Ticket-Splitting and Strategic Voting in Mixed Electoral Systems

Gschwend, Thomas

URL: http://aceproject.org/ero-en/topics/parties-and-ca...
Additional URL: http://polmeth.wustl.edu/media/Paper/gschw01.pdf
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2003
The title of a journal, publication series: Arbeitspapiere / Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung = Working papers
Volume: 61
Place of publication: Mannheim
ISSN: 1437-8574
Publication language: English
Institution: Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > Mannheim Centre for European Social Research - Research Department B
Subject: 320 Political science
Abstract: This work attempts to refocus the discussion about strategic voting from its narrow focus on single-member district systems. It provides several contributions to the literature on strategic voting, ticket-splitting and on electoral systems. My first contribution is to allow the electoral institutions to vary, thereby opening up the possibility to provide different incentives to operate at the same time for the same voter. I offer a theory that particular institutions not only determine the degree of strategic voting, but also the kind of strategies voters employ. In mixed electoral systems strategic voting has two facets. Strategic voters employ either a wasted-vote strategy or a coalition insurance strategy. My second contribution is to provide evidence that people vary in their proclivity to vote strategically, as determined by various motivational factors as well as their capability to comprehend the strategic implications that are offered by particular electoral rules. Evidence supporting these contributions is stemming from an appropriate choice-model using individual-level data from the 1998 German National Election Study.

Dieser Eintrag ist Teil der Universitätsbibliographie.

Metadata export


+ Search Authors in

BASE: Gschwend, Thomas

Google Scholar: Gschwend, Thomas

ORCID: Gschwend, Thomas ORCID: 0000-0002-8656-9622

+ Page Views

Hits per month over past year

Detailed information

You have found an error? Please let us know about your desired correction here: E-Mail

Actions (login required)

Show item Show item