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Civil Rights Protests and Election Outcomes: Exploring the Effects of the Poor People's Campaign

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CIVIL RIGHTS PROTESTS AND ELECTION OUTCOMES: EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF THE POOR PEOPLE'S CAMPAIGN

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Abstract. The Poor People's Campaign (PPC) of 1968 was focused on highlighting, and ultimately reducing, poverty in the United States. As part of the campaign, protestors from across the country were transported to Washington, D.C. in 6 separate bus caravans, each of which made stops en route to rest, recruit, and hold non-violent protests. Using data from 1960-1970, we estimate the effects of these protests on congressional election outcomes. In the South, we find that PPC protests led to reductions in Democratic vote share and turnout, while in the West they may have benefited Democratic candidates at the expense of their Republican rivals.

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This will be no mere one-day march in Washington, but a trek to the nation's capital by suffering and outraged citizens

--Martin Luther King Jr.

1. INTRODUCTION

On December 4, 1967, Martin Luther King Jr. held a press conference to announce the upcoming Poor People's Campaign. In the spring, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) would lead "waves of the nation's poor and disinherited" to Washington, D.C., where they would stay until Congress took concrete action to mitigate poverty in the United States.[1]

Although King's assassination caused a short delay, the Poor People's Campaign (PPC) was launched on May 2, 1968. It began with a three-mile march from the Lorraine Hotel, where King was shot, through the slums of Memphis. Then, approximately 350 marchers boarded busses to Marks, Mississippi, the first of several stops before what was dubbed the "Freedom Caravan" ultimately reached Washington, D.C.

Five additional bus caravans (the Eastern, the Midwestern, the Northwestern, the Southern, and the Western) transported protesters from cities across the United States to Washington, D.C. during May of 1968, stopping periodically along the way to rest, recruit, and hold marches or rallies. As one observer noted, the caravans were "moving billboards for the campaign's message" (Hurley 2018, para. 36). Importantly, the PPC organizers were committed to peaceful protest and, with only a few exceptions, neither protestors nor police resorted to violence during the marches and rallies (Warden 1968; Wildstrom 1968; Lohr 2008).

Upon arrival in D.C., the PPC protesters were housed in Resurrection City, an encampment built on the National Mall. SCLC leadership organized daily marches and a handful of vigils (e.g., a

[1] Dr. King's full statement is available at: https://www.crmvet.org/docs/6712_mlk_ppc-anc.pdf. Our description of the Poor People's Campaign is based on contemporary newspaper articles and longer retrospectives by Fager (1969), McKnight (1998), Wright (2007), and Hamilton (2020). A list of newspaper articles used for general background information is provided in Appendix B.

vigil at the Department of Agriculture and another outside the home of Wilbur Mills, the chairmen of the House Ways and Means Committee), but struggled to come up with concrete goals and a coherent strategy. A series of heavy rain showers lowered morale and, by early June, the number of Resurrection City residents had dwindled from a peak of 2,500-3,000 to less than 1,000 (Anders 1968; Poynter 1968; Fager 1967). The permit to occupy the National Mall expired on June 23, and the process of dismantling Resurrection City began shortly thereafter.

More than 50 years after the PPC was launched, scholars are still debating its effectiveness. Most have dismissed the PPC as a poorly managed debacle that could not force a reluctant Congress into meaningful action (Fager 1969; Sitkoff 1981; Harrison 1996; McKnight 1998; Fairclough 2002; Wright 2020), while others contend that it drew needed attention to the pressing, interconnected issues of poverty and race in America (Jackson 2007; Hamilton 2020).[2]

In this study, we revisit the question of whether the PPC was effective by comparing the evolution of congressional election outcomes in "treated" counties (i.e., counties in which a caravan stopped) to their evolution in "untreated" counties. Our event-study estimates represent the first quasi-experimental evidence on the relationship between non-violent protests and election outcomes during the civil rights era. We find that, on average, the PPC protests had no discernable effect on either the 1968 or 1970 congressional elections at the county level.[3] This null result, however, masks important geographic heterogeneity.

[2] While acknowledging that the government's response was "relatively weak," Hamilton (2020, pp. 244-245) argued that the PPC "forced America to look at and learn about the ugliness of poverty…" A new PPC was launched in the summer of 2018, with 40 days of marches, sit-ins and other peaceful protests (Sainz 2018). In June of 2019, over 1,000 community leaders convened in Washington, D.C. for the "Poor People's Moral Action Congress," which included a hearing before the House Budget Committee on problems facing the millions of low-income people in the United States ("About the Poor People's Campaign" n.d.).

[3] Our estimation equation, described below, includes state-by-year fixed effects on the right-hand side, which capture any nation-wide (i.e., common) effect of the PPC on congressional election outcomes. The national press coverage of the PPC focused on the leadership squabbles and the conditions in Resurrection City (Mantler 2010), while the local newspaper coverage tended to be more sympathetic.

In the South, where public opinion towards the civil rights movement was least favorable (Sheatsley 1966; Erskine 1967; Stevens 2002), PPC protests are associated with reduced Democratic vote share and turnout. By the mid-1960s, an effective political alliance had been forged between mainstream civil rights leaders, including King, and the national Democratic Party (Jackson 2007; DiSalvo 2010; Milkis 2012). We speculate the PPC protests could have increased the salience of this alliance among Southern White voters, causing an anti-Democratic backlash at the polls. In the Midwest and East, PPC protests did not have discernable effects on congressional election outcomes, at least in the short run; and in the West, there is evidence that they may have benefited Democratic candidates at the expense of their Republican rivals.

The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we detail the caravan routes and provide a brief review of the literature. In Section 3, we describe our data and empirical framework, and in Section 4 we report estimates on the relationship between PPC protests en route to Washington, D.C. and congressional election outcomes. Section 5 concludes.

2. BACKGROUND

Civil rights protests of the 1960s are often credited with shaping political attitudes, election outcomes, and policymaking (Burstein 1979; Eskew 1997; Lee 2002; Santoro 2008; Risen 2014; Andrews and Gaby 2015; Biggs and Andrews 2015). Although quasi-experimental evidence that they were effective is lacking, two often-cited correlational studies in political science, Mazumder (2018) and Wasow (2020), are closely related to ours.

Mazumder (2018) found a positive association between civil rights protests during the period 1960-1965 and Democratic vote share in presidential elections. He concluded that this association likely reflected the effect of civil rights protests on "the public's support for left-wing issues particularly as they relate to racial issues" (Mazumder 2018, p. 930), but acknowledged the

potentially important role of unobserved confounders.[4] Wasow (2020) found a positive association between non-violent Black-led protests and Democratic vote share in three presidential elections (1964, 1968, and 1972); by contrast, he found that Black-led protests featuring violent tactics on the part of protestors (as opposed to the police or White civilians) were negatively associated with Democratic vote share in these same three presidential elections.

Underlying, economic and social trends likely influenced where Black-led protests occurred, when they occurred, and even the tactics used by protesters and police. Because these same underlying economic and social trends could have also influenced voting in presidential elections, Wasow (2020) adopted an instrumental variables strategy in a supplementary analysis. Restricting his attention to counties that were at least 90 percent White in 1960, he leveraged rain-induced—and therefore arguably exogenous—variation in the violent protests that occurred in the immediate aftermath of King's assassination.[5] According to Wasow's second-stage estimates, the violent protests sparked by King's assassination led to a 6-8 percentage point reduction in Democratic vote share in the 1968 presidential election. Whether non-violent protests during the civil rights era had the opposite effect is still an open question.

[4] As a robustness check, Mazumder (2018) regressed Black voter registration rates in 2011 on whether there was a civil rights protest during the period 1960-1965. The association between Black voter registration rates and civil rights protests was small and statistically insignificant, which, he argued is "consistent with the notion that protests could have led to behavioral changes among whites" (Mazumder 2018, p. 931). Using data for the period 1960-1990, Gillion and Soule (2018, p. 1649) found a positive association between protests that "express liberal issues" and Democratic vote share in congressional elections; conservative protests were positively associated with Republican vote share.

[5] Rainfall in the month of April 1968 is a valid instrument if its association with election outcomes is entirely explained by protest activity. See Mellon (2021) for a general critique of studies that use weather-related instruments such as rainfall and temperature.

2.1. The PPC caravans

The PPC was supposed to act as a catalyst for reform by highlighting the miserable conditions under which millions of poor Americans lived and worked. A non-violent march or rally was held at nearly every caravan stop to garner media attention and encourage new recruits to join the effort. Although PPC organizers relied on the cooperation of local, and often more militant, activists and organizations (Wright 2007), SCLC leadership was committed to peaceful protest (Hamilton 2020, pp. 79 and 85); those who were deemed unruly or too militant were sent home (McKnight, 1998, p. 103). For instance, approximately a dozen "undesirables" were sent home before the Southern Caravan left Charlotte, NC (Reimler 1968, p. 1), and 8 protestors were sent home for "disciplinary reasons" before the Midwestern Caravan left Pittsburgh, PA (McFeatters and Johnson 1968, p. 9).

