjective structural position within the group of individuals in lower objective structural positions and, in tendency, negative effects for objective differences between lower and higher structural groups, but these effects are not consistently significant. Moderation effects related to system threat do not reach significance for subjective structural differences for individuals in lower structural groups in all models, but these moderation effects are also not significant for most combined measures of structural position generated using EGP classes.

Taking all analyses on subjective versus objective measures of structural position together, at the most basic level, all findings support the idea of parallel effects of objective and subjective measures of structural position. Systematic differences in terms of group-specific CLIs are not clearly evident since most effects are inconsistent with regard to the use of different indicators of structural position. At the same time, partial evidence for systematic differences in interactions between groups with consistent versus inconsistent objective and subjective position suggests that complex relations between objective structural position, subjective structural position and context-level factors might be relevant even though not conclusively identified, especially for the influence of fractionalization, but possibly also for moderation effects of actual inequality and system threat.

4.5.2 Using satisficing behavior as an indicator of hedonic motivation

As a second step of testing bridge assumptions with regard to motivational pathways as proposed in the theoretical model, I additionally control for effects associated with a measure of hedonic motivation, based on a basic implementation of measuring the satisficing behavior of respondents. In the following three series of models, I present models including main and interaction effects for two basic measures of satisficing, one linear measure, standardized on country-year level[299], and one dichotomous measure, dividing the linear measure into two groups at the mean values of country years. I test CLIs of hedonic motivation with contextual factors, the interaction between hedonic motivation and structural position and the threeway interactions between hedonic motivation,

299 Not using country-specific standardization in additional tests leads to similar results as reported in this chapter. Consistent between all analyses, no positive main effect is found for hedonic motivation, no interaction is visible between structural position and hedonic motivation, and no consistent threeway interaction is evident for structural position, hedonic motivation and the various contextual factors tested.

structural position and the various contextual factors. This procedure serves multiple purposes, all being related to the hedonic motive as theoretically postulated. First, I test if the main effect of structural position is decreased for higher levels of hedonic motivation as illustrated by more pronounced satisficing behavior visible in response patterns[300]. Second, I also investigate if CLIs of hedonic motivation with contextual factors are visible, and if differences for CLIs with structural position are evident as compared to the main analyses, especially with regard to system threat[301]. Consecutively, I also present a model using a categorical variable for hedonic motivation, differentiating between four levels of satisficing behavior. For this model, I only test the interaction between structural position and the four groups of hedonic motivation, to see if the interaction is only visible for specific levels of hedonic motivation in contrast to a more general interaction[302]. To allow for more freedom in terms of functional relations, I test both standardized logarithmic and standardized non-logarithmic variants of household equivalence income (SEI and SLEI) and personal income (SPI and SLPI) in all analyses related to hedonic motivation.

Using the continuous measure of satisficing (HEDL) as an indicator of hedonic motivation (see Table 4.54), the effects related to hedonic motivation are not completely consistent across the various measures used as indicators of structural position and inequality tolerance. Even with regard to the main effect of hedonic motivation, only half of the models show significant influences of hedonic motivation on inequality tolerance, specifically all models using the first indicator of inequality tolerance, while all main effects, including those not significant, are negative. For the twoway interaction between structural position and hedonic motivation, not a single model shows a significant influence and the effect even changes direction between models. The same is the case for the threeway interactions between structural position, hedonic motivation and contextual factors. The twoway interactions between structural position and contextual factors mostly show similar patterns to previous models with regard to the positive influence of redistribution, the negative influence of

300 This would support the assumption that basic economic self-interest is reduced for individuals associated with higher levels of hedonic motivation in accordance with assumptions related to GFT and the differences in motivational pathways as proposed in the theoretical section of this study (H9).

301 System threat is the main context-level factor that is theoretically associated with increased hedonic motivation reducing structural effects. I expect that, when controlling for hedonic motivation, effects of system threat are not significant (H9a).

302 This constitutes an additional test of assumptions related to the reduction of main structural effects under conditions of higher hedonic motivation (H9), leaving some room for functional nonlinearities or threshold effects.

Tab. 4.54: Effects of income and satisficing behavior using the continuous measure (HEDL)

	SEI		SPI		SLEI		SLPI	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	10.95	10.70	11.12	10.48	11.00	10.96	8.76	8.10
Hedonic motivation (HEDL)	-3.96	-1.00	-4.13	-1.24	-4.03	-1.05	-4.18	-1.25
Hedonic motivation * structural position	-0.19	-0.80	1.39	0.02	0.21	-1.23	1.22	-0.59
CLI, structural position:								
Actual inequality	*-0.75*	*-0.23*	*2.51*	*3.04*	*-0.41*	*0.04*	*2.69*	*3.21*
Redistribution	*1.62*	*2.29*	*3.53*	*4.24*	*2.37*	*2.90*	*3.58*	*4.38*
Prosperity	*0.51*	*-0.87*	*0.48*	*-0.06*	*-0.85*	*-2.37*	*0.10*	*-0.71*
System threat	*-2.29*	*-3.74*	*-4.83*	*-5.81*	*-3.26*	*-5.69*	*-5.82*	*-5.52*
Fractionalization	*-0.25*	*-0.40*	*-0.48*	*-0.75*	*-0.40*	*-0.50*	*-1.48*	*-1.40*
Mobilization	*-0.64*	*-1.10*	*0.24*	*-0.04*	*-0.61*	*-1.34*	*0.35*	*-0.26*
Political distrust	*-1.23*	*-1.63*	*-0.09*	*-0.80*	*-0.90*	*-1.41*	*-0.53*	*-1.01*
Perceived inequality	*2.34*	*2.24*	*1.73*	*1.02*	*2.23*	*2.29*	*0.78*	*-0.11*
Inequality tolerance	*-0.95*	*-0.22*	*-1.07*	*-1.25*	*-1.27*	*-0.15*	*-1.55*	*-1.67*
CLI, hedonic motivation:								
Actual inequality	*-3.35*	*-2.06*	*-3.16*	*-2.37*	*-3.33*	*-2.07*	*-3.11*	*-2.38*
Redistribution	*-1.51*	*-0.95*	*-0.53*	*-0.76*	*-1.44*	*-0.92*	*-0.47*	*-0.75*
Prosperity	*-1.76*	*-1.12*	*-1.26*	*-0.23*	*-1.86*	*-1.20*	*-1.25*	*-0.23*
System threat	*4.76*	*3.27*	*4.05*	*3.38*	*4.58*	*3.14*	*4.01*	*3.34*
Fractionalization	*-0.36*	*-1.08*	*0.12*	*-0.70*	*-0.38*	*-1.07*	*0.16*	*-0.67*
Mobilization	*0.21*	*2.13*	*0.39*	*2.11*	*0.11*	*2.07*	*0.36*	*2.18*
Political distrust	*0.53*	*0.40*	*-0.28*	*-0.16*	*0.39*	*0.31*	*-0.35*	*-0.17*
Perceived inequality	*0.50*	*-0.08*	*-0.52*	*-1.28*	*0.49*	*-0.06*	*-0.54*	*-1.32*
Inequality tolerance	*0.46*	*0.45*	*0.45*	*0.06*	*0.54*	*0.52*	*0.54*	*0.11*
*CLI, hedonic motivation * structural pos.:*								
Actual inequality	*1.59*	*0.00*	*-0.14*	*-1.16*	*2.61*	*0.27*	*0.73*	*-0.70*
Redistribution	*0.12*	*-0.56*	*-0.66*	*-0.69*	*0.92*	*0.18*	*-0.32*	*-0.19*
Prosperity	*1.76*	*1.64*	*0.05*	*0.27*	*1.65*	*1.30*	*-0.52*	*-0.29*
System threat	*-1.47*	*-1.29*	*-0.93*	*-0.32*	*-5.21*	*-2.31*	*-0.86*	*0.12*
Fractionalization	*-0.25*	*1.00*	*-1.12*	*0.96*	*-1.06*	*0.87*	*-1.60*	*0.40*
Mobilization	*1.95*	*-0.04*	*2.26*	*-0.91*	*1.98*	*-0.55*	*2.14*	*-0.05*
Political distrust	*-0.21*	*0.22*	*0.51*	*-0.18*	*-1.18*	*-1.05*	*0.44*	*0.28*
Perceived inequality	*-1.29*	*0.85*	*-1.84*	*1.32*	*-2.32*	*0.69*	*-2.61*	*0.90*
Inequality tolerance	*-0.48*	*0.83*	*-1.70*	*1.21*	*-1.14*	*0.65*	*-1.37*	*1.03*
N (individuals)	63247	63247	54337	54337	63247	63247	54337	54337
N (groups)	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

system threat and the positive differential influence of actual versus perceived inequality on personal versus household equivalence income. In sum, the interactions between contextual factors and structural position are not affected by hedonic motivation in these models. For the twoway interactions

Tab. 4.55: Effects of income and satisficing behavior using the dichotomous measure (HEDD)

	SEI		SPI		SLEI		SLPI	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	10.75	10.93	9.18	9.31	9.69	9.97	6.27	6.60
Hedonic motivation (HEDD)	-3.92	-0.38	-3.51	-0.45	-3.98	-0.41	-3.59	-0.50
Hedonic motivation * structural position	-0.19	-0.55	1.06	0.48	-0.63	-0.91	0.56	-0.44
CLI, structural position:								
Actual inequality	*-1.20*	*-0.56*	*2.54*	*2.99*	*-0.88*	*-0.15*	*2.31*	*2.84*
Redistribution	*0.93*	*1.52*	*3.32*	*4.09*	*1.35*	*2.04*	*2.96*	*3.60*
Prosperity	*-1.08*	*-1.88*	*0.17*	*-0.10*	*-2.17*	*-2.98*	*0.05*	*-0.15*
System threat	*-2.31*	*-2.89*	*-5.45*	*-5.07*	*-3.04*	*-4.17*	*-5.47*	*-4.91*
Fractionalization	*0.09*	*-0.05*	*-0.30*	*-1.06*	*0.24*	*-0.16*	*-0.56*	*-1.11*
Mobilization	*-1.42*	*-0.68*	*-0.70*	*0.70*	*-1.56*	*-0.94*	*-1.20*	*-0.39*
Political distrust	*-0.36*	*-0.87*	*-0.12*	*-0.65*	*-0.04*	*-0.61*	*-0.67*	*-1.12*
Perceived inequality	*2.39*	*0.96*	*1.81*	*-0.67*	*2.35*	*0.80*	*1.01*	*-1.43*
Inequality tolerance	*-0.19*	*-0.80*	*-0.41*	*-1.99*	*-0.62*	*-0.62*	*-0.96*	*-2.05*
CLI, HEDL:								
Actual inequality	*-2.02*	*-1.44*	*-1.07*	*-1.33*	*-2.05*	*-1.46*	*-1.01*	*-1.31*
Redistribution	*-0.70*	*-1.19*	*0.32*	*-0.75*	*-0.68*	*-1.18*	*0.35*	*-0.75*
Prosperity	*-1.17*	*-1.62*	*-0.66*	*-0.76*	*-1.28*	*-1.69*	*-0.60*	*-0.72*
System threat	*4.12*	*3.41*	*3.21*	*3.24*	*4.15*	*3.38*	*3.33*	*3.31*
Fractionalization	*-1.07*	*-1.46*	*-0.77*	*-1.19*	*-1.04*	*-1.46*	*-0.79*	*-1.21*
Mobilization	*0.28*	*2.82*	*0.47*	*2.01*	*0.22*	*2.80*	*0.48*	*2.06*
Political distrust	*-0.06*	*1.83*	*-0.41*	*1.07*	*-0.09*	*1.82*	*-0.45*	*1.07*
Perceived inequality	*0.25*	*-0.25*	*-0.64*	*-0.45*	*0.29*	*-0.23*	*-0.64*	*-0.44*
Inequality tolerance	*0.04*	*0.02*	*-0.45*	*-0.60*	*0.11*	*0.06*	*-0.38*	*-0.55*
*CLI, Hedonic motivation * structural pos.:*								
Actual inequality	*0.90*	*0.45*	*-1.30*	*-1.39*	*0.83*	*-0.01*	*-0.80*	*-1.06*
Redistribution	*0.87*	*0.46*	*-0.72*	*-0.99*	*1.01*	*0.13*	*-0.84*	*-0.83*
Prosperity	*2.67*	*1.44*	*0.15*	*0.07*	*2.57*	*1.65*	*-0.16*	*-0.43*
System threat	*0.00*	*-1.69*	*0.85*	*0.04*	*-0.40*	*-1.80*	*1.52*	*0.72*
Fractionalization	*-0.34*	*-0.34*	*-0.04*	*0.89*	*-0.93*	*-0.24*	*-0.79*	*0.26*
Mobilization	*2.17*	*-0.35*	*1.77*	*-1.53*	*2.38*	*-0.21*	*2.40*	*0.48*
Political distrust	*-2.20*	*-1.54*	*0.19*	*-0.65*	*-2.42*	*-1.91*	*0.70*	*0.80*
Perceived inequality	*-0.83*	*2.14*	*-0.29*	*2.96*	*-0.83*	*2.85*	*-0.60*	*2.86*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.47*	*1.25*	*-0.67*	*1.82*	*-0.85*	*1.16*	*-0.31*	*1.81*
N (individuals)	63247	63247	54337	54337	63247	63247	54337	54337
N (groups)	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

between hedonic motivation and contextual factors, a positive effect is visible for actual inequality and a negative effect is evident for system threat in all models. This pattern mirrors the relationships consistently found for the moderation of structural effects, with inequality accentuating and system threat attenuating both structural and hedonic effects.

With regard to the models using the dichotomous measure of satisficing (HEDD) as an indicator of hedonic motivation (see Table 4.55), results are essentially similar to the previous eight series of models (compare Table 4.54), with two exceptions. Main effects of hedonic motivation are again negative in tendency, but significant only in half of the models tested, specifically for all models using the first indicator of inequality tolerance. The twoway interaction between structural position and hedonic motivation as well as all threeway interactions including all contextual factors are again not consistent and only significant in some of the models, but this time in all models for perceived inequality using the second indicator of inequality. In these models, the usual significant interaction between household equivalence income and perceived inequality is not significant. With regard to other twoway interactions between structural position and contextual factors, the interactions including redistribution, system threat and actual inequality show the same tendencies as in previous models, but only five of the eight model series result in a significant interaction between structural position and redistribution. Twoway interactions between hedonic motivation and contextual factors are only consistently significant for system threat, showing a positive influence counteracting the, in tendency, negative effect of hedonic motivation in contexts of higher system threat.

Turning to the third set of models using four categories of hedonic motivation (HEDC) in terms of main effects and interactions with structural position, but no CLIs for the variables related to hedonic motivation (see Table 4.56), the main effects of the dummy variables related to categories of hedonic motivation are inconsistent. The models using the first indicator of inequality tolerance show that the group associated with the highest hedonic motivation has lower inequality tolerance, but this difference is not significant for the second indicator of inequality tolerance, even when using an alpha level of 0.10 in any of the models. Interactions between hedonic motivation and structural position are not significant in a single model for a single category of hedonic motivation and any income-based measure of structural position, even when using an alpha level of 0.10. With regard to CLIs, redistribution shows the expected positive interaction with structural position, but it fails to reach significance in one model. Interactions of system threat with structural position are consistently significant and in line with expectations. For actual and perceived inequality, the differential relationship discovered in most previous analyses in this study is again visible, with higher levels of actual inequality correlating with increased effects of personal income, and higher levels of perceived

Tab. 4.56: Effects of income and satisficing behavior using four categories (HEDC)

	SEI		SPI		SLEI		SLPI	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	6.96	7.58	7.10	7.85	6.15	7.47	5.00	5.87
Middle hedonic motivation	-0.94	0.19	-1.41	-0.27	-1.03	0.14	-1.43	-0.29
Higher hedonic motivation	-1.48	0.36	-1.44	0.10	-1.56	0.33	-1.47	0.09
Highest hedonic motivation	-3.67	-0.95	-4.42	-1.26	-3.75	-0.99	-4.44	-1.27
Interaction, structural pos.:								
Middle hedonic motivation	-0.14	-0.62	0.35	-0.72	1.28	-0.30	0.78	-0.71
Higher hedonic motivation	1.29	0.86	1.10	0.34	1.21	0.36	1.00	0.00
Highest hedonic motivation	0.11	-0.33	0.99	0.37	0.40	-0.59	1.05	-0.24
CLI, structural position:								
Actual inequality	*-0.90*	*-0.38*	*2.31*	*2.82*	*-0.50*	*-0.11*	*2.55*	*3.06*
Redistribution	*1.47*	*2.17*	*3.34*	*4.12*	*2.27*	*2.70*	*3.45*	*4.22*
Prosperity	*0.58*	*-0.81*	*0.54*	*-0.09*	*-0.89*	*-2.44*	*0.14*	*-0.70*
System threat	*-2.18*	*-3.53*	*-4.86*	*-5.57*	*-3.22*	*-5.64*	*-5.66*	*-5.53*
Fractionalization	*-0.23*	*-0.42*	*-0.62*	*-0.83*	*-0.39*	*-0.51*	*-1.49*	*-1.42*
Mobilization	*-0.44*	*-0.87*	*0.28*	*-0.16*	*-0.51*	*-1.20*	*0.43*	*-0.22*
Political distrust	*-1.26*	*-1.62*	*-0.22*	*-0.93*	*-0.87*	*-1.38*	*-0.53*	*-1.07*
Perceived inequality	*2.25*	*2.17*	*1.67*	*1.03*	*2.15*	*2.17*	*0.73*	*-0.10*
Inequality tolerance	*-0.94*	*-0.27*	*-1.08*	*-1.11*	*-1.29*	*-0.25*	*-1.58*	*-1.64*
N (individuals)	63247	63247	54337	54337	63247	63247	54337	54337
N (groups)	42	42	42	42	42	42	42	42

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

inequality positively moderating the effect of household equivalence income. These effects are significant in all models, but only for the respective types of income measures.

Taking all models using indicators for hedonic motivation together, the analyses in tendency show negative main effects of hedonic motivation on inequality tolerance and no interaction with structural position. With regard to CLIs, moderation effects related to structural position are in line with the main models and previous results in general, while threeway interactions between context-level factors, structural position and hedonic motivation are inconsistent. For twoway interactions of context-level factors with hedonic motivation, a pattern involving accentuating effects of actual inequality and attenuating influences of system threat is evident, similar to the moderation effects involving structural position.

4.5.3 Normative motivation and individual internalization of norms

As a third and final test of bridge assumptions, I turn to the effects of normative aspects on individual level. This serves the purpose to investigate if a moderation of structural effects by internalized norms and values as proposed for cross-level interaction is evident on individual level. In order to test this, I use measures of left-wing orientation and religiosity on both individual and country-year level as well as additional context-level measures of aggregate inequality tolerance and aggregate individualism. I also include models without individual-level interactions to test if individual-level interactions are a plausible mechanism for potential context-level moderation effects in the context of normative factors.

First, I present models using both cross-level and individual-level interactions between measures of left-wing orientation and religiosity on the one hand and structural position on the other. Second, I test similar models additionally including CLIs between structural position and aggregate inequality tolerance and aggregate individualism. The models for the analyses listed so far use some hierarchical steps and are presented for standardized logarithmic household equivalence and personal income. As a third and final step, I use additional objective and subjective indicators of structural position as a further test of the assumptions related to the moderation of structural effects by normative aspects. For these models, I only use the model including all interaction effects for left-wing orientation and religiosity, but no interaction effects for aggregate inequality tolerance and aggregate individualism[303]. I also present main effects of contextual factors for these models, since the potential influence of newly added contextual normative factors might be interesting in combination with interaction effects, but these effects are not consistently significant as can be seen in the following tables. All models in this section have drastically reduced case numbers, since items related to the normative aspects tested show a lot of missing values. Additionally, the inclusion of individual-level interactions between normative aspects and structural position might bias the estimation of CLIs related to structural position. Therefore, results regarding CLIs have to be interpreted with some caution and do not serve as an additional test for the main hypotheses[304].

303 As can be seen in this chapter, the models using individualism and aggregate inequality tolerance along with individualism in addition to left-wing orientation and religiosity (see Table 4.58) do not show additional consistent results in terms of main effects or cross-level interactions related to norm-related indicators.

304 Additional tests reported in the appendix (see Tables A.10.1 and A.10.2) show that the reduced case numbers are the more important factors explaining why most CLIs that are associated with consistent effects in the main analyses do not show consistent significant effects in these models using normative factors on individual level. Effect directions are mostly in line with previous analyses, but the significance of CLIs is not as consistent as in other groups of models.

Tab. 4.57: Normative influences as moderators of structural effects on individual and aggregate level using income-based measures of structural position

	SLPI		SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI		SLEI	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	3.58	3.78	5.65	5.89	4.69	3.36	7.54	4.07	3.40	3.40	6.02	5.15
Left orientation., individual level	-5.21	-5.13	-5.20	-5.17					-5.15	-5.20	-5.10	-5.23
Religiosity, individual level					3.85	2.18	4.30	2.38	3.35	1.30	3.85	1.38
Interaction on individual level, structural position:												
Left orientation	-1.62	-1.89	-2.22	-3.13					-1.65	-1.91	-2.46	-3.27
Religiosity					-1.03	0.00	-2.03	-0.55	-1.25	-0.22	-2.54	-1.13
Context-level main effects:												
Actual inequality	0.86	0.44	0.55	0.01	0.89	0.48	0.56	0.03	0.86	0.44	0.55	0.02
Redistribution	1.08	1.40	0.90	1.30	1.04	1.37	0.91	1.31	1.08	1.40	0.91	1.31
Prosperity	1.30	1.56	0.71	0.98	1.31	1.57	0.71	0.97	1.30	1.56	0.71	0.97
System threat	0.68	2.23	0.48	2.37	0.72	2.30	0.50	2.40	0.70	2.25	0.50	2.38
Fractionalization	-1.29	-0.98	-1.27	-0.65	-1.31	-0.99	-1.28	-0.64	-1.30	-0.99	-1.30	-0.66
Mobilization	-0.92	-0.24	-1.14	-0.45	-0.95	-0.27	-1.14	-0.45	-0.92	-0.24	-1.14	-0.46
Political distrust	-2.81	-1.53	-2.82	-1.53	-2.79	-1.49	-2.81	-1.50	-2.82	-1.53	-2.83	-1.53
Perceived inequality	1.92	1.40	2.25	1.84	1.98	1.48	2.28	1.88	1.93	1.41	2.25	1.85
Left orientation	-2.25	-0.72	-2.41	-0.97	-3.09	-1.77	-3.19	-1.93	-2.32	-0.75	-2.46	-1.00
Religiosity	-1.13	0.49	-1.47	0.29	-1.64	0.09	-1.96	-0.10	-1.44	0.32	-1.81	0.10
CLI:												
Actual inequality	*0.94*	*1.72*	*-1.85*	*-0.93*	*1.11*	*1.64*	*-1.80*	*-1.35*	*1.11*	*1.73*	*-1.83*	*-1.38*
Redistribution	*2.87*	*3.51*	*1.79*	*2.38*	*2.52*	*3.00*	*1.43*	*2.16*	*2.77*	*3.40*	*1.64*	*2.37*
Prosperity	*-0.79*	*-1.00*	*-1.55*	*-1.94*	*-1.43*	*-1.07*	*-2.22*	*-1.63*	*-1.27*	*-1.07*	*-1.73*	*-1.34*
System threat	*-4.03*	*-5.77*	*-5.09*	*-6.44*	*-4.46*	*-5.64*	*-5.88*	*-6.83*	*-4.63*	*-6.07*	*-5.35*	*-6.54*
Fractionalization	*0.20*	*-0.24*	*0.97*	*-0.06*	*-0.07*	*-0.23*	*1.04*	*0.41*	*-0.11*	*-0.35*	*0.96*	*0.28*
Mobilization	*0.11*	*0.38*	*-0.21*	*-0.63*	*-0.26*	*0.25*	*-0.15*	*-0.16*	*-0.34*	*0.19*	*-0.27*	*-0.16*
Political distrust	*-0.16*	*-0.42*	*-2.22*	*-3.31*	*-0.25*	*-0.29*	*-1.73*	*-2.29*	*-0.50*	*-0.55*	*-2.08*	*-2.78*
Perceived inequality	*2.06*	*1.73*	*4.02*	*3.56*	*1.43*	*1.10*	*3.55*	*2.91*	*1.64*	*1.46*	*3.91*	*3.54*
Left orientation	*0.23*	*-0.78*	*0.62*	*-0.31*					*-0.04*	*-0.97*	*0.61*	*-0.02*
Religiosity					*-0.87*	*-0.46*	*-0.03*	*0.78*	*-0.67*	*-0.38*	*0.46*	*1.12*
N (individuals)	30731	30731	35101	35101	30731	30731	35101	35101	30731	30731	35101	35101
N (groups)	60	60	61	61	60	60	61	61	60	60	61	61

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed.

Controlling for both individual-level and aggregate-level interactions of structural position with left-wing orientation only (see the first four data columns in Table 4.57) shows that results for CLIs of non-normative factors are essentially similar to the main analyses and most previous models with one notable exception. While redistribution and system threat show the expected interactions with structural position, the differential relationship between actual and perceived inequality on the one

hand and personal and household equivalence income on the other is not visible. In these models with restricted case numbers additionally controlling for left-wing orientation, the interaction effect including structural position and actual inequality does not reach significance for models using personal income, but instead in one of the two models, perceived inequality shows the positive interaction with personal income expected for actual inequality. System threat shows a consistent negative interaction with both income-based measures of structural position.

In terms of normative influences, the main effect of left-wing orientation is only significant on individual level, decreasing inequality tolerance as is to be expected. There also is a negative interaction evident on individual level, decreasing structural effects with increasing left-wing orientation, but this effect is only significant for the two models using household equivalence income, not for the two models using personal income when relying on an alpha level of 0.05, and not for one of the two models using personal income when relying on an alpha level of 0.10.

When controlling for main effects and interactions including religiosity instead of left-wing orientation (see data columns five through eight in Table 4.57), most interaction effects related to structural position are similar to the models controlling for left-wing orientation. The main effect of religiosity on individual level shows a positive influence on inequality tolerance, describing increasing inequality tolerance for higher levels of individual religiosity. Both interaction effects, connecting structural position with religiosity on individual and aggregate level, are not significant in three of the four models, whereas one model shows a significant negative interaction on individual level, with weaker structural effects for individuals with higher religiosity. Including all interactions for effects related both to left-wing orientation and to religiosity (see the last four columns in Table 4.57) again leads to very similar results. Effects including structural position are essentially similar to the previous eight models. With regard to normative influences, main effects of left-wing orientation on individual level are positive across all models, whereas the interaction of left-wing orientation and structural position is negative in all four models, but only significant in two. Main effects of religiosity are again positive in tendency, but only significant in two of four models, whereas the negative interaction of religiosity and structural position on individual level is only significant in one of four models.

Adding aggregate inequality tolerance and aggregate individualism to the previous models for household equivalence income (see the first four data columns in Table 4.58) and personal income (see

Tab. 4.58: Normative influences as moderators of structural effects additionally controlling for inequality tolerance and aggregate individualism

	SLPI		SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI		SLEI	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	3.40	3.65	5.70	5.05	3.33	3.62	5.70	4.98	8.27	7.16	13.15	9.29
Left orientation., individual level	-5.24	-5.28	-5.11	-5.23	-5.23	-5.27	-5.10	-5.23				
Religiosity, individual level	2.80	0.83	3.33	0.89	2.78	0.83	3.31	0.89				
Interaction on individual level, structural position:												
Left orientation	-1.60	-1.95	-2.64	-3.53	-1.56	-1.95	-2.63	-3.55				
Religiosity	-0.85	0.12	-2.08	-0.81	-0.86	0.12	-2.09	-0.80				
Context-level main effects:												
Actual inequality	-1.96	-1.28	-2.05	-1.56	-1.55	-0.99	-1.75	-1.25	-1.53	-0.96	-1.75	-1.23
Redistribution	-0.31	0.36	-0.56	0.25	-0.07	0.57	-0.36	0.52	-0.15	0.51	-0.38	0.50
Prosperity	1.14	0.98	0.67	0.56	1.15	0.99	0.69	0.60	1.14	0.99	0.68	0.58
System threat	1.42	2.35	1.25	2.57	1.37	2.32	1.23	2.53	1.38	2.36	1.21	2.52
Fractionalization	-1.34	-0.94	-1.39	-0.56	-1.36	-0.96	-1.40	-0.59	-1.34	-0.94	-1.36	-0.56
Mobilization	0.23	0.64	0.01	0.40	0.33	0.75	0.09	0.54	0.28	0.70	0.10	0.55
Political distrust	-2.60	-1.24	-2.71	-1.26	-2.58	-1.22	-2.69	-1.23	-2.54	-1.19	-2.66	-1.21
Perceived inequality	2.33	1.85	2.69	2.20	2.35	1.88	2.71	2.24	2.45	1.99	2.76	2.29
Inequality tolerance	0.62	1.23	0.58	1.03	0.72	1.30	0.67	1.18	0.76	1.35	0.67	1.20
Left orientation	-0.93	0.53	-1.19	0.30	-0.99	0.45	-1.25	0.19	-1.84	-0.41	-2.13	-0.68
Religiosity	-0.85	1.00	-1.29	0.85	-0.84	1.01	-1.28	0.86	-0.58	1.10	-0.90	0.99
Individualism					-0.54	-0.60	-0.39	-0.76	-0.50	-0.56	-0.36	-0.73
CLI:												
Actual inequality	*1.54*	*2.15*	*-0.88*	*-0.78*	*1.18*	*2.03*	*-1.39*	*-0.46*	*1.09*	*1.86*	*-1.34*	*-0.51*
Redistribution	*2.81*	*3.39*	*1.37*	*1.88*	*2.31*	*3.29*	*0.63*	*2.54*	*2.05*	*2.90*	*0.47*	*2.16*
Prosperity	*-1.30*	*-1.12*	*-0.74*	*-1.03*	*-1.36*	*-1.10*	*-0.80*	*-1.05*	*-1.61*	*-1.45*	*-1.34*	*-1.74*
System threat	*-4.97*	*-6.95*	*-5.59*	*-6.21*	*-3.34*	*-4.84*	*-3.84*	*-5.77*	*-3.10*	*-4.59*	*-3.63*	*-5.56*
Fractionalization	*0.05*	*0.44*	*0.33*	*0.18*	*0.20*	*0.47*	*0.47*	*0.07*	*0.16*	*0.39*	*0.49*	*0.12*
Mobilization	*-0.80*	*-0.54*	*-0.03*	*-0.14*	*-1.01*	*-0.58*	*-0.22*	*0.02*	*-0.89*	*-0.46*	*-0.24*	*0.03*
Political distrust	*-0.61*	*-0.21*	*-2.77*	*-2.91*	*-0.59*	*-0.21*	*-2.80*	*-2.83*	*-0.33*	*0.12*	*-2.23*	*-2.21*
Perceived inequality	*0.69*	*0.64*	*2.59*	*2.96*	*0.54*	*0.59*	*2.48*	*3.07*	*0.53*	*0.55*	*2.40*	*2.92*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.20*	*-2.19*	*-1.40*	*-0.57*	*-1.89*	*-1.81*	*-1.85*	*0.39*	*-1.73*	*-1.65*	*-1.50*	*0.63*
Left orientation	*-0.71*	*-1.29*	*-0.20*	*-0.18*	*-0.44*	*-1.20*	*0.07*	*-0.42*	*-0.73*	*-1.45*	*-0.32*	*-1.03*
Religiosity	*-1.00*	*-0.67*	*0.17*	*0.90*	*-0.99*	*-0.67*	*0.15*	*0.92*	*-1.54*	*-0.90*	*-0.71*	*0.43*
Individualism					*1.80*	*0.34*	*1.49*	*-1.07*	*1.91*	*0.45*	*1.76*	*-0.80*
N (individuals)	29173	29173	33211	33211	29173	29173	33211	33211	29173	29173	33211	33211
N (groups)	58	58	59	59	58	58	59	59	58	58	59	59

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed.

data columns five through eight in Table 4.58), leads to slightly decreased case numbers due to data on individualism, but does not substantially change effects with the exception that redistribution only shows a significant interaction in one of the four models using household equivalence income. The

negative interaction effect of system threat is consistent throughout all models. In terms of normative influences, main effects of left-wing orientation are again consistently negative and significant in all models, but only on individual level. Religiosity again shows significant positive influences on inequality tolerance in all models using the first indicator of inequality tolerance. With regard to interaction effects including normative measures, left-wing orientation shows a significant negative influence on the structural effect in all models using household equivalence income, but not in those using personal income. In the models for personal income, the effect only reaches significance when using an alpha level of 0.10 and only for two of the four models. The interaction of structural position and religiosity is significant and negative in only two of the eight models. Interaction effects of left-wing orientation and religiosity in general are only significant on individual level. For aggregate inequality tolerance, only one of the eight models shows significant interactions with structural position using an alpha level of 0.05, but four models when using an alpha level of 0.10. For aggregate individualism, all models show insignificant effects.

When excluding individual-level interaction effects between normative factors and structural position, (see the last four data columns in Table 4.58), aggregate normative factors again do not show any significant interaction with structural position. In sum, while aggregate inequality tolerance and individualism show significant moderation effects in some models when using an alpha level of 0.10, even the direction of effects is not consistent in all models. Therefore, the four normative factors tested do not seem to be relevant context-level influences on structural effects, even when excluding individual-level normative factors from models.

With regard to the models using alternative indicators of structural position (see Table 4.59), the results are inconsistent with regard to both main effects of norm-related factors and CLIs including structural effects, but the moderating influence of normative factors on individual level is visible in most models. As is the case for the models using income-based measures, CLIs including structural effects known from the main analyses again are, even though in line with expectations in terms of direction, mostly not significant in these models. Across all 14 full models, only six models show significant influences of redistribution and only three models (or four models when using an alpha level of 0.10) result in significant moderation effects of system threat. Only six models (or nine when using an alpha level of 0.10) are associated with significant interaction effects related to perceived inequality.

Tab. 4.59: Normative influences as moderators of structural effects on individual and aggregate level using alternative measures of structural position

	ISEI		MPS		SIOPS		SBTB		EGP		ESeC		SBCL	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	7.93	7.38	6.11	5.26	7.04	6.35	5.26	5.09	-7.76	-6.20	-7.25	-6.74	-8.60	-7.53
Left orientation., individual level	0.97	0.86	0.52	0.13	1.35	1.47	-2.13	-2.07	-5.90	-6.17	-5.48	-6.14	-7.77	-6.89
Religiosity, individual level	4.13	2.35	2.61	0.75	3.49	1.99	2.22	1.33	0.63	-0.43	0.40	-0.67	-0.22	-1.37
Interaction on individual level, structural position:														
Left orientation	-4.32	-4.60	-3.91	-3.59	-4.10	-4.18	-1.33	-1.77	4.21	3.41	4.46	3.71	3.80	3.88
Religiosity	-2.98	-2.35	-2.48	-1.49	-2.66	-2.06	-1.46	-0.87	2.51	1.64	2.72	1.66	3.34	3.24
Context-level main effects:														
Actual inequality	0.71	0.51	0.42	0.59	0.39	0.65	2.21	1.75	0.57	0.51	0.89	0.70	0.81	0.37
Redistribution	0.17	1.02	0.21	0.84	-0.20	0.65	0.08	0.08	1.92	2.50	1.50	1.87	1.18	1.77
Prosperity	1.53	1.91	1.80	2.05	1.36	1.81	0.85	1.07	1.27	1.64	1.33	1.63	0.91	0.91
System threat	1.93	2.00	1.86	1.81	1.83	1.37	0.60	1.42	1.37	1.87	0.80	2.43	0.50	2.89
Fractionalization	-1.50	-0.09	-2.07	-1.34	-1.16	-0.23	-1.74	-0.85	-1.40	-0.50	-1.73	-1.21	-1.47	-1.16
Mobilization	-0.44	0.10	0.31	0.71	-0.01	0.49	-1.72	-1.48	-0.89	0.19	-1.21	-0.40	-0.81	-0.25
Political distrust	-2.69	-1.20	-3.20	-1.68	-2.06	-0.56	-3.13	-2.13	-4.12	-2.14	-3.67	-2.13	-2.97	-1.78
Perceived inequality	0.33	0.70	-0.22	-0.11	0.69	0.78	-0.23	0.33	2.17	1.88	1.99	1.57	2.43	1.79
Left orientation	-2.16	-0.81	-2.29	-0.66	-2.31	-1.17	-1.31	0.40	-3.51	-1.23	-3.20	-0.85	-3.25	-1.38
Religiosity	-2.07	-0.52	-2.00	-0.39	-1.72	-0.16	-3.62	-2.53	-2.29	-0.22	-2.02	-0.24	-1.57	0.27
CLI:														
Actual inequality	*-0.14*	*-0.10*	*-1.39*	*-1.26*	*0.32*	*-0.50*	*-2.64*	*-1.75*	*0.67*	*0.16*	*-0.21*	*-0.19*	*1.33*	*0.29*
Redistribution	*3.28*	*2.63*	*1.13*	*1.15*	*3.53*	*2.99*	*1.53*	*1.32*	*-1.40*	*-0.97*	*-2.90*	*-1.49*	*0.46*	*-2.03*
Prosperity	*-0.92*	*-1.01*	*-0.56*	*-0.72*	*-0.58*	*-0.74*	*-0.82*	*-0.76*	*0.54*	*0.11*	*1.05*	*1.27*	*1.10*	*1.61*
System threat	*-2.16*	*-0.81*	*-2.17*	*-1.37*	*-1.95*	*0.01*	*0.34*	*-0.42*	*-0.41*	*-0.65*	*0.17*	*-0.14*	*0.89*	*1.99*
Fractionalization	*0.45*	*-0.95*	*-0.12*	*-0.44*	*0.06*	*-0.41*	*1.17*	*0.42*	*-0.48*	*-0.19*	*-0.53*	*-0.22*	*-1.51*	*-0.74*
Mobilization	*-0.59*	*-0.53*	*-0.66*	*-0.85*	*-0.94*	*-1.27*	*0.85*	*1.56*	*-1.26*	*-2.05*	*0.04*	*-0.13*	*-1.12*	*0.25*
Political distrust	*-0.42*	*-2.00*	*-0.28*	*-1.45*	*-0.88*	*-2.77*	*1.56*	*1.57*	*-0.36*	*0.23*	*-0.63*	*0.15*	*-2.93*	*-1.50*
Perceived inequality	*2.71*	*1.88*	*3.38*	*2.05*	*1.86*	*1.39*	*3.01*	*2.08*	*-0.93*	*-0.38*	*-1.66*	*-0.51*	*-3.18*	*-1.93*
Left orientation	*-1.27*	*-0.42*	*-0.70*	*-0.27*	*-0.38*	*0.33*	*-1.16*	*-1.70*	*1.60*	*1.99*	*0.36*	*0.28*	*-0.55*	*-0.13*
Religiosity	*0.40*	*0.67*	*0.79*	*0.61*	*0.09*	*0.11*	*1.78*	*1.92*	*0.56*	*0.51*	*0.62*	*0.60*	*-0.46*	*-0.18*
N (individuals)	29378	29378	22907	22907	29378	29378	23168	23168	29378	29378	28767	28767	35155	35155
N (groups)	53	53	52	52	53	53	36	36	53	53	59	59	55	55

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. All models using subjective top-bottom ranking are based on data for the 2009 wave only because of the problems with the measure in all waves before 2009 discovered for the top-bottom for the waves before 2009 in the previous analyses. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed.

