information acquisition , dynamic auctions , dominant strategies , large language models , consideration sets , price competition
Abstract:
Information is rarely free: learning, comparing, and verifying what to do often takes time, effort, or expertise. These informational frictions shape how individuals make decisions and interact with others. In particular, when information is costly to acquire, difficult to process, or only partially observed, incentives change and outcomes can differ sharply from the predictions of full-information models.
In this thesis I study how informational frictions interact with incentives and economic design, and how they can be mitigated by appropriate mechanisms and decision tools.
Across three self-contained chapters, I analyze gradual information acquisition in a mechanism design setting, I develop a framework for using large language models as a tool to help users play optimally in strategy-proof mechanisms, and I analyze the role of limited price comparisons by consumers in shaping equilibrium pricing in a duopoly setting.
Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.
Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.
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