Final Report

of the Research Project

The Moral Dimension of Doxastic Norms

by Marc Andree Weber

Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Kennedyallee 40 · 53175 Bonn, Germany · Postal address: 53170 Bonn, Germany
Tel.: + 49 228 885-1 · Fax: + 49 228 885-2777 · postmaster@dfg.de · www.dfg.de

FINAL REPORT

1 General Information

DFG reference number: WE 6242/1-1

Project number: 467739750

Project title: The Moral Dimension of Doxastic Norms

Name of the applicant: Marc Andree Weber

Official address: Universität Mannheim, Philosophisches Seminar, L 9, 5, 68161 Mannheim

Name(s) of the co-applicants: –

Name(s) of the cooperation partners: –

Reporting period (entire funding period): 01.10.2021–30.4.2022 and 01.10.2023–28.02.2026

2 Summary (in English and German)

The aim of the research project was to explain, to explore, and to establish the moral dimension of doxastic norms, where doxastic norms are those that govern our belief management.

Norms like the evidentialist principle, which holds that our beliefs should be in line with the evidence at hand, are usually regarded as *epistemic*; they aim, roughly speaking, at gaining knowledge. According to the position that is vindicated in the project with reference to norms of assertion, we ought to comply with such norms also for *moral* reasons. For one thing, this is a remarkable result as it stands; after all, it says that forming or maintaining evidentially unjustified beliefs is a moral failure, so that, contrary to common parlance, one is not allowed to believe as one wants. For another thing, there are striking implications for tricky problems in normative epistemology. By acknowledging a moral dimension of doxastic norms, we can reconcile the apparent blameworthiness of epistemic failures with the lack of control that we have with regard to what we believe and what not; we can far easier balance epistemic requirements on the one hand and moral or practical ones on the other; and we can non-arbitrarily determine the extension of epistemic norms.

Moreover, lines of reasoning that are central for the project bear on various topics within normative ethics and epistemology, partly insofar as insights from these fields help justifying key theses of the project, and partly insofar as positions maintained in the project question views held in other domains. Thus, the research done in the project yielded fruitful and even astonishing results to other philosophical debates, among them those on disagreement, friendship, promises, and the relationship between lying and self-deception.

Das Ziel dieses Forschungsprojekts war, die moralische Dimension doxastischer Normen zu erklären, zu erkunden und zu etablieren. Doxastische Normen sind dabei solche, die unser Überzeugungsmanagement betreffen.

Prinzipien wie das evidentialistische, demzufolge unsere Überzeugungen im Einklang mit den uns vorliegenden Informationen sein sollten, werden in der Erkenntnistheorie als *epistemische* Normen aufgefasst, also grob gesprochen als solche, die auf Erkenntnisgewinn abzielen. Nach der im Projekt vertretenen und unter Verweis auf Normen des Behauptens detailliert begründeten Ansicht sollten wir solchen Prinzipien allerdings auch aus *moralischen* Gründen Folge leisten. Dies ist zum einen für sich genommen ein bemerkenswertes Resultat, besagt es doch, dass das Formen oder Beibehalten schlecht begründeteter Überzeugungen eine moralische Verfehlung darstellt und man somit, anders als gemeinhin angenommen, nicht einfach glauben darf, was man will. Zum anderen zeigen sich aber auch erstaunliche Implikationen hinsichtlich kniffliger Probleme innerhalb der normativen Erkenntnistheorie. So gelingt es unter der Annahme einer moralischen Dimension doxastischer Normen etwa, die Kritikwürdigkeit epistemischer Verfehlungen zusammenzudenken mit der fehlenden Kontrolle, die wir darüber haben, was wir für wahr und was für falsch halten; es gelingt, in Normkonflikten Abwägungen zwischen epistemischen und moralisch-praktischen Forderungen zu erleichtern; und es gelingt, auf eine nicht willkürliche Weise zu bestimmen, worauf genau sich epistemische Normen überhaupt erstrecken.