In terms of moderation effects related to normative factors, the models using indicators of structural position based on socio-economic status and occupational prestige (see the first six data columns in Table 4.59) show that a negative influence of left-wing orientation is consistent and

significant in all six models, whereas a negative influence of religiosity is significant in five of the six models. For subjective top-bottom ranking (see data columns seven and eight in Table 4.59), no significant effect is evident when using an alpha level of 0.05 and only the moderating influence of left-wing orientation is significant in one of the two models when using an alpha level of 0.10. In terms of measures based on objective class (see data columns nine through 12 in Table 4.59), all four models show a significant influence of left-wing orientation but only two of the four models, specifically both models using the first indicator of inequality tolerance, show a significant moderation effect of religiosity. With regard to subjective class (see the last two columns in Table 4.59), individual-level interaction effects are visible for left-wing orientation and religiosity in both full models.

In sum, whereas religiosity shows a negative moderating individual-level influence on the structural effect in nine of 14 models, left-wing orientation is associated with a significant negative moderation effect in 12 of 14 models, or 13 of 14 models when using an alpha level of 0.10. In theoretical terms, this lends some support to assumptions regarding moderating influences, specifically for left-wing orientation. However, the evidence is nearly exclusively based on individual-level interactions in these models, since only three models show significant CLIs including normative aggregate factors.

Taking all results using individual-level interactions of structural position and normative aspects together, including both income-based and alternative measures, a majority of models supports assumptions related to moderating normative influences, but the results are not completely consistent with regard to significance. Especially for the moderating influence of left-wing orientation on individual level, the evidence clearly supports the assumptions for most indicators tested, but the effect does not reach significance in the models using personal income or subjective top-bottom ranking as an indicator of structural position when using an alpha-level of 0.05. When using an alpha level of 0.10, 16 of the 18 full models (see Tables 4.57 and 4.59) show a significant interaction between structural position and left-wing orientation on individual level. This includes most models using objective measures of structural position but excludes one of the two models for subjective top-bottom ranking and for personal income, respectively. For religiosity on individual level and for all four aggregate-level normative factors tested, the results are less consistent. Religiosity shows significant moderating influence in 10 of the 18 models when using an alpha level of 0.10, whereas the CLIs

between structural position and aggregate normative factors is only significant for left-wing orientation in one of the 34 models tested in this section and not significant for religiosity in any of the models tested when using an alpha-level of 0.05. In the additional models using income-based measures of structural position and additional CLIs with aggregate inequality tolerance and aggregate individualism, the interaction as expected is negative for aggregate inequality tolerance, but only significant in three of the four full models and four of the eight models tested when using an alpha level of 0.10 whereas individualism only shows a significant negative influence in one of the four models. In sum, evidence for normative moderating influences on aggregate level is scarce and only in tendency visible for one of the four factors used, specifically the factor aggregate inequality tolerance, which is conceptually closely related to the dependent construct used in most analyses. On individual level, left-wing orientation shows a clear tendency and a nearly consistent significance influence, specifically reducing structural effects for individuals with higher values of left-wing orientation, but controlling for religiosity does not lead to consistent interaction effects. The different measures of individual-level norms are therefore associated with divergent effects.

With regard to the moderation of structural effects by contextual factors, the CLIs that are consistently significant in the main analyses and most previous models in general are mostly in line with expectations in terms of effect direction for the models using interaction effects with normative aspects on individual level, but in these models, the effects are not consistently significant, even when using an alpha level of 0.10. Further tests (see Tables A.10.1 and A.10.2 in the appendix) using the same case numbers without controlling for normative aspects on individual level show that the insignificant effects of CLIs of income and redistribution as well as system threat are not mainly explained by the influence of normative aspects, but instead by the restricted case numbers. Only a minority of models show the expected interaction effects of structural position with redistribution and system threat in a significant way, in a pattern highly similar to the one occurring when controlling for individual-level norms. Therefore, the insignificance of interaction terms related to structural position and contextual factors is not interpreted here as a substantial results with regard to the added control of normative factors but instead as a result of the drastically reduced case numbers in these models.

4.6 Summarizing evaluation of results and hypothesis tests

The analyses conducted in this study are extensive and include several forms of additional tests and robustness checks. Based on different model configurations, alternative indicators for all constructs of relevance, varying case numbers and controls and tests of bridge assumptions, the combined results are complicated in nature and have to be interpreted carefully. In general, all hypotheses could be regarded as falsified based on at least one model for each hypothesis, if all models in main and additional analyses are taken together and if the varying implications of different types of analyses are ignored. At the same time, some consistent effects are visible in the main models and some clear trends and patterns are evident when comparing the results for all analyses.

In the following, I briefly recapitulate the main results and provide a summary of results for all tests of hypotheses. First, I summarize results in terms of the consistency of main effects of structural position and of associated interactions with context-level constructs. I present tables showing effect directions across the various models to give a simplified overview for most analyses conducted. Second, I focus on theoretical propositions and evaluate hypotheses based on the most important groups of models. On this foundation, I evaluate all proposed hypotheses before turning to the general discussion of theoretical implications, contributions and limitations concluding this thesis.

4.6.1 Consistency of moderating influences on the effects of structural position

The main analyses (see the first six data rows in Table 4.60) show a partly consistent pattern of a main positive effect of structural position, increased in contexts of higher actual inequality or lower fractionalization for measures of personal income and in contexts of higher perceived inequality for measures based on household equivalence income. The negative effect of actual inequality visible in most models controlling only for CLIs with inequality in early steps of hierarchical series is inverted or does not reach significance in later models of the same series when controlling for redistribution and system threat. For both income types used in the main analyses (personal and household equivalence income), redistribution mostly correlates with stronger structural effects and system threat with decreased structural effects. In the models using country-level fixed effects (see data rows seven through 14 in Table 4.60), effects for actual and perceived inequality are similar to those found in the main analyses, but only for random differences on country level in the case of actual inequality.

Tab. 4.60: Consistency of main and moderation effects related to structural position for model series of all main tests, tests using country-level fixed effects and tests using alternative indicators

Test series	ME	AI	RD	PC	ST	FR	MI	DT	PI	IT
Main models 1, regional controls	+	+[1]	+	0	-	-[1]	(-)[2]	0	+[2]	-[1]
Main models 2, country-year controls	+	+[1]	+	0	-	-[1]	(-)[2]	0	+[2]	-[1]
Main models 3, regional CLIs	+	+[1]	+[1]	0	-[1]	-[1]	(-)[2]	0	+[2]	0
Corrected SEs 1, regional controls	+	+[1]	+	0	-	-[1]	0	0	+[2]	0
Corrected SEs 2, country-year controls	+	+[1]	+	0	-	-[1]	0	0	+[2]	0
Corrected SEs 3, regional CLIs	+	+[1]	+[1]	0	-[1]	-[1]	0	0	+[2]	0
Fixed effects models 1, regional controls (RE)	+	+[1]	+[1]	0	-	0	0	N/A	+[2]	0
Fixed effects models 1, regional controls (FE)	+	0	+	(-)[2]	0	0	0	N/A	+[2]	0
Fixed effects models 2, country-year controls (RE)	+	+[1]	+[1]	0	-	0	0	N/A	+[2]	0
Fixed effects models 2, country-year controls (FE)	+	0	+	(-)[2]	0	0	0	N/A	+[2]	0
Fixed effects models 3, regional CLIs (RE)	+	+[1]	+[1]	0	-[1]	0	0	N/A	+[2]	0
Fixed effects models 3, regional CLIs (FE)	+	0	+	(-)[2]	0	0	0	N/A	+[2]	0
Fixed effects models 4, ISSP inequ. measures (RE)	+	0	+	0	-	(-)	0	N/A	+[2]	0
Fixed effects models 4, ISSP inequ. measures (FE)	+	0	+	0	0	0	0	N/A	+[2]	0
Indicator comparison 1, equivalence income	+	0	+	0	-	0	(-)	0	+	0
Indicator comparison 2, personal income	+	(+)	+	0	-	0	0	0	0	0
Indicator comparison 3, family income	+	0	+	0	-	0	0	0	+	0
Indicator comparison 4, status and prestige	+	0	+	(-)	(-)	-	(-)	0	(+)	(+)
Indicator comparison 5, subjective ranking (2009)	+	0	+	0	(-)	0	0	(-)	+	0
Indicator comparison 6, objective class	+	0	+	0	0	0	0	0	(+)	+
Indicator comparison 7, subjective class	+	0	(+)	0	0	0	0	0	+	0
Indicator comparison 8, inequality tolerance, logarithmic	+	+[1]	+	0	-	0	0	0	+[2]	0
Indicator comparison 9, inequality tolerance, linear	+	(+)	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0
Indicator comparison 10, justice gaps low	+	0	+[1]	0	0	0	0	0	(+)	+[1]
Indicator comparison 11, justice gaps high	-	0	0	0	-[1]	0	0	0	0	-[2]
Indicator comparison 12, rating measures	+	(-)	0	0	0	0	0	(+)[1]	0	+[1]
Indicator comparison 13, inequality	+	(+)	(+)	0	-	0	0	0	(+)	0
Indicator comparison 14, redistribution	+	+[1]	+	0	-	0	0	(+)[2]	+[2]	0
Indicator comparison 15, system threat (poverty)	+	+[1]	+	0	-	0	0	0	+[2]	0
Indicator comparison 16, mobilizat. (press freedom)	+	+[1]	+	0	-	0	+	0	+[2]	0
Indicator comparison 17, other moderators	+	(+)	(+)	0	(-)	0	0	0	(+)[2]	(-)

Notes: Data columns show effect direction of main effects [ME] and of cross-level interactions between context-level factors (see below for abbreviations used) and structural position if consistently significant. Signs in parentheses indicate effects that are not completely consistent in terms of significance, but only fail to reach significance in no more than 25% of full models in specific groups of models with effect direction in line with hypotheses. + (-) indicates effects in line with a positive (negative) influence of structural position on higher inequality tolerance and accentuation effects for contextual moderators. [1] denotes effects only consistent for measures of structural position based on personal income, [2] denotes effects only consistent for measures of structural position based on household equivalence income. Models for subjective top-bottom ranking included here only use data from the 2009 wave of the ISSP. The following terms are abbreviated in this table: “main effects” [ME], “actual inequality” [AI], “redistribution” [RD], “prosperity and mobility chances” [PC], “system threat” [ST], “fractionalization” [FR], “mobilization and information” [MI], distrust [DT], “perceived inequality” [PI] and “inequality tolerance” [IT].

Random differences in system threat correlate with decreased structural effects, but the positive influence of perceived inequality on structural effects (for indicators of structural position based on household equivalent income) and the positively moderating influence of redistribution are visible for both fixed and random effects in all groups of models.

Using alternative indicators (see data rows 15 through 30 in Table 4.60) leads to varying results not always in line with the main series of models, especially for actual inequality, but also for perceived inequality and system threat. The respective moderation effects, while mostly in line with assumptions throughout the analyses conducted in terms of effect direction, fail to reach significance for actual inequality in most groups of models using alternative indicators of structural position and inequality tolerance, and in four groups of models (of the 16 groups of models using alternative indicators listed in Table 4.60) for system threat and perceived inequality. More precisely, models using objective and subjective class-based measures of structural position do not lead to consistent moderating influences of system threat, and models based on personal income or using alternative indicators of individual-level inequality tolerance do not show consistent moderating influences of perceived inequality. The moderating influence of redistribution is visible throughout all analyses of alternative measures, excepting the models using alternative, conceptually different indicators of inequality tolerance. Additional effects limited in consistency to specific groups of models include the influence of fractionalization, which is visible in all models using socio-economic status and occupational prestige, but is falsified in all models using other indicators of structural position. Aggregate inequality tolerance only shows consistent interactions with structural position in the sense of increased structural effects in most models using the alternative class- and status-based objective measures of structural position.

Differences between measures are especially clear for the alternative indicators of inequality tolerance. Even the consistently influential factor redistribution fails to reach significance as a moderating influence in three groups of models (of the 16 groups of models using alternative indicators presented in Table 4.60). These three groups of models all use alternative indicators of the dependent variable inequality tolerance that are based on completely different operationalization and conceptualization and are partly only roughly related to the main dependent variable. Some of these differences are informative. Specifically, the results for models using justice gaps for higher versus lower income groups indicate that the moderating influence of economic accentuation in terms of both

redistribution and perceived inequality on structural effects on inequality tolerance is mostly related to the justice gap for lower income groups, whereas the opposite is the case for influences of system threat. Additionally, the justice gap analyses show that there might be some counteracting effects of context-level moderators with regard to low versus high justice gaps, especially for the influence of aggregate inequality tolerance, even though results are not consistently significant in this context. In contrast to these results that complement the main analyses, effects on indicators of inequality tolerance based on general rating items and on non-logarithmic measures of inequality tolerance substantially diverge from the main results. For the measures of inequality tolerance based on logarithmic ratios of occupational income estimates, redistribution and system threat show consistent influences. This is also the case for actual inequality in models using personal income and for perceived inequality in models using household equivalence income.

Considering alternative indicators of context-level factors, effects of redistribution and system threat are mostly consistent throughout most groups of models, whereas actual and perceived inequality seem to be only significant influences when using specific measures of inequality and structural position. Effects are usually significant when using personal income for actual inequality and household equivalence or family income, measures of socio-economic status and prestige, subjective top-bottom ranking, objective class or subjective class for perceived inequality. Alternative indicators of actual inequality based on either World Bank data using restricted data sets or on aggregated ISSP individual-level data do not show consistent interaction effects. But the alternative indicators based on the SWIID show significant interaction effects for personal income in line with expectations. Indicators based on income shares as well as one of the two measures indicating wealth inequality only partially show significant interactions with structural position in line with expectations.

Alternative indicators related to redistribution and perceived inequality show consistent influences in line with the main measures used, but the scope of the alternative measures used is limited. For system threat, all indicators based on poverty data show effects in line with the main analyses, but other indicators relying on perceived conflict or homicides do not. One alternative indicator for mobilization and information, press freedom, shows a consistent and relatively pronounced positive influence on the structural effect in line with expectations, but other measures of the same construct based on education, internet usage, the percentage of people employed in research

Tab. 4.61: Consistency of main and moderation effects related to structural position for model series of selected additional tests using alternative indicators and model specifications

Test series	ME	AI	RD	PC	ST	FR	MI	DT	PI	IT
Split regression (high, linear)	+	0	0	0	-[1]*	0	0	0	+	0
Split regression (high, dummy)	+	0	0	0	-[1]	0	0	0	0	0
Split regression (low, linear)	+	0	+	-[2]	0	0	0	+[1]*	0	0
Squared income (linear)	+	+[1]	+	0	(-)	0	0	0	(+)[2]	0
Squared income (squared)	(-)[2]	-	-	(+)	(+)[2]	0	0	0	+[1]	0
Parallel 1, SBTB vs. income (income)	+	+[1]	0	0	0	-[1]	(-)[1]	0	(+)[1]	(-)
Parallel 1, SBTB vs. income (SBTB)	+	0	(+)	0	0	0	(-) [2]	0	0	0
Parallel 2, SBTB vs. status (status)	+	(+)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Parallel 2, SBTB + status (SBTB)	+	0	(+)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Parallel 3, objective vs. subjective class (objective class)	+	0	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Parallel 3, objective vs. subjective class (subjective class)	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(+)	0
Combined 1, income/status and ranking (inconsistent, low)	+	0	+	0	(-)	(+)	(-)	0	(+)	0
Combined 1 (intermediary)	+	(+)	(+)	0	(-)	(-)	(-)	0	0	0
Combined 1 (inconsistent, high)	+	+[1]	+	0	-[1]	0	(-)	0	(-)	(+)
Combined 1 (consistent, high)	(+)	+[1]	+	0	-[1]	(-)	(-)	0	-[1]	0
Combined 2, objective and subjective class (inconsistent, low)	+	0	0	0	0	+	0	(-)	0	0
Combined 2, class (intermediary)	+	0	+	0	(-)	(+)	0	(-)	0	0
Combined 2, class (inconsistent, high)	+	0	(+)	0	0	0	0	0	+	+
Combined 2, class (consistent, high)	0	(+)	(+)	(+)	(-)	0	0	0	0	0
Hedonic motivation (satisficing CLIs)	(-)	(+)	0	0	-	0	0	(-)	0	0
Hedonic motivation (income CLIs)	+	+[1]	(+)	0	-	0	0	0	+[2]	0
Hedonic motivation (threeway CLIs)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	(+)	0
Individual-level values (structural position, CLIs)	+	0	(+)	0	(-)	0	0	0	(+)	0
Individual-level values (left orientation, main effects)	-	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Individual-level values (left orientation, CLIs)	-[2]*	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Individual-level values (religiosity, main effects)	(+)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Individual-level values (religiosity, CLIs)	(-)[2]*	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Notes: Data columns show effect direction of main effects [ME] and of cross-level interactions between context-level factors (see below for abbreviations used) and structural position if consistently significant. Signs in parentheses indicate effects that are not completely consistent in terms of significance, but only fail to reach significance in no more than 25% of full models in specific groups of models with effect direction in line with hypotheses, + (-) indicates effects in line with a positive (negative) influence of structural position on higher inequality tolerance and accentuation (attenuation) effects for contextual moderators. [1] denotes effects only consistent for measures of structural position based on personal income, [2] denotes effects only consistent for measures of structural position based on household equivalence income, * denotes effects only consistent for one indicator of inequality tolerance. The following terms are abbreviated in this table: “main effects” [ME], “actual inequality” [AI], “redistribution” [RD], “prosperity and mobility chances” [PC], “system threat” [ST], “fractionalization” [FR], “mobilization and information” [MI], distrust [DT], “perceived inequality” [PI] and “inequality tolerance” [IT].

and development and unionization-related measures fail to do so. Effects of other context-level factors are inconsistent or not significant in most models.

In sum, at least one factor related to economic accentuation, specifically actual inequality, redistribution or perceived inequality, is significant as a positively moderating influence in nearly every model estimated. This often is the case in the sense that one inequality-related effect is significant in combination with the effect of redistribution in the same model. The effect of indicators related to system threat and SJT is also visible in a clear majority of models. For other factors, even though the consistency of effect direction is partly high, such as for the negative influences of prosperity and mobility chances and of fractionalization, the consistency in terms of significance across different types of models and measures is mostly very low.

With regard to additional analyses, the models using nonlinear income-based measures of structural position (see data rows one through five in Table 4.61) show that moderation effects of redistribution are mostly relevant for increased accentuation and stronger linear effects within lower income groups. This is indicated by a significant positive effect for the lower half of the income distribution in the split income models and a significant general linear effect accompanied by a negative influence on the effect of squared income, i.e. a form of saturation effect for higher income groups. Perceived inequality shows some indication for being relevant mostly for higher income groups, but the evidence in the models using squared income terms is not completely consistent. Other effects in these models show a less clear pattern. System threat seems to be related to effects in higher income strata, but the models using squared income terms show a general effect with some saturation in higher strata. The functional relation is possibly more complex than both types of models tested.

The groups of models combining objective and subjective indicators of structural position as separate and parallel main effects (see data rows six through 11 in Table 4.61) illustrate that, while moderation effects are less pronounced and rarely consistently significant when additionally controlling for subjective measures, objective and subjective indicators mostly work in a highly similar and partly parallel way with main and interaction effect usually aligned in terms of effect direction. Effects even of the contextual factors that prove influential in most other analyses are only sporadically visible in these groups of model using objective and subjective measures of structural position in parallel. In tendency, when using measures based on income and socio-economic status parallel to subjective ranking, inequality-related measures seem to be more consistently relevant for

objective structural position, but redistribution seems to be more relevant as a moderating influence on the effects of subjective structural position. In contrast, when using class-based measures, redistribution shows consistent influences on effects of objective structural position. Notably, whereas moderating influences of actual inequality, redistribution and perceived inequality are visible in some models for the effects of some indicators of structural position, effects of system threat are not consistently significant in any of these groups of models.

In the analyses using models that combine objective and subjective measures into five categories including consistent and inconsistent groups (see data rows 12 through 19 in Table 4.61), the evidence mostly differs between the models using measures based on income and subjective ranking versus those using indicators related to objective and subjective class. As common factors, actual inequality seems to be mostly relevant as a moderating influence for objective differences between lower versus middle and higher structural groups. For redistribution, the class-based models indicate that only objective differences are affected, but the income- and ranking-based models show an additional positive influence on the differences between consistent lower and inconsistent lower structural groups. System threat also seems to be mostly, but not exclusively, relevant for objective differences. Higher fractionalization seems to correlate with increased differences between consistent lower and inconsistent lower structural groups, whereas other differences are partly contradictory in terms of effect direction, possibly explaining the zero findings for this factor in many other models, but the evidence is not completely clear. In sum, controlling for subjective position either in a parallel way to objective measures or in the form of combined categories reduces the consistency of moderation effects for income. Patterns with regard to CLIs are not consistent in terms of significance and partly also in terms of effect direction, but effect directions related to actual inequality, redistribution and system threat, if significant, are mostly in line with assumptions for both objective and subjective indicators of subjective position. This is not the case for fractionalization, which seems to be positive for the difference between consistent and inconsistent lower structural groups, but negative, if significant, for the differences between lower structural groups and objectively higher structural groups. This suggests that actual and subjective position are parallel influences and partly, but not completely, subject to similar moderating forces on contextual level.

For the analyses testing influences of hedonic motivation on individual level (see data rows 20 through 22 in Table 4.61), the influence of structural position and its moderators in these groups of

models is mostly in line with the main models. The measure of satisficing used as an indicator for hedonic motivation, if significant, shows a negative influence on inequality tolerance, partly reduced by higher actual inequality, lower system threat and lower distrust. At the same time, the interaction between structural position and hedonic motivation is not significant as a two-way interaction in any model. Furthermore, only one contextual factor, perceived inequality, affects this interaction effects in some models in the form of a three-way cross-level interaction. This result is not in line with expectations, since it shows increased inequality tolerance for individuals in higher structural positions reporting higher hedonic motivation in contexts of higher perceived inequality.

With regard to the groups of models testing influences of normative factors on individual level (see data rows 23 through 27 in Table 4.61), the results show less consistently significant CLIs in most groups of models using individual-level normative moderators but are in line with the main analyses when effects are significant. For the individual-level normative influences, left-wing orientation shows a negative main effect and is correlated with decreased structural effects in most models. Results for religiosity are less consistent, but show positive main effects and a negative influence on structural effects in a majority of models.

4.6.2 Evaluation of hypotheses

In terms of theory-based tests (see Table 4.62), when results are based on multiple series of models, I generally consider hypotheses falsified for specific groups of model series if the results in the respective final models are not consistently in line with assumptions in terms of direction or if the associated effects do not reach significance in more than 25% percent of models in the respective group. As reported in previous chapters, even when using this evaluation procedure, all hypotheses related to contextual moderators are falsified by some groups of models when counting all models using alternative indicators, additional tests and sensitivity checks. I therefore also consider clear trends of results, such as consistent effects for specific groups of indicators used for constructs such as inequality or structural position and take note of exceptions and differences between groups of indicators or model configurations. For the general evaluation of hypotheses, I do not consider the models using alternative dependent variables apart from different logarithmic computations of inequality tolerance as model tests, since the methodical and theoretical implications are very different

Tab. 4.62: List of general hypotheses, showing moderating constructs, expected effects and results

Hypothesis	Moderating constructs	Expectation	Main results	Models using context-level fixed effects	Alternative indicators of structural position	Alternative indicators of inequality tolerance	Alternative indicators of context-level factors
H1 Economic accentuation	Actual inequality,	+	+ [PI] / 0	0	0	+ [PI] / 0	+ (Market inequality) / 0
	Perceived inequality	+	+ [EI] / 0	+ FE & RE [EI] / 0	+	+ [EI] / 0	+ [EI] / 0
	Redistribution	+	+	+ FE & RE	+	+	+
H2 Upward mobility	Prosperity	-	0	+ FE [EI] / 0	0	0	0
H3 Downward mobility	Fractionalization of ethnic and social groups	-	(-)	0	0	0	0
H4 System distrust	Political distrust	-	0	N/A	0	0	0
H5 Mobilization	Unionization	+	0	0	0	0	+ (Press freedom) / 0
H6 System threat	Poverty	-	-	- RE	- / 0 (Class measures)	-	- (Poverty measures) / 0
H7 Primary norms	Normative legitimization of inequality	-	0	0	0	0	0

Notes: + (-) indicates effects in line with a positive (negative) main influence on higher inequality tolerance and accentuation (attenuation) effects for contextual moderators. Specific results for models using measures of personal income (household equivalence income) are marked with "PI" ("EI"). Alternative indicators of structural position considered here only include logarithmic measures based on occupational income estimates.

from the main models (the results for these models are presented only in Table 4.63). Models only presented in the appendix are also not considered for the evaluation of hypotheses.

All other models presented in the study are considered as groups of models for the evaluation of hypotheses. Since these models are based on varying model configurations and case numbers on country and individual level, not all groups of models have the same methodical and theoretical implications. For this reason, I consider the result of hypotheses tests for different groups of models separately in terms of evaluation and discussion. For the main hypotheses related to the moderating influence of contextual factors, I summarize results of hypothesis tests based on the main models, the models using country-level fixed effects and the additional models using alternative indicators of structural position, inequality tolerance and contextual moderators. For differential effects depending on position, I consider the models with split regression and squared income terms. Finally, for the test of bridge assumptions on individual level, I summarize the results of models using objective versus

subjective indicators in various combinations, the models using indicators of hedonic motivation and the models using measures of potentially moderating normative aspects on individual level.

4.6.2.1 Main hypotheses

Of the seven main or general hypotheses (see Table 4.62), only two can not be falsified based on the analyses that are considered here. Assumptions related to the *accentuation of economic self-interests* (H1) in line with a positive influence of both inequality and redistribution on structural effects have been evident in a broad majority of models for all types of analyses and groups of models, excepting some of the additional dependent variables. For actual inequality, this effect is not completely consistent and mostly visible for the influence on the effect of personal income, whereas for perceived inequality, effects of household equivalence income are more affected, for both random and fixed effects of the country-level factor. Redistribution also shows both random and fixed effects and consistent effects across nearly all models. Therefore, the hypothesis is supported by the evidence, specifically as indicated by effects of redistribution, whereas effects of perceived inequality and especially of actual inequality are less consistent and more dependent on specific measures used. In this context, the effect of personal income is mostly significantly affected by actual inequality, whereas household equivalence income and most other structural indicators used are more consistently affected by levels of perceived inequality instead.

For hypotheses related to *system threat* (H6), results are in line with expectations for all groups of models with the exception of class measures as alternative indicators of structural position and alternative indicators of system threat not based on data related to poverty. All four indicators based on poverty data show consistently significant moderation effects in line with expectations, but this is not the case for other indicators of system threat. Additionally, only the country-level random effect of poverty is a significant influence on structural effects, but not the country-level fixed effect. Even though the hypothesis is not evaluated as falsified, the differences between these results and the results for economic accentuation (H1) have to be further addressed in the discussion in terms of possible theoretical and methodical implications.

Assumptions related to the influences of *prosperity and mobility chances* (H2), *ethnic fractionalization* (H3), *system distrust* (H4), *mobilization and information* (H5) and *primary norms*

Tab. 4.63: List of hypotheses related to specific income groups, showing moderating constructs, expected effects and results

Hypothesis	Moderating construct	Expected influence on structural effects	Results using split regression	Results using quadratic term
H1a Differential impact of redistribution	Redistribution	+ (Lower positions)	+ (Lower positions)	+ (Lower positions)
H1b Differential inequality perception	Perceived inequality	+ (Higher positions)	+ (Higher positions)	+ (Higher positions) [PI] / + (general effect) [EI]
H2a Differential chances	Prosperity and mobility chances	- (Lower positions)	- (Lower positions) [EI] / 0	0
H3a Differential losses / H3b Distraction	Social and ethnic fractionalization	+ (Higher positions) / - (lower positions)	0	0
H4a Differential power	Distrust in political system and institutions	- (Lower positions)	0	0
H5a Differential information deficit	Mobilization and information	+ (Lower positions)	0	0
H6a Fear of conflict / H6b System justification	System threat	- (Higher positions / lower positions)	- (Higher positions; high/low difference) [PI] / 0	- (General effect)
H7a Saturation	Normative legitimization of inequality	- (Lower positions)	0	0

Notes: + (-) indicates effects in line with a positive (negative) main influence on higher inequality tolerance and accentuation (attenuation) effects for contextual moderators. Specific results for models using measures of personal income (household equivalence income) are marked with "PI" ("EI").

(H7) do not lead to consistent significant results and are therefore clearly falsified. However, the influence visible for country-level fixed effects of the main indicator of *prosperity and mobility chances* (H2) as well as for press freedom as an alternative indicator of *mobilization and information* (H5) are noteworthy. Whereas the fixed effect of prosperity is in opposite direction to assumptions based on upward mobility (H2), the effect of press freedom is in line with the general idea of increased accentuation and expression of economic interests in contexts of higher *mobilization and information* (H5), but only for the single indicator press freedom. Additionally, assumptions related to *ethnic fractionalization* of (H3) can not be falsified for personal income based on the main analyses, but in all other groups of models, this effect is not consistent and partly not in line with expectations, including all alternative indicators.

In sum, the *economic accentuation* hypothesis (H1) is repeatedly supported by empirical results, including country-level fixed and random effects, and the *system threat* hypothesis (H6) is supported[305] in terms of country-level random effects, but exclusively for all measures based on

305 The reduced model (see Chapter 4.4.4 additionally underlines the reliability of results, since a drastically reduced set of context-level factors leads to completely consistent results for economic accentuation (H1) and system threat (H6).

poverty data, not for other measures. The *mobilization and information* hypothesis (H5) receives limited support, consistent only for one of six indicators used, specifically for press freedom, as one of the three information-focused indicators. All other main or general hypotheses are considered falsified.

4.6.2.2 Group-specific hypotheses

For tests related to differential moderation effects depending on structural position, the results are mostly in line with the general results with regard to the group of contextual moderators that show consistent influences, specifically factors related to economic accentuation and system threat (see Table 4.63). In the context of economic accentuation, redistribution is expected to show a consistent positive influence on structural effects especially in lower structural groups as proposed based on the assumed *differential impact of redistribution* (H1a). This influence is visible in both types of models used for the analyses in this context. Split regression models show that the positive moderation effect of redistribution is consistent only in the lower half of the income distribution. Models using squared income show that the moderation effect of redistribution for linear income effects and the moderation for quadratic income effects are significant.

Perceived inequality is expected to show a positive influence especially for higher structural groups based on the hypothesis related to *differential inequality perception* (H1b). This assumption is supported by the evidence[306]. Split regression models show consistently significant positive moderation effects only for the upper half of the income distribution. Additionally, models using quadratic terms for income show positive effects for the quadratic measure, even though only in a consistent way for models using personal income. For models using household equivalence income, the moderation effect is only consistent for the linear term of income. Additionally highlighting the role played by economic accentuation, even though not explicitly included in the hypotheses, the influence of actual inequality follows similar patterns to redistribution for the models using personal income.

306 Controlling for interaction effects of income with individual-level inequality perception shows no significant moderation using an alpha level of 0.05,. Even though some significant positive effects are visible in models when using an alpha level of 0.10, this pattern is not consistent for all models. Cross-level interaction effects are not substantially affected by including this individual-level moderation (see Table A.11 in the appendix). I suspect that the inclusion of the individual-level main effect of perception is responsible for these results with regard to individual-level interactions, between inequality perception and structural position, since cross-level interaction effects between structural position and aggregate perceived inequality might be related to differences in individual-level inequality perception and its main effect without leading to significant individual-level interaction effects.

With regard to the expected influences of system threat, two contrasting hypotheses are formulated, specifically *fear of conflict* assuming negative effects for higher structural groups (H6a) and *system justification* postulating negative effects for lower structural groups (H6b). The results are not completely consistent between and partly within the two different types of analyses. Using split regression models with personal income leads to moderating influences on both effects within higher structural groups and between structural groups, but for household equivalence income, all three types of structural effects fail to consistently reach significance. The models using squared income terms result in consistent general linear moderation effects for both measures of income used. Even though the evidence is not completely consistent, it indicates that effects within lower structural groups are not decreased in contexts of higher system threat. Even though this does not relate to differences between higher and lower structural groups, it could be interpreted as evidence against *system justification* (H6a) and for *fear of conflict* (H6a). But the most consistent effects in this context are related to neither assumptions regarding fear of conflict (H6a) nor system justification (H6b), but instead to general differences between low and high parts of the income distribution. This is the case for both procedures used to differentiate between effects in different parts of the income distribution, specifically median-split income and using both linear and squared terms for income variables.

For the contextual factor prosperity and mobility chances, the investigation of assumptions related to the *differential influence of prosperity and mobility chances* depending on structural position (H2a) leads to inconsistent results between groups of models. The analyses using split regression show a significant negative influence for lower structural groups, but only when using personal income as an indicator of structural position. Even though not significant, in tendency there are positive effects for the difference between upper and lower groups and for structural effects within the upper income group. These, in tendency, counteracting effects would explain why there is no significant general moderation effect visible in the less differentiated analysis of overall effects. However, the models using household equivalence income do not show any moderating influence of prosperity and mobility chances on structural effects for any of the three types of structural effects tested in these models. Additionally, models using squared income terms do not show a consistent significant influence of prosperity. Since the hypothesis is only supported in one of the two types of analyses and only for personal income, assumptions related to differential effects of prosperity have to be considered falsified or, at the most, only weakly supported.

Tab. 4.64: List of hypotheses related to bridge assumptions, showing specific assumptions, expected effects and results

Hypothesis	Specific assumptions	Expected influence	Results
H8 Subjective economic motivation	Parallel main effects of objective and subjective position	+	+
	Effects of subjective positioning within objectively low structural group	+	+
H8a CLI of subjective position with prosperity, fractionalization	Cross-level interaction	-	0
H9 Hedonic motivation	Main effect	+	- / 0
	Moderation of structural effects	-	0
H9a Indirect influence of hedonic motivation	Reduction of cross-level interaction of poverty and structural position	-	0
H10 Normative motivation	Main effect	-	- (Left political orientation on individual level)
H10a Normative moderation of structural effects	Moderation of structural effects	-	- (Left political orientation on individual level)

Notes: + (-) indicates effects in line with a positive (negative) main influence on higher inequality tolerance and accentuation (attenuation) effects for contextual moderators.

As seen in previous groups of models, the general moderation effect of ethnic fractionalization is negative in the models that show a significant influence of fractionalization. This negative effect is, in tendency, in line with assumptions related to *political distraction* (H3b) and contrary to the idea of *differential losses* (H3a), even though only in terms of effect direction, ignoring specificity of effects as related to structural groups. At the same time, both forms of tests for nonlinear and group-specific effects do not show consistent significant positive or negative influences. Therefore, both hypotheses are falsified, but taken together with the evidence on general moderation effects, evidence on the potential influence of fractionalization is inconclusive.

