This dissertation studies the design of market mechanisms under private information. Across three self-contained essays, it analyzes strategic behavior in procurement and auction environments in which participants possess privately known costs or valuations. The first chapter characterizes Bayes–Nash equilibria in pay-as-bid auctions for divisible goods and establishes uniqueness of an everywhere-optimal equilibrium with two bidders. The second chapter applies mechanism design to electricity markets and shows that maintaining bidding zones with uniform prices creates a procurement-cost premium relative to one-stage mechanisms such as nodal pricing. The third chapter extends the theory of first-price auctions by characterizing equilibria when valuation distributions contain gaps or mass points. Together, the essays advance the theoretical understanding of market mechanisms, provide new equilibrium characterizations, and derive implications for the design of auctions and electricity markets.
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