Darüber hinaus weisen die für das Projekt zentralen Erwägungen Berührungspunkte zu verschiedenen anderen Themenfeldern der normativen Ethik und Erkenntnistheorie auf, teils insofern Einsichten aus diesen Themenfeldern zur Begründung zentraler Thesen im Projekt herangezogen werden, teils insofern umgekehrt im Projekt vertretene Standpunkte dazu Anlass geben, Ansichten auf anderen Gebieten zu hinterfragen. So ergaben sich zu manchen philosophischen Debatten – darunter jenen zu Meinungsverschiedenheiten, Freundschaft, Versprechen und dem Verhältnis von Lüge und Selbsttäuschung – aus der Arbeit am Projekt heraus fruchtbare und mitunter verblüffende Forschungsresultate.

3 Progress Report

3.1 Main Objectives of the Project

This research project consisted primarily in developing and justifying a core thesis and in applying it to several puzzles in the field of epistemic normativity. The core thesis holds that

(1) we always have a *moral* reason to form only those doxastic attitudes that our evidence suggests.

The puzzles concern epistemic motivation, doxastic responsibility, the extension of epistemic normativity, epistemic-practical conflicts, and the so-called clutter problem.

What is special about the core thesis is the kind of normativity involved. Usually, the relationship between the available evidence on the one hand and the epistemic subject's doxastic states (such as belief, disbelief, or suspension of belief) is said to be governed by *epistemic* norms: one's evidence gives one epistemic reasons to form specific doxastic attitudes. According to (1), however, the failure of not believing in line with one's evidence is not (or not only) epistemic but *moral*.

In a nutshell, the reasoning that leads to this idea is as follows: If one forms a doxastic attitude that is not in accordance with one's evidence, one thereby imposes on other people the risk of getting misinformed. For others might ask one for information, and if there are no overriding considerations, one should provide that information when one thinks one has it. But one can only provide appropriate information if one's relevant doxastic attitudes are evidentially justified. So acquiring evidentially unjustified doxastic attitudes puts other people at risk of getting misinformed, and as misinforming others is a way of harming them, given that actions based on unjustified doxastic attitudes are more likely to yield negative than positive consequences, one is morally obliged not to impose that risk on them. Hence one has a moral obligation not to form evidentially unjustified doxastic attitudes, at least if there are no overriding considerations.

To be sure, as one relies in one's (non-verbal) actions on one's doxastic attitudes, one may even more directly harm others by forming unjustified doxastic attitudes because actions based on them are more likely to incidentally cause harm to others than those based on justified doxastic attitudes. But not all of our doxastic attitudes affect our non-verbal actions. For instance, those that concern highly theoretical issues (advanced number theory, say) usually do not. By contrast, every doxastic attitude one has might cause one to misinform others. This is why reference to non-verbal actions that are based on unjustified doxastic attitudes cannot establish (1), while reference to the risk of misinforming others can. For only the latter applies across the board and thus gives us the universality expressed by 'always'.

In order to work out in detail that acquiring any unjustified doxastic attitude imposes on others the risk of getting misinformed and is hence morally impermissible, I drew on insights from several philosophical debates, including those on assertion, risk imposition, doxastic wronging, the nature of epistemic normativity, the relationship between lying and self-deception, and the epistemic implications of being a good friend and of making promises. I contributed to several of these debates.

In addition to justifying and elaborating the core thesis (1), I explored its implications to several puzzles in contemporary epistemology, most notably those concerning doxastic responsibility, the nature and extension of epistemic normativity, and epistemic-practical conflicts. A common characteristic of all these problems is the peculiar role of epistemic norms, which on the one hand appear to be both irreducible and genuinely normative, but on the

other hand seem to lack what is sometimes called the 'normative oomph': it is unclear why we should comply with them if not for moral or prudential reasons. However, under the assumption that epistemic norms are always accompanied by moral ones (which is a slightly more general version of (1)), the problems can be shown to vanish. The reason is that we can then account for the seemingly contradictory role of epistemic norms by limiting their applicability and regarding them as mere evaluations of the correspondence between doxastic attitudes and evidential situation, while at the same time preserving their bindingness in an indirect way, via the moral norms that oblige us to do what is epistemically required.