Other contextual factors do not show consistent differential effects in split regression models and models using quadratic income terms, falsifying all respective hypotheses based on *differential power* (H4a), *differential information deficit* (H5a) and *saturation* (H7a). As is to be expected, the hypotheses related to differential moderation effects that are supported by the results are partly based on the more general main hypotheses that also receive support in the main analyses. Specifically, assumptions related to both *differential impact of redistribution* (H1a) and *differential inequality perception* (H1b) are clearly supported by the evidence. The results for *differential chances* (H2a) and *fear of conflict* (H6a) are not consistent between types of analyses and measures of income. Specifically, differential chances seem to be exclusively relevant for household equivalence income,

whereas fear of conflict seems to be relevant for personal income. The exclusive effect related to personal income is notable and might be explained by a possible direct influence of personal income on the evaluation of threats, independent of family and household constellations.

In sum, there is some evidence for differential effects related to CLIs between different parts of the income distribution and contextual factors, but the evidence presented in this thesis using two distinct procedures is not completely consistent. Only for the effect of redistribution, the results show a consistent differential influence in line with theoretical assumptions both related to the accentuation of economic interests (H1) and differential effects of redistribution (H1b). However, since both procedures applied are related to very different methodological implications, some of the differences found here might be reconcilable with more differentiated analyses on the topic.

4.6.2.3 Hypotheses based on bridge assumptions related to mechanisms

Turning to the hypotheses related to bridge assumptions and the three individual-level motivational pathways of the theoretical model proposed, results only partly support the model (see Table 4.64). Models investigating the influence of *subjective economic motivation* (H8) with parallel main effects as well as effects of subjective positioning within objective groups show that the influence of subjective aspects is consistently positive as a main effect at least partly parallel to objective position. This is specifically visible for lower structural groups in the models estimating effects of subjective positioning within objectively low structural groups. The results for both types of models are completely in line with expectations based on all indicators tested. With regard to CLIs, different patterns contrasting with those for objective position are not visible in the data. Even though there is some limited evidence for differential effects in this context, CLIs mostly are in line with those found for objective structural position, falsifying assumptions postulating *differential moderating influences (*H8a). More precisely, moderation effects related to economic accentuation (H1) seem to affect both objective and subjective aspects of structural position. Redistribution specifically moderates effects of both objective and subjective measures, whereas actual inequality mostly interacts with objective measures of structural position and perceived inequality mostly affects the influence of subjective measures, if significant as a moderator at all. The moderating effects of system threat related to SJT (H6) do not reach significance in most models, but when significant, these effects are visible for objective measures. Other moderation effects are not significant or not consistent in these models.

These results indicate that main effects of subjective aspects of position are in line with expectations related to an at least partly parallel and potentially biasing influence when not controlled for. Additionally, the indirect test for the influence of secondary norms based on objective structural interests as indicated by class position does not support the assumptions related to specific moderation effects. Mobilization and aggregate normative influences do not seem to affect class-based structural effects at all. This obviously does not rule out effects of secondary norms, but the conceptualization of specific moderation effects is not supported.

Models using consistent and inconsistent combinations of objective and subjective measures of structural position additionally support assumptions related to parallel effects of objective and subjective measures of structural position (H8) in contrast to ideas related to specific interactions (H8a). The significant effects for subjective position within the objectively lower structural group indicate that subjective evaluations might indeed interfere with objective interests in line with assumptions related to biasing effects of subjective evaluation[307]. Most CLIs are not completely consistent between the models using different indicators and are mostly similar across the different groups combining objective and subjective measures of structural position, with some exceptions. In tendency, effects of economic accentuation (H1) seem to be mostly relevant for differences between the consistent lower group and the objectively higher groups, whereas effects related to redistribution are also visible in most models for differences of the consistent lower group versus the intermediary structural group. Assumptions related to system threat (H6) are supported for all groups in most of the models using income-based measurement, but not for any group in the models using measures of socio-economic status and prestige. In tendency, fractionalization seems to be associated with positive or zero moderation effects for the influence of subjective differences within objectively lower structural groups and with zero or negative effects on objective structural influences. In sum, results are highly inconsistent apart from the main effects of differences between the consistent lower group versus all other groups in most models. The results support the view that effects of objective and structural position are closely related to each other in terms of moderating influences, in contrast to assumptions related to differential interactions (H8a), although the results for fractionalization indicate

307 At the same time, the only main effects related to structural position that are not significant in these models are those between consistent lower and consistent higher structural position in most models using class-based measures, which cannot be explained by biased perceptions of structural position. Other factors, possibly related to specific attitudes, norms or economic considerations in the service class, seem to be relevant in this context.

that there might be complex interactions that lead to zero effects in most other analyses that rely on single measures of structural position, but the evidence is inconclusive.

With regard to the postulated *hedonic motive*, all hypotheses based on the model proposed (H9 and H9a) are falsified by the analyses. The indicators of hedonistic motivation used are not related to higher inequality tolerance in a positive way, but instead insignificant or act even as a negative influence in terms of main effects. These negative main effects are in clear contrast to the assumption that high hedonic motivation increases inequality tolerance in tendency, based on anchoring effects and the idea that minimal cognitive processing is necessary for inequality affirmation. Additionally, the insignificant interaction between structural position and hedonic motivation falsifies assumptions related to the moderating negative influence of hedonic motivation on structural effects (H9). If at all, hedonic motivation seems to affect inequality tolerance as a parallel, not interrelated influence. Additionally, the negative, even though not always significant, main effect of hedonic motivation is reduced in contexts of comparatively high system threat.

These results contrasts with the view that increased system threat results in increased system justification, in turn increasing levels of hedonic motivation and finally reducing structural effects. In sum, all results related to hedonic motivation indicate that either the indicator used or the theoretical construct in question are following completely different patterns in contrast to all assumptions used and specified in the theoretical model. Since cross-level threeway interactions related to structural position, hedonic motivation and contextual factors are not consistent across indicators of structural position and inequality tolerance and also not significant in most models for any contextual factor, assumptions regarding influences of hedonic motivation on the moderation of structural effects are also not supported (H9a). Twoway CLIs between hedonic motivation and contextual factors are consistent and negative for actual inequality and consistent and positive for system threat. Therefore, high actual inequality accentuates and high system threat attenuates the, in tendency, negative main effect of hedonic motivation, as is the case for the relation between these contextual factors and structural position. Even though not postulated in the theoretical model, this effect is noteworthy, since the theoretical pathways explicitly link system threat to hedonic motivation in the context of structural effects. Taken together, even though there is some limited evidence for influences of hedonic motivation and system threat in line with SJT, the results falsify all specific hypotheses related to both

the influence of hedonic motivation and the interplay between hedonic motivation and structural effects in the determination of inequality tolerance.

In the context of *normative influences*, assumptions related to both the main effect (H10) and the moderating influence of norm-related factors (H10a) are only partly supported, dependent on the specific indicator or normative dimension used. Both main and interaction effects with structural position are consistent on individual level for left-wing orientation, but not for religiosity. Introducing additional normative controls on contextual level does not lead to substantial changes. Therefore, the individual-level mechanisms of decreased effects of structural position for individuals reporting left-wing orientation, implying internalized norms related to equality, is evident. At the same time, as is visible in the main analyses, the influence of normative aspects on country level is not consistent across the various indicators used in the analyses of this study, and not even consistent for different models using the same indicator of normative constructs.

In sum, assumptions related to main effects of individual-level *subjective economic motivation* (H8) are completely supported by the evidence, whereas ideas related to specific different *CLIs of subjective structural position* (H8a) are falsified. Hypotheses based on *hedonic motivation* (H9 and H9a) are thoroughly falsified by the analyses conducted. Assumptions based on *individual-level normative motivation* (H10 and H10a) are supported for left-wing orientation, but not for religiosity.

5 Discussion and conclusion

To recapitulate this thesis, I begin with the general research question if contextual influences moderate structurally determined self-interests as evident in the effects of income and other measures of structural position on attitudes towards inequality. In terms of theoretical explanation, a broad general model is used to integrate various theoretical ideas presented in the literature reviewed for this thesis. Based on the statistical analyses conducted in the empirical section of this thesis, the general research question can be answered in the affirmative. Even though a number of issues with regard to specific contextual influences of relevance are not completely resolved, the various analyses undertaken show some clear consistencies of results, as is demonstrated in the previous chapters.

More precisely, starting with a set of middle-range theories postulating a contextual moderation of structural effects on inequality tolerance, this study proposes[308] an integrative and complementary view of potential moderators, providing an integrative general theoretical model based on reasoning related to the SEU framework and cognitive rationality (Yee, 1997; Savage, 1954), GFT (Lindenberg, 2008) and the MFS (Kroneberg, 2010; 2007; 2005). The general model consists of three motivational pathways affecting attitudes in general and inequality tolerance in particular, economic self-interest, hedonic motives and normative motives closely related to the goal frames in GFT and the cognitive frames in the MFS. The difference of the model proposed, even though not necessarily in contrast to some readings of GFT, is that all motives are treated as strictly parallel, non-exclusive factors. In contrast to the MFS, I do not assume that there is a specific and cognitively identifiable first step of frame selection, but instead assume that rational considerations are a general mechanism in line with subjective utility theory, including the utility considerations related to economic factors as well as considerations related to hedonic and normative factors. At the same time, the importance or salience of specific factors is affected by both contextual as well as individual aspects in specific circumstances, such as objective economic circumstances, the level of norm internalization and the perception of objective economic interests. These factors affect the influence and salience of specific factors and of the three motivational groups, potentially resulting in effects in line with assumptions based on the MFS, with strong norm internalization resulting in a dampening of effects of objective

308 As noted in the theoretical section, the proposed model is not an elaborate theory or a formalized mathematical model, but instead a consistent but framework open for the incorporation of specific assumptions and middle-range theories related to the moderation of structural effects.

economic considerations. This model allows for the integration of various and in principle even of counteracting motives.

Based on this general model, I integrate middle-range theories assuming influences of contextual moderators on structural effects on inequality-related attitudes by proposing specific and unambiguous ways in which specific contextual factors are related to the salience and effects of specific motivational groups. This procedure results in a list of general or main hypotheses postulating forms of cross-level moderation for structural effects. Since some middle-range theories are focused on effects specific to particular structural groups, I also generate hypotheses for potential differential and nonlinear effects of structural position as related to specific structural groups. To investigate if the general model proposed is in line with the evidence on individual level, I additionally test bridge assumptions for all three motivational groups on individual level. All hypotheses generated are tested based on a comparative multi-indicator analysis of multilevel data using the ISSP for individual-level data as well as for aggregated indicators and additional data sources for most indicators on country-level. Even though the analyses conducted are extensive and the results are not completely consistent between the various groups of models used, some clear trends in the results are evident as outlined in the previous chapter.

Specifically, redistribution is related to significant moderation effects for nearly all indicators used for the various theoretical constructs with regard to both dependent and independent variables, whereas the three context-level factors actual inequality, perceived inequality and system threat, as indicated by measures of poverty, are related to nearly consistent moderation effects for subsets of indicators of structural position. Other economic, political and cultural factors tested show mostly inconsistent or insignificant results. The results imply that only a small set of hypotheses and only a part of the integrative model used is supported by the evidence. At the same time, the respective effects, specifically the moderating influences of actual inequality, redistribution, system threat and perceived inequality are also nearly consistent in all models using restricted samples based on regression diagnostics and the moderating influences of redistribution, system threat and perceived inequality are completely consistent when using the main income-related indicators of structural position in the models based on a reduced set of context-level factors that only includes the variables associated with clear trends of significant effects in preceding analyses.

In the following, I investigate broader substantive interpretations as well as theoretical, methodical and political implications of the results and give an overview of contributions and limitations of this thesis. First, I evaluate the general theoretical model proposed in this thesis and the related bridge assumptions tested. Second, I discuss the results as related to the middle-range theories in the context of moderating influences on structural effects, i.e. cross-level interactions. Third, I turn to theoretical implications of the results presented in the empirical sections of this thesis. Fourth, I focus on methodical implications based on the various comparative results for the use of alternative indicators and model configurations. Fifth, I discuss general contributions of the thesis to the various areas of research reviewed in the theoretical section. Sixth, I briefly outline potential political implications of this thesis. Seventh, I explain limitations of the thesis in theoretical and methodical terms and examine how future research can progress to further investigate the topic of moderation of structural effects on inequality-related attitudes based on the contributions and limitations of this thesis.

5.1 Evaluation of the integrative model proposed

Taking the results for main proposed moderation effects together, only a small part of the general hypotheses based on the original model are not falsified by the analyses. Hypotheses related to prosperity and mobility chances, ethnic fractionalization, system distrust and aggregate inequality acceptance are all falsified by a strict reading of the analyses. But two hypotheses are supported nearly consistently. First, general assumptions related to economic accentuation, proposing stronger structural effects in contexts of higher inequality and higher redistribution (due to higher economic stakes with regard to inequality and inequality reduction), are supported nearly consistently. Second, the general assumption for system threat (based on the combination of two ideas, i.e. fear of conflict in higher structural positions and system justification in lower structural position), proposing weaker structural effects in context of higher system threat as indicated by measures such as poverty, crime and perceived conflict, receive partial support. These results for system threat are strongly affected by countries in the Global South. At the same time, the effects are significant for different levels of system threat as indicated by poverty within this group of countries.

With regard to nonlinear structural effects, the nearly consistent moderation effects found for context factors related to economic accentuation and system threat are not completely restricted to

specific structural groups across all tests conducted, but there are some tendencies for effects in line with group-specific hypotheses for both economic accentuation and system threat. More specifically, assumptions related to the differential impact of redistribution are consistently supported, whereas hypotheses related to the differential perception of inequality and the impact of system threat related to fear of conflict and system justification receive weaker and inconsistent support. Results are partly more in line with general moderation effects proposed without group-specific assumptions. All other hypotheses related to general and group-specific moderation effects have to be regarded as falsified based on the analyses conducted using strict rules of consistency to evaluate results of models.

Since all effects related to assumptions based on hedonic motivation are falsified and assumptions related to normative aspects are supported only for individual-level moderation, the results indicate that hedonic motivation plays no obvious role for the structural polarization of inequality tolerance, whereas the influence of normative factors is in line with assumptions only for individual-level moderation effects, supporting the integrative model in terms of individual-level processes assumed. The result that cross-level moderators related to normative aspects do not affect structural effects as tested in the analyses presented in this study indicates that the normative aspects included on contextual level are too weak to be measured and less important for the polarization of inequality tolerance as compared to the respective individual-level effects. An alternative explanation is the possibility that these contextual influences are dependent on other factors such as threeway interactions or additional normative dimensions not included in the analyses presented in this study.

For all main effects proposed with regard to objective and subjective self-interests, effects are consistently in line with basic assumptions for structural effects, i.e. higher inequality tolerance in higher objective and subjective structural positions. In theoretical terms, this lends strong support to the structural position thesis (see for instance Hadler, 2005; Mau 1997) in general and related theoretical ideas such as the minimization of cognitive dissonance by keeping objective self-interests and attitudes consistent (compare Hadjar, 2008, 75f.). Additionally, it supports ideas of distorted interest evaluation related to relative deprivation and cognitive bias in the perception of structural position and objective economic interests.

In sum, the integrative theoretical model used in this study proposes three distinct groups of motivational factors relevant for decision-making processes, moderated by contextual and individual-level factors, resulting in the attitudes reported to interviewers in surveys. With regard to the three

main groups of motives proposed, results are only partly in line with the assumptions based on the theoretical model. Factors related to economic self-interest work in line with assumptions with regard to main effects and the potential bias of subjective evaluations of structural position. Whereas factors related to hedonic motivation seemingly have no consistent main or moderating influence, factors related to normative motivation show consistent negative influences on structural effects on individual-level, but not on contextual level in the form of CLIs. While the simple conceptualization of hedonic influences as enforcing status-quo bias and decreasing influences of structural effects is not supported at all, the conceptualization of normative influences has to be questioned specifically with regard to the contextual factors analyzed in this thesis. In general, the framing models (Kroneberg, 2010; Lindenberg, 2008) that are modified to generate a foundation to integrate various middle-range theories are focused on individual-level effects. Therefore, the utilization of the model for contextual moderation of individual-level effects can be seen as problematic in a theoretical sense, since contextual influences do not necessarily translate to individual-level effects.

The specific influences proposed for the three motive groups that are used to connect contextual factors to moderation effects, i.e. economic versus hedonic versus normative motives, are not completely supported by the results of the empirical analyses. Taking all consistent cross-level moderation effects influencing structural effects together, individual inequality tolerance correlates with various hierarchical measures of structural position. This relationship is affected by contextual factors shaping economic conditions, but specifically by perceived inequality and redistribution, less consistently by actual inequality and poverty. Economic influences are evident for main and some moderation effects, but hedonic influences are not visible as conceptualized with regard to both contextual moderation and individual-level effects and normative influences are only visible for main and moderation effects on individual level. Therefore, with regard to the cross-level moderation of structural effects, only factors theoretically related to influences on individual self-interest seem to be relevant and only consistently with regard to ideas based on economic accentuation and fear of conflict. Basic economic considerations seem to be dominant and relevant in terms to moderation effects affecting the influence of structural position on inequality tolerance. In sum, the integrated theoretical model receives only limited support and while the conceptualization of economic and normative motives is in line with the results, specifically the integration of hedonic influences and the selection of aggregate normative influences is not compelling.

Fig. 5.1: Cross-level moderation of structural effects on inequality tolerance, consistent effects



Notes: Inequality refers to both actual and aggregate perceived inequality in this figure. Consistent effects are illustrated in black and inconsistent or consistently insignificant effects in light grey.

5.2 The moderation of structural effects

With regard to the middle-range hypotheses related to the moderation of structural effects that are supported in the results, the consistency of the results for various alternative indicators and models for some constructs on context level is remarkable. This is specifically the case for redistribution, perceived inequality and system threat (see Figure 5.1). Therefore, I assume that the results presented in this thesis are valuable for the understanding of structural polarization in attitudes towards inequality and do not result from mere coincidences.

As the contextual factor most commonly used in the literature reviewed for this thesis for the explanation of attitudes towards inequality, actual inequality is associated with only partial evidence for moderation effects in the analyses of this thesis. While actual inequality shows clear tendencies of increasing polarization between structural positions, these results are only close to consistency for two groups of models. First, models using alternative measures of actual inequality based on income shares show a clear tendency of significant interaction effects between inequality and structural position in line with expectations. Second, models using indicators of structural position based on personal income and a limited set of measures of actual inequality, including the main indicator based on the Gini index, usually result in significant moderation effects. But the reduced model limited to significant moderating influences shows that aggregate perceived inequality is a more consistent influence even for the effect of personal income. Additionally, for nonlinear effects in line with ideas such as ideal inequality levels (compare Varshavsky, 2010) and for interactions of inequality with poverty (compare Rambotti, 2015), no significant effects are visible based on the analyses conducted for this thesis. The effects of actual inequality and the more consistent effects found for redistribution and perceived inequality are all related to economic motives in the general theoretical model,

supporting ideas of the increased accentuation of economic interests related to inequality in contexts of higher perceived inequality and higher redistribution. Assumptions based on the potentially higher impact of redistribution for lower structural groups in terms of relative costs of living and the differential perception of inequality in different structural groups due to information deficits are both supported in tendency as evident in a majority of models testing group-specific effects based on two different approaches[309]. The effects of redistribution seems to be completely consistent, with both fixed and random country-level effects showing positive influences on structural position. With regard to the indicator-specific differences found for perceived versus actual inequality, with perceived inequality increasing polarization in household income, whereas objective inequality increases polarization in personal income, results are nearly consistent for perceived inequality, but less consistent for actual inequality, with tests of moderation effects not reaching significance for most indicators of structural position apart from measures based on personal income in most models. However, the direction of effects is consistently in line with expectations and most models show significant moderating influences of either actual or perceived inequality. When reducing the statistical model to context-level influences that prove to be consistent influences, the interaction between aggregate perceived inequality and structural position is significant even for models using measures for structural position based on personal income (see Chapter 4.4.6).

For system threat as another consistently relevant factor, effects are significant in a large majority of models in line with the assumption that high levels of system threat decrease structural effects. But this does not include the moderation of structural influences by fixed effects on country-level and the moderation of structural effects as indicated by objective class. On the one hand, effects in models using within- and between-effects for two broad income groups, in tendency, are partly evident within the higher structural group and between groups, but not within the lower structural group. On the other hand, models using squared income terms contrast with this result by showing that structural effects are getting weaker with higher individual income and predictions of legitimate

309 More precisely, the results for tests using squared income terms (see Chapter 4.3.2) do not only lead to substantially similar results as compared to the models based on within- and between-effects for two broad income groups (see Chapter 4.3.1), but also resemble the results for predicted legitimate income ratios based on ideal-type combinations of structural position and context-level factors (see Chapter 4.4.5). This congruence of results is especially notable since for other factors, these results are inconsistent. These inconsistencies can potentially be explained by the different character of the test conducted (compare Chapter 5.7).

Fig. 5.2: Cross-level moderation of structural effects on inequality tolerance, including tendencies



Notes: Inequality refers to both actual and aggregate perceived inequality in this figure. Consistent effects are illustrated in black, tendencies in dark grey and inconsistent or consistently insignificant effects in light grey.

income ratios based on marginal effects indicate that context-level effects are most pronounced in lower structural positions. Therefore, assumptions related to both fear of conflict in higher structural positions and system justification in lower structural positions are not consistently supported.

As the results reported here are based on consistent effects across different groups of models involving various alternative indicators for all relevant independent constructs, and estimations include both fixed and random effects on country level as well as additional changes in model configurations, the interpretation of results can be considered to be extremely careful or conservative. This especially seems to be a plausible assumption in light of some additionally consistent effects in certain groups of models and findings related to the consistency of effect directions when counting effects that do not reach statistical significance. The picture changes substantially when taking all evidence from different groups of analyses together in a less exclusionary way by counting effect tendencies when single groups of models show consistent influences and when effects are consistent in terms of effect direction if significant, even when other groups do not lead to the same conclusions (see Figure 5.2), specifically for ethnic and social fractionalization and for mobilization and information.

With regard to the expected positive influence of ethnic and social fractionalization based on assumptions related to reduced fear of downward mobility in higher structural positions, the effect depends on model groups. It is, in tendency, negative with regard to effect direction, in contrast to some expectations, but not consistent across and within most groups of models. Specifically, the moderation effect is only consistently negative in all main models using personal income as indicator of structural position, but not in any other group of models. Additionally, not many single models using alternative indicators show significant moderating influences of fractionalization. Since most

significant effects of fractionalization found are negative and no effects are evident in the analyses for specific structural groups, assumptions related to reduced fear of downward mobility in higher structural groups (H3a) are also thoroughly falsified in the analyses presented in this study. The negative effect found is in principle in line with theoretical assumptions based on ideas of political distraction (H3b), but the evidence for it is inconsistent, inconclusive and not compelling overall.

In the context of mobilization and information, the caveats of using broad groupings of conceptually different aspects related to political mobilization versus information are evident. Whereas most models do not show significant influences on structural effects, all significant moderation effects found for union membership as the main indicator of mobilization are negative, whereas effects for the alternative information-focused measure press freedom are consistently significant and positive. This might indicate two separate but relevant dimensions of the combined construct used as mobilization and information that are, at least in tendency for the mobilization-based measure, working in contrasting and seemingly counteracting ways. While other information- or mobilization-related alternative indicators do not show consistent effects, the positive evidence for the influence of press freedom is consistent in the tests conducted for alternative indicators and in line with expectations based on assumptions related to information deficits.

For prosperity and mobility chances, results still are inconsistent between groups of models and show consistent significant influences only in two groups of models, with opposite effect direction. A positive moderation of structural influences by the country-level fixed effect of prosperity is evident for household equivalence income in contrast to expectations. At the same time, there are negative effects of prosperity on structural influences in lower structural groups using split-regression models. This might be explained by highly nonlinear and group-specific effects or potential important threeway interactions not included in the model and controlled for empirically. It is also possible that different group-specific effects, such as fixed versus random effects or effects within lower groups versus effects within higher groups versus effects between groups, are partly counteracting to each other, resulting in zero effects in most general models. In terms of theoretical implications, the evidence is inconclusive, but assumptions specifically related to differential impact of prosperity as related to lower structural groups (H2a) are not conclusively falsified by the evidence.

5.3 Theoretical implications

The empirical results of the analyses conducted in this study specifically support a small set of theoretical assumptions in a very consistent way. These assumptions are related to biased and moderated economic self-interest as a part of the integrative model proposed. As reported above, this includes main effects of objective and subjective indicators of structural position, main and individual-level moderation effects of normative influences and contextual moderation effects related to economic accentuation and system threat (as indicated by poverty). Other tests for contextual factors and all expected individual-level effects related to hedonic motives fail to reach significance consistently. This indicates that the respective theoretical assumptions are either not adequately operationalized or problematic assumptions, at least in the way they are conceptualized in the integrated model. The falsification of assumptions casts doubt specifically on the relevance of moderation-specific ideas related to perceived upward mobility chances, perceived downward mobility chances, distrust in politics and inequality-promoting norms. Evidence for political distraction, system justification (and status anxiety resulting in similar expectations), mobilization and information is inconclusive. In the following, I discuss the various theoretical implications of the consistent results found in more detail.

First, various indicators of objective position used show consistent positive effects on inequality tolerance in line with expectations based on the structural position thesis (see for instance Hadler, 2005; Mau 1997). This includes all 12 indicators based on income measures, all three indicators based on objective socio-economic status and prestige and both indicators based on objective class. These results for main effects lend clear support to the structural position thesis. In terms of the theoretical model proposed, structural effects are at least partly driven by rational economic motives related to current structural position.

Second, subjective evaluations of structural position affect inequality tolerance in ways very similar to objective position even within objective structural groups in line with reasoning related to the biased perception of structural position and relative deprivation. This is evident for the measure of subjective top-bottom ranking[310] and the measure of subjective class used. The tests using categories of

310 As has been noted in the results section, for subjective top-bottom ranking, there are different effects found in the ISSP waves before 2009. In these waves, effects are partly in contrast to assumptions and also not correlated with any of the other objective or subjective measures of structural position used. Since effects for the 2009 wave are consistent across country years for 2009, it seems plausible to assume that there are measurement errors in the waves before 2009 for the variable measuring subjective top-bottom ranking in the ISSP data. A different possible explanation would be

consistent and inconsistent combinations of subjective versus objective structural position show that there are no differences in inequality tolerance between individuals in consistent lower versus consistent higher structural positions, but significant differences in line with expectations when comparing individuals in lower structural positions with those in objectively higher structural positions who show an inconsistent evaluation of subjective position[311]. This is only the case for class-based measures, whereas the combined measures based on income and subjective top-bottom ranking show significant differences between lower structural groups with consistent evaluations of their position and higher structural groups regardless of the consistency of their evaluation. Substantially, this difference might be explained by the definition of structurally higher classes in the class categorizations used. These allow for hierarchical ranking between some groups of classes, but are not intended as strictly hierarchical categorizations for all differences between categories. Both categorizations used are based on the definition of a professional service class as the highest class, based on differences between types of employment relations, resulting in a broad group of individuals in higher structural positions. This stands in obvious contrast to traditional Marxist categorizations, which would result in a much smaller group of individuals defined by ownership of the means of production, but in turn are harder to measure in surveys because of the low proportion of respective individuals in societies and the lower propensity to participate in surveys which can be assumed for higher structural position.

Third, the most consistent evidence in terms of cross-level moderation of structural effects including tests across multiple model configurations and alternative indicators used is visible for the influence of the various dimensions and indicators related to the basic accentuation of economic

substantial changes in the relation between objective and subjective structural position taking place in all countries surveyed in multiple waves in 10 to 20 years, resulting in zero effects or negative effects of subjective top-bottom ranking in years before 2009 and positive effects in later years, but this could be seen as the more problematic assumption since other effects, including those of subjective class position, stay consistent in tendency between waves.

311 In other words, it is notable that an inconsistent subjective evaluation of structural position in high structural positions seems to correlate with significantly higher inequality tolerance as compared to consistent low structural positions, whereas the group exhibiting a consistent evaluation in structurally high position does not show significant differences to individuals in consistent low structural positions. This would seem to indicate that subjective positioning is the more influential determining factor for differences in inequality tolerance, but since all other analyses do not lead to this conclusion, it seems more plausible to assume that the specificity of the class-based measures used is decisive for this specific result and it is not to be interpreted as a substantial result for the effects of structural position as a hierarchical concept in general. It has to be kept in mind at this point that class-based measures are only included in this study to provide a comparative overview across multiple groups of potential alternative indicators of structural position in addition of the 12 income-based indicators used.

interests by variation in contextual determinants of self-interested considerations. Specifically, high levels of actual (when using personal income in combination with inequality measures taken from the SWIID) and mean aggregate perceived inequality (when using household equivalence income and most other indicators of structural position apart from personal income) as well as redistribution tend to accentuate polarization in attitudes and increase structural effects. Results nearly consistently support the accentuation of economic interests in contexts of high (perceived) inequality and redistribution (H1). Therefore, ideas of basic economic interest accentuation in line with the general integrative model proposed, but also in line with a narrow reading of the SEU framework or rational choice approaches focused on factors related to self-interest and even to economic calculations in a narrow sense, are supported by this evidence. This again illustrates the important role played by economic interests in the determination of inequality tolerance. Especially the evidence with regard to the influence of economic accentuation in contexts of high redistribution is completely consistent and includes both random and fixed effects on country-level as well as effects within and between lower and higher structural groups. Even though this study took an approach focused on single indicators related to theoretical concepts instead of broad categorizations such as welfare state regimes, the results for redistribution shed new light on the ongoing discussion of welfare state regimes. With regard to redistribution, the evidence for a positive moderation of structural effects on inequality tolerance is nearly consistent across all model configurations and alternative tests. This result is especially interesting in light of the comparatively high polarization found in some studies for social-democratic regimes[312], which are characterized by high redistribution levels (see for instance Sachweh, 2016, 301ff.), in contrast to conservative and especially to liberal welfare state regimes.

Fourth, the evidence for moderating influences of system threat, even though not encompassing country-level fixed effects and effects of structural position as indicated by objective class[313], is mostly in line with a general polarization between lower and higher income groups. Results

312 For instance, Svallfors (2004) shows that class differences with regard to the support of welfare-related government intervention are particularly large in the social-democratic welfare state Sweden as compared to countries classified as other welfare state regimes and Jaeger (2009) reports the highest variance in support for redistribution for social-democratic regimes.

313 It is also notable that in the additional models using both objective and subjective indicators of structural position, moderation effects of system threat, in contrast to moderation effects related to economic accentuation, are exclusively significant in models using measures based on personal income as indicators of structural position, not in the models using indicators based on socio-economic status and prestige. In the models not using personal income, moderation effects related to system threat are not even close to reaching significance in this context.

with regard to the differences between lower and higher structural positions are inconclusive. The predicted values for ideal-type combinations of structural position and context-level factors based on marginal effects indicate that all moderation effects are mostly affecting lower structural groups, while estimated legitimate income ratios in higher structural groups do not vary strongly in dependency of context-level factors. In contrast to these results based on marginal effects, the evidence of the models including quadratic income terms and the models differentiating between effects in the lower and upper halves of the income distribution did not clearly and consistently support one of the group-specific assumptions. On the one hand, some results based on the estimation of effects between and within two broad income groups indicate an influence of fear of conflicts or altruism (compare for instance Rueda & Stegmueller, 2016; 2014; Alesina & Rodrik, 1994) in higher structural positions, both ideas leading to expectations of effects for higher structural position[314]. On the other hand, results of models using a squared income term in addition to a linear term are more in line with expectations based on ideas of system justification (see for instance Jost et al., 2003) in lower structural positions. Additionally, analyses with the reduced model (see Chapter 4.4.4) show that when limiting the number of context-level factors considered, main effects of system threat emerge as significant. These effects are positive, increasing inequality tolerance in contexts of higher system threat for lower positions and therefore more in line with assumptions based on SJT (H6a) in contrast to fear of conflict (H6b).

Taken together, the results for system threat are not completely consistent and only the general polarization between lower and higher structural positions in contexts of high system threat, specifically as indicated by measures of poverty and especially for income-based measures of structural position, is a result consistently seen throughout the empirical sections of this thesis. The fact that only effects for poverty are evident among indicators of system threat might fit better with the idea of influences of altruistic considerations, since other indirect and direct measures of perceived system threat in general are not necessarily expected to affect altruistic considerations in a way similar to poverty. Additionally, qualitative research indicates that extreme poverty and extreme wealth are a

314 Ideas related to differential altruism in different structural positions, which got some empirical support in the literature (see Dimick, Rueda & Stegmueller, 2016; compare Rueda & Stegmueller, 2019a, 135–141; 2019b), lead to the expectation of stronger effects of poverty on attitudes in higher structural positions due to normative considerations. This can be understood as an alternative explanation to the influence of fear of conflicts in the context of this thesis, generally leading to similar expectations with regard to moderating influences of poverty as an indicator of system threat. As seen in the results in previous chapters, the analyses used in this thesis do not clearly support any of the three theoretical ideas in this context.

common focus of inequality-related perceptions of injustice (Sachweh, 2012). Even though indicators of inequality comparatively sensitive to the tails of the income distribution such as ratio-based and absolute measures are not associated with consistent significant effects in the analyses of this thesis, the consistent moderating effect of poverty could be interpreted on this basis. Alternatively, in contrast to being an indicator of system threat, poverty in this context might be conceptualized by a focus on upstream influences, specifically political measures related to welfare that also result in higher redistribution[315].

Fifth, moderation effects for subjective indicators of structural position are, similarly to main effects of subjective position, in line with expectations for objective indicators of structural position in terms of effect direction, but only consistently significant for economic accentuation. Therefore, on individual level, general assumptions related to the biased perception of inequality and individual structural position based on cognitive bias, differential information deficits and relative deprivation (compare for instance Pedersen & Mutz, 2019; Kim et al., 2018; Franko, 2017; Yanai, 2017; Trump, 2013; Schneider, 2012, 434; Cruces, Perez-Truglia & Tetaz, 2011; Osberg & Smeeding, 2006; Gijsberts, 2002) are also supported by the evidence for moderation effects. The theoretical differentiation between moderation effects related to system improvement versus position improvement is not visible in the evidence with regard to the expected specific cross-level moderation effects related to subjective position in contrast to objective position. Additional assumptions related to specific moderation effects on individual mobility expectations as implied in the general integrated model[316], using subjective position as an indicator for self-interest with a focus on mobility expectations or mobility improvement, are therefore not supported. This again illustrates that indicators of subjective position work in similar ways to objective position and are a potentially biasing influence mostly by potential inconsistencies between the individual evaluation of position and actual position, but not by moderation processes particularly related to subjective evaluation.

315 Since poverty levels are particularly low in social-democratic welfare states (see for instance Sachweh, 2016, 303f.), this result could potentially also be explained by the influence of welfare politics. While poverty levels are also influenced by economic aspects that are not completely determined by government interventions such as prosperity, the respective indicators do not show consistent significant effects in the analysis of this thesis. Therefore, government intervention resulting in high levels of redistribution and low levels of poverty might increase structural polarization in attitudes towards inequality.

316 The general model specifically implies that moderation effects related to prosperity and mobility chances, fractionalization and inequality tolerance are at least partly based on the influence on motives related to individual position improvement, as the second self-interest motive of relevance besides system improvement. For all three moderating influences, the results show no consistent cross-level interaction effects with the subjective indicators used.

Sixth, the integrative model clearly fails to be supported by any test related to the influence of hedonic motives. This includes main effects of hedonic motivation as indicated by satisficing behavior, individual-level interaction effects of hedonic motivation and structural position, and threeway cross-level moderation effects between hedonic motivation, structural position and contextual factors. Hedonic motivation as operationalized in this study seems to work in contrast to theoretical assumptions in all regards. These results indicate that either the theoretical integration and conceptualization of hedonic motivation is problematic, or that the operationalization of the construct, relying on a crude measure of satisficing behavior, is inadequate.

With regard to theoretical aspects, the conceptualization of hedonic motivation in terms of specifically expected levels of inequality in the form of simple cognitive heuristics seems to be the most likely factor that is integrated in a substantially problematic way. The general assumption is that high hedonic motivation results in a higher probability to use perceived occupational incomes given as cognitive anchors for legitimate occupational incomes, resulting in higher inequality tolerance proportional to the level of hedonic motivation. This does not necessarily have to be the case, when other cognitively accessible heuristics exist[317]. For instance, an equalization of inequalities, for instance by using more equalized estimates might be an alternative. It is not implausible to assume that this would result in individuals reporting substantially lower legitimate values in contrast to perceived values if a cognitively more sophisticated processing would also include expected negative effects that are salient and directly result in negative emotions or fear. This interpretation is speculative but roughly in line with findings in previous analyses that mean legitimate levels are regularly lower than mean perceived levels, which is usually the case when comparing countries (see for instance Osberg & Smeeding, 2006, 461; Gijsberts, 2002, 275). In the data analyzed for this thessis, only about nine percent of individuals overall favor legitimate occupational income ratios higher than or equal to perceived ratios. A broad general tendency in favor of inequality reduction might be related to influences in the sense of relevant heuristics, especially for individuals with high hedonic motivation.