Information on the caravan routes comes from contemporary newspaper articles (Appendix B) and the Archives at Auburn Avenue Research Library, Emory University. Appendix C lists the newspaper articles containing information on the number of protestors and buses in each caravan. Figure 1 shows the complete routes of each of the 6 bus caravans and the counties in which stops were made:

1. Freedom Caravan (May 2-12), with stops in: Memphis, TN; Marks, MS; Nashville, TN; Knoxville, TN; Raleigh, NC; and Danville, VA. No rally or march was held in Danville, VA, but there was a three-hour church service for protesters that received press coverage (Associated Press 1968; Nash 1968). Approximately 500 protestors on 11 buses arrived in Washington, D.C.

2. Southern Caravan (May 6-22), with stops in: Edwards, MS; Selma, AL; Montgomery, AL; Birmingham, AL; Atlanta, GA; Macon, GA; Savannah, GA; Charleston, SC; Greenville, SC; Charlotte, NC; Greensboro, NC; Durham, NC; Norfolk, VA; Richmond, VA; and Fairfax, VA. No march or rally was held in Fairfax, VA. Approximately 450 protesters on 10 buses arrived in Washington, D.C.

3. Eastern Caravan (May 8-18), with stops in: Brunswick, ME; Boston, MA; Providence, RI; New York, NY; Newark, NJ; Trenton, NJ; Philadelphia, PA; Claymont, DE; Wilmington, DE; Baltimore, MD; and Greenbelt, MD. On May 10, a picketer was stabbed during a

march held in Boston, one of the few acts of violence that occurred during the trip to Washington, D.C. No march or rally was held in Greenbelt, MD. Approximately 850 protesters on 24 buses arrived in Washington, D.C.

4. Midwestern Caravan (May 8-18), with stops in: Chicago, IL; South Bend, IN; Indianapolis, IN; Louisville, KY; Cincinnati, OH; Dayton, OH; Columbus, OH; Toledo, OH; Detroit, MI; Cleveland, OH; Akron, OH; Youngstown, OH; Pittsburgh, PA; and Baltimore, MD. No march or rally was held in Baltimore, MD. On May 13, mounted police charged a group of PPC protesters in Detroit, injuring several of them. Approximately 650 protesters on 19 buses arrived in Washington, D.C.

5. Two bus caravans converged to form the Western Caravan (May 15-23). One left from Los Angeles on May 15, with stops in: Phoenix, AZ; El Paso, TX; Albuquerque, NM, and Santa Fe, NM. The other left from Oakland, CA on May 16, with stops in: Sacramento, CA; Reno, NV; and Salt Lake City, UT. After the caravans converged in Denver, CO, there were stops in: Kansas City, MO; Columbia, MO; St. Louis, MO; and Louisville, KY. Protesters from El Paso, TX joined the caravan in Kansas City, stopping along the way in: San Antonio, TX; Austin, TX; Dallas, TX; and Tulsa, OK. Approximately 800 protesters on 19 buses arrived in Washington, D.C.

6. Northwestern Caravan (May 17-23), with stops in: Seattle, WA; Spokane, WA; Missoula, MT; Billings, MT; Bismarck, ND; Minneapolis, MN; Madison, WI; Chicago, IL; and Toledo, OH. There were no marches or rallies in Missoula, MT or Toledo, OH. Approximately 100 protesters on three buses arrived in Washington, D.C.

A total of 68 counties were treated by at least one of the 6 bus caravans described above. In addition to the bus caravans, the SCLC organized the Mule Train (May 13-June 18), which consisted of approximately 15 covered wagons, 35 mules, three horses, and 100 protestors. The Mule Train started in Marks, MS and traveled slowly to Atlanta, GA, from where protestors and animals continued by train to Alexandria, VA. On June 14, 67 of its participants were arrested by Georgia state troopers for operating non-motorized vehicles on an interstate highway, an incident that received widespread media coverage; the charges were quickly dropped and the Mule Train was given authorization to continue on to Washinton D.C. (Lundy and Goodwin 1968).

National press coverage of the PPC emphasized leadership squabbles, the threat of violence, and deteriorating conditions in Resurrection City (Mantler 2010). Local press coverage of the caravans was generally more sympathetic, often describing the protestors' clothing, sleeping

arrangements, and mood.[6] The racial and ethnic composition of the protesters in the Northwestern and Western caravans received a great deal of attention from the local press. Approximately half of the protesters in the Northwestern Caravan were Native American (Jordan 1968); the Western Caravan was composed of Asian Americans, Blacks, Mexican Americans, Native Americans, and Whites (Cassels 1968; Powers 1968; Mantler 2013). From its inception, the PPC was envisioned as multiethnic and multiracial, reflecting the fact that structural poverty in the United States was not limited to Blacks in the rural South or Blacks living in urban ghettos and slums (Hamilton 2020).

2.2. Protests and voting

There are several potential mechanisms through which protests could affect election outcomes and policy. According to Lohmann (1993, 1994a), protests are informative because the act of protesting is costly. If enough protestors are willing to signal their support for a particular reform, then voters and politicians update their assessment of this reform and its benefits, potentially causing sudden shifts in the political landscape (Lohmann 1994b).

Madestam et al. (2013) leveraged rain-induced variation in the size of Tea Party protests, which were held on April 15, 2009. These authors found that larger protests increased Republican vote share in the 2010 congressional elections and caused members of the House of Representatives from both political parties to vote more conservatively. The estimated effects on how House members voted grew stronger over time, suggesting that the Tea Party protests caused a semi-permanent rightward shift in voter preferences, perhaps by facilitating face-to-face proselytizing or grassroots organizing (Madestam et al. 2013).

[6] See the newspaper articles listed in Appendix B. Anonymous (1968), Bailey (1968), Balboni (1968), Gagetta (1968), Lobb (1968), Marlowe (1968), Powers (1968), Rovner (1968), and Kale (1968) are good examples of articles appearing in local newspapers about the caravans that focused on transportation logistics and the protestors' clothing, sleeping arrangements, and mood.

Madestam et al. (2013) noted that such a shift in voter preferences would be inconsistent with the informational mechanism proposed by Lohmann (1993, 1994a). If House members were simply responding to new information, then the effects of rain-induced differences in protest size should have diminished over time as additional information became available (Madestam et al. 2013). Teeselink and Melios (2021) examined the effects of Black Lives Matter protests on Democratic vote share in the 2020 presidential election. Using rain as an instrument, these authors found that larger protests led to short-run increases in Democratic vote share.[7]

Media coverage represents another potential mechanism through which protests could have longer-run effects on election outcomes and policy (Madestam et al. 2013). Wasow (2020), in fact, found that non-violent Black-led protests in the 1960s and early 1970s received more sympathetic newspaper coverage than violent Black-led protests. He argued that non-violent Black-led protests were associated with increased Democratic vote share in three presidential elections (1964, 1968, and 1972) precisely because they received sympathetic media coverage; violent Black-led protests were associated with reduced Democratic vote share in these same three presidential elections because of the tenor and content of newspaper accounts. Wasow (2020) showed that newspaper accounts of violent Black-led protests were more likely to include words such as "fire," "night," "police," "riot," and "violence" than accounts of non-violent Black-led protests (Wasow 2020, pp. 654-655).

Since Barry Goldwater's 1964 presidential campaign, Republican politicians had couched their opposition to the civil rights movement in "criminological terms," rhetorically linking Black-led

[7] See also Enos et al. (2019), Collins and Margo (2004, 2007), Larreboure and Gonzalez (2021), and Lagios et al. (2022). Enos et al. (2019) found increased support for public school spending after the 1992 Rodney King riot in Los Angeles. Collins and Margo (2004, 2007) examined the effect of rain-induced variation in protest activity after King's assassination on the labor market outcomes of Black men and inner-city property values. Larreboure and Gonzalez (2021) leveraged temperature-induced variation to examine the effects of the 2017 Women's March on U.S. House of Representatives election outcomes. Lagios et al. (2022), who also used rainfall as an instrument, explored the effects of protests against the far right on voting outcomes in the 2002 French presidential elections.

protests and rising crime rates (Murakawa 2008, p. 252).[8] Liberal Democrats, who had entered into a successful political alliance with mainstream civil rights leaders (Jackson 2007; DiSalvo 2010; Milkis 2012), countered by arguing that the best way to address rising crime was through providing better educational, employment, and housing opportunities—an argument that was undermined by newspaper coverage of Black-led protests emphasizing destructive and violent behavior on the part of the protestors.[9] According to Wasow (2020), unsympathetic newspaper coverage of violent Black led protests contributed to an anti-Democratic backlash among White voters in the 1964, 1968, and 1972 presidential elections.[10]

3. Outcomes and Empirical Approach

3.1. Outcomes

Our focus is on estimating the effects of being treated by a caravan on Democratic vote share (i.e., votes received by the Democratic candidate as a proportion of total votes cast in county c during election year t) and Republican vote share (defined analogously). In addition, we estimate the effects of treatment on turnout, as measured by the votes received by the Democratic/Republican

[8] President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law on July 2, 1964. Murakawa (2008, p. 246) observed that, before 1964, "Americans did not distinguish the parties in terms of civil rights; after 1964, most Americans identified the Democratic Party as the champion of civil rights and the Republican Party as the opponent of civil rights." Kuziemko and Washington (2018, p. 2833) provide evidence that civil rights became an issue of "great salience" associated with the Democratic Party in the spring of 1963. For instance, Kuziemko and Washington (2018) showed that President Kennedy's popularity among Southerners plummeted in the spring of 1963, when there was a sharp increase in the number of articles published in the *New York Times* containing the terms "civil rights" and "President Kennedy." Feinstein and Schickler (2008) and Baylor (2013) provide evidence that the national Democratic Party began championing the cause of civil rights as early as the 1940s.