A specific debate in normative epistemology, to which I devoted my habilitation thesis (Weber 2019), is on peer disagreement. In the research project described here, I planned to continue my work on disagreement by applying (1) to the norms relevant in that debate.

3.2 Scientific Output

During the course of the project, I completed work on eight papers on the topic of the project and will presumably finish writing a ninth one soon (see (I) below). I also gave eleven talks on the project's topic at international conferences or to audiences at universities other than my own.

Moreover, I organised a three-day conference entitled 'New Ideas on Normativity', which featured five invited talks by internationally renowned speakers and seven contributions selected blindly from 24 submissions to a call for papers. The conference took place at the University of Mannheim from the 22nd to the 24th of Jan. 2026. Keynote speakers were Arianna Falbo (Toronto Metropolitan University), Antti Kauppinen (University of Helsinki), Kate Nolfi (University of Vermont), Sebastian Schmidt (University of Zurich), and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (Aarhus University). I also contributed a talk, in which I presented the main ideas from my research project.

During my time as an interim professor at the university of Hamburg, I was given the opportunity to organise a lecture series on a topic of my choice. So I was able to invite speakers to talk about the ethics of belief – more specifically, the topic I chose was *Was dürfen wir glauben?* [*What May We Believe?*] – and thereby get into contact with reseachers working in the same field as I do. The invited speakers were Kathi Beier (Universität Bremen), Matthew Chrisman (University of Edinburgh), Sabine Döring (Universität Tübingen),[1] Katherine Dormandy (Universität Innsbruck), Gerhard Ernst (Universität Erlangen) und Anne Meylan (Universität Zürich). In addition, I contributed an introductory lecture to the series.

In what follows, I will briefly outline the results presented in each of papers that I wrote on the topic of the project and clarify their relation to the overall project. Up to now, only two out

[1] Sabine Döring eventually cancelled her talk because, as she pointed out to me, she needed all of her time to prepare for her back then upcoming duties as undersecretary.

of eight papers have been published; a third one is conditionally accepted by *Studia Philosophica*; another one is in a revise-and-resubmit procedure at *Philosophical Quarterly*; and the other four are under review. The order of presentation is neither chronological nor by relevance; rather, it is chosen so as to make apparent how the different subtopics hang together.

(A) An Argument for Moral Evidentialism *(12,659 words;[2] published 2024 in 'Theoria')*
In this paper, I present a formal argument for the thesis that

(2) if believing that *p* is not directly causally efficacious to a high degree, then one must (morally): believe that *p* only if one is evidentially justified to believe that *p*.

(2) is a restricted version of a view commonly called *moral evidentialism,* which dates back to Clifford's seminal paper *The Ethics of Belief* (Clifford 1877). (2) is a version of (1) that is both stronger and more nuanced. It is more nuanced because it makes explicit under what conditions the relevant moral reasons are decisive, namely if believing the proposition under debate is not directly causally efficacious to a high degree. It is stronger than (1) insofar as (1), but not (2), leaves it open whether direct causal efficaciousness is the only way to overrule evidence-induced moral reasons. Usually, beliefs are only indirectly causally efficacious insofar as they help one to arrive at a decision of what to say or do. In that case, one is free to ignore at least some of one's beliefs. By contrast, a belief is directly causally efficacious if the very fact that one has it has certain causal (and not only rational) effects. For example, if a mind-reading device activates an alarm as soon as I form the belief that the sun will shine tomorrow, this belief would be directly causally efficacious. However, as hardly any belief is directly causally efficacious in this way, the moral norm not to believe against one's evidence holds with only slight restrictions. The argument in favour of (2) relies on norms of assertion and their connection to evidential justification (see, e.g., MacFarlane 2010; Goldberg 2015).

Much of the paper, which is based on chap. 3 of Weber 2019, was completed before the project started. During the course of the project, I revised it extensively and prepared it for publication.