317 As discussed in the theoretical section, high inequality tolerance is expected to result in cognitive dissonance specifically for lower structural positions. It is therefore plausible to assume that using a simple cognitive anchoring or "stauts quo" heuristic, even though not cognitively demanding in the form of computation, results in high levels of cognitive dissonance and is therefore not necessarily the most attractive heuristic in situations of high hedonic motivation. This implies a differential effect of hedonic motivation dependent on income level which is not evident in the results. But it is not impossible that additional differential effects specific to higher structural groups decrease inequality tolerance in higher structural groups, possibly resulting in a general negative effect of hedonic motivation.

The analyses using hedonic motivation also show that high inequality accentuates and system threat attenuates hedonic effects. This result is noteworthy since it mirrors the results for structural effects, even though it can not be easily explained by reference to similar theoretical assumptions. But if higher system threat increases the inequality tolerance of individuals with high hedonic motivation, it can be interpreted with reference to SJT if the additional bridge assumption is added that higher system threat does not necessarily increase hedonic motivation, but instead forms of system justification for individuals with higher hedonic motivation.

Seventh, normative influences on structural effects are evident on individual level, but not for the cross-level moderation of structural effects. Since the conceptualization of normative influences is very broad in the theoretical model and the various indicators used are not conceptually related to each other, this problematic operationalization of normative factors is a plausible explanation for the lack of consistent effects found for CLIs. But it has to be kept in mind that effects of some of these factors on individual level are highly consistent and in line with expectations. For the moderating influence of normative factors on country level, there is only very limited configuration-specific evidence[318]. Cross-level interaction effects including aggregate normative measures are specifically evident for alternative models using general rating-based measures mixing different dimensions of inequality perception and evaluation as dependent variables. For these models, aggregate-level inequality tolerance is the most consistent factor, increasing structural effects on individual-level inequality tolerance in contrast to theoretical assumptions. This result is not completely consistent even with regard to the limited number of models conducted using general rating-based measures of inequality tolerance. It is also not necessarily substantial, since it might stem from the fact that individual general evaluations and perceptions of inequality are not differentiated in these general rating-based measures, and both might be influenced by norms related to aggregate inequality tolerance.

The fact that even main effects of structural position and control variables that are associated with consistent effects throughout other models are not significant in these models casts doubt on these

318 Further attempts to differentiate between multiple dimensions of normative factors in this study also resulted in inconsistent and often insignificant effects, apart from models using alternative general rating-based indicators mixing perceptive and evaluative dimensions as dependent variables. This includes additional tests using alternative indicators such as collectivism and power distance and alternative data sources both on individual and country level such as the World Values Survey. Results for these tests are not explicitly reported in this study for reasons of brevity. It should be noted that especially evidence for moderating influences in line with assumptions of economic accentuation was prevalent in nearly all tests conducted.

results. Additionally, previous research has shown that general rating items are subject to bias by cultural differences related to question interpretation, a problem that is obviously not remedied by the fact that the measures in question mingle perceptive and evaluative dimensions. Therefore, systemic bias in the general rating-based items related to levels of inequality is a plausible assumption and might explain the seemingly positive influence of aggregate inequality tolerance on structural effects which is nearly exclusively found for the rating-based measures as dependent variables in a consistent way. With regard to moderation effects in models using the main indicators of inequality tolerance (based on occupational income estimates) as dependent variables, the insignificance of effects might be explained by different effects on estimates for lower versus higher structural positions. Specifically, the additional tests using justice gap measures (Jasso, 1999) show that, in tendency, structural effects on justice gaps in lower groups are increased, whereas structural effects on justice gaps in higher structural positions are decreased in contexts of higher aggregate inequality tolerance. These seemingly contrasting effects might add up to insignificant net-zero effects on measures combining estimates for lower versus higher structural position in single measures.

Eighth, the two groups of models using justice gaps for higher- and lower-income occupational groups as dependent variables indicate that effects of contextual factors might be specific to higher- versus lower-income occupational groups. The effects of economic accentuation as indicated by redistribution are affecting lower justice gaps whereas effects related to system threat affect higher justice gaps. Therefore, higher inequality seems to increase polarization in terms of the evaluation of the aggregate income of lower-income occupations, whereas higher poverty seems to decrease polarization in the evaluation of the aggregate income of higher-income occupations. Additionally, inequality tolerance seems to have differential effects depending on the income type used for the measurement of structural position and the specific justice gap in question. This might be one factor contributing to the inconsistent and mostly insignificant effects found for aggregate normative influences in general when using inequality tolerance as dependent variable.

5.4 Methodological implications

The broad comparative focus of the analyses conducted allows for some methodological conclusions to be drawn. With regard to the evaluation of the comparative approach itself, relying on the consistency of effects across multiple groups of models for hypothesis tests has proven to be useful for

the differentiation between effects that are exclusive to specific model configurations and effects that are nearly universal within the range of parameters and alternative indicators compared in the analyses. Specifically, for main effects of objective and subjective indicators of structural positions and for the cross-moderation of these effects by contextual factors related to economic accentuation and system threat, results are mostly consistent across groups of models apart from very specific configurations such as conceptually different dependent variables and combinations of CLIs for both objective and subjective indicators of position or for specific categories of combined measures. The effects for other contextual factors, specifically prosperity and fractionalization, are either completely inconsistent within and between the various groups of models tested, or consistent within specific groups of models, but inconsistent in other groups and between groups. Systematic differences in this regard might in some cases be explained by conceptual or substantial differences, but in other cases, analyses restricted to the respective groups of models might result in false-positive results for these tests. Therefore, the comparative approach using various alternative indicators and model configurations can be regarded as a relatively reliable approach with the only drawback being demands in the form of time and energy invested. A second potential disadvantage is that the interpretation of various consistent and inconsistent effects across various types of models does not necessarily have to result in trends as clear as in this study. But inconsistent results are an important result per se, indicating that effects are either too weak to be measured consistently or dependent on unknown additional biasing or moderating factors. I would still argue in these potential cases that the knowledge of inconsistencies is preferable to a potentially unfounded belief in general effects that are instead highly specific and change with varying model configurations and indicators used.

Whereas the approach of this study is very broad in scope in terms of comparative testing, in general, a more limited comparative approach might already prove useful. For instance, instead of using 12 measures based on income data and three measures for socio-economic status and prestige (see Chapter 3.3), a restricted set with one measure based on personal income, one based on household equivalence income and one based on one of the measures for socio-economic status and prestige would already substantially result in a pattern of consistent and inconsistent results very close to those reported for the full set of indicators used in this study. In most cases, effects found are either highly consistent across all groups of models or highly inconsistent (and in these cases often close to zero effects), so that a limited set of alternative models already leads to the same conclusions as the full set

of models[319]. Generally, the comparative approach using alternative indicators for all dimensions has proven valuable with clear advantages in terms of identifying reliable results with regard to consistent effects versus inconsistent effects and effects depending on specific indicators or model configurations.

With regard to more specific methodological implications, whereas most models are roughly in line with each other at least in terms of effects direction of consistently significant effects, two groups of models show highly inconsistent results. First, the models using both objective and subjective indicators of individual structural position in parallel or combined ways lead to less significant interaction effects. This result could potentially be explained by effects being split up between objective and subjective factors with none of the moderation effects reaching significance, which is mostly indicated by effect directions observed, or by a substantial interplay between objective and subjective factors, possibly including partial mediation effects. Consistent with both assumptions, the effect direction of significant effects is in line with those found in the main models.

Second, the models using alternative indicators of inequality tolerance based on non-logarithmic ratios of legitimate incomes based on occupational income estimates and on general rating measures as dependent variables lead to results not congruent with other analyses. For both rating-based measures and non-logarithmic measures based on occupational income estimates, not only moderation effects but also main effects of structural position and control variables on individual level are not consistent and not significant in most cases, in contrast to the tendencies identified for models using logarithmic measures based on occupational income estimates. The interpretation of these divergences is not completely clear. It has to be remembered at this point that one of my reasons for using occupational income estimates[320] as the main dependent variable is the potential bias of rating measures stemming from the low level of information and the mixing of perceptive and evaluative dimensions present in some respective items. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that biases, limited

319 As has been noted in the empirical section, the empirical research conducted for this study includes additional tests for alternative indicators of constructs used and some alternative configurations and explanations not explicitly reported in detail for reasons of brevity. This even more extended set of comparative still results in very similar results for most additional groups of tests conducted.

320 Even though occupational income estimates also bring their own sets of limitations, I minimize problems arising from potential systematic bias related to status-quo bias and differential perception of specific levels, I control for individual-level inequality perception and use multiple computations of inequality tolerance based on varying sets of occupational groups for the direct measures of inequality tolerance and justice gaps for higher- and lower-income occupations.

information, context-specific differences in the interpretation of rating items and the combination of perception and evaluation in this context might be a reason for the differences in results[321]. With regard to non-logarithmic measures based on occupational income estimates, I suspect that the relative influence of structural effects with regard to comparatively low occupational ratios and the influence of outliers with regard to high legitimate income ratios biases the results substantially. This explanation also seems to be in line with the consistency of results for main and moderation effects found throughout tests of other alternative indicators, including all variations of legitimate income ratios based on occupational estimates that include logarithmic transformation. It is also noteworthy that in the related context of justice functions, the logarithmic transformation has some advantages over the linear specification (see Jasso, 1999, 139f.) and the use of justice functions as dependent variables in this thesis resulted in evidence substantially in line with the main analyses.

For all models using different occupational groups to compute logarithmic inequality tolerance, the results are nearly identical and in line with the main models. Using non-logarithmic measures of inequality based on the same data leads to slightly different results, with actual inequality, perceived inequality and redistribution losing consistency and only system threat remaining as a consistent influence across models. At the same time, the direction of effects remains unchanged as compared to the main models. This indicates that using the logarithmic measures of inequality tolerance is better suited to capture the impact of moderation effects and that these are on average more prevalent for middle and lower structural groups in contrast to very high structural positions. This result is also supported by the predicted legitimate income ratios for ideal-type combinations of minimal and maximal values for individual structural position and context-level factors, showing more pronounced

321 A number of additional ad-hoc explanations for the differences found between the results for the measures based on occupational income estimates on the one hand and the measure of inequality tolerance based on general rating items on the other hand seem possible at this point. First, structural effects on perception might vary depending on contextual influences, and these potential effects do not necessarily have to be the same contextual factors that are relevant for the moderation of influences of structural position on inequality tolerance. Second, possible cultural differences with regard to aspects affecting general answering patterns to rating items such as acquiescence bias (see for instance He & van de Vijver, 2012) might additionally bias rating items in contrast to numeric estimates. But it should be noted that, in principle, this might also be the case for cognitive factors potentially affecting measures based on occupational income, such as anchoring effects (compare Trump, 2013, 49ff.) or reactions to high cognitive load (compare Eidelman et al., 2012). Third, asking for specific income estimates instead of general ratings of agreement with verbal statements might increase the relevance or salience of specific motives (or activate different frames in the sense of framing theories) due to the focus on specific numeric estimates versus general verbal evaluations. This might, for instance, include a higher salience of goal-oriented motives (or rational frames) in the context of measures based on occupational incomes.

influences of context-level factors on estimates for lower structural positions. The models using justice gaps are consistent with the main models if the two justice gaps are understood as being more specific sub-dimensions of inequality tolerance both in terms of conceptualization and operationalization, since the justice gaps are limited to high versus low income groups. Therefore, all models using various measures based on quantitative occupational income estimates with logarithmic transformation show congruent tendencies, whereas the models using rating-based measures and measures based on occupational estimates without logarithmic transformation lead to inconsistent and mostly insignificant results, even for main effects. It is a possibility that a thorough investigation of related but conceptually and methodically different constructs might lead to the discovery of different consistent moderation effects in the context of inequality tolerance.

With regard to functional forms of effects of structural position in general, country-specific scatter plots and models using quadratic and cubic terms tested in additional analyses not reported in detail in this thesis (but compare Chapter 4.3.2 and Figure A.1 in the appendix) indicate that the differences in functional forms of structural effects across country years are substantial and any model estimating effects across various country years can only be a rough approximation of actual relations. The inclusion of interactions with squared terms for income and the models using interactions with split income terms in this study proves to be useful and leads to complementary and consistent results. Using three- and four-way interaction effects between contextual factors and linear, quadratic and cubic terms of income might, in theory, be an option to investigate those effects further, but results could become difficult to interpret in a substantial way and this approach might be more suited to analyses focusing on the functional form of moderation effects of a more limited set of contextual factors.

In terms of comparing the various conceptually different indicators of individual structural position, whereas main effects are completely consistent with the exception of specific waves for the indicator based on subjective top-bottom ranking, there are some notable exceptions for moderation effects. Differences between indicators are specifically evident for class-based measures and subjective top-bottom ranking versus other indicators, with objective and subjective class-based measures not showing consistent influences of system threat. Additionally, using objective class-based measures leads to nearly consistent influences of aggregate inequality tolerance. These findings might be explained by the broad grouping used for the class-based indicators, focused on separating working

class from middle classes and service class. When combining objective and subjective indicators into single measures, the group with higher objective and subjective class position shows no significant differences to the group with lower objective and subjective class position in contrast to all other groups and to models using income and subjective top-bottom ranking for the grouping. This might be explained by the fact that the class categorizations used are mostly focused on differences in employment relations and define a very broad group of individuals as the highest position in the form of the service classes. Class categorizations based on smaller groups at the top, for instance by relying on ownership, might lead to different results, but also by definition result in much smaller groups of individuals that are not even necessarily present in country-specific samples[322].

As another notable difference between structural indicators, all measures based on personal income show some special attributes in contrast to all other indicators of individual structural position used in this study. In the models using personal income, actual inequality tends to increase polarization in inequality tolerance for personal income, whereas perceived inequality increases polarization in inequality tolerance for household income and most other indicators of structural position. The evidence for this difference between actual inequality and personal income versus perceived inequality and other structural indicators is nearly consistent as a configuration-independent general pattern. There is some evidence that the effect of personal income is affected by actual inequality mostly in lower structural positions, whereas the effect of household income is affected by perceived inequality mostly in higher structural positions[323], but predicted values of legitimate income ratios for ideal-type combinations of values for structural position and context-level factors indicate that context-level influences on inequality tolerance are more pronounced in lower structural positions. Taken together, with some exceptions, the broad variety of indicators of structural position used in this study resulted in notably consistent results, especially with regard to all 12 income-based indicators.

Comparing country-level fixed effects versus random effects with regard to CLIs has proven to be a valuable approach to the research question. Specifically, the respective tests show that moderating influences related to economic accentuation are related to both fixed and random country-level effects, whereas influences related to system threat and fear of conflict are only visible for random country-

322 Preliminary tests not explicitly reported in this study that use alternative categorizations resulted in extremely low case numbers for these classes and posed problems for the estimation of effects.

323 An ad-hoc explanation for this pattern might be that personal income is more directly connected to highly occupation-specific information on the income in their own occupation, increasing the objective perception of inequality in higher structural positions as measured by personal income in contrast to other indicators of structural position.

level effects. This indicates that changes in levels of system threat do not affect polarization in inequality tolerance between different structural positions, and that the moderation effect of system threat found in the data might be biased by other unmeasured influences[324].

The evidence for a moderating influence of the fixed effect, but not the random effect, of prosperity is also notable. The mixed evidence from split regression models and models using squared income terms, as well as the models using combined measures of objective and subjective position, can be read as indicating a positive effect in higher structural positions and a negative effect in lower structural positions. Taken together, the negative effect visible in lower structural positions might be based on the random effect of prosperity, but too weak to be measured as a general effect in the models using fixed and random moderation effects, whereas the positive effect found for higher structural positions is highlighted and reaches significance when separating fixed from random effects.

With regard to alternative indicators of context-level factors, the results indicate that, even though further conceptual differentiation is warranted in some cases such as for the factor mobilization and information, relying on just a single indicator poses a substantial risk to the reliability of results[325]. For the various alternative measures of actual inequality, all indicators apart from those using income shares and those based on SWIID data are not consistently influential as moderators when controlling for perceived inequality, but usually also not influential in previous hierarchical steps of model series.

324 Based on the reported differences between random and fixed effects of system threat (as indicated by poverty), it seems possible that historic differences between countries with high system threat and those with low system threat are partly responsible for the results found with regard to the moderating influence of system threat on structural effects. At the same time, models generally control for additional context-level factors such as inequality, redistribution, prosperity and even geographic region and tests using dummy variable adjustment for differences between countries with values of zero for system threat and those with higher values show that the differences in specific levels of poverty is significant for income-based measures. Results for alternative indicators of structural position partly deviate from this pattern, but since alternative indicators of structural position, especially class-based measures, generally show less consistent results for the moderating influence of system threat, I assume that the results for class-based measures might be explained by the very broad operationalization of class, which contrasts with the fine-grained operationalization used for measures based on income or socio-economic status and prestige.

325 Including alternative indicators in parallel to the main indicators in the sense of multiple dimensions of the same construct doe not result in systematic differences in most cases. The direction of effects, if significant, is usually in line with the models only including only one indicator, but the significance of effects varies. When both effects are included, moderation effects seem to be split up between both indicators, especially for relative measures of income inequality, and often do not reach significance. This indicates that the measures used mostly do not indicate different and separate dimensions of the constructs in question but instead work as related proxies of abstract constructs according to expectations, with the potential exception of information as a separate construct and influence from mobilization, and potential differences between different types of indicators of actual inequality such as absolute and relative measures. Absolute inequality might be closer in effect to influences of poverty and effects in line with system justification and fear of conflict, in contrast to relative measures and influences in line with economic accentuation.

This is also the case for conceptually related measures based on different data sources. Even though the range of variables used as indicators for actual inequality was comparatively broad, the list of measures of inequality could be further extended with regard to both absolute and relative measures, including measures more sensitive to upper and lower tails of the income distribution. Specifically for measures of wealth inequality, the indicators used have to be understood as being very limited in terms of coverage and informational content. Overall, the influence of aggregated inequality perception is more consistent, but only one alternative measure is included for inequality perception which is based on the same data (ISSP) as the main measure used in all other analyses. The highly consistent results for redistribution are also based on only one alternative indicator using the same data source (SWIID) as the main indicator used in all other analyses and one additional measure. Therefore, differences between data sources, potentially due to data quality, case numbers or differences in data collection, seem to be partly relevant for the inconsistency of results. This potentially biasing influence should be investigated further in future analyses. In contrast to the use of alternative indicators for contextual factors, alterations in model specifications such as ways of controlling for the potential influence of geographic region do not lead to substantially different results in terms of effect direction, but affect the significance and consistency of effects.

5.5 General contributions to the literature

In the following, based on the evaluation of empirical results, I provide some points of comparison with regard to the relation of this thesis to previous theoretical and empirical research to highlight the contributions of the theoretical and methodical work conducted. In this thesis I add to the respective literature in several ways. Even though the empirical results of this study are not completely consistent and conclusive across the different types of analyses and alternative indicators and model configurations used, the study starts closing some of the gaps identified in the literature reviewed and provides several contributions to multiple areas of research.

First, I provide a comprehensive comparative discussion and analysis of various potential moderators of structural effects on contextual level discussed in previous research potentially influencing structural effects on inequality tolerance. The broad review of research in different fields into the contextual moderation of structural effects on attitudes provided in the theoretical section of this study gives an overview for research into an important research question with social and political

implications. Previous studies were usually focused on tests of more limited sets of potential moderators.

Second, in the study I propose and test a general model based on a broad reading of the SEU framework and additionally borrowing from GFT and the MFS with regard to the explicit differentiation between economic, hedonic and normative motives. In contrast to frame-related models of decision, I do not postulate distinct processes, but instead assume that the three groups of motives work in parallel, partly moderating the influence of each other simply by their relative differences in respective outcomes with regard to expected utility. I assume that if estimations are simple because of clear preferences or perceptions resulting in specific influences to be clearly dominating in terms of utility expectations, the process is streamlined by a fast discounting of specific alternative influences, such as the discounting of economic interests and normative motives when hedonic motivation is very high, but I assume the process to be essentially similar in any case. This broad theoretical framework allows for the integration of additional moderating factors by using bridge hypotheses linking these additional factors to individual-level parameters related to economic, hedonic and normative motives, influencing utility and probability expectations.

Third, I generate hypotheses related to potential moderators based on middle-range theories used in previous research and test the main hypotheses by using extensive testing with alternative indicators and model configurations, including country-level fixed effects. The theoretical integration of substantially related middle-range theories from different fields based on a broad universal framework furthers the theoretical grounding of research into attitudes towards inequality.

Fourth, I use various sophisticated measures of inequality tolerance clearly differentiating between perceived inequality levels and inequality levels judged as legitimate, complemented by additional measures of partly conceptually close and partly fundamentally different inequality-related attitudes, providing some insights into differences and relations between measures. In contrast to indicators of attitudes based on general rating items, the indicators based on occupational estimates have important advantages. These measures clearly separate between perception of context and evaluation of context and allow for the control of perception when analyzing evaluations. The information contained in these estimates is highly differentiated and specific. The measures based on occupational estimates also allow for the use of multiple groupings of higher and lower income groups for the computation of estimates, implying additional ways of investigating the robustness of results.

Fifth, I interpret results for moderation effects based on their consistency in terms of significance and direction across various groups of models, resulting in the identification of consistent versus inconsistent and sporadic moderation effects. This approach, even though time-demanding and more complex in terms of interpretation, has the advantage of directly focusing on the robustness and sensitivity of all results in a comprehensive way. This goal was especially important for the analysis of variation in structural effects because of inconsistent and limited findings of previous studies and further complicating aspects such as the substantial variation in functional forms of structural effects across country years. Therefore, the thesis provides a very thorough test of hypotheses with various alternative models and sensitivity checks. The concrete evidence on moderating effects of various contextual factors on differences in attitudes between higher and lower structural positions is based on extensive analyses using various alternative indicators and model configurations. Substantially, middle-range theories related to the structural position thesis (see for instance Hadler, 2005; Mau 1997), economic accentuation (Jaeger, 2009), differential information bias (Gijsberts, 2002) and relative deprivation (Runciman, 1972) receive nearly universal support in the analyses. Substantially, this indicates that middle-range theories related to structural effects being moderated by economic factors and the perception of these factors and of individual structural position are relevant influences biasing the effects of actual structural position. Specific results also lend limited support to more differentiated influences of perceived upward mobility chances (Filetti, 2017), mobilization and information (Condon & Wichowsky, 2019), fear of conflicts (Rueda & Stegmueller, 2016; 2014; Alesina & Rodrik, 1994) or differential altruism (Dimick, Rueda & Stegmueller, 2016) in higher structural positions and system justification (Jost et al., 2003) in lower structural positions.

Sixth, I test additional hypotheses based on the general integrative models related to moderation and biasing effects on individual level with regard to hedonic and normative motives as well as to the influence of subjective evaluation of individual structural position. These tests show that no consistent influences of hedonic influences in this context could be measured and that moderating factors on contextual level showing consistent influences seem to be mostly related to economic interests, whereas normative factors only show consistent moderating influences on structural effects for individual-level interactions, but not for cross-level moderation. This highlights the need to further investigate the influence of hedonic factors, especially with regard to inequality tolerance and possibly other attitudes related to economic or sociopolitical contexts. With regard to normative influences, the

results for moderation on individual level are roughly in line with framing models, specifically GFT (Lindenberg, 2008) and the MFS (Kroneberg, 2010; 2007; 2005). Even though my conceptualization diverges from these two models in favor of a utility-based framework, the empirical results are not testing between these paradigms and also lend general support to framing models in the sense of a moderation of self-interest by normative influences.

Seventh, I provide several tests of hypotheses related to nonlinearities in both main effects of structural position and cross-level interaction effects additionally including contextual factors. This approach shows interesting results with regard to the nonlinearity of moderation effects usually only measured as linear two-way interactions, if included in studies at all. Specifically, it shows that influences of redistribution are only consistently significant for effects within the group of individuals in lower structural positions, supporting theoretical ideas related to the differential impacts of redistribution.

In sum, the extensive parallel tests of hypotheses related to contextual moderation and additional potentially biasing effects have not been considered before in comparative or integrative form. The results show clear evidence for the effects of constructs and interactions rarely analyzed in this context. Extensive sensitivity and robustness checks and the comparison of main and interaction effects for theoretical constructs such as structural position and social inequality based on various alternative indicators, computations and model specifications provide a comprehensive comparison of results and methods. This not only furthers the evaluation of the robustness of substantial results, specifically showing high consistency for results in line with the structural position thesis, economic accentuation, differential information bias and relative deprivation, but in some cases also shows the decisive influences of decisions made by researchers in the context of construct operationalization.

5.6 Political implications

Coming back to the potential political implications of high inequality as discussed in the introduction of this thesis (see especially Chapter 1.1), various authors on the subject of inequality in different areas of research share critical views of high levels of inequality, partly expecting severe social, economic and political problems for societies in general stemming from rising inequalities (see for instance Piketty, 2020, 862–965; Morelli, 2017, 416–435; Scheidel, 2017, 411–432; Milanovic, 2016, 192–211; compare Atkinson, 2015, 9–16). Taking these concerns seriously implies that the mobilization of lower

structural groups is important to increase the political opportunities for reducing inequalities. This is especially the case if left-wing parties, which are traditionally thought of as comparatively supportive of redistribution, only support redistributive politics if low-income voters are mobilized and exert some form of pressure on the political process (compare Pontusson & Rueda, 2010). Even though the focus of this thesis is specifically on the polarization of attitudes between higher and lower structural positions, the results of the empirical analyses contribute to the discussion of these political issues in multiple ways.

First, results of the empirical analyses conducted for this thesis consistently show that redistribution significantly accentuates the influences of structural position on inequality tolerance. The facts that this relationship is also present for moderating influences of fixed effects for country-level variation in redistribution and that the results are in line with research on differences between attitudes in social-democratic welfare state regimes and other regime types (see for instance Jaeger, 2009; Svallfors, 2004) further underlines the important role that redistribution seems to play for effects of structural position on inequality tolerance. Since research on influences of different socio-economic groups on political decisions shows that preferences of lower and even middle structural groups tend to be of no relevance for decisions in contrast to the interests of higher structural groups (see for instance Gilens & Page 2014; Gilens, 2012), the tendency of polarization of attitudes in contexts of comparatively high levels of redistribution poses a potential problem for the maintenance and expansion of redistribution and welfare state regimes in general. But at the same time, high polarization between structural positions might also contribute to the mobilization in lower structural groups. In line with this idea, the analyses using split regression and quadratic effects clearly show that moderation effects of redistribution are consistently significant for general effects and differences within lower structural groups.

Second, while the results presented in the empirical section of this thesis are not conclusive with regard to the moderation of individualist motives, there is some slight evidence for the influence of respective motives related to mobility chances in models testing for the moderation of nonlinear effects using split regression. In these models, there are negative moderation effects (decreasing structural polarization) associated with the indicator used for prosperity and mobility chances, even though only in tendency and only for lower structural groups when using measures based on household equivalence income. At the same time, the fact that models using fixed effects in

combination with measures of structural position based on household equivalence income partly lead to a positive moderation of structural effects by prosperity and mobility chances contrasts with these explanations and is generally one of the most puzzling findings in this thesis. Individualism on aggregate level is not associated with consistent significant effects in the analyses. But at the same time, there is some evidence for a systematic overestimation of mobility chances[326] (see Davidai & Gilovich, 2018; Kraus & Tan, 2015; Han et al., 2012, 31f.; but compare Nero et al., 2018; Clark, 2014) and authors on environmental topics such as attitudes towards global climate change argue that the individualization of responsibility is far more prominent than systemic political approaches in media reports (see for instance Kristiansen, Painter & Shea, 2021). The potential influences of individualist conceptions of mobility and a focus on position improvement in contrast to system improvement and the possible moderating effects of contextual factors such as poverty might prove to be very relevant for efforts to mobilize or distract lower structural groups.

Third, the impact of information on attitudes and polarization in attitudes is clearly visible in the consistent effects found for perception of inequality on individual level and in the effects associated with aggregate-level perception of inequality in models using household equivalence income and models using alternative indicators and testing for nonlinear effects. In the context of inequality and individual mobility, analyses of media activity are very rare in the literature reviewed for this thesis, especially with regard to the moderation of structural effects, but the available evidence for misestimation shows that inequality levels and especially the incomes of higher-earning occupations tend to be underestimated (see for instance McCall & Chin, 2013; Osberg & Smeeding, 2006, 463ff.). A systematic misestimation in this context might contribute to individualization with regard to individual mobility chances, again underlining the potential importance of information as well as activities in media organizations and the political sphere. Research on main effects shows correlations between the individual consumption of media and inequality-related attitudes and partly

326 Additionally, partly in line with ideas of system justification (Jost et al., 2003) and general research on coping strategies in lower structural positions (Pellicer, 2018), Frankel (2015) argues in an article on the similarities between coping reactions to personal trauma and ideological reactions to economic marginalization that the focus in lower structural positions can shift to ideas of autonomy and self-reliance instead of systematic political solutions to economic problems. He describes how this individualization of problems is actively supported by prominent individuals in media and politics and can result in an emphasis on group-based aggression, but also on conformity and a general rejection of vulnerability (ibid., 367ff.). This might also explain the lack of influence of the indicators used for hedonic motivation in this thesis. If high system threat leads to increased system conformity and inequality tolerance in lower structural positions without affecting hedonic motives, the results found for indicators of hedonic motivation and for indicators of system threat are compatible and understandable.

even indicates that individuals in lower structural positions might be more affected by media influences (Di Gioacchino & Verashchagina, 2020; Jin, 2017; compare also De Benedictis, Allen & Jensen, 2017; McCall, 2013, 80–139). The influence of media activity, biased perceptions and published opinions should be considered for inclusion in future studies on the topic.

Fourth, among the indicators of system threat, the measures related to poverty are the only indicators used for system threat that show consistent effects. As discussed, alternative conceptualizations of these indicators such as the interpretation as a measure of extreme economic polarization might be more adequate. Additionally, all analyses conducted show that hedonic motives have no consistent significant main or interaction effects and neither actual nor perceived inequality show negative effects, even when including tendencies in effect directions in addition to consistent significant effects. These results are contrary to expectations based on ideas of higher system justification in situations of increased perceived system threat in lower structural positions. Even though the conceptualization and operationalization of hedonic motives could be improved in further studies, the results for hedonic motivation can be interpreted as evidence that increased societal problems stemming from high inequality levels do not have to lead to increased system justification in lower structural positions. In contrast, the general results indicate that system threat as measured by poverty is nearly consistently decreasing structural polarization in inequality attitudes. It is not clear at this point if this effect is related to effects of actual poverty or the perception of poverty, since no measure of poverty perception was used in the empirical section of this thesis, but if the theoretical conceptualization of these effects is adequate, the results pose a potential problem for political efforts to reduce both inequality and poverty and related cultural or media-related activities. If increased perception of poverty increases system justification in lower structural positions, efforts to increase mobilization or awareness based exclusively on information might have some counterproductive effects. This additionally stresses the importance of comprehensive and differentiated research into the effects of specific forms of information availability, mobilization efforts and media activity on inequality tolerance, on respective structural effects and on support for related political measures in different structural positions. Political actors and organizations might benefit from paying close attention to these results and further research in this context.

5.7 Limitations, outlook and conclusion

There are several disadvantages to the broad comparative approach used in this study with regard to both theoretical and methodological aspects. Some of these aspects are inherent to the theoretical framework and the research design of this study, while others are related to specific choices of construct conceptualization and operationalization. Additionally, some specific inconsistencies and unclear results are in need of further investigation. In the following, I discuss these drawbacks and outline how future research could address these problems.

In general, even though theory-driven and based on a clear theoretical framework integrating specific middle-range theories, the scope of integrated assumptions and resulting tested hypotheses is extensive, giving the study a partly exploratory character. The limited number of consistent effects found is a first baseline for cross-level moderators to be further investigated, but the extensive results reported in this study also include various less consistent effects that might not be entirely random, but instead potentially subject to stricter boundary conditions in the form of indicator-specific effects, nonlinearities, spurious influences or threeway interactions not controlled for. At the same time, it is obvious that the broad conceptualization of constructs on contextual level and the broad range of indicators used for these constructs might be responsible for some of the inconsistencies found between indicators. Using multiple conceptually different indicators for broad constructs as a first exploratory test indicates that some specific constructs in particular could be included in a more differentiated, multidimensional way. In these and other cases, the conceptual inconsistency of indicators used could be easily remedied in future studies on the topic by introducing explicit sub-dimensions for the broad constructs used in this thesis, additionally to those tested in the complementary models using main and alternative indicators in parallel.

Regarding specific differences between the various indicators used for single constructs, whereas the effects are mostly in line with each other for the extensive range of indicators used for individual structural position, differences between the alternative indicators used for factors on contextual level are evident for various constructs. Further differentiation seems especially promising for dimensions related to the construct conceptualized as system threat in this study, dimensions of mobilization and information and normative constructs on aggregate level. Additionally, even though the use of various indicators of actual inequality did not lead to consistent results apart from the

indicators based on either income shares or SWIID data[327], further analyses of more differentiated inequality-related measures are necessary for three main reasons. First, the moderating effects found consistently for both indicators of actual inequality based on SWIID data when using personal income on individual level, even including fixed effects on country-level, indicate that the influence of actual inequality might be relevant and partly decreased by the influence of additional controls such as perceived inequality and poverty in this study. The nearly consistent influence of redistribution, perceived inequality and poverty as factors closely related to inequality implies that the influence of the factor might be underestimated in this study or biased by the inclusion of additional related and possibly mediating constructs. Second, likelihood-ratio tests for the initial inclusion of inequality in hierarchical model series are consistently significant and there are some inconsistent sporadic negative effects across these initial models if not controlling for other contextual influences. Third, since inequality perception proves to be a highly relevant factor and analyses of most other objective context-level factors (apart from redistribution and poverty as an indicator of system threat) do not lead to similar results in terms of significance and consistency, a stronger focus on the perception of other context factors seems to be a promising approach for future studies.

In terms of consistent results, the three influential factors redistribution, poverty and perceived inequality should be included in further analyses on the topic. For poverty, the influence is opposite to the effect of actual and perceived inequality, attenuating structural polarization in tendency, and mostly consistent, even though limited to random effects on country level. With regard to the concept system threat as a contextual factor, all four measures based on poverty data taken from different sources lead to highly consistent results, but other alternative indicators of system threat do not show consistent moderation effects. This might be due to the specific alternative indicators, possibly not measuring system threat as effectively as poverty, or it might result from poverty being related to completely different conceptual influences apart from system threat. Since there is some evidence for the expected nonlinear effects related to group-specific hypotheses for the influence of system threat, I think the first explanation is more plausible than the second.

327 Preliminary tests included a considerably wider range of indicators for actual inequality that also did not lead to consistent effects and mostly showed no significant moderating influence, such as additional sources for measures based on Gini index and income shares or ratios. These measures are not explicitly included in the study since the case number was considerably lower for some sources and the analyses presented already are extensive.

For mobilization and information, the influence of press freedom as an alternative indicator is consistently positive, but the influence of unionization measures is usually negative, if significant at all. This further indicates that the broad theoretical constructs used in this study in some cases might not be differentiated enough to specifically capture moderation effects across different dimensions. But two results in particular point to the relevance of factors related to mobilization and information on the one hand and to perception of context (in contrast to objective context) on the other. While cultural, normative and most mobilization- and information-related contextual factors included in the analyses do not exhibit consistent significant influences, press freedom shows a significant positive effect in models using it as an alternative indicator for mobilization and information. Additionally, aggregate perceived inequality, even though not a consistently significant influence, shows clear tendencies of positive moderating influences increasing structural effects in models using measures based on household equivalence income. This result is in line with recent research focusing on perception and the differences between perceived and actual inequality (see for instance Gimpelson & Treisman, 2018). These two results indicate that some aspects of media activity and information related to inequality might be relevant for structural effects. Since only a limited set of indicators related to information availability and aggregate perception is included in the empirical section of this thesis, further investigation using related but more differentiated indicators might lead to more specific and consistent results. Based on previous research in related areas, I suspect that especially the influence of specific media-related aspects such as the coverage of inequality-related topics versus other topics in general, the frequency of reports on possible political measures to combat rising inequalities and their effects (compare Kuziemkko et al., 2015), the inclusion of information on inequality levels and related aspects (compare Becker, 2020) and comparisons between multiple countries (compare Pellicer, Pirairo & Wegner, 2019) are factors that should be systematically investigated with regard to the moderation of structural effects in future studies. Further aspects in this context to be analyzed in future studies on the topic might include more specific indicators of political mobilization (compare Pontusson & Rueda, 2010) and aggregate political awareness (compare Jordan, 2018).

Even though this thesis is focused on structurally determined polarization in attitudes, some results in the context of main effects, especially the completely consistent effect of individual-level perception of inequality on inequality tolerance, also indicate that the influence of information-related factors in analyses of main effects associated with both contextual- and individual-level factors is

important. Additionally, even though not completely consistent across all models in terms of significance, a trend with regard to main effects of context factors on inequality tolerance is the negative influence of the construct mobilization and information and the positive influence of aggregate perceived inequality found in many model series[328]. Taken together, multiple results of the analyses presented in this study indicate that the inclusion of additional data on media activity, perception, mobilization and information availability might prove useful for future research on attitudes towards inequality. Research might conceptualize related factors in a more differentiated way, possibly separating between worker mobilization, information access, media activity, press freedom and aspects related to the perception of contextual factors. The systematic analysis of some of these factors depends on the use of extensive additional data sources such as comprehensive quantitative content analyses of media activity in multiple countries.