[9] See Murakawa (2008) for more details on how Republicans (and Southern Democrats) rhetorically linked rising crime rates and Black-led protests. Liberal Democrats and President Johnson, by contrast, argued that promoting civil rights and implementing anti-poverty programs would lead to reductions in crime (Murakawa 2008; Kohler-Hausmann 2015).

[10] Enos et al. (2019) provide evidence that riots do not inevitably lead to a conservative backlash. As noted above, Enos et al. (2019) found that the Rodney King riot led to increased support for public school spending. They speculated that a series of riots could provoke conservative backlash, "while a single riot invokes sympathy" (Enos et al. 2019, p. 1026).

candidate as a proportion of the 1960 voting-age population.[11] These (or similar) outcomes have been used by previous researchers interested in the economic and social determinants of voting behavior in the United States.[12] County-level data on congressional elections for the period 1960-1970 are from the *General Election Data for the United States, 1950-1990* (ICPSR 2013), which contains the total votes cast and votes received by the Democratic and Republican candidates.[13]

3.2. Empirical approach

To estimate the effects of the PPC, we examine the evolution of congressional election outcomes before and after treatment by a caravan. The pre-treatment period is 1960-1966, during which there were 4 congressional elections; the post-treatment period is 1968-1970, during which two congressional elections were held.

Baseline estimates are from an event-study regression of the following form:

$$(1) \qquad Y_{ct} = \alpha_0 + \sum_{y=1960}^{1964} \pi_y D_c 1(t = y) + \sum_{y=1968}^{1970} \pi_y D_c 1(t = y) + \delta_c + \gamma_{st} + \sum_{y=1960}^{1970} \lambda_y \boldsymbol{X}_c 1(t = y) + \varepsilon_{ct},$$

where Y_{ct} is the outcome in county c and election year t = 1960, 1962…1970.[14] The treatment indicator, D_c, is equal to 1 if a bus caravan or the Mule Train stopped in county c (and is equal to 0

[11] Voting-age population is from the 1960 Census available at the *Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States, 1790-2002* (Haines and ICPSR 2010). The voting-age population consists of individuals 21 years of age and older except in Georgia and Kentucky, where it was 18 years of age and older.

[12] See, for instance, Madestam et al. (2013), Calderon et al. (2021), Larreboure and Gonzalez (2021), Mayda et al. (2022), and Mansour and Reeves (2022).

[13] Data on Minnesota congressional election outcomes are not available from the *General Election Data for the United States, 1950-1990* (ICPSR 2013) for the period 1960-1970. Data on congressional election outcomes in Minnesota for this period were obtained from *Electoral Data for Counties in the United States: Presidential and Congressional Races, 1840-1972* (Clubb et al. 2006).

[14] Because treatment is not staggered, the recent critiques of two-way fixed effects models do not apply to our setting (Baker et al. 2022). Exploratory analyses of the effects of PPC protests on the 1968 presidential election outcomes and on congressional election outcomes in 1972, 1974, and 1976 produced imprecise and inconsistent results. Economists

otherwise). The post-treatment coefficients of the event-year dummies, π_y, characterize the effects of the caravan stops. Note that $y = 1966$ is omitted, which normalizes the estimates of π_y to 0 in that election year. The pre-treatment estimates of π_y can be thought of as falsification tests—their patterns and precision allow us to investigate the parallel trends assumption.

County fixed effects, δ_c, control for time-invariant determinants of election outcomes; state-by-year fixed effects, γ_{st}, allow for differential shocks to election outcomes at the state level caused by, for instance, the quality of a candidate for state-wide office, shifts in public opinion, or the introduction of new voter registration requirements. It is worth noting that the state-by-year fixed effects also capture common shocks to voting behavior caused by, for instance, events in Washington, D.C. or the passage of federal legislation such as the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Any country-wide effect due to the national press coverage of the PPC, which emphasized leadership squabbles and the conditions in Resurrection City (Mantler 2010), is captured by the state-by-year fixed effects.

Finally, interactions between county characteristics, $\boldsymbol{X}_c$, and the year dummies are included on the right-hand side of equation (1). The following county-level covariates are included in $\boldsymbol{X}_c$: White population share, urban population share, population density, the unemployment rate, poverty rate, and the number of Black-led riots in 1968.[15] Data on population density, the unemployment rate, and urban population share come from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (2012) and pertain to 1960. The poverty rate and White population share, which also pertain to 1960, come from Haines and ICPSR (2010).

interested in estimating the effects of protests on election outcomes have restricted their attention to one election cycle (Madestam et al. 2013; Larreboure and Gonzalez 2021; Lagios et al. 2022; Teeselink and Melios 2022).

[15] The number of Black-led riots in 1968 is from Carter (1986). Black-led riots that occurred after the November elections are not included. The estimates reported below are qualitatively unchanged if we replace Black-led riots in 1968 with the total number of protests in 1968, the number of non-violent protests in 1968, or the number of violent protests in 1968. Additional information on protest activity was obtained from McAdam et al. (2009).

The difference-in-differences (DiD) analogue of equation (1) is:

$$(2) \qquad Y_{ct} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 D_c \times Post_t + \delta_c + \gamma_{st} + \sum_{y=1960}^{1970} \lambda_y \boldsymbol{X}_c 1(t = y) + \varepsilon_{ct},$$

where $Post_t$ is equal to 1 if $t \geq 1968$ (and is equal to 0 otherwise). The estimate of α_1 can be thought of as summarizing the post-treatment estimates of π_y.

Appendix Table A1 provides pre-treatment descriptive statistics for the outcomes and covariates used in our baseline analysis. Eighty counties were treated by a PPC bus caravan or the Mule Train; the 2,254 counties in which neither a bus caravan nor the Mule Train stopped serve as controls. Sixteen states were bypassed entirely by the PPC caravans on their way to Washington, D.C. (Figure 2). Counties located in these 16 states are excluded from the analysis.[16]

4. RESULTS

Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equations (1) and (2) for Democratic and Republican vote shares are reported in Figure 3.[17] The pre-treatment estimates of π_y exhibit no clear trend; consistent with the parallel trends assumption, they are, without exception, small and statistically insignificant. In the post-treatment period, the estimates of π_y are also small and statistically insignificant, providing little evidence that the PPC protests held en route to

[16] Fifteen counties were treated by the Mule Train, 68 counties were treated by at least one bus caravan, and three counties were treated by the Mule Train and a bus caravan. Seven untreated counties located in states through which a PPC caravan passed were excluded from the analysis because of missing information on the controls.

[17] Regressions are weighted by total population in 1960 and standard errors are clustered at the county level (Bertrand et al. 2004). The estimates of π_y used to produce Figure 3 are reported in column (2) of Appendix Table A2. Also in Appendix Table A2, we report estimates of the effect of treatment on Democratic/Republican vote share from a more parsimonious regression with only county and state-by-year fixed effects on the right-hand side, a regression in which the vector of covariates, $\boldsymbol{X}_c$, includes indicators for population size (i.e., an indicator for counties with a 1960 population of less than 10,000, an indicator for population between 10,000 and 100,000, and an indicator for population over 3,000,000), and regressions in which we replace the number of Black-led riots in 1968 with total protests in 1968, violent protests in 1968, or non-violent protests in 1968. These estimates are consistent with those shown in Figure 3.

Washington, D.C. were effective. For instance, PPC treatment is associated with a 0.002 increase in Democratic vote share in the 1968 congressional elections. Based on the upper bound of the 90 percent confidence interval of this estimate, we can rule out an estimated effect larger than 2.7 percentage points. The two-period DiD estimates (i.e., our estimates of a_1) for Democratic and Republican vote shares are 0.009 (p-value = 0.542) and -0.0006 (p-value = 0.968), respectively.