(B) Belief Formation Moralised *(14,998 words, under review)*
This is the central paper of the research project. It consists of two parts. In the first part, I present a line of reasoning in favour of (1) that is similar but much more detailed than the one sketched in sect. 3.1 above. The paper also addresses several potentially problematic issues of my argument for (2) in (A) and discusses them extensively.[3] The argument in favour of (1)

[2] All word counts include abstract, footnotes, and references.

[3] As I think that only directly causally efficacious beliefs may give us moral reasons that can overrule the evidence-induced moral reasons, I acknowledge even the stronger thesis (2); however, for many lines of argument developed in the project, adherence to (1) suffices.

relies, among other things, on considerations about risk imposition (see, e.g., Oberdiek 2017, Parr and Slavny 2019) and about lying and self-deception (see, e.g., Mele 2001; Beier 2019).

In the second part, I show that accepting (1) solves five puzzles in normative epistemology: First, the problem of explaining what motivates us to comply with epistemic norms. Second, the problem of accounting for the fact that even though we seem to have no control over our doxastic attitudes (we cannot, for example, by an act of will bring ourselves to believe that the sun will shine tomorrow), we can apparently be legitimately blamed for forming or having unjustified doxastic attitudes.[4] Third, the problem of delineating the extension of epistemic normativity (see (C) below). Fourth, the problem of balancing epistemic and non-epistemic norms (see (D) below). A special case hereof, which I also address, arises if there are directly *morally* (not causally!) efficacious beliefs, that is, beliefs whose formation or maintenance is morally wrong (candidates are racist or sexist beliefs).[5] Fifth, the so-called clutter puzzle: the problem of explaining what, if anything, is epistemically wrong with forming or maintaining trivial or pointless beliefs.[6]

***(C) The Extension Problem of Epistemic* Normativity** (10,897 words, under review)

There are two papers which each give an exclusive treatment to one of the five puzzles just mentioned. (C) deals with what I call the *extension problem* of epistemic normativity: the fact that the question of whether such activities as gathering evidence, making assertions, or drawing inferences are governed by epistemic norms is astonishingly hard to answer. On the one hand, these activities, if carried out properly, are clearly conducive to reaching epistemic goals like acquiring knowledge (Friedman 2020; McWilliams 2023), and it is difficult to say what else epistemic normativity is about if not reaching epistemic goals. What is more, the kind of criticism that one deserves for not carrying out such activities properly seems to be epistemic (Flores and Woodard 2023). On the other hand, as clearly not all activities that are conducive to reaching an epistemic goal fall under epistemic norms – eating enough so that one's brain works well clearly isn't – we face the problem of drawing a non-arbitrary boundary between those activities that are governed by epistemic norms and those that are not (Falbo 2023). In addition, we face two further problems: epistemic normativity would become a rather inhomogeneous kind of normativity if it were to encompass evaluative norms for mental states as well as prescriptive norms for activities; and the so-called *zetetic paradox* would arise (Friedman 2020). I address the extension problem by pointing out that accepting

[4] This kind of blame is called 'epistemic blame' and has been intensely discussed in recent years; see, e.g., Rettler 2018, Brown 2020, Boult 2021, and Schmidt 2025.

[5] This is commonly discussed under the label 'doxastic wronging'; see, e.g., Basu and Schroeder 2019.

[6] This problem dates back to Harman 1986; for a recent account, see, e.g., Balcerak Jackson et al. 2022.

(1) enables us to regard epistemic norms as comprising only evaluative norms for mental states, because the specific kind of moral norms that accompany the epistemic ones can take care of activities that are directed to reaching the epistemic goals.