With regard to normative aspects, even when context-level factors related to norms and values show significant effects, the effect direction is not consistent across alternative indicators of other constructs. For instance, depending on the specific model used, aggregate inequality tolerance shows varying effect direction with regard to moderating influences on structural effects, even though the rare significant effects are usually of a positive, accentuating nature. Further conceptual differentiation and empirical testing seems necessary due to the sheer amount of possible influences that might plausibly affect structural effects. However, the analyses in this study did not result in consistent evidence for any systematic influences in the context of normative CLIs[329], and even the evidence for individual-level moderation effects is limited. It has to be considered that not only more differentiated dimensions might be necessary, but possible threeway interactions, including multiple factors on contextual level, might also be relevant.

Concerning the measurement of individual structural position, even though a wide range of indicators of individual structural position is used in the analyses of this thesis, there are some important limitations to the informative value of these measures, mostly resulting from data availability. First, information on individual and household wealth is completely missing from analyses due to data limitations. Second, no class categorization focused on differences between the

328 Significant main negative effects of mobilization and information as well as aggregate perceived inequality are found in most full models (compare for instance Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.44), but not in a consistent way and especially not in full models when using fixed and random effects for contextual factors (see Tables 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11).

329 This is also the case for additional tests using WVS individual-level data and additional indicators and normative constructs related to individualism. These tests are not presented here for reasons of brevity and space.

traditional Marxist dichotomy between bourgeoisie and proletariat is included in the analyses, since the case numbers for the higher classes in respective categorizations tested in preliminary analyses are very low. Third, the individual-level data used has to be regarded as limited in general with regard to the coverage of structural positions at the very high end of distributions. This is a general problem for survey data, since participation rates tend to decrease with rising income levels (Korinek et al., 2006). Fourth, even though moderating influences of contextual factors on the effects of individual intra- and intergenerational mobility are not visible in preliminary analyses not reported in this thesis for reasons of space and brevity, the exclusion of related measures and mobility prospects leaves open additional room for future studies that are more streamlined with regard to other constructs. Additionally, the investigation of nonlinear cross-level interactions with regard to differences between context-level influences on effects in higher versus lower structural positions can be further improved and conducted in more differentiated forms. Even though three different analyses related to these questions are conducted in this study (i.e. models using squared income terms, models analyzing within- and between effects for two broad income groups and ideal-type predictions of legitimate income ratios), the scope of the respective analyses conducted for this thesis is limited and the inconsistencies of results, even though partly consistent within groups of analyses, implies that further research is required. More specific analyses might contribute to a better understanding of the related issues.

Turning to individual-level inequality tolerance as a dependent variable, whereas indicators of inequality tolerance based on occupational estimates with logarithmic transformation used as dependent variables lead to consistent results, measures based on general rating items and occupational estimates without logarithmic transformation show completely different influences in terms of moderation effects. Because of conceptual implications, especially in terms of limited information and mixing perceptive and evaluative dimensions in the general rating items used, I suspect that the evidence using quantitative estimates is more reliable. At the same time, it has to be considered that there might be substantial and systematic differences in moderation effects related to the conceptual differences in measures of inequality tolerance used. For the dependent variables used, and for similar measures and related theoretical constructs, potentially far-reaching implications of conceptual differences are not implausible, especially with regard to support for political measures versus quantitative measures of inequality tolerance versus general rating-based measures. Further

comparisons of a wider set of conceptually different indicators related to attitudes towards inequality and redistribution as dependent variables might shed more light on this issue.

Similarly, the conceptualization and operationalization of hedonic motivation has to be revised. In addition to the tests reported, multiple other operationalizations of hedonic motivation based on satisficing behavior and closely related to the variants tested were not reported, but lead to similar, mostly not significant, results. In substantial terms, even though the zero and partly negative main effect found can be explained, as discussed, using a different conceptualization of the cognitive baselines for different occupational income estimations, it still remains problematic that no interaction effects with indicators of structural position are consistently evident in the analyses. Therefore, tests using different indicators, possibly based on other measures of satisficing, explicit questions or specific forms of cognitive or physiological data seem to be desirable.

As an important limiting factor for the empirical analyses conducted for this thesis, the comparatively rare use of occupational income estimates in international studies has to be noted. The rare utilization of cognitively demanding, but highly informative measures such as occupational estimates is a problem for the investigation of any question related to attitudes towards inequality. Additionally, it would be very interesting if these occupational estimates were included in studies employing a panel design on individual level. Using multiple international waves of panel data would allow for the estimation of fixed and random effects on both individual and country level.

In sum, the specific integrative model used in this thesis as a form of structuring potential influences based on middle-range theories as a broad comparative approach is complemented by the extensive testing of assumptions using alternative indicators and model configurations. Even though strictly based on tests of hypotheses derived from a clear theoretical model, the broad integration of various middle-range theories and specific assumptions as potential moderation effects gives the study a partly exploratory character. As a first broadly-focused comparative study combining and extensively testing assumptions from different areas of research on the question of moderation effects of structural position on inequality-related attitudes, it provides the groundwork for further research of more limited scope focused on more specific questions. In the future, more limited tests for specific questions are necessary. This includes the investigation of sub-dimensions and nonlinearities in the context of contextual moderators, specifically for factors related to actual and perceived inequality, redistribution, system threat and aggregate normative influences. Additionally, further analyses of factors related to

motive groups on individual level are needed, apart from research into hedonic motivation also for the impact and interplay of subjective and objective structural position, since the exact mechanisms of interrelations are not completely clear at this point, including the separation between biasing, mediating and parallel influences of subjective versus objective position.

Appendix

Tab. A.1.1: Case numbers for specific countries

		Full sample		Using SLEI		Using SLPI	
Country	Code	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Argentina	ARG	787	0.98	635	1.00	561	1.03
Australia	AUS	3639	4.52	2980	4.71	2954	5.44
Austria	AUT	1826	2.27	1483	2.34	1441	2.65
Belarus	BEL	963	1.19	873	1.38	818	1.51
Brazil	BRA	1176	1.46	1110	1.76	765	1.41
Bulgaria	BGR	2070	2.57	1083	1.71	1691	3.11
Canada	CAN	399	0.50	330	0.52	328	0.60
Chile	CHL	2256	2.80	1796	2.84	1610	2.96
China	CHN	2401	2.98	2288	3.62	1974	3.63
Croatia	HRV	1150	1.43	775	1.23	757	1.39
Cyprus	CYP	972	1.21	751	1.19	813	1.50
Czech Republic	CZE	3666	4.55	2969	4.69	3010	5.54
Denmark	DNK	2673	3.32	2539	4.01	2652	4.88
Estonia	EST	958	1.19	827	1.31	413	0.76
Finland	FIN	757	0.94	697	1.10	698	1.28
France	FRA	3875	4.81	3605	5.70	3273	6.02
Germany	DEU	3447	4.28	2528	4.00	2422	4.46
Hungary	HUN	1768	2.19	1428	2.26	1436	2.64
Ireland	IRL	1652	2.05	776	1.23	775	1.43
Italy	ITA	935	1.16	809	1.28	689	1.27
Japan	JPN	1124	1.39	536	0.85	484	0.89
South Korea	KOR	1560	1.94	123	0.19	150	0.28
Latvia	LVA	1965	2.44	1658	2.62	1605	2.95
Lithuania	LTU	849	1.05	554	0.88	610	1.12
Netherlands	NLD	3991	4.95	3591	5.68	977	1.80
New Zealand	NZL	1759	2.18	1630	2.58	1700	3.13
Norway	NOR	2274	2.82	1936	3.06	2147	3.95
Philippines	PHL	2050	2.54	1988	3.14	1176	2.16
Poland	POL	2917	3.62	2759	4.36	1429	2.63
Portugal	PRT	1617	2.01	1370	2.17	1397	2.57
Russia	RUS	2366	2.94	1864	2.95	1018	1.87
Slovakia	SVK	1072	1.33	912	1.44	917	1.69
Slovenia	SVN	1760	2.18	1222	1.93	1293	2.38
South Africa	ZAF	3002	3.73	2282	3.61	1747	3.22
Spain	ESP	1658	2.06	1182	1.87	957	1.76
Sweden	SWE	1938	2.40	1681	2.66	1707	3.14
Switzerland	CHE	1963	2.44	1548	2.45	1493	2.75
Turkey	TUR	1346	1.67	1104	1.75	697	1.28
Ukraine	UKR	1195	1.48	835	1.32	842	1.55
United Kingdom	GBR	2294	2.85	1259	1.99	767	1.41
United States	USA	3585	4.45	2114	3.34	1534	2.82
Venezuela	VEN	933	1.16	817	1.29	610	1.12
Total		80588	100.00	63247	100.00	54337	100.00

Tab. A.1.2: Case numbers for specific country years

			Full sample		Using SLEI		Using SLPI	
Country	Code	Year	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Argentina	ARG	2009	787	0.98	635	1.00	561	1.03
Australia	AUS	1987	1179	1.46	1086	1.72	1086	2.00
		1999	1217	1.51	764	1.21	741	1.36
		2009	1243	1.54	1130	1.79	1127	2.07
Austria	AUT	1999	861	1.07	782	1.24	708	1.30
		2009	965	1.20	701	1.11	733	1.35
Belarus	BEL	2009	963	1.19	873	1.38	818	1.51
Brazil	BRA	1999	1176	1.46	1110	1.76	765	1.41
Bulgaria	BGR	1992	790	0.98			700	1.29
		1999	785	0.97	734	1.16	671	1.23
		2009	495	0.61	349	0.55	320	0.59
Canada	CAN	2009	399	0.50	330	0.52	328	0.60
Chile	CHL	1999	896	1.11	799	1.26	602	1.11
		2009	1360	1.69	997	1.58	1008	1.86
China	CHN	2009	2401	2.98	2288	3.62	1974	3.63
Croatia	HRV	2009	1150	1.43	775	1.23	757	1.39
Cyprus	CYP	2009	972	1.21	751	1.19	813	1.50
Czech Republic	CZE	1992	894	1.11	783	1.24	799	1.47
		1999	1630	2.02	1356	2.14	1368	2.52
		2009	1142	1.42	830	1.31	843	1.55
Denmark	DNK	1999	1368	1.70	1368	2.16	1368	2.52
		2009	1305	1.62	1171	1.85	1284	2.36
Estonia	EST	2009	958	1.19	827	1.31	413	0.76
Finland	FIN	2009	757	0.94	697	1.10	698	1.28
France	FRA	1999	1666	2.07	1522	2.41	1425	2.62
		2009	2209	2.74	2083	3.29	1848	3.40
Germany	DEU	1987	1141	1.42	629	0.99	539	0.99
		1999	1149	1.43	913	1.44	919	1.69
		2009	1157	1.44	986	1.56	964	1.77
Hungary	HUN	1999	940	1.17	727	1.15	755	1.39
		2009	828	1.03	701	1.11	681	1.25
Ireland	IRL	1987	780	0.97				
		1999	872	1.08	776	1.23	775	1.43
Italy	ITA	2009	935	1.16	809	1.28	689	1.27
Japan	JPN	1999	562	0.70	536	0.85	484	0.89
		2009	562	0.70				
South Korea	KOR	2009	1560	1.94	123	0.19	150	0.28
Latvia	LVA	1999	1039	1.29	989	1.56	927	1.71
		2009	926	1.15	669	1.06	678	1.25
Lithuania	LTU	2009	849	1.05	554	0.88	610	1.12
Netherlands	NLD	1987	1243	1.54	1135	1.79		
		1999	1606	1.99	1434	2.27		
		2009	1142	1.42	1022	1.62	977	1.80

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Tab. A.1.2: Case numbers for specific country years (continued)

			Full sample		Using SLEI		Using SLPI	
Country	Code	Year	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
New Zealand	NZL	1999	925	1.15	829	1.31	891	1.64
		2009	834	1.03	801	1.27	809	1.49
Norway	NOR	1999	1124	1.39	1074	1.70	1075	1.98
		2009	1150	1.43	862	1.36	1072	1.97
Philippines	PHL	1999	1062	1.32	1016	1.61	547	1.01
		2009	988	1.23	972	1.54	629	1.16
Poland	POL	1992	1112	1.38	1103	1.74	572	1.05
		1999	891	1.11	826	1.31	409	0.75
		2009	914	1.13	830	1.31	448	0.82
Portugal	PRT	1999	993	1.23	960	1.52	971	1.79
		2009	624	0.77	410	0.65	426	0.78
Russia	RUS	1999	1015	1.26	785	1.24	445	0.82
		2009	1351	1.68	1079	1.71	573	1.05
Slovakia	SVK	2009	1072	1.33	912	1.44	917	1.69
Slovenia	SVN	1999	921	1.14	695	1.10	721	1.33
		2009	839	1.04	527	0.83	572	1.05
South Africa	ZAF	2009	3002	3.73	2282	3.61	1747	3.22
Spain	ESP	1999	734	0.91	598	0.95	395	0.73
		2009	924	1.15	584	0.92	562	1.03
Sweden	SWE	1999	939	1.17	770	1.22	802	1.48
		2009	999	1.24	911	1.44	905	1.67
Switzerland	CHE	1999	906	1.12	762	1.20	700	1.29
		2009	1057	1.31	786	1.24	793	1.46
Turkey	TUR	2009	1346	1.67	1104	1.75	697	1.28
Ukraine	UKR	2009	1195	1.48	835	1.32	842	1.55
United Kingdom	GBR	1987	909	1.13				
		1999	623	0.77	581	0.92	338	0.62
		2009	762	0.95	678	1.07	429	0.79
United States	USA	1987	1246	1.55				
		1999	971	1.20	829	1.31	674	1.24
		2009	1368	1.70	1285	2.03	860	1.58
Venezuela	VEN	2009	933	1.16	817	1.29	610	1.12
		Total	80588	100.00	63247	100.00	54337	100.00

Tab. A.2.1: Descriptive statistics of categorical variables used

		Full sample		Using SLEI		Using SLPI	
Variable description	Value	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Year	1987	6498	8.06	2850	4.51	1625	2.99
	1992	2796	3.47	1886	2.98	2071	3.81
	1999	26871	33.34	23535	37.21	19476	35.84
	2009	44423	55.12	34976	55.30	31165	57.36
	Total	80588	100.00	63247	100.00	54337	100.00
Geographical region	North America and Oceania	9382	11.64	7054	11.15	6516	11.99
	Europe (without East. Europe)	32835	40.74	26628	42.10	23026	42.38
	Eastern Europe	21736	26.97	16886	26.70	15021	27.64
	Other (Asia, South America and Middle East)	16635	20.64	12679	20.05	9774	17.99
	Total	80588	100.00	63247	100.00	54337	100.00
Gender	male	38279	47.50	30280	47.88	27173	50.01
	female	42309	52.50	32967	52.12	27164	49.99
	Total	80588	100.00	63247	100.00	54337	100.00
Marital status	Married	47556	59.77	37503	59.30	32607	60.01
	Widowed	5928	7.23	4778	7.55	3955	7.28
	Divorced	5498	6.72	4478	7.08	4093	7.53
	Separated	1559	1.86	1302	2.06	1167	2.15
	Never	20047	24.42	15186	24.01	12515	23.03
	Total	80588	100.00	63247	100.00	54337	100.00
Education	No degree	1961	2.43	1638	2.59	1284	2.36
	Lowest formal	6599	8.19	5349	8.46	4620	8.50
	Above lowest	11244	13.95	9083	14.36	7713	14.19
	Higher secondary	35066	43.51	26835	42.43	23167	42.64
	University degree	25718	31.91	20342	32.16	17553	32.30
	Total	80588	100.00	63247	100.00	54337	100.00
ESeC	Middle or upper class	38354	71.32	31305	70.79	29608	71.14
	Working class	15426	28.68	12917	29.21	12013	28.86
	Total	53780	100.00	44222	100.00	41621	100.00
EGP	Middle or upper class	36443	65.62	29536	64.85	27505	65.56
	Working class	19096	34.38	16006	35.15	14450	34.44
	Total	55539	100.00	45542	100.00	41955	100.00
Subjective class (SBCL)	Middle or upper class	43001	65.18	34257	64.20	31215	65.01
	Working class	22972	34.82	19105	35.80	16800	34.99
	Total	65973	100.00	53362	100.00	48015	100.00
Combined – Personal income and top-bottom ranking	Consistent lower position	2447	4.56	2250	4.54	2447	4.56
	Inconsistent lower position	8828	16.44	7977	16.08	8828	16.44
	Intermediary	26473	49.29	24556	49.5	26473	49.29
	Inconsistent higher position	9442	17.58	8809	17.76	9442	17.58
	Consistent higher position	6515	12.13	6017	12.13	6515	12.13
	Total	53705	100	49609	100	53705	100

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Tab. A.2.1: Descriptive statistics of categorical variables used (continued)

		Full sample		Using SLEI		Using SLPI	
Variable description	Value	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent	Freq.	Percent
Combined – ESeC and subjective class	Consistent lower position	8057	16.97	6851	17.73	6599	17.55
	Inconsistent lower position	5903	12.43	4780	12.37	4521	12.02
	Intermediary	27912	58.78	22520	58.28	21985	58.46
	Inconsistent higher position	5478	11.54	4390	11.36	4403	11.71
	Consistent higher position	135	0.28	98	0.25	97	0.26
Combined – ISEI and top-bottom ranking	Consistent lower position	2544	4.63	2190	4.85	1950	4.69
	Inconsistent lower position	9243	16.83	7691	17.04	6890	16.59
	Intermediary	28442	51.79	23387	51.82	21534	51.84
	Inconsistent higher position	8153	14.84	6690	14.82	6123	14.74
	Consistent higher position	6541	11.91	5170	11.46	5044	12.14
	Total	54923	100	45128	100	41541	100
Combined – EGP and subjective class	Consistent lower position	9808	20.04	8300	20.92	7746	20.46
	Inconsistent lower position	7532	15.39	6151	15.5	5672	14.98
	Intermediary	25479	52.06	20332	51.24	19650	51.89
	Inconsistent higher position	5984	12.23	4794	12.08	4703	12.42
	Consistent higher position	140	0.29	101	0.25	97	0.26
	Total	48943	100	39678	100	37868	100
Hedonic motivation (HEDD)	Low satisficing	42873	53.2	33662	53.22	29539	54.36
	High satisficing	37715	46.8	29585	46.78	24798	45.64
	Total	80588	100	63247	100	54337	100
Hedonic motivation (HEDC)	Low satisficing	19745	24.50	15840	25.04	13554	24.94
	Middle satisficing	20838	25.86	15857	25.07	14256	26.24
	High satisficing	19184	23.81	15292	24.18	12541	23.08
	Highest satisficing	20821	25.84	16258	25.71	13986	25.74
	Total	80588	100.00	63247	100.00	54337	100.00

Tab. A.2.2: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables used

		Full sample			Using SLEI			Using SLPI		
Variable description	Code	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Variables on individual level:										
Age		80588	45.19	16.44	63247	45.70	16.31	54337	45.90	15.72
Income, SLPI	SLPI	54337	0.00	0.99	50123	0.01	0.99	54337	0.00	0.99
Income, SPI	SPI	54337	0.00	0.99	50123	0.00	0.99	54337	0.00	0.99
Income, LPI	LPI	54337	7.69	2.83	50123	7.64	2.84	54337	7.69	2.83
Income, SZPI	SZPI	63910	-0.01	0.99	57991	0.02	0.99	54337	0.14	1.00
Income, SLEI	SLEI	63247	0.00	1.00	63247	0.00	1.00	50123	0.06	0.98
Income, SEI	SEI	63247	0.00	0.99	63247	0.00	0.99	50123	0.05	1.01
Income, LEI	LEI	63247	7.76	2.77	63247	7.76	2.77	50123	7.71	2.87
Income, SZEI	SZEI	63887	0.00	0.99	63247	0.01	0.98	50358	0.05	1.01
Income, SLFI	SLFI	63814	0.00	1.00	63247	0.00	1.00	50561	0.05	0.98
Income, SFI	SFI	63814	0.00	0.99	63247	0.00	0.99	50561	0.04	1.01
Income, LFI	LFI	63814	8.26	2.75	63247	8.25	2.75	50561	8.21	2.85
Income, SZFI	SZFI	64454	0.00	0.99	63247	0.01	0.99	50796	0.05	1.00
ISEI	ISEI	55539	43.00	16.84	45542	42.75	16.93	41955	43.13	17.01
SIOPS	SIOPS	55539	41.41	13.74	45542	41.31	13.74	41955	41.69	13.79
MPS	MPS	43972	74.89	37.54	36511	74.44	37.55	33188	75.56	38.04
Subjective top-bottom ranking	SBTB	79491	5.47	1.86	62573	5.49	1.88	53705	5.49	1.83
Hedonic motivation	HEDL	80588	-2.68	2.00	63247	-2.58	1.99	54337	-2.61	1.98
Religiosity	REL	76298	3.18	2.23	60280	3.12	2.22	51687	2.99	2.16
Left-right orientation	LFT	46760	3.11	1.01	36717	3.12	1.03	32193	3.12	1.03
Inequality tolerance 1, log.	IT1	80588	1.45	0.86	63247	1.45	0.84	54337	1.44	0.83
Perceived inequality 1, log.		80588	2.26	1.05	63247	2.26	1.04	54337	2.25	1.02
Inequality tolerance 2, log.	IT2	80588	1.97	1.01	63247	1.97	0.99	54337	1.94	0.98
Perceived inequality 2, log.		80588	2.84	1.16	63247	2.84	1.15	54337	2.81	1.13
Inequality tolerance 3, log.	IT3	80588	1.39	0.79	63247	1.40	0.78	54337	1.38	0.76
Perceived inequality 3, log.		80588	2.11	0.98	63247	2.11	0.96	54337	2.09	0.94
Inequality tolerance 1, linear	IN1	80588	274.46	55291.78	63247	343.60	62411.01	54337	397.54	67333.52
Perceived inequality 1, linear	IPN	80588	211.78	48371.83	63247	249.46	54591.69	54337	285.46	58898.23
Inequality tolerance 2, linear	IN2	80588	967.47	151574.30	63247	1203.00	171062.10	54337	1333.28	184102.70
Perceived inequality 2, linear		80588	698.25	141761.10	63247	837.85	159996.10	54337	956.11	172613.40
Inequality tolerance 3, linear	IN3	80588	189.27	37226.01	63247	236.65	42019.15	54337	272.08	45332.38
Perceived inequality 3, linear		80588	147.59	32251.21	63247	173.27	36397.87	54337	197.45	39269.04
Justice gap 1, low	JGL1	80588	-0.32	0.43	63247	-0.32	0.43	54337	-0.32	0.42
Justice gap 2, low	JGL2	80588	-0.34	0.49	63247	-0.34	0.49	54337	-0.34	0.49
Justice gap 3, low	JGL3	80588	-0.32	0.43	63247	-0.32	0.43	54337	-0.32	0.42
Justice gap 1, high	JGH1	80588	0.49	0.73	63247	0.49	0.73	54337	0.49	0.71
Justice gap 2, high	JGH2	80588	0.53	0.79	63247	0.53	0.78	54337	0.53	0.76
Justice gap 3, high	JGH3	80588	0.39	0.64	63247	0.39	0.63	54337	0.39	0.62
Inequality tolerance 4	IT4	80155	2.03	0.93	62962	2.02	0.93	54100	2.02	0.94
Inequality tolerance 5	IT5	34633	-0.54	1.33	27192	-0.57	1.33	22333	-0.57	1.35

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Tab. A.2.2: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables used (continued)

		Full sample			Using SLEI			Using SLPI		
Variable description	Code	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Variables on context level:										
Gini of income, post-tax (SWIID)	GNS	80588	32.45	8.96	63247	32.58	9.22	54337	32.11	8.97
Gini of income, market	GMS	80588	46.59	6.51	63247	46.83	6.16	54337	46.42	6.31
Gini of income, post-tax (WB)	GNW	42943	37.60	10.97	35534	37.63	10.94	29052	36.93	10.95
Gini of EI (ISSP)	GIE	76301	0.34	0.10	63247	0.34	0.10	53637	0.33	0.10
Gini of PI (ISSP)	GIP	74242	0.36	0.09	60678	0.37	0.09	54337	0.36	0.09
Share of lowest 20%	SH20	49519	7.61	1.55	39534	7.64	1.55	35540	7.80	1.53
Share of lowest 10%	SH10	49519	2.96	0.75	39534	2.98	0.74	35540	3.05	0.74
P90/P10 ratio, PI	R91P	74242	8.32	9.51	60678	8.36	9.27	54337	8.07	8.80
P90/P10 ratio, EI	R91E	76301	5.77	4.60	63247	5.73	4.49	53637	5.57	4.33
P90/P50 ratio, PI	R95P	74242	2.48	1.61	60678	2.48	1.55	54337	2.41	1.45
P90/P50 ratio, EI	R95E	76301	2.22	0.85	63247	2.21	0.83	53637	2.17	0.80
P50/P10 ratio, PI	R51P	74242	0.39	0.13	60678	0.39	0.13	54337	0.39	0.14
P50/P10 ratio, EI	R51E	76301	0.45	0.11	63247	0.45	0.11	53637	0.45	0.11
Share of billionaire wealth	WSF	30983	5.42	5.82	23615	5.94	6.20	20437	5.56	5.65
Gini of wealth	WGE	25311	54.08	10.16	19110	53.97	9.70	17280	53.57	9.54
SD, personal income	SDP	76959	147917.20	567417.10	60678	131256.90	522700.60	54337	131866.60	528356.40
SD, household equivalence income	SDE	77381	35754.66	130893.10	62068	35222.67	139313.70	52474	32295.90	121029.40
SD, PI in US$	SXP	74242	22730.23	56796.03	60678	16983.44	40314.92	54337	19244.30	44444.82
SD, EI in US$	SXE	76301	18901.67	43858.58	63247	14488.54	31136.29	53637	16414.71	35325.94
Relative redistribution	RGR	80588	30.55	14.20	63247	30.76	14.60	54337	31.06	14.32
Absolute redistribution	RGA	80588	14.14	6.67	63247	14.25	6.79	54337	14.30	6.72
Tax revenue	RTR	44007	32.95	8.00	36916	33.04	8.14	33116	33.61	7.90
GDP (WDI)	GD1	80588	22166.08	17653.83	63247	22678.93	18007.87	54337	23896.81	18854.84
GDP (PWT)	GD2	80588	1586643.00	3094216.00	63247	1571455.00	3196990.00	54337	1465400.00	3069156.00
HDI	HDI	78268	796.45	85.56	61532	795.47	87.97	52712	800.97	86.32
Aggregate upward mobility	MB1	74090	0.87	0.10	60397	0.87	0.10	52712	0.87	0.10
Aggregate mobility	MB2	74090	3.3	0.18	60397	3.31	0.18	52712	3.32	0.18
Aggregate meritocracy perception	MRT	44423	-0.71	0.37	34976	-0.73	0.38	31165	-0.75	0.38
Unemployment, total	UE1	74090	8.74	4.65	60397	8.68	4.52	52712	8.53	4.40
Unemployment, long-term	UE3	70831	29.76	15.06	55607	30.05	14.21	47395	29.21	14.60
Unemployment, tertiary education	UE2	66124	17.51	10.49	53705	17.42	10.61	46122	16.94	10.07
Poverty headcount ratio at 1.25$ day	PV1	80588	4.15	10.68	63247	4.68	11.35	54337	3.92	10.21
Poverty headcount ratio at 2$ a day	PV2	80588	1.87	5.19	63247	2.13	5.55	54337	1.76	4.90

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Tab. A.2.2: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables used (continued)

		Full sample			Using SLEI			Using SLPI		
Variable description	Code	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
Poverty gap at 1.25$ a day	PV3	80588	1.38	3.46	63247	1.55	3.68	54337	1.31	3.35
Poverty gap at 2$ a day	PV4	80588	0.47	1.19	63247	0.54	1.28	54337	0.45	1.16
Aggregate conflict perception 1	PC1	80588	1.59	0.34	63247	1.57	0.33	54337	1.55	0.33
Aggregate conflict perception 2	PC2	80588	1.41	0.28	63247	1.40	0.28	54337	1.38	0.28
Homicide rate	HMC	46619	2.81	3.47	38728	2.86	3.43	34567	2.48	2.98
Ethnic fractionalization (Fearon)	FR1	80588	0.28	0.20	63247	0.28	0.20	54337	0.29	0.19
Ethnic fractionalization (Selway)	FR2	80588	0.20	0.22	63247	0.20	0.22	54337	0.19	0.21
Ethnic-income cross-fragmentation	FR3	72502	0.72	0.15	56825	0.72	0.15	47838	0.72	0.15
Ethnic polarization	FR4	78531	0.26	0.23	61894	0.26	0.24	53243	0.26	0.24
Cultural fractionalization	FR5	80588	0.19	0.14	63247	0.19	0.14	54337	0.20	0.13
International migrants	MGR	53890	9.49	7.07	42329	9.70	7.19	38263	10.06	7.34
Political distrust	PDW	80588	2.73	0.32	63247	2.73	0.33	54337	2.74	0.32
Corruption perception	CPI	80588	6.31	2.22	63247	6.31	2.27	54337	6.37	2.24
Government reliability 1	GV1	71294	0.92	0.76	58511	0.93	0.78	50641	0.98	0.74
Government reliability 2	GV2	71294	1.02	0.88	58511	1.03	0.89	50641	1.09	0.86
Union, percentage (ISSP)	UNI	80588	0.22	0.16	63247	0.23	0.17	54337	0.24	0.18
Union density	UND	58995	28.09	17.79	47502	28.56	18.13	42132	29.42	18.69
Bargaining rights	UNA	40543	52.98	30.25	33695	52.95	30.92	30659	55.44	29.75
Secondary education	ISE	57005	100.23	24.74	46286	98.42	23.73	38495	100.64	21.22
Internet access	IIU	74090	41.30	29.16	60397	40.21	28.95	52712	41.79	29.50
Science and research	IRD	68160	2713.11	1590.29	55586	2663.53	1575.34	48727	2750.67	1624.08
Press freedom	PFI	80588	11.74	17.88	63247	12.27	18.96	54337	11.29	18.01
Perc. inequality 1, log.	IP1	80588	2.26	0.61	63247	2.26	0.60	54337	2.24	0.60
Perc. inequality 1, lin.	IPN	80588	211.51	1530.75	63247	247.67	1710.37	54337	195.16	1487.67
Perc. inequality 2, log.	IP2	80588	2.84	0.64	63247	2.83	0.64	54337	2.80	0.63
Perc. inequality 3, log.	IP3	80588	2.11	0.55	63247	2.10	0.54	54337	2.08	0.54
Inequality tolerance 1	NR1	80588	2.04	0.39	63247	1.45	0.36	54337	1.43	0.37
Inequality tolerance 2	NR2	80588	1.45	0.38	63247	1.97	0.45	54337	1.94	0.45
Inequality tolerance 3	NR3	80588	1.97	0.46	63247	1.40	0.35	54337	1.38	0.35
Inequality tolerance 4	NGN	80588	1.40	0.37	63247	2.04	0.39	54337	2.03	0.39
Individualism	IDV	75419	59.31	22.16	59379	59.82	21.40	50935	59.41	21.31
Rationalism-traditionalism	RTN	54360	0.41	0.59	43910	0.39	0.59	38155	0.45	0.57

Notes: This table shows the code or abbreviation of variables, their mean and standard deviation and the number of valid country years for the complete sample, the sample restricted to cases with valid values for personal income and the sample restricted to cases with valid values for household equivalence income. The terms “standard deviation” [SD], “personal income” [PI], “household equivalence income” [EI], “perceived” [perc.], “linear” [lin.], “logarithmic” [log.] and the “number of valid country years” for each variable [N] are additionally abbreviated in some or all instances in this table.

Tab. A.2.3: Lowest and highest regression coefficients for structural effects in single country years

Rank	Country	Year	Effect of SPI on IT1	Effect of SEI on IT1	Effect of ISEI on IT1	Effect of SPI on IT2	Effect of SEI on IT2	Effect of ISEI on IT2
1.	South Korea	2009	-0.0898	0.0584	0.0039	-0.0406	0.0901	0.0040
2.	Philippines	2009	-0.0885	-0.0354	-0.0016	-0.0473	-0.0103	0.0001
3.	Venezuela	2009	-0.0272	0.0145	-0.0021	0.0064	0.0471	0.0004
4.	Bulgaria	1992	-0.0234	.	0.0014	-0.0114	.	0.0028
5.	Bulgaria	2009	-0.0166	-0.0179	0.0016	0.0107	0.0293	0.0004
6.	Philippines	1999	-0.0156	0.0058	.	-0.0756	-0.0319	.
7.	Portugal	1999	-0.0020	0.0526	.	-0.0263	0.0309	.
8.	Slovenia	1999	0.0038	0.0589	.	0.0351	0.0643	.
9.	China	2009	0.0080	0.0158	0.0005	0.0325	0.0221	0.0012
10.	Japan	1999	0.0095	0.0179	.	-0.0012	0.0107	.
	<< country years excluded >>							
60.	Australia	1999	0.1075	0.1049	0.0038	0.0906	0.0909	0.0019
61.	Sweden	2009	0.1079	0.1004	0.0050	0.1212	0.1089	0.0036
62.	Hungary	2009	0.1189	0.1336	0.0064	0.1450	0.1085	0.0122
63.	Australia	2009	0.1275	0.1004	0.0076	0.1203	0.1071	0.0077
64.	Canada	2009	0.1290	0.1167	0.0018	0.0206	0.1503	0.0006
65.	United Kingdom	2009	0.1362	0.0932	0.0063	0.1912	0.0938	0.0032
66.	Latvia	2009	0.1366	0.1490	0.0045	0.1434	0.1497	0.0042
67.	Germany	2009	0.1536	0.1540	0.0092	0.1425	0.1439	0.0096
68.	France	2009	0.1559	0.1145	0.0040	0.1688	0.0887	0.0049
69.	France	1999	0.1586	0.1430	.	0.1641	0.1330	.

Notes: Displayed are regression coefficients of the effect of structural position on inequality tolerance for the 10 country years showing the largest structural effects (of SPI on IT1) and the 10 country years showing the smallest structural effects (of SPI on IT1).

