Why do equally qualified women shy away from competition? Why do donors leave tax money on the table that they would only have to ask for? And why does the sale of a kidney provoke moral outrage when the sale of almost anything else does not? At first glance these are three unrelated puzzles, drawn from three different corners of economic life. Standard economic reasoning has clean predictions in each case: the best performers should enter the competition, the eligible donors should claim the deduction, and two consenting adults should be free to trade whatever they want. However, in each case, real behavior departs from this prediction. In this dissertation, I show that the three puzzles share a common explanation. In all three settings, the decisive factor is the social context.
Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.
Das Dokument wird vom Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim bereitgestellt.
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
Search Authors in