(D) Can Epistemic Normativity Be Reconciled with an Ought* Simpliciter*? *(11,171 words, under review)*

There are norms of different kinds, most notably moral, prudential, and epistemic norms. But what ought we to do in cases of norm conflict? If one morally ought to ϕ but prudentially ought not to ϕ, the question arises whether one just has to decide between compliance with the moral and compliance with the prudential norm (Baker 2018; Copp 2020), or whether there is an overall ought, or *ought simpliciter*, that tells one what to do *all things considered* (McLeod 2001; Brown 2024). As I describe in the paper, proponents of the existence of an ought *simpliciter* have a hard time integrating epistemic norms, partly because there is reason to think that epistemic and practical norms are incompatible (Kauppinen 2023), and partly because it is unclear how much weight epistemic norms should be given, if any at all (Mantel 2019). If they acknowledge my core thesis (1), however, proponents of the existence of an ought *simpliciter* can be helped. For then they are free to give epistemic norms no weight at all, while the accompanying moral norms ensure that epistemic considerations (not norms!) are allocated the authority they in fact appear to have.

(E) Lug und Selbstbetrug *(written in German; English title 'Lying and Self-Deception'; 7,924 words, published 2024 in 'Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie')*

An important part of the line of reasoning that leads to (1) is the insight that self-deception is morally wrong in normal cases for much the same reasons as lying is, whatever exactly those reasons are. To be sure, the extent of wrongdoing is usually greater in the case of lying than in that of self-deception; but it is a fact in both cases that a moral wrong is done. In this paper, I set out in great detail the link between the ethics of lying and the ethics of self-deception.

The paper is written in German mainly because several noteworthy articles and monographs on lying or self-deception on which I draw are in German as well (e.g., Künne 1999; Dietz 2002; Beier 2010), so that I can take up existing discussions in German.

(F) Promising, Trusting, and Being a Good Friend: On Epistemically Doubtful Social Practices *(8,999 words, under review)*

There is a class of potential counterexamples, not so much to (1), but to (2): social practices such as being a good friend or making a promise. As to friendship, assume that my evidence suggests that a good friend of mine lied to me. Arguably, mistrusting my friend and not believing what they say appears to come close to treating them not as a friend but as some replaceable person. Hence, I should *not* believe what my evidence suggests, perhaps even for moral

reasons (Keller 2004, Stroud 2006). As to promises, assume that I promise my partner to run a marathon within the next year. However, according to statistical evidence known to both of us, most people who set out to run a marathon fail, so that I am not evidentially justified to believe that I will indeed run a marathon within the next year. But surely I can sincerely promise to do so. Hence, it seems that I am allowed to believe against my evidence in this case – and that my partner is allowed to trust me that I will keep my promise (Marušić 2015, Brinkerhoff 2021).

In the paper, I argue that even in cases of conflict between those social practices and the norm to believe in line with one's evidence, we should stick to that norm and rather revise our social practises if they indeed require us *not* to believe in accordance with our evidence.

(G) Synergy and Disagreement *(10,045 words; revise-and-resubmit at 'Philosophical Quarterly')*
As I planned to apply my theory to the debate on peer disagreement, with which I am most familiar, I continued to track new developments in that debate. I thereby found the standard treatment of so-called *synergy effects* (see Easwaran et al. 2015; Skipper Rasmussen et al. 2018) unconvincing and constructed a counterexample to it. In the paper, I present the counterexample and suggest a better treatment. – While the research that led to this paper was part of the project, its content is not closely related to that of the other papers.

(H) Disagreement and Neutrality *(7,098 words; conditionally accepted by 'Studia Philosophica')*
This paper grew out of a contribution to the *Symposium on The Philosophy of Neutrality,* which took place in Switzerland in August 2025. It discusses pragmatic objections against a prominent thesis (the so-called *Equal Weight View*) in the debate on peer disagreement, analyses answers from the literature to them (Goldberg 2013; Barnett 2019), finds them lacking, and proposes a better solution. The paper thereby shows that another putative reason for the permissibility of believing against one's evidence, besides those connected to friendship or promising, does not hold, since we can deal with the pragmatic considerations put forward against the Equal Weight View without allowing for evidentially unjustified beliefs.