Tab. A.3: Selected full models showing regression coefficients and standard errors for theoretically relevant variables and additional control variables on individual level

	SLEI – IT1			SLEI – IT2			SLPI – IT1			SLPI – IT2		
	Estimate	SE	Z	Estimate	SE	Z	Estimate	SE	Z	Estimate	SE	Z
Perceived inequality	0.460***	0.003	147.57	0.498***	0.003	158.34	0.465***	0.003	138.35	0.500***	0.003	147.28
Gender: female	-0.084***	0.005	-15.40	-0.091***	0.006	-14.57	-0.071***	0.006	-12.06	-0.080***	0.007	-11.78
Age	-0.005***	0.001	-4.95	-0.008***	0.001	-6.82	-0.006***	0.001	-5.63	-0.011***	0.001	-8.23
Age, squared	0.000***	0.000	8.47	0.000***	0.000	9.47	0.000***	0.000	8.73	0.000***	0.000	10.51
Lowest formal	0.001	0.020	0.07	-0.009	0.022	-0.39	0.017	0.021	0.77	0.019	0.025	0.75
Above lowest	0.010	0.019	0.50	-0.020	0.022	-0.93	0.034*	0.021	1.64	0.016	0.024	0.68
Higher secondary	0.051	0.018	2.79	0.030	0.021	1.44	0.076***	0.020	3.75	0.069**	0.023	2.98
University degree	0.127***	0.019	6.55	0.078***	0.022	3.52	0.160***	0.021	7.62	0.121***	0.024	5.01
Widowed	-0.008	0.011	-0.70	-0.017	0.013	-1.31	-0.030	0.012	-2.51	-0.033	0.014	-2.35
Divorced	-0.017	0.011	-1.54	-0.002	0.012	-0.15	-0.039***	0.011	-3.60	-0.022	0.013	-1.75
Separated	0.015	0.019	0.78	0.021	0.021	0.97	-0.010	0.019	-0.53	0.015	0.022	0.67
Never	0.010	0.008	1.25	0.013	0.009	1.40	0.010	0.008	1.22	0.009	0.009	0.91
Structural position	0.055***	0.003	17.76	0.054***	0.004	15.39	0.047***	0.003	14.10	0.048***	0.004	12.50
Context-level main effects:												
Actual inequality	-0.008	0.045	-0.17	0.004	0.048	0.09	0.011	0.044	0.24	0.016	0.047	0.35
Redistribution	0.046	0.037	1.23	0.061	0.040	1.54	0.048	0.037	1.30	0.065	0.039	1.66
Prosperity	-0.002	0.037	-0.06	-0.008	0.039	-0.22	0.010	0.036	0.27	-0.007	0.038	-0.17
System threat	-0.006	0.021	-0.27	-0.004	0.023	-0.16	-0.007	0.021	-0.31	-0.007	0.022	-0.30
Fractionalization	0.016	0.029	0.56	0.062*	0.031	2.00	0.023	0.029	0.79	0.061*	0.030	2.01
Mobilization	-0.065**	0.024	-2.65	-0.054*	0.026	-2.08	-0.066**	0.025	-2.68	-0.057*	0.026	-2.20
Political distrust	-0.044	0.024	-1.83	-0.037	0.026	-1.44	-0.041	0.024	-1.69	-0.038	0.026	-1.50
Perceived inequality	0.098**	0.029	3.37	0.092**	0.031	2.97	0.084**	0.029	2.93	0.086**	0.030	2.88
Inequality tolerance	0.066*	0.033	2.00	0.076*	0.035	2.16	0.064*	0.032	1.98	0.082*	0.034	2.42
CLI:												
Actual inequality	-0.006	0.007	-0.96	0.000	0.008	0.00	0.024***	0.007	3.51	0.036***	0.008	4.53
Redistribution	0.015**	0.006	2.68	0.022***	0.006	3.49	0.029***	0.006	5.05	0.043***	0.007	6.35
Prosperity	-0.002	0.004	-0.54	-0.011**	0.004	-2.78	0.000	0.004	0.13	-0.005	0.004	-1.09
System threat	-0.016***	0.004	-3.75	-0.028***	0.005	-5.87	-0.025***	0.005	-4.98	-0.036***	0.006	-6.29
Fractionalization	-0.001	0.003	-0.41	-0.003	0.004	-0.89	-0.008*	0.003	-2.26	-0.010*	0.004	-2.50
Mobilization	-0.005	0.004	-1.40	-0.011*	0.004	-2.46	-0.003	0.004	-0.69	-0.007	0.005	-1.53
Political distrust	-0.003	0.003	-0.73	-0.007	0.004	-1.83	0.002	0.004	0.57	-0.002	0.004	-0.52
Perceived inequality	0.018***	0.005	3.90	0.017**	0.005	3.18	0.006	0.005	1.10	-0.002	0.006	-0.40
Inequality tolerance	-0.008*	0.004	-2.30	-0.001	0.004	-0.20	-0.009*	0.004	-2.39	-0.009	0.004	-2.02
Constant	0.293**	0.085	3.45	0.553***	0.091	6.05	0.275**	0.085	3.22	0.564***	0.091	6.20
Variance (level two)	0.018	0.003		0.020	0.004		0.017	0.003		0.019	0.003	
Residual variance	0.422	0.002		0.552	0.003		0.402	0.002		0.532	0.003	
N (individuals)	60397			60397			52712			52712		
N (groups)	67			67			67			67		

Notes: Displayed are estimates of regression coefficients, standard errors and Z-values of effects. Effects for region and survey wave are not displayed. Variance of level-two and -one errors and Chi² values of LR tests are displayed in the last four rows. Significant with * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Tab. A.4.1: Full hierarchical steps, using SLEI, IT1, regional CLIs and LR tests

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9	M. 10	M. 11	M. 12	M. 13	M. 14
Structural position		20.44	20.45	9.62	4.25	7.36	7.40	7.05	6.56	6.53	6.31	6.14	6.24	6.26
Context-level main effects:														
Region: Europe			-0.58	-0.55	-0.57	-0.56	-0.88	-0.83	-0.89	-0.92	-0.88	-1.00	-1.03	0.56
Region: East. Europe			-1.90	-1.74	-1.91	-1.91	-2.10	-1.08	-1.10	-1.05	-1.31	-1.29	-1.89	-0.34
Region: Other			1.67	1.11	1.69	1.71	1.92	2.05	1.61	1.54	2.01	2.00	2.04	2.53
Actual inequality			0.55	0.66	0.55	0.55	1.07	1.23	0.90	0.96	0.65	0.71	-0.51	-0.18
Redistribution							1.11	0.87	0.74	0.75	1.44	1.56	1.59	1.23
Prosperity								0.70	0.81	0.85	1.33	1.24	0.77	-0.06
System threat									0.95	0.91	1.04	0.67	1.21	-0.27
Fractionalization										-0.34	-0.53	-0.52	0.02	0.56
Mobilization											-2.70	-2.82	-2.63	-2.66
Political distrust												-0.77	-1.77	-1.83
Perceived inequality													2.74	3.37
Inequality tolerance														1.99
CLI:														
Region: Europe					*0.43*	*0.89*	*0.60*	*0.53*	*0.79*	*0.70*	*0.88*	*1.08*	*0.98*	*-0.85*
Region: East. Europe					*1.38*	*2.59*	*2.37*	*1.41*	*1.37*	*1.52*	*1.20*	*1.25*	*0.30*	*-1.28*
Region: Other					*-3.96*	*-7.14*	*-6.95*	*-6.79*	*-4.62*	*-4.71*	*-4.38*	*-4.31*	*-3.94*	*-4.48*
Actual inequality					*1.31*	*2.62*	*2.62*	*2.55*	*3.74*	*3.85*	*3.51*	*3.52*	*0.66*	*0.17*
Redistribution							*0.75*	*0.94*	*1.57*	*1.74*	*2.36*	*2.05*	*1.41*	*1.91*
Prosperity								*-0.77*	*-1.46*	*-1.28*	*-1.15*	*-1.06*	*-1.89*	*-1.18*
System threat									*-4.42*	*-4.56*	*-4.45*	*-3.63*	*-2.74*	*-1.92*
Fractionalization										*-1.26*	*-1.46*	*-1.72*	*-1.05*	*-0.63*
Mobilization											*-2.57*	*-1.84*	*-1.04*	*-1.02*
Political distrust												*1.78*	*-0.51*	*-0.60*
Perceived inequality													*4.27*	*3.03*
Inequality tolerance														*-2.31*
Constant	35.1	10.71	5.97	5.90	5.75	5.68	5.82	4.58	4.69	4.69	4.43	4.49	4.81	3.42
Variance (level two)	0.08	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Residual variance	0.59	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42
Chi² value of LR test		20830	26	183	32	63	2	1	20	2	14	4	25	35
LR Test against M. 3						152								

Notes: N (individuals): 60397, N (country years): 67. Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors and Chi² values of LR tests are displayed in the last four rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. LR tests are conducted against the previous model (vice versa for the test of M. 6 against M. 5).

Tab. A.4.2: Full hierarchical steps, using SLPI, IT1, regional CLIs and LR tests

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9	M. 10	M. 11	M. 12	M. 13	M. 14
Structural position		16.35	16.35	8.34	2.77	4.99	5.44	5.61	4.74	4.70	4.64	4.37	4.45	4.64
Context-level main effects:														
Region: Europe			-0.49	-0.20	-0.51	-0.49	-0.90	-0.82	-0.92	-0.94	-0.90	-1.02	-1.02	0.57
Region: East. Europe			-1.64	-1.41	-1.64	-1.64	-1.90	-0.72	-0.74	-0.69	-0.98	-0.97	-1.47	-0.05
Region: Other			1.43	0.77	1.43	1.44	1.71	1.97	1.44	1.37	1.82	1.82	1.84	2.32
Actual inequality			0.98	1.31	0.94	0.98	1.58	1.82	1.38	1.39	1.06	1.10	-0.01	0.24
Redistribution							1.39	1.05	0.88	0.89	1.61	1.74	1.74	1.30
Prosperity								1.01	1.15	1.19	1.62	1.51	1.09	0.27
System threat									1.26	1.23	1.36	0.95	1.41	-0.31
Fractionalization										-0.34	-0.53	-0.52	-0.05	0.80
Mobilization											-2.60	-2.74	-2.60	-2.68
Political distrust												-0.81	-1.64	-1.69
Perceived inequality													2.30	2.94
Inequality tolerance														1.97
CLI:														
Region: Europe					*1.58*	*2.71*	*1.54*	*1.46*	*1.92*	*1.78*	*1.88*	*2.10*	*2.05*	*0.13*
Region: East. Europe					*1.38*	*2.19*	*1.45*	*0.23*	*0.37*	*0.72*	*0.29*	*0.46*	*0.03*	*-1.25*
Region: Other					*-3.25*	*-5.13*	*-4.72*	*-4.96*	*-2.25*	*-2.46*	*-2.12*	*-2.10*	*-1.98*	*-2.45*
Actual inequality					*1.99*	*2.81*	*3.99*	*3.79*	*5.55*	*5.93*	*5.33*	*5.31*	*3.39*	*3.03*
Redistribution							*3.11*	*3.44*	*4.30*	*4.55*	*4.99*	*4.34*	*3.92*	*4.28*
Prosperity								*-1.56*	*-2.32*	*-2.06*	*-2.05*	*-1.81*	*-2.21*	*-1.45*
System threat									*-5.91*	*-6.12*	*-5.90*	*-4.79*	*-4.30*	*-3.72*
Fractionalization										*-2.21*	*-2.38*	*-2.56*	*-2.28*	*-1.82*
Mobilization											*-2.21*	*-1.32*	*-0.83*	*-0.73*
Political distrust												*1.67*	*0.48*	*0.56*
Perceived inequality													*2.23*	*1.17*
Inequality tolerance														*-1.92*
Constant	34.68	9.58	5.54	5.58	5.55	5.42	5.68	4.33	4.49	4.47	4.21	4.29	4.50	3.21
Variance (level two)	0.08	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Residual variance	0.56	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40
Chi² value of LR test		18186	26	133	25	76	12	3	36	5	11	3	10	18
LR Test against M. 3						82								

Notes: N (individuals): 52713, N (country years): 67. Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors and Chi² values of LR tests are displayed in the last four rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. LR tests are conducted against the previous model (vice versa for the test of M. 6 against M. 5) if not further specified (compare the last row).

Tab. A.4.3: Full hierarchical steps, using SLEI, IT2, regional CLIs and LR tests

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9	M. 10	M. 11	M. 12	M. 13	M. 14
Structural position		17.01	17.04	8.72	3.47	5.78	5.85	5.70	5.09	5.05	4.83	4.83	4.90	3.39
Context-level main effects:														
Region: Europe			-1.51	-1.47	-1.49	-1.50	-2.00	-1.96	-2.21	-2.21	-2.22	-2.29	-2.35	-0.34
Region: East. Europe			-2.42	-2.09	-2.43	-2.43	-2.78	-1.75	-1.86	-1.83	-2.05	-2.04	-2.52	-0.76
Region: Other			2.01	1.29	2.02	2.04	2.41	2.42	1.49	1.45	1.81	1.80	1.82	2.37
Actual inequality			0.83	0.95	0.85	0.83	1.67	1.73	0.99	0.96	0.70	0.74	-0.27	0.09
Redistribution							1.74	1.55	1.27	1.27	1.82	1.90	1.91	1.54
Prosperity								0.44	0.74	0.75	1.14	1.07	0.67	-0.22
System threat									2.55	2.53	2.68	2.26	2.72	-0.16
Fractionalization										-0.16	-0.31	-0.30	0.15	2.00
Mobilization											-2.18	-2.26	-2.06	-2.08
Political distrust												-0.57	-1.38	-1.44
Perceived inequality													2.24	2.97
Inequality tolerance														2.15
CLI:														
Region: Europe					*0.51*	*0.67*	*0.33*	*0.25*	*0.59*	*0.48*	*0.67*	*0.64*	*0.58*	*0.79*
Region: East. Europe					*1.85*	*3.00*	*2.73*	*1.61*	*1.55*	*1.75*	*1.42*	*1.41*	*0.78*	*0.94*
Region: Other					*-3.28*	*-5.36*	*-5.17*	*-5.17*	*-2.61*	*-2.74*	*-2.40*	*-2.41*	*-2.18*	*-1.88*
Actual inequality					*0.86*	*1.22*	*1.53*	*1.44*	*3.08*	*3.47*	*3.11*	*3.11*	*1.13*	*1.21*
Redistribution							*0.94*	*1.16*	*1.98*	*2.20*	*2.84*	*2.84*	*2.42*	*2.23*
Prosperity								*-0.91*	*-1.81*	*-1.59*	*-1.45*	*-1.46*	*-1.99*	*-2.06*
System threat									*-5.77*	*-5.94*	*-5.83*	*-5.59*	*-4.96*	*-4.89*
Fractionalization										*-1.61*	*-1.82*	*-1.76*	*-1.32*	*-1.40*
Mobilization											*-2.71*	*-2.64*	*-2.10*	*-2.10*
Political distrust												*-0.25*	*-1.56*	*-1.54*
Perceived inequality													*2.76*	*2.76*
Inequality tolerance														*0.54*
Constant	36.44	14.22	8.53	8.47	8.25	8.23	8.53	7.04	7.59	7.57	7.37	7.41	7.70	6.02
Variance (level two)	0.13	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Residual variance	0.80	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55
		2278												
Chi² value of LR test		1	45	150	32	55	4	1	39	3	12	0	12	17
LR Test against M. 3						127								

Notes: N (individuals): 60397, N (country years): 67. Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors and Chi² values of LR tests are displayed in the last four rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. LR tests are conducted against the previous model (vice versa for the test of M. 6 against M. 5) if not further specified (compare the last row).

Tab. A.4.4: Full hierarchical steps, using SLPI, IT2, regional CLIs and LR tests

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9	M. 10	M. 11	M. 12	M. 13	M. 14
Structural position		13.95	13.97	7.23	1.39	2.85	3.38	3.48	2.58	2.53	2.49	2.51	2.51	2.13
Context-level main effects:														
Region: Europe			-1.50	-1.12	-1.52	-1.51	-2.09	-2.04	-2.32	-2.33	-2.34	-2.42	-2.46	-0.25
Region: East. Europe			-2.24	-1.82	-2.25	-2.24	-2.65	-1.54	-1.66	-1.62	-1.87	-1.87	-2.31	-0.50
Region: Other			1.91	1.53	1.91	1.92	2.35	2.42	1.47	1.41	1.77	1.77	1.78	2.40
Actual inequality			1.06	1.29	1.05	1.07	2.00	2.09	1.31	1.29	1.01	1.04	0.04	0.35
Redistribution							2.01	1.76	1.47	1.48	2.06	2.16	2.16	1.66
Prosperity								0.59	0.90	0.94	1.27	1.18	0.80	-0.17
System threat									2.68	2.65	2.80	2.33	2.74	-0.30
Fractionalization										-0.26	-0.42	-0.41	0.01	2.01
Mobilization											-2.13	-2.25	-2.10	-2.20
Political distrust												-0.70	-1.42	-1.50
Perceived inequality													2.04	2.88
Inequality tolerance														2.41
CLI:														
Region: Europe					*2.37*	*3.52*	*2.20*	*2.15*	*2.64*	*2.47*	*2.52*	*2.45*	*2.45*	*1.54*
Region: East. Europe					*2.58*	*3.65*	*2.80*	*1.68*	*1.83*	*2.26*	*1.96*	*1.92*	*1.86*	*1.19*
Region: Other					*-2.44*	*-3.63*	*-3.20*	*-3.33*	*-0.59*	*-0.87*	*-0.67*	*-0.67*	*-0.67*	*-0.73*
Actual inequality					*1.70*	*2.11*	*3.54*	*3.42*	*5.33*	*6.04*	*5.61*	*5.61*	*4.74*	*4.62*
Redistribution							*3.43*	*3.55*	*4.47*	*4.79*	*4.99*	*4.89*	*4.81*	*4.73*
Prosperity								*-0.95*	*-1.77*	*-1.44*	*-1.43*	*-1.46*	*-1.46*	*-1.27*
System threat									*-6.31*	*-6.58*	*-6.43*	*-6.05*	*-5.93*	*-5.68*
Fractionalization										*-2.84*	*-2.94*	*-2.88*	*-2.84*	*-2.71*
Mobilization											*-1.40*	*-1.40*	*-1.35*	*-1.33*
Political distrust												*-0.31*	*-0.33*	*-0.32*
Perceived inequality													*0.12*	*-0.03*
Inequality tolerance														*-0.31*
Constant	36.04	13.55	8.48	8.29	8.40	8.31	8.75	7.21	7.77	7.74	7.55	7.60	7.85	6.17
Variance (level two)	0.14	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Residual variance	0.76	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53
Chi² value of LR test		19674	44	110	28	57	16	1	47	8	6	1	4	10
LR Test against M. 3						80								

Notes: N (individuals): 52713, N (country years): 67. Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors and Chi² values of LR tests are displayed in the last four rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. LR tests are conducted against the previous model (vice versa for the test of M. 6 against M. 5) if not further specified (compare the last row).

Tab. A.4.5: Full hierarchical steps, using SLEI, IT1, country-year controls and LR tests

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9	M. 10	M. 11	M. 12	M. 13	M. 14
Structural position		20.44	20.42	9.61	10.51	21.10	20.15	20.26	20.74	20.73	19.39	19.30	18.08	17.74
CLI:														
Actual inequality					*-3.36*	*-8.09*	*-1.78*	*-1.87*	*2.03*	*1.84*	*1.71*	*1.75*	*-0.92*	*-0.97*
Redistribution							*3.00*	*3.48*	*3.89*	*3.82*	*4.59*	*4.24*	*2.85*	*2.68*
Prosperity								*-2.15*	*-3.59*	*-3.59*	*-2.31*	*-2.05*	*-2.14*	*-0.54*
System threat									*-7.64*	*-7.45*	*-6.96*	*-5.83*	*-4.36*	*-3.75*
Fractionalization										*-0.13*	*-0.73*	*-1.04*	*-0.64*	*-0.42*
Mobilization											*-3.69*	*-2.78*	*-1.44*	*-1.39*
Political distrust												*1.83*	*-0.86*	*-0.72*
Perceived inequality													*5.13*	*3.90*
Inequality tolerance														*-2.30*
Constant	35.10	10.71	5.27	4.98	4.97	5.05	5.12	5.03	5.01	5.00	4.99	4.96	4.97	4.93
Variance (level two)	0.11	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Residual variance	0.60	0.42	0.42	0.00	0.00	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42
Chi² value of LR test		20830	355	181	10	126	9	5	58	0	14	3	26	32
LR Test against M. 3						65.49								

Notes: N (individuals): 60397, N (country years): 67. Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors and Chi² values of LR tests are displayed in the last four rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for country-year controls and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. LR tests are conducted against the previous model (vice versa for the test of M. 6 against M. 5) if not further specified (compare the last row).

Tab. A.4.6: Full hierarchical steps, using SLPI, IT1, country-year controls and LR tests

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9	M. 10	M. 11	M. 12	M. 13	M. 14
Structural position		16.35	16.34	8.35	8.78	16.59	15.64	15.64	15.90	15.93	15.28	15.14	14.68	14.08
CLI:														
Actual inequality					*-2.43*	*-5.71*	*1.16*	*1.15*	*4.95*	*5.39*	*5.14*	*5.08*	*3.40*	*3.51*
Redistribution							*5.20*	*5.23*	*5.88*	*6.20*	*6.58*	*6.05*	*5.27*	*5.05*
Prosperity								*-0.88*	*-2.24*	*-2.50*	*-1.64*	*-1.38*	*-1.48*	*0.13*
System threat									*-7.51*	*-7.78*	*-7.25*	*-6.09*	*-5.46*	*-4.98*
Fractionalization										*-2.14*	*-2.53*	*-2.68*	*-2.55*	*-2.26*
Mobilization											*-2.42*	*-1.62*	*-0.93*	*-0.69*
Political distrust												*1.32*	*0.22*	*0.58*
Perceived inequality													*2.20*	*1.10*
Inequality tolerance														*-2.39*
Constant	34.68	9.58	4.35	4.29	4.28	4.20	4.43	4.39	4.38	4.35	4.29	4.29	4.26	4.23
Variance (level two)	0.12	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Residual variance	0.57	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40
Chi² value of LR test		18186	345	130	6	103	27	1	56	5	6	2	5	11
LR Test against M. 3						33								

Notes: N (individuals): 52713, N (country years): 67. Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors and Chi² values of LR tests are displayed in the last four rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for country-year controls and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. LR tests are conducted against the previous model (vice versa for the test of M. 6 against M. 5) if not further specified (compare the last row).

Tab. A.4.7: Full hierarchical steps, using SLEI, IT2, country-year controls and LR tests

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9	M. 10	M. 11	M. 12	M. 13	M. 14
Structural position		17.01	17.03	8.68	9.59	17.70	16.90	17.12	17.64	17.61	16.37	16.36	15.48	15.37
CLI:														
Actual inequality					*-3.56*	*-7.96*	*-2.11*	*-2.24*	*1.97*	*2.04*	*1.92*	*1.92*	*0.01*	*0.00*
Redistribution							*2.53*	*3.30*	*3.74*	*3.79*	*4.54*	*4.51*	*3.51*	*3.49*
Prosperity								*-3.14*	*-4.66*	*-4.69*	*-3.39*	*-3.38*	*-3.45*	*-2.78*
System threat									*-8.17*	*-8.10*	*-7.61*	*-7.16*	*-6.06*	*-5.87*
Fractionalization										*-0.67*	*-1.24*	*-1.19*	*-0.92*	*-0.89*
Mobilization											*-3.60*	*-3.42*	*-2.46*	*-2.45*
Political distrust												*-0.18*	*-1.84*	*-1.83*
Perceived inequality													*3.50*	*3.18*
Inequality tolerance														*-0.20*
Constant	36.44	14.22	12.12	11.75	11.74	11.91	11.97	11.85	11.84	11.83	11.82	11.82	11.83	11.82
Variance (level two)	0.19	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Residual variance	0.81	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55
Chi² value of LR test		22781	366	146	11	94	6	10	67	0	13	0	12	12
LR Test against M. 3						63.30								

Notes: N (individuals): 60397, N (country years): 67. Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors and Chi² values of LR tests are displayed in the last four rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for country-year controls and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. LR tests are conducted against the previous model (vice versa for the test of M. 6 against M. 5) if not further specified (compare the last row).

Tab. A.4.8: Full hierarchical steps, using SLPI, IT2, country-year controls and LR tests

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9	M. 10	M. 11	M. 12	M. 13	M. 14
Structural position		13.95	13.97	7.21	7.74	14.25	13.30	13.40	13.65	13.69	13.17	13.19	13.00	12.49
CLI:														
Actual inequality					*-2.92*	*-6.14*	*1.08*	*1.05*	*4.80*	*5.47*	*5.28*	*5.30*	*4.45*	*4.54*
Redistribution							*5.39*	*5.64*	*6.28*	*6.69*	*6.92*	*6.88*	*6.54*	*6.35*
Prosperity								*-1.67*	*-2.99*	*-3.31*	*-2.60*	*-2.69*	*-2.71*	*-1.09*
System threat									*-7.39*	*-7.76*	*-7.34*	*-7.00*	*-6.74*	*-6.30*
Fractionalization										*-2.62*	*-2.90*	*-2.78*	*-2.75*	*-2.50*
Mobilization											*-1.80*	*-1.93*	*-1.74*	*-1.53*
Political distrust												*-0.72*	*-0.83*	*-0.51*
Perceived inequality													*0.41*	*-0.40*
Inequality tolerance														*-2.02*
Constant	36.04	13.55	12.07	11.95	11.93	11.93	12.15	12.08	12.09	12.04	12.00	12.00	12.00	11.97
Variance (level two)	0.19	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Residual variance	0.77	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53
Chi² value of LR test		19674	357	108	8	78	29	3	55	7	3	1	0	4
LR Test against M. 3						37.66								

Notes: N (individuals): 52713, N (country years): 67. Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors and Chi² values of LR tests are displayed in the last four rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for country-year controls and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. LR tests are conducted against the previous model (vice versa for the test of M. 6 against M. 5) if not further specified (compare the last row).

Tab. A.4.9: Hierarchical steps, using SLEI, IT1, regional controls and cluster-corrected standard errors

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9
Structural position	8.20	7.82	7.93	10.07	10.03	8.79	8.95	10.03	10.08
Context-level main effects:									
Actual inequality	0.41	0.68	0.77	0.64	0.74	0.50	0.54	-0.36	-0.13
Redistribution		0.87	0.70	0.61	0.61	1.31	1.40	1.30	0.95
Prosperity			0.55	0.61	0.61	1.03	0.96	0.60	-0.05
System threat				1.23	1.15	1.14	0.76	1.36	-0.24
Fractionalization					-0.30	-0.46	-0.46	0.02	0.61
Mobilization						-2.94	-3.04	-2.55	-2.43
Political distrust							-0.79	-1.62	-1.66
Perceived inequality								1.99	2.37
Inequality tolerance									1.92
CLI:									
Actual inequality	*-3.72*	*-1.25*	*-1.28*	*1.27*	*1.10*	*1.07*	*1.03*	*-0.54*	*-0.60*
Redistribution		*1.51*	*1.89*	*2.74*	*2.62*	*2.99*	*2.68*	*2.08*	*2.01*
Prosperity			*-1.07*	*-2.23*	*-2.29*	*-1.66*	*-1.56*	*-1.86*	*-0.42*
System threat				*-5.12*	*-5.16*	*-5.16*	*-4.23*	*-3.03*	*-2.69*
Fractionalization					*-0.08*	*-0.46*	*-0.65*	*-0.44*	*-0.31*
Mobilization						*-1.74*	*-1.26*	*-0.75*	*-0.75*
Political distrust							*0.90*	*-0.53*	*-0.44*
Perceived inequality								*2.86*	*2.26*
Inequality tolerance									*-1.36*
Constant	5.68	5.87	4.19	4.32	4.28	4.08	4.13	3.92	3.21
Variance (level two)	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Residual variance	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42

Notes: N (individuals): 60397, N (country years): 67. Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors are displayed in the last two rows.

Tab. A.4.10: Hierarchical steps, using SLEI, IT2, regional controls and cluster-corrected standard errors

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9
Structural position	7.52	7.31	7.51	10.51	10.58	9.63	9.75	10.04	10.04
Context-level main effects:									
Actual inequality	0.65	1.21	1.25	0.78	0.79	0.57	0.61	-0.22	0.08
Redistribution		1.49	1.32	1.02	1.02	1.65	1.70	1.50	1.07
Prosperity			0.39	0.63	0.62	1.02	0.93	0.60	-0.19
System threat				3.54	3.46	3.50	2.72	3.19	-0.16
Fractionalization					-0.14	-0.28	-0.27	0.15	2.34
Mobilization						-1.98	-2.05	-1.62	-1.60
Political distrust							-0.58	-1.26	-1.25
Perceived inequality								1.60	1.98
Inequality tolerance									1.82
CLI:									
Actual inequality	*-3.60*	*-1.59*	*-1.59*	*1.59*	*1.52*	*1.52*	*1.53*	*0.01*	*0.00*
Redistribution		*1.48*	*1.97*	*2.59*	*2.52*	*3.15*	*2.97*	*2.48*	*2.50*
Prosperity			*-1.54*	*-2.89*	*-2.91*	*-2.72*	*-2.75*	*-3.04*	*-2.16*
System threat				*-8.08*	*-7.72*	*-7.16*	*-6.78*	*-5.31*	*-5.25*
Fractionalization					*-0.37*	*-0.77*	*-0.76*	*-0.61*	*-0.60*
Mobilization						*-1.87*	*-1.69*	*-1.35*	*-1.35*
Political distrust							*-0.10*	*-1.26*	*-1.24*
Perceived inequality								*2.19*	*2.01*
Inequality tolerance									*-0.15*
Constant	6.77	6.96	5.83	6.05	6.00	6.03	5.95	5.82	5.12
Variance (level two)	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Residual variance	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55

Notes: N (individuals): 60397, N (country years): 67. Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors are displayed in the last two rows.

Tab. A.4.11: Hierarchical steps, using SLPI, IT1, regional controls and cluster-corrected standard errors

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9
Structural position	7.09	7.19	7.12	8.33	8.45	8.23	8.16	8.44	8.09
Context-level main effects:									
Actual inequality	0.83	1.21	1.36	1.15	1.19	0.92	0.96	-0.01	0.20
Redistribution		1.19	0.92	0.77	0.77	1.54	1.66	1.51	1.08
Prosperity			0.78	0.86	0.85	1.24	1.14	0.84	0.20
System threat				1.89	1.79	1.70	1.19	1.66	-0.29
Fractionalization					-0.29	-0.47	-0.46	-0.05	0.84
Mobilization						-2.83	-2.90	-2.54	-2.48
Political distrust							-0.82	-1.55	-1.54
Perceived inequality								1.81	2.21
Inequality tolerance									1.86
CLI:									
Actual inequality	*-3.11*	*0.58*	*0.56*	*3.42*	*3.90*	*4.07*	*3.92*	*2.48*	*2.63*
Redistribution		*2.61*	*2.66*	*3.95*	*4.09*	*4.50*	*4.23*	*3.77*	*3.47*
Prosperity			*-0.51*	*-1.55*	*-1.65*	*-1.14*	*-0.97*	*-1.09*	*0.12*
System threat				*-6.72*	*-7.44*	*-8.77*	*-8.03*	*-6.70*	*-5.08*
Fractionalization					*-1.29*	*-1.72*	*-1.72*	*-1.67*	*-1.52*
Mobilization						*-1.90*	*-1.17*	*-0.76*	*-0.55*
Political distrust							*0.90*	*0.14*	*0.36*
Perceived inequality								*1.35*	*0.69*
Inequality tolerance									*-1.42*
Constant	4.90	5.09	3.76	3.87	3.83	3.55	3.55	3.44	2.94
Variance (level two)	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Residual variance	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40

Notes: N (individuals): 52713, N (country years): 67. Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors are displayed in the last two rows.

Tab. A.4.12: Hierarchical steps, using SLPI, IT2, regional controls and cluster-corrected standard errors

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9
Structural position	6.48	6.60	6.56	7.93	8.16	7.96	8.07	8.20	7.94
Context-level main effects:									
Actual inequality	0.90	1.71	1.76	1.18	1.16	0.92	0.97	0.04	0.34
Redistribution		1.85	1.58	1.24	1.24	1.98	2.07	1.82	1.22
Prosperity			0.52	0.78	0.76	1.13	1.00	0.70	-0.14
System threat				4.12	4.03	3.98	2.90	3.23	-0.31
Fractionalization					-0.22	-0.36	-0.36	0.01	2.24
Mobilization						-1.88	-1.97	-1.64	-1.70
Political distrust							-0.69	-1.34	-1.31
Perceived inequality								1.59	2.04
Inequality tolerance									2.03
CLI:									
Actual inequality	*-2.79*	*0.48*	*0.45*	*3.04*	*3.93*	*3.84*	*3.92*	*3.24*	*3.26*
Redistribution		*2.87*	*3.00*	*4.24*	*4.67*	*5.11*	*5.05*	*4.80*	*4.49*
Prosperity			*-1.14*	*-2.26*	*-2.38*	*-2.08*	*-2.28*	*-2.33*	*-1.12*
System threat				*-6.22*	*-6.98*	*-6.62*	*-7.64*	*-7.09*	*-5.62*
Fractionalization					*-1.47*	*-1.72*	*-1.72*	*-1.70*	*-1.56*
Mobilization						*-1.36*	*-1.42*	*-1.32*	*-1.18*
Political distrust							*-0.51*	*-0.60*	*-0.37*
Perceived inequality								*0.31*	*-0.29*
Inequality tolerance									*-1.32*
Constant	7.19	7.50	6.43	6.65	6.55	6.44	6.31	6.22	5.65
Variance (level two)	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Residual variance	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53

Notes: N (individuals): 52713, N (country years): 67. Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors are displayed in the last two rows.

Tab. A.4.13: Hierarchical steps, using SLEI, IT1, regional CLIs and cluster-corrected standard errors

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9
Structural position	7.52	8.68	6.48	6.74	6.91	6.97	6.25	7.10	5.38
Context-level main effects:									
Region: Europe	-0.77	-1.20	-1.12	-1.20	-1.20	-1.06	-1.21	-1.08	0.66
Region: East. Europe	-2.85	-2.97	-1.09	-1.11	-1.02	-1.39	-1.38	-1.80	-0.39
Region: Other	1.58	1.84	1.95	1.45	1.44	1.77	1.72	1.73	2.34
Actual inequality	0.40	0.68	0.77	0.64	0.74	0.49	0.54	-0.36	-0.13
Redistribution		0.87	0.70	0.61	0.61	1.31	1.40	1.30	0.95
Prosperity			0.54	0.60	0.61	1.03	0.96	0.60	-0.05
System threat				1.23	1.16	1.14	0.76	1.36	-0.25
Fractionalization					-0.30	-0.46	-0.46	0.02	0.61
Mobilization						-2.94	-3.04	-2.56	-2.43
Political distrust							-0.79	-1.62	-1.66
Perceived inequality								1.99	2.37
Inequality tolerance									1.91
CLI:									
Region: Europe	*0.69*	*0.54*	*0.46*	*0.69*	*0.62*	*0.81*	*0.95*	*1.06*	*-0.61*
Region: East. Europe	*2.02*	*1.94*	*0.95*	*1.01*	*1.12*	*0.83*	*0.87*	*0.22*	*-0.97*
Region: Other	*-4.21*	*-4.19*	*-4.19*	*-3.58*	*-3.64*	*-3.58*	*-3.42*	*-3.32*	*-4.13*
Actual inequality	*1.51*	*1.53*	*1.47*	*2.72*	*2.62*	*2.46*	*2.35*	*0.38*	*0.11*
Redistribution		*0.53*	*0.67*	*1.13*	*1.23*	*1.59*	*1.39*	*1.28*	*1.48*
Prosperity			*-0.50*	*-1.08*	*-0.89*	*-0.82*	*-0.78*	*-1.47*	*-0.87*
System threat				*-4.50*	*-4.69*	*-4.65*	*-3.15*	*-2.23*	*-1.83*
Fractionalization					*-0.89*	*-1.06*	*-1.20*	*-0.76*	*-0.48*
Mobilization						*-1.31*	*-0.94*	*-0.63*	*-0.64*
Political distrust							*1.11*	*-0.32*	*-0.39*
Perceived inequality								*2.47*	*1.74*
Inequality tolerance									*-1.39*
Constant	5.85	5.89	4.13	4.29	4.25	4.04	4.08	3.88	3.18
Variance (level two)	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Residual variance	0.36	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42

Notes: N (individuals): 60397, N (country years): 67. Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors are displayed in the last two rows.

Tab. A.4.14: Hierarchical steps, using SLEI, IT2, regional CLIs and cluster-corrected standard errors

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9
Structural position	5.44	6.64	5.29	5.43	5.63	5.66	5.66	6.43	3.31
Context-level main effects:									
Region: Europe	-1.79	-2.18	-2.19	-2.38	-2.30	-2.31	-2.41	-2.24	-0.30
Region: East. Europe	-2.97	-3.17	-1.66	-1.72	-1.64	-2.06	-2.09	-2.28	-0.70
Region: Other	1.79	2.16	2.24	1.40	1.37	1.64	1.61	1.64	2.20
Actual inequality	0.65	1.21	1.25	0.78	0.78	0.57	0.61	-0.22	0.07
Redistribution		1.49	1.32	1.02	1.02	1.65	1.70	1.50	1.07
Prosperity			0.39	0.63	0.62	1.02	0.93	0.60	-0.19
System threat				3.55	3.47	3.50	2.72	3.19	-0.16
Fractionalization					-0.14	-0.28	-0.27	0.15	2.34
Mobilization						-1.98	-2.05	-1.62	-1.61
Political distrust							-0.59	-1.26	-1.25
Perceived inequality								1.60	1.98
Inequality tolerance									1.82
CLI:									
Region: Europe	*0.54*	*0.34*	*0.24*	*0.58*	*0.47*	*0.69*	*0.64*	*0.65*	*0.71*
Region: East. Europe	*2.22*	*2.33*	*1.24*	*1.44*	*1.58*	*1.28*	*1.27*	*0.71*	*0.80*
Region: Other	*-2.88*	*-2.88*	*-3.00*	*-1.79*	*-1.78*	*-1.64*	*-1.65*	*-1.57*	*-1.30*
Actual inequality	*0.69*	*0.82*	*0.76*	*2.09*	*2.09*	*1.97*	*1.97*	*0.70*	*0.78*
Redistribution		*0.69*	*0.87*	*1.55*	*1.61*	*2.29*	*2.18*	*2.13*	*1.95*
Prosperity			*-0.66*	*-1.64*	*-1.39*	*-1.32*	*-1.32*	*-1.95*	*-1.84*
System threat				*-6.51*	*-6.37*	*-5.56*	*-5.45*	*-4.78*	*-4.36*
Fractionalization					*-0.98*	*-1.18*	*-1.17*	*-0.90*	*-0.97*
Mobilization						*-1.53*	*-1.47*	*-1.30*	*-1.29*
Political distrust							*-0.17*	*-1.16*	*-1.14*
Perceived inequality								*1.87*	*1.96*
Inequality tolerance									*0.37*
Constant	6.83	6.92	5.81	6.06	6.00	6.02	5.95	5.80	5.10
Variance (level two)	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Residual variance	0.47	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55

Notes: N (individuals): 60397, N (country years): 67. Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors are displayed in the last two rows.

