Causes and Effects of Coalition Preferences in a Mixed-Member Proportional System

URL:	http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2014/5098/pd...
Weitere URL:	http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/publications/wp/wp...
Dokumenttyp:	Arbeitspapier
Erscheinungsjahr:	1999
Titel einer Zeitschrift oder einer Reihe:	Arbeitspapiere / Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung = Working papers
Band/Volume:	1
Ort der Veröffentlichung:	Mannheim
ISSN:	1437-8574
Sprache der Veröffentlichung:	Englisch
Einrichtung:	Fakultät für Sozialwissenschaften > Politische Wissenschaft I (Pappi 1990-2007, Em) Außerfakultäre Einrichtungen > MZES - Arbeitsbereich B
Fachgebiet:	320 Politik
Abstract:	This paper adapts features of a model of Brams/Fishburn (1992) on coalition voting to the context of a mixed-member proportional system. We differentiate between a candidate vote which determines the winner of a constituency contest, a party vote which determines the seat shares of the parties in parliament, and a coalition preference for all parties the voter considers acceptable for building a majority government. In contrast to the purely axiomatic contribution of Brams/Fishburn we formulate a descriptive model of choice behavior for a real world political environment. We focus a) on congruence between party/candidate preference and coalition preference b) on congruence between coalition preference and party/candidate vote; c) on congruence between coalition preferences and ticket combinations; d) on sincerity/insincerity of party and candidate vote; e) on causes of ticket splitting. Hypotheses are complemented by information on the voters' expectations. Data base of this paper is a representative national sample conducted during the German parliamentary elections 1998.