Expectations about coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation

Herrmann, Michael

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URL:	https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2317
URN:	urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-23170
Document Type:	Working paper
Year of publication:	2008
The title of a journal, publication series:	Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung
Volume:	08-28
Place of publication:	Mannheim
Publication language:	English
Institution:	School of Law and Economics > Sonstige - Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre
MADOC publication series:	Sonderforschungsbereich 504 > Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008)
Subject:	320 Political science
Subject headings (SWD):	Österreich , Wahl , Wahlverhalten , Koalitionsbildung
Abstract:	In this paper, I suggest that voters may act strategically in proportional representation elections with post-election coalition building. Based on a stylized setup involving three possible coalitions of four parties on a single policy dimension, voters whose preferred coalition is least likely to win are predicted to strategically cast their ballot for a centrist party. By contrast, those who perceive a chance for their preferred coalition to become the next government are predicted to strategically vote for a non-centrist party. I test these predictions against the standard model of sincere proximity voting, using a unique dataset on voter expectations in the Austrian parliamentary election 2006. Analyses show that believing one's preferred coalition is non-viable raises the probability of voting for a centrist vs. non-centrist party while believing one's preferred coalition to be viable lowers the probability of voting for a centrist vs. non-centrist party.
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