In Figure 4, we turn our attention to turnout, as measured by votes received by Democratic/Republican House candidates as a proportion of the 1960 voting-age population. Not surprisingly given the results reported in Figure 3, there is no evidence that the PPC protests affected turnout for either Democratic or Republican congressional candidates. The estimates of π_y are, without exception, small and statistically insignificant; the two-period DiD estimate for Democratic turnout is -0.001 (p-value = 0.888) and the two-period DiD estimate for Republican turnout is -0.003 (p-value = 0.760).[18]

4.1. Heterogeneity analysis

The event-study estimates of π_y reported in Figures 3-4 provide little evidence that PPC protests held en route to Washington, D.C. influenced the outcomes of the 1968 or 1970 congressional elections. These estimates, however, could mask important regional differences in how the PPC protests were covered by the local press. For example, 500 Black protesters arriving

[18] In column (2) of Appendix Table A3, we report the estimates of π_y used to produce Figure 4. Also in Appendix Table A3, we report estimates from a more parsimonious regression with only county and state-by-year fixed effects on the right-hand side, a regression in which our vector of covariates, $\boldsymbol{X}_c$, includes indicators for population size (i.e., an indicator for counties with a 1960 population of less than 10,000, an indicator for population between 10,000 and 100,000, and an indicator for population over 3,000,000), and regressions in which we replace the number of Black-led riots in 1968 with total protests in 1968, violent protests in 1968, or non-violent protests in 1968. These estimates are generally consistent with those reported in Figure 4. With only county and state-by-year fixed effects on the right-hand side, treatment is associated with a 2.5 percentage point reduction in Republican turnout in the 1968 congressional elections. If we replace the number of Black-led riots in 1968 by total protests in 1968, violent protests in 1968, or non-violent protests in 1968, treatment is associated with a 1.5 to 1.6 percentage point reduction in Republican turnout in the 1968 elections.

on 10 buses was front-page news in small Southern communities such as Macon, GA and Durham, NC.[19] By contrast, the PPC protests in major Eastern and Midwestern cities (e.g., Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, New York) tended to receive subdued, low-key coverage (Josten 1968; Murphy 1968; Riddell 1968; Wyatt 1968), possibly because each had repeatedly been exposed to Black-led protests by the spring of 1968.[20]

The event-study estimates of π_y reported in Figures 3-4 could also mask important regional differences in how the PPC protests were received by local residents. Whites in the South were, for example, more likely to hold negative views of Black-led protests than their counterparts in other regions of the country (Sheatsley 1966; Erskine 1967). According to a National Opinion Research Center survey conducted in December of 1963, 78 (59) percent of Southern (non-Southern) Whites expressed general disapproval "of actions Negroes have taken to obtain civil rights," and 60 (43) percent of Southern (non-Southern) Whites said that "[d]emonstrations have hurt rather than helped the Negro cause" (Sheatsley 1966, p. 231). According to the same survey, 63 (47) percent of Southern (non-Southern) Whites said that the "Negro protest movement has been generally violent rather than peaceful," and 27 (21) percent of Southern (non-Southern) Whites said that "Communists are behind" the movement (Sheatsley 1966, p. 231).[21]

To explore regional heterogeneity in the effectiveness of the PPC protests, we estimate a modified version of equation (1):

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[19] See, for instance, Welch (1968) and "500 on Caravan Due Here Today" (1968).

[20] Boston experienced two violent Black-led protests and 13 non-violent Black-led protests during the period 1960 through April, 1968; Chicago experienced 35 violent Black-led protests, and 57 non-violent Black-led protests during this period; Cincinnati experienced 8 violent Black-led protests, and 9 non-violent Black-led protests during this period; and New York City experienced 41 violent Black-led protests, and 222 non-violent Black-led protests during this period. Information on the number of Black-led protests comes from McAdam et al. (2009).

[21] In November of 1965, a Gallup poll asked, "To what extent, if any, have the Communists been involved in the demonstrations over civil rights—a lot, some, to a minor extent or not at all?" In the South, 59 percent of respondents answered "a lot"; in the East, 41 percent answered "a lot"; in the Midwest, 46 percent answered "a lot"; and in the West, 45 percent answered "a lot" (Erskine 1967).

(3) $$Y_{ct} = \alpha_0 + \sum_r \sum_{y=1960}^{1964} \pi_{y,r} D_{c,r} 1(t = y) + \sum_r \sum_{y=1968}^{1970} \pi_{y,r} D_{c,r} 1(t = y) + \delta_c + \gamma_{st} + \sum_{y=1960}^{1970} \lambda_y \boldsymbol{X}_c 1(t = y) + \varepsilon_{ct},$$

where subscript *r* indexes region (i.e., East, Midwest, South, and West). The results for this exercise are reported in Figures 5 and 6.[22]

The East

Estimates of $\pi_{y,r}$ for caravan stops in the East of the United States are reported in the top-left panels of Figures 5 and 6. They provide little evidence that PPC protests benefited Democratic congressional candidates. Although treatment is associated with a 2.9 percentage point increase in Democratic turnout in 1968 (p-value = 0.003), the 1964 estimate for Democratic turnout is also positive, statistically significant, and of similar magnitude. In the 1970 congressional elections, treatment is associated with a 5.7 percentage point increase in Republican vote share and a 3.1 percentage point increase in Republican turnout.

The Midwest

In the top-right panels of Figures 5 and 6, we report estimates of $\pi_{y,r}$ for caravan stops in the Midwest. The 1968 estimates are, without exception, small and statistically insignificant. The estimates for the 1970 congressional elections, however, provide evidence, albeit tentative, of longer-run effects: treatment is associated with a (statistically insignificant) 2.3 percentage point increase in

[22] Appendix Figure A1 shows the bus caravan and Mule Train stops by region of the United States (i.e., the East, Midwest, South, and West). The Freedom Caravan, the Southern Caravan, and the Mule Train all made stops in the South. The Northwestern and Western caravans made stops in the West before continuing through the Midwest. In total, 10 counties were treated by the Eastern Caravan, 13 counties were treated by the Midwestern Caravan, 33 counties were treated by the Southern Caravan, Freedom Caravan or Mule Train, and 24 counties were treated by the Western or Northwestern Caravans. In Appendix Table A4, we report the estimates of $\pi_{y,r}$ used to produce Figures 5 and 6.

Democratic vote share (p-value = 0.375), and a 4.9 percentage point increase in Democratic turnout (p-value = 0.003). These 1970 estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that caravan stops in the Midwest facilitated face-to-face proselytizing and grassroots organizing. The SCLC had a history of cooperating with the liberal wing of the national Democratic Party (Weisbrot and Mackenzie 2008), but depended on local activists to mobilize grassroots support and recruit volunteers. Laurent (2018, pp. 209-212) describes Chicago activists returning home after the campaign with "a desire to continue the complex fight initiated by the PPC" and forming the Rainbow Coalition in Chicago.[23]

The South

In the bottom-left panels of Figures 5 and 6, we report estimates of $\pi_{y,r}$ for caravan stops in the South, where public opinion towards Black-led protests, the civil rights movement, and federal efforts to address racial inequalities was least favorable (Sheatsley 1966; Erskine 1967; Horowitz 1988; Stevens 2002). They provide evidence that the PPC protests held en route to Washington, D.C. had immediate, negative, and sizeable effects on the election prospects of Southern Democratic congressional candidates. Specifically, PPC protests are associated with an 11.1 percentage point decrease in Democratic vote share and an 8.1 percentage point increase in Republican vote share in the 1968 elections, driven by a 5.9 percentage point reduction in Democratic turnout and a 3.5 percentage point increase in Republican turnout. There is also evidence of a large reduction in Democratic vote share in the 1970 elections (7.5 percentage points), but this estimate is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p-value = 0.147).

[23] See Serrato (2019) and Williams (2019) for more information on the origins and ideology of the Rainbow Coalition. Eventually, the Rainbow Coalition "transformed from a community grassroots organization on the margins of Chicago's political arena to a chief player in the city's politics," successfully mounting a campaign against Edward Hanrahan, the Democratic candidate for Cook County State's Attorney in 1972 (Williams 2019, p. 82).

The West

Estimates of $\pi_{y,r}$ for caravan stops in the West are reported in the bottom-right panels of Figures 5 and 6. They provide evidence that Western and Northwestern caravan stops positively impacted the election prospects of Democratic congressional candidates: treatment is associated with a 3.8 percentage point increase in Democratic vote share in 1968 and a (statistically insignificant) 5.3 percentage point increase in Democratic vote share in 1970 (p-value = 0.138). These effects may have been driven by reductions in Republican turnout. Although not statistically significant at conventional levels, treatment is associated with a 2.1 percentage point decrease in Republican turnout in 1968 (p-value = 0.157), and a 1.7 percentage point decrease in Republican turnout in 1970 (p-value = 0.316).

The Western and Northwestern caravans were the only ones to make stops west of the Mississippi River. Essentially ignored by the national press (Mantler 2010), they were also the most ethnically and racially diverse of the 6 bus caravans that transported PPC protesters to Washington, D.C. (Cassels 1968; Jordan 1968; Powers 1968; Wright 2007; Mantler 2013). The large, positive estimated effect on Democratic vote share in the 1970 congressional elections, while imprecise, is nonetheless consistent with anecdotal evidence of PPC protestors from Western cities enthusiastically engaging in political organization at the grassroots level after returning home from the PPC (Mantler 2013). See, for instance, Mantler (2013, p. 196), who described how Corky Gonzales retuned to Denver and translated his experience with the PPC into a "nationalist vision of the Chicano movement."[24]

[24] According to Mantler (2013, p. 196),

> Gonzales's orchestration of the Chicano Youth Liberation conferences in 1969 and 1970 and his championing and leadership of the race-based La Raza Unida party demonstrated the ties between multiracial coalition building and the politics of identify. A new chapter in this relationship began to take shape most clearly near the end of the [PP] campaign, especially during the Solidarity Day rally, and accelerated when Gonzales returned to Denver.