(I) What Are Epistemic Norms? *(yet unfinished)*
The longer I worked in the field of epistemic normativity, the more evident it became to me that it is far from obvious what epistemic norms are. There is no pre-theoretical concept of epistemic normativity to which we can adhere, and no distinguished theoretical role from which such a concept can be distilled (Cohen 2016). What is more, epistemic norms cannot be defined with recourse to subject matter, because there are also moral and prudential norms pertaining to belief formation or knowledge acquisition. (This is why I reserve the term 'doxastic norms' for all norms of beliefs, regardless of the nature of the normativity involved.) Nor can they be defined, as I will show in this paper, with recourse to epistemic virtues, epistemic aims, or epistemic accountability (as, e.g., Kauppinen 2018 maintains). All we can do is to stipulate what exactly we

want to mean with the term ‘epistemic norm.’ Or, expressed in a more positive way: we are free to choose whatever conception of epistemic normativity is most suitable for theoretical purposes.

Of the papers mentioned here, this is the only one that I have not yet completed. I will presumably finish working on it by the end of April 2026.

3.3 Bibliography

Baker, Derek. 2018. ‘Skepticism about Ought *Simpliciter*.’ In: Shafer-Landau, Russ (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, Vol. 13. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 230–252.

Balcerak Jackson, Brendan, David Didomenico and Kenji Lota. 2022. ‘In Defense of Clutter.’ *Ergo* 9.1: 1–18.

Barnett, Zach. 2019. ‘Philosophy Without Belief.’ *Mind* 128.509: 109–138.

Basu, Rima, and Mark Schroeder. 2019. ‘Doxastic Wronging.‘ In: Kim, Brian, and Matthew McGrath (eds.), *Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology*. New York: Routledge, pp. 181–205.

Beier, Kathi. 2010. *Selbsttäuschung*, Berlin: De Gruyter.

Beier, Kathi. 2019. ‘Lying and Self-Deception’ In: Meibauer, Jörg (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Lying*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 203–213.

Boult, Cameron. 2021. ‘There Is a Distinctively Epistemic Kind of Blame.’ *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 103.3, 518–534.

Brinkerhoff, Anne, 2021. ‘The Promising Puzzle.’ *Philosopher’s Imprint* 21.22: 1–17.

Brown, James. 2024. ‘On Scepticism about Ought *Simpliciter*.’ *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 102.2: 497–511.

Brown, Jessica. 2020. ‘What Is Epistemic Blame?’ *Noûs* 54.2: 389–407.

Clifford,William K. 1877. The Ethics of Belief. *The Contemporary Review* 29, 289–309.

Cohen, Stewart. 2016. ‘Theorizing about the Epistemic.’ *Inquiry* 59.7–8: 839–857.

Copp, David. 2020. ‘Normative Pluralism and Skepticism about “Ought *Simpliciter*”.’ In Chang, Ruth, and Kurt Sylvan (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason*. London: Routledge, pp. 416–437.

Dietz, Simone. 2002. *Der Wert der Lüge*. Paderborn: Mentis.

Easwaran, Kenny, Luke Fenton-Glynn, Christopher Hitchcock, and Joel D. Velasco. 2016. ‘Updating on the Credences of Others: Disagreement, Agreement, and Synergy.’ *Philosopher’s Imprint* 16.11: 1–39.

Falbo, Arianna. 2023. ‘Should Epistemology Take the Zetetic Turn?’ *Philosophical Studies* 180.: 2977–3002.

Flores, Carolina, and Elise Woodard. 2023. ‘Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering.’ *Philosophical Studies 180*.9: 2547–2571.

Friedman, Jane. 2020. ‘The Epistemic and the Zetetic.’ *Philosophical Review* 129.4: 501–536.

Goldberg, Sanford. 2013. ‘Defending Philosophy in the Face of Systematic Disagreement.’ In: Machuca, Diego (ed.), *Disagreement and Skepticism*. New York: Routledge, pp. 277–294.

Goldberg, Sanford. 2015. *Assertion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Harman, Gilbert. 1986. *Change in View*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Kauppinen, Antti. 2018. ‘Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Accountability.’ *Philosopher’s Imprint* 18.8: 1–16.

Kauppinen, Antti. 2023. ‘The Epistemic vs. the Practical.’ In: Shafer-Landau, Russ (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, Vol. 18. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 137–162.