Tab. A.4.15: Hierarchical steps, using SLPI, IT1, regional CLIs and cluster-corrected standard errors

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9
Structural position	2.29	2.54	3.01	2.60	2.87	2.76	2.68	2.79	3.16
Context-level main effects:									
Region: Europe	-0.70	-1.17	-1.07	-1.18	-1.19	-1.04	-1.19	-1.06	0.66
Region: East. Europe	-2.37	-2.51	-0.70	-0.72	-0.65	-1.00	-0.99	-1.39	-0.06
Region: Other	1.57	1.83	2.03	1.43	1.42	1.78	1.71	1.67	2.35
Actual inequality	0.82	1.21	1.36	1.15	1.19	0.92	0.96	-0.01	0.20
Redistribution		1.19	0.92	0.77	0.77	1.54	1.66	1.51	1.08
Prosperity			0.78	0.86	0.85	1.24	1.14	0.84	0.21
System threat				1.89	1.79	1.70	1.19	1.66	-0.29
Fractionalization					-0.29	-0.47	-0.46	-0.05	0.84
Mobilization						-2.83	-2.90	-2.54	-2.48
Political distrust							-0.81	-1.55	-1.54
Perceived inequality								1.81	2.21
Inequality tolerance									1.85
CLI:									
Region: Europe	*1.22*	*0.75*	*0.75*	*0.95*	*0.93*	*0.98*	*1.11*	*1.13*	*0.08*
Region: East. Europe	*1.10*	*0.75*	*0.14*	*0.25*	*0.50*	*0.19*	*0.30*	*0.02*	*-0.82*
Region: Other	*-2.38*	*-2.24*	*-2.54*	*-1.36*	*-1.49*	*-1.28*	*-1.31*	*-1.20*	*-1.56*
Actual inequality	*1.64*	*1.91*	*1.81*	*3.84*	*4.64*	*4.35*	*4.20*	*2.19*	*2.05*
Redistribution		*1.87*	*2.06*	*2.82*	*2.89*	*3.29*	*2.91*	*2.88*	*2.96*
Prosperity			*-1.06*	*-1.76*	*-1.46*	*-1.47*	*-1.31*	*-1.58*	*-1.13*
System threat				*-5.44*	*-5.82*	*-6.55*	*-6.15*	*-5.16*	*-3.62*
Fractionalization					*-1.43*	*-1.64*	*-1.65*	*-1.45*	*-1.13*
Mobilization						*-1.80*	*-1.01*	*-0.79*	*-0.65*
Political distrust							*1.17*	*0.31*	*0.36*
Perceived inequality								*1.38*	*0.73*
Inequality tolerance									*-1.14*
Constant	5.02	5.09	3.71	3.85	3.81	3.52	3.52	3.41	2.92
Variance (level two)	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Residual variance	0.34	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40

Notes: N (individuals): 52713, N (country years): 67. Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors are displayed in the last two rows.

Tab. A.4.16: Hierarchical steps, using SLPI, IT2, regional CLIs and cluster-corrected standard errors

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9
Structural position	1.72	2.02	2.33	1.75	1.98	1.88	1.86	1.85	1.36
Context-level main effects:									
Region: Europe	-1.85	-2.30	-2.32	-2.54	-2.44	-2.41	-2.55	-2.38	-0.23
Region: East. Europe	-2.71	-2.98	-1.44	-1.52	-1.42	-1.82	-1.86	-2.09	-0.47
Region: Other	1.89	2.30	2.43	1.55	1.49	1.79	1.75	1.74	2.44
Actual inequality	0.90	1.71	1.76	1.18	1.16	0.92	0.97	0.04	0.34
Redistribution		1.85	1.58	1.24	1.24	1.98	2.07	1.82	1.22
Prosperity			0.53	0.78	0.77	1.13	1.01	0.70	-0.14
System threat				4.12	4.03	3.97	2.90	3.23	-0.31
Fractionalization					-0.23	-0.37	-0.36	0.01	2.24
Mobilization						-1.88	-1.97	-1.64	-1.70
Political distrust							-0.69	-1.34	-1.31
Perceived inequality								1.60	2.05
Inequality tolerance									2.02
CLI:									
Region: Europe	*1.98*	*1.35*	*1.38*	*1.62*	*1.59*	*1.62*	*1.57*	*1.57*	*1.05*
Region: East. Europe	*2.17*	*1.74*	*1.23*	*1.48*	*1.89*	*1.57*	*1.54*	*1.39*	*0.75*
Region: Other	*-1.78*	*-1.56*	*-1.72*	*-0.32*	*-0.45*	*-0.35*	*-0.35*	*-0.34*	*-0.36*
Actual inequality	*1.13*	*1.55*	*1.49*	*3.18*	*4.04*	*3.79*	*3.80*	*3.01*	*2.88*
Redistribution		*1.99*	*2.18*	*3.04*	*3.27*	*3.64*	*3.60*	*3.67*	*3.56*
Prosperity			*-0.75*	*-1.55*	*-1.18*	*-1.15*	*-1.19*	*-1.13*	*-1.11*
System threat				*-4.46*	*-4.69*	*-4.64*	*-5.14*	*-5.12*	*-4.12*
Fractionalization					*-1.70*	*-1.80*	*-1.81*	*-1.76*	*-1.64*
Mobilization						*-1.10*	*-1.12*	*-1.14*	*-1.13*
Political distrust							*-0.24*	*-0.25*	*-0.24*
Perceived inequality								*0.08*	*-0.02*
Inequality tolerance									*-0.19*
Constant	7.31	7.52	6.43	6.68	6.56	6.45	6.32	6.22	5.64
Variance (level two)	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Residual variance	0.46	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53

Notes: N (individuals): 52713, N (country years): 67. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Effects for survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors are displayed in the last two rows.

Tab. A.4.17: Hierarchical steps, using SLEI, IT1, country-year controls and cluster-corrected standard errors

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9
Structural position	8.19	7.81	7.92	10.06	10.03	8.79	8.94	10.02	10.06
CLI:									
Actual inequality	*-3.72*	*-1.25*	*-1.29*	*1.26*	*1.10*	*1.07*	*1.02*	*-0.54*	*-0.61*
Redistribution		*1.52*	*1.89*	*2.74*	*2.62*	*2.99*	*2.68*	*2.08*	*2.01*
Prosperity			*-1.06*	*-2.22*	*-2.29*	*-1.66*	*-1.56*	*-1.85*	*-0.42*
System threat				*-5.12*	*-5.16*	*-5.17*	*-4.23*	*-3.03*	*-2.69*
Fractionalization					*-0.08*	*-0.46*	*-0.65*	*-0.44*	*-0.31*
Mobilization						*-1.74*	*-1.26*	*-0.75*	*-0.74*
Political distrust							*0.91*	*-0.52*	*-0.43*
Perceived inequality								*2.85*	*2.26*
Inequality tolerance									*-1.35*
Constant	3.29	3.41	3.45	3.46	3.44	3.40	3.39	3.43	3.38
Variance (level two)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Residual variance	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42

Notes: N (individuals): 60397, N (country years): 67. Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for country-year control and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors are displayed in the last two rows.

Tab. A.4.18: Hierarchical steps, using SLPI, IT1, country-year controls and cluster-corrected standard errors

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9
Structural position	7.08	7.17	7.10	8.30	8.43	8.21	8.13	8.43	8.07
CLI:									
Actual inequality	*-3.12*	*0.58*	*0.56*	*3.41*	*3.90*	*4.07*	*3.91*	*2.48*	*2.63*
Redistribution		*2.61*	*2.66*	*3.95*	*4.09*	*4.50*	*4.23*	*3.77*	*3.47*
Prosperity			*-0.51*	*-1.55*	*-1.65*	*-1.15*	*-0.97*	*-1.09*	*0.11*
System threat				*-6.72*	*-7.44*	*-8.77*	*-8.05*	*-6.70*	*-5.08*
Fractionalization					*-1.29*	*-1.71*	*-1.72*	*-1.67*	*-1.52*
Mobilization						*-1.89*	*-1.16*	*-0.75*	*-0.55*
Political distrust							*0.91*	*0.15*	*0.37*
Perceived inequality								*1.35*	*0.68*
Inequality tolerance									*-1.42*
Constant	2.58	2.76	2.80	2.82	2.77	2.74	2.74	2.74	2.74
Variance (level two)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Residual variance	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40

Notes: N (individuals): 52713, N (country years): 67. Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for country-year control and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors are displayed in the last two rows.

Tab. A.4.19: Hierarchical steps, using SLEI, IT2, country-year controls and cluster-corrected standard errors

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9
Structural position	7.54	7.32	7.52	10.5	10.58	9.61	9.73	10.02	10.01
CLI:									
Actual inequality	*-3.61*	*-1.58*	*-1.59*	*1.59*	*1.52*	*1.52*	*1.53*	*0*	*0*
Redistribution		*1.48*	*1.97*	*2.59*	*2.52*	*3.15*	*2.97*	*2.48*	*2.5*
Prosperity			*-1.54*	*-2.88*	*-2.91*	*-2.72*	*-2.75*	*-3.03*	*-2.15*
System threat				*-8.08*	*-7.72*	*-7.17*	*-6.78*	*-5.31*	*-5.25*
Fractionalization					*-0.37*	*-0.76*	*-0.76*	*-0.61*	*-0.6*
Mobilization						*-1.87*	*-1.68*	*-1.35*	*-1.35*
Political distrust							*-0.1*	*-1.26*	*-1.23*
Perceived inequality								*2.19*	*2.01*
Inequality tolerance									*-0.15*
Constant	7.25	7.39	7.45	7.52	7.49	7.43	7.46	7.51	7.49
Variance (level two)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Residual variance	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.55

Notes: N (individuals): 60397, N (country years): 67. Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for country-year control and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors are displayed in the last two rows.

Tab. A.4.20: Hierarchical steps, using SLPI, IT2, country-year controls and cluster-corrected standard errors

	M. 1	M. 2	M. 3	M. 4	M. 5	M. 6	M. 7	M. 8	M. 9
Structural position	6.49	6.61	6.57	7.9	8.14	7.94	8.04	8.19	7.91
CLI:									
Actual inequality	*-2.79*	*0.48*	*0.45*	*3.04*	*3.93*	*3.84*	*3.92*	*3.24*	*3.26*
Redistribution		*2.87*	*3*	*4.24*	*4.68*	*5.11*	*5.05*	*4.8*	*4.5*
Prosperity			*-1.14*	*-2.26*	*-2.38*	*-2.08*	*-2.28*	*-2.33*	*-1.12*
System threat				*-6.22*	*-6.98*	*-6.62*	*-7.65*	*-7.09*	*-5.62*
Fractionalization					*-1.47*	*-1.72*	*-1.72*	*-1.7*	*-1.56*
Mobilization						*-1.36*	*-1.42*	*-1.32*	*-1.18*
Political distrust							*-0.51*	*-0.6*	*-0.37*
Perceived inequality								*0.3*	*-0.3*
Inequality tolerance									*-1.32*
Constant	7.67	7.92	7.96	8.04	7.94	7.91	7.92	7.92	7.99
Variance (level two)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Residual variance	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.53

Notes: N (individuals): 52713, N (country years): 67. Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for country-year control and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. Additionally, variance of level-two and -one errors are displayed in the last two rows.

Tab. A.5.1: Comparison of indicators used for fractionalization in main versus FE models, IT1

	FR1 SLEI		MGR		FR1 SLPI		MGR	
	Full model	Restricted	Full model	Restricted	Full model	Restricted	Full model	Restricted
Sample restriction	No	MGR	No	FR1	No	MGR	No	FR1
Structural position	10.74	10.08	10.64	10.53	8.57	8.09	7.86	8.05
Context-level main effects:								
Actual inequality	-0.12	-0.13	-0.25	-0.21	0.21	0.20	0.06	0.10
Redistribution	0.92	0.95	0.93	1.06	1.07	1.08	1.03	1.20
Prosperity	-0.01	-0.05	-0.10	-0.12	0.22	0.20	0.16	0.14
System threat	-0.26	-0.24	-0.92	-1.00	-0.30	-0.29	-0.90	-0.99
Fractionalization	0.63	0.61	0.74	0.59	0.85	0.84	0.98	0.81
Mobilization	-2.35	-2.43	-2.23	-2.43	-2.44	-2.48	-2.17	-2.43
Political distrust	-1.66	-1.66	-1.64	-1.73	-1.53	-1.54	-1.50	-1.62
Perceived inequality	2.26	2.37	2.38	2.46	2.15	2.21	2.23	2.33
Inequality tolerance	1.84	1.92	1.81	1.92	1.82	1.86	1.75	1.87
CLI:								
Actual inequality	*-0.53*	*-0.60*	*-1.01*	*-1.06*	*2.60*	*2.63*	*2.16*	*2.12*
Redistribution	*2.28*	*2.01*	*1.64*	*1.47*	*3.45*	*3.47*	*3.14*	*2.82*
Prosperity	*-0.75*	*-0.42*	*-0.78*	*-0.68*	*0.27*	*0.12*	*-0.01*	*0.18*
System threat	*-3.16*	*-2.69*	*-2.78*	*-2.64*	*-5.63*	*-5.08*	*-4.11*	*-3.79*
Fractionalization	*-0.41*	*-0.31*	*1.70*	*1.73*	*-1.50*	*-1.52*	*1.73*	*1.87*
Mobilization	*-0.87*	*-0.75*	*-0.55*	*-0.31*	*-0.48*	*-0.55*	*-0.30*	*0.18*
Political distrust	*-0.52*	*-0.44*	*-0.21*	*-0.10*	*0.43*	*0.36*	*0.31*	*0.50*
Perceived inequality	*2.18*	*2.26*	*2.44*	*2.42*	*0.73*	*0.69*	*0.78*	*0.70*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.35*	*-1.36*	*-1.66*	*-1.73*	*-1.63*	*-1.42*	*-1.44*	*-1.57*
Constant	2.35	3.21	3.40	3.25	2.36	2.94	3.19	3.00
N (individuals)	63247	60397	61054	60397	54337	52712	53516	52712
N (groups)	70	67	68	67	69	67	68	67

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) are not displayed. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive.

Tab. A.5.2: Comparison of indicators used for fractionalization in main versus FE models, IT2

	FR1 SLEI		MGR		FR1 SLPI		MGR	
	Full model	Restricted	Full model	Restricted	Full model	Restricted	Full model	Restricted
Sample restriction	No	MGR	No	FR1	No	MGR	No	FR1
Structural position	10.81	10.04	10.72	10.42	8.05	7.94	7.48	7.56
Context-level main effects:								
Actual inequality	0.08	0.08	0.01	0.02	0.35	0.34	0.20	0.22
Redistribution	1.05	1.07	1.05	1.05	1.22	1.22	1.17	1.20
Prosperity	-0.15	-0.19	-0.22	-0.23	-0.14	-0.14	-0.19	-0.21
System threat	-0.17	-0.16	-0.35	-0.37	-0.31	-0.31	-0.42	-0.45
Fractionalization	2.35	2.34	2.39	2.26	2.25	2.24	2.33	2.18
Mobilization	-1.57	-1.60	-1.62	-1.52	-1.70	-1.70	-1.64	-1.59
Political distrust	-1.26	-1.25	-1.24	-1.24	-1.31	-1.31	-1.29	-1.32
Perceived inequality	1.94	1.98	1.99	2.00	2.04	2.04	2.05	2.09
Inequality tolerance	1.81	1.82	1.80	1.83	2.04	2.03	1.98	2.03
CLI:								
Actual inequality	*-0.05*	*0.00*	*-0.46*	*-0.49*	*3.12*	*3.26*	*2.51*	*2.47*
Redistribution	*2.72*	*2.50*	*2.23*	*2.09*	*4.25*	*4.49*	*4.05*	*3.71*
Prosperity	*-2.23*	*-2.16*	*-2.19*	*-2.10*	*-0.63*	*-1.12*	*-1.13*	*-0.89*
System threat	*-5.64*	*-5.25*	*-5.48*	*-5.27*	*-5.48*	*-5.62*	*-5.09*	*-4.84*
Fractionalization	*-0.56*	*-0.60*	*1.45*	*1.46*	*-1.44*	*-1.56*	*0.60*	*0.68*
Mobilization	*-1.40*	*-1.35*	*-1.26*	*-1.03*	*-1.01*	*-1.18*	*-1.24*	*-0.72*
Political distrust	*-1.22*	*-1.24*	*-1.17*	*-1.07*	*-0.20*	*-0.37*	*-0.67*	*-0.42*
Perceived inequality	*2.17*	*2.01*	*2.09*	*2.06*	*-0.15*	*-0.29*	*-0.22*	*-0.30*
Inequality tolerance	*-0.37*	*-0.15*	*-0.33*	*-0.39*	*-1.72*	*-1.32*	*-1.36*	*-1.50*
Constant	5.88	5.12	5.15	5.12	5.70	5.65	5.78	5.70
N (individuals)	63247	60397	61054	60397	54337	52712	53516	52712
N (groups)	70	67	68	67	69	67	68	67

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed.

Tab. A.6.1: Effects of indicators of structural position without controlling for education and effects of education as an indicator of structural position, IT1

	SLEI	SLPI	ESeC	EGP	ISEI	MPS	SIOPS	SBCL	SBTB	Educ., sec.	Educ., tert.
Structural position	12.83	9.75	-11.63	-12.67	14.72	13.44	13.93	-17.30	10.50	11.21	14.26
Context-level main effects:											
Actual inequality	0.18	0.45	0.78	0.71	0.64	0.52	0.55	0.41	1.50	-0.25	0.14
Redistribution	0.15	0.23	0.93	1.24	-0.45	-0.14	-0.55	0.49	-0.70	0.24	1.05
Prosperity	0.18	-0.10	0.97	1.03	1.27	1.70	1.27	0.45	-0.61	-0.78	-1.02
System threat	-0.25	-0.40	-0.51	-0.36	0.96	0.38	1.03	-0.81	-0.14	-0.26	-0.44
Fractionalization	2.42	2.36	1.39	0.57	1.17	0.70	0.85	2.38	0.63	1.01	0.36
Mobilization	-1.40	-1.54	-1.15	-0.88	-0.43	-0.06	-0.47	-1.32	-0.72	-1.02	-1.63
Political distrust	-1.24	-1.23	-1.40	-0.86	-0.59	-0.74	-0.59	-1.53	-1.17	-2.42	-2.55
Perceived inequality	2.33	2.35	2.71	2.72	1.45	1.35	1.76	2.51	1.84	2.22	2.67
Inequality tolerance	3.07	3.12	3.45	3.21	2.92	2.90	2.88	3.04	3.10	2.46	2.70
CLI:											
Actual inequality	*-0.84*	*2.75*	*0.22*	*0.43*	*-0.14*	*-0.74*	*-0.06*	*1.29*	*-0.14*	*0.97*	*-0.43*
Redistribution	*1.22*	*3.86*	*-2.31*	*-1.98*	*2.21*	*0.88*	*2.24*	*-2.55*	*4.14*	*3.63*	*1.80*
Prosperity	*-1.72*	*-0.48*	*4.32*	*3.23*	*-2.23*	*-2.22*	*-2.11*	*0.93*	*-0.93*	*-1.65*	*-0.29*
System threat	*-4.28*	*-4.61*	*1.62*	*0.47*	*-1.83*	*-2.08*	*-1.18*	*0.79*	*-2.33*	*-2.53*	*-1.20*
Fractionalization	*-0.49*	*-1.00*	*-1.17*	*0.03*	*-1.72*	*-1.99*	*-1.78*	*-0.74*	*-1.68*	*-0.20*	*0.46*
Mobilization	*-0.60*	*0.21*	*0.64*	*-0.08*	*-1.01*	*-1.51*	*-0.70*	*1.14*	*-1.54*	*-1.65*	*1.01*
Political distrust	*-0.59*	*0.16*	*-1.08*	*-0.46*	*-0.07*	*-0.49*	*-0.01*	*-1.13*	*-0.17*	*0.24*	*-0.83*
Perceived inequality	*2.22*	*-0.13*	*-2.75*	*-1.97*	*3.46*	*2.37*	*1.92*	*-2.00*	*1.58*	*1.32*	*-0.42*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.15*	*-2.03*	*-2.43*	*-1.90*	*1.13*	*0.94*	*0.72*	*1.02*	*0.27*	*-0.44*	*-1.57*
N (individuals)	74550	64542	62287	64048	64033	48145	64033	75222	44176	80588	80588
N (groups)	77	77	69	69	68	69	71	40	75	75	75

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed. Data columns one through nine show effects of structural indicators and CLIs without controlling for education, whereas data columns 10 and 11 show effects of individual-level education as an indicator of structural position, specifically completed secondary and tertiary education. The terms “education” [educ.], “secondary” [sec.] and “tertiary” [tert.] are additionally abbreviated in this table.

Tab. A.6.2: Effects of indicators of structural position without controlling for education and effects of education as an indicator of structural position, IT2

	SLEI	SLPI	ESeC	EGP	ISEI	MPS	SIOPS	SBCL	SBTB	Educ., sec.	Educ., tert.
Structural position	14.81	12.24	-13.42	-13.45	16.91	16.06	16.43	-18.02	12.06	7.65	10.93
Context-level main effects:											
Actual inequality	0.04	0.37	0.45	0.30	0.13	0.11	-0.22	0.15	1.04	0.13	0.60
Redistribution	-0.10	0.11	0.51	0.59	-1.04	-0.74	-1.16	0.12	-0.14	0.60	1.17
Prosperity	-1.00	-1.08	-0.42	-0.30	-0.23	0.22	-0.21	-0.44	-1.41	0.08	-0.05
System threat	-0.35	-0.41	-0.56	-0.62	0.27	-0.14	0.58	-0.74	-0.50	-0.31	-0.34
Fractionalization	0.56	0.70	-0.21	-0.01	1.38	0.81	1.35	0.18	-0.26	2.91	2.39
Mobilization	-1.85	-1.92	-1.66	-1.50	-0.66	-0.37	-0.76	-1.57	-1.48	-0.52	-1.15
Political distrust	-1.95	-1.93	-1.88	-1.45	-1.90	-1.57	-1.77	-2.15	-1.99	-1.28	-1.47
Perceived inequality	2.99	2.97	3.27	3.26	1.48	1.65	1.88	3.19	1.51	2.08	2.29
Inequality tolerance	2.93	2.95	3.49	3.12	2.46	2.78	2.34	3.16	2.94	2.43	2.62
CLI:											
Actual inequality	*-1.20*	*2.22*	*0.25*	*0.48*	*0.39*	*-0.59*	*1.36*	*2.00*	*-0.76*	*0.77*	*-0.28*
Redistribution	*0.59*	*2.50*	*-2.42*	*-1.81*	*2.53*	*1.05*	*2.68*	*-1.37*	*3.22*	*2.85*	*1.78*
Prosperity	*-0.88*	*0.35*	*2.30*	*1.56*	*-1.89*	*-1.64*	*-1.53*	*-0.08*	*-0.83*	*-1.30*	*-0.58*
System threat	*-3.18*	*-3.90*	*1.76*	*0.81*	*-2.66*	*-3.96*	*-2.82*	*1.34*	*-1.34*	*-1.82*	*-0.36*
Fractionalization	*-0.13*	*-1.08*	*-1.37*	*0.20*	*-1.18*	*-2.00*	*-1.64*	*-0.86*	*-1.04*	*0.15*	*0.01*
Mobilization	*-0.30*	*0.65*	*1.25*	*0.44*	*-1.21*	*-1.52*	*-0.69*	*0.93*	*-0.77*	*-1.30*	*0.91*
Political distrust	*0.01*	*1.07*	*-1.70*	*-0.91*	*0.62*	*-0.56*	*0.49*	*-1.09*	*0.80*	*-0.67*	*-1.59*
Perceived inequality	*2.74*	*0.77*	*-3.50*	*-2.14*	*4.05*	*3.67*	*2.43*	*-4.22*	*2.15*	*0.41*	*-1.59*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.78*	*-1.89*	*-1.96*	*-1.63*	*1.71*	*1.46*	*1.37*	*-0.23*	*0.71*	*-1.27*	*-4.04*
N (individuals)	74550	64542	62287	64048	64033	48145	64033	75222	44176	80588	80588
N (groups)	78	77	77	69	69	68	69	71	40	75	75

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed. Data columns one through nine show effects of structural indicators and CLIs without controlling for education, whereas data columns 10 and 11 show effects of individual-level education as an indicator of structural position, specifically completed secondary and tertiary education. The terms “education” [educ.], “secondary” [sec.] and “tertiary” [tert.] are additionally abbreviated in this table.

Tab. A.7.1: Global correlations between different objective and subjective indicators of structural position

	SBTB	SLEI	SEI	LEI	SLPI	SPI	LPI	SLFI	SFI	LFI	ISEI	MPS	SIOPS	ESeC	EGP
SLEI	0.01	1.00													
SEI	0.01	0.86	1.00												
LEI	-0.04	0.23	0.19	1.00											
SLPI	0.01	0.61	0.53	0.13	1.00										
SPI	0.00	0.58	0.62	0.11	0.84	1.00									
LPI	-0.01	0.17	0.14	0.97	0.25	0.20	1.00								
SLFI	0.00	0.92	0.77	0.21	0.59	0.56	0.17	1.00							
SFI	0.00	0.80	0.90	0.18	0.51	0.61	0.14	0.86	1.00						
LFI	-0.03	0.22	0.18	1.00	0.13	0.12	0.97	0.24	0.20	1.00					
ISEI	0.06	0.32	0.30	0.07	0.33	0.33	0.08	0.30	0.28	0.06	1.00				
MPS	0.07	0.31	0.29	0.08	0.33	0.34	0.10	0.29	0.27	0.08	0.91	1.00			
SIOPS	0.06	0.30	0.28	0.07	0.33	0.33	0.08	0.28	0.27	0.07	0.88	0.88	1.00		
ESeC	0.00	-0.18	-0.17	-0.04	-0.14	-0.16	-0.04	-0.17	-0.17	-0.04	-0.57	-0.55	-0.54	1.00	
EGP	-0.01	-0.21	-0.20	-0.06	-0.17	-0.19	-0.06	-0.19	-0.19	-0.06	-0.62	-0.57	-0.57	0.86	1.00
SBCL	-0.02	-0.26	-0.23	-0.01	-0.20	-0.21	0.00	-0.25	-0.23	0.00	-0.36	-0.35	-0.34	0.32	0.33

Notes: N (individuals): 35212, N (country years): 68. Displayed are pairwise correlations.

Tab. A.7.2: Global correlations between different objective and subjective indicators of structural position for the ISSP wave 2009

	SBTB	SLEI	SEI	LEI	SLPI	SPI	LPI	SLFI	SFI	LFI	ISEI	MPS	SIOPS	ESeC	EGP
SLEI	0.34	1.00													
SEI	0.31	0.86	1.00												
LEI	0.17	0.35	0.29	1.00											
SLPI	0.29	0.65	0.57	0.20	1.00										
SPI	0.30	0.61	0.68	0.17	0.85	1.00									
LPI	0.19	0.24	0.21	0.95	0.36	0.30	1.00								
SLFI	0.34	0.93	0.79	0.33	0.62	0.59	0.24	1.00							
SFI	0.32	0.81	0.91	0.28	0.55	0.65	0.21	0.87	1.00						
LFI	0.17	0.34	0.29	0.99	0.20	0.18	0.95	0.37	0.31	1.00					
ISEI	0.33	0.36	0.33	0.15	0.37	0.36	0.16	0.33	0.32	0.13	1.00				
MPS	0.32	0.34	0.32	0.13	0.35	0.36	0.14	0.30	0.30	0.12	0.91	1.00			
SIOPS	0.31	0.33	0.32	0.15	0.35	0.35	0.16	0.30	0.30	0.14	0.87	0.88	1.00		
ESeC	-0.22	-0.18	-0.18	-0.08	-0.14	-0.17	-0.08	-0.17	-0.17	-0.08	-0.54	-0.53	-0.52	1.00	
EGP	-0.23	-0.22	-0.21	-0.10	-0.18	-0.20	-0.10	-0.20	-0.20	-0.10	-0.59	-0.55	-0.55	0.86	1.00
SBCL	-0.39	-0.28	-0.25	-0.14	-0.22	-0.22	-0.14	-0.27	-0.25	-0.14	-0.36	-0.35	-0.34	0.31	0.32

Notes: N (individuals): 20383, N (country years): 38. Displayed are pairwise correlations.

Tab. A.7.3: Global correlations between different objective and subjective indicators of structural position without the ISSP wave 2009

	SBTB	SLEI	SEI	LEI	SLPI	SPI	LPI	SLFI	SFI	LFI	ISEI	MPS	SIOPS	ESeC	EGP
SLEI	-0.26	1.00													
SEI	-0.25	0.86	1.00												
LEI	-0.01	0.21	0.17	1.00											
SLPI	-0.22	0.58	0.49	0.13	1.00										
SPI	-0.24	0.55	0.57	0.11	0.83	1.00									
LPI	0.00	0.16	0.13	0.97	0.24	0.19	1.00								
SLFI	-0.27	0.91	0.75	0.19	0.57	0.53	0.16	1.00							
SFI	-0.26	0.79	0.88	0.16	0.47	0.57	0.13	0.86	1.00						
LFI	-0.02	0.20	0.16	1.00	0.13	0.11	0.97	0.22	0.18	1.00					
ISEI	-0.31	0.28	0.26	0.04	0.29	0.30	0.04	0.25	0.24	0.04	1.00				
MPS	-0.31	0.28	0.25	0.07	0.31	0.31	0.07	0.26	0.24	0.07	0.91	1.00			
SIOPS	-0.29	0.26	0.24	0.04	0.30	0.30	0.05	0.24	0.23	0.04	0.88	0.88	1.00		
ESeC	0.25	-0.17	-0.16	0.00	-0.14	-0.16	0.01	-0.16	-0.16	0.00	-0.61	-0.58	-0.58	1.00	
EGP	0.27	-0.20	-0.18	-0.03	-0.17	-0.18	-0.01	-0.19	-0.18	-0.03	-0.66	-0.60	-0.59	0.86	1.00
SBCL	0.36	-0.24	-0.22	0.07	-0.18	-0.20	0.08	-0.23	-0.22	0.07	-0.36	-0.35	-0.33	0.33	0.35

Notes: N (individuals): 14829, N (country years): 30. Displayed are pairwise correlations.

Tab. A.7.4: Effects on indicators of inequality tolerance based on linear occupational income ratio and general rating items, using a non-logarithmic measure of aggregate perceived inequality (IPN)

	SLEI			SLPI		
	IN1	IN2	IN3	IN1	IN2	IN3
Structural position	0.77	0.04	0.75	-1.02	-0.56	-1.06
CLI:						
Actual inequality	1.04	-1.26	1.38	1.14	-1.09	1.40
Redistribution	-0.51	-2.03	-0.29	0.47	-0.81	0.64
Prosperity	1.02	1.46	0.98	0.99	0.89	0.96
System threat	-1.35	-2.13	-2.71	-1.27	-1.50	-2.15
Fractionalization	-1.18	-0.65	-1.05	-1.12	-1.82	-1.01
Mobilization	-0.65	0.34	-0.80	-0.87	0.67	-0.95
Political distrust	-0.95	-0.63	-0.81	-0.97	-1.49	-0.90
Perceived inequality, alternative measure	-5.81	-2.81	-5.15	-10.37	-6.05	-8.79
Inequality tolerance	-0.89	0.94	-0.95	-0.85	-0.04	-0.90
N (individuals)	63247	63247	63247	54337	54337	54337
N (groups)	70	70	70	69	69	69

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

Tab. A.8.1: Effects for full models using alternative indicators of actual inequality based on income shares in combination with the main indicator of actual inequality

	SH20				SH10			
	SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI	
	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1
Structural position	9.82	8.04	8.48	6.55	11.23	8.68	8.12	6.72
CLI:								
Actual inequality, alternative indicator	*-1.64*	*-3.06*	*-0.59*	*-1.66*	*-2.80*	*-4.06*	*-0.47*	*-1.87*
Actual inequality, main indicator	*0.29*	*-0.71*	*2.68*	*1.71*	*-0.13*	*-0.93*	*2.80*	*1.68*
Redistribution	*2.58*	*3.03*	*6.29*	*5.60*	*2.94*	*3.32*	*6.56*	*6.19*
Prosperity	*-2.73*	*-2.39*	*-1.05*	*-0.91*	*-2.93*	*-2.90*	*-1.07*	*-1.11*
System threat	*-4.85*	*-2.31*	*-5.82*	*-4.99*	*-4.18*	*-1.82*	*-5.17*	*-4.26*
Fractionalization	*-1.34*	*-1.43*	*-1.10*	*-2.07*	*-1.70*	*-2.17*	*-1.10*	*-2.18*
Mobilization	*0.17*	*0.44*	*0.18*	*-0.67*	*-0.23*	*-0.07*	*0.10*	*-1.03*
Political distrust	*0.08*	*0.48*	*1.37*	*0.90*	*0.25*	*0.71*	*1.38*	*1.07*
Perceived inequality	*1.67*	*1.63*	*-0.04*	*1.04*	*2.31*	*2.58*	*0.08*	*1.38*
Inequality tolerance	*-0.49*	*-1.64*	*-2.87*	*-2.27*	*-0.44*	*-1.73*	*-2.85*	*-2.25*
N (individuals)	39534	39534	35540	35540	39534	39534	35540	35540
N (groups)	45	45	46	46	45	45	46	46

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6), main effects of context-level factors and the constant are not displayed.

Tab A.8.2: Effects of total unemployment and related measures as indicators for prosperity and mobility chances

	UE2				UE3			
	SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	9.41	11	9.56	7.42	10.01	8.37	8.32	6.79
Context-level main effects:								
Actual inequality	0.52	0.28	0.5	0.95	0.04	0.46	0.53	0.79
Redistribution	1.18	1.14	0.16	0.86	0	0.6	1.24	1.3
Prosperity (unempl.)	-1.54	-1.72	-1.75	-1.87	-1.94	-2.08	-1.56	-1.4
Prosperity (unempl., alt.)	-0.96	-0.38	-3.57	-2.73	-3.73	-2.85	-0.01	-0.55
System threat	0.8	0.44	1.09	2.59	1.43	3.24	0.53	0.76
Fractionalization	0.34	0.06	-0.05	-0.22	0.38	0.22	-0.34	-0.13
Mobilization	-1.76	-2.16	-3.26	-2.62	-2.94	-2.3	-2.6	-2.21
Political distrust	-2.53	-3.7	-3.59	-2.7	-3.4	-2.31	-3.8	-2.71
Perceived inequality	2.34	2.72	3.99	2.98	3.8	2.85	2.72	2.33
Inequality tolerance	1.96	1.55	3.66	3.71	3.2	3.29	2.06	2.54
CLI:								
Actual inequality	*-1.64*	*-0.91*	*1.06*	*1.68*	*-1.11*	*-1.67*	*1.21*	*2.01*
Redistribution	*1.4*	*1.12*	*2.41*	*3.87*	*0.97*	*0.43*	*2.58*	*3.91*
Prosperity (unempl.)	*2.14*	*1.44*	*1.12*	*0.39*	*1.16*	*1.87*	*1.82*	*1.13*
Prosperity (unempl., alt.)	*0.63*	*-0.05*	*-0.36*	*-2.02*	*-0.04*	*-1.43*	*-0.13*	*-0.01*
System threat	*-3.63*	*-3.68*	*-3.93*	*-4.12*	*-2.02*	*-3.95*	*-5.66*	*-5.13*
Fractionalization	*-0.9*	*0.13*	*-0.87*	*-0.62*	*0.05*	*-0.55*	*-1.01*	*-1.02*
Mobilization	*0.91*	*1.51*	*1.83*	*1.74*	*1.58*	*1.24*	*1.54*	*1.2*
Political distrust	*-0.82*	*0.08*	*0.47*	*-0.18*	*-0.12*	*-0.74*	*0.56*	*-0.54*
Perceived inequality	*2.45*	*3.07*	*0.99*	*0.29*	*2.44*	*2.17*	*1.05*	*-0.03*
Inequality tolerance	*0.51*	*-0.6*	*-0.59*	*-0.71*	*-0.86*	*0.86*	*-0.48*	*-1.12*
N (individuals)	53386	53386	46122	46122	53705	53705	46309	46309
N (groups)	61	61	61	61	62	62	60	60

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed.

Tab A.9.1: Main models with the samples used for tests of subjective top-bottom ranking, income-based indicators of structural position

	SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	6.17	6.09	8.37	8.21	6.47	6.05	7.03	5.73
Context-level main effects:								
Actual inequality	0.22	0.59	0.66	1.07	0.21	0.59	0.65	1.06
Redistribution	0.44	0.49	0.61	0.63	0.44	0.50	0.62	0.65
Prosperity	-0.98	-1.26	-1.01	-1.19	-0.98	-1.26	-1.01	-1.20
System threat	-0.65	-0.36	-0.76	-0.40	-0.65	-0.36	-0.76	-0.40
Fractionalization	-0.46	-0.50	-0.56	-0.61	-0.45	-0.50	-0.54	-0.59
Mobilization	-2.62	-2.01	-2.88	-2.00	-2.63	-2.02	-2.89	-2.01
Political distrust	-1.73	-1.32	-2.00	-1.41	-1.73	-1.32	-2.01	-1.42
Perceived inequality	2.66	2.94	2.67	2.89	2.66	2.94	2.67	2.88
Inequality tolerance	3.38	3.41	3.81	3.55	3.38	3.40	3.80	3.54
CLI:								
Actual inequality	*0.56*	*0.98*	*3.40*	*4.08*	*0.97*	*1.28*	*4.31*	*4.17*
Redistribution	*1.21*	*1.55*	*2.55*	*3.50*	*1.54*	*1.56*	*2.62*	*3.13*
Prosperity	*0.95*	*0.45*	*0.90*	*0.89*	*0.55*	*-0.08*	*0.84*	*0.73*
System threat	*-0.59*	*-1.18*	*-2.96*	*-3.00*	*-1.14*	*-2.27*	*-3.86*	*-4.21*
Fractionalization	*-0.88*	*-0.55*	*-1.43*	*-2.06*	*-1.80*	*-1.25*	*-2.94*	*-2.84*
Mobilization	*1.42*	*0.88*	*1.89*	*1.37*	*1.29*	*0.59*	*2.14*	*0.86*
Political distrust	*-0.06*	*-1.47*	*1.84*	*-0.40*	*0.13*	*-1.25*	*0.71*	*-1.19*
Perceived inequality	*1.11*	*0.32*	*0.89*	*-0.16*	*1.05*	*0.13*	*-0.51*	*-1.51*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.97*	*-0.50*	*-2.36*	*-1.10*	*-2.55*	*-0.69*	*-3.01*	*-2.17*
N (individuals)	34702	34702	30903	30903	34702	34702	30903	30903
N (groups)	39	39	39	39	39	39	39	39

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed.