4.2. Gauging the effects of unplanned stops in the South

The planning of the bus caravan and Mule Train routes began well before King was assassinated on April 4, 1968. In Appendix D, we show three internal SCLC planning documents produced before King's death listing all of the "major cities" through which the caravans would run. It is possible that cities in the South were chosen in advance by the SCLC leadership because, even in the absence of treatment, they would have experienced reduced Democratic vote share and turnout. In an effort to address this possibility, we turn our attention to estimating the effects of unplanned caravan stops.

Twenty-three of the 33 treated counties in the South were not listed in the SCLC internal planning documents shown in Appendix D. To estimate the effects of unplanned stops in the South, we match each of these 23 counties to its nearest neighbor using propensity score matching and pre-determined county characteristics.[25] The matching is done without replacement and, to accommodate the correlation between treated and untreated counties caused by matching, we cluster the standard errors at the matched-pair level.[26]

Event-study estimates of the effects of unplanned caravan stops in the South based on the matched sample of 46 counties (the 23 treated counties and their 23 matched controls) are reported

[25] We matched on the following county-level variables: the natural log of population, White population share, urban population share, urban population density, poverty rate, unemployment rate, and the number of Black-led riots in 1968. Matching on local poverty rates may be particularly important given that funding through the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act was targeted at poorer communities. Bailey and Duquette (2014) found that War on Poverty spending was correlated with election outcomes at the county level. Bhalotra et al. (2017) used a similar matching strategy to estimate the effects of a 1930s Swedish program that was designed to provide mothers with information on nutrition and sanitation.

[26] Abadie and Spiess (2022) showed that, in regressions performed after matching without replacement, standard errors should be clustered at the matched-pair level. Appendix Figure A2 shows the counties in the South treated with an unplanned bus caravan or Mule Train stop and their matched controls. See Appendix Table A5 for descriptive statistics. Importantly, after matching, none of the observed differences in county-level characteristics are statistically distinguishable from zero. To account for the fact that there are only 23 clusters, we also performed inference using wild cluster bootstrapping with Rademacher weights and 999 replications (Cameron et al. 2008; Cameron and Miller 2015; Roodman et al. 2019).

in the top panel of Figure 7.[27] Intriguingly, these estimates, although imprecise, are generally consistent with those reported in Figures 5 and 6. Treatment is associated with a (statistically insignificant) 9.4 percentage point decrease in Democratic vote share (p-value = 0.334) and a (statistically insignificant) 9.3 percentage point increase or Republican vote share (p-value = 0.318). The voter-turnout estimates of the effects of unplanned stops in the South are more precise than the vote-share estimates and consistent with those reported in Figure 6: in the 1968 congressional elections, treatment by an unplanned caravan stop is associated with a 4.9 percentage point decrease in Democratic turnout (p-value = 0.042).

4.3. Gauging the effects of unplanned stops in the West

The Western and Northwestern caravans stopped in 27 counties. Remarkably, all but 4 of these stops were unplanned (i.e., they were not mentioned in the planning documents reproduced in Appendix D). To gauge their effects, we match each of the 23 counties in the West in which unplanned stops were made to its nearest neighbor using propensity score matching and pre-determined county characteristics.[28] Again, the matching is done without replacement, and we cluster the standard errors at the matched-pair level.

[27] In panel A of Appendix Table A6, we report the estimates of π_j shown in Figure 7. We also report the p-values from wild cluster bootstrapping. Because, after matching, the treated and untreated counties have similar observable characteristics, we include year fixed effects instead of state-by-year fixed effects on the right-hand side of the regression and do not include county-level covariates interacted with the year indicators. The results are, however, robust to including the county-level covariates on the right-hand side.

[28] We matched on the following county-level variables: the natural log of population, White population share, urban population share, urban population density, poverty rate, unemployment rate, and the number of Black-led riots in 1968. Appendix Figure A3 shows the counties in the West treated with an unplanned caravan stop and their matched controls. In Appendix Table A5, we provide descriptive statistics for the 23 counties in the West treated with an unplanned caravan stop and their 23 controls obtained through matching. None of the observed differences in county-level characteristics are statistically distinguishable from zero.

Event-study estimates of the effects of unplanned caravan stops in the West based on the matched sample are reported in the bottom panels of Figure 7.[29] These estimates, although imprecise, are consistent with those reported in Figures 5 and 6. In the 1968 congressional elections, treatment by an unplanned caravan stop is associated with a (statistically insignificant) 2.5 percentage point increase in Democratic vote share (p-value = 0.572); it is also associated with a (statistically insignificant) 3.5 percentage point reduction in Republican turnout (p-value = 0.253).

5. CONCLUSION

The conventional view among scholars is that the Poor People's Campaign (PPC), launched in the spring of 1968, was a failure. Organizers could not overcome the leadership void created by King's assassination and could not persuade Congress to take concrete action (Fager 1969; Sitkoff 1981; Harrison 1996; McKnight 1998; Fairclough 2002; Wright 2020). Other scholars, however, maintain that it drew much-needed attention to the issues of race and poverty in the United States (Jackson 2007; Hamilton 2020). For instance, Jackson (2007, p. 353 and p. 358) argued that, despite being "all but ignored" by Congress and the Johnson administration, the PPC made "poverty and economic racism…visible to all if they chose to look."

Using county-level data for the period 1960-1970, we explore the relationship between PPC protests held en route to Washinton D.C. and outcomes of U.S. House of Representatives elections. We find that PPC protests in the South appear to have had sizeable, negative effects on the election prospects of Democratic candidates to the House of Representatives. Specifically, being treated by

[29] In panel B of Appendix Table A6, we report the estimates of π_y used to produce the bottom panels of Figure 7. Because, after matching, the treated and untreated counties have similar observable characteristics, we include year fixed effects instead of state-by-year fixed effects on the right-hand side of the regression and do not include county-level covariates interacted with the year indicators. The results are, however, robust to including the county-level covariates on the right-hand side. Because the matched control counties are more concentrated in the Southwest (Appendix Figure A3), we experimented with forcing matched counties to be from the same state as the treated counties (Appendix Figure A4). The event-study estimates based on this alternative procedure are reported in Appendix Figure A5.

the Freedom Caravan, the Southern Caravan, or the Mule Train is associated with an 11.1 percentage point reduction in Democratic vote share and a 5.9 percentage point reduction in Democratic turnout in the 1968 congressional elections. By the mid-1960s, mainstream civil rights leaders and the liberal wing of the national Democratic Party had forged an effective political alliance (Jackson 2007; DiSalvo 2010; Milkis 2012). It is possible that PPC protests—and the coverage they received in the local press—increased the salience of this alliance among Southern White voters, causing a backlash at the polls. Compared to their counterparts from other regions of the country, Southern Whites were more likely to hold negative views of the civil rights movement and more likely to describe Black-led protests as violent and inspired by Communists (Sheatsley 1966; Erskine 1967; Stevens 2002).

In the West, there is evidence that Democratic congressional candidates benefited from PPC caravan stops. Treatment in the western half of the country is associated with a 3.8 percentage point increase in Democratic vote share and a 2.1 percentage point decrease in Republican turnout in the 1968 congressional elections. The Western and Northwestern caravans were more racially and ethnically diverse than the other PPC caravans (Cassels 1968; Jordan 1968; Powers 1968; Wright 2007; Mantler 2013). This diversity received a fair amount of attention in the local press and could explain the positive association between treatment and Democratic vote share. The caravan stops in the West were also, with only a few exceptions, unplanned: there is no mention of them in documents produced by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference before King's assassination (Appendix D). Estimated effects of unplanned Northwestern and Western caravan stops on Democratic vote share, although admittedly imprecise, are positive and similar in magnitude to estimates that do not distinguish between planned and unplanned stops.

During the last 50 years, peaceful political protests have become increasing popular in the United States and, in fact, worldwide (Chenoweth 2020). As peaceful protests become more

frequent and easier to organize (Chenoweth et al. 2019), gauging their effectiveness has taken on greater importance. Our estimates represent the first quasi-experimental evidence on the relationship between non-violent Black-led protests and election outcomes during the civil rights era. They suggest that peaceful protests can, under certain circumstances, backfire. Future researchers interested in estimating their effects should carefully consider how geographic-based differences in receptiveness and media coverage might interact with the message and tactics being used by protestors.

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Figure 1. Bus Caravan and Mule Train Routes



Figure 2. States in Sample



Figure 3. The Effects of Caravan Stops on Democratic and Republican Vote Shares in Congressional Elections



Notes: County-level data on outcomes of the U.S. House of Representative elections are from the *General Election Data for the United States, 1950-1990* (ICPSR 2013). Two-way fixed effects estimates (and their 90% confidence intervals) are reported, in which the omitted year is 1966. The dependent variable is equal to the votes received by the Democratic/Republican candidate in county *c* and election year *t* as a proportion of total votes cast. All models control for county fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects, and the following covariates interacted with the year indicators: White population share, urban population share, urban population density, poverty rate, unemployment rate, and the number of Black-led riots in 1968. Estimates are weighted by total population in 1960 and standard errors are clustered at the county level. Column (2) of Appendix Table A2 reports the estimates plotted above. N = 2,334.

