Expectations about coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation


Herrmann, Michael


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URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2317
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-23170
Document Type: Working paper
Year of publication: 2008
The title of a journal, publication series: Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung
Volume: 08-28
Place of publication: Mannheim
Publication language: English
Institution: School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series: Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject: 320 Political science
Subject headings (SWD): Österreich , Wahl , Wahlverhalten , Koalitionsbildung
Abstract: In this paper, I suggest that voters may act strategically in proportional representation elections with post-election coalition building. Based on a stylized setup involving three possible coalitions of four parties on a single policy dimension, voters whose preferred coalition is least likely to win are predicted to strategically cast their ballot for a centrist party. By contrast, those who perceive a chance for their preferred coalition to become the next government are predicted to strategically vote for a non-centrist party. I test these predictions against the standard model of sincere proximity voting, using a unique dataset on voter expectations in the Austrian parliamentary election 2006. Analyses show that believing one's preferred coalition is non-viable raises the probability of voting for a centrist vs. non-centrist party while believing one's preferred coalition to be viable lowers the probability of voting for a centrist vs. non-centrist party.
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Herrmann, Michael (2008) Expectations about coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation. Open Access Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung Mannheim 08-28 [Working paper]
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