Tab A.9.2: Main models with the samples used for tests of subjective top-bottom ranking, alternative indicators of structural position

	ISEI		MPS		SIOPS		EGP		ESeC	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	6.93	6.59	6.99	7.03	6.22	5.78	-8.43	-8.40	-7.81	-7.11
Context-level main effects:										
Actual inequality	-0.13	0.34	-0.74	0.17	-0.45	0.11	-0.57	0.04	0.04	0.43
Redistribution	0.25	0.08	-0.14	-0.38	0.07	-0.15	1.66	2.01	1.55	1.82
Prosperity	-0.63	-1.01	-1.01	-1.10	-0.64	-0.98	-0.05	-0.33	-0.06	-0.53
System threat	-0.60	-0.58	-1.83	-1.66	-0.65	-0.56	1.93	1.51	0.54	2.01
Fractionalization	0.07	0.41	-1.89	-1.71	0.31	0.46	-0.93	-0.82	-0.47	-0.64
Mobilization	-2.52	-2.02	-3.08	-2.21	-2.67	-1.97	-0.99	-0.76	-1.51	-1.29
Political distrust	-2.38	-1.18	-3.31	-2.18	-2.09	-0.57	-3.84	-2.96	-3.02	-2.33
Perceived inequality	1.92	2.18	1.48	1.87	2.22	2.59	2.83	2.85	2.76	2.95
Inequality tolerance	2.58	3.07	3.55	3.63	2.39	2.80	2.48	2.51	2.25	2.41
CLI:										
Actual inequality	*2.16*	*1.70*	*1.88*	*1.13*	*3.10*	*2.04*	*0.28*	*-0.96*	*0.02*	*-1.15*
Redistribution	*2.86*	*2.54*	*2.13*	*1.87*	*3.54*	*3.26*	*-3.26*	*-3.90*	*-4.30*	*-4.18*
Prosperity	*-0.10*	*0.04*	*-0.24*	*-0.65*	*-0.08*	*-0.12*	*0.12*	*2.14*	*0.65*	*3.08*
System threat	*-1.14*	*-0.75*	*-1.37*	*-0.82*	*-0.95*	*-0.62*	*-0.18*	*1.21*	*0.36*	*1.62*
Fractionalization	*-1.86*	*-2.28*	*-1.28*	*-1.06*	*-2.13*	*-2.12*	*0.55*	*0.15*	*-0.97*	*-0.89*
Mobilization	*0.82*	*1.20*	*1.11*	*0.77*	*1.22*	*0.88*	*0.28*	*0.24*	*0.77*	*0.77*
Political distrust	*0.74*	*-0.87*	*0.91*	*-0.51*	*0.26*	*-1.63*	*0.36*	*0.56*	*-0.21*	*0.09*
Perceived inequality	*2.61*	*2.75*	*2.83*	*1.83*	*1.49*	*1.14*	*-1.78*	*-1.78*	*-3.06*	*-2.70*
Inequality tolerance	*0.53*	*0.35*	*0.83*	*1.17*	*0.77*	*1.07*	*-1.05*	*-1.23*	*-1.02*	*-1.23*
N (individuals)	37054	37054	28631	28631	37054	37054	48943	48943	47485	47485
N (groups)	40	40	39	39	40	40	58	58	64	64

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed.

Tab A.10.1: Main models without aggregate inequality tolerance using the samples for tests of normative influences, income-based indicators of structural position

	SLEI		SLPI		SLEI		SLPI	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	14.85	12.56	14.00	11.88	14.54	11.45	9.97	7.84
Context-level main effects:								
Actual inequality	1.99	-1.84	2.22	-0.80	1.94	-1.91	2.20	-0.83
Redistribution	0.45	0.94	0.56	1.61	0.46	0.93	0.43	1.47
Prosperity	0.40	0.06	1.12	0.17	0.47	0.07	1.16	0.19
System threat	1.80	6.13	0.89	4.63	1.78	6.09	0.86	4.59
Fractionalization	-1.61	-0.10	-1.44	-0.45	-1.58	-0.06	-1.40	-0.41
Mobilization	-2.76	-3.56	-3.00	-3.55	-2.89	-3.65	-3.05	-3.57
Political distrust	-0.09	-0.74	0.44	-0.58	-0.04	-0.68	0.40	-0.62
Perceived inequality	-2.72	2.31	-1.43	3.23	-2.64	2.36	-1.52	3.13
CLI:								
Actual inequality	*-2.02*	*-0.74*	*1.46*	*2.41*	*-2.16*	*-0.96*	*1.10*	*2.11*
Redistribution	*1.14*	*2.28*	*4.30*	*4.83*	*1.71*	*2.70*	*4.20*	*4.90*
Prosperity	*-0.26*	*-1.23*	*-1.11*	*-1.02*	*-2.06*	*-2.63*	*-1.34*	*-1.39*
System threat	*-3.76*	*-4.37*	*-4.38*	*-5.31*	*-4.40*	*-5.51*	*-4.66*	*-5.65*
Fractionalization	*1.40*	*0.58*	*1.67*	*0.99*	*1.41*	*0.27*	*0.39*	*-0.07*
Mobilization	*-0.51*	*-0.63*	*-0.26*	*0.21*	*0.08*	*-0.70*	*0.37*	*0.47*
Political distrust	*-2.52*	*-3.09*	*0.73*	*0.41*	*-1.99*	*-3.02*	*0.13*	*-0.17*
Perceived inequality	*4.68*	*4.30*	*3.89*	*3.17*	*4.74*	*3.98*	*2.66*	*1.93*
N (individuals)	35101	35101	30731	30731	35101	35101	30731	30731
N (groups)	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed.

Tab A.10.2: Main models without aggregate inequality tolerance using the samples for tests of normative influences, alternative indicators of structural position

	ESeC		EGP		ISEI		MPS		SIOPS		SBCL		SBTB	
	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2	IT1	IT2
Structural position	-7.72	-6.35	-8.55	-7.27	9.95	9.31	8.13	7.49	7.90	6.71	-12.59	-9.89	8.36	7.70
Context-level main effects:														
Actual inequality	2.29	0.30	2.51	0.67	2.47	0.59	2.88	1.40	2.19	0.90	2.28	-0.22	1.62	1.23
Redistribution	1.70	3.63	2.07	4.07	0.51	2.25	1.12	2.64	0.15	1.81	0.37	2.90	0.36	0.28
Prosperity	1.49	1.19	0.54	-0.04	0.90	0.41	1.26	0.66	0.59	0.19	0.56	-0.98	1.88	1.70
System threat	1.47	2.97	0.12	1.00	1.23	1.26	0.71	0.80	1.35	0.84	-0.36	1.54	0.51	1.43
Fractionalization	-1.80	-0.79	-1.45	-0.01	-1.67	0.29	-1.97	-0.49	-1.48	0.11	-1.18	-0.11	-0.98	-0.24
Mobilization	-1.30	-1.97	-1.31	-1.63	-0.22	-0.77	-0.85	-1.32	0.40	-0.22	-1.13	-3.25	-0.75	-0.52
Political distrust	-0.07	-1.95	-0.06	-1.35	0.15	-0.26	-0.10	-0.24	0.58	0.32	2.02	0.64	-2.16	-1.43
Perceived inequality	-2.17	2.75	-1.70	2.92	-3.49	0.94	-3.28	0.93	-3.07	0.68	-2.16	2.87	-0.04	0.63
CLI:														
Actual inequality	*0.66*	*0.63*	*1.14*	*0.54*	*0.01*	*0.15*	*-1.60*	*-1.42*	*0.37*	*-0.45*	*1.82*	*0.60*	*-2.23*	*-1.17*
Redistribution	*-1.75*	*-1.22*	*-1.15*	*-0.94*	*2.98*	*2.58*	*0.94*	*1.12*	*3.42*	*3.04*	*0.24*	*-1.60*	*1.44*	*1.20*
Prosperity	*-0.05*	*0.62*	*-0.37*	*-0.60*	*-0.83*	*-0.82*	*-0.79*	*-1.10*	*-0.44*	*-0.50*	*0.10*	*1.20*	*-0.92*	*-0.81*
System threat	*-0.66*	*-1.02*	*-0.53*	*-0.86*	*-2.71*	*-1.01*	*-3.32*	*-1.20*	*-2.62*	*-0.25*	*0.42*	*1.01*	*0.31*	*-0.49*
Fractionalization	*-0.47*	*-0.14*	*-0.53*	*-0.22*	*0.54*	*-0.85*	*-0.29*	*-0.73*	*0.14*	*-0.40*	*-1.90*	*-1.12*	*0.82*	*-0.05*
Mobilization	*-0.24*	*-0.45*	*-0.84*	*-1.33*	*-1.14*	*-0.80*	*-0.89*	*-0.90*	*-1.63*	*-1.17*	*-1.70*	*-0.57*	*0.16*	*0.65*
Political distrust	*-0.62*	*0.04*	*-0.44*	*0.21*	*-0.29*	*-1.38*	*-0.56*	*-1.57*	*-1.01*	*-2.09*	*-3.30*	*-2.19*	*1.22*	*1.04*
Perceived inequality	*-1.79*	*-0.68*	*-1.35*	*-0.59*	*2.90*	*1.48*	*3.19*	*1.74*	*2.19*	*1.40*	*-4.07*	*-3.75*	*2.86*	*1.77*
N (individuals)	28767	28767	29378	29378	29378	29378	22907	22907	29378	29378	35155	35155	23168	23168
N (groups)	40	40	40	40	40	40	39	39	40	40	40	40	36	36

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed.

Tab. A.11: Main models with individual-level interactions between structural position and perceived inequality

	SLEI IT1	SLEI IT2	SLPI IT1	SLPI IT2	SLEI IT1	SLEI IT2	SLPI IT1	SLPI IT2
Perc. inequ. (indiv. level)	22.46	22.65	25.30	24.38	22.96	22.92	25.40	24.33
Structural position	0.88	3.55	1.27	2.34	0.77	2.66	1.50	1.55
Perc. inequ. (ind.) * str. pos.	1.95	1.95	1.88	1.41	1.25	1.52	0.94	1.08
Context-level main effects:								
Actual inequality	0.18	0.05	0.53	0.35	0.17	0.05	0.53	0.34
Redistribution	1.04	1.03	1.24	1.21	1.04	1.03	1.24	1.21
Prosperity	-0.51	-1.50	-0.77	-1.49	-0.51	-1.49	-0.79	-1.50
System threat	-0.27	-0.43	-0.46	-0.45	-0.26	-0.43	-0.42	-0.42
Fractionalization	2.41	0.40	2.32	0.59	2.42	0.41	2.28	0.57
Mobilization	-1.28	-1.85	-1.40	-1.77	-1.29	-1.85	-1.39	-1.77
Political distrust	-1.61	-2.57	-1.72	-2.53	-1.62	-2.57	-1.75	-2.56
Perceived inequality	2.05	2.58	2.18	2.55	2.04	2.57	2.16	2.54
Inequality tolerance	2.13	2.25	2.47	2.37	2.11	2.23	2.44	2.35
CLI:								
Actual inequality	*-0.32*	*-0.86*	*3.06*	*2.39*	*-0.12*	*-0.56*	*3.14*	*2.58*
Redistribution	*2.24*	*1.54*	*4.20*	*3.31*	*2.76*	*2.28*	*4.26*	*3.43*
Prosperity	*-0.42*	*0.67*	*0.21*	*0.65*	*-1.99*	*-0.78*	*-0.48*	*0.27*
System threat	*-3.93*	*-2.23*	*-6.10*	*-4.87*	*-6.11*	*-3.17*	*-5.37*	*-5.64*
Fractionalization	*-0.46*	*-0.36*	*-0.91*	*-0.66*	*-0.47*	*-0.40*	*-1.41*	*-1.48*
Mobilization	*-0.91*	*-0.55*	*-0.02*	*0.37*	*-1.13*	*-0.55*	*-0.13*	*0.43*
Political distrust	*-1.70*	*-1.23*	*-0.88*	*-0.05*	*-1.46*	*-0.86*	*-1.05*	*-0.46*
Perceived inequality	*0.82*	*1.54*	*-0.24*	*0.75*	*0.97*	*1.46*	*-0.72*	*0.02*
Inequality tolerance	*-0.53*	*-1.00*	*-1.30*	*-1.27*	*-0.45*	*-1.27*	*-1.82*	*-1.68*
N (individuals)	63247	63247	54337	54337	63247	63247	54337	54337
N (groups)	70	70	69	69	70	70	69	69

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region, survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed.

Tab. A.12: Main models with interactions between structural position and survey waves

	IT1 SLPI	IT1 SPI	IT2 SLPI	IT2 SPI	IT1 SLEI	IT1 SEI	IT2 SLEI	IT2 SEI
Perceived inequality (indiv. level)	24.19	24.12	25.00	24.82	22.27	22.26	22.03	21.86
Structural position	6.27	6.90	7.26	8.76	7.46	7.39	7.23	7.93
Context-level main effects:								
Wave: 1999 (Ref.: 1987/1992)	0.24	0.23	0.28	0.28	0.40	0.40	0.17	0.18
Wave: 2009 (Ref.: 1987/1992)	-0.82	-0.88	-1.38	-1.44	-0.42	-0.43	-1.18	-1.20
Actual inequality	0.20	0.21	0.34	0.36	-0.13	-0.12	0.08	0.08
Redistribution	1.08	1.08	1.22	1.22	0.95	0.95	1.07	1.07
Prosperity	0.20	0.22	-0.14	-0.13	-0.05	-0.05	-0.19	-0.18
System threat	-0.29	-0.32	-0.31	-0.34	-0.24	-0.25	-0.16	-0.17
Fractionalization	0.84	0.86	2.24	2.28	0.61	0.60	2.34	2.34
Mobilization	-2.48	-2.46	-1.70	-1.68	-2.43	-2.43	-1.60	-1.60
Political distrust	-1.54	-1.55	-1.31	-1.32	-1.66	-1.66	-1.25	-1.25
Perceived inequality	2.21	2.22	2.04	2.05	2.37	2.37	1.98	1.99
Inequality tolerance	1.86	1.88	2.03	2.05	1.92	1.93	1.83	1.84
CLI:								
Wave: 1999	*-0.02*	*-0.11*	*-0.17*	*0.12*	*-0.06*	*-0.81*	*0.30*	*-0.32*
Wave: 2009	*0.25*	*-0.08*	*0.15*	*0.23*	*-0.05*	*-0.61*	*0.35*	*-0.18*
Actual inequality	*2.39*	*2.24*	*3.02*	*2.68*	*-0.56*	*-0.75*	*-0.06*	*-0.22*
Redistribution	*3.43*	*3.33*	*4.47*	*4.25*	*2.02*	*1.30*	*2.50*	*1.98*
Prosperity	*-0.23*	*0.39*	*-0.94*	*-0.35*	*-0.25*	*0.65*	*-1.89*	*-0.58*
System threat	*-4.94*	*-4.24*	*-5.54*	*-4.89*	*-2.54*	*-1.67*	*-4.95*	*-3.15*
Fractionalization	*-1.48*	*-0.64*	*-1.57*	*-0.94*	*-0.31*	*-0.34*	*-0.61*	*-0.54*
Mobilization	*-0.39*	*-0.19*	*-1.04*	*-0.91*	*-0.77*	*-1.17*	*-1.33*	*-1.58*
Political distrust	*0.36*	*0.23*	*-0.24*	*-0.23*	*-0.35*	*-0.23*	*-1.11*	*-0.81*
Perceived inequality	*0.61*	*1.54*	*-0.33*	*0.83*	*2.19*	*2.09*	*2.01*	*1.99*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.22*	*-0.95*	*-1.17*	*-0.73*	*-1.25*	*-0.98*	*-0.02*	*-0.22*
N (individuals)	52712	52712	52712	52712	60397	60397	60397	60397
N (groups)	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for region and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed.

Tab. A.13.1: Main models for IT1 using SLEI and SLPI with additional sample restrictions

	Restriction 1 SLPI	Restriction 2 SLPI	Restriction 3 SLEI	Restriction 4 SLEI	Restriction 5 SLEI	Restriction 6 SLEI
Structural position	8.02	7.56	9.98	9.97	9.10	8.69
Context-level main effects:						
Region: Europe	0.56	-0.16	0.57	0.43	0.49	1.95
Region: East. Europe	-0.29	-0.91	-0.47	-0.30	-0.04	1.17
Region: Other	2.38	0.50	2.26	1.66	1.92	2.78
Actual inequality	-0.01	1.15	-0.24	0.73	0.42	-0.90
Redistribution	1.24	2.02	0.94	1.56	1.06	-0.75
Prosperity	0.06	-0.48	0.06	0.35	0.45	-0.21
System threat	0.00	-0.21	-0.32	-0.27	-1.12	-1.12
Fractionalization	0.81	1.13	0.91	1.34	0.65	-0.21
Mobilization	-2.16	-1.39	-2.59	-2.79	-3.42	-2.10
Political distrust	-1.93	-0.93	-1.54	-1.36	-1.54	-1.37
Perceived inequality	2.60	0.88	2.43	1.66	1.73	2.32
Inequality tolerance	1.76	1.19	1.83	1.65	1.58	2.66
CLI:						
Actual inequality	*3.21*	*2.05*	*-0.26*	*-0.24*	*-0.32*	*0.49*
Redistribution	*3.65*	*2.98*	*2.04*	*1.97*	*1.17*	*2.29*
Prosperity	*0.11*	*-0.25*	*-0.56*	*-0.55*	*-0.28*	*0.38*
System threat	*-4.88*	*-4.08*	*-2.02*	*-2.02*	*-2.06*	*-1.78*
Fractionalization	*-2.14*	*-3.02*	*-0.15*	*-0.14*	*-0.33*	*-0.42*
Mobilization	*-0.46*	*-0.19*	*-0.62*	*-0.62*	*-0.58*	*-0.28*
Political distrust	*0.69*	*0.25*	*-0.62*	*-0.63*	*-0.22*	*0.29*
Perceived inequality	*0.49*	*1.36*	*2.28*	*2.19*	*2.07*	*1.91*
Inequality tolerance	*-1.75*	*-1.03*	*-1.43*	*-1.43*	*-1.47*	*-2.25*
N (individuals)	50890	43996	59381	59258	55873	49339
N (groups)	64	55	66	65	63	57

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed.

Tab. A.13.2: Main models for IT1 using ESeC and ISEI with additional sample restrictions

	Rest.1 ESeC	Rest. 2 ESeC	Rest. 3 ESeC	Rest. 4 ESeC	Rest. 5 ESeC	Rest. 6 ESeC	Rest.1 ISEI	Rest. 2 ISEI	Rest. 3 ISEI	Rest. 4 ISEI	Rest. 5 ISEI	Rest. 6 ISEI
Structural position	-7.71	-6.80	-8.07	-7.71	-7.25	-6.48	13.48	10.78	14.09	13.43	12.44	12.68
Context-level main effects:												
Region: Europe	0.73	0.08	0.84	0.66	0.88	1.89	0.54	-0.19	0.66	0.46	0.71	1.67
Region: East. Europe	-0.06	-0.34	0.16	0.31	0.67	1.36	-0.06	-0.32	0.22	0.31	0.64	1.47
Region: Other	3.13	1.80	3.10	2.46	2.82	3.84	2.84	1.85	2.81	2.17	2.45	3.24
Actual inequality	0.10	1.37	0.15	0.95	0.79	-0.36	-0.33	1.07	-0.13	0.61	0.58	-0.56
Redistribution	1.76	2.66	1.59	2.17	1.72	0.20	0.22	1.02	-0.03	0.42	0.31	-1.16
Prosperity	0.08	-0.31	0.26	0.51	0.50	0.08	0.58	0.33	0.68	0.84	0.75	0.31
System threat	-0.14	-0.64	-0.46	-0.45	-1.28	-1.23	0.65	0.47	0.42	0.42	0.01	-0.44
Fractionalization	0.24	-0.11	0.64	0.96	0.20	-0.57	1.90	1.56	1.84	2.11	1.33	0.02
Mobilization	-2.66	-1.97	-3.19	-3.38	-3.99	-2.41	-1.99	-1.18	-2.32	-2.37	-2.68	-2.10
Political distrust	-1.88	-0.86	-1.38	-1.19	-1.46	-1.20	-0.88	0.25	-0.63	-0.37	-0.81	-0.61
Perceived inequality	2.96	1.36	2.56	1.77	1.98	2.20	1.38	-0.30	1.11	0.50	0.79	0.65
Inequality tolerance	2.27	1.92	2.38	2.23	2.42	2.74	1.15	0.61	1.26	1.12	1.28	1.92
CLI:												
Actual inequality	*0.05*	*0.29*	*0.05*	*0.03*	*0.63*	*0.21*	*0.64*	*0.77*	*0.82*	*1.24*	*0.48*	*0.65*
Redistribution	*-4.76*	*-2.66*	*-4.74*	*-3.48*	*-1.93*	*-4.26*	*4.04*	*3.59*	*4.16*	*4.26*	*2.73*	*3.67*
Prosperity	*1.38*	*1.05*	*1.41*	*1.37*	*1.00*	*0.85*	*-1.71*	*-2.44*	*-1.71*	*-1.66*	*-1.28*	*-0.85*
System threat	*1.18*	*1.02*	*1.13*	*1.16*	*1.72*	*1.06*	*-2.03*	*-1.78*	*-2.02*	*-2.12*	*-2.18*	*-1.52*
Fractionalization	*-1.22*	*-0.73*	*-1.33*	*-1.29*	*-0.30*	*-0.70*	*-1.49*	*-2.06*	*-1.69*	*-1.42*	*-1.62*	*-1.32*
Mobilization	*0.25*	*0.45*	*0.00*	*0.04*	*0.07*	*-0.39*	*-1.05*	*-1.01*	*-0.73*	*-0.89*	*-0.84*	*-0.08*
Political distrust	*1.91*	*2.51*	*1.39*	*1.37*	*0.47*	*1.48*	*-1.13*	*-1.36*	*-0.85*	*-0.81*	*-0.38*	*-0.94*
Perceived inequality	*-3.29*	*-3.85*	*-2.71*	*-2.23*	*-1.90*	*-2.67*	*4.12*	*4.25*	*3.62*	*2.98*	*2.72*	*3.90*
Inequality tolerance	*-2.10*	*-2.47*	*-1.94*	*-1.98*	*-1.88*	*-0.85*	*2.31*	*2.65*	*2.14*	*2.07*	*1.93*	*1.15*
N (individuals)	51735	44805	53471	52072	49591	46073	53388	46360	55539	54108	51370	47430
N (groups)	66	57	68	67	65	59	60	53	63	62	60	54

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed. The term “Restriction” [Rest.] is abbreviated in this table.

Tab. A.13.3: Main models for IT1 using four indicators of structural position, excluding Global South versus using dummy-variable adjustment for poverty

	Restr. 7 SLEI	Restr. 7 SLPI	Restr. 7 ISEI	Restr. 7 ESeC	Restr. 8 SLEI	Restr. 8 SLPI	Restr. 8 ISEI	Restr. 8 ESeC	No restr. SLEI	No restr. SLPI	No restr. ISEI	No restr. ESeC
Structural position	7.73	7.10	6.66	-4.08	3.22	4.25	6.37	-7.32	4.98	4.69	7.43	-6.41
Context-level main effects:												
Region: Europe	1.82	1.80	1.95	2.17					0.82	0.84	0.92	1.22
Region: East. Europe	0.93	1.36	1.44	1.47					1.43	1.56	1.82	1.68
Region: Other	3.30	3.46	4.21	5.16					3.66	3.83	4.35	4.62
Actual inequality	-1.67	-1.66	-1.17	-1.03	-0.80	-1.07	-0.77	-0.41	0.62	0.93	0.65	0.93
Redistribution	-1.09	-0.87	-1.50	-0.24	-0.12	-0.11	-0.22	0.59	1.21	1.37	-0.04	1.84
Prosperity	-0.40	-0.33	0.16	-0.37	0.61	0.53	0.84	0.54	-0.26	-0.02	0.52	-0.09
System threat	-0.94	-1.24	-0.19	-0.99	0.18	0.63	1.15	1.15	0.93	1.02	1.88	0.42
No system threat (dummy variable)									2.96	3.03	2.38	2.33
Fractionalization	-1.37	-0.64	-0.06	-0.72	-1.18	-1.44	-0.10	-1.25	-0.29	-0.37	0.32	-0.45
Mobilization	-2.81	-3.11	-2.68	-3.07	-2.60	-2.73	-2.51	-2.83	-2.64	-2.62	-2.36	-3.09
Political distrust	-0.27	-0.61	-0.23	0.05	-0.51	-0.63	-0.34	-0.41	-2.20	-2.03	-1.12	-2.11
Perceived inequality	2.81	2.52	0.88	2.54	1.43	1.41	0.15	1.43	2.20	2.12	0.92	2.52
Inequality tolerance	2.54	2.77	1.87	3.23	2.31	2.73	1.58	2.98	1.77	1.87	1.14	2.65
CLI:												
Actual inequality	*0.11*	*2.12*	*0.00*	*-1.78*	0.06	1.63	0.97	-1.12	*-0.61*	*2.66*	*0.80*	*0.11*
Redistribution	*1.48*	*3.19*	*3.29*	*-3.52*	1.37	2.94	3.24	-2.59	*2.03*	*3.53*	*4.13*	*-4.21*
Prosperity	*-0.95*	*0.03*	*-1.50*	*2.20*	-1.42	-0.24	-1.45	1.73	*-1.18*	*-0.15*	*-1.75*	*0.79*
System threat	*-0.17*	*-0.25*	*-1.27*	*0.72*	-1.16	-0.81	-0.14	-2.18	*-2.33*	*-4.61*	*-1.92*	*1.23*
No system threat (dummy variable)									*1.65*	*0.43*	*-0.13*	*1.97*
Fractionalization	*0.29*	*-0.28*	*-1.21*	*-0.80*	-0.16	-0.77	-1.48	-0.13	*-0.11*	*-1.42*	*-1.64*	*-1.26*
Mobilization	*-0.10*	*0.22*	*0.11*	*-1.06*	-0.47	0.40	-0.07	-0.56	*-0.90*	*-0.62*	*-0.76*	*-0.20*
Political distrust	*0.93*	*0.57*	*0.77*	*0.77*	1.03	0.73	0.37	0.24	*-0.48*	*0.37*	*-0.85*	*1.41*
Perceived inequality	*2.90*	*1.05*	*4.09*	*-2.01*	2.30	1.28	3.46	-1.88	*2.21*	*0.68*	*3.61*	*-2.71*
Inequality tolerance	*-0.73*	*-1.25*	*3.22*	*-1.70*	-0.38	-0.93	2.99	-2.73	*-1.71*	*-1.44*	*2.00*	*-2.33*
N (individuals)	49481	44269	47394	45889	48704	43545	43238	41805	60397	52712	55539	53780
N (groups)	58	58	55	60	56	55	50	54	67	67	63	69

Notes: Displayed are Z-values of regression coefficients. Additionally, numbers of cases and groups are displayed in the last two rows. Results for cross-level interactions of context-level factors with structural position are printed in cursive. Effects for survey wave and control variables on individual level (see Chapter 3.6) and the constant are not displayed. The term "restriction" [restr.] is abbreviated in this table. The models in the first four data columns [Restr. 7] use a sample restricted to countries of the Global North, specifically Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and countries in Europe and Northern America. The following four models [Restr. 8] are based on a sample restricted to WEIRD (i.e. Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic, see Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan, 2010) countries without controlling for region. The models in the last four data columns are based on the full sample, but use a dummy variable to differentiate between country years with system threat (as indicated by poverty) equaling zero and country years with values of system threat different from zero.

Tab. A.14.1: Estimated inequality tolerance for ideal-type cases using logarithmic income measures

	Predicted value	SE	Z	p	Confidence interval, lower bound	Confidence interval, upper bound
LPI (min.), actual inequality (min.)	1.47	0.30	4.89	0.00	0.88	2.07
LPI (max.), actual inequality (min.)	1.80	0.10	17.60	0.00	1.60	2.00
LPI (min.), actual inequality (max.)	-0.27	0.69	-0.38	0.70	-1.62	1.09
LPI (max.), actual inequality (max.)	1.75	0.23	7.72	0.00	1.31	2.19
LPI (min.), perceived inequality (min.)	2.76	0.58	4.74	0.00	1.62	3.90
LPI (max.), perceived inequality (min.)	1.75	0.18	9.86	0.00	1.40	2.09
LPI (min.), perceived inequality (max.)	0.06	0.27	0.23	0.82	-0.47	0.60
LPI (max.), perceived inequality (max.)	1.80	0.12	15.09	0.00	1.57	2.04
LPI (min.), redistribution (min.)	0.99	0.43	2.33	0.02	0.16	1.82
LPI (max.), redistribution (min.)	1.65	0.12	14.22	0.00	1.42	1.87
LPI (min.), redistribution (max.)	0.94	0.43	2.16	0.03	0.09	1.79
LPI (max.), redistribution (max.)	1.91	0.11	16.63	0.00	1.69	2.14
LPI (min.), system threat (min.)	0.84	0.06	13.22	0.00	0.71	0.96
LPI (max.), system threat (min.)	1.78	0.05	34.58	0.00	1.68	1.88
LPI (min.), system threat (max.)	3.28	0.47	6.96	0.00	2.35	4.20
LPI (max.), system threat (max.)	1.85	0.15	12.16	0.00	1.56	2.15
LEI (min.), actual inequality (min.)	0.48	0.47	1.02	0.31	-0.45	1.41
LEI (max.), actual inequality (min.)	2.00	0.13	15.32	0.00	1.74	2.25
LEI (min.), actual inequality (max.)	1.61	1.08	1.49	0.14	-0.51	3.73
LEI (max.), actual inequality (max.)	2.01	0.26	7.79	0.00	1.51	2.52
LEI (min.), perceived inequality (min.)	2.66	0.80	3.33	0.00	1.09	4.23
LEI (max.), perceived inequality (min.)	2.16	0.23	9.28	0.00	1.71	2.62
LEI (min.), perceived inequality (max.)	-0.14	0.39	-0.37	0.71	-0.90	0.61
LEI (max.), perceived inequality (max.)	1.91	0.15	12.90	0.00	1.62	2.20
LEI (min.), redistribution (min.)	1.85	0.66	2.80	0.01	0.56	3.14
LEI (max.), redistribution (min.)	1.99	0.16	12.63	0.00	1.68	2.30
LEI (min.), redistribution (max.)	-0.28	0.68	-0.42	0.68	-1.61	1.05
LEI (max.), redistribution (max.)	2.01	0.15	13.09	0.00	1.71	2.31
LEI (min.), system threat (min.)	0.67	0.08	8.02	0.00	0.51	0.84
LEI (max.), system threat (min.)	1.99	0.06	35.68	0.00	1.88	2.10
LEI (min.), system threat (max.)	3.04	0.68	4.48	0.00	1.71	4.37
LEI (max.), system threat (max.)	2.17	0.16	13.22	0.00	1.85	2.49

Notes: Displayed are predicted values, standard errors (SE), Z-values, p-values and confidence intervals for inequality tolerance (measured based on IT1) based on marginal effects at ideal-type minimum [min.] and maximum [max.] values for structural position (as indicated by logarithmic personal income [LPI] and logarithmic household equivalence income [LEI]) and four context-level factors (actual inequality, perceived inequality, redistribution and system threat) using main measures. Predictions are estimated using the margins command in Stata 16 with other independent variables set too mean values.

Tab. A.14.2: Estimated inequality tolerance for ideal-type cases using standardized logarithmic income measures

	Predicted value	SE	Z	p	Confidence interval, lower bound	Confidence interval, upper bound
SLPI (min.), actual inequality (min.)	1.30	0.16	8.29	0.00	0.99	1.60
SLPI (max.), actual inequality (min.)	1.53	0.11	14.50	0.00	1.32	1.73
SLPI (min.), actual inequality (max.)	0.44	0.36	1.23	0.22	-0.26	1.15
SLPI (max.), actual inequality (max.)	2.46	0.25	9.81	0.00	1.96	2.95
SLPI (min.), perceived inequality (min.)	1.59	0.27	5.95	0.00	1.07	2.11
SLPI (max.), perceived inequality (min.)	1.00	0.21	4.79	0.00	0.59	1.41
SLPI (min.), perceived inequality (max.)	0.77	0.14	5.46	0.00	0.49	1.05
SLPI (max.), perceived inequality (max.)	2.19	0.10	21.19	0.00	1.99	2.40
SLPI (min.), redistribution (min.)	0.96	0.21	4.65	0.00	0.55	1.36
SLPI (max.), redistribution (min.)	1.48	0.16	8.97	0.00	1.15	1.80
SLPI (min.), redistribution (max.)	1.12	0.21	5.27	0.00	0.70	1.54
SLPI (max.), redistribution (max.)	2.10	0.17	12.23	0.00	1.77	2.44
SLPI (min.), system threat (min.)	0.98	0.06	17.64	0.00	0.87	1.09
SLPI (max.), system threat (min.)	1.85	0.05	39.44	0.00	1.76	1.94
SLPI (min.), system threat (max.)	2.26	0.30	7.50	0.00	1.67	2.85
SLPI (max.), system threat (max.)	0.88	0.15	5.68	0.00	0.58	1.18
SLEI (min.), actual inequality (min.)	0.72	0.21	3.45	0.00	0.31	1.13
SLEI (max.), actual inequality (min.)	1.91	0.13	15.10	0.00	1.66	2.15
SLEI (min.), actual inequality (max.)	0.99	0.49	2.02	0.04	0.03	1.96
SLEI (max.), actual inequality (max.)	1.69	0.32	5.31	0.00	1.06	2.31
SLEI (min.), perceived inequality (min.)	1.23	0.33	3.76	0.00	0.59	1.86
SLEI (max.), perceived inequality (min.)	1.39	0.18	7.80	0.00	1.04	1.73
SLEI (min.), perceived inequality (max.)	0.58	0.16	3.59	0.00	0.26	0.89
SLEI (max.), perceived inequality (max.)	2.07	0.09	22.73	0.00	1.89	2.25
SLEI (min.), redistribution (min.)	1.06	0.28	3.82	0.00	0.52	1.61
SLEI (max.), redistribution (min.)	1.30	0.17	7.46	0.00	0.96	1.64
SLEI (min.), redistribution (max.)	0.48	0.28	1.72	0.09	-0.07	1.03
SLEI (max.), redistribution (max.)	2.37	0.16	15.10	0.00	2.06	2.68
SLEI (min.), system threat (min.)	0.73	0.07	9.77	0.00	0.58	0.87
SLEI (max.), system threat (min.)	1.87	0.04	42.28	0.00	1.79	1.96
SLEI (min.), system threat (max.)	1.97	0.36	5.43	0.00	1.26	2.68
SLEI (max.), system threat (max.)	1.29	0.24	5.33	0.00	0.82	1.76

Notes: Displayed are predicted values, standard errors [SE], Z-values, p-values and confidence intervals for inequality tolerance (measured based on IT1) based on marginal effects at ideal-type minimum [min.] and maximum [max.] values for structural position (as indicated by standardized logarithmic personal income [SLPI] and standardized logarithmic household equivalence income [SLEI]) and four context-level factors (actual inequality, perceived inequality, redistribution and system threat) using main measures. Predictions are estimated using the margins command in Stata 16 with other independent variables set too mean values.

Fig. A.1: Exemplary income distribution of selected countries



Notes: Data for pooled country years of the following countries, from upper left to lower right: South Africa, Brazil, Philippines, USA, Germany, Venezuela.

Fig. A.2.1: Estimated inequality tolerance for ideal-type cases: actual inequality, LPI and LEI



Fig. A.2.2: Estimated inequality tolerance for ideal-type cases: perceived inequality, LPI and LEI



Fig. A.2.3: Estimated inequality tolerance for ideal-type cases: redistribution, LPI and LEI



Fig. A.2.4: Estimated inequality tolerance for ideal-type cases: system threat, LPI and LEI



Fig. A.2.5: Estimated inequality tolerance for ideal-type cases: actual inequality, SLPI and SLEI



Fig. A.2.6: Estimated inequality tolerance for ideal-type cases: perceived inequality, SLPI and SLEI



Fig. A.2.7: Estimated inequality tolerance for ideal-type cases: redistribution, SLPI and SLEI



Fig. A.2.8: Estimated inequality tolerance for ideal-type cases: system threat, SLPI and SLEI



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