Figure 4. The Effects of Caravan Stops on Democratic and Replication Votes Received in Congressional Elections as a Proportion of Population



Notes: County-level data on outcomes of the U.S. House of Representative elections are from the *General Election Data for the United States, 1950-1990* (ICPSR 2013). Two-way fixed effects estimates (and their 90% confidence intervals) are reported, in which the omitted year is 1966. The dependent variable is equal to the votes received by the Democratic/Republican candidate in county *c* and election year *t* as a proportion of the 1960 voting-age population. All models control for county fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects, and the following covariates interacted with the year indicators: White population share, urban population share, urban population density, poverty rate, unemployment rate, and the number of Black-led riots in 1968. Estimates are weighted by total population in 1960 and standard errors are clustered at the county level. Column (2) of Appendix Table A3 reports the estimates plotted above. N = 2,334.

Figure 5. The Effects of Caravan Stops on Democratic and Republican Vote Shares in Congressional Elections by Region



Notes: Notes: County-level data on outcomes of the U.S. House of Representative elections are from the *General Election Data for the United States, 1950-1990* (ICPSR 2013). Two-way fixed effects estimates (and their 90% confidence intervals) are reported, in which the omitted year is 1966. The dependent variable is equal to the votes received by the Democratic/Republican candidate in county c and election year t as a proportion of total votes cast. All models control for county fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects, and the following covariates interacted with the year indicators: White population share, urban population share, urban population density, poverty rate, unemployment rate, and the number of Black-led riots in 1968. Estimates are weighted by total population in 1960 and standard errors are clustered at the county level. Columns (1) and (2) of Appendix Table A4 reports the estimates plotted above.

Figure 6. The Effects of Caravan Stops on Votes Received in Congressional Elections as a Proportion of Population by Region



Notes: Notes: County-level data on outcomes of the U.S. House of Representative elections are from the *General Election Data for the United States, 1950-1990* (ICPSR 2013). Two-way fixed effects estimates (and their 90% confidence intervals) are reported, in which the omitted year is 1966. The dependent variable is equal to the votes received by the Democratic/Republican candidate in county *c* and election year *t* as a proportion of the 1960 voting-age population. All models control for county fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects, and the following covariates interacted with the year indicators: White population share, urban population share, urban population density, poverty rate, unemployment rate, and the number of Black-led riots in 1968. Estimates are weighted by total population in 1960 and standard errors are clustered at the county level. Columns (3) and (4) of Appendix Table A4 reports the estimates plotted above.

Figure 7. The Effects of Unplanned Caravan Stops on Congressional Elections Outcomes in the South and the West



Notes: County-level data on outcomes of the U.S. House of Representative elections are from the *General Election Data for the United States, 1950-1990* (ICPSR 2013). Two-way fixed effects estimates (and their 90% confidence intervals) are reported, in which the omitted year is 1966. In the left-hand-side panels, the dependent variable is equal to the votes received by the Democratic/Republican candidate in county *c* and election year *t* as a proportion of total votes cast. In the right-hand-side panels, the dependent variable is equal to the votes received by the Democratic/Republican candidate in county *c* and election year *t* as a proportion of the 1960 voting-age population. In each event study, election outcomes in counties treated by unplanned stops are compared with those in control counties. Control counties were selected using a propensity score matching procedure. All models control for county and year fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by total population in 1960 and standard errors are clustered at the matched-pair level. Appendix Table A6 reports the estimates plotted above.

Appendix A

For Online Publication

Appendix Figure A1. Bus Caravan and Mule Train Stops by Region



Appendix Figure A2. Counties Treated with an Unplanned Caravan Stops in the South and their Matched Controls



Notes: Twenty-three counties were treated with an unplanned bus caravan or Mule Train stop in the South. Twenty-three counties selected using nearest-neighbor propensity score matching without replacement serve as controls. The matching is based on 7 pre-determined covariates: natural log of population, White population share, urban population share, urban population density, poverty rate, unemployment rate, and the number of Black-led riots in 1968.

Appendix Figure A3. Counties Treated with an Unplanned Caravan Stop in the West and their Matched Controls



Notes: Twenty-three counties were treated with an unplanned bus caravan stop in the West. Twenty-three counties selected using nearest-neighbor propensity score matching without replacement serve as controls. The matching is based on 7 pre-determined covariates: natural log of population, White population share, urban population share, urban population density, poverty rate, unemployment rate, and the number of Black-led riots in 1968.

Appendix Figure A4. Counties Treated with an Unplanned Caravan Stop in the West and their Within-State Matched Controls



Notes: Twenty-three counties were treated with an unplanned bus caravan stop in the West. Twenty-three counties selected using nearest-neighbor propensity score matching without replacement serve as controls. The matching is based on 8 pre-determined covariates: a state indicator, natural log of population, White population share, urban population share, urban population density, poverty rate, unemployment rate, and the number of Black-led riots in 1968.

Appendix Figure A5. The Effects of Unplanned Caravan Stops on Congressional Elections Outcomes in the West: Based on Within-State Matched Samples



Notes: County-level data on outcomes of the U.S. House of Representative elections are from the *General Election Data for the United States, 1950-1990* (ICPSR 2013). Two-way fixed effects estimates (and their 90% confidence intervals) are reported, in which the omitted year is 1966. In the top panel, the dependent variable is equal to the votes received by the Democratic/Republican candidate in county *c* and election year *t* as a proportion of total votes cast. In the bottom panel, the dependent variable is equal to the votes received by the Democratic/Republican candidate in county *c* and election year *t* as a proportion of the 1960 voting-age population. In each event study, election outcomes in counties treated by unplanned caravan stops are compared with those in control counties from the same state. Controls were selected using a propensity score matching procedure. All models control for county and year fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by total population in 1960 and standard errors are clustered at the matched-pair level.

Appendix Table A1. Descriptive Statistics by Treatment Status

	Treated counties	Control counties	Difference
Democratic vote share (%, 1966)	60.0	57.5	2.40
	(19.9)	(24.1)	
Republican vote share (%, 1966)	38.3	41.3	-2.96
	(21.8)	(24.8)	
Votes for Democrat (per 100 voting-age population, 1966)	24.2	25.3	-1.12
	(8.45)	(11.2)	
Votes for Republican (per 100 voting-age population, 1966)	18.1	21.9	-3.88**
	(11.9)	(15.2)	
Independent variables			
Population (1960)	569,468	47,365	522,103***
	(944,430)	(120,144)	
Voting-age population (1960)	354,585	28,347	326,237***
	(603,695)	(75,980)	
Population per square mile (1960)	2,694	172	2,522***
	(8,784)	(1,289)	
White population share (%, 1960)	81.0	88.8	-7.80***
	(15.3)	(16.9)	
Urban population share (%, 1960)	79.3	31.2	48.0***
	(23.4)	(27.7)	
Poverty rate (%, 1960)	25.7	35.2	-9.46***
	(15.4)	(16.9)	
Unemployment rate (%, 1960)	4.90	5.31	-0.417
	(1.36)	(2.49)	
Black-led riots in 1968	1.06	0.064	0.999***
	(1.62)	(0.356)	
Total number of protests in 1968	4.75	0.081	4.67***
	(21.9)	(0.602)	
Total number of violent protests in 1968	1.35	0.025	1.33***
	(5.06)	(0.205)	
Total number of non-violent protests in 1968	3.40	0.056	3.34***
	(17.0)	(0.461)	
N	80	2,254	2,334

Notes: County-level data on election outcomes are from the *General Election Data for the United States, 1950-1990* (ICPSR 2013). County-level demographic data are from the *Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States, 1790-2002* (Haines and ICPSR, 2010), and the *County and City Data Book [United States] Consolidated File: County Data, 1947-1977* (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2012). Data on Black-led riots in 1968 are from Carter (1986). Data on violent and non-violent protests in 1968 are from McAdam et al (2009). Unweighted means are reported and standard deviations are reported in parentheses.

Appendix Table A2. The Effects of Caravan Stops on Democratic and Republican Vote Shares in Congressional Elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. Democratic Vote Share						
1960	0.003	0.001	-0.005	-0.007	-0.010	-0.005
	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
1962	-0.016*	-0.010	-0.014	-0.012	-0.012	-0.012
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)
1964	-0.007	-0.005	-0.007	-0.008	-0.007	-0.008
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)
1968	0.014	0.002	-0.005	0.002	-0.002	0.003
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)
1970	0.022	0.010	-0.002	0.017	0.016	0.017
	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Panel B. Republican Vote Share						
1960	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.011	0.012	0.010
	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)
1962	0.013	0.001	0.005	0.004	0.003	0.004
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)
1964	0.008	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)
1968	-0.010	0.006	0.003	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)
1970	-0.020	-0.003	0.011	-0.009	-0.007	-0.009
	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)
State-by-year FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X
Year indicators interacted with county characteristics		X	X	X	X	X
Year indicators interacted with Black-led riots in 1968		X	X			
Year indicators interacted with population-size indicators			X			
Year indicators interacted with total protests in 1968				X		
Year indicators interacted with violent protests in 1968					X	
Year indicators interacted with non-violent protests in 1968						X
N	2,341	2,334	2,334	2,334	2,334	2,334

*Statistically significant at 10% level.

