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Polls, coalition signals and strategic voting : An experimental investigation of perceptions and effects
Meffert, Michael F.
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Gschwend, Thomas
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DOI:
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01986.x
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URL:
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https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j...
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Weitere URL:
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https://www.researchgate.net/publication/23753406_...
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Dokumenttyp:
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Zeitschriftenartikel
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Erscheinungsjahr:
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2011
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Titel einer Zeitschrift oder einer Reihe:
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European Journal of Political Research
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Band/Volume:
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50
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Heft/Issue:
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5
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Seitenbereich:
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636-667
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Ort der Veröffentlichung:
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Oxford
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Verlag:
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Wiley-Blackwell
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ISSN:
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0304-4130 , 1475-6765
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Sprache der Veröffentlichung:
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Englisch
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Einrichtung:
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Fakultät für Sozialwissenschaften > Politische Wissenschaft, Quantitative Sozialwissenschaftliche Methoden (Gschwend 2007-)
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Fachgebiet:
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320 Politik
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Abstract:
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Polls and coalition signals can help strategic voters in multiparty systems with
proportional representation and coalition governments to optimise their vote decision.
Using a laboratory experiment embedded in two real election campaigns, this study focuses
on voters’ attention to and perception of polls and coalition signals. The manipulation of
polls and coalition signals allows a causal test of their influence on strategic voting in a
realistic environment.The findings suggest that active information acquisition to form fairly
accurate perceptions of election outcomes can compensate for the advantage of high political
sophistication.The theory of strategic voting is supported by the evidence, but only for a
small number of voters. Most insincere vote decisions are explained by other factors. Thus,
the common practice to consider all insincere voters as strategic is misleading.
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