Keller, Simon. 2004. ‘Friendship and Belief.’ *Philosophical Papers* 33.3: 329–351.

Künne, Wolfgang. 1999. ‚Über Lug und Trug.‘ In: Morscher, Edgar (ed.), *Bernard Bolzanos geistiges Erbe für das 21. Jahrhundert*. Sankt Augustin: Academia, pp. 29–58.

MacFarlane, John. 2011. ‘What Is an Assertion?’ In: Brown, Jessica, and Herman Cappelen (eds.), *Assertion: New Philosophical Essays*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 79–96.

Mantel, Susanne. 2019. 'Do Epistemic Reasons Bear on the Ought *Simpliciter*?' *Philosophical Issues* 29.1: 214–227.

Marušić, Berislav. 2015. *Evidence & Agency. Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McLeod, Owen. 2001. 'Just Plain "Ought".' *The Journal of Ethics* 5.4, 269–291.

McWilliams, Emily. 2023. 'Evidentialism and Epistemic Duties to Inquire. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 73.4: 965–982.

Mele, Alfred R. 2001. *Self-Deception Unmasked*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Oberdiek, John. 2017. *Imposing Risk*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Parr, Tom, and Adam Slavny. 2019. 'What's Wrong with Risk?' *Thought* 8.2: 76–85.

Rettler, Lindsay. 2018. 'In Defense of Doxastic Blame.' *Synthese* 195.5: 2205–2226.

Schmidt, Sebastian. 2025. *Responsibility for Rationality*. New York: Routledge.

Skipper Rasmussen, Mattias, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, and Jens Christian Bjerring. 2018. 'A Higher-order Approach to Disagreement.' *Episteme* 15.1: 80–100.

Stroud, Sarah. 2006. 'Epistemic Partiality in Friendship.' *Ethics* 116.3: 498–524.

Weber, Marc Andree. 2019. *Meinungsverschiedenheiten.* Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann.

4 Published Project Results

4.1 Category A – Articles in peer-reviewed journals, contributions to peer-reviewed conferences or to anthology volumes, and book publications

Peer-reviewed Papers:

Weber, Marc Andree. 2024. 'An Argument for Moral Evidentialism.' *Theoria* 90.6: 583–602. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12557

Contributions to Peer-reviewed Conferences:

Warum Huck Finn das Falsche tat, XII. Tagung für Praktische Philosophie, Passau, Sept. 25–26, 2025.

Can Epistemic Normativity Be Reconciled with an Ought Simpliciter? GAP.12, Düsseldorf, Sept. 8–11, 2025.

Disagreement and Neutrality. Symposium on The Philosophy of Neutrality, Neuchâtel, Aug. 27–29, 2025.

Epistemic Normativity and the Ought Simpliciter. 6th Cyprus Metaethics Workshop, Nikosia, May 2, 2025.

The Scope Problem of Epistemic Normativity. XXVI. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie, Münster, Sept. 23–26, 2024.

Lug und Selbstbetrug. X. Tagung für Praktische Philosophie, Salzburg, Sept. 28–29, 2023.

The Moral Dimension of Doxastic Norms. 11th European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, Wien, Aug. 21–25, 2023

Synergy, Disagreement, and Degrees of Justification. International Conference 'Epistemic Justification: Formal Epistemology Meets Mainstream Epistemology', Munich, March 30–April 1, 2023.

4.2 Category B – Any other form of published results

Non-peer-reviewed Papers:

Weber, Marc Andree. 2024. 'Lug und Selbstbetrug.' *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 72.3: 323–343. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2024-0025

Contributions to Non-peer-reviewed Conferences:

Belief Formation Moralised. International Conference 'New Ideas on Normativity', Mannheim, Jan. 22–24, 2026. (This conferenced was part of the research project.)

Synergy and Disagreement. Institut für Philosophie, Düsseldorf, May 20, 2025.

Are We Permitted to Believe What We Want? Institut für Philosophie, Graz, Jan. 14, 2025.