Notes: County-level data on outcomes of the U.S. House of Representative elections are from the *General Election Data for the United States, 1950-1990* (ICPSR 2013). Two-way fixed effects estimates are reported, in which the omitted year is 1966. The dependent variable is equal to the votes received by the Democratic/Republican candidate in county *c* and election year *t* as a proportion of total votes cast. All models control for county fixed effects and state-by-year fixed effects. County characteristics include the following: White population share, urban population share, urban population density, poverty rate, and unemployment rate. Indicators for population size are for counties with a 1960 population < 10,000, between 10,000 and 100,000, and > 3,000,000. Estimates are weighted by total population in 1960 and standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Appendix Table A3. The Effects of Caravan Stops on Democratic and Republican Votes Received in Congressional Elections as a Proportion of Population

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. Votes for Democrat						
1960	0.018*	0.005	-0.001	0.009	0.008	0.009
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)
1962	0.010*	0.006	0.003	0.010	0.011	0.009
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
1964	0.016***	0.008	0.006	0.008	0.010	0.008
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
1968	0.009	-0.003	-0.006	-0.008	-0.010	-0.007
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)
1970	0.009	0.010	0.007	0.009	0.008	0.010
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Panel B. Votes for Republican						
1960	-0.0001	0.008	0.006	0.011	0.011	0.011
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
1962	0.007	0.0001	-0.0003	0.005	0.004	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
1964	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
1968	-0.025***	-0.005	-0.006	-0.016*	-0.015*	-0.016*
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
1970	-0.009	0.004	0.016	-0.002	0.002	-0.002
	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)
State-by-year FEs	X	X	X	X	X	X
Year indicators interacted with county characteristics		X	X	X	X	X
Year indicators interacted with Black-led riots in 1968		X	X			
Year indicators interacted with population-size indicators			X			
Year indicators interacted with total protests in 1968				X		
Year indicators interacted with violent protests in 1968					X	
Year indicators interacted with non-violent protests in 1968						X
N	2,341	2,334	2,334	2,334	2,334	2,334

*Statistically significant at 10% level; *** at 1% level.

Notes: County-level data on outcomes of the U.S. House of Representative elections are from the *General Election Data for the United States, 1950-1990* (ICPSR 2013). Two-way fixed effects estimates are reported, in which the omitted year is 1966. The dependent variable is equal to the votes received by the Democratic/Republican candidate in county *c* and election year *t* as a proportion of the 1960 voting-age population. All models control for county fixed effects and state-by-year fixed effects. County characteristics include the following: White population share, urban population share, urban population density, poverty rate, and unemployment rate. Indicators for population size are for counties with a 1960 population < 10,000, between 10,000 and 100,000, and > 3,000,000. Estimates are weighted by total population in 1960 and standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Appendix Table A4. The Effects of Caravan Stops on Congressional Election Outcomes by Region

	(1) Democratic Vote Share	(2) Republican Vote Share	(3) Votes for Democrat	(4) Votes for Republican
Panel A. East				
1960	0.001	-0.006	0.020	-0.012
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.013)	(0.016)
1962	-0.010	0.003	-0.005	-0.013
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.010)
1964	-0.009	0.012	0.025***	0.009
	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.009)	(0.015)
1968	0.016	0.001	0.029***	0.006
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.015)
1970	-0.033	0.057***	0.003	0.031**
	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Panel B. Midwest				
1960	-0.029	0.023	-0.009	-0.007
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.011)
1962	-0.015	0.009	0.002	-0.003
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.008)
1964	-0.023	0.025*	-0.009	0.002
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.008)
1968	0.010	-0.003	0.004	-0.015
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.014)
1970	0.023	-0.004	0.049***	0.009
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Panel C. South				
1960	0.004	-0.026	-0.014	-0.004
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.015)	(0.019)
1962	-0.069*	0.034	0.021	0.006
	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.015)	(0.013)
1964	-0.054	0.027	0.006	0.018
	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.015)	(0.013)
1968	-0.111***	0.081**	-0.059***	0.035**
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.014)	(0.015)
1970	-0.075	0.052	-0.008	0.022
	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Panel D. West				
1960	0.015	0.011	0.014	0.028**
	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.014)
1962	0.015	-0.016	0.008	0.005
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.008)
1964	0.024	-0.022	0.009	-0.001
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.009)	(0.008)
1968	0.038*	-0.019	0.003	-0.021
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.015)
1970	0.053	-0.047	0.001	-0.017
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.013)	(0.017)

*Statistically significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level *** at 1% level.

Notes: County-level data on outcomes of the U.S. House of Representative elections are from the *General Election Data for the United States, 1950-1990* (ICPSR 2013). Two-way fixed effects estimates are reported, in which the omitted year is 1966. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is equal to the votes received by the Democratic/Republican candidate in county *c* and election year *t* as a proportion of total votes cast. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is equal to the votes received by the Democratic/Republican candidate as a proportion of 1960 voting-age population. All models control for county fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects, and the following covariates interacted with the year indicators: White population share, urban population share, urban population density, poverty rate, unemployment rate, and the number of Black-led riots in 1968. Estimates are weighted by total population in 1960 and standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Appendix Table A5. Descriptive Statistics for Counties with Unplanned Caravan Stops Versus Control Counties Based on Propensity Score Matching

	South			West		
	Treated counties	Control counties	Difference	Treated counties	Control counties	Difference
Democratic vote share (%, 1966)	64.3	65.6	-1.36	56.6	64.2	-7.61
	(24.5)	(25.9)		(17.3)	(24.4)	
Republican vote share (%, 1966)	31.1	34.2	-3.13	43.0	35.6	7.34
	(28.5)	(26.0)		(18.2)	(24.5)	
Democratic votes (per 100 voting-age population, 1966)	22.5	19.2	3.32	26.5	24.0	2.52
	(8.95)	(7.21)		(9.62)	(9.35)	
Republican votes (per 100 voting-age population, 1966)	12.1	13.0	-0.858	23.4	19.8	3.59
	(10.9)	(10.8)		(12.5)	(17.0)	
Independent variables						
Population (1960)	161,957	110,619	51,338	422,531	436,176	-13,645
	(149,399)	(81,690)		(315,898)	(344,677)	
Voting-age population (1960)	93,373	64,160	29,214	253,570	259,808	-6,238
	(86,831)	(48,078)		(195,632)	(210,451)	
Population per square mile (1960)	530	359	171	1,232	1,355	-123
	(1,243)	(439)		(2,829)	(3,412)	
White population share (%, 1960)	70.2	74.6	-4.45	93.2	92.6	0.593
	(13.2)	(13.4)		(6.65)	(7.13)	
Urban population share (%, 1960)	62.1	56.3	5.87	87.7	88.0	-0.317
	(26.5)	(31.8)		(8.77)	(11.5)	
Poverty rate (%, 1960)	38.6	37.0	1.63	18.5	21.2	-2.70
	(13.9)	(12.7)		(7.25)	(14.3)	
Unemployment rate (%, 1960)	4.54	4.60	-0.057	5.00	5.29	-0.287
	(1.10)	(1.71)		(1.52)	(2.18)	
	(28.5)	(26.0)		(18.2)	(24.5)	
Black-led riots in 1968	0.609	0.391	0.217	0.522	0.478	0.043
	(1.03)	(0.583)		(0.994)	(0.730)	
N	23	23	46	23	23	46

Notes: County-level data on election outcomes are from the *General Election Data for the United States, 1950-1990* (ICPSR 2013). County-level demographic data are from the *Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States, 1790-2002* (Haines and ICPSR, 2010), and the *County and City Data Book [United States] Consolidated File: County Data, 1947-1977* (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2012). Data on Black-led riots in 1968 are from Carter (1986). Unweighted means are reported and standard deviations are reported in parentheses.

Appendix Table A6. The Effects of Unplanned Caravan Stops on Congressional Election Outcomes in the South and West

	(1) Democratic Vote Share	(2) Republican Vote Share	(3) Votes for Democrat	(4) Votes for Republican
Panel A. South				
1960	-0.105	0.119	-0.028	0.031
	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.031)	(0.054)
	[0.415]	[0.350]	[0.388]	[0.600]
1962	-0.087	0.059	-0.012	0.010
	(0.074)	(0.090)	(0.025)	(0.032)
	[0.275]	[0.508]	[0.637]	[0.731]
1964	-0.054	0.044	0.004	0.025
	(0.079)	(0.072)	(0.022)	(0.029)
	[0.524]	[0.574]	[0.881]	[0.392]
1968	-0.094	0.093	-0.049**	0.024
	(0.087)	(0.084)	(0.023)	(0.030)
	[0.334]	[0.318]	[0.042]	[0.440]
1970	-0.028	0.020	0.003	-0.011
	(0.113)	(0.110)	(0.030)	(0.039)
	[0.804]	[0.867]	[0.921]	[0.755]
Panel B. West				
1960	0.020	0.022	0.008	0.037
	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.040)	(0.024)
	[0.598]	[0.389]	[0.829]	[0.136]
1962	0.003	0.001	-0.008	0.017
	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.018)	(0.025)
	[0.938]	[0.980]	[0.654]	[0.525]
1964	0.011	-0.021	-0.003	0.004
	(0.066)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.021)
	[0.876]	[0.648]	[0.955]	[0.832]
1968	0.025	-0.031	0.004	-0.035
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.030)
	[0.572]	[0.478]	[0.921]	[0.253]
1970	0.004	0.003	-0.002	0.014
	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.030)	(0.027)
	[0.963]	[0.970]	[0.958]	[0.601]

**Statistically significant at 5% level.

Notes: County-level data on outcomes of the U.S. House of Representative elections are from the *General Election Data for the United States, 1950-1990* (ICPSR 2013). Two-way fixed effects estimates are reported, in which the omitted year is 1966. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is equal to the votes received by the Democratic/Republican candidate in county *c* and election year *t* as a proportion of total votes cast. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is equal to the votes received by the Democratic/Republican candidate as a proportion of 1960 voting-age population. In each event study, election outcomes in counties treated by unplanned stops are compared with those in control counties. Control counties were selected using a propensity score matching procedure. All models control for county and year fixed effects. Estimates are weighted by total population in 1960 and standard errors are clustered at the matched-pair level. P-values from wild cluster bootstrap procedure are in brackets and are based on 999 replications.

Appendix B

For Online Publication

Sources for General Background Information

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Appendix C

For Online Publication

Sources with Information on the Numbers of Buses, Protesters, Mules, and Wagons

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Appendix D

For Online Publication

SCLC Internal Planning Documents Dated Prior to the Death of Martin Luther King Jr.
(Obtained from the Archives at Auburn Avenue Research Library, Emory University)



334 Auburn Ave., N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Telephone 522-1420

S C L C

Southern Christian Leadership Conference

MEMORANDUM

FROM: Frogmore ADHOC Committee

TO: Aide Memoir

SUBJECT: Provisional Assignments For Washington, D. C. Spring Project

cc: All SCLC Staff

Following provisional assignments made at Frogmore for the Washington Spring project. These assignments will be modified as required. Cities and areas are indicated in their approximate order of priority. (Asterisk * - indicates non-staff member.)

I. MAJOR CITIES

1. Washington, D. C.:

   J. T. Johnson
   Henry Brownlee
   Lester Hankerson
   *John Barber and/or Ivanhoe Downs

2. Baltimore, Maryland:

   Phil Goobler
   *Richard Boone

3. New York, N. Y.:

   F. D. Kirkpatrick
   Jimmy Collier
   *Carliss Russell

4. Virginia (Richmond, Petersburg, etc.):

   Herbert Coulton
   James Gibson
   Milton Ried
   Curtis Harris

5. Chicago, Illinois:

   Billy Hollins
   Ralph Henry
   Helen Lattimore (will assist in Cleveland as well)

6. Cleveland, Ohio (Plus Akron & Toledo):

   Eddie Osborne
   Mike Bibler

7. Philadelphia, Pa.:

   James Orange
   Willie Tabb

8. Newark, N. J.:

   Al Sampson
   Herman Jenkins

9. Boston, Mass.:

   Golden Frinks
   Meredith Gilbert
   *Sara Small
   Stoney Cooks (Roving assignment)

10. Detroit , Michigan:

   * Ben Clarke
   *Frank Ditto
   *Cecil Franklin

11. Cincinnati, Ohio:

(Fred Shuttlesworth)

12. Louisville, Ky.:

unassigned

13. Milwaukee, Wis.:

unassigned

14. Pittsburg, Pa.:

unassigned

II. RURAL AREAS

1. North Carolina:

Golden Frinks
(Additional staff to be assigned)
*Elton Cox

2. South Carolina:

Ben Mack
Carl Farris
Bernice Robinson
Septima Clark

3. Georgia:

Fred C. Bennette
Samuel Wells
Rebecca Jenkins
Willie Bolden

4. Alabama:

Albert Turner
Ben (Sunshine) Owens
Andrew Marisette

5. Mississippi:

Leon Hall
R. B. Cottonreader
*Marion Wright
*Paul Breas
*Victoria Gray (Freedom Democratic Party)

III. ROVING ASSIGNMENTS
(College campus, youth organizations)

Stoney Cooks
*Candy Dawson

Los Angeles - Babu

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTLINE OF ACTION PLAN

April 22 — Dr. King - 4 poor from each area=60 - 40 leaders
Visit: HEW, COMMERCE, MANSFIELD, DIRKSON
USDA, OEO, McCORMICK, HUD

Testify before Congressional Committees: (Labor, Education, etc.)

TOURS

	SOUTHERN	MIDWEST	EAST
April 26	Mississippi	Milwaukee	Boston
April 27	Birmingham	Chicago	Hartford
April 28	Atlanta	Detroit	New York
April 29	Columbia Greenville	Cleveland	Newark
April 30	Greensboro Winston-Salem	Pittsburgh	Trenton
May 1	Richmond Danville	Philadelphia	Philadelphia
May 2	Alexandria	Baltimore	Baltimore

May 3 — ENTER THE CAPITAL

May 5 — MARCH AROUND CAPITAL HILL

Demonstrations at Capital Hill
Visit Key Congressmen, Committee Chairmen, etc.

May 12 — Mother's March - Nationwide - Welfare Mothers

May 17 — Schools Turn Out .....Nationwide

May 30 — Masses converge on Capital

Dille WPPC

Rev. Rogers

APPROVED ITINERARY FOR DR. KING'S POOR PEOPLE'S TOUR

March 19th - March 23rd, 1968

TUESDAY, March 19, 1968 (Mississippi)

TOWN	TIME IN	TIME OUT	TRAVEL TO	MILEAGE	TRAVEL TIME	MODE OF TRAVEL	MEETING PLACE & ADDRESS	CONTACT NAME & ADDRESS
Batesville	11:00 AM	11:50 AM	Marks	28	40 min.	Car	Mt. Zion Missionary Bapt. Extended End of Penolia Avenue	Mr. Robert Mills Phone: 563-3058
Marks (Lunch)	12:30 PM	1:15 PM	Clarksdale	18	45 min.	Car	Silent Grove 1st Baptist Hemper Street	Rev. L. C. Coleman Phone: 236-4491
Clarksdale	2:00 PM	2:45 PM	Greenwood	38	45 min.	Car	Chapel Hill Baptist 303 Carolina Avenue	Dr. Aaron Henry Phone: 624-2913
Greenwood	3:30 PM	4:10 PM	Grenada	30	50 min.	Car	Jenning's Temple Church Avenue "G" Street	Mr. David Jordan Phone: 453-6407
Grenada	5:00 PM	5:30 PM	Laurel	150	90 min.	Plane	1st New Hope Baptist Bell Street	Rev. B. J. Cameron Phone: 226-4683
Laurel	7:00 PM	7:30 PM	Hattiesburg	24	30 min.	Car	St. Paul Methodist 517 Jefferson Street	Rev. Allen Johnson Phone: 426-6155 Mrs. S. Ruffin Phone: 428-0468
Hattiesburg	8:30 PM	9:30 PM	Overnight	0	0	0	Mt. Zion Baptist Spencer Street	Mr. Benton White Phone: 584-9452

WEDNESDAY, March 20, 1968 (Mississippi)

Hattiesburg	0	9:00 PM	McComb	60	60 min.	Plane	0	0
McComb	10:00 AM	10:30 AM	Jackson	50	60 min.	Plane	Rosehill Church In Magnolia	Rev. Summons Phone: 684-5731
Jackson	11:30 AM	12:45 PM	Alabama	0	0	Plane	Masonic Temple 1072 West Lynch St.	Miss Tut Tate Phone: 352-0924

WEDNESDAY, March 20, 1968 (Alabama)

TOWN	TIME IN	TIME OUT	TRAVEL TO	MILEAGE	TRAVEL TIME	MODE OF TRAVEL	MEETING PLACE & ADDRESS	CONTACT NAME & ADDRESS
Bessemer	3:00 PM	3:30 PM	Eutaw	60	60 min.	Plane	New Zion Baptist 1026 N. 24th Street	
Eutaw	4:30 PM	5:30 PM	Greensboro	30	30 min.	Car	First Baptist Church Greensboro Road	
Greensboro	6:00 PM	6:30 PM	Marion	30	30 min.	Car	St. Luke Methodist Church Greensboro Highway	
Marion	7:00 PM	7:30 PM	Birmingham	30	30 min.	Car	Berean Baptist Church Washington Street	
Birmingham	8:00 PM	Overnight	0	0	0	0	A. G. Gaston Motel 16th St. & 5th Avenue	

THURSDAY, March 21, 1968 (Alabama)

Birmingham	0:	9:00 AM	Lisman	60	60 min.	Plane	0	0
Lisman	10:00 AM	10:30 AM	Linden	45	45 min.	Car	First Baptist Church Lisman, Alabama	
Linden	11:15 AM	12:45 PM	Camden	45	45 min.	Car	Lewis Chapel AME 7th Avenue	
Camden	1:30 PM	2:00 PM	Depart for Atlanta	0	0	Plane	Antioch Baptist Church Camden